6/17/2017 G.R.No.

L16887

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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L16887November17,1920

MIGUELR.CORNEJO,petitioner,
vs.
ANDRESGABRIEL,provincialgovernorofRizal,andthePROVINCIALBOARDOFRIZAL,composedof
ANDRESGABRIEL,PEDROMAGSALINandCATALINOS.CRUZ,respondents.

GregorioPerfectoforpetitioner.

MALCOLM,J.:

The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these proceedings in
mandamus to have the provincial governor and the provincial board of the Province of Rizal temporarily
restrained from going ahead with investigation of the charges filed against him pending resolution of the case,
and to have an order issue directed to the provincial governor commanding him to return the petitioner to his
positionasmunicipalpresidentofPasay.Themembersoftheprovincialboardhaveinterposedademurrerbased
on the ground that this court has no right to keep them from complying with the provisions of the law. The
provincial governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he alleges as a special defense that numerous
complaints have been received by him against the conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay
that these complaints were investigated by him that he came to the conclusion that agreeable to the powers
conferred upon provincial governors, the municipal president should be temporarily suspended, and that an
investigationisnowbeingconductedbytheprovincialboard.

Counselforpetitionerhasargued,withmucheloquence,thathisclienthasbeendeprivedofanoffice,towhich
hewaselectedbypopularvote,withouthavinganopportunitytobeheardinhisowndefense.Therespondents
reply that all that the provincial governor and the provincial board have done in this case is to comply with the
requirementsofthelawwhichtheyaresworntoenforce.Obviously,therefore,weshouldfirsthavebeforeusthe
applicableprovisionsofthePhilippinelawbearingonthesubjectofsuspensionofpublicofficers.

Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of the Administrative
Code,provides:

The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect of
duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. for minor delinquency he may
reprimand the offender and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not
beingthemunicipaltreasurer)pendingactionbytheboard,ifinhisopinionthechargebeoneaffectingthe
officialintegrityoftheofficerinquestion.Wheresuspensionisthuseffected,thewrittenchargesagainstthe
officershallbefiledwiththeboardwithintendays.

Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are preferred by a provincial
governor against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next meeting, regular or special,
furnish a copy of said charges to the accused official, with a notification of the time and place of hearing
thereonandatthetimeandplaceappointed,theboardshallproceedtohearandinvestigatethetruthor
falsity of said charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall occur as
soonasmaybepracticable,andincasesuspensionhasbeeneffected,notlaterthanfifteendaysfromthe
date the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official shall, on sufficient
grounds,requestanextensionoftimetopreparehisdefense.

Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall adjudge that the
charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed if it shall adjudge that the accused has
beenguiltyofmisconductwhichwouldbesufficientlypunishedbyreprimand,orfurtherreprimand,itshall
directtheprovincialgovernortodeliversuchreprimandinpursuanceofitsjudgmentandineithercasethe
official,ifpreviouslysuspended,shallbereinstated.

Ifintheopinionoftheboardthecaseisonerequiringmoreseverediscipline,itshallwithoutunnecessary
delayforwardtotheChiefoftheExecutiveBureaucertifiedcopiesoftherecordinthecase,includingthe
charges,theevidence,andthefindingsoftheboard,towhichshallbeaddedtherecommendationofthe
boardastowhethertheofficialoughttobesuspended,furthersuspended,orfinallydismissedfromoffice
andinsuchcasetheboardmayexerciseitsdiscretiontoreinstatetheofficial,ifalreadysuspended,orto
suspendhimorcontinuehissuspensionpendingfinalaction.

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Thetrialofasuspendedmunicipalofficialandtheproceedingsincidenttheretoshallbegivenpreference
overthecurrentandroutinebusinessoftheboard.

ActionbyChiefofExecutiveBureau.UponreceivingthepapersinanysuchproceedingtheChiefofthe
Executive Bureau shall review the case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the
reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant.
DisciplinarysuspensionmadeuponorderofthechiefoftheExecutiveBureaushallbewithoutpayandin
durationshallnotexceedtwomonths.Nofinaldismissalhereinundershalltakeeffectuntilrecommended
bytheDepartmentHeadandapprovedbytheGovernorGeneral.

Withtheforegoinglegalprovisionsinmind,certainaspectsofthecasecanbedisposedofwithoutdifficulty.Thus
itcannotbeseriouslycontendedthatthecourtsshouldinterferewithanorderlyinvestigationwhichisabouttobe
conductedbytheprovincialboard.Norcantherebeanydoubtastothemeaningofthelaw.Averyminuteand
extensiveprocedureisprovidedbytheLegislatureforcentralandprovincialsupervisionofmunicipalofficers.The
provincialgovernor,inreceivingandinvestigatingcomplaintsagainstsuchofficers,maytakethreecourses.Fora
minordelinquencyhemayreprimandtheoffenderbutifthemaladministrationinofficeismoreserioushemay
temporarily suspend the officer, and thereafter may file written charges against the officer with the provincial
board. The procedure followed before the provincial board and later on appeal to the Chief of the Executive
Bureau, while interesting, does not concern us. The important fact is that the law, in permitting a provincial
governortemporarilytosuspendamunicipalofficer,makesnomentionofaformalhearingofthecharges.

