TodayisTuesday,January31,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC

G.R.No.L32362September19,1973
INECETAALFANTA,petitioner,
vs.
NOLASCONOEandTHECOURTOFAPPEALS,respondents.
MarcelinoM.Facunlaforpetitioner.
AdelaidaE.Reyesforprivaterespondent.

ANTONIO,J.:
ReviewoncertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.No.42409R(CAR),affirmingthejudgment
oftheCourtofAgrarianRelationsatGapan,NuevaEcija,grantingthereductionoftheannualrentalof40to31.8
cavans of palay, of the lessee, and after compensating the excess and short rentals on the land in question,
directing the lessee to pay the lessor the sum of P243.70 representing the short rentals for the agricultural years
19601961,19611962,19621963,19631964,19641965,19651966,and19661967.
Thereisnodisputeastothefacts.Theparceloflandinvolvedinthisactioncontainsanareaofabouttwohectares
situatedatBo.Caisiwan,SanAntonioNuevaEcija,anddevotedtotheproductionofpalayandisapartofthe72
hectaresbelongingtoSantiagoGancayco,whichpetitionerInecetaAlfantaleasedfromGancaycosince1953,and
which, in turn, petitioner delivered to fourteen tenants to cultivate. The leasehold relationship between the parties
hereincommencedinagriculturalyear19601961.Theagreedannualleaserentalwas40cavansofpalay.Inthe
complaintfiledbyNoewiththeagrariancourt,respondenttenantalleged,amongothers,thatthesaidagreedrental
wasinexcessofthemaximumrentalallowedbylaw.Heaccordinglyprayedforareductionthereofandforpayment
to him by petitioner landholder of a sum equal to the value of the excess rentals he had paid in previous crop
seasons. In her answer petitioner landholder alleged that her lease contract with respondent tenant was a civil
lease,hence,itwascoveredbytheprovisionsoftheCivilCodeandnotbythelawsontenancy.
After due trial, the agrarian court found that a leasehold relationship was established between the parties which
commenced in agricultural year 19601961, and that, therefore, in determining the annual lease rental, the same
should be based on the annual harvests for the three agricultural years preceding the establishment of the
leasehold,whichcorrespondtoagriculturalyears(1)19571958,170cavans(2)19581959,186cavansand(3)
19591960, of which no evidence on the produce was presented by either party. In ascertaining the annual lease
rental, the said court stated that: "Since the evidence presented by defendanflandholderleassor as basis for the
computationoftherentalisincomplete,itwouldbefairandreasonabletoincludeoneofthenormalharvestsofthe
landholding after the inception of the leasehold relationship which is the quantity of 100 cavans." The trial court
thereuponproceededwithitscomputation.Itadded170cavans,186cavansand100cavans,andobtainedayearly
averageof152cavans.Fromthisitdeductedtheseedlingsconsistingof2cavans,reapingexpensesequalto15
cavans, and threshing expenses equivalent to 7 cavans, thus arriving at 127.3 cavans as the average net
produce.Itthenmultipliedthisby25%,arrivingat31.8cavansasthecorrectyearlyrentalwhichrespondenttenant
shouldpaytopetitionerlandholder.Thecourt,findingthatrespondenttenanthadanunpaidbalanceof20cavans
and16.1kilosofpalayforthecropyears1960196119661967,atthepriceofP12.00percavan,orderedhimto
pay petitioner landholder the sum of P243.70 representing the short rental. The Court of Appeals in giving its
imprimaturtothejudgmentoftheagrariancourtdeclared:
Since the lower court found that the leasehold relationship has commenced from agricultural year
19601961,therefore,the3precedingnormalharvestswouldbethosethatcorrespondtoagricultural
years(1)19571958,170cavans(2)19581959,186cavansand(3)19591960,noevidenceonthe

produce was presented by either party. In order to remedy the situation and prevent a delay of the
case,thelowercourtsaid:"Sincetheevidencepresentedbythedefendantlandholderlessorasbasis
for the computation of the rental is incomplete, it would be fair and reasonable to include one of the
normalharvestsofthelandholdingaftertheinceptionoftheleaseholdrelationshipwhichisthequantity
of100cavans"(seeorderofDecember7,1967,amendingthedecision,rec.191193).Itwillbenoted
thatthe100cavanspickedbythetrialcourtrepresentingthegrossproductionforcropyear19641965
isfarbelowthegrossharvestforbasiccropyear19571958,170cavans,andbasiccropyear1958
1959, 186 cavans. Despite the cautious attitude of the lower court, defendantlessor assails the
procedureadoptedstating"Weunderstandittobethelawinthiscountrythatthetenantwhoisseeking
a reduction of rental must be the one to prove a justification for the same. If he fails to show to the
Court any ground for the reduction, as what happened in the case at bar, the complaint out to be
dismissed and the agreed and implemented rentals should not be disturbed. The Court below totally
deviated from this principle and even to the extent of picking one of the harvests after the
commencement of the leasehold relationship as basis for reducing the rentals'(defendantlessor
appellant'sbrief,p.32).TheAgrarianCounsel,onbehalfofplaintifftenantlessee,counteredbystating
that"thediscretionexercisedbythelowercourtinpickingthesameasoneofthenormalharvestsof
thelandholdingisacourageousmanifestationofjudicialstatesmanshipinupholdingthenoblepolicyof
the agricultural tenancy law enunciated in Sec. 36, RA1199, as amended, that courts shall solve all
grave doubts in favor of the tenant" (plaintiffappellee's brief, p. 7). We find the Court's exercise of
discretiononthispointtobeproper,practicalandexpeditious.Atanyrate,itdidnotcauseanydamage
tothedefendantlandownerasshownbythefactthatthefigureselectedisverymuchlowerthanthe
normalharvestforthefirsttwoprecedingyears.
Inthisappeal,however,thequestionnolongertouchesuponthecharacteroftheleasecontract,foritisnowagreed
thatsuchcontractisanagriculturallease.Petitioner'sthesisisthatwhileanagreemententeredintobyandbetween
a tenant and a landholder may be declared illegal where the agreed rental exceeds that authorized by law, the
burden of proof is upon the tenant to show the harvests for the three crop years immediately preceding the crop
yearwhentheleaseholdrelationshipbegan.Inthiscase,whilethesaidthreecropyearsare19571958,19581959
and19591960,respondenttenantlesseedidnotadduceevidencetoprovethenormalharvestfor19591960and
becauseofthatfailure,accordingtopetitioner,therecanbenovalidbasisfordeterminingtheproperrental,inwhich
event the rental agreed upon between the parties should be maintained. According to the petitioner, the agrarian
courthadnoauthoritytopicktheharvestof100cavansofpalayinagriculturalyear19641965tosupplythelacking
evidence as to the produce in agricultural year 19591960, for that constituted a deviation from Section 48 of
RepublicActNo.1199,andfromthedoctrineenunciatedinVelascov.CAR,etal.(109Phil.,642).
Therealquestion,however,beforethisCourtis:Maytheagrariancourt,indeterminingwhatshouldbetheannual
lease rental, if direct evidence on the normal harvest of one of the three preceding agricultural years, prior to the
establishmentofleasehold,isnotavailable,considerevidencecircumstantialincharacterinordertopreventadelay
inthesettlementoftheconflictbetweentheagriculturallessorandlessee?
Theprovisionoflawwhichthepartiescorrectlyconcedeisapplicable,isSection46ofRepublicActNo.1199,as
amendedbySection14ofRepublicActNo.2263,whichstatesinpart:
(a)Thefixedconsiderationfortheuseofricelands,shallnotbemorethantheequivalentoftwentyfive
per centum in case of first class land and twenty per centum in case of second class land of the
average gross produce, after deducting the same amount of palay used as seed and the cost of
harvestingandthreshingofthepastthreenormalharvest:Provided,Thatifthelandholderintroduced
improvements on the farm which will increase its productivity, he may demand for an increase in the
rental proportionate to the increase in production resulting from such improvements. In case of
disagreement the Court shall determine the reasonable increase in rental. Classification of ricelands
shallbedeterminedbyproductivityfirstclasslandsbeingthosewhichyieldmorethanfortycavansper
hectareandsecondclassbeingthosewhichyieldfortycavansorless,thesametobecomputedupon
thenormalaverageharvestofthethreeprecedingyears.
1. It is true that in Velasco v. Court of Agrarian Relations,1 We declared that where the legality of the annual lease
rentalsofanagriculturalleaseholdisdisputed,thepartywhoclaimstherentalsasexcessivehastheburdenofprovingthat
thesameareexcessiveandarenotconformabletolaw.IntheVelascocase,however,thereisnoquestionthattherewas
factual basis for the annual rentals fixed, as the lessor in fact introduced evidence on the normal harvests for the three
agricultural years preceding the leasehold. The circumstance that the agrarian court refused to accord credence to this
leassor is of no moment. Here, We cannot assume that the annual rental fixed by the lessor is in accordance with law as
thereisnotevenanyadequatefactualbasisforsuchannualleaserental,consideringthatthelessorherselfcouldnoteven
showthenormalharvestfortheagriculturalyear19591960,whichunderthelawisoneofthebasesforthedeterminationof
theannualrental.Whileitistrueasageneralrulethatitisincumbentonthelesseechallengingthereasonablenessofthe
rentals to prove that the same are excessive, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, We feel that the lessee has
sufficientlydischargedsuchburdenbyshowingbyevidencewhichmaybeconsideredcircumstantial,theimprobabilitythat
thenormalharvestfortheagriculturalyear19591960couldhaveexceeded100cavans.Itwouldhavebeenpointlessforthe
agrariancourttorequirethelesseetoprovethenormalharvestforthatagriculturalyear,sinceitisafactfoundbyboththe

