Republic Act No. 7432: Mendoza, J P
Republic Act No. 7432: Mendoza, J P
Republic Act No. 7432: Mendoza, J P
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using thisfor at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)
Annex A "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December
1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November
13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R.
SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1
which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." There is also
Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the
Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which
Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional
tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension
of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter
No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim.
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the
Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of
Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1,
1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the
order, 2dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's
motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No.
11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18,
1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount
to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint
within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in
1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no
longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was
set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City
Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had
the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege
to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In
fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an
IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but
as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay
such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the
contrary. prLL
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A",
"B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted
by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case.
In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when
he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only
a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled
the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in
law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that,
as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court,
he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years
in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005.]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, 1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption
from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged
unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after
being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years
that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil
Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter
alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of
law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as
long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined
by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme
Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been
upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program;
and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for
all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of
the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is
allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the
secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that
the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for
the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by
the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues. EcSaHA
In his reply 4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what
he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of NonExemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership
dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual
membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law
by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service
from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers. 7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar 8 which power required members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and
omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter
to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the
1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the
1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35%
and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The
starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least
one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar
results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).
This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner
himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to
believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to
the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion
or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned.
If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair
and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its
conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the
bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the
records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five
subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar
candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial
bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963,
and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by
virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the
passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to
him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973,
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days
from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the reevaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on
March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo,
Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing
on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on
March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent
Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the
same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not
respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of
examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to
meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of
this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as
respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another
paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent reevaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No.
1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in
the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from
4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to
testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee
as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L.
Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on
Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university.
Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973
(Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does
not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations,
did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules
to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973
and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, partiesrespondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum
on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up
permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully
employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo,
who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the
Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as
their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they
re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar
examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for reevaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such
re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is
numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7%
each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his
allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1,
2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of
said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but
to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return
for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the
one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his
affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain
from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's
code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on
February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in
a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook
bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested
me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of
57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84,
if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee
the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me
that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my
control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the
name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661
had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might
have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the
same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased
grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority
to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number
of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the
two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and
in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that
I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up
to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant
whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of
my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless
called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact
with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his
authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his
representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an
error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular
in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it
was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his
malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor
had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and
even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of
the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of
the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me
one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned
into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question
were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing
in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly
that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether
or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the
notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch,
I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point
that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object
and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of
the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was
"954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk
of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the
fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it
is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look
for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum
of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to
link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in
assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968
when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to
1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo
and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo;
1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-aLanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these
incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific
War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;
(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and
since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language
and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable reevaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades
they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"
(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 4041, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I reevaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of
said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the
said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him,
but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by
respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the reevaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the reevaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of
any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondentsexaminers that their participation in the admission of members to the
Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest
absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to exercise
the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in
bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8,
Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not
presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of
Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his
high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958.
From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency
entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as
of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A,
Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who
all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits
and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as
a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 8687, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he
was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13,
rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June
28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to
the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the
said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill
of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86,
rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and
City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take
a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge
and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does
not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as
veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father
of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the
91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined
the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially
while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 810 . January 27, 1998.]
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His
oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution
which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the
condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation
rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA
COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted
probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his
case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's
oath at the Court's most convenient time" attaching thereto the Order
dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique
discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his
righteous, peaceful and law abiding character. On July 15, 1997, the
Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require
Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I.
Camaligan, to comment thereon.
The Court stated that it shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son.
Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "he is not, in a
position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit
and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of
law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for
disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of
law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a
helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the
bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few
who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications
the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become
a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give
petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al
Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's
oath. The Court then resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas Jr. to
take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be
set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. STcADa
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR;
PETITION TO TAKE LAWYER'S OATH AFTER DISCHARGE FROM
PROBATION, GRANTED; CASE AT BAR. The petition before the Court
requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing
petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate
participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which
resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that
moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of
law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high
standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty
bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well to exclude
those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the
profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a
chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros
Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath.
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any
infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of
his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death
of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of
the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a
few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence
of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times and to live strictly accordingly to his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To
Take the Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he
Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society." ACCORDINGLY, the Court
hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to take the
lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by
the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. DaHcAS
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J p:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations, 1 His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the
Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take
the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass
the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending
approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from
petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI'A
BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one
of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a
supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose
on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 15685 and 15686,
both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on
May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez'
wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
"Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling
filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident
and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover,
Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against
him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He
should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases
filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still
required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath,
and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What
matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is,
as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him
makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." 5
As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters,
the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there wasno valid reason why he signed as
"attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of
law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S.
Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
"attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to
take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that
he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling's
membership in the Shari'a Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC.
Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders
the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari'a
Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a
matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good
moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the
2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she
"has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule
or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or
indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by
the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal
cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath
at that. IaDcTC
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good
moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that
he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi
v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari'a Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5768. March 26, 2010.]
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have
hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against
him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a
complaint-affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the
following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff's counsel in Civil
Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated
that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil
Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on
February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer
nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
signatory to the document. TDESCa
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk,
threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga tagaCamarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of
Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a
notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until
proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case
against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge
for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in
Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and
criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to
falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission
on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty.
Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with
inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to
dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for
examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats
against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients
filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon,
vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been
falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks
against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was
improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite
Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations
that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he
degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations
that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against
Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter
guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed
this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave
threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for
disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m.,
while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son's taxi, it figured in a collision
with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle's
passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers
helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied
knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk.
Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident
to the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had
already been dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly
received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines
Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of
Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial
judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of
lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the
same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the
suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer's
violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case
7040, the falsification of the plaintiff's affidavit despite the absence of
evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found
that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the
start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV2002-225, 6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in
its Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already
endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003,
however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of
Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8On May 22, 2008 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation 9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty.
Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of
Governors' IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 11 On August 12,
2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer's comment as a petition
for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon
filed his comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further,
he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines
Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is
justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to
disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a
patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the
suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one
year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer's personal record
as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the
same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
||| (Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, [March 26, 2010], 630
PHIL 524-533)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002.]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO
PEFIANCO, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, District Public Attorney of the Public
Attorney's Office in San Jose, Antique filed a complaint against Atty.
Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar for
using improper and offensive language and threatening and
attempting to assault complainant in the latter's office. In his
Comment, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying
woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted
him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that
complainant had ordered an employee to put a sign outside prohibiting
"standbys" from hanging around in the Public Attorney's Office.
Accordingly, the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in
the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same will be dealt with
more severely in the future.
The Court found the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline to be well taken. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are
duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times. In this case,
respondent's meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so
Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two
of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to
the Public Attorney's Office because they heard the commotion, and
two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to
stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the
way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted
by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this
to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and
REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Alcantara v. Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, [December 3, 2002], 441 PHIL
514-520)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3149. August 17, 1994.]
CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H.
LIM, respondent.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6290. July 14, 2004.]
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANA LUZ B.
CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000,
complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent
Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been
falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, 1 which
states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila.
Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and the National
Statistics Office (NSO) 3 prove that norecord of marriage exists
between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two
are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel
Tenorio 4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III. 5 But in the birth certificates of
their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John Cedric
Tenorio, 7 another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely,
12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the
respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous
affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The
respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor
Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant
alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law
by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to
the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement
"Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal
activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As
to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the
Civil Registry of Quezon City. 8 Her husband has no prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied
that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory
affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor
Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to
besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was
likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her CristalTenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of
Registration of Business Name. 9 Hence, she has no partners in her law
office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped
pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied
that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka
lang" on 24 January 2000.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita NoeLacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente
(Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for
Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel
for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for
falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or
Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa
signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana
further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as
Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. IDTSaC
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his
paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to
continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine
Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former secretary. Busmente alleged
that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that
she represented Ulaso as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that
Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of
her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from
the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmente's designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that
Busmente's only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach
him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez
(Ortalez), Busmente's staff, alleging Macasieb's failure to endorse
pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD
noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso's case in her affidavit
and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb
withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmente's office in
November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift
Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned
in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005,
which belied Busmente's allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally
practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only
due to Dela Rosa's connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente's
allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD
gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he
failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four
months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente's suspension from the practice
of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution
No. XVII-2006-271, 3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the
period of Busmente's suspension to six months. DaESIC
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4
from the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared
with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that
they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011
Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Busmente's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants
his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for
compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. 5 The Court further ruled that holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of
a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 7 ESCacI
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a
member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente's
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is
whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in
2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice
of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of
Busmente's staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed
that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices
were still sent to Busmente's office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that
Dela Rosa's practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente's office continued to receive all the notices of Civil
Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC.
Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In
that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil
Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for
Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering
Busmente's claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no
access to the files in Busmente's office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature
on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen
signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the
same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the
NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,
however, showed that there were other documents signed by
Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and
Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. NoeLacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to
her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the
occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente
failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No.
9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his
office to inquire about its status. Busmente's allegation contradicted
the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides
stating that: cEAHSC
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at
suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case
which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in
representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as
Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was
our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the
notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not
be taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a
lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred
her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign
any pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all
of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal
counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that
the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;
SIDTCa
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the
narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the
integrity which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA
we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to
practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and
shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that
she has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty.
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our
hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal
counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give
legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was
sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBPCBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice
of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be
also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23, 2011],
677 PHIL 1-9)
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.]
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, complainants, vs. ATTY.
CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23467. March 27, 1968.]
AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M.
JAVIER, for Himself and as General President, ATTY. JOSE UR.
CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell and for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; DISPUTE MERELY
INCIDENTAL TO A MAIN CIR CASE; CIR HAS JURISDICTION. The CIR
has authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorney's fees,
where as in this case, the said controversy over attorneys' fees is but
an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. This is so,
because once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction
over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until
the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related
thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; INVALIDITY OF AGREEMENT THAT UNION PRESIDENT
SHOULD SHARE IN THE ATTORNEYS' FEES. The alleged oral
agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys' fees
is immoral. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in
terms clear and explicit. The union president is not the attorney for the
laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president.
3. ID.; ID.; STIPULATED FEES MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVE; DUTY OF
COURT. Because of the inequality of the situations between lawyers
and laborers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of
attorney's fees based solely on contracts. Contracts for legal services
between laborer and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the
end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
Considering the circumstances of this case the 30% stipulated
attorneys' fee is excessive. An award of 25% is reasonable.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J p:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their
union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier,
general president of said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of
same in the English language are hereto attached as annexes 'A' 'A-1'
hereof;
case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of
authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their
reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a
labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's
authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a