Intheexerciseofthisdisciplinarypowerbytheprovincialgovernor,allthathecandobeforethepresentationof
formalchargesiseithertoreprimandtheofficerortosuspendhimtemporarilyfromoffice.Inthelattercasethe
provincialgovernor'sactionisnotafinality.Thelawisespeciallycarefultoguardtherightsofofficerchargedwith
maladministration in office. But the point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions of the law and
notwithstandinglongofficialpractice,thetemporarysuspensionofamunicipalofficer,withoutanopportunitytobe
heared in his own defense, is in contravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning due
processoflaw.

So much has been written on the subject of due process of law that is would be futile to enter into its intricate
mazes.Itisselfevident,however,that,inordinarycases,tocondemnwithoutahearingviolatesthedueprocess
oflawclauseoftheAmericanConstitutionandofthePhilippineBillofRights.Itisforthisreasonthatwecanwell
understandthelogicofthosewhoclingtothisthroughandtowhomacontemplatedviolationoftheConstitutionis
mostrepugnant.Itisbutfair,inordinarycases,thatapublicofficialshouldnotberemovedorsuspendedwithout
notice,charges,atrial,andanopportunityforexplanation.Butnotpermittingourjudgmenttobeundulyswayed
by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and recalling again that the courts have ordinarily to give effect to
legislativepurposes,itisfurtheronlyfairtomentioncertainexceptionstothedueprocessoflawrule,whichwould
seemtoincludetheinstantcase.

Thefactshouldnotbelostsightofthatwearedealingwithanadministrativeproceedingandnotwithajudicial
proceeding.AsJudgeCooley,theleadingAmericanwriteronconstitutionalLaw,haswellsaid,dueprocessoflaw
isnotnecessarilyjudicialprocessmuchoftheprocessbymeansofwhichtheGovernmentiscarriedon,andthe
order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is
judicialprocess.Whileadayincourtisamatterofrightinjudicialproceedings,inadministrativeproceedingsitis
otherwisesincetheyrestupondifferentprinciples.(Weimervs.bunbury[1874],30Mich.,201Den.vs.Hoboken
LandandImprovementCo.[1856],18How.,272followedinForbesvs.ChuocoTiaco[1910],16Phil.,534Tan
Tevs.Bell{1914],27Phil.,354U.S.vs.GomezJesus[1915],31Phil.,218andotherPhilippinecases).Incertain
proceedings,therefore,ofanadministrativecharacter,itmaybestated,withoutfearofcontradiction,thattheright
to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings
affectingthelife,libertyorpropertyoftheindividualwithoutanyhearingcaneasilyberecalled.Amongtheseare
the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges the restraint of property in tax cases the granting of
preliminaryinjunctionexparteandthesuspensionofofficersoremployeesbytheGovernorGeneraloraChief
ofaBureaupendinganinvestigation.(SeeWeimervs.Bunbury,supra12C.J.,1224AdministrativeCode,sec.
694.)

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an
officeas"property."Itis,however,wellsettledintheUnitedStates,thatapublicofficeisnotpropertywithinthe
senseoftheconstitutionalguarantiesofdueprocesoflaw,butisapublictrustoragency.InthecaseofTaylorvs.
Beckham([1899],178,U.S.,548),Mr.ChiefJusticeFullersaidthat:"Decisionsarenumeroustotheeffectthat
public offices are mere agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the
PhilippineIslands,asintheUnitedStates,isthatofapopularrepresentativegovernment,theofficersbeingmere
agentsandnotrulersofthepeople,onewherenoonemanorsetofmenhasaproprietaryorcontractualrightto
an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a
trustforthepeoplewhomherepresents.

Comingnowtothemorespecificconsiderationoftheissueinthiscase,weturntothearticlebyProf.FrankJ.
Goodnow,generallyconsideredtheleadingauthorityintheUnitedStatesonthesubjectofAdministrationLaw,in
Vol.29,CyclopediaofLawandProcedure,andfindtherulesastosuspensionofpublicofficerslaiddownvery
concisely as follows: "Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to the person suspended." (P. 1405.)
The citation by Professor Goodnow to support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. AttorneyGeneral vs.
Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla., 433 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the
governorcould,undersection15oftheexecutivearticleoftheConstitution,suspendanofficerforneglectofduty
inofficewithoutgivingpreviousnoticetotheofficerofthechargemadeagainsthim.

