032007

TransnationalizingthePublicSphere

OntheLegitimacyandEfficacyofPublicOpinioninaPostWestphalian
World
NancyFraser
Itiscommonplacenowadaystospeakoftransnationalpublicspheres,diasporicpublicspheres,Islamicpublic
spheresandevenanemergingglobalpublicsphere.Andsuchtalkhasaclearpoint.Agrowingbodyofmedia
studiesliteratureisdocumentingtheexistenceofdiscursivearenasthatoverflowtheboundsofbothnationsand
states.Numerousscholarsinculturalstudiesareingeniouslymappingthecontoursofsucharenasandtheflows
ofimagesandsignsinandthroughthem.[1]Theideaofatransnationalpublicsphereisintuitivelyplausible,
then,andseemstohavepurchaseonsocialreality.
Nevertheless,thisidearaisesaproblem.Theconceptofthepublicspherewasdevelopednotsimplyto
understandcommunicationflowsbuttocontributeanormativepoliticaltheoryofdemocracy.Inthattheory,a
publicsphereisconceivedasaspaceforthecommunicativegenerationofpublicopinion.Insofarastheprocess
isinclusiveandfair,publicityissupposedtodiscreditviewsthatcannotwithstandcriticalscrutinyandtoassure
thelegitimacyofthosethatdo.Thus,itmatterswhoparticipatesandonwhatterms.Inaddition,apublicsphere
isconceivedasavehicleformarshalingpublicopinionasapoliticalforce.Mobilizingtheconsideredsenseof
civilsociety,publicityissupposedtoholdofficialsaccountableandtoassurethattheactionsofthestate
expressthewillofthecitizenry.Thus,apublicsphereshouldcorrelatewithasovereignpower.Together,these
twoideasthenormativelegitimacyandpoliticalefficacyofpublicopinionareessentialtotheconceptofthe
publicsphereindemocratictheory.[2]Withoutthem,theconceptlosesitscriticalforceanditspoliticalpoint.
Yetthesetwofeaturesarenoteasilyassociatedwiththediscursivearenasthatwetodaycalltransnational
publicspheres.Itisdifficulttoassociatethenotionoflegitimatepublicopinionwithcommunicativearenasin
whichtheinterlocutorsarenotfellowmembersofapoliticalcommunity,withequalrightstoparticipateinpolitical
life.Anditishardtoassociatethenotionofefficaciouscommunicativepowerwithdiscursivespacesthatdonot
correlatewithsovereignstates.Thus,itisbynomeansclearwhatitmeanstodaytospeakoftransnational
publicspheres.Fromtheperspectiveofdemocratictheory,atleast,thephrasesoundsabitlikeanoxymoron.
Nevertheless,weshouldnotrushtojettisonthenotionofatransnationalpublicsphere.Suchanotionis
indispensable,Ithink,tothosewhoaimtoreconstructdemocratictheoryinthecurrentpostnational
constellation.Butitwillnotbesufficientmerelytorefertosuchpublicspheresinarelativelycasual
commonsenseway,asifwealreadyknewwhattheywere.Rather,itwillbenecessarytoreturntosquareone,
toproblematizepublicspheretheoryandultimatelytoreconstructitsconceptionsofthenormativelegitimacy
andpoliticalefficacyofcommunicativepower.Thetrickwillbetowalkanarrowlinebetweentwoequally
unsatisfactoryapproaches.Ontheonehand,oneshouldavoidanempiricistapproachthatsimplyadaptsthe
theorytotheexistingrealities,asthatapproachriskssacrificingitsnormativeforce.Ontheotherhand,one
shouldalsoavoidanexternalistapproachthatinvokesidealtheorytocondemnsocialreality,asthatapproach
risksforfeitingcriticaltraction.Thealternative,rather,isacriticaltheoreticalapproachthatseekstolocate
normativestandardsandemancipatorypoliticalpossibilitiespreciselywithinthehistoricallyunfolding
constellation.
