Home Indemnity Company v. Arapahoe Drilling Company, Inc., 5 F.3d 546, 10th Cir. (1993)
Home Indemnity Company v. Arapahoe Drilling Company, Inc., 5 F.3d 546, 10th Cir. (1993)
Home Indemnity Company v. Arapahoe Drilling Company, Inc., 5 F.3d 546, 10th Cir. (1993)
3d 546
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On September 26, 1989, Home and Arapahoe filed a stipulation with the New
Mexico Department of Insurance, agreeing to submit to the jurisdiction of the
department of insurance "the issues set forth in the ... Amended Complaint ...,
Amended Answer ... and Counterclaim, and Reply to Counterclaim filed in the
cause entitled Home Indemnity Company v. Arapahoe Drilling Company, Inc."
Appellee's Supp.App. at 18. The federal court action was stayed pending
resolution of the administrative proceeding.
While the case was pending on appeal, Home filed a motion for summary
judgment in the federal district court, claiming that its entitlement to the
$90,254 in unpaid premiums had not been at issue before the department of
insurance and remained unresolved. In its reply brief, Home also argued that
even if the issue of the unpaid premiums had been before the department of
insurance, the department had no jurisdiction to decide a contract dispute.
The district court denied Home's motion for summary judgment and dismissed
the case with prejudice. In doing so, the court made the following remarks:
10
I absolutely cannot comprehend Mr. Biehler's statements that this was not
litigated in front of the Insurance Commission. He asks specifically for a
finding that they owed him $90,000, and he argues jurisdiction. He submitted
himself to that jurisdiction. Everything that's asked in this lawsuit has been
decided by the State. It's up on appeal in the State. It's a State matter now.
There's nothing left to litigate in this Court.
11
.... He litigated that. He lost. He now comes back here and asks me to relitigate
it. I'm not going to relitigate it. The matter is moot.
....
12
13
Dismissing a case does not deny Rule 11 sanctions. The Court retains
jurisdiction for that part. I also call to defendant's counsel 28 USC 1927 as a
possible avenue. This matter has been totally litigated. There's nothing left for
me to do except dismiss it, which I will do.
14
15
16
Home argues that the district court erred in imposing sanctions because (1) it
failed to make specific findings and conclusions, and (2) sanctions were
unwarranted. We review the district court's decision to impose sanctions under
an abuse of discretion standard. O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893,
903 (10th Cir.1992)(28 U.S.C.1927 and Rule 11); Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc.,
955 F.2d 1388, 1393 (10th Cir.1992)(Rule 11).
17
18
"A district court's failure to make express findings does not require a remand if
'a complete understanding of the issues may be had [from the record] without
the aid of separate findings.' " Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Cos.,
760 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.1985)(quoting Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859,
861 (9th Cir.1975)). So long as the district court's findings and conclusions are
sufficiently specific to allow us to "follow the path" taken by the district court,
the imposition of sanctions may be upheld. Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods.,
Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1037 (7th Cir.) (quoting Brown v. Federation of State
Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir.1987)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909
(1988).
19
Here, although the district court did not recite the specific language of the
statutes, it clearly found that Home's act of filing the summary judgment
motion "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplied litigation and was not "well
grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law." 28 U.S.C.1927;
Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. In its summary judgment ruling, the court found Home's
statement that the unpaid premium issue was not before the insurance
commission not to be well grounded in fact. In that same ruling, and later, after
the hearing on sanctions, the court found Home's legal arguments in support of
its motion to be meritless. Finally, the court found that because the premium
issue had been completely litigated before the state tribunal, Home's attempt to
relitigate the issue in federal court was unjustified. In other words, Home's
motion unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings. Because we
are able to "follow the path" taken by the district court, its findings and
conclusions are sufficiently specific.
20
We also reject Home's contention that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing sanctions. Home's stipulations and pleadings clearly demonstrate that
the issue of the allegedly overdue premiums was before the state administrative
tribunal, the corporation commission, the New Mexico district court and the
court of appeals. To later claim that this issue was not before these bodies was a
blatant misrepresentation of fact.
21
Home's jurisdictional argument, raised for the first time in its reply brief in
support of its motion for summary judgment, is similarly without merit.2 As
stipulated by the parties, a determination whether the tool pushers were
properly classified automatically resolved the overdue premium issue as well.
Because the insurance commission clearly had jurisdiction to determine
whether the tool pushers were properly classified, Home's argument has no
basis in law.
22
1992); see also 59A-16-24(B) and 59A-17-8. For this reason, as well, Home's
jurisdictional argument has no legal basis.
23
24
**
Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, District Judge, United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.
R. 36.3
Because Home's argument was first raised in its reply brief, and did not go to
the jurisdiction of the district court, the court was under no obligation to
address the argument on its merits. See, e.g., Boone v. Carlsbad
Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1554 n.6 (10th Cir.1992); Comeau v.
Rupp, 762 F.Supp. 1434, 1451 (D.Kan.1991)