Objectivity in History
Objectivity in History
Objectivity in History
Objectivity in History
Author(s): Mark Bevir
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Oct., 1994), pp. 328-344
Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University
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OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY
MARK BEVIR
ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
There are all sorts of reasons for rejecting the possibility of objective knowledge
of the past. But one reason has become particularly prominent in the latter
half of the twentieth century. In general terms, the argument is that we cannot
have objective historical knowledge because we do not have access to a given
past against which to judge rival interpretations. Hermeneutic theorists some-
times make this point by stressing the historicity of our understanding. We
cannot have access to a given past because any understanding we develop of
the past necessarily will be infused by prejudices arising from our particular
historical situation. For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued that "there
is no understanding or interpretation in which the totality of this existential
structure [the historicity of being] does not function, even if the intention of
the knower is simply to read 'what is there' and to discover from his sources
'how it was'."' Genealogists make a similar point by pointing to the role of
discourses and regimes of power in producing all knowledge. We cannot have
access to a given past because the past is constructed by discourses which are
themselves the effects of power. For example, Michel Foucault has argued that
the ideal of history offering a true reconstruction of the past must give way to
a history of the present offering a perspective on the past designed to challenge
contemporary systems of power/knowledge.2 Finally, deconstructionists make
1. H-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, transl. W. Glen-Doepel (London, 1979), 232.
2. See, in particular, M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, transl. D. Bouchard and S. Sherry, ed. with
intro. D. Bouchard (Oxford, 1977).
OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY 329
much the same point by arguing that nothing can be straightforwardly present
as a given truth. We cannot have access to a given past because the objects of
the past, like all other objects, do not have stable meanings or identities. For
example, Jacques Derrida has suggested that all discourse includes a "trace (of
that) which can never be presented," so any attempt to pin down the nature
of an object will exhibit a logic of supplementarity with the language of the
account of the object referring to something ostensibly excluded from the ac-
count of the object.3 All these are instances of rejecting historical objectivity
on the grounds that we do not have access to a given past against which to
judge rival interpretations. They reject the possibility of access to a given past
for rather different reasons -the historicity of our being, the influence of power
on discourse, the absence of any stable meanings-but they all agree that we
cannot grasp the past as a presence, and that this threatens the very possibility
of objective historical knowledge.
In what follows, I will offer an account of historical objectivity which relies
on criteria of comparison, not on our having access to a given past. I will do
so because if historical objectivity does not depend on our having access to a
given past, then to deny that we have access to a given past is not to show the
impossibility of historical objectivity. In short, I want to argue that even though
we cannot grasp historical facts as immediately present truths, we can have
objective knowledge of the past that is neither relativistic nor irrational. In
doing so, I will not offer a direct critique of Gadamer, Foucault, and Derrida;
after all, they all could accept the possibility of historical objectivity as I define
it, limiting their critique to concepts of objectivity which rely on access to a
given past. Nonetheless, I will offer an indirect critique of their positions; there
are times when they seem to oppose historical objectivity as such, and the
general orientation of their ideas often suggests they would not want to accept
any concept of objectivity (this is particularly true of the antirationalism of
Foucault and Derrida).
I will begin by considering why we cannot have access to a given past. Here
I will show that even though we cannot have access to any given truths, historical
knowledge is not especially underprivileged at least in this respect. Next, in the
bulk of the essay, I will construct a general account of objective knowledge in
terms of criteria of comparison, and show how this account applies to history
as exemplified by discussions of Locke's views on property. Finally, I will defend
this account against the charge of out-and-out relativism.
Empiricists argue that historians can justify their interpretations using a logic
of either vindication or refutation. Logics of vindication tell us how to determine
a narrow account of empiricism defined against both realism and idealism or a broad account
defined against idealism alone.
5. For a subtle version of the probabilist variety of verificationism see R. Carnap, The Logical
Syntax of Language (London, 1937).
6. For a subtle version of falsificationism see K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(New York, 1959).
OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY 331
incorporate theoretical understanding. Our everyday accounts of our experi-
ences reflect numerous realist assumptions, including that objects exist indepen-
dently of our perceiving them; objects persist through time; other people can
perceive the same objects we perceive; and objects sometimes act causally upon
one another. This does not mean that our categories determine what experiences
we have - objects do force sensations on us - but it does mean that our catego-
ries influence the way we experience the sensations we have. We make sense of
the sensations objects force on us using our categories. Because our experiences
embody theoreticalassumptions, our experiencescannot be pure, and this means
that our experiences cannot provide unvarnished data for determining the truth
or falsity of our theories.
Empiricists might respond to this criticism by giving a phenomenological
account of pure experience. Here the ideal of pure experience would refer to
the content of our sensations without invoking realist assumptions about the
relationship of these sensations to an external reality. This response will not
do for two reasons. First, a purely phenomenological account of experience
cannot capture the actuality of experience: when we see an object falling, we
see an object falling; we cannot have a more fundamental experience, and we
cannot give a simpler description of the experience. If we could deprive people
of the theoretical assumptions entwined within their experience, we would be
left with people so disoriented, they would not be able to make coherent sense of
the world in the way they would have to if they were to describe their sensations.
Second, the very idea of phenomenological experience already presupposes a
background which includes realist theories. We cannot make sense of the idea
that we have sensations which do not embody realist assumptions except in
contrast to the idea that we have experiences embodying realist assumptions.
More generally, to identify experiences with pure sensations bereft of intelligent
resolution would be to identify experiences with things we cannot conceive of
precisely because they cannot be objects of experience. Thus, even a purely
phenomenological account of our experiences presupposes a prior realist ac-
count of the world.
Empiricism is false because experiencing is something done by individuals,
and all experiences embody the theoretical categories of the individuals having
the experiences. People make observations, and they do so in the light of their
current opinions. Moreover, any attempt to abstract the notion of sensation
from the experiences of individuals ends in the dismissal of the idea of sensation
because sensation always occurs within the context of the experiences of individ-
uals. The idea of experiences or sensations without prior theories is incompre-
hensible.
Because experience or observation entails theory, objectivity cannot rely on
a logic of vindication or refutation. If an observation disproved a favorite
theory, we could rescue the theory by insisting that the observation itself rested
on a false theory; and, if an observation proved a detested theory, we could
jettison the theory by insisting that the observation itself rested on a false theory.
332 MARK BEVIR
but not go so far as to say that it is a fact they saw a wolf: their uncertainty
about their classification could hold them back. Observations embodying cate-
gories count as facts only if they are exemplary, that is, if we cannot reasonably
expect to have a better opportunity to judge the correctness of our classification.
For instance, if a couple of naturalists watch a wolf through binoculars for an
hour or so, they can say it is a fact they saw a wolf even though they thereby
make certain theoretical assumptions such as those concerning the working of
binoculars. A fact is an exemplary case of a classification. Thus, when we say
that such and such is a historical fact, we are not simply asserting such and
such, we also are asserting that such and such is either an exemplary case, or
a case that has been tested against exemplary cases.
Historical interpretations explain facts by postulating significant relation-
ships, connections, and similarities between them. They try to account for
the facts being as they are by bringing out relevant parallels, overlaps, and
distinctions. The important point is: a fact acquires a particular character as
a result of its relationship to other facts which provide it with a definite context.
Here interpretations reveal the particular character of facts by uncovering their
relationship to other facts, by presenting a fact in terms of other facts that
locate it in time and space, and suitably define the preconditions of its unfolding.