Thisprojectfacesamajordifficulty,however.Atleastsinceits1962adumbrationbyJrgenHabermas,public
spheretheoryhasbeenimplicitlyinformedbyaWestphalianpoliticalimaginary:ithastacitlyassumedtheframe
ofaboundedpoliticalcommunitywithitsownterritorialstate.Thesameistruefornearlyeverysubsequent
egalitariancritiqueofpublicspheretheory,includingthoseoffeminists,multiculturalistsandantiracists.Only
veryrecently,infact,havethetheorysWestphalianunderpinningsbeenproblematized.Onlyrecently,thanksto

postColdWargeopoliticalinstabilities,ontheonehand,andtheincreasedsalienceoftransnationalphenomena
associatedwithglobalizationontheother,hasitbecomepossibleandnecessarytorethinkpublicsphere
theoryinatransnationalframe.Yetthesesamephenomenaforceustofacethehardquestion:istheconceptof
thepublicspheresothoroughlyWestphalianinitsdeepconceptualstructureastobeunsalvageableasacritical
toolfortheorizingthepresent?OrcantheconceptbereconstructedtosuitapostWestphalianframe?Inthe
lattercase,thetaskwouldnotsimplybetoconceptualizetransnationalpublicspheresasactuallyexisting
institutions.Itwouldratherbetoreformulatethecriticaltheoryofthepublicsphereinawaythatcanilluminate
theemancipatorypossibilitiesofthepresentconstellation.
InthisarticleIwanttosketchtheparametersforsuchadiscussion.Ishallbemappingtheterrainandposing
questionsratherthanofferingdefinitiveanswers.ButIstartwiththeassumptionthatpublicspheretheoryisin
principleanimportantcriticalconceptualresourcethatshouldbereconstructedratherthanjettisoned,ifpossible.
Mydiscussionwillproceedinthreeparts.First,IshallexplicatetheimplicitWestphalianpresuppositionsof
Habermasspublicspheretheoryandshowthatthesehavepersistedinitsmajorfeminist,antiracistand
multiculturalcritiques.Second,Ishallidentifyseveraldistinctfacetsoftransnationalitythatproblematizeboth
traditionalpublicspheretheoryanditscriticalcountertheorizations.Finally,Ishallproposesomestrategies
wherebypublicspheretheoristsmightbegintorespondtothesechallenges.Myoverallaimistorepoliticize
publicspheretheory,whichiscurrentlyindangerofbeingdepoliticized.

ClassicalPublicSphereTheoryandItsRadicalCritique:
ThematizingtheWestphalianFrame
Letmebeginbyrecallingsomeanalyticfeaturesofpublicspheretheory,drawnfromthelocusclassicusofall
discussions,JrgenHabermassStructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere(1989).Inthisearlywork,
Habermassinquiryproceededsimultaneouslyontwolevels,oneempiricalandhistorical,theotherideological
criticalandnormative.Onbothlevels,thepublicspherewasconceptualizedascoextensivewithabounded
politicalcommunityandasovereignterritorialstate,oftenanationstate.Tobesure,thiswasnotalwaysfully
explicit.Tacitly,however,Habermassaccountofthepublicsphererestedonatleastsixsocialtheoretical
presuppositions,allofwhichtookforgrantedtheWestphalianframingofpoliticalspace.
(1)Structuraltransformationcorrelatedthepublicspherewithamodernstateapparatusthat
exercisedsovereignpoweroveraboundedterritory.Thus,Habermasassumedthatpublicopinion
wasaddressedtoaWestphalianstatethatwascapableinprincipleofregulatingitsinhabitants
affairsandsolvingtheirproblems(Habermas,1989:1426,7988,1998a:1358,1414,3667,
4336).
(2)StructuralTransformationconceivedtheparticipantsinpublicspherediscussionasfellow
membersofaboundedpoliticalcommunity.Castingthetelosoftheirdiscussionsasthearticulated
generalinterestofademos,whichshouldbetranslatedintobindinglaws,Habermastacitly
identifiedmembersofthepublicwiththecitizenryofademocraticWestphalianstate(1989:204,
517,6273,838,141ffseealso1998a:3656,3817).
(3)StructuralTransformationconceivedaprincipaltoposofpublicspherediscussionastheproper
organizationofthepoliticalcommunityseconomicrelations.Thelatter,inturn,islocatedina
capitalistmarketeconomythatwaslegallyconstitutedandsubjectinprincipletostateregulation.
Ineffect,Habermasassumedthataprimaryfocusofthepublicsconcernwasanationaleconomy,
containedbyaWestphalianstate(1989:1420,esp.p.17seealso1998a:34451,esp.pp.349
50).
