United States v. Charles T. Bennett, Wilbert Haywood, Elmer Jessup, Henry Stanton and Farris Thomas, 415 F.2d 1113, 2d Cir. (1969)
United States v. Charles T. Bennett, Wilbert Haywood, Elmer Jessup, Henry Stanton and Farris Thomas, 415 F.2d 1113, 2d Cir. (1969)
United States v. Charles T. Bennett, Wilbert Haywood, Elmer Jessup, Henry Stanton and Farris Thomas, 415 F.2d 1113, 2d Cir. (1969)
2d 1113
Leave to file out-of-time petitions for rehearing of our decision in 409 F.2d 888
(2 Cir. 1969) was sought by appellant Farris Thomas pro se and later by
counsel who had represented him on the appeal. We granted leave and
The only point raised which merits discussion is that, in light of Chimel v.
California, decided June 23, 1969, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685
(1969), the address books containing Jessup's telephone numbers and the
business card of Austin Burke found in various parts of Thomas' bedroom after
his arrest and the letter found in Joyce Hoffman's pocketbook in the bedroom
closet, see 409 F.2d at 895-897, should not have been received in evidence. It
may be, as the Government suggests, that the warrantless search for and seizure
of some or even all of these items would have been allowable under Chimel.
However, we are not required either to decide on the Government's contention,
which might necessitate further development of the facts, or to consider the
possible application of the doctrine of harmless error as most recently
explicated in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d
284 (1969). For, despite the Court's reluctance to decide the issue last spring,
see Van Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 2051, 23 L.Ed.2d 728
(1969), and Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 89 S.Ct. 2053, 23 L.Ed.2d 732
(1969), we do not regard Chimel as applicable to searches (other than that in
Chimel itself) prior to June 23, 1969.
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199
(1967), the Court explained that in determining how far a newly announced
constitutional rule of criminal procedure would be made prospective only,
attention should be given to "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards,
(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive
application of the new standards." All three considerations point to making
Chimel prospective in the full sense of Stovall and Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969), namely, "only to the petitioner
involved in the case in which the new rule is announced and to all future cases
in which the proscribed official conduct has not yet occurred." Desist v. United
States, supra, 394 U.S. at 257, 89 S.Ct. at 1038 (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan). See United States v. Hutto, 393 F.2d 783, 784 & n. 3 (4 Cir.
1968). The purpose to be served by Chimel is deterrent; law enforcement
officers had justifiably relied upon Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67
S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950);1 and the effect of retroactive application
of Chimel on the administration of justice would thus be substantial even if this
were limited to cases where the judgment had not become final. In contrast
there is little to be said in favor of retroactivity under the standards the Court
has announced. As pointed out in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 638, 639,
85 S.Ct. 1731, 1742, 1743, 14 L.Ed. 2d 601 (1965), "there is no likelihood of
Notes:
*
Although theChimel opinion notes that the Court's decisions on the permissible
scope of a warrantless search "have been far from consistent," 395 U.S. at 755,
89 S.Ct. 2034, the Court recognized that Harris and Rabinowitz were generally
accepted as setting out the applicable standards.