agrariancourtandtheCourtofAppeals,thatrespondentlesseeonlycommencedworkingonthelandduringtheagricultural
year19601961atthecommencementoftheleasehold,aspriortheretothelandwascultivatedbyothertenants.Thereisno
question that proof of collateral facts and circumstances may be allowed provided the existence of the main fact may be
reasonablyinferredtherefromaccordingtoreasonandcommonexperience.Onthebasisofthefactsthusshownduringthe
trial,theagrariancourtascertainedthatthenormalharvestfortheagriculturalyear19591960was,therefore,100cavans.
Asstatedheretofore,thisfindingoffactwassustainedbytheCourtofAppeals.

2.ItmustbeobservedthattheaforementionedstatutehasbeenenactedbyCongresspursuanttotheconstitutional
mandatethatthe"promotionofsocialjusticetoensurethewellbeingandeconomicsecurityofallthepeopleshall
be the concern of the state" and of the obligation of the state to accord protection to labor and to regulate the
relations between landowner and tenant. Social justice, in the words of Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams, 2
means the "humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in the
rationalandobjectivelysecularconceptionmayatleastbeapproximated."Thestatutewas,therefore,designedtoimprove
thelotofthesharecropperbygrantingtohimamoreequitableparticipationintheproduceofthelandwhichhecultivates.
Viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate and obvious legislative intent, the provisions of the law should be
construedtofurthertheirpurposeofredeemingthetenantfromhisbondageofmisery,wantandoppressionarisingfromthe
onerous terms of his tenancy and to uplift his social and financial status. As we said in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 3 under the
establishedjurisprudenceoftheCourt,intheinterpretationoftenancyandlaborlegislation,"itwillbeguidedbymorethan
justaninquiryintotheletterofthelawasagainstitsspiritandwillultimatelyresolvegravedoubtsinfavorofthetenantand
worker."

ItisforthispurposethatSection10ofRepublicAct1267,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.1409,creatingtheCourt
ofAgrarianRelations,providesthat"inthehearing,investigationanddeterminationofanyquestionorcontroversy
and in exercising any duty and power under this Act, the Court shall, in the hearing and determination of cases
pending before it, not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence." Complementary to this provision is
Section 155 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, which provides that "in the hearing, investigation and
determinationofanyquestionorcontroversypendingbeforethem,theCourtswithoutimpairingsubstantialrights,
shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases."4 We
find,therefore,thatthedecisionoftheagrariancourtisnotonlyinaccordwiththespiritandintentoftheAgriculturalTenancy
ActandLandReformCodebut,moreimportant,withtheaforecitedprinciplesoftheConstitution.

IntheenvironmentofanewsocialorderWecandonoless.Thus,underthenewConstitution,propertyownership
hasbeenimpressedwithasocialfunction.Thisimpliesthattheownerhastheobligationtousehispropertynotonly
tobenefithimselfbutsocietyaswell.Hence,itprovidesundersection6ofArticleIIthereof,thatinthepromotionof
social justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private
property,andequitablydiffusepropertyownershipandprofits."TheConstitutionalsoensuresthattheworkershall
haveajustandlivingwagewhichshouldassureforhimselfandhisfamilyanexistenceworthyofhumandignityand
givehimopportunitiesforabetterlife(Sections7,&9,ofArticleII).
WHEREFORE,thejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsappealedfromisaffirmed.Withoutcosts.
Soordered.
Makalintal,Actg.C.J.,Zaldivar,Castro,Barredo,MakasiarandEsguerra,JJ.,concur.
Teehankee,J.,concursintheresult.

SeparateOpinions

FERNANDO,J.,concurring:
ItiseasytodiscernthattheopinionoftheCourtpennedbyJusticeAntoniowithhischaracteristicthoroughnessand
lucidity possesses merit as to the approach taken, the legal grounds relied upon, and the conclusion reached. It
deservesconcurrence,andthatIyield.Norcantherebeanydissenttotheviewthereinexpressedastohowfarthe
revisedConstitutionhasgoneinmakingmorecomprehensiveandexplicitthesocialjusticeprinciple.Itisdeserving
oftheencomiumheapeduponitbymylearnedcolleague.Nonetheless,Ifeelthataseparateopinionwouldnotbe
amiss, if only to give expression anew to my firmlyheld conviction that even under the 1935 Constitution, no
insuperableobjectiondidexisttomeasurescalculatedtoaidtheimpoverishedandtheneedyamongus,evenifto
dosowouldgreatlycurtailrightsofproperty.