(4)Structuraltransformationassociatedthepublicspherewithmodernmediathat,inenabling

communicationacrossdistance,couldknitspatiallydispersedinterlocutorsintoapublic.Tacitly,
however,Habermasterritorializedpublicitybyfocusingonnationalmedia,especiallythenational
pressandnationalbroadcasting.Thus,heimplicitlyassumedanationalcommunications
infrastructure,containedbyaWestphalianstate(1989:58,6070seealso1998a:3734,3767).
(5)StructuralTransformationtookforgrantedthatpublicspherediscussionwasfully
comprehensibleandlinguisticallytransparent.Tacitlypresupposingasinglesharedmediumof
publiccommunication,Habermaseffectivelyassumedthatpublicdebatewasconductedina
nationallanguage(1989:2439,esp.pp.367,556,6073seealso1998a:3602,36970,375
7).
(6)Finally,StructuralTransformationtracedtheculturaloriginsofthepublicspheretotheletters
andnovelsof18thand19thcenturyprintcapitalism.Itcreditedthosebourgeoisgenreswith
creatinganewsubjectivestance,throughwhichprivateindividualsenvisionedthemselvesas
membersofapublic(1989:413,4851seealso1998a:3734.[3]Thus,Habermasgroundedthe
structureofpublicspheresubjectivityintheverysamevernacularliteraryformsthatalsogaverise
totheimaginedcommunityofthenation(Anderson,1991).
ThesesixsocialtheoreticalpresuppositionstieHabermassearlyaccountofthepublicspheretothe
Westphalianframingofpoliticalspace.InStructuralTransformation,publicscorrelatewithmodernterritorial
statesandnationalimaginaries.Tobesure,thenationalaspectwentlargelyunthematizedinthiswork.Butits
presencethereasanimplicitsubtextbetraysapointthatHabermashassincemadeexplicit:historically,therise
ofmodernpublicitycoincidedwiththeriseofthenationstate,inwhichtheWestphalianterritorialstatebecame
fusedwiththeimaginedcommunityofthenation(Habermas,1998b).Itmaybetrue,asHabermas(1998b)now
claims,thatpresentdaydemocraticstatescandispensewithnationalidentityasabasisofsocialintegration.
ButitremainsthecasethatStructuralTransformationsconceptionofpublicityhadanationalsubtext.That
worksaccountofthepublicspherepresupposedanationallyinflectedvariantoftheWestphalianframe.
Butthatisnotall.Thankstoits(national)Westphalianpresuppositions,StructuralTransformationconceptualized
thepublicspherefromthestandpointofahistoricallyspecificpoliticalproject:thedemocratizationofthemodern
territorial(nation)state.FarfromputtinginquestionthatprojectsWestphalianframe,Habermasenvisioneda
deliberativemodelofdemocracythatwassituatedsquarelywithinit.Inthismodel,democracyrequiresthe
generation,throughterritoriallyboundedprocessesofpubliccommunication,conductedinthenationallanguage
andrelayedthroughthenationalmedia,ofabodyofnationalpublicopinion.Thisopinionshouldreflectthe
generalinterestofthenationalcitizenryconcerningtheorganizationoftheirterritoriallyboundedcommonlife,
especiallythenationaleconomy.Themodelalsorequiresthemobilizationofpublicopinionasapoliticalforce.
Effectivelyempoweringthenationalcitizenry,publicityshouldinfluencelawmakersandholdstateofficials
accountable.Servingthustorationalizenationalpoliticaldomination,itshouldensurethattheactionsand
policiesoftheWestphalianstatereflectthediscursivelyformedpoliticalwillofthenationalcitizenry.In
StructuralTransformation,therefore,thepublicsphereisakeyinstitutionalcomponentof(national)Westphalian
democracy.
Empirically,then,StructuralTransformationhighlightedhistoricalprocesses,howeverincomplete,ofthe
democratizationoftheWestphaliannationstate.Normatively,itarticulatedamodelofdeliberativedemocracyfor
aterritoriallyboundedpolity.Accordingly,thepublicsphereservedasabenchmarkforidentifying,andcritiquing,
thedemocraticdeficitsofactuallyexistingWestphalianstates.Thus,Habermassearlytheoryenabledusto
ask:areallcitizensreallyfullmembersofthenationalpoliticalpublic?Canallparticipateonequalterms?In
otherwords,iswhatpassesasnationalpublicopiniongenuinelylegitimate?Moreover,doesthatopinionattain
sufficientpoliticalforcetoreininprivatepowersandtosubjecttheactionsofstateofficialstocitizencontrol?
