066-Luneta Motor Co. vs. A.D. Santos, Inc. 5 Scra 809
066-Luneta Motor Co. vs. A.D. Santos, Inc. 5 Scra 809
066-Luneta Motor Co. vs. A.D. Santos, Inc. 5 Scra 809
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mentioned heretofore for the approval of the sale. In the meantime and before his death, Amador D. Santos sold
and transferred (Commission Case No. 1272231) all his rights and interests in the certificate of public convenience
in question in favor of the now respondent A.D. Santos, Inc., who opposed petitioner's application.
The record discloses that in the course of the hearing on said application and after petitioner had rested its case, the
respondent A. D. Santos, Inc., with leave of court, filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
a) under the petitioner's Articles of Incorporation, it was not authorized to engage in the taxicab business or
operate as a common carrier;
b) the decision in Civil Case No. 20853 of the Court of First Instance of Manila did not affect the oppositor
nor its predecessor Amador D. Santos inasmuch as neither of them had been impleaded into the case;
c) that what was sold to the petitioner were only the "rights, interests and participation" of Nicolas
Concepcion in the certificate that had been granted to him which were no longer existing at the time of the
sale.
On October 18, 1960, the respondent Commission, after considering the memoranda submitted by the parties,
rendered the appealed decision sustaining the first ground relied upon in support thereof, namely, that under
petitioner's articles of incorporation it had no authority to engage in the taxicab business or operate as a common
carrier, and that, is a result, it could not acquire by purchase the certificate of public convenience referred to above.
Hence, the present appeal interposed by petitioner who claims that, in accordance with the Corporation Law and its
articles of incorporation, it can acquire by purchase the certificate of public convenience in question, maintaining
inferentially that, after acquiring said certificate, it could make use of it by operating a taxicab business or operate
is a common carrier by land.
There is no question that a certificate of public convenience granted to the public operator is liable to execution
(Raymundo vs. Luneta Motor Co., 58 Phil. 889) and may be acquired by purchase. The question involved in the
present appeal, however, is not only whether, under the Corporation Law and petitioner's articles of incorporation,
it may acquire by purchase a certificate of public convenience, such as the one in question, but also whether, after
its acquisition, petitioner may hold the certificate and thereunder operate as a common carrier by land.
It is not denied that under Section 13 (5) of the Corporation Law, a corporation created thereunder may purchase,
hold, etc., and otherwise deal in such real and personal property is the purpose for which the corporation was
formed may permit, and the transaction of its lawful business may reasonably and necessarily require. The issue
here is precisely whether the purpose for which petitioner was organized and the transaction of its lawful business
reasonably and necessarily require the purchase and holding by it of a certificate of public convenience like the one
in question and thus give it additional authority to operate thereunder as a common carrier by land.
Petitioner claims in this regard that its corporate purposes are to carry on a general mercantile and commercial
business, etc., and that it is authorized in its articles of incorporation to operate and otherwise deal in and
concerning automobiles and automobile accessories' business in all its multifarious ramification (petitioner's brief
p. 7) and to operate, etc., and otherwise dispose of vessels and boats, etc., and to own and operate steamship and
sailing ships and other floating craft and deal in the same and engage in the Philippine Islands and elsewhere in the
transportation of persons, merchandise and chattels by water; all this incidental to the transportation of automobiles
(id. pp. 7-8 and Exhibit B).
We find nothing in the legal provision and the provisions of petitioner's articles of incorporation relied upon that
could justify petitioner's contention in this case. To the contrary, they are precisely the best evidence that it has no
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authority at all to engage in the business of land transportation and operate a taxicab service. That it may operate
and otherwise deal in automobiles and automobile accessories; that it may engage in the transportation of persons
by water does not mean that it may engage in the business of land transportation an entirely different line of
business. If it could not thus engage in the line of business, it follows that it may not acquire an certificate of public
convenience to operate a taxicab service, such as the one in question, because such acquisition would be without
purpose and would have no necessary connection with petitioner's legitimate business.
In view of the conclusion we have arrived at on the decisive issue involved in this appeal, we deem it unnecessary
to resolve the other incidental questions raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., took no part.