AsfarbackasMay29,1939,intheoriginaldecisioninAngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,1intheconcurring
opinionofJusticeLaurel,notonlyarenownedconstitutionalistbutalsooneoftheleadingdelegatesinthe1934Constitution
Convention,theextensiveamplitudeandthewidescopeofsocialjustice2weredulynoted.Thus"Itshouldbeobservedat
theoutsetthatourConstitutionwasadoptedinthemidstofsurgingunrestanddissatisfactionresultingfromeconomicand
socialdistresswhichwasthreateningthestabilityofgovernmentstheworldover.Alivetothesocialandeconomicforcesat
work,theframersofourConstitutionboldlymettheproblemsanddifficultieswhichfacedthemandendeavoredtocrystalize,
with more or less fidelity, the political, social and economic propositions of their age, and this they did, with the
consciousness that the political and philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a great jurist, "be
doubtedbythenextandperhapsentirelydiscardedbythethird."(ChiefJusticeWinslowinBorguisv.FalkCo.,147Wis327
133 N.W. 209) Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution which are
intended to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between component elements of society through the
applicationofwhatmaybetermedasthejustitiacommunisadvocatedbyGrotiusandLeibnitzmanyyearsagotobesecured
throughthecounterbalancingofeconomicandsocialforcesandopportunitieswhichshouldberegulated,ifnotcontrolled,by
theStateorplaced,asitwere,incustodiasocietatis."Thepromotionofsocialjusticetoinsurethewellbeingandeconomic
securityofallthepeople"wasthusinsertedasavitalprincipleinourConstitution.(Sec.5,Art.II,Constitution.)Andinorder
thatthisdeclarationofprinciplemaynotjustbeanemptymedleyofwords,theConstitutioninvarioussectionsthereofhas
provided the means towards its realization. For instance, section 6 of Article XIII declares that the State "shall afford
protectiontolabor,especiallytoworkingwomenandminors,andshallregulatetherelationsbetweenlandownerandtenant,
andbetweenlaborandcapitalinindustryandinagriculture."Thesamesectionalsostatesthat"theStatemayprovidefor
compulsoryarbitration."Inextraordinarycasesmentionedinsection16,ArticleVI,oftheConstitution,thePresidentofthe
Philippines may be authorized by law, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as the National Assembly may
prescribe,to"promulgaterulesandregulationstocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy."Albeit,almostatthesametimethe
CongressoftheUnitedStatesapprovedtheNationalLaborRelationsAct(49Stat.449)onJuly5,1935,commonlyknown
as the Wagner Act, we were in the Philippines headway towards the adoption of our fundamental law, pursuant to
congressionalauthoritygivenintheTydingsMcDuffieIndependenceAct,approvedMarch24,1934.InourBillofRightswe
now find the following provision: "The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged." (Par. 6, Section 1, Art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the United States which brought about the
recommendation by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a
LaborBillofRightsasanamendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionis,inourcase,virtuallyanacceptedprinciple,which
maybeexpandedandvitalizedbylegislationtokeeppacewiththedevelopmentoftimeandcircumstances."3

He continued his dissertation in these words: "By and large, these provisions in our Constitution all evince and
express the need of shifting emphasis to community interests with a view to affirmative enhancement of human
values. In conformity with the constitutional objective and cognizant of the historical fact that industrial and
agriculturaldisputeshadgivenrisetodisquietude,bloodshedandrevolutioninourcountry,theNationalAssembly
enactedCommonwealthActNo.103entitled"AnActtoaffordprotectionoflaborbycreatingaCourtofIndustrial
Relationsempoweredtofixminimumwagesforlaborersandmaximumrentaltobepaidbytenants,andtoenforce
compulsoryarbitrationbetweenemployersorlandlords,andemployeesortenants,respectivelyandbyprescribing
penaltiesfortheviolationofitsorders"and,later,CommonwealthActNo.213entitled"AnActtodefineandregulate
legitimatelabororganizations."...."4JusticeLaurelhadtheseadditionalobservations:"Fromwhathasbeenstated,it
appearsthatthelegislationwhichwearenowcalledupontoconstruewasenactedinpursuanceofwhatappearstobethe
deliberate embodiment of a new social policy, founded on the conception of a society integrated not by independent
individuals dealing at arms" length, but by interdependent members of a consolidated whole whose interests must be
protected against mutual aggression and warfare among and between divers and diverse units which are impelled by
countervailingandoppositeindividualandgroupinterests,andthisisparticularlytrueintherelationshipbetweenlaborand
capital. Social and industrial disturbance which fifty years ago were feudallike and of isolated importance may now well
result in a serious strain upon the entire economic organism of the nation. In the United States labor legislation has
undergonealongprocessofdevelopmenttoolongtonarratehere,culminatingintheenactmentsofwhatwerecommonly
knownastheClaytonAct,theNorrisLaGuardiaActand,finally,theWagnerActcreatedtheNationalLaborRelationsBoard
asaninstrumentalityoftheFederalGovernmentinthesettlementoflabordisputes,whichdeviseisaimedattheavoidance
of unnecessary friction between labor and capital and the establishment of industrial peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that
countryandofpronouncementsmadebyitsSupremeCourtrevealsacontinuousrenovationandchangemadenecessaryby
the impact of changing needs and economic pressure brought about by the irresistible momentum of new social and
economicforcesdevelopedthere.Inthelightofchangesthathaveoccurred,itisdoubtedifthepronouncementsmadeby
thesaidSupremeCourtin1905(Lochnerv.NewYork,198U.S.45)orin1908(Adairv.U.S.,52L.ed.435,208U.S.161,
and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1) cases which are relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum still
retain their virtuality at the present time. In the Philippines, social legislation has had a similar development, although of
course to a much smaller degree and of different adaptation, giving rise to several attempts at meeting and solving our
peculiar social and economic problems. (See Commonwealth Acts Nos. 37, 104, 139, 211 Presidential Message to the
NationalAssembly,September2,1936ExecutiveOrderNo.49,S.1936.)ThesystemofvoluntaryarbitrationdevisedbyAct
No. 4055 of the defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been abandoned by the enactment of the aforementioned
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In the midst of changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if the
pronouncementmadebythisCourtinthecaseofPeoplev.Pomar,46Phil.440,alsorelieduponbythepetitionerinits
printedmemorandum,stillretainsitsvirtualityasalivingprinciple.Thepolicyoflaissezfairehastosomeextentgivenway
totheassumptionbytheGovernmentoftherightofinterventionevenincontractualrelationsaffectedwithpublicinterest."5

TheaboveauthoritativeexpositionofJusticeLaureloftheindisputableprerogativeofthegovernmentestablished
underthe1935Constitutiontotakesuchactioninthepursuanceofasocialjusticepolicyagainstwhichtheasserted

diminutiontoaconsiderableextentofpropertyrightswouldnotavailsuppliedthebasisforthisCourt'sdecisionin
AntamokGoldfieldsMiningCompanyv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,6decidedbarelyayearlater,onJune28,1940,
sustainingthevalidityoftheCourtofIndustrialRelations
Act.7TowardstheendofthatyearonDecember2,1940,cametheepochaldecisionCalalangv.Williams,8relieduponin
theopinionoftheCourtforthedefinitionofsocialjustice.AsnotedthereinitwasJusticeLaurelwhowastheponente.His
conceptofsocialjusticeunderthe1935Constitutionwhichwouldnegateaniggardlyinterpretationbasedonatenderregard
forpropertyrightsdeservestobequotedinfull.Thus:"Socialjusticeis"neithercommunism,nordespotism,norantomism,
noranarchy,"butthehumanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothatjusticein
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
componentelementsofsociety,throughthemaintenanceofapropereconomicandsocialequilibriumintheinterrelationsof
themembersofthecommunity,constitutionally,throughtheadoptionofmeasureslegallyjustifiable,orextraconstitutionally
throughtheexerciseofpowersunderlyingtheexistenceofallgovernmentsonthetimehonoredprincipleofsaluspopuliest
supremalex.Socialjustice,therefore,mustbefoundedontherecognitionofthenecessityofinterdependenceamongdivers
anddiverseunitsofasocietyandoftheprotectionthatshouldbeequallyandevenlyextendedtoallgroupsasacombined
forceinoursocialandeconomiclife,consistentwiththefundamentalandparamountobjectiveofthestateofpromotingthe
health,comfort,andquietofallpersons,andofbringingabout"thegreatestgoodtothegreatestnumber.""9

Thatthevalidityofsuchanapproachhasnotbeenimpairedbytimeandcircumstanceismadeclearinarelatively
recent decision, Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions, 10 with
Acting Chief Justice Makalintal speaking for the Court. As was clearly pointed out by him: "The growing complexities of
modernsociety,however,haverenderedthistraditionalclassificationofthefunctionsofgovernmentquiteunrealistic,notto
sayobsolete.Theareaswhichusedtobelefttoprivateenterpriseandinitiativeandwhichthegovernmentwascalledupon
toenteroptionally,andonly"becauseitwasbetterequippedtoadministerforthepublicwelfarethanisanyprivateindividual
or group of individuals," continue to lose their welldefined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
governmentmustundertakeinitssovereigncapacityifitistomeettheincreasingsocialchallengesofthetimes.Hereas
almosteverywhereelsethetendencyisundoubtedlytowardsagreatersocializationofeconomicforces.

