FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124043. October 14, 1998]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG MENS CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by the Young Mens Christian
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) established as a welfare, educational and
charitable non-profit corporation -- subject to income tax under the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) and the Constitution?
The Case
This is the main question raised before us in this petition for review on certiorari
challenging two Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals 1[1] on September 28,
19952[2] and February 29, 19963[3] in CA-GR SP No. 32007. Both Resolutions affirmed
the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA to claim tax
exemption on the latters income from the lease of its real property.
The Facts
The Facts are undisputed.4[4] Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit
institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the
public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable
objectives.
In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80 from
leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen
operators, and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2,
1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private
respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for
deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional
fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private respondent formally protested the
assessment and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985.
In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.
Contesting the denial of its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for review at the Court if
Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due course, the CTA issued this ruling in favor
of the YMCA:

xxx [T]he leasing of private respondents facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and
canteen operators and the operation of the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the [private
respondents]. It appears from the testimonies of the witnesses for the [private respondent]
particularly Mr. James C. Delote, former accountant of YMCA, that these facilities were
leased to members and that they have to service the needs of its members and their
guests. The Rentals were minimal as for example, the barbershop was only charged P300
per month. He also testified that there was actually no lot devoted for parking space but
the parking was done at the sides of the building. The parking was primarily for members
with stickers on the windshields of their cars and they charged P.50 for non-members.
The rentals and parking fees were just enough to cover the costs of operation and
maintenance only. The earning[s] from these rentals and parking charges including those
from lodging and other charges for the use of the recreational facilities constitute [the]
bulk of its income which [is] channeled to support its many activities and attainment of
its objectives. As pointed out earlier, the membership dues are very insufficient to support
its program. We find it reasonably necessary therefore for [private respondent] to make
[the] most out [of] its existing facilities to earn some income. It would have been different
if under the circumstances, [private respondent] will purchase a lot and convert it to a
parking lot to cater to the needs of the general public for a fee, or construct a building and
lease it out to the highest bidder or at the market rate for commercial purposes, or should
it invest its funds in the buy and sell of properties, real or personal. Under these
circumstances, we could conclude that the activities are already profit oriented, not
incidental and reasonably necessary to the pursuit of the objectives of the association and
therefore, will fall under the last paragraph of section 27 of the Tax Code and any income
derived therefrom shall be taxable.
Considering our findings that [private respondent] was not engaged in the business of
operating or contracting [a] parking lot, we find no legal basis also for the imposition of
[a] deficiency fixed tax and [a] contractors tax in the amount[s] of P353.15 and
P3,129.73, respectively.
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the following assessments are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit:
1980 Deficiency Fixed Tax P353,15;
1980 Deficiency Contractors Tax P3,129.23;
1980 Deficiency Income Tax P372,578.20.
While the following assessments are hereby sustained:
1980 Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax P1,798.93;
1980 Deficiency Withholding Tax on Wages P33,058.82

plus 10% surcharge and 20% interest per annum from July 2, 1984 until fully paid but not
to exceed three (3) years pursuant to Section 51 (e)(2) & (3) of the National Internal
Revenue Code effective as of 1984.5[5]
Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In its Decision of February 16, 1994, the CA6[6] initially decided in favor of the CIR and
disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
Following the ruling in the afore-cited cases of Province of Abra vs. Hernando and Abra
Valley College Inc. vs. Aquino, the ruling of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals that the
leasing of petitioners (herein respondent) facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and
canteen operators and the operation of the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the petitioners,' and the
income derived therefrom are tax exempt, must be reversed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED in so far as it dismissed the
assessment for:
1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 353.15
1980 Deficiency Contractors Tax P 3,129.23, &
1980 Deficiency Income Tax
P372,578.20,
but the same is AFFIRMED in all other respect.7[7]
Aggrieved, the YMCA asked for reconsideration based on the following grounds:
I
The findings of facts of the Public Respondent Court of Tax Appeals being supported
by substantial evidence [are] final and conclusive.
II
The conclusions of law of [p]ublic [r]espondent exempting [p]rivate [r]espondent
from the income on rentals of small shops and parking fees [are] in accord with the
applicable law and jurisprudence.8[8]
Finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the YMCA, the CA reversed
itself and promulgated on September 28, 1995 its first assailed Resolution which, in part,
reads:
The Court cannot depart from the CTAs findings of fact, as they are supported by
evidence beyond what is considered as substantial.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The second ground raised is that the respondent CTA did not err in saying that the rental
from small shops and parking fees do not result in the loss of the exemption. Not even the
petitioner would hazard the suggestion that YMCA is designed for profit. Consequently,
the little income from small shops and parking fees help[s] to keep its head above the
water, so to speak, and allow it to continue with its laudable work.
The Court, therefore, finds the second ground of the motion to be meritorious and in
accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED; the respondent CTAs
decision is AFFIRMED in toto.9[9]
The internal revenue commissioners own Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
Respondent Court in its second assailed Resolution of February 29, 1996. Hence, this
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.10[10]
The Issues
Before us, petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals the following errors:
I
In holding that it had departed from the findings of fact of Respondent Court of Tax
Appeals when it rendered its Decision dated February 16, 1994; and
II
In affirming the conclusion of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals that the income of
private respondent from rentals of small shops and parking fees [is] exempt from
taxation.11[11]
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Factual Findings of the CTA
Private respondent contends that the February 16, 1994 CA Decision reversed the factual
findings of the CTA. On the other hand, petitioner argues that the CA merely reversed the
ruling of the CTA that the leasing of private respondents facilities to small shop owners,
to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of parking lots are reasonably
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the
private respondent and that the income derived therefrom are tax exempt. 12[12] Petitioner
insists that what the appellate court reversed was the legal conclusion, not the factual
finding, of the CTA.13[13] The commissioner has a point.

Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when supported
by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the said
court committed gross error in the appreciation of facts. 14[14] In the present case, this
Court finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule.
The latter merely applied the law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue
raised by the CIR: Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the
lease of certain premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last
paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended. 15
[15]
Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned
issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the
CTA did not necessarily imply a reversal of factual findings.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been
held that [t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. 16[16] In the present case, the
CA did not doubt, much less change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the
law to the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA is
not irregular or abnormal.
Second Issue:
Is the Rental Income of the YMCA Taxable?
We now come to the crucial issue: Is the rental income of the YMCA from its real estate
subject to tax? At the outset, we set forth the relevant provision of the NIRC:
SEC. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. -- The following organizations shall not
be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such -xxx

xxx

xxx

(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare;
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or member;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Notwithstanding the provision in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind
and character of the foregoing organization from any of their properties, real or personal,
or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of

such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under this Code. (as amended by Pres.
Decree No. 1457)
Petitioners argues that while the income received by the organizations enumerated in
Section 27 (now Section 26) of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax
in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not apply to income
derived xxx from any if their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities
conducted for profit, regardless, of the disposition made of such income xxx.
Petitioner adds that rented income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of
its properties, real or personal, [is] not, therefore, exempt from income taxation, even if
such income [is] exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. 17[17] We
agree with the commissioner.
Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of
strict interpretation in construing tax exemptions. 18[18] Furthermore, a claim of statutory
exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the
law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption must expressly be granted in a
statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.19[19]
In the instant case, the exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the
very wording of the last paragraph of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates that
the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties,
real or personal, be subject to the imposed by the same Code. Because the last paragraph
of said section unequivocally subjects to tax the rent income f the YMCA from its rental
property,20[20] the Court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to
refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction.
It is axiomatic that where the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, its express
terms must be applied.21[21] Parenthetically, a consideration of the question of
construction must not even begin, particularly when such question is on whether to apply
a strict construction or a literal one on statutes that grant tax exemptions to religious,
charitable and educational propert[ies] or institutions.22[22]
The last paragraph of Section 27, the YMCA argues, should be subject to the qualification
that the income from the properties must arise from activities conducted for profit before
it may be considered taxable.23[23] This argument is erroneous. As previously stated, a
reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any property of exempt
organizations, as well as that arising from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable.
The phrase any of their activities conducted for profit does not qualify the word
properties. This makes income from the property of the organization taxable, regardless
of how that income is used -- whether for profit or for lofty non-profit purposes.
Verba legis non est recedendum. Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals committed
reversible error when it allowed, on reconsideration, the tax exemption claimed by
YMCA on income it derived from renting out its real property, on the solitary but

unconvincing ground that the said income is not collected for profit but is merely
incidental to its operation. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is
taxable regardless of whence such income is derived and how it used or disposed of.
Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
Constitutional Provisions
on Taxation
Invoking not only the NIRC but also the fundamental law, private respondent submits
that Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, 24[24] exempts charitable
institutions from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any
source.25[25] In support of its novel theory, it compares the use of the words charitable
institutions, actually and directly in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, on the hand; and
in Article VI Section 22, par. 3 of the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand.26[26]
Private respondent enunciates three points. First, the present provision is divisible into
two categories: (1) [c]haritable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques and non-profit cemeteries, the incomes of which are, from
whatever source, all tax-exempt;27[27] and (2) [a]ll lands, buildings and improvements
actually and directly used for religious, charitable or educational purposes, which are
exempt only from property taxes.28[28] Second, Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,29[29] which limited the exemption only to the payment of property taxes,
referred to the provision of the 1935 Constitution and not to its counterparts in the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions.30[30] Third, the phrase actually, directly and exclusively used
for religious, charitable or educational purposes refers not only to all lands, buildings and
improvements, but also to the above-quoted first category which includes charitable
institutions like the private respondent.31[31]
The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the
framers of the Constitution reveal their intent which, in turn, may have guided the people
in ratifying the Charter.32[32] Such intent must be effectuated.
Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, who is
now a member of this Court, stressed during the Concom debates that xxx what is
exempted is not the institution itself xxx; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes.33[33] Father Joaquin G. Bernas, an eminent authority
on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the
exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes.34[34]
In his treatise on taxation, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating that [t]he tax
exemption covers property taxes only."35[35] Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed
by private respondent finds no basis in Article VI, Section 28, par. 3 of the Constitution.
Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter, 36[36]
claiming that the YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues

and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is
exempt from taxes on its properties and income. 37[37] We reiterate that private respondent
is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its
property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution
is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.
As previously discussed, laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris.
Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited
provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification
non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted
from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.
However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private
respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.
Is the YMCA an educational institution within the purview of Article XIV, Section 4,
par.3 of the Constitution? We rule that it is not. The term educational institution or
institution of learning has acquired a well-known technical meaning, of which the
members of the Constitutional Commission are deemed cognizant. 38[38] Under the
Education Act of 1982, such term refers to schools. 39[39] The school system is
synonymous with formal education,40[40] which refers to the hierarchically structured
and chronological graded learnings organized and provided by the formal school system
and for which certification is required in order for the learner to progress through the
grades or move to the higher levels.41[41] The Court has examined the Amended Articles
of Incorporation42[42] and By-Laws43[43] of the YMCA, but found nothing in them that
even hints that it is a school or an educational institution.44[44]
Furthermore, under the Education Act of 1982, even non-formal education is understood
to be school-based and private auspices such as foundations and civic-spirited
organizations are ruled out.45[45] It is settled that the term educational institution, when
used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a xxx school seminary, college or
educational establishment xxx.46[46] Therefore, the private respondent cannot be deemed
one of the educational institutions covered by the constitutional provision under
consideration.
xxx Words used in the Constitution are to be taken in their ordinary acceptation. While in
its broadest and best sense education embraces all forms and phrases of instruction,
improvement and development of mind and body, and as well of religious and moral
sentiments, yet in the common understanding and application it means a place where
systematic instruction in any or all of the useful branches of learning is given by methods
common to schools and institutions of learning. That we conceive to be the true intent
and scope of the term [educational institutions,] as used in the Constitution.47[47]
Moreover, without conceding that Private Respondent YMCA is an educational
institution, the Court also notes that the former did not submit proof of the proportionate
amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes. Article XIII, Section 5 of the YMCA by-laws, which formed part of

the evidence submitted, is patently insufficient, since the same merely signified that [t]he
net income derived from the rentals of the commercial buildings shall be apportioned to
the Federation and Member Associations as the National Board may decide. 48[48] In sum,
we find no basis for granting the YMCA exemption from income tax under the
constitutional provision invoked
Cases Cited by Private
Respondent Inapplicable
The cases49[49] relied on by private respondent do not support its cause. YMCA of Manila
v. Collector of Internal Revenue50[50] and Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino51[51] are
not applicable, because the controversy in both cases involved exemption from the
payment of property tax, not income tax. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, Inc. v. Pasay
City52[52] is not in point either, because it involves a claim for exemption from the
payment of regulatory fees, specifically electrical inspection fees, imposed by an
ordinance of Pasay City -- an issue not at all related to that involved in a claimed
exemption from the payment if income taxes imposed on property leases. In Jesus Sacred
Heart College v. Com. Of Internal Revenue,53[53] the party therein, which claimed an
exemption from the payment of income tax, was an educational institution which
submitted substantial evidence that the income subject of the controversy had been
devoted or used solely for educational purposes. On the other hand, the private
respondent in the present case had not given any proof that it is an educational institution,
or that of its rent income is actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes.
Epilogue
In deliberating on this petition, the Court expresses its sympathy with private respondent.
It appreciates the nobility its cause. However, the Courts power and function are limited
merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to
suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and
invading the realm of legislation.
We concede that private respondent deserves the help and the encouragement of the
government. It needs laws that can facilitate, and not frustrate, its humanitarian tasks. But
the Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the
wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments
of government. Indeed, some of the member of the Court may even believe in the wisdom
and prudence of granting more tax exemptions to private respondent. But such belief,
however well-meaning and sincere, cannot bestow upon the Court the power to change or
amend the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 are hereby dated February 16, 1995 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,

1995 is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that the income tax. No pronouncement as to

costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., see Dissenting Opinion.

1[1] Special Former Fourth Division composed of J. Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr., presiding justice and
ponente; and JJ., Fidel P. Purisima (now an associate justice of the Supreme Court) and Corona IbaySomera, concurring.
2[2] Rollo, pp. 42-48.
3[3] Ibid., pp. 50-51.
4[4] See Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 1-10 and Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 3-10; rollo,
pp. 149-158 and 192-199, respectively. See also Decision of the CTA, pp. 1-21; rollo, pp. 69-89.
5[5] CTA Decision, pp. 16-18 and 2--21; rollo, pp. 84-86 and 88-89.
6[6] Penned by J. Asaali S. Isnani and concurred in by JJ. Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., chairman, and
Corona Ibay-Somera of the Fourth Division.
7[7] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
8[8] CA Resolution, p. 2; rollo, p. 43.
9[9] Ibid., pp. 2,, 6-7; rollo, pp. 43, 47-48.
10[10] The case was submitted for resolution on April 27, 1998, upon receipt by this Court of private
respondents Reply Memorandum.
11[11] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 199-200.
12[12] Ibid., p. 16; rollo, p. 205.
13[13] Ibid., p. 17; rollo, p. 206.
14[14] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mitsubishi Metal Corp., 181 SCRA 214, 220, January 22,
1990.
15[15] Rollo, p. 36.
16[16] Ramos et al. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. et al., 19 SCRA 289, 292, February 9, 1967,
per Bengzon, J.; citing II Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 255 and II Bouviers Law
Dictionary, 2784.
17[17] Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 210-211.
18[18] See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18,
1997.
19[19] Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals,
GR No. 117359, p. 15, July 23, 1998, per Panganiban, J.

20[20] Justice Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Tax Law and Jurisprudence, p. 75, 4th revised ed. (1989);
and De Leon, Hector S., The National Internal Revenue Code Annotated, p. 108, 5th ed. (1994), citing
a BIR ruling dated May 6, 1975.
21[21] See Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.
22[22] Cooley, Thomas M., The Law of Taxation, p. 1415, Vol. II, 4th ed. (1924).
23[23] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 10. p. 234.
24[24] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages of convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (Underlining copied from
Reply Memorandum of Private Respondent, p. 7; rollo, p. 231)
25[25] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 7; rollo, p. 231.
26[26] Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements actually, directly , and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
27[27] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 231-232.
28[28] Ibid., p. 8; rollo, p. 232.
29[29] 14 SCRA 292, June 16, 1965.
30[30] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 230-231.
31[31] Ibid., p. 9; rollo, p. 233.
32[32] Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, 291-292, July 27, 1987.
33[33] Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. Two, p. 90.
34[34] Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p.
720, 1996 ed.; citing Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, p. 295.
35[35] Vitug, supra, p. 16.
36[36] All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly,
and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution
or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law.
37[37] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 20; rollo, p. 244.
38[38] See Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil 461, 468 (1947).

39[39] Section 26, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

40[40] Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.
41[41] Section 20, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.
42[42] Exhibit B, BIR Records, pp. 54-56.
43[43] Exhibit C, BIR Records, pp. 27-53.
44[44] This is in stark contrast to its predecessor, the YMCA of Manila. In YMCA of Manila v.
Collector of Internal Revenue (33 Phil 217, 221 [1916]), cited by private respondent, it was noted that
the said institution had an educational department that taught courses in various subjects such as law,
commerce, social ethics, political economy and others.
45[45] Dizon, Amado C., Education Act of 1982 Annotated, Expanded and Updated, p. 72 (1990).
46[46] 84 CJS 566.
47[47] Kesselring v. Bonnycastle Club, 186 SW2d 402, 404 (1945).
48[48] By-Laws of the YMCA, p. 22; BIR Records, p. 31.
49[49] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 238-240.
50[50] Supra.
51[51] 162 SCRA 106, June 15, 1988.
52[52] 16 SCRA 226, February 28, 1966.
53[53] 95 SCRA 16, May 24, 1954.