Alatercompilationofthepertinentauthoritiesistobefoundin22RulingCaseLaw,pp.564,565.Onthesubject
ofsuspensionofpublicofficersitishearedsaid:

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The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for the time being,
seemstobeuniversallyacceptedasfair,andoftennecessary....Noticeandhearingarenotprerequisite
to suspension unless required by statute and therefore suspension without such notice does not deprive
theofficerofpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Norisasuspensionwantingindueprocessoflawora
denialoftheequalprotectionofthelawsbecausetheevidenceagainsttheofficerisnotproducedandheis
notgivenanopportunitytoconfronthisaccusersandcrossexaminethewitnesses. la w p h !l.n e t

ThecasetosupportthefirstsentenceintheaboveenunciationoftheruleisStatevs.Megaarden(85Minn.,41),
which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50 Minn., 239). In a discussion of the subject more
generalthanspecific,itwassaid:

Thesafetyofthestate,whichisthehighestlaw,imperativelyrequiresthesuspension,pendinghistrial,ofa
public officer, especially a custodian of public funds, charged with malfeasance or nonfeasance in
office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but merely prevents him, for the time being, from
performing the functions of his office and from the very necessities of the case must precede a trial or
hearing.Suchtemporarysuspensionwithoutprevioushearingisfullyinaccordancewiththeanalogiesof
thelaw.Itisaconstitutionalprinciplethatnopersonshallbedeprivedofhislibertyorpropertyexceptby
dueprocessoflaw,whichincludesnoticeandahearing,yetitwasneverclaimedthatincriminalprocedure
apersoncouldnotbearrestedanddeprivedofhislibertyuntilatrialcouldreasonablybehad,orthatin
civilactionsexparteandtemporaryinjunctionsmightnotbeissuedandretainedinpropercase,untilatrial
couldbehad,andtherightsofthepartiesdetermined.Wehavenodoubt,therefore,oftheauthorityofthe
legislature to vest the governor with power to temporarily suspend a county treasurer pending the
investigationofthechargesagainsthim,ofofficialmisconduct.

The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority for their second sentence is that of Griner vs.
Thomas([1907],101Texas,3616Ann.Cas.,944).Theholdingofthecourtherewasthatitiswithinthepower
of the legislature to authorize the temporary suspension of a public officer during the pendency of valid
proceedings to remove such officer and as an incident to such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the
constitutionhasgivenpowertoremovesuchofficeronlyforcauseandafterahearing.Noticeandhearingarenot
preprequisites to the suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and
hearing.

The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the United States Supreme Court. (Wilson vs. North
Carolina[1897],169U.S,586.)Anexaminationofthedecision,however,showsthatwhileittendstosubstantiate
the rule, the facts are not exactly on all fours with those before us. Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the
facts,onlythefollowingfromthebodyofthedecisionedbenoted,viz.:

InspeakingofthestatuteandthepurposeofthisparticularprovisiontheSupremeCourtoftheStatesaid:
"The duty of suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the highest motives of public policy to
prevent the danger to the public interests which might arise from leaving such great powers and
responsibilitiesinthehandsofmenlegallydisqualified.Toleavetheminfullchargeoftheirofficeuntilthe
next biennial session of the legislature, or pending litigation which might be continued for year, would
destroy the very object of the law. As the Governor was, therefore, by the very and spirit of the law,
requiredtoactandactpromptly,necessarilyuponhisownfindingsoffact,wearecompelledtoholdthat
suchofficialactionwas,underthecircumstances,dueprocessoflaw.Evenifitwereproper,theGovernor
wouldhavenopowertodirectanissuelikeachancellor."

ThehighestcourtoftheStatehasheldthatthisstatuewasnotaviolationoftheconstitutionoftheState
thatthehearingbeforetheGovernorwassufficientthattheofficewassubstantiallyanadministrativeone,
althoughthecommissionwasdesignedbyastatutesubsequenttothatwhichcreatedit,acourtofrecord
thattheofficertakingofficeunderthestatutewasboundtotakeitonthetermsprovidedforthereinthathe
waslawfullysuspendedfromofficeandthathewasnotentitledtoatrialbyjuryuponthehearingofthis
caseinthetrialcourt.Asaresultthecourtheldthatthedefendanthadnotbeendeprivedofhisproperty
withoutdueprocessoflaw,norhadhebeendeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws.

xxxxxxxxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him by the Federal
Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the Governor under the statute above mentioned, and
resultinginhissuspensionfromoffice.

The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the State. It was taken under a valid
statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court has held. What kind and how
muchofahearingtheofficershouldhavebeforesuspensionbytheGovernorwasamatterforthestate
legislature to determine, having regard to the constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as
supportingauthorityStateexrel.Wendlingvs. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis.,
295 Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60 Gray vs. McLendon [1901], 134 Ga., 224 State vs. Police
Commissioners,16Mo.App.,947Prestonvs.CityofChicago[1910],246III.,26andPeoplevs.Draper
[1910],124N.Y.S.,758,whereitwasheldthatthelegislaturehastherighttoauthorizeanofficertoremove
anappointiveorelectiveofficerwithoutnoticeorhearing.)

