SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint dated February 8, 1997 to this Court. He alleged that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for a number of years had not
indicated the proper Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had been using this for at least three years already. This matter was being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies a that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." In his comment, Atty. Llamas claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it clear in his
Income Tax Return that he had only a limited practice of law and his principal occupation is farming. And being a senior citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of  Republic
Act No. 7432 in the payment of taxes. Thus, he honestly believed in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues
with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. Nonetheless, despite such honest belief, he was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.

The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that  R.A. No. 7432,
§4, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his
misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merited the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for
a more temperate application of the law, the Court believed that the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, was
appropriate.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP); MEMBERSHIP DUES; PAYMENT IS REQUIRED TO LIMITED PRACTICE. — Respondent can
engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."

2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7432; SENIOR CITIZENS EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES;
PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION DUES ARE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN. — While it is true that  R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.

3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED BY MISREPRESENTATION OF LAWYER TO PUBLIC AND COURTS
THAT HE HAS PAID HIS IBP DUES. — By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATED BY LAWYER'S ADVANCED AGE, EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIS IBP DUES AND PLEA FOR MORE TEMPERATE
APPLICATION OF LAW. — Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and
data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been
using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts
in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br.
259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM
 Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition"
dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." There is also Rule
139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any
PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not
only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM
(see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the
receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in
Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid
or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which
the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998,
respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same
O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above
cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court
of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never
set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he
had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which
he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
 Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In
fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he
never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any
time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender
such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for
vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to
pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the contrary. prLL
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was
denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is
here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and
cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he
is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the
IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the
pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership
and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited"
practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under  R.A. No. 7432, §4
as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of
the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association
dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later, is appropriate. LLjur
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until
he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL 569-578)

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 139 . March 28, 1983.]

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association,
Inc., complainant, vs. ELMO S. ABAD respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ADMISSION TO THE — BAR; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES TO BE COMPLIED WITH BEFORE BECOMING A MEMBER THEREOF. —
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys (Rule
138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court).

2. REMEDIAL LAW; ASSUMING TO BE AN ATTORNEY AND ACTING AS SUCH WITHOUT AUTHORITY CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. —
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar,
Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. The proven charge against Abad constitutes contempt of court [Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court].
 DECISION

ABAD SANTOS, J p:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law
without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. In
exculpation he gives the following lame explanation: LLjur
"1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En
Banc dated July 10, 1979, . . . prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar
Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128792, . . . paid his Certification Fee
in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, . . . and also paid his Membership Dues for the
year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740, . . ."
"2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court,
included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of
Request dated July 23, 1979, . . .
"3. At around Eleven O'clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath
as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M.
Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The
Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's
Oath was further suspended. . .
"4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable
Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
"5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my
Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting
together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, . . .
"6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge
Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my name in the Roll of
Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my
membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown
by Official Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, . . . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax
Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, . . .
"7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the
name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, . . .
"8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC-607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the
Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent
be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
"9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due
and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official
Receipt No. 3363, . . .
"10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No.
3195776, . . .
"11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well
as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, . . ."
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule
138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) prcd
The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)
 WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
||| (In re Abad v. Abad, B.M. No. 139, [March 28, 1983], 206 PHIL 172-175)

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 712. July 13, 1995.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.  ARGOSINO, AL
C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

Benedicto Malcontento for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE LIMITED TO CITIZENS OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. — The practice of law is not a
natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INQUIRY AS TO THE MORAL CHARACTER IS BROADER IN SCOPE THAN IN A DISBARMENT PROCEEDING. — It has also been stressed that the
requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry
into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than
the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it.
 RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J p:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of
one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of
the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago.
The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to
take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to
admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order
dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of
Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it
is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts
which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
"xxx xxx xxx
This 'upright character' prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy
the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence
of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of
least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper.  Consider for a moment
the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every
man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he
deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx" 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
"It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight
and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons
the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes
clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners, as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession,
 and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license."
In Re Keenan: 6
"The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not
all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the
fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain
the standards are allowed to remain in it."
Re Rouss: 7
"Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness."
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
"Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights
and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is
of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of
justice."
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
". . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
'The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law
unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral
character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead
of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.'" 9
 
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The
scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a lawyer in proceedings for
disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
"The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding."
Re Wells: 11
". . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would
be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that
in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment."
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity
be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good
moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
 who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that,
at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de
novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of
application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His
evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation
for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction
was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and
addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) days from
notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
||| (In re of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful Bar Applicant Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [July 13,
1995], 316 PHIL 43-52)
 EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 712 . March 19, 1997.]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

SYLLABUS

1.LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those
who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
only to "weed our" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

2.ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER'S OATH; NOT A MERE CEREMONY OR FORMALITY FOR PRACTICING LAW; EVERY LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES WEIGH HIS ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAWYER'S OATH AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. — After a very careful evaluation of this case, we
resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following, admonition: In allowing
Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr.  Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give
him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr.  Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal
and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J p:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8)
accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
 On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al
C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a
scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the
eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a.He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b.He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the incident.
c.As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an
untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d.He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness
required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that
the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a
parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes
other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer. cdasia
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer' s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On
the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give
him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
 We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster,
fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he
will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by
the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Re: Al Argosino, B.M. No. 712 (Resolution), [March 19, 1997], 336 PHIL 766-771)