DoesthecommunicativepowergeneratedinWestphaliancivilsocietyeffectivelytranslateintolegislativeand

administrativepowerintheWestphalianstate?Inotherwords,isnationalpublicopinionpoliticallyefficacious?
Byinvitingustoexploresuchquestions,StructuralTransformationconstitutedacontributiontothecritiqueof
actuallyexistingdemocracyinthemodernWestphalianstate.
Somereadersfoundthecritiqueinsufficientlyradical.Inthediscussionthatfollowedtheworksbelated
translationintoEnglish,theobjectionstendedtodivideintotwodistinctstreams.Onestreaminterrogatedthe
legitimacyofpublicopinionalonglinesbeyondthosepursuedbyHabermas.Focusedonrelationswithincivil
society,exponentsofwhatIshallcallthelegitimacycritiquecontendedthatStructuralTransformationobscured
theexistenceofsystemicobstaclesthatdeprivesomewhoarenominallymembersofthepublicofthecapacity
toparticipateonaparwithothers,asfullpartnersinpublicdebate.Highlightingclassinequalitiesandstatus
hierarchiesincivilsociety,thesecriticsanalyzedtheireffectsonthosewhomtheWestphalianframeincludedin
principle,butexcludedormarginalizedinpractice:propertylessworkers,women,thepoorethnoracial,religious
andnationalminorities.[4]Thus,thiscritiquequestionedthelegitimacyofwhatpassesforpublicopinionin
democratictheoryandinsocialreality.
AsecondstreamofcriticismradicalizedHabermassproblematizationoftheefficacyofpublicopinion.Focused
onrelationsbetweencivilsocietyandthestate,proponentsoftheefficacycritiquemaintainedthatStructural
Transformationfailedtoregisterthefullrangeofsystemicobstaclesthatdeprivediscursivelygeneratedpublic
opinionofpoliticalmuscle.NotconvincedthatthesehadbeenadequatelycapturedbyHabermassaccountof
therefeudalizationofthepublicsphere,thesecriticssoughttotheorizethestructuralforcesthatblocktheflow
ofcommunicativepowerfromcivilsocietytothestate.Highlightingtherespectiverolesofprivateeconomic
powerandentrenchedbureaucraticinterests,theircritiqueservedtodeependoubtabouttheefficacyofpublic
opinionasapoliticalforceincapitalistsocieties.[5]
Notwithstandingthedifferenceinfocus,thetwostreamsofcriticismsharedadeeperassumption.LikeStructural
Transformation,boththelegitimacycriticsandtheefficacycriticstookforgrantedtheWestphalianframingof
politicalspace.Tobesure,someproponentsofthelegitimacycritiqueexposedthenationalsubtextofpublicity
thathadlargelygonewithoutsayinginHabermassaccount.Analyzingitsexclusionaryeffectsonnational
minorities,multiculturalistcriticssoughttopurgethepublicsphereofmajoritynationalprivilegeinhopesof
reducingdisparitiesofparticipationinpublicdebate.Thepoint,however,wasnottoquestiontheterritorialbasis
ofthepublicsphere.FarfromcastingdoubtontheWestphalianframe,thecriticssoughttoenhancethe
legitimacyofpublicopinionwithinit.Ananalogousobjectiveinformedtheefficacycritique.Takingforgranted
thatpublicopinionwasaddressedtoaterritorialstate,proponentsofthiscritiquehopedtosubjectthelattermore
firmlytothediscursivelyformedwillofitsdemos.LikeHabermas,then,ifarguablymoreradically,bothsetsof
criticsplacedtheirreflectionsonthepublicspherewithintheWestphalianframe.
Myownearlierefforttorethinkthepublicspherewasnoexception.Inanarticleoriginallypublishedin1991,I
directedcriticismsofbothtypesagainstwhatIcalled,followingHabermas,theliberalmodelofthebourgeois
publicsphere.Initslegitimacyaspect,mycritiquefocusedontheeffectsonpublicopinionofinequalitywithin
civilsociety.Rebuttingtheliberalviewthatitwaspossibleforinterlocutorsinapublicspheretobracketstatus
andclassdifferentialsandtodeliberateasiftheywerepeers,Iarguedthatsocialequalityisanecessary
conditionforpoliticaldemocracy.Underrealworldconditionsofmassiveinequality,Ireckoned,theonlywayto
reducedisparitiesinpoliticalvoicewasthroughsocialmovementcontestationthatchallengedsomebasic
featuresofbourgeoispublicity.Complicatingthestandardliberalpictureofasinglecomprehensivepublicsphere,
Iclaimedthattheproliferationofsubalterncounterpublicscouldenhancetheparticipationofsubordinatestratain
stratifiedsocieties.Exposing,too,thebourgeoismasculinistbiasinstandardliberalviewsofwhatcountsasa
publicconcern,Iendorsedeffortsbymovementssuchasfeminismtoredrawtheboundariesbetweenpublicand
private.Yetthiscritiquepresupposedthenationalterritorialunderstandingofpublicity.Farfromchallengingthe
Westphalianframe,itaimedtoenhancethelegitimacyofpublicopinionwithinit(Fraser,1991,seealso1992).

My1991articlealsopropoundedanefficacycritique,whichinterrogatedthecapacityofpublicopiniontoachieve
politicalforce.Identifyingforcesthatblockthetranslationofcommunicativepowerintoadministrativepower,I
questionedthestandardliberalviewthatafunctioningpublicspherealwaysrequiresasharpseparationbetween
civilsocietyandthestate.Distinguishingtheweakpublicsofcivilsociety,whichgeneratepublicopinionbut
notbindinglaws,fromthestrongpublicswithinthestate,whosedeliberationsissueinsovereigndecisions,I
soughttoenvisioninstitutionalarrangementsthatcouldenhancethelattersaccountabilitytotheformer.Aiming,
too,toopenspaceforimaginingradicaldemocraticalternatives,Iquestionedtheapparentforeclosureby
Habermasofhybridforms,suchasquasistrongdecisionmakingpublicsincivilsociety.Yethere,too,I
neglectedtochallengetheWestphalianframe.Thethrustofmyargumentwas,onthecontrary,toenhancethe
efficacyofpublicopinionvisavisWestphalianstate(Fraser,1991:esp.12932).
Boththelegitimacycritiqueandtheefficacycritiquestillseemrighttomeasfarastheywent.ButInowbelieve
thatneitherwentfarenough.Neithercritiqueinterrogated,letalonemodified,thesocialtheoreticalunderpinnings
ofStructuralTransformation,whichsituatedthepublicsphereinaWestphalianframe.Stillorientedtothe
prospectsfordeliberativedemocracyinaboundedpoliticalcommunity,bothcritiquescontinuedtoidentifythe
publicwiththecitizenryofaterritorialstate.Neitherabandonedtheassumptionofanationaleconomy,whose
propersteeringbythedemocraticstateremainedaprincipaltoposofpublicspheredebate,whichwasitselfstill
envisionedasbeingconductedinthenationallanguagethroughthenationalmedia.Thus,neitherthelegitimacy
critiquenortheefficacycritiquechallengedtheWestphalianframe.Animatedbythesamepoliticalprojectas
StructuralTransformation,bothsoughttofurtherdeliberativedemocracyinthemodernterritorialstate.
ThesameistrueforHabermasssubsequentdiscussionofpublicityinBetweenFactsandNorms(1998a).
Amongotherthings,thatworkrevisitedthepublicsphereandincorporatedelementsofthetwocritiques.
Stressingthecoimplicationofprivateandpublicautonomy,Habermasvalorizedtheroleofemancipatorysocial
movements,suchassecondwavefeminism,inpromotingdemocracybypursuingequality,andviceversa
(1998a:4203).Bythusacknowledgingthemutualdependenceofsocialpositionandpoliticalvoice,hegrappled
herewithpreviouslyneglectedaspectsofthelegitimacydeficitsofpublicopinionindemocraticstates.In
addition,BetweenFactsandNormswascentrallyconcernedwiththeproblemofefficacy.Theorizinglawasthe
propervehiclefortranslatingcommunicativeintoadministrativepower,theworkdistinguishedanofficial,
democraticcirculationofpower,inwhichweakpublicsinfluencestrongpublics,whichinturncontrol
administrativestateapparatuses,fromanunofficial,undemocraticone,inwhichprivatesocialpowersand
entrenchedbureaucraticinterestscontrollawmakersandmanipulatepublicopinion.Acknowledgingthatthe
unofficialcirculationusuallyprevails,Habermashereprovidedafulleraccountoftheefficacydeficitsofpublic
opinionindemocraticstates(1998a:3603).