Certainintimationshavebeenmadethatundertheprocedureprescribedbythelawaninjusticemightbedone
municipalofficers.Suchsuppositionsarenotunusualevenastocasesbeforethecourts,butinthisasinallother
instances,thepresumptionalwaysisthatthelawwillbefollowedandthattheinvestigationandthehearingwillbe
impartial. In the language of Justice Trent in Severino vs. GovernorGeneral ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the
presumptionisjustasconclusiveinfavorofexecutiveaction,astoitscorrectnessandjustness,asitisinfavorof
judicialaction."Weentertainnodoubtthattheprovincialgovernor,fullyconsciousofthetrustreposedinhimby

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thelaw,willactonlyincaseswherestrongreasonsexistforexercisingthepowerofsuspensionanduponahigh
considerationofhisduty.

Thesuggestionthatanunfriendlygovernormightundulydelaythehearingisalsowithoutmuchforce.Thesame
mightbesaidofanyadministrativeofficer,orinfactofanyjudicialofficer.Thepresumption,again,isthatevery
officerwilldohisdutypromptly,andifhedoesnot,certainlyaremedycanbefoundtomakehimdoso.Notonly
this, but the law before us expedites the proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days within which the
provincial governor must lay the charges before the provincial board, which must be heard by the latter body
withinfifteendays.Ofmorecompellingforceisthesuggestionfromtheothersidethatthepublicinterestmight
sufferdetrimentbypostponingthetemporarysuspensionuntilafterthehearing.

Ourholding,aftermostthoughtfulconsideration,isthattheprovisionsofsection2188oftheAdministrativeCode
areclearandthattheydonotoffendthedueprocessoflawclauseofthePhilippineBillofRights.Accordingly,itis
ourdutytoapplythelawwithoutfearorfavor.

Petitiondeniedwithcosts.Soordered.

Mapa,C.J.,Street,AvanceaandVillamor,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

JOHNSON,J.,dissenting:

This is an original action for the writ of mandamus to require the respondents to reinstate the petitioner to his
officeaspresidentofthemunicipalityofPasay,ProvinceofRizal.

Thefactsuponwhichthepetitionisbasedarenotindispute.Theyarenotonlyadmittedbythedemurrerofthe
respondentAndresGabrielbuywereexpresslyadmittedbyhiminopencourt.Theyare:

(1)ThatthepetitionerwasdulyelectedbythepeopleofthemunicipalityofPasayaspresidentfortheperiodof
threeyearsfromthe16thdayofOctober,1919

(2)Thatthepetitionerwassuspendedfromsaidofficeonthe13thdayofSeptember,1920,bytherespondent
AndresGabriel,withoutnotice,withoutahearing,andwithoutanopportunitytopresentanyproofwhatsoeverin
hisdefense.

Thefactshavingbeenadmitted,wehaveonlyaquestionoflawtodecide,towit:Isthegovernorofaprovince
authorizedunderthelawtosuspendamunicipalpresidentfromhisoffice,towhichhehasbeenlegallyelected
foraperiodfixedbythelaw,withoutnotice,withoutahearingandwithoutanopportunitytopresentproofinhis
defense?

Section 3 (first paragraph) of the Jones Law provides "that no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall
depriveanypersonoflife,libertyorpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,ordenytoanypersonthereintheequal
protectionofthelaw."

Section2188ofActNo.2711provides:

SEC.2188.Supervisoryauthorityofprovincialgovernorovermunicipalofficers.Theprovincialgovernor
shall receive the investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption, or other form of maladministration in office. For minor delinquency he may reprimand the
offenderandifamoreseverepunishmentseemstobedesirable,heshallsubmitwrittenchargestouching
themattertotheprovincialboard,andhemayinsuchcasesuspendtheofficer(notbeingthemunicipal
treasurer)pendingactionbytheboard,ifinhisopinionthechargebeoneaffectingtheofficialintegrityof
theofficerinquestion.Wheresuspensionisthuseffected,thewrittenchargesagainsttheofficershallbe
filedwiththeboardwithintendays.

Itwillbenotedthatwhilesection2188providesforasuspension,itmakesnoprovisionfortheprocedureinsuch
cases.Intheabsenceofaprocedureprescribedbythestatute,weareoftheopinionthattheproceduremarked
bytheConstitution(JonesLaw)mustbefollowed,towit:Thatnopersonshallbedeprivedofhislife,liberty,or
property, without due process of law. "Due process of law" has been defined many, many times, and simply
means that before a man can be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to
defendhimself.

Therighttohold,occupyandexerciseanofficeisasmuchasspeciesofpropertywithintheprotectionofthelaw,
asanyotherthingcapableofpossessionand,towrongfullydepriveoneofitorunjustlywithholdit,isaninjury
whichthelawcanredressinasampleamannerasanyotherwrong.Andthatrightisregardedasarightwithin
theprotectionoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,whichsays:"NoStateshall
makeorenforceanylawwhichshallabridgetheprivilegesorimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStatesnorshall
nayStatedepriveanypersonoflife,libertyorpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw."(Pennoyervs.Neff,95U.S.,
714Dentvs.WestVirginia,129U.S.,114,124Hulingvs.Kaw,etc.Ry.Co.,130U.S.,559Scottvs.Neal,154
U.S.,34NewOrleansWaterworksvs.NewOrleans,164U.S.,471Twiningvs.NewJersey,211U.S.,78,110

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Haddockvs. Haddock, 201 U.S., 562, 567, Michigan Trust Co. vs. Ferry, 175 fed., 667 Bunton vs. Lyford, 37
N.H.,512[75Am.Dec.,144]Fostervs.Kansas,112U.S.,201.)

Thepowertoremoveanofficerwhohasbeendulyelectedforaspecifiedperiodcanbeexercisedonly,andfor
justcause,aftertheofficerhashadanopportunityfordefense.

Intheabsenceofexpresspower,giveninexpresswords,thepresumptionmustbe,inviewoftheprovisionsof
theJonesLawabovequoted,thatthelegislatureintendedthateveryofficerdulyelectedforafixedperiodshould
beentitledtoholdhisofficeuntiltheexpirationofsuchperiod,unlessremovedtherefromforcause,afterafair
and impartial investigation in which he has been given an opportunity to defend himself. (1 Dillon, Mun.
Corporations,sec.250Fieldsvs.Commonwealth,32Pa.,478Stadlervs.Detroit,13Mich.,346Statevs.Bryce,
7 Ohio St., 2 Bagg's Case, 11 Coke, 93 Hobokan vs. Gear, 27 H.J.L., 265 Dullan vs. Wilson, 53 Mich., 392
Peoplevs.Therrien,80Mich.,187Robbinsonvs.Miner,68Mich.,549.)

It seems to me that if the hero of the Filipino people, Jose Rizal, could read the decision of the majority of this
court and thereby learn that one of the citizens of the Philippine Islands has been deprived of his property and
rights,withoutahearing,hewouldturnoverinhisgraveand,withawailingcry,exclaim:"Asocialcancerofanew
typeisagaininmybelovedland!"

Thequestionpresentedisnotanewone.IthasbeendiscussedsincelongbeforetheEnglishpeople,inmass,
metuponthefieldsofRunnymedeanddemandedandobtainedfromanunwillingkingtheMagnaCharta,which
has constituted the chief stone in the political edifice of all the civilized nations since that time (years 1215). In
creatingtheconstitutionfortheFilipinopeople,theUnitedStatesGovernmentexpresslyprovidedthatnoperson,
no Filipino, no citizen of the Philippine Islands, shall be deprived of his life or property without "due process of
law."

Thequestionhasbeenpresentedtothecourtsmany,manytimes,andwithoutexceptionthesaidprovisionofthe
constitution has been sustained, except where the same constitution contains other provisions authorizing the
suspension of officers without a hearing. In the Philippine Islands there is no authority in the constitution (the
Jones Law) authorizing or justifying the statute in question. Not only is such a statute not authorized but it is
absolutelyprohibitedbytheprovisionsoftheJonesLawquotedabove.TheJonesLawprovidesthatnolawshall
beenacted,etc.

In a discussion of the subject before us we must bear in mind the distinction between an appointive and an
electedofficer.Thereareafewcaseswhichholdthatincaseofanappointiveofficer,wheretheappointmentisat
the pleasure of the appointing power, his suspension or removal is exercisable at the mere discretion of the
appointingpower.(Statevs.St.Louis,90Mo.,19Fieldvs.Commonwealth,32Pa.St.,478Statevs.Johnson,
18L.R.A.,410.)

Whereapersonisappointedtoanofficeandisamereemployee,whosepositiondoesnothavethedignityofan
office,and,byvirtueofhisappointment,mayberemovedorsuspendedatthewilloftheappointingpower,then,
ofcourse,theruleisdifferent.Suchpersonsarenotofficersbutmereemployees.(Thorppvs.Langdon,40Mich.,
673Peoplevs.McDill,15Mich.,182Portmanvs.StateBoard,etc.50Mich.,258AttorneyGeneralvs.Cain,84
Mich.,223.)

On the other hand the authorities are practically unanimous, where the appointment or election is made for a
definite term and the removal is to be for cause, that the power of removal or suspension cannot be exercised
withoutduenoticeandhearing.(MechemonPublicOfficers,sec.454Dullanvs.Wilson,53Mich.,392[51Am.
Rep.,128]Bagg'sCase,11Coke,99Kingvs.Gaskin,8TermRep.,209Ramshay'sCase,Ad.&E.[N.S.],190
Williamsvs.Bagot,3B.&C.,786Queenvs.Archbishop,1Ell.&El.,545Pagevs.Hardin,8B.Mon.[Ky.],672
Willard'sAppeal,4R.I.,601Fieldvs.Commonwealth,32Pa.,St.,478Statevs.Bryce,7Ohio,82Fostervs.
Kansas,112U.S.,201Kenardvs.Louisiana,92U.S.,480.)

The constitution and laws of the Philippine Islands having created the office of president of the different
municipalitiesandhavingfixeddefinitelythetenureofsaidoffice,thelegislature,byvirtueoftheprovisionsofthe
JonesLaw,isprohibitedfromenactinganylawwhichwouldjustifyanyindividualinthestateinremovinghimfrom
officewithoutfirstpresentingchargesagainsthimandgivinghimanopportunitytobeheard.(RemovalofPublic
Officer,25Am.LawRev.,201Statevs.Commonwealth,3Metcalf[Ky.],237Pagevs.Hardin[supra]Brownvs.
Grover, 6 Bush [Ky.], 1 Commonwealth vs. Gamble, 62 Pa., 342 State vs. Draper, 50 Mo., 353 State vs.
Thoman, 10 Kansas, 191 State vs. McMeely, 24 La. Ann., 19 Cooley, Const. Lim., 6th ed., p. 78 People vs.
Draper,15N.Y.,532Statevs.Williams,5Wis.,308Statevs.Baker,38Wis.,71Statevs. Hewitt, 16 L. R. A.,
413.)

InthecaseofStatevs. Hewitt (16 L. R. A., 413) the attorneygeneral of the State of South Dakota admitted in
open court "that it is true, as contended by the relator, that the preponderance of authorities is against the
removal of the officer for cause, whose term of office is fixed by law, without formal charges and a hearing
thereonontimelynotice."

Mr.JusticeBaileyoftheEnglishCourt,inthecaseofWilliamsvs.Bagot(3BarnandC.,785),said:"Itiscontrary
tocommonsenseofjusticethatanypartycouldbedeprivedofhisrightsandbeconcludedunheard."

EveryofficerinthePhilippineGovernmentwhohasbeenlegallyelectedforafixedperiodhasarighttobeheard
undertheprovisionsoftheJonesLawbeforehecanbedeprivedofhisrights.Hehasarighttobeheardandto
explain.

Intheabsenceofexpressconstitutionalauthority,thePhilippineLegislatureisprohibitedfromenactingalawby
whichanyofficerelectedbythepeopleforadefiniteperiodmaybesuspendedorremovedfromhisofficewithout
firsthavingbeengivenanopportunitytobeheardandtopresentwhateverdefensehemayhave.(JonesLaw,

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sec. 3 Dullan vs. Wilson, 51 Mich., 128 Hallgreen vs. Campbell, 82 Mich., 255 Jacques vs. Little, 51 Kansas,
300.)

In the case of Dullan vs. Wilson (53 Mich., 392) the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, with whom Mr.
Justice Cooley agreed, said: "We have examined carefully the authorities cited upon the brief of the learned
counsel for relator in support of the position that no notice is required to be given, and that the action of the
Executive is final and conclusive. It is sufficient to say, without commenting specially upon them, that the
reasoningofthosecasesdoesnotcommenditselftoourjudgment.Theyappeartoustobeopposed,notonlyto
thedecidedweightofauthority,butalsotothefundamentalprinciplesofjustice."

InthecaseofHallgreenvs.Campbell(82Mich.,255),theSupremeCourtoftheStateofMichigansaid:"Wehave
notfoundanycasewhereanofficerwhoisappointedforafixedtermhasbeenheldtoberemovableexceptfor
cause,and,wherevercausemustbeassignedfortheremovaloftheofficer,heisentitledtonoticeandachance
todefendhimself."

InthecaseofHanvs.Boston(142Mass.,90)itwasheldthatnopowertoremoveorsuspendanofficercouldbe
exerciseduntilafternoticeandanopportunitybytheofficialinquestiontobeheardinhisowndefense.

InthecaseofStatevs.St.Louis(90Mo.,19)theSupremeCourtsaid:"Whentheremovalisnotdiscretionary,but
mustbeforacause,...andnothingissaidastotheprocedure,aspecificationofthecharges,notice,andan
opportunitytobeheardareessential."

Mr. Dillon, in his valuable work on Municipal Corporations (sec. 250) says: "Where the right of removal or
suspension is confined to specific causes, such power cannot be exercised until there have been formulated
charges against the officer, notice thereof, and an opportunity for defense." (Biggs vs. McBride, 17 Ore., 640
Statevs.Hawkins,44OhioSt.,98.)

In the case of State vs. Hastings (16 L. R. A., 791, 797) the Supreme Court of Nebraska, after citing and
commentingnotonlyuponthecasescitedabovebutalsouponothercases,said:"Itseemsplaintousthatthe
doctrineofthesecasesisinaccordwiththeweightofauthorityandissupportedbythesoundestreasons."

It is true that a few cases can be found which hold that an officer may be suspended under a statute, without
notice and without a hearing. But it is believed that an examinations of each of such cases will show that such
statuesareauthorizedbytheconstitutionoftheparticularstate.(Grinesvs.DistrictJudge,101Tex.,36Poevs.
State,72Tex.,625,Statevs.Johnson,18L.R.A.,410.)

All that has been said above relates only to the petition for mandamus against the respondent the provincial
governorofRizal.IamfullyconvincedthatagreatpreponderanceofthejurisprudenceuponthequestionwhichI
haveherediscussedshowsclearlythatthepetitionerhereinwassuspendedinamannernotauthorizedbylaw,
andthatthewritofmandamusprayedforshouldbeissued,directingthereinstatementofthepetitioner.

Withreferencetotherespondentprovincialboard,therecordshowsthatitwasnotapartytotheactscomplained
ofinthepetitioninthepresentcase.Thepetition,therefore,asagainsttheprovincialboardshouldbedenied.

ARAULLO,J.,dissenting:

Section 2188 of the Administrative Code which empowers the provincial governor to investigate complaints
againstmunicipalofficersforneglectofduty,corruptionorotherformofmaladministrationinofficedoesnot,as
maybeseenfromthetextitselfofsaidsection,empowertheprovincialgovernortosuspendtheofficeragainst
whomthecomplaintmaybepresentedpendingtheinvestigation.Thereisevennowordwhateverinsaidsection
fromwhichsuchpowermaybeinferred.

Thesuspensionoftheofficeragainstwhomthecomplaintmayhavebeenpresented(whenheisnotamunicipal
treasurer) may, according to said section, be ordered by the provincial governor when written charges are
submitted by the latter to the provincial board after the investigation has been made, if he thinks it desirable to
impose a more severe punishment, or if, in his opinion, the charge is one affecting the official integrity of the
officerinquestionand,inthiscase,thatis,whenthesuspensioniseffectedaftertheinvestigationisheld,such
writtenchargeagainstsaidofficialmustbepresentedbythegovernortotheprovincialboardwithintheperiodof
tendays.Therefore,itisclearandevident,accordingtothetextofsaidsection,thatduringtheinvestigationthat
theprovincialgovernormayhold,inviewofachargepresentedagainstamunicipalofficer,thelattercannotbe
suspended from his office for the simple reason that such investigation may end in a reprimand of the officer,
which is the only punishment that the provincial governor may impose in such case upon the municipal officer,
andthelawdoesnotempowerthegovernortoordersaidsuspensionatthattime,exceptonlywhenacomplaint
ispresentedagainstthemunicipalofficertotheprovincialboard.

If,ashasbeensaid,theinvestigationwhichtheprovincialgovernormayholdagainstamunicipalofficermayend
eitherintheimpositionofapunishment,suchasareprimandoftheofficerorinacomplaintagainstthemunicipal
officer which the provincial governor may submit to the provincial board, in the latter case suspending said
municipalofficerfromthattime,thatis,fromthetimethecomplaintismadeandsubmittedtotheboardwithinthe
periodoftendays,aperioddeterminedandfixed,whichthelawgrantsforsaidpurposes,itisevidentthatthe
municipal officer should be notified of the complaint and therefore should be heard in said investigation
otherwise,inholdingtheinvestigationwithoutthepresenceoftheofficeragainstwhomthecomplaintmayhave
beenpresented,and,inholding,atmost,asummarytrialagainsthimwithoutfirsthearinghimorgivinghiman
opportunitytodefendhimself,thereprimandimposeduponhimastheresultoftheinvestigationinthefirstcase
towhichsaidarticle2188refers,wouldbeapenaltyimposedupontheofficerwithoutdueprocessoflaw.

Ifthisistrue,itisalsotruethattheofficersubjectedtoinvestigationshouldbenotifiedofthecomplaintandshould
beheardinsaidinvestigationfor,ifsuchinvestigationshouldendinachargewhichtheprovincialgovernormay

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consider proper to present against him to the provincial board, such investigation would be the basis of the
charge against the officer and the provincial board should take cognizance of such investigation in the
correspondingproceeding.Ifthemostvulgarcriminalisnotifiedofthecomplaintpresentedagainsthimbeforea
justice of the peace and is heard in the preliminary investigation which this judicial officer must hold before the
correspondinginformationisfiledbythefiscalinacourtoffirstinstance,andifinthatinvestigationheisgiventhe
opportunitytopleadguiltyornotguiltyaswellastodefendhimselfinorderthatthejusticeofpeaceholdingthe
investigationmayconsiderthemeritsofthecomplaintandtheresultthereof,sothathemaydeterminewhether
or not reasonable motives exist for him to believe that the accused is guilty and also to determine, as a
consequence, whether sufficient motives exist to present against the accused the corresponding information in
the Court of First Instance these being facts which the fiscal in turn should consider before filing the
correspondinginformationitisunreasonable,unjustandillegalthat,inapreliminaryinvestigationsuchasthat
heldbytheprovincialgovernorinthesecondcasereferredtoinsection2188byvirtueofthecomplaintpresented
tohimagainstamunicipalofficer,suchmunicipalofficershouldnotbenotifiedofthecomplaintorheadorgiven
theopportunitytodefendhimselfinorderthattheprovincialgovernormaydulydeterminewhetheritisproperto
impose upon said officer a more severe punishment or whether the abuse or neglect of duty imputed to him is
amongthosethataffecttheofficialintegrityofsaidofficer.

Whenacomplaintchargingthecommissionofadelito(felony)islaidbeforeamagistrate,theaccusedis
entitled as of right to a preliminary investigation as to "probable cause" before being committed to stand
trialforthecrimechargedtherein.(U.S.vs.M'Govern,6Phil.,621)

Whenapreliminaryexamination,undertheprovisionsofGeneralOrders,No.58,isconductedbyajudge
orbyajusticeofthepeaceinthisjurisdiction,eitherwithinorwithoutthecityofManila,theaccusedhasa
righttobepresentandtobeheardbyhimselfandbycounselandtopresentwitnessesinhisbehalf.....
(U.S.vs.GrantandKennedy,18Phil.,122.)

Theobjectofapreliminaryinvestigation,orapreviousinquiryofsomekind,beforeanaccusedpersonis
placed upon trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to
protecthimfromanopenandpublicaccusationofcrime,fromthetrouble,expensesandanxietyofapublic
trial,andalsotoprotecttheStatefromuselessandexpensiveprosecutions.(U.S.vs.GrantandKennedy,
18Phil.,122.)

Thedoctrineestablishedbythiscourtinthecasesabovementioned,andinmanyothersthatneednotbecited,
isapplicablealsotothecasewhereaninvestigationisheld,accordingtosaidsection2188oftheAdministrative
Code,bytheprovincialgovernorbyvirtueofacomplaintpresentedagainstamunicipalofficer,becausewithout
aninvestigationheldinlegalform,thatis,byhearingthepersonaccusedofacrimeinajudicialcomplaintorthe
municipal officer accused in a complaint presented to the provincial governor, and giving him the opportunity to
defendhimself,theinformationagainsttheaccusedinthefirstcase,cannotbefiledintheCourtofFirstInstance
and,inthesecondcase,thecomplaintagainstthemunicipalofficer,whichmayresultinhisdischarge,cannotbe
presentedtotheprovincialboardandastherighttobepresentattheinvestigation,andbeheardbyhimselfor
through an attorney and present witnesses in his favor, which are what constitute due process of law, is an
essentialrightoftheaccusedineithercase,then,ifintheinvestigationbytheprovincialgovernorofRizal,ofthe
complaint received by him against Miguel Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay, and referred to in his answer,
said governor, without previously notifying the accused municipal president of said charges, held a preliminary
investigation in his absence, without hearing him and without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, the
complaint against said municipal officer filed by said provincial governor or Rizal with the provincial board is
withoutfoundationandisillegalforwantofdueprocesoflawinsaidinvestigation.Therefore,theadministrative
proceeding instituted against said municipal officer by virtue of that complaint is for that reason affected with a
radicalviceanditisevidentthattheprovincialgovernorhasnotactedinaccordancewiththeclearandconclusive
provisionsofthesectionoftheAdministrativeCodealreadycitedandthathehasactedinexcessofhispowers,
not only in ordering the suspension of the municipal president, petitioner herein, but also in presenting to the
provincial board, as a result of said investigation, the complaint against him. Hence the proceeding instituted
beforesaidprovincialboardbyvirtueofsaidcomplaint,isillegalandvoid.

Forthereasonsabovestated,indissentingfromtherespectableopinionofthemajority,Iamoftheopinionthat
the petition presented by Miguel Cornejo, municipal president of Pasay, against Andres Gabriel, provincial
governorofRizalaswellasagainsttheprovincialboardofRizal,composedofAndresGabriel,PedroMagsalin,
andCatalinoS.Cruz,iswelltaken,andtherespondentsshouldbe,astheynotare,orderedtopaythecosts.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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