Roxas v. Co. v. Damba-Nfsw
Roxas v. Co. v. Damba-Nfsw
Roxas v. Co. v. Damba-Nfsw
Parking Fees
On weekdays, P25.00 for the first four
hours and P10.00 for every succeeding
hour; on weekends, flat rate of P25.00 per
day
Robinsons
Shangri-la
SM Prime
(i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees) would be going against the
declared policy of R.A. 7394.
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the responsibility for the
administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code, including
the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the
Secretary of Public Works. This set up, however, is not being carried out
in reality.
In the position paper submitted by the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, accurately pointed out
that the Secretary of the DPWH is responsible for the
implementation/enforcement of the National Building Code. After the
enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government
units (LGU's) were tasked to discharge the regulatory powers of the
DPWH. Hence, in the local level, the Building Officials enforce all
rules/regulations formulated by the DPWH relative to all building plans,
specifications and designs including parking space requirements. There
is, however, no single national department or agency directly tasked to
supervise the enforcement of the provisions of the Code on parking,
notwithstanding the national character of the law. 6
The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 10 against respondents. This Petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1210 and raffled to the RTC of Makati, Branch
135, presided over by Judge Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed
that the RTC:
1. After summary hearing, a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from collecting
parking fees from their customers; and
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring that the practice of
respondents in charging parking fees is violative of the National Building
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations and is therefore
invalid, and making permanent any injunctive writ issued in this case.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for. 11
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 135,
issued an Order consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210 with Civil Case No. 001208 pending before Judge Marella of RTC of Makati, Branch 138.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the morning of 8 August
2001, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order 12 of even date which limited the
issues to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 to the
following:
1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil Case No. 00-1210 to institute
the present proceedings and relative thereto whether the controversy in
the collection of parking fees by mall owners is a matter of public
welfare.
2. Whether declaratory relief is proper.
On 29 May 2002, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision in Civil Cases No.
00-1208 and No. 00-1210.
The RTC resolved the first two issues affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG
can initiate Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential Decree No. 478 and
the Administrative Code of 1987. 14 It also found that all the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief were present, to wit:
The requisites for an action for declaratory relief are: (a) there is a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy is between persons whose
interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest
in the controversy; and (d) the issue involved is ripe for judicial
determination.
SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] is a mall operator who
stands to be affected directly by the position taken by the government
officials sued namely the Secretary of Public Highways and the Building
Officials of the local government units where it operates shopping malls.
The OSG on the other hand acts on a matter of public interest and has
taken a position adverse to that of the mall owners whom it sued. The
construction of new and bigger malls has been announced, a matter
which the Court can take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of
whether mall operators should provide parking facilities, free of charge
needs to be resolved. 15
As to the third and most contentious issue, the RTC pronounced that:
The Building Code, which is the enabling law and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations do not impose that parking spaces shall be
provided by the mall owners free of charge. Absent such directive[,]
Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-la and SM [Prime] are under no
obligation to provide them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is clear:
"Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those
expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient evidence to justify any
award for damages.
The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint Decision in Civil
Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00-1210 that:
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares that Ayala Land[,] Inc.,
Robinsons Land Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and SM
Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to provide parking spaces in their
malls for the use of their patrons or public in general, free of charge.
All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210 are dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs. 17
while the four errors assigned by respondent SM Prime in its Appellant's Brief
were:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE RULE XIX OF
THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA
VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THE
IMPLEMENTING RULES INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN
PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE OSG'S
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION FOR
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT THE
OSG HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT CASE. 21
The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions should be read together
with Section 102 of the National Building Code, which declares:
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health,
property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the
purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a
framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and
control their location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use,
occupancy, and maintenance.
the use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with
it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control partially or, as in this
case, absolutely the imposition of such fees.
The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory
provisions, garnered from a plain reading thereof, is that respondents, as
operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking
and loading spaces, in accordance with the minimum ratio of one slot per 100
square meters of shopping floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to
the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In fact, the
term "parking fees" cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building
Code and its IRR.
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempt at
interpretation. 26 Since Section 803 of the National Building Code and Rule
XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said provisions do not
regulate the collection of the same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only
those expressly determined in this Code or in special laws are
demandable, and shall be regulated by the precepts of the law which
establishes them; and as to what has not been foreseen, by the
provisions of this Book. (Emphasis ours.)
Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees within the ambit of
the National Building Code and its IRR, the OSG had to resort to specious
and feeble argumentation, in which the Court cannot concur.
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to
expand the coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the
IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation
to the first part of Section 102 of the National Building Code declaring the
policy of the State "to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare,
consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and
control"; but totally ignores the second part of said provision, which reads,
"and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings
and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to
regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance". While the first part of
Section 102 of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the
second part thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the
Code. Section 102 of the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing
grant of regulatory power to the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in
the name of life, health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits
the regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum standards
and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set forth in the National
Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the
minimum requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR
also mandates that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free
of charge. If Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be
added to or included in the implementing rules. The rule-making power of
administrative agencies must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot
be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. 27
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG repeatedly referred
to Republic v. Gonzales 28 and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas 29 to support its
position that the State has the power to regulate parking spaces to promote
the health, safety, and welfare of the public; and it is by virtue of said power
that respondents may be required to provide free parking facilities. The OSG,
though, failed to consider the substantial differences in the factual and legal
backgrounds of these two cases from those of the Petition at bar.
In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought to eject the occupants
of two parcels of land of the public domain to give way to a road-widening
project. It was in this context that the Court pronounced:
The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the City had been clothed
with full power to control and regulate its streets for the purpose of promoting
public health, safety and welfare. The City can regulate the time, place, and
manner of parking in the streets and public places; and charge minimal fees
for the street parking to cover the expenses for supervision, inspection and
control, to ensure the smooth flow of traffic in the environs of the public
market, and for the safety and convenience of the public.
Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in the local streets; in
contrast, the present case deals with privately owned parking facilities
available for use by the general public. In Republic and City of Ozamis, the
concerned local governments regulated parking pursuant to their power to
control and regulate their streets; in the instant case, the DPWH Secretary
and local building officials regulate parking pursuant to their authority to
ensure compliance with the minimum standards and requirements under
the National Building Code and its IRR. With the difference in subject matters
and the bases for the regulatory powers being invoked, Republic and City of
Ozamis do not constitute precedents for this case.
Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain pronouncements that
weaken the position of the OSG in the case at bar. In Republic, the Court,
instead of placing the burden on private persons to provide parking facilities to
the general public, mentioned the trend in other jurisdictions wherein the
municipal governments themselves took the initiative to make more parking
spaces available so as to alleviate the traffic problems, thus:
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, parking in designated
areas along public streets or highways is allowed which clearly indicates
that provision for parking spaces serves a useful purpose. In other
jurisdictions where traffic is at least as voluminous as here, the provision
the collection of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities,
they cannot allow or prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether
allowing or prohibiting the collection of such parking fees, the action of the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials must pass the test of classic
reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means in the promotion of
the ends sought to be accomplished. 32
Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of reasonableness and
propriety of measures or means, the Court notes that Section 803 of
the National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on Light and Ventilation.
Evidently, the Code deems it necessary to regulate site occupancy to ensure
that there is proper lighting and ventilation in every building. Pursuant thereto,
Rule XIX of the IRR requires that a building, depending on its specific use
and/or floor area, should provide a minimum number of parking spaces. The
Court, however, fails to see the connection between regulating site occupancy
to ensure proper light and ventilation in every building vis--vis regulating the
collection by building owners of fees for the use of their parking spaces.
Contrary to the averment of the OSG, the former does not necessarily include
or imply the latter. It totally escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation
conditions at the malls could be affected by the fact that parking facilities
thereat are free or paid for.
The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by arguing that:
Under Section 803 of the National Building Code, complimentary parking
spaces are required to enhance light and ventilation, that is, to avoid
traffic congestion in areas surrounding the building, which certainly
affects the ventilation within the building itself, which otherwise, the
annexed parking spaces would have served. Free-of-charge parking
avoids traffic congestion by ensuring quick and easy access of legitimate
shoppers to off-street parking spaces annexed to the malls, and thereby
removing the vehicles of these legitimate shoppers off the busy streets
near the commercial establishments. 33
The
Court
is
unconvinced.
The National
Building
Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum specifications and
requirements for the same. It does not concern itself with traffic
congestion in areas surrounding the building. It is already a stretch to say
that the National Building Code and its IRR also intend to solve the problem of
traffic congestion around the buildings so as to ensure that the said buildings
shall have adequate lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court cannot
simply assume, as the OSG has apparently done, that the traffic congestion in
areas around the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their
parking facilities, thus, forcing vehicle owners to just park in the streets. The
Court notes that despite the fees charged by respondents, vehicle owners still
use the mall parking facilities, which are even fully occupied on some days.
Vehicle owners may be parking in the streets only because there are not
enough parking spaces in the malls, and not because they are deterred by the
parking fees charged by respondents. Free parking spaces at the malls may
even have the opposite effect from what the OSG envisioned: more people
may be encouraged by the free parking to bring their own vehicles, instead of
taking public transport, to the malls; as a result, the parking facilities would
become full sooner, leaving more vehicles without parking spaces in the malls
and parked in the streets instead, causing even more traffic congestion.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police
power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the
collection by the owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the
public for the use thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees from the public for the use of the
mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to
merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The
power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit.
A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate.
Police power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private
property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order
and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. 34
ordinance obliging private cemeteries within its jurisdiction to set aside at least
six percent of their total area for charity, that is, for burial grounds of deceased
paupers. According to the Court, the ordinance in question was null and void,
for it authorized the taking of private property without just compensation:
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six
(6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
'The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city
and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions
of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177(q)
that a sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in
such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it
simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has
been the law, and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers
of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to
pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
homeowners.