Onemayquestion,tobesure,whetherHabermasfullysucceededinaddressinghiscriticsconcernsoneither
point.[6]Butevenifwegranthimthebenefitofthatdoubt,thefactremainsthatBetweenFactsandNorms
continuedtoassumetheWestphalianframe.ItsmanydeparturesfromStructuralTransformation
notwithstanding,thelaterworkstillconceivedtheaddresseeofpublicopinionasasovereignterritorialstate,
whichcouldsteeranationaleconomyinthegeneralinterestofthenationalcitizenryanditstillconceivedthe
formationofpublicopinionasaprocessconductedinthenationalmediaviaanationalcommunications
infrastructure.Granted,Habermasdidadvocateapostnationalistformofsocialintegration,namely
constitutionalpatriotism,withtheaimofemancipatingthedemocraticstatefromitsnationalistintegument
(1998a:4656,500).ButinthisheeffectivelyendorsedamorepurelyWestphalian,becausemoreexclusively
territorial,conceptionofpublicity.
Ingeneral,then,thepublicitydebateincriticaltheorycontainsamajorblindspot.FromStructuralTransformation
throughBetweenFactsandNorms,virtuallyalltheparticipants,includingme,correlatedpublicsphereswith
territorialstates.Despitetheirotherimportantdisagreements,allassumedtheWestphalianframingofpolitical
spaceatpreciselythemomentwhenepochalhistoricaldevelopmentsseemedtobecallingthatframeinto

question.

ThePostnationalConstellation:ProblematizingtheWestphalianFrame
Today,theWestphalianblindspotofpublicspheretheoryishardtomiss.Whethertheissueisglobalwarming
orimmigration,womensrightsorthetermsoftrade,unemploymentorthewaragainstterrorism,current
mobilizationsofpublicopinionseldomstopatthebordersofterritorialstates.Inmanycases,theinterlocutorsdo
notconstituteademosorpoliticalcitizenry.Often,too,theircommunicationsareneitheraddressedtoa
Westphalianstatenorrelayedthroughnationalmedia.Frequently,moreover,theproblemsdebatedareinherently
transterritorialandcanneitherbelocatedwithinWestphalianspacenorresolvedbyaWestphalianstate.Insuch
cases,currentformationsofpublicopinionscarcelyrespecttheparametersoftheWestphalianframe.Thus,
assumptionsthatpreviouslywentwithoutsayinginpublicspheretheorynowcryoutforcritiqueandrevision.
Nowonder,then,thatexpressionsliketransnationalpublicspheres,diasporicpublicspheresandtheglobal
publicspherefiguresoprominentlyincurrentdiscussions.Viewsaboutthesephenomenadivideintotwo
camps.Onecamptreatstransnationalpublicityasanewdevelopment,associatedwithlate20thcentury
globalization.Claimingthatthemoderninterstatesystempreviouslychanneledmostpoliticaldebateinto
statecentereddiscursivearenas,thiscampmaintainsthattheWestphalianframewasappropriatefortheorizing
publicspheresuntilveryrecently(Held,1995Heldetal.,1999Sassen,1998,2006).Thesecondcampinsists,
incontrast,thatpublicityhasbeentransnationalatleastsincetheoriginsoftheinterstatesysteminthe17th
century.CitingEnlightenmentvisionsoftheinternationalrepublicoflettersandcrossnationalmovementssuch
asabolitionismandsocialism,nottomentionworldreligionsandmodernimperialism,thiscampcontendsthat
theWestphalianframehasalwaysbeenideological,obscuringtheinherentlyunboundedcharacterofpublic
spheres(BoliandThomas,1999KeckandSikkink,1998).Undoubtedly,bothinterpretationshavesomemerit.
