Pertemuan #8
Pertemuan #8
Pertemuan #8
Financial
Shenanigans
Pertemuan ke 8
Fraud
Auditors responsibility for detecting fraud has
generated considerable controversy and it is
popularly believed that auditors are responsible for
detecting fraud. Detection of fraud and error was at
one time an important function of audit, but today
auditors concentrate on assessing the integrity and
competence of management, and the effectiveness
of internal control, using analytical procedures, and
largely restricting detailed audit work to high risk
areas.
Fraud
The auditing standard on fraud states that it is not
the auditors function to prevent fraud and error,
but that auditors plan, perform and evaluate their
audit work in order to have a reasonable
expectation of detecting material misstatements
arising from error or fraud.
Management has prime responsibility to prevent
and detect the occurrence of fraud through
appropriate systems of internal control and other
means.
Fraud
Board of directors responsibilities include
maintaining sound internal controls to safeguard
shareholders investment and company assets,
including prevention and detection of fraud and
error.
Fraud
Means to achieve these include:
Fraud
Auditors do plan and conduct audit tests to limit
the possibility that material fraud and irregularities
go undetected.
This process starts at the planning phase when
auditors consider the company and its
environment and the risks facing it.
Fraud
Auditors argue they cannot guarantee detection of
all frauds and errors because of:
(1) inherent limitations in audit techniques and
tests;
(2) deceit, collusion and other means to conceal
fraud make detection difficult;
(3) audit evidence is that required to form an
opinion and not specifically to find fraud.
Fraud
Identification of motives and indicators of potential
significant fraud are important.
Pressure to misrepresent financial performance
may be high.
In such circumstances auditors might change their
audit approach to reflect higher risk.
Fraud
Reasons behind misrepresentation might be:
(a) the company has performed badly or is under
pressure from markets;
(b) directors wish to show continuing growth;
(c) where the company expands by acquisition,
directors may wish to inflate profits to show
success, and to sustain the share price;
(d) there are liquidity problems.
Fraud
Characteristics of personnel, the management team
and its structure may provide helpful indicators as to
when and where a fraud is likely:
(a) particular directors are autocratic and
authoritarian;
(b) staff are poorly qualified or lack motivation;
(c) individuals are paid by results;
(d) individuals are allowed too much authority or
power;
(e) turnover of staff is high.
Fraud
Weaknesses in systems may:
reduce the reliability of accounting information;
allow employees to commit fraud;
allow management to avoid or override controls.
Fraud
Once auditors have ascertained that fraud might
be taking place they decide on appropriate action:
(a) confirm understanding of facts, nature of fraud
and likely magnitude to aid determination of
additional audit tests;
(b) discuss the fraud or error with senior
management, directors or audit committee.
Fraud
If fraud has been discovered, auditors should:
(i) ask directors to consider changing financial
statements;
(ii) ask management to determine the extent of
fraud or error;
(iii) assess the impact on other audit work.
Fraud
If auditors suspect non-directors may be
implicated, they should discuss the matter with the
directors.
If directors may be involved, they should consider
reporting to the audit committee.
They might also seek legal advice and, in some
circumstances, report their suspicions to third
parties.
Fraud
If directors do not take appropriate action, it may
be difficult to determine the full extent of the fraud
or error, may have implications for the audit report,
and may cause the auditors to re-evaluate the
integrity of management and the control
environment.
Fraud
Auditors should document the process until it is
satisfactorily resolved, including:
(a) initial grounds for suspicion;
(b) additional audit work;
(c) details of what, when and to whom they
reported;
(d) managements response and any action;
(e) implications for audit work
Fraud
The Audit Agenda highlighted the difficulty of
detecting fraud where it is well planned, ingenious
or involving collusion or top management, but
noted that auditors can contribute to the
prevention of fraud by informing management of
weaknesses in the control systems.
It also referred to the limited nature of penalties
imposed on directors if they mislead auditors.
Fraud
Some auditing standards might be amended but
APB says that a significant increase in the likelihood
of detecting management fraud requires radical
change, including:
(a) increased emphasis on professional scepticism;
(b) tighter rules on acceptable audit evidence;
(c) reporting material matters in the financial
statements that are supported only by
managements representations.
Fraud
APB considers that expanding the auditors role
could be helpful in preventing and detecting fraud,
perhaps by:
(a) reporting to boards and audit committees on
controls to prevent and detect fraud;
(b) more reporting of suspected frauds.
Investors are often tricked into believing that a companys earnings are
stronger, its cashflows more robust and its balance sheet position more
secure than are really the case.
Senior executives can freely criticize and disagree with one another
A single dictatorial leader runs roughshod over the others culture fear and
intimidations exists
Investors face great risks if that dictatorial leader is also bent on creating
misleading financial reports
Management who publicly boasts about its long consecutive streak of meeting
or exceeding expectations
2.
3.
Stretched out the last month of the quarter and both backdated and forged
sales contract
Consignment Arrangements
The sale was contingent on the receipt of outside funding and no revenue
should have been recognized until such funding had been secured
2.
3.
4.
2.
Dispose a business unit to another company and at the same time enter
into an agreement to buy back product from that sold business unit
2.
3.
Step-up Costs
4.
2.
3.
4.
Pretending no invoice from a vendor until after the quarter has ended
Create a bogus liability with a desirable credit balance and then, whenever
needed, make an accounting entry that moves the credit from the liability
and boosting profits
2.
3.
4.
Instruct the target company to hold revenue until after the merger closes
Decide not to record the sale before the period closes, thereby hodling back
revenue until the later period
2.
2.
3.
2.
3.
2.
3.
2.
Company cannot continue to collect at a faster and faster rate every quarter
perpetuity
3.
4.