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    Cagayan Robina V CA

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    Phylian Corazon W. Oras
    The Supreme Court ruled that: 1) The assessment of petitioner's sugar mill machineries based on the Assets Privatization Trust's floor bid price was proper under the Real Property Tax Code, as the law allows various valuation approaches. 2) The Court of Appeals correctly found that petitioner's appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was time-barred, as it was filed more than 30 days past the deadline set in the law to appeal decisions of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Tax appeals must be filed within mandatory jurisdictional periods.

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    Cagayan Robina V CA

    Uploaded by

    Phylian Corazon W. Oras
    218 views2 pages
    The Supreme Court ruled that: 1) The assessment of petitioner's sugar mill machineries based on the Assets Privatization Trust's floor bid price was proper under the Real Property Tax Code, as the law allows various valuation approaches. 2) The Court of Appeals correctly found that petitioner's appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was time-barred, as it was filed more than 30 days past the deadline set in the law to appeal decisions of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Tax appeals must be filed within mandatory jurisdictional periods.

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    Cagayan Robina v CA

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    The Supreme Court ruled that: 1) The assessment of petitioner's sugar mill machineries based on the Assets Privatization Trust's floor bid price was proper under the Real Property Tax Code, as the law allows various valuation approaches. 2) The Court of Appeals correctly found that petitioner's appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was time-barred, as it was filed more than 30 days past the deadline set in the law to appeal decisions of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Tax appeals must be filed within mandatory jurisdictional periods.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    218 views2 pages

    Cagayan Robina V CA

    Uploaded by

    Phylian Corazon W. Oras
    The Supreme Court ruled that: 1) The assessment of petitioner's sugar mill machineries based on the Assets Privatization Trust's floor bid price was proper under the Real Property Tax Code, as the law allows various valuation approaches. 2) The Court of Appeals correctly found that petitioner's appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was time-barred, as it was filed more than 30 days past the deadline set in the law to appeal decisions of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Tax appeals must be filed within mandatory jurisdictional periods.

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    of 2

    [G.R. No. 122451.

    October 12, 2000]


    CAGAYAN ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CO., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
    CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
    APPEALS, and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF CAGAYAN, respondents.
    Facts:
    In 1990, the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) offered for sale all the assets and
    properties of the Cagayan Sugar Corporation (CASUCO), which had been foreclosed
    and transferred to APT by the Development Bank of the Philippines. The APT set the
    floor bid price for the said properties at three hundred fifty five million pesos
    (P355,000,000.00).Petitioner, as the highest bidder, acquired the aforesaid properties for
    a total price of P464,000,000.00. Among the properties bought by petitioner were sugar
    mill machineries located at the CASUCO millsite in Sto. Domingo, Piat, Cagayan. The
    market value of these machineries was pegged at P391,623,520.00 and the assessed
    value was set at P313,298,820.00 under Tax Declaration No. 5355.
    On October 18, 1990, the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan issued a "Notice of
    Assessment of Real Property" to petitioner covering the machineries installed at the
    CASUCO millsite based on the market value of P391,623,520.00 and the assessed
    value thereof at P313,298,820.00. On February 8, 1991, petitioner appealed the
    assessment to the LBAA, on the ground that it was excessive, erroneous, and unjust.
    On September 10, 1991, petitioner asked the Provincial Assessor to reconsider his
    assessment, contending that it should not be based on the APT-set selling price alone,
    but should likewise consider the operating conditions of the properties and pricing
    factors such as goodwill and future business potential. The LBAA resolved that the basis
    if the market value for assessment purposes of the properties should be the APT floor
    bid price of P355,000,000.00, then deducted the value of the land, the total market value
    of the buildings and the value of machineries not subject to real property tax putting the
    assessed value at P208,261,650.00
    On April 18, 1992, petitioner prepared an "Appeal of Assessment" addressed to
    the LBAA but did not file the same with the CBAA. It was only on November 25, 1992,
    that petitioner filed with the CBAA an "Appeal of Assessment" identical with its earlier
    appeal dated April 18, 1992.
    Issues:
    (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the assessment of petitioner's machineries
    proper and correct under the Real Property Tax Code?
    (2) Did the appellate court err in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's appeal to the
    CBAA for being time-barred?
    Ruling:
    (1) We agree with petitioner that Section 28 of the Real Property Tax Code provides
    for a formula for computing the current market value of machineries. However, Section
    28 must be read in consonance with Section 3 (n) of the said law, which defines "market
    value." Under the latter provision, the LBAA and CBAA were not precluded from
    adopting various approaches to value determination, including adopting the APT "floor
    bid price" for petitioner's properties. As correctly pointed out by the CBAA and affirmed
    by the court a quo:
    Valuation on the basis of a floor bid price is not bereft of any basis in law. One of
    the approaches to value is the Sales Analysis Approach or the Market Data Approach
    where the source of market data for valuation is from offer of sales or bids of real

    property. Valuation based on the floor bid price belongs to this approach, pursuant to
    Section 3(n)
    Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good
    faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. In the instant case,
    petitioner failed to show that the use by the LBAA and CBAA of the APT floor bid price,
    pursuant to Section 3 (n) of the Real Property Tax Code was incorrect and done in bad
    faith. The method used by the LBAA and CBAA cannot be deemed erroneous since
    there is no rigid rule for the valuation of property, which is affected by a multitude of
    circumstances and which rules could not foresee nor provide for.
    (2) Based on the records, we hold that the respondent court did not err in finding
    petitioner's appeal to the CBAA time-barred. The applicable provision is Section 34 of
    P.D. No. 464, and not Section 30. Where the owner or administrator of a property or an
    assessor is not satisfied with the decision of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, he
    may, within thirty days from the receipt of the decision, appeal to the Central Board of
    Assessment Appeals. Petitioner does not dispute respondent court's findings that
    petitioner received on April 18, 1992, the LBAA resolution denying its appeal and that it
    had only until May 18, 1992, to appeal the local board's resolution to the
    CBAA. Petitioner, however, only filed its appeal with the CBAA on November 25, 1992 or
    way beyond the period to perfect an appeal. Well-entrenched is the rule that the
    perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
    and that failing in this regard renders the decision final and executory.

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