Whereasthefirstaccuratelycapturesthehegemonicdivisionofpoliticalspace,thesecondrightlyremindsus
thatmetropolitandemocracyaroseintandemwithcolonialsubjection,whichgalvanizedtransnationalflowsof
publicopinion.Forpresentpurposes,therefore,Iproposetosplitthedifferencebetweenthem.Grantingthat
transnationalpublicityhasalonghistory,Ishallassumethatitspresentconfigurationisneverthelessnew,
reflectingyetanotherstructuraltransformationofthepublicsphere.Onthispoint,allpartiescansurelyagree:
thecurrentconstitutionofpublicopinionburstsopentheWestphalianframe.
Yetthefullimplicationsremaintobedrawn.Focusinglargelyonculturalaspectsoftransnationalflows,suchas
hybridizationandglocalization,manystudentsoftransnationalpublicityneglecttoposethequestionsof
greatestimportanceforacriticaltheory:ifpublicopinionnowoverflowstheWestphalianframe,whatbecomesof
itscriticalfunctionofcheckingdominationanddemocratizinggovernance?Morespecifically,canwestill
meaningfullyinterrogatethelegitimacyofpublicopinionwhentheinterlocutorsdonotconstituteademosor
politicalcitizenry?Andwhatcouldlegitimacymeaninsuchacontext?Likewise,canwestillmeaningfully
interrogatetheefficacyofpublicopinionwhenitisnotaddressedtoasovereignstatethatiscapableinprinciple
ofregulatingitsterritoryandsolvingitscitizensproblemsinthepublicinterest?Andwhatcouldefficacymeanin
thissituation?Absentsatisfactoryanswerstothesequestions,welackausablecriticaltheoryofthepublic
sphere.[7]
Toclarifythestakes,Iproposetorevisitthesixconstitutivepresuppositionsofpublicspheretheory.Ishall
consider,inthecaseofeachpresupposition,howmattersstandempiricallyandwhatfollowsforthepublic
spheresstatusasacriticalcategory.
(1)Consider,first,theassumptionthattheaddresseeofpublicopinionisamodernWestphalianstate,with
exclusive,undividedsovereigntyoveraboundedterritory.Empirically,thisviewofsovereigntyishighly
questionableandnotjustforpoorandweakstates.Today,evenpowerfulstatesshareresponsibilityformany
keygovernancefunctionswithinternationalinstitutions,intergovernmentalnetworksandnongovernmental

organizations.Thisisthecasenotonlyforrelativelynewfunctions,suchasenvironmentalregulation,butalso
forclassicalones,suchasdefense,policing,andtheadministrationofcivilandcriminallawwitnessthe
InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,theInternationalCriminalCourt,andtheWorldIntellectualProperty
Organization.[8]Certainly,theseinstitutionsaredominatedbyhegemonicstates,aswastheinterstatesystem
beforethem.Butthemodeinwhichhegemonyisexercisedtodayisevidentlynew.Farfrominvokingthe
Westphalianmodelofexclusive,undividedstatesovereignty,hegemonyincreasinglyoperatesthroughapost
Westphalianmodelofdisaggregatedsovereignty.[9]Empirically,therefore,thefirstpresuppositionofpublic
spheretheorydoesnotstandup.
Butwhatfollowsforpublicspheretheory?Theeffect,Isubmit,isnotsimplytofalsifythetheorys
underpinnings,butalsotojeopardizethecriticalfunctionofpublicopinion.Ifstatesdonotfullycontroltheirown
territories,iftheylackthesoleandundividedcapacitytowagewar,secureorderandadministerlaw,thenhow
cantheircitizenriespublicopinionbepoliticallyeffective?Evengranting,forthesakeofargument,thatnational
publicityisfairlygeneratedandsatisfiescriteriaoflegitimacyevengranting,too,thatitinfluencesthewillof
parliamentandthestateadministrationhow,underconditionsofdisaggregatedsovereignty,canitbe
implemented?How,insum,canpublicopinionbeefficaciousasacriticalforceinapostWestphalianworld?
(2)Consider,next,theassumptionthatapubliccoincideswithanationalcitizenry,residentonanational
territory,whichformulatesitscommoninterestasthegeneralwillofaboundedpoliticalcommunity.This
assumption,too,iscounterfactual.Foronething,theequationofcitizenship,nationalityandterritorialresidence
isbeliedbysuchphenomenaasmigrations,diasporas,dualandtriplecitizenshiparrangements,indigenous
communitymembershipandpatternsofmultipleresidency.Everystatenowhasnoncitizensonitsterritory
mostaremulticulturaland/ormultinationalandeverynationalityisterritoriallydispersed.[10]Equally
confounding,however,isthefactthatpublicspherestodayarenotcoextensivewithpoliticalmembership.Often
theinterlocutorsareneitherconationalsnorfellowcitizens.Theopiniontheygenerate,therefore,represents
neitherthecommoninterestnorthegeneralwillofanydemos.Farfrominstitutionalizingdebateamongcitizens
whoshareacommonstatusaspoliticalequals,postWestphalianpublicityappearsintheeyesofmany
observerstoempowertransnationalelites,whopossessthematerialandsymbolicprerequisitesforglobal
networking(Calhoun,2002).
Here,too,thedifficultyisnotjustempiricalbutalsoconceptualandpolitical.Iftheinterlocutorsdonotconstitute
ademos,howcantheircollectiveopinionbetranslatedintobindinglawsandadministrativepolicies?If,
moreover,theyarenotfellowcitizens,putativelyequalinparticipationrights,statusandvoice,thenhowcanthe
opiniontheygeneratebeconsideredlegitimate?How,insum,canthecriticalcriteriaofefficacyandlegitimacy
bemeaningfullyappliedtotransnationalpublicopinioninapostWestphalianworld?
(3)Consider,now,theassumptionthataprincipaltoposofpublicspherediscussionistheproperregulationbya
territorialstateofanationaleconomy.Thatassumption,too,isbeliedbypresentconditions.Weneedonly
mentionoutsourcing,transnationalcorporationsandoffshorebusinessregistrytoappreciatethatterritorially
basednationalproductionisnowlargelynotional.Thanks,moreover,tothedismantlingoftheBrettonWoods
capitalcontrolsandtheemergenceof24/7globalelectronicfinancialmarkets,statecontrolovernational
currencyispresentlyquitelimited.Finally,asthosewhoprotestpoliciesoftheWTO,theIMF,NAFTAandthe
WorldBankhaveinsisted,thegroundrulesgoverningtrade,productionandfinancearesettransnationally,by
agenciesmoreaccountabletoglobalcapitalthantoanypublic.[11]Intheseconditions,thepresuppositionofa
nationaleconomyiscounterfactual.
Asbefore,moreover,theeffectistoimperilcriticalfunctionofpublicspheres.Ifstatescannotinprinciplesteer
economiesinlinewiththearticulatedgeneralinterestoftheirpopulations,howcannationalpublicopinionbean
effectiveforce?Then,too,ifeconomicgovernanceisinthehandsofagenciesthatarenotlocatablein
Westphalianspace,howcanitbemadeaccountabletopublicopinion?Moreover,ifthoseagenciesare

invalidatingnationallaborandenvironmentallawsinthenameoffreetrade,iftheyareprohibitingdomesticsocial
spendinginthenameofstructuraladjustment,iftheyareinstitutionalizingneoliberalgovernancerulesthatwould
onceandforallremovemajormattersofpublicconcernfromanypossibilityofpoliticalregulation,ifinsumthey
aresystematicallyreversingthedemocraticproject,usingmarketstotamepoliticsinsteadofpoliticstotame
markets,thenhowcancitizenpublicopinionhaveanyimpact?Lastly,iftheworldcapitalistsystemoperatesto
themassivedetrimentoftheglobalpoor,howcanwhatpassesfortransnationalpublicopinionberemotely
legitimate,whenthoseaffectedbycurrentpoliciescannotpossiblydebatetheirmeritsaspeers?Ingeneral,
then,howcanpublicopinionconcerningtheeconomybeeitherlegitimateorefficaciousinapostWestphalian
world?
(4)Consider,aswell,theassumptionthatpublicopinionisconveyedthroughanationalcommunications
infrastructure,centeredonprintandbroadcasting.Thisassumptionimpliedthatcommunicativeprocesses,
howeverdecentered,weresufficientlycoherentandpoliticallyfocusedtocoalesceinpublicopinion.Butit,too,
isrenderedcounterfactualbycurrentconditions.Recalltheprofusionofnichemedia,somesubnational,some
transnational,whichdonotinanycasefunctionasnationalmedia,focusedonