Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16887 November 17, 1920

MIGUEL R. CORNEJO, petitioner,

Gregorio Perfecto for petitioner.

MALCOLM, J.:

The petitioner in this case, the suspended municipal president of Pasay, Rizal, seeks by these
proceedings in mandamus to have the provincial governor and the provincial board of the
Province of Rizal temporarily restrained from going ahead with investigation of the charges filed
against him pending resolution of the case, and to have an order issue directed to the provincial
governor commanding him to return the petitioner to his position as municipal president of
Pasay. The members of the provincial board have interposed a demurrer based on the ground that
this court has no right to keep them from complying with the provisions of the law. The
provincial governor has filed an answer to the petition, in which he alleges as a special defense
that numerous complaints have been received by him against the conduct of Miguel R. Cornejo,
municipal president of Pasay; that these complaints were investigated by him; that he came to the
conclusion that agreeable to the powers conferred upon provincial governors, the municipal
president should be temporarily suspended, and that an investigation is now being conducted by
the provincial board.

Counsel for petitioner has argued, with much eloquence, that his client has been deprived of an
office, to which he was elected by popular vote, without having an opportunity to be heard in his
own defense. The respondents reply that all that the provincial governor and the provincial board
have done in this case is to comply with the requirements of the law which they are sworn to
enforce. Obviously, therefore, we should first have before us the applicable provisions of the
Philippine law bearing on the subject of suspension of public officers.

Under the title of "Provincial supervision over municipal officers," Article IV of Chapter 57 of
the Administrative Code, provides:

The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or other form of maladministration in
 office. for minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; and if a more severe
punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one
affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus
effected, the written charges against the officer shall be filed with the board within ten
days.

Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. — When written charges are preferred by
a provincial governor against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next
meeting, regular or special, furnish a copy of said charges to the accused official, with a
notification of the time and place of hearing thereon; and at the time and place appointed,
the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said charges, giving
the accused official full opportunity to be heard. The hearing shall occur as soon as may
be practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later than fifteen days from
the date the accused is furnished a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official
shall, on sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his defense.

Action by provincial board. — If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall
adjudge that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall
adjudge that the accused has been guilty of misconduct which would be sufficiently
punished by reprimand, or further reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to
deliver such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment; and in either case the official, if
previously suspended, shall be reinstated.

If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, it shall
without unnecessary delay forward to the Chief of the Executive Bureau certified copies
of the record in the case, including the charges, the evidence, and the findings of the
board, to which shall be added the recommendation of the board as to whether the official
ought to be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and in such
case the board may exercise its discretion to reinstate the official, if already suspended, or
to suspend him or continue his suspension pending final action.

The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto shall be
given preference over the current and routine business of the board.

Action by Chief of Executive Bureau. — Upon receiving the papers in any such
proceeding the Chief of the Executive Bureau shall review the case without unnecessary
delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further
suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant. Disciplinary suspension made upon
order of the chief of the Executive Bureau shall be without pay and in duration shall not
exceed two months. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended
by the Department Head and approved by the Governor-General.

With the foregoing legal provisions in mind, certain aspects of the case can be disposed of
without difficulty. Thus it cannot be seriously contended that the courts should interfere with an
orderly investigation which is about to be conducted by the provincial board. Nor can there be
any doubt as to the meaning of the law. A very minute and extensive procedure is provided by
the Legislature for central and provincial supervision of municipal officers. The provincial
governor, in receiving and investigating complaints against such officers, may take three courses.
For a minor delinquency he may reprimand the offender; but if the maladministration in office is
more serious he may temporarily suspend the officer, and thereafter may file written charges
against the officer with the provincial board. The procedure followed before the provincial board
and later on appeal to the Chief of the Executive Bureau, while interesting, does not concern us.
The important fact is that the law, in permitting a provincial governor temporarily to suspend a
municipal officer, makes no mention of a formal hearing of the charges.

In the exercise of this disciplinary power by the provincial governor, all that he can do before the
presentation of formal charges is either to reprimand the officer or to suspend him temporarily
from office. In the latter case the provincial governor's action is not a finality. The law is
especially careful to guard the rights of officer charged with maladministration in office. But the
point is made that, notwithstanding the provisions of the law and notwithstanding long official
practice, the temporary suspension of a municipal officer, without an opportunity to be heared in
his own defense, is in contravention of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights concerning
due process of law.

So much has been written on the subject of due process of law that is would be futile to enter into
its intricate mazes. It is self-evident, however, that, in ordinary cases, to condemn without a
hearing violates the due process of law clause of the American Constitution and of the Philippine
Bill of Rights. It is for this reason that we can well understand the logic of those who cling to this
through and to whom a contemplated violation of the Constitution is most repugnant. It is but
fair, in ordinary cases, that a public official should not be removed or suspended without notice,
charges, a trial, and an opportunity for explanation. But not permitting our judgment to be unduly
swayed by sympathy for the petitioner's brave fight, and recalling again that the courts have
ordinarily to give effect to legislative purposes, it is further only fair to mention certain
exceptions to the due process of law rule, which would seem to include the instant case.

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not
with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law,
has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by
means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a
day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles. (Weimer vs. bunbury [1874], 30 Mich., 201;
Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18 How., 272 followed in Forbes vs.
Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534; Tan Te vs. Bell {1914], 27 Phil., 354; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus
[1915], 31 Phil., 218 and other Philippine cases). In certain proceedings, therefore, of an
administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice
and hearing are not essential to due process of law. Examples of special or summary proceedings
affecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without any hearing can easily be recalled.
Among these are the arrest of an offender pending the filing of charges; the restraint of property
in tax cases; the granting of preliminary injunction ex parte; and the suspension of officers or
employees by the Governor-General or a Chief of a Bureau pending an investigation. (See
Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12 C.J., 1224; Administrative Code, sec. 694.)

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary
to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public
office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due proces of law, but is
a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs. Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere
agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in the Philippine
Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popular representative government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary
or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions
of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents.

Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in this case, we turn to the article by
Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generally considered the leading authority in the United States on the
subject of Administration Law, in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, and find the rules
as to suspension of public officers laid down very concisely as follows: "Power to suspend may
be exercised without notice to the person suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor
Goodnow to support his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs. Johnson
([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by the Supreme Court of Florida that the
governor could, under section 15 of the executive article of the Constitution, suspend an officer
for neglect of duty in office without giving previous notice to the officer of the charge made
against him.

A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found in 22 Ruling Case Law, pp. 564,
565. On the subject of suspension of public officers it is heared said:

The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, so as to tie his hands for
the time being, seems to be universally accepted as fair, and often necessary. . . . Notice
and hearing are not prerequisite to suspension unless required by statute and therefore
suspension without such notice does not deprive the officer of property without due
process of law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial of the equal
protection of the laws because the evidence against the officer is not produced and he is
not given an opportunity to confront his accusers and cross-examine the
witnesses.lawph!l.net

The case to support the first sentence in the above enunciation of the rule is State vs. Megaarden
(85 Minn., 41), which in turn is predicated on State vs. Peterson ([1892], 50 Minn., 239). In a
discussion of the subject more general than specific, it was said:

The safety of the state, which is the highest law, imperatively requires the suspension,
pending his trial, of a public officer, — especially a custodian of public funds, — charged
with malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. Suspension does not remove the officer, but
merely prevents him, for the time being, from performing the functions of his office; and
from the very necessities of the case must precede a trial or hearing. Such temporary
 suspension without previous hearing is fully in accordance with the analogies of the law.
It is a constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of his liberty or property
except by due process of law, which includes notice and a hearing, yet it was never
claimed that in criminal procedure a person could not be arrested and deprived of his
liberty until a trial could reasonably be had, or that in civil actions ex parte and temporary
injunctions might not be issued and retained in proper case, until a trial could be had, and
the rights of the parties determined. We have no doubt, therefore, of the authority of the
legislature to vest the governor with power to temporarily suspend a county treasurer
pending the investigation of the charges against him, of official misconduct.

The case cited by the editors of Ruling Case Law as authority for their second sentence is that of
Griner vs. Thomas ([1907], 101 Texas, 36; 16 Ann. Cas., 944). The holding of the court here was
that it is within the power of the legislature to authorize the temporary suspension of a public
officer during the pendency of valid proceedings to remove such officer and as an incident to
such proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that the constitution has given power to remove such
officer only for cause and after a hearing. Notice and hearing are not preprequisites to the
suspension of a public officer under a statute which does not provide for such notice and hearing.

The third case cited by Ruling Case Law comes from the United States Supreme Court. (Wilson
vs. North Carolina [1897], 169 U.S, 586.) An examination of the decision, however, shows that
while it tends to substantiate the rule, the facts are not exactly on all fours with those before us.
Without, therefore, stopping to set forth the facts, only the following from the body of the
decisioned be noted, viz.:

In speaking of the statute and the purpose of this particular provision the Supreme Court
of the State said: "The duty of suspension was imposed upon the Governor from the
highest motives of public policy to prevent the danger to the public interests which might
arise from leaving such great powers and responsibilities in the hands of men legally
disqualified. To leave them in full charge of their office until the next biennial session of
the legislature, or pending litigation which might be continued for year, would destroy
the very object of the law. As the Governor was, therefore, by the very and spirit of the
law, required to act and act promptly, necessarily upon his own findings of fact, we are
compelled to hold that such official action was, under the circumstances, due process of
law. Even if it were proper, the Governor would have no power to direct an issue like a
chancellor."

The highest court of the State has held that this statue was not a violation of the
constitution of the State; that the hearing before the Governor was sufficient; that the
office was substantially an administrative one, although the commission was designed by
a statute subsequent to that which created it, a court of record; that the officer taking
office under the statute was bound to take it on the terms provided for therein; that he was
lawfully suspended from office; and that he was not entitled to a trial by jury upon the
hearing of this case in the trial court. As a result the court held that the defendant had not
been deprived of his property without due process of law, nor had he been denied the
equal protection of the laws.
 xxx xxx xxx

We are of opinion the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him
by the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the Governor under the
statute above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office.

The procedure was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the State. It was taken
under a valid statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court
has held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should have before
suspension by the Governor was a matter for the state legislature to determine, having
regard to the constitution of the State. (There can also be cited as supporting authority
State ex rel. Wendling vs. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners [1915], 159 Wis.,
295; Sumpter vs. State {1906], 81 Ark., 60; Gray vs. McLendon [1901], 134 Ga., 224;
State vs. Police Commissioners, 16 Mo. App., 947; Preston vs. City of Chicago [1910],
246 III., 26; and People vs. Draper [1910], 124 N.Y.S., 758, where it was held that the
legislature has the right to authorize an officer to remove an appointive or elective officer
without notice or hearing.)

Certain intimations have been made that under the procedure prescribed by the law an injustice
might be done municipal officers. Such suppositions are not unusual even as to cases before the
courts, but in this as in all other instances, the presumption always is that the law will be
followed and that the investigation and the hearing will be impartial. In the language of Justice
Trent in Severino vs. Governor-General ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 402), "the presumption is just as
conclusive in favor of executive action, as to its correctness and justness, as it is in favor of
judicial action." We entertain no doubt that the provincial governor, fully conscious of the trust
reposed in him by the law, will act only in cases where strong reasons exist for exercising the
power of suspension and upon a high consideration of his duty.

The suggestion that an unfriendly governor might unduly delay the hearing is also without much
force. The same might be said of any administrative officer, or in fact of any judicial officer. The
presumption, again, is that every officer will do his duty promptly, and if he does not, certainly a
remedy can be found to make him do so. Not only this, but the law before us expedites the
proceedings by fixing a short period of ten days within which the provincial governor must lay
the charges before the provincial board, which must be heard by the latter body within fifteen
days. Of more compelling force is the suggestion from the other side that the public interest
might suffer detriment by postponing the temporary suspension until after the hearing.

Our holding, after most thoughtful consideration, is that the provisions of section 2188 of the
Administrative Code are clear and that they do not offend the due process of law clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it is our duty to apply the law without fear or favor.

Petition denied with costs. So ordered.