Of course, as interpretations reveal the particular character of a fact, they often
partially define the way we regard the fact. Interpretations do not just reveal
the character of facts, they also create the character of facts, and, what is more,
they guide our decisions as to what constitutes a fact. Because there are no
pure observations, facts do not hold out their particular characters to such
observations. Rather, we partly construct the particular characters of facts
through the interpretations which we incorporate in our observations. Thus,
we cannot say simply that such and such an interpretation either does or does
not fit the facts. Instead, we must compare bundles of interpretations in terms
of their success in relating innumerable facts to one another through highlighting
pertinent similarities and differences, continuities and disjunctions, and the like.
Objectivity arises from comparing and criticizing rival webs of interpretations
in terms of facts. The basis for such a comparison of rival views exists because
historians agree on a wide number of facts which collectively provide sufficient
overlap for them to debate the merits of their respective views. For instance,
even if Peter's view entails theoretical presuppositions with which Mary dis-
agrees, and even if Mary's view entails theoretical presuppositions with which
Peter disagrees, Peter and Mary still might agree on enough facts to make
debate worthwhile, and perhaps to enable them to reach a decision as to the
merits of their respective views. Because they agree on numerous facts, the
facts constitute an authority they can refer to in their attempts to justify their
views and compare their alternative interpretations.
But, someone might ask, if facts embody interpretations, do not interpreta-
tions end up determining the nature of the facts they explain, and if interpreta-
tions determine the nature of what they explain, how can we judge interpre-
OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY 335
tations by their success in explaining these things? The whole process seems
perilously circular. It is here that criticism plays a vital role. The existence of
criticism means no interpretation can determine which facts it will encounter.
The critics of a theory can point to facts the proponents of the theory have
not considered, and demand that the theory explain these facts. Critics can
highlight what they take to be counter-instances to an interpretation, and the
interpretation must meet these tests set by its critics. In this way, criticism gives
facts a relative autonomy which prevents the process of comparing interpreta-
tions in terms of facts from being purely circular.
Nonetheless, there remains the problem that appeals to the facts never can
be decisive. For instance, if Peter refers to a fact apparently supporting his
view and contradicting Mary's, Mary need not admit that Peter is right. Instead,
Mary could question the fact or introduce a speculative theory to reconcile the
fact with her original interpretation. It is at this point that we must take an
anthropological turn so as to ground objectivity in human practices and the
values they embody. When historians debate the merits of rival interpretations
they engage in a human practice which has a number of rules defining a standard
of intellectual honesty. These rules of debate are neither decisive nor indepen-
dent of us; they neither compel us to give up our interpretations in specifiable
situations, nor force us to comply with their vaguer strictures. Rather, they
represent a normative standard which exercises a control on our behavior be-
cause we recognizetheir reasonableness.Thus, objectivity is principallya product
of our intellectual honesty in dealing with criticism; when we contrast objective
belief with biased belief, we recognize that objectivity is a normative standard
arising out of a human practice.
Let us consider more closely the rules of thumb which demarcate the norma-
tive standard of intellectual honesty. The first rule is: objective behavior requires
a willingness to take criticism seriously. If Mary does not take Peter's criticism
of her views seriously, we will consider Mary to be biased. Nonetheless, as we
have seen, Mary could respond to a fact or argument against her view either
by denying the fact or argument, or by deploying a speculative theory to recon-
cile the fact or argument with her interpretation. The second rule is: objective
behavior implies a preference for established standards of evidence and reason
backed by a preference for challenges to these standards which themselves rest
on impersonal and consistent criteria of evidence and reason. This rule limits
those occasions when we can reject a fact or argument which contradicts our
views. In particular, this rule sets up a presumption against exceptions: we
should try to avoid responding to uncomfortable facts or arguments by declaring
them to be exceptions proving our interpretation; instead, we should try to
modify our webs of interpretations to accommodate troublesome cases. The
third rule is: objective behavior implies a preference for positive speculative
theories, that is, speculative theories postulating exciting new predictions, not
speculative theories merely blocking off criticisms of our existing interpreta-
tions. This rule limits the occasions when we can have recourse to speculative
336 MARK BEVIR
facts, they can use them as a starting point for comparing their rival interpreta-
tions of Locke's work. Most theories in the history of ideas are either interpreta-
tions of texts, that is, attempts to show how various facts come together to
give one or more texts a certain significance, or they are philosophical views
of the general nature and place of texts and ideas in history and society. For
instance, C. B. Macpherson marshalled various facts to argue that Locke de-
fended the rationality of unlimited desire, and so capital accumulation, in a
way that provided a moral basis for capitalism. What is more, Macpherson
did so in the context of a broadly Marxist historiography, according to which
British theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century adopted ideas which
reflected the emergence of a capitalist economy.8
When historians criticize and compare theories in terms of accepted facts,
they use criteriaof accuracy, comprehensiveness,consistency, fruitfulness, open-
ness, and progressiveness. Thus, Alan Ryan has criticized Macpherson for inac-
curacy.9He argued that Macpherson was wrong to say Locke thought rationality
was restricted to one class who went in for the acquisition of capital goods.
Rather, Locke explicitly said that all adults apart from lunatics were rational
enough to understand what the law of nature required of them. Ryan also
criticized Macpherson, at least implicitly, for failing to be comprehensive: Mac-
pherson's theory could not account for the many passages in the Two Treatises
that appear to say things clearly contrary to Macpherson's interpretation. More
generally, Ryan suggested that Macpherson's errors stem from an unfruitful
method. Macpherson's historiography led to an emphasis on factors other than
Locke's text as a basis for a reading of it, but when Ryan evaluated this reading
against the text he found passages in it showing the reading to be wrong. Mac-
pherson's historiography was unfruitful because it inspired a prediction that
received no real support from the facts. In contrast, Ryan recommended a
method based on reading the text alone so as to uncover what Locke said, if
not what Locke intended to say.
John Dunn too has criticized Macpherson for not being comprehensive: Mac-
pherson's theory took no account of Locke's religious faith, a faith which
provided the unifying theme of his thought.'0 In particular, Dunn argued that
Locke could not have intended to demonstrate the overriding rationality of
capital accumulation precisely because his view of rationality depended on his
religious beliefs, and so for him the rationality of any action in this world
necessarily would depend on the effect of the action on one's afterlife. More
recently, James Tully has developed Dunn's broad critique of Macpherson by
interpreting the Two Treatises, within the context of Locke's religious beliefs,
as an attempt to defend a self-governing community of small proprietors en-
joying the security to harvest the fruits of their labors, an ideal which Tully sees
as contrary to capitalism." More generally, Dunn, too, related Macpherson's
Numerous historical debates could have illustrated the way historians might
deploy my criteria of comparison to defend their interpretations. But any ex-
ample I chose probably would meet the objections that an account of historical
objectivity based on generally accepted facts and criteria of comparison fails
12. For Dunn's methodological beliefs see J. Dunn, "The Identity of the History of Ideas,"
Philosophy 43 (1968), 85-104.
13. N. Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism (Berkeley, 1984).
340 MARK BEVIR
14. This seems to me to be the criticism suggested by the anti-rationalism of Foucault, and to
some extent Derrida, who argues that it is precisely because knowledge rests exclusively on human
practices,epistemes, discourses, or regimesof power that there is no rational basis for such knowledge.
15. This seems to me to be a criticism suggested by-or perhaps I should say a criticism that
could be levelled at - Gadamer's defining truth solely within the context of a tradition: if questions
of truth are settled within a tradition, we cannot expect historians from outside our tradition to
share our answers to these questions.
OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY 341
by the natureof the world.For example,supposethat John operatesa dogsled
in the ArcticCirclebut he does not perceiveany differencebetweendogs and
wolves.Beforetoo long, John will run into serioustrouble. Supposenow that
all humanshad perceptionsas unreliableas John's. In this case, humanityas
a whole would have run into serious problemslong ago. Thus, the very fact
that we are here,let alone the successeswe have had in manipulatingthe world
accordingto our wills, is strong evidencethat our perceptionsgenerallyare
reliable.Further,becausewe can rely on the broadcontentof our perceptions,
we havea good reasonto assumethe facts we agreeupon usuallywill be true;
afterall, factsaresimplyexemplaryperceptions.Finally,becausewecanassume
acceptedfacts usually will be true, interpretationsbased on these facts will
be relativelysecure. In short, we can groundinterpretationsin facts, facts in
perceptions,andperceptionsin our abilityto interactsuccessfullywithourenvi-
ronment.
We can relatehistoricalobjectivityto truth becauseour abilityto find our
way aroundin the world vouches for the basic accuracy-of our perceptions.
Here my anthropologicalepistemologytakes on a naturalistictint. It is our
place in the naturalorder of things which enablesus to treat our knowledge
as an approximationto truth. Nonetheless,my anthropologicalepistemology
differssignificantlyfrom naturalizedepistemologies.Most naturalizedepiste-
mologiesequatean accountof objectivitywith a peculiarlyabstractpsycholog-
ical or sociologicalstudy of the way people actuallyreachwhat we take to be
justifiedknowledge.In contrast,my anthropologicalepistemologypresentsa
normativeaccountof objectivityaccordingto whichhistoriansshouldjustify
theirinterpretationsin termsof my criteriaof comparison.It is just that when
historiansdo justify their interpretationsin this way, they can fend off the
chargeof irrationalismby referenceto the natureof our being in the world.
Ourinteractionwith our environmentsecuresthe broadcontentof our per-
ception,not particularinstancesof our perception.This is why we can accept
criteriafor comparingrival webs of interpretations,but not a logic of either
vindicationor refutationfor evaluatingindividualinterpretations.Our ability
to interactwith our environmentimpliesthat our perceptionsof our environ-
ment must fall within the limits demarcatingthe point beyond which such
interactionwouldnot be possible.Thus, mostof the factshistoriansagreeupon
must be more or less true. However, while our perceptionsas a whole must
fall withinthese limits, no particularperceptionis foolproof. Thus, the facts
historiansagreeupon arenot secureenoughto enableus conclusivelyto deter-
mine the truthor falsity of any particulartheory. I can make the same point
in a differentway.Ourknowledgeultimatelyderivesfroman empiricalbase,but
our knowledgeof this empiricalbaseembodiesthe theorieswe use to categorize
things in termsof similaritiesand differences,and to ascribecertainqualities
to thingsso categorized.Herethe empiricalbasis of our knowledgesecuresthe
generalaccuracyof agreedfacts,therebymakingsenseof oureffortsto compare
webs of interpretations.But the theoreticalcomponentof our knowledgepre-
342 MARK BEVIR
vents our being certainabout any particularfact, and so about the truth or
falsity of any particularinterpretation.We can secure the general sweep of
historicalknowledge,but not a particularaspectof historicalknowledge.
Let us turn now to the problem of incommensurability.The practiceof
objectivitydependson ourcomparingrivalwebsof interpretations.If historians
disagreeaboutthe relativemeritsof differentwebs,theyshoulddrawbackfrom
the pointof disagreementuntilthey findan acceptableplatform-consisting of
agreedfacts, standardsof evidence, and ways of reasoning- from which to
comparethesewebs.Proponentsof incommensurability suggesthistoriansfrom
differentculturalbackgroundsmightnot shareanysuchplatformso theycannot
comparetheir respectivewebs of interpretations.For the sake of argument,
imaginea groupof anthropologistswho discovera lost tribeopposedto manyof
ourbeliefs,our standardsof evidence,and our waysof reasoning.Nonetheless,
universaldisagreementdoes not precludemeaningfulcomparison,so the mere
existenceof the tribedoes not establisha thesisof incommensurability. Rather,
our criticsmust arguethat the anthropologistsand the membersof the tribe
cannotcomparetheirrespectiveworldviews.Here we will findthat worldviews
cannotbe incommensurable becausethe anthropologistsandthe tribecan come
to understandeachother'sworldview,andbecausetheythen can comparetheir
worldviewsby tryingto accountfor the practicesinspiredby each worldview
in terms of the other worldview.
Once again, the crucialpoint is: our beliefs guide our actions within given
naturaland socialenvironments.Becauseour worldviewsinformour practices,
membersof any given culturemust recognizesome similaritiesand differences
in the things they encounter:all practicesconsist of repeatablepatternsof
behavior,and these can exist only if the practitionersrecognizeat least some
situationsas similarto, and others as differentfrom, at least some previous
situations. Further,becausethe perceptionof similaritiesor differencesulti-
matelymust rest on exemplaryperceptions,exemplaryperceptionswill count
as facts in all cultures:people in all cultureswill be as confidentabout the
thingstheytaketo be exemplaryperceptionsas theycouldbe aboutanyevidence
or reasonto acceptthose exemplaryperceptions.Thus, even if the anthropolo-
gists and the tribe disagreewith each and every fact the other group believes
in, the structuresof theirworldviewsmustbe moreor lesssimilar.All worldviews
mustreston factsunderstoodas exemplaryperceptionswhichleadto a categori-
zation of thingsin termsof similaritiesand differences.Thus, the anthropolo-
gists and the tribe can come to understandeach others'beliefs providedthey
can perceivethe similaritiesand differencesin termsof whicheachothercatego-
rizes things.
Becausethe successof both the tribe and the anthropologistsin interacting
with theirenvironmentsguaranteesthe broadcontentof both of their percep-
tions, they both could come to perceivethe similaritiesand differencesin terms
of whichthe other groupcategorizesthings. For a start, a broadguaranteeof
the perceptionsof the tribeimpliesthat manyof the similaritiesand differences
OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY 343
embodiedin theirworldviewmustbe trueof reality.Further,a broadguarantee
of theperceptionsof theanthropologistsimpliesthattheycanrecognizesimilari-
ties and differencesthat are true of reality, includingthe true similaritiesand
differencescontainedwithinthe worldviewof the tribe. Thus, the anthropolo-
gistscancometo understandthe beliefsof the tribe;and, by parallelreasoning,
the tribe can come to understandthe beliefs of the anthropologists.Even if
their categorizationsare not remotelysimilar, it remainstrue that they both
perceivethingsmoreor less as they are, theircategorizationsmust be more or
less true to reality, and they can come to grasp each others'categorizations
preciselybecausethese categorizationsare more or less true of reality.
Once the anthropologistsand the tribe understandeach other'sworldview,
theycan comparethe meritsof theirrespectiveworldviewsby tryingto account
for the practicesinspiredby each worldviewin termsof the other worldview.
As the anthropologistscome to perceivethe similaritiesand differencesin-
formingthe worldviewof the tribe,theytypicallywillcometo offerexplanations
of these similaritiesand differences.Eitherthey will incorporatea belief of the
tribeinto theirworldview,or they will dismissthe beliefas an illusion,in which
case they will try to explainthe persistenceof this illusionin the worldviewof
the tribe. Similarly,as the tribe comes to understandthe worldviewof the
anthropologists,eitherthey will incorporatenew beliefs into their worldview,
or they will dismiss these beliefs as illusions, in which case they will try to
explainthese illusions. In this way, the anthropologistsand the tribe acquire
a stock of sharedfacts, or, at the veryleast, they developexplanationsof each
other'sworldviews.Thus, they now can comparetheir worldviewsin termsof
their respectiveability to account for shared facts, or, at the very least, to
account for each other's worldviews.Their encounterwith one another has
resultedin their understandingsbecomingcommensurable.
VI. CONCLUSION