Hereofcoursethisdevelopmentwasenvisioned,indeedadoptedasanationalpolicy,bytheConstitutionitselfinits
declarationofprincipleconcerningthepromotionofsocialjustice."11
Inaseparateopinioninthatdecision,thesamethoughtfindsexpressioninthisexcerpt:"Theinfluenceexertedby
AmericanconstitutionaldoctrinesunavoidablewhenthePhilippineswasstillunderAmericanrulenotwithstanding,
an influence that has not altogether vanished even after independence, the laissezfaireprincipleneverfoundfull
acceptanceinthisjurisdiction,evenduringtheperiodofitsfullfloweringintheUnitedStates.Moreover,toerase
anydoubts,theConstitutionalConventionsawtoitthatourfundamentallawembodiesapolicyoftheresponsibility
thrust on government to cope with social and economic problems and an earnest and sincere commitment to the
promotion of the general welfare through state action. It would thus follow that the force of any legal objection to
regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights or to statutes organizing public corporations that may
engageincompetitionwithprivateenterprisehasbeenblunted.Unlesstherebeaclearshowingofanyinvasionof
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, their validity is a foregone conclusion. No fear need be entertained that
thereby spheres hitherto deemed outside government domain have been encroached upon. With our explicit
disavowalofthe"constituentministrant"test,theghostofthe
laissezfaire concept no longer stalks the juridical stage." 12 In support of the above view, the words of two leading
delegates,ManuelRoxas,latertheFirstPresidentoftheRepublicandRafaelPalma,aformerPresidentoftheUniversityof
thePhilippines,werecited.AstoDelegateRoxas:"Ourconstitutionwhichtookeffectin1935,upontheinaugurationofthe
CommonwealthofthePhilippines,erasedwhateverdoubtstheremightbeonthatscore.Itsphilosophyisantitheticaltothe
laissezfaireconcept.Delegate,laterPresident,ManuelRoxas,oneoftheleadingmembersoftheConstitutionalConvention,
inanswerpreciselytoanobjectionofDelegateJoseReyesofSorsogon,whonotedthe"vastextensionsinthesphereof
governmentalfunctions"andthe"almostunlimitedpowertointerfereintheaffairsofindustryandagricultureaswellasto
compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other
jurisdictions,spokethus:"Myansweristhatthisconstitutionhasadefiniteandwelldefinedphilosophy,notonlypoliticalbut
socialandeconomic.Aconstitutionthatin1776orin1789wassufficientintheUnitedStates,consideringtheproblemsthey
hadatthattime,maynotnowbesufficientwiththegrowingandeverwideningcomplexitiesofsocialandeconomicproblems
and relations. If the United States of America were to call a convention today to draft a constitution for the United States,
doesanyonedoubtthatintheprovisionsofthatconstitutiontherewillbefounddefinitedeclarationsofpolicyastoeconomic
tendenciesthattherewillbematterswhicharenecessaryinaccordancewiththeexperienceoftheAmericanpeopleduring
theseyearswhenvastorganizationsofcapitalandtradehavesucceededtoacertaindegreetocontrolthelifeanddestinyof
theAmericanpeople?Ifinthisconstitutionthegentlemanwillfinddeclarationsofeconomicpolicy,theyaretherebecause
theyarenecessarytosafeguardtheinterestsandwelfareoftheFilipinopeoplebecausewebelievethatthedayshavecome
when in selfdefense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the
freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a
constitutional provision automatically imposes." Delegate Roxas continued further: "The government is the creature of the
peopleandthegovernmentexercisesitspowersandfunctionsinaccordancewiththewillandpurposesofthepeople.That
is the first principle, the most important one underlying this document is, in its form, in our opinion, the most adapted to
prevailingconditions,circumstancesandthepoliticaloutlookoftheFilipinopeople.Rizalsaid,"Everypeoplehasthekindof
government that they deserve." That is just another form of expressing the principle in politics enunciated by the French
philosophers when they said: "Every people has the right to establish the form of government which they believe is most

conducivetotheirwelfareandtheirliberty."Whyhavewepreferredthegovernmentthatisestablishedinthisdraft?Because
itisthegovernmentwithwhichwearefamiliar.Itistheformofgovernmentfundamentallysuchasitexiststodaybecauseit
istheonlykindofgovernmentthatourpeopleunderstanditisthekindofgovernmentwehavefoundtobeinconsonance
withourexperience,withthenecessarymodification,capableofpermittingafairplayofsocialforcesandallowingthepeople
toconducttheaffairsofthatgovernment."" 13 As to Palma: "One of the most prominent delegates, a leading intellectual,
former President Rafael Palma of the University of the Philippines, stressed as a fundamental principle in the draft of the
Constitutionthelimitationontherighttoproperty.Hepointedoutthatthethenprevailingviewallowedtheaccumulationof
wealthinonefamilydowntothelastremotedescendant,resultinginagravedisequilibriumandbringinginitswakeextreme
misery side by side with conspicuous luxury. He did invite attention to the few millionaires at one extreme with the vast
massesofFilipinosdeprivedofthenecessitiesoflifeattheother.HeaskedtheConventionwhethertheFilipinopeoplecould
longremainindifferenttosuchadeplorablesituation.Forhimtospeakofademocracyundersuchcircumstanceswouldbe
nothing but an illusion. He would thus emphasize the urgent need to remedy the grave social injustice that had produced
suchwidespreadimpoverishment,thusrecognizingthevitalroleofgovernmentinthissphere."14

It could thus be concluded: "The regime of liberty contemplated in the Constitution with social justice as a
fundamental principle to reinforce the pledge in the preamble of promoting the general welfare reflects traditional
concepts of a democratic policy infused with an awareness of the vital and pressing need for the government to
assumeamuchmoreactiveandvigorousroleintheconductofpublicaffairs.Theframersofourfundamentallaw
wereasoneintheirstronglyheldbeliefthattherebythegraveandseriousinfirmitythenconfrontingourbodypolitic,
onthewholestillwithusnow,ofgreatinequalityofwealthandmasspoverty,withthegreatbulkofourpeopleill
clad, illhoused, illfed, could be remedied. Nothing else than communal effort, massive in extent and earnestly
engaged in, would suffice. To paraphrase Laski, with the necessary modification in line with such worthy
constitutionalends,welookuponthestateasanorganizationtopromotethehappinessofindividuals,itsauthority
as a power bound by subordination to that purpose, liberty while to be viewed negatively as absence of restraint
impressed with a positive aspect as well as to assure individual selffulfillment in the attainment of which greater
responsibilityisthrustongovernmentandrightsasboundarymarksdefiningareasoutsideitsdomain.Fromwhich
itwouldfollowasLaskisoaptlystatedthatitistheindividual's"happinessandnotitswellbeing[thatis]thecriterion
bywhichitsbehavior[is]tobejudged.Hisinterests,andnotitspowers,setthelimitstotheauthorityit[is]entitledto
exercise."Wehaveundersuchatestenlargeditsfieldofcompetence."15
A year previous to the Agricultural Credit decision, in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 16 this Court had
stressedthefutilityofassailingsocialjusticemeasuresonthesolegroundoftheiradverseeffectonproperty.Thus:"Itisto
beadmittedofcoursethatpropertyrightsfindshelterinspecificconstitutionalprovisions,oneofwhichisthedueprocess
clause.Itisequallycertainthatourfundamentallawframedatatimeof"surgingunrestanddissatisfaction",whentherewas
the fear expressed in many quarters that a constitutional democracy, in view of its commitment to the claims of property,
wouldnotbeabletocopeeffectivelywiththeproblemsofpovertyandmiserythatunfortunatelyafflictsomanyofourpeople,
is not susceptible to the indictment that the government therein established is impotent to take the necessary remedial
measures.Theframerssawtothat.ThewelfarestateconceptisnotalientothephilosophyofourConstitution.Itisimplicitin
quiteafewofitsprovisions.Itsufficestomentiontwo.Thereistheclauseonthepromotionofsocialjusticetoensurethe
wellbeingandeconomicsecurityofallthepeople,aswellasthepledgeofprotectiontolaborwiththespecificauthorityto
regulatetherelationsbetweenlandownersandtenantsandbetweenlaborandcapital.Thisparticularizedreferencetothe
rightsofworkingmenwhetherinindustryandagriculturecertainlycannotprecludeattentiontoandconcernfortherightsof
consumers, who are the objects of solicitude in the legislation now complained of. The police power as an attribute to
promotethecommonwealwouldbedilutedconsiderablyofitsreachandeffectivenessifonthemerepleathatthelibertyto
contractwouldberestricted,thestatutecomplainedofmaybecharacterizedasadenialofdueprocess.Therighttoproperty
cannotbepressedtosuchanunreasonableextreme."17Onlyrecently,threeyearsago,inEduv.Ericta,18therewasagain
a reiteration of the undeniable competence of the government under the 1935 Constitution to vitalize the social justice
conceptevenittodosowouldconstituteanintrusionintowhat,underapolicyalientothatadoptedbysuchfundamentallaw,
wasadomainbeyondthepowerofthestatetoinvade.AssetforthintheopinionoftheCourt:"Whatismore,toeraseany
doubts,theConstitutionalConventionsawtoitthattheconceptoflaissezfairewasrejected.Itentrustedtoourgovernment
the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic
affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No constitutional
objectiontoregulatorymeasuresadverselyaffectingpropertyrights,especiallysowhenpublicsafetyistheaim,islikelyto
beheeded,unlessofcourseontheclearestandmostsatisfactoryproofofinvasionofrightsguaranteedbytheConstitution.
On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because, the laissezfaire principle was disregarded but
because the due process, equal protection, or nonimpairment guarantees would call for vindication. To repeat, our
Constitutionwhichtookeffectin1935erasedwhateverdoubtstheremightbeonthatscore.Itsphilosophyisarepudiationof
laissezfaire."19

Thereferencetotheabovedoctrinesisnottobeconstruedasinanywayintendedtodetractfromtheindisputable
meritthatattachestotherevisedConstitutionwheresocialjusticeisconcerned.Asamatteroflaw,itisnotlikely
thatsinceeffectivity,counsel,zealousintheirdefenseofproperty,wouldstillbotherthisCourtwithaphilosophythat
hadserveditsdayandhadbeensospecificallythereinrepudiated.Thatsucheffortsaremorethaneverdoomedto
futilityshouldbequiteobvious.Nonetheless,thewriterofthisopinionhadtogiveexpressiontohisviewsifonlyby
wayofdeservedtributetotheframersofthe1935Constitution,whohadthevisionandforesighttoprovideforthe
solutionofthenation'sgrowingpains,whichunfortunatelyafflictusmuchmoresonow,andwhichfortunatelyunder

the present charter, the government has sought to put an end to by what is to be hoped are more efficacious
remedialmeasures.

SeparateOpinions
FERNANDO,J.,concurring:
ItiseasytodiscernthattheopinionoftheCourtpennedbyJusticeAntoniowithhischaracteristicthoroughnessand
luciditypossessesmeritastotheapproachtaken,thelegalgroundsreliedupon,andtheconclusionreached.It
deservesconcurrence,andthatIyield.Norcantherebeanydissenttotheviewthereinexpressedastohowfarthe
revisedConstitutionhasgoneinmakingmorecomprehensiveandexplicitthesocialjusticeprinciple.Itisdeserving
oftheencomiumheapeduponitbymylearnedcolleague.Nonetheless,Ifeelthataseparateopinionwouldnotbe
amiss,ifonlytogiveexpressionanewtomyfirmlyheldconvictionthatevenunderthe1935Constitution,no
insuperableobjectiondidexisttomeasurescalculatedtoaidtheimpoverishedandtheneedyamongus,evenifto
dosowouldgreatlycurtailrightsofproperty.
AsfarbackasMay29,1939,intheoriginaldecisioninAngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,1intheconcurring
opinionofJusticeLaurel,notonlyarenownedconstitutionalistbutalsooneoftheleadingdelegatesinthe1934Constitution
Convention,theextensiveamplitudeandthewidescopeofsocialjustice2weredulynoted.Thus"Itshouldbeobservedat
theoutsetthatourConstitutionwasadoptedinthemidstofsurgingunrestanddissatisfactionresultingfromeconomicand
socialdistresswhichwasthreateningthestabilityofgovernmentstheworldover.Alivetothesocialandeconomicforcesat
work,theframersofourConstitutionboldlymettheproblemsanddifficultieswhichfacedthemandendeavoredtocrystalize,
withmoreorlessfidelity,thepolitical,socialandeconomicpropositionsoftheirage,andthistheydid,withthe
consciousnessthatthepoliticalandphilosophicalaphorismoftheirgenerationwill,inthelanguageofagreatjurist,"be
doubtedbythenextandperhapsentirelydiscardedbythethird."(ChiefJusticeWinslowinBorguisv.FalkCo.,147Wis327
133N.W.209)Embodyingthespiritofthepresentepoch,generalprovisionswereinsertedintheConstitutionwhichare
intendedtobringabouttheneededsocialandeconomicequilibriumbetweencomponentelementsofsocietythroughthe
applicationofwhatmaybetermedasthejustitiacommunisadvocatedbyGrotiusandLeibnitzmanyyearsagotobesecured
throughthecounterbalancingofeconomicandsocialforcesandopportunitieswhichshouldberegulated,ifnotcontrolled,by
theStateorplaced,asitwere,incustodiasocietatis."Thepromotionofsocialjusticetoinsurethewellbeingandeconomic
securityofallthepeople"wasthusinsertedasavitalprincipleinourConstitution.(Sec.5,Art.II,Constitution.)Andinorder
thatthisdeclarationofprinciplemaynotjustbeanemptymedleyofwords,theConstitutioninvarioussectionsthereofhas
providedthemeanstowardsitsrealization.Forinstance,section6ofArticleXIIIdeclaresthattheState"shallafford
protectiontolabor,especiallytoworkingwomenandminors,andshallregulatetherelationsbetweenlandownerandtenant,
andbetweenlaborandcapitalinindustryandinagriculture."Thesamesectionalsostatesthat"theStatemayprovidefor
compulsoryarbitration."Inextraordinarycasesmentionedinsection16,ArticleVI,oftheConstitution,thePresidentofthe
Philippinesmaybeauthorizedbylaw,foralimitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsastheNationalAssemblymay
prescribe,to"promulgaterulesandregulationstocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy."Albeit,almostatthesametimethe
CongressoftheUnitedStatesapprovedtheNationalLaborRelationsAct(49Stat.449)onJuly5,1935,commonlyknown
astheWagnerAct,wewereinthePhilippinesheadwaytowardstheadoptionofourfundamentallaw,pursuantto
congressionalauthoritygivenintheTydingsMcDuffieIndependenceAct,approvedMarch24,1934.InourBillofRightswe
nowfindthefollowingprovision:"Therighttoformassociationsorsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolawshallnotbe
abridged."(Par.6,Section1,Art.III,Constitution.)WhatwasanagitationintheUnitedStateswhichbroughtaboutthe
recommendationbytheCommissiononIndustrialRelationscreatedbyanActofCongressin1912fortheadoptionofa
LaborBillofRightsasanamendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionis,inourcase,virtuallyanacceptedprinciple,which
maybeexpandedandvitalizedbylegislationtokeeppacewiththedevelopmentoftimeandcircumstances."3

Hecontinuedhisdissertationinthesewords:"Byandlarge,theseprovisionsinourConstitutionallevinceand
expresstheneedofshiftingemphasistocommunityinterestswithaviewtoaffirmativeenhancementofhuman
values.Inconformitywiththeconstitutionalobjectiveandcognizantofthehistoricalfactthatindustrialand
agriculturaldisputeshadgivenrisetodisquietude,bloodshedandrevolutioninourcountry,theNationalAssembly
enactedCommonwealthActNo.103entitled"AnActtoaffordprotectionoflaborbycreatingaCourtofIndustrial
Relationsempoweredtofixminimumwagesforlaborersandmaximumrentaltobepaidbytenants,andtoenforce
compulsoryarbitrationbetweenemployersorlandlords,andemployeesortenants,respectivelyandbyprescribing
penaltiesfortheviolationofitsorders"and,later,CommonwealthActNo.213entitled"AnActtodefineandregulate
legitimatelabororganizations."...."4JusticeLaurelhadtheseadditionalobservations:"Fromwhathasbeenstated,it
appearsthatthelegislationwhichwearenowcalledupontoconstruewasenactedinpursuanceofwhatappearstobethe
deliberateembodimentofanewsocialpolicy,foundedontheconceptionofasocietyintegratednotbyindependent
individualsdealingatarms"length,butbyinterdependentmembersofaconsolidatedwholewhoseinterestsmustbe
protectedagainstmutualaggressionandwarfareamongandbetweendiversanddiverseunitswhichareimpelledby
countervailingandoppositeindividualandgroupinterests,andthisisparticularlytrueintherelationshipbetweenlaborand
capital.Socialandindustrialdisturbancewhichfiftyyearsagowerefeudallikeandofisolatedimportancemaynowwell
resultinaseriousstrainupontheentireeconomicorganismofthenation.IntheUnitedStateslaborlegislationhas
undergonealongprocessofdevelopmenttoolongtonarratehere,culminatingintheenactmentsofwhatwerecommonly

knownastheClaytonAct,theNorrisLaGuardiaActand,finally,theWagnerActcreatedtheNationalLaborRelationsBoard
asaninstrumentalityoftheFederalGovernmentinthesettlementoflabordisputes,whichdeviseisaimedattheavoidance
ofunnecessaryfrictionbetweenlaborandcapitalandtheestablishmentofindustrialpeace.Scrutinyoflegislationinthat
countryandofpronouncementsmadebyitsSupremeCourtrevealsacontinuousrenovationandchangemadenecessaryby
theimpactofchangingneedsandeconomicpressurebroughtaboutbytheirresistiblemomentumofnewsocialand
economicforcesdevelopedthere.Inthelightofchangesthathaveoccurred,itisdoubtedifthepronouncementsmadeby
thesaidSupremeCourtin1905(Lochnerv.NewYork,198U.S.45)orin1908(Adairv.U.S.,52L.ed.435,208U.S.161,
andCoppagev.Kansas,236U.S.1)caseswhicharerelieduponbythepetitionerinitsprintedmemorandumstill
retaintheirvirtualityatthepresenttime.InthePhilippines,sociallegislationhashadasimilardevelopment,althoughof
coursetoamuchsmallerdegreeandofdifferentadaptation,givingrisetoseveralattemptsatmeetingandsolvingour
peculiarsocialandeconomicproblems.(SeeCommonwealthActsNos.37,104,139,211PresidentialMessagetothe
NationalAssembly,September2,1936ExecutiveOrderNo.49,S.1936.)ThesystemofvoluntaryarbitrationdevisedbyAct
No.4055ofthedefunctPhilippineLegislaturehasapparentlybeenabandonedbytheenactmentoftheaforementioned
CommonwealthActsNos.103and213.Inthemidstofchangesthathavetakenplace,itmaylikewisebedoubtedifthe
pronouncementmadebythisCourtinthecaseofPeoplev.Pomar,46Phil.440,alsorelieduponbythepetitionerinits
printedmemorandum,stillretainsitsvirtualityasalivingprinciple.Thepolicyoflaissezfairehastosomeextentgivenway
totheassumptionbytheGovernmentoftherightofinterventionevenincontractualrelationsaffectedwithpublicinterest."5

TheaboveauthoritativeexpositionofJusticeLaureloftheindisputableprerogativeofthegovernmentestablished
underthe1935Constitutiontotakesuchactioninthepursuanceofasocialjusticepolicyagainstwhichtheasserted
diminutiontoaconsiderableextentofpropertyrightswouldnotavailsuppliedthebasisforthisCourt'sdecisionin
AntamokGoldfieldsMiningCompanyv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,6decidedbarelyayearlater,onJune28,1940,
sustainingthevalidityoftheCourtofIndustrialRelations
Act.7TowardstheendofthatyearonDecember2,1940,cametheepochaldecisionCalalangv.Williams,8relieduponin
theopinionoftheCourtforthedefinitionofsocialjustice.AsnotedthereinitwasJusticeLaurelwhowastheponente.His
conceptofsocialjusticeunderthe1935Constitutionwhichwouldnegateaniggardlyinterpretationbasedonatenderregard
forpropertyrightsdeservestobequotedinfull.Thus:"Socialjusticeis"neithercommunism,nordespotism,norantomism,
noranarchy,"butthehumanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothatjusticein
itsrationalandobjectivelysecularconceptionmayatleastbeapproximated.Socialjusticemeansthepromotionofthe
welfareofallthepeople,theadoptionbytheGovernmentofmeasurescalculatedtoinsureeconomicstabilityofallthe
componentelementsofsociety,throughthemaintenanceofapropereconomicandsocialequilibriumintheinterrelationsof
themembersofthecommunity,constitutionally,throughtheadoptionofmeasureslegallyjustifiable,orextraconstitutionally
throughtheexerciseofpowersunderlyingtheexistenceofallgovernmentsonthetimehonoredprincipleofsaluspopuliest
supremalex.Socialjustice,therefore,mustbefoundedontherecognitionofthenecessityofinterdependenceamongdivers
anddiverseunitsofasocietyandoftheprotectionthatshouldbeequallyandevenlyextendedtoallgroupsasacombined
forceinoursocialandeconomiclife,consistentwiththefundamentalandparamountobjectiveofthestateofpromotingthe
health,comfort,andquietofallpersons,andofbringingabout"thegreatestgoodtothegreatestnumber.""9

Thatthevalidityofsuchanapproachhasnotbeenimpairedbytimeandcircumstanceismadeclearinarelatively
recentdecision,AgriculturalCreditandCooperativeFinancingAdministrationv.ConfederationofUnions,10with
ActingChiefJusticeMakalintalspeakingfortheCourt.Aswasclearlypointedoutbyhim:"Thegrowingcomplexitiesof
modernsociety,however,haverenderedthistraditionalclassificationofthefunctionsofgovernmentquiteunrealistic,notto
sayobsolete.Theareaswhichusedtobelefttoprivateenterpriseandinitiativeandwhichthegovernmentwascalledupon
toenteroptionally,andonly"becauseitwasbetterequippedtoadministerforthepublicwelfarethanisanyprivateindividual
orgroupofindividuals,"continuetolosetheirwelldefinedboundariesandtobeabsorbedwithinactivitiesthatthe
governmentmustundertakeinitssovereigncapacityifitistomeettheincreasingsocialchallengesofthetimes.Hereas
almosteverywhereelsethetendencyisundoubtedlytowardsagreatersocializationofeconomicforces.

Hereofcoursethisdevelopmentwasenvisioned,indeedadoptedasanationalpolicy,bytheConstitutionitselfinits
declarationofprincipleconcerningthepromotionofsocialjustice."11
Inaseparateopinioninthatdecision,thesamethoughtfindsexpressioninthisexcerpt:"Theinfluenceexertedby
AmericanconstitutionaldoctrinesunavoidablewhenthePhilippineswasstillunderAmericanrulenotwithstanding,
aninfluencethathasnotaltogethervanishedevenafterindependence,thelaissezfaireprincipleneverfoundfull
acceptanceinthisjurisdiction,evenduringtheperiodofitsfullfloweringintheUnitedStates.Moreover,toerase
anydoubts,theConstitutionalConventionsawtoitthatourfundamentallawembodiesapolicyoftheresponsibility
thrustongovernmenttocopewithsocialandeconomicproblemsandanearnestandsincerecommitmenttothe
promotionofthegeneralwelfarethroughstateaction.Itwouldthusfollowthattheforceofanylegalobjectionto
regulatorymeasuresadverselyaffectingpropertyrightsortostatutesorganizingpubliccorporationsthatmay
engageincompetitionwithprivateenterprisehasbeenblunted.Unlesstherebeaclearshowingofanyinvasionof
rightsguaranteedbytheConstitution,theirvalidityisaforegoneconclusion.Nofearneedbeentertainedthat
therebysphereshithertodeemedoutsidegovernmentdomainhavebeenencroachedupon.Withourexplicit
disavowalofthe"constituentministrant"test,theghostofthe
laissezfaireconceptnolongerstalksthejuridicalstage."12Insupportoftheaboveview,thewordsoftwoleading
delegates,ManuelRoxas,latertheFirstPresidentoftheRepublicandRafaelPalma,aformerPresidentoftheUniversityof
thePhilippines,werecited.AstoDelegateRoxas:"Ourconstitutionwhichtookeffectin1935,upontheinaugurationofthe
CommonwealthofthePhilippines,erasedwhateverdoubtstheremightbeonthatscore.Itsphilosophyisantitheticaltothe

laissezfaireconcept.Delegate,laterPresident,ManuelRoxas,oneoftheleadingmembersoftheConstitutionalConvention,
inanswerpreciselytoanobjectionofDelegateJoseReyesofSorsogon,whonotedthe"vastextensionsinthesphereof
governmentalfunctions"andthe"almostunlimitedpowertointerfereintheaffairsofindustryandagricultureaswellasto
competewithexistingbusiness"as"reflectionsofthefascinationexertedby[thethen]currenttendencies"inother
jurisdictions,spokethus:"Myansweristhatthisconstitutionhasadefiniteandwelldefinedphilosophy,notonlypoliticalbut
socialandeconomic.Aconstitutionthatin1776orin1789wassufficientintheUnitedStates,consideringtheproblemsthey
hadatthattime,maynotnowbesufficientwiththegrowingandeverwideningcomplexitiesofsocialandeconomicproblems
andrelations.IftheUnitedStatesofAmericaweretocallaconventiontodaytodraftaconstitutionfortheUnitedStates,
doesanyonedoubtthatintheprovisionsofthatconstitutiontherewillbefounddefinitedeclarationsofpolicyastoeconomic
tendenciesthattherewillbematterswhicharenecessaryinaccordancewiththeexperienceoftheAmericanpeopleduring
theseyearswhenvastorganizationsofcapitalandtradehavesucceededtoacertaindegreetocontrolthelifeanddestinyof
theAmericanpeople?Ifinthisconstitutionthegentlemanwillfinddeclarationsofeconomicpolicy,theyaretherebecause
theyarenecessarytosafeguardtheinterestsandwelfareoftheFilipinopeoplebecausewebelievethatthedayshavecome
wheninselfdefense,anationmayprovideinitsconstitutionthosesafeguards,thepatrimony,thefreedomtogrow,the
freedomtodevelopnationalaspirationsandnationalinterests,nottobehamperedbytheartificialboundarieswhicha
constitutionalprovisionautomaticallyimposes."DelegateRoxascontinuedfurther:"Thegovernmentisthecreatureofthe
peopleandthegovernmentexercisesitspowersandfunctionsinaccordancewiththewillandpurposesofthepeople.That
isthefirstprinciple,themostimportantoneunderlyingthisdocumentis,initsform,inouropinion,themostadaptedto
prevailingconditions,circumstancesandthepoliticaloutlookoftheFilipinopeople.Rizalsaid,"Everypeoplehasthekindof
governmentthattheydeserve."ThatisjustanotherformofexpressingtheprincipleinpoliticsenunciatedbytheFrench
philosopherswhentheysaid:"Everypeoplehastherighttoestablishtheformofgovernmentwhichtheybelieveismost
conducivetotheirwelfareandtheirliberty."Whyhavewepreferredthegovernmentthatisestablishedinthisdraft?Because
itisthegovernmentwithwhichwearefamiliar.Itistheformofgovernmentfundamentallysuchasitexiststodaybecauseit
istheonlykindofgovernmentthatourpeopleunderstanditisthekindofgovernmentwehavefoundtobeinconsonance
withourexperience,withthenecessarymodification,capableofpermittingafairplayofsocialforcesandallowingthepeople
toconducttheaffairsofthatgovernment.""13AstoPalma:"Oneofthemostprominentdelegates,aleadingintellectual,
formerPresidentRafaelPalmaoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,stressedasafundamentalprincipleinthedraftofthe
Constitutionthelimitationontherighttoproperty.Hepointedoutthatthethenprevailingviewallowedtheaccumulationof
wealthinonefamilydowntothelastremotedescendant,resultinginagravedisequilibriumandbringinginitswakeextreme
miserysidebysidewithconspicuousluxury.Hedidinviteattentiontothefewmillionairesatoneextremewiththevast
massesofFilipinosdeprivedofthenecessitiesoflifeattheother.HeaskedtheConventionwhethertheFilipinopeoplecould
longremainindifferenttosuchadeplorablesituation.Forhimtospeakofademocracyundersuchcircumstanceswouldbe
nothingbutanillusion.Hewouldthusemphasizetheurgentneedtoremedythegravesocialinjusticethathadproduced
suchwidespreadimpoverishment,thusrecognizingthevitalroleofgovernmentinthissphere."14

Itcouldthusbeconcluded:"TheregimeoflibertycontemplatedintheConstitutionwithsocialjusticeasa
fundamentalprincipletoreinforcethepledgeinthepreambleofpromotingthegeneralwelfarereflectstraditional
conceptsofademocraticpolicyinfusedwithanawarenessofthevitalandpressingneedforthegovernmentto
assumeamuchmoreactiveandvigorousroleintheconductofpublicaffairs.Theframersofourfundamentallaw
wereasoneintheirstronglyheldbeliefthattherebythegraveandseriousinfirmitythenconfrontingourbodypolitic,
onthewholestillwithusnow,ofgreatinequalityofwealthandmasspoverty,withthegreatbulkofourpeopleill
clad,illhoused,illfed,couldberemedied.Nothingelsethancommunaleffort,massiveinextentandearnestly
engagedin,wouldsuffice.ToparaphraseLaski,withthenecessarymodificationinlinewithsuchworthy
constitutionalends,welookuponthestateasanorganizationtopromotethehappinessofindividuals,itsauthority
asapowerboundbysubordinationtothatpurpose,libertywhiletobeviewednegativelyasabsenceofrestraint
impressedwithapositiveaspectaswellastoassureindividualselffulfillmentintheattainmentofwhichgreater
responsibilityisthrustongovernmentandrightsasboundarymarksdefiningareasoutsideitsdomain.Fromwhich
itwouldfollowasLaskisoaptlystatedthatitistheindividual's"happinessandnotitswellbeing[thatis]thecriterion
bywhichitsbehavior[is]tobejudged.Hisinterests,andnotitspowers,setthelimitstotheauthorityit[is]entitledto
exercise."Wehaveundersuchatestenlargeditsfieldofcompetence."15
AyearprevioustotheAgriculturalCreditdecision,inAlalayanv.NationalPowerCorporation,16thisCourthad
stressedthefutilityofassailingsocialjusticemeasuresonthesolegroundoftheiradverseeffectonproperty.Thus:"Itisto
beadmittedofcoursethatpropertyrightsfindshelterinspecificconstitutionalprovisions,oneofwhichisthedueprocess
clause.Itisequallycertainthatourfundamentallawframedatatimeof"surgingunrestanddissatisfaction",whentherewas
thefearexpressedinmanyquartersthataconstitutionaldemocracy,inviewofitscommitmenttotheclaimsofproperty,
wouldnotbeabletocopeeffectivelywiththeproblemsofpovertyandmiserythatunfortunatelyafflictsomanyofourpeople,
isnotsusceptibletotheindictmentthatthegovernmentthereinestablishedisimpotenttotakethenecessaryremedial
measures.Theframerssawtothat.ThewelfarestateconceptisnotalientothephilosophyofourConstitution.Itisimplicitin
quiteafewofitsprovisions.Itsufficestomentiontwo.Thereistheclauseonthepromotionofsocialjusticetoensurethe
wellbeingandeconomicsecurityofallthepeople,aswellasthepledgeofprotectiontolaborwiththespecificauthorityto
regulatetherelationsbetweenlandownersandtenantsandbetweenlaborandcapital.Thisparticularizedreferencetothe
rightsofworkingmenwhetherinindustryandagriculturecertainlycannotprecludeattentiontoandconcernfortherightsof
consumers,whoaretheobjectsofsolicitudeinthelegislationnowcomplainedof.Thepolicepowerasanattributeto
promotethecommonwealwouldbedilutedconsiderablyofitsreachandeffectivenessifonthemerepleathatthelibertyto
contractwouldberestricted,thestatutecomplainedofmaybecharacterizedasadenialofdueprocess.Therighttoproperty
cannotbepressedtosuchanunreasonableextreme."17Onlyrecently,threeyearsago,inEduv.Ericta,18therewasagain
areiterationoftheundeniablecompetenceofthegovernmentunderthe1935Constitutiontovitalizethesocialjustice

conceptevenittodosowouldconstituteanintrusionintowhat,underapolicyalientothatadoptedbysuchfundamentallaw,
wasadomainbeyondthepowerofthestatetoinvade.AssetforthintheopinionoftheCourt:"Whatismore,toeraseany
doubts,theConstitutionalConventionsawtoitthattheconceptoflaissezfairewasrejected.Itentrustedtoourgovernment
theresponsibilityofcopingwithsocialandeconomicproblemswiththecommensuratepowerofcontrolovereconomic
affairs.Therebyitcouldliveuptoitscommitmenttopromotethegeneralwelfarethroughstateaction.Noconstitutional
objectiontoregulatorymeasuresadverselyaffectingpropertyrights,especiallysowhenpublicsafetyistheaim,islikelyto
beheeded,unlessofcourseontheclearestandmostsatisfactoryproofofinvasionofrightsguaranteedbytheConstitution.
Onsuchashowing,theremaybeadeclarationofnullity,butnotbecause,thelaissezfaireprinciplewasdisregardedbut
becausethedueprocess,equalprotection,ornonimpairmentguaranteeswouldcallforvindication.Torepeat,our
Constitutionwhichtookeffectin1935erasedwhateverdoubtstheremightbeonthatscore.Itsphilosophyisarepudiationof
laissezfaire."19

Thereferencetotheabovedoctrinesisnottobeconstruedasinanywayintendedtodetractfromtheindisputable
meritthatattachestotherevisedConstitutionwheresocialjusticeisconcerned.Asamatteroflaw,itisnotlikely
thatsinceeffectivity,counsel,zealousintheirdefenseofproperty,wouldstillbotherthisCourtwithaphilosophythat
hadserveditsdayandhadbeensospecificallythereinrepudiated.Thatsucheffortsaremorethaneverdoomedto
futilityshouldbequiteobvious.Nonetheless,thewriterofthisopinionhadtogiveexpressiontohisviewsifonlyby
wayofdeservedtributetotheframersofthe1935Constitution,whohadthevisionandforesighttoprovideforthe
solutionofthenation'sgrowingpains,whichunfortunatelyafflictusmuchmoresonow,andwhichfortunatelyunder
thepresentcharter,thegovernmenthassoughttoputanendtobywhatistobehopedaremoreefficacious
remedialmeasures.
Footnotes
Antonio,J.,
1109Phil.,642.
270Phi.,726.
3L2532627,May29,1970,33SCRA105,120,citingManiegov.Castelo,101Phil.,293(1957)Vda.
deSantosv.Garcia,L16894,May31,1963,8SCRA194Quimsonv.deGuzman,L18240,Jan.31,
1963,7SCRA158andPagdanganv.CourtofAgrarianRelations,108Phil.,590(1960).
4Masav.Baes,etal.,L29784,May21,1969,28SCRA263,267.
Fernando,J.concurring:
1L46496,7Lawyers'Journal.TheoriginaldecisionwiththeopinionpennedbyJusticeVillaRealwith
theemployerprevailingwassetasideonproceduraldueprocessgroundinamotionfor
reconsideration,withJusticeLaurelthistimespeakingfortheCourt.Vide69Phil.635(1940).
2AccordingtoArticleII,Section5ofthe1935Constitution:"Thepromotionofsocialjusticetoinsure
thewellbeingandeconomicsecurityofallthepeopleshouldbetheconcernoftheState."
3L46496,7Lawyers'Journal487,494.
4Ibid,494495.
5Ibid,495.
670Phil.340.
7CommonwealthAct.No.103(1936).
870Phil.726.
9Ibid,734735.
10L21484,November29,1969,30SCRA649.
11Ibid,662.
12Ibid,672673.
13Ibid,674676.
14Ibid,676.

15Ibid,682.Theseparateopinioncamefromthewriterofthisconcurrence.
16L24396,July29,1968,24SCRA172.
17Ibid,181182.
18L32096,October24,1970,35SCRA481.
19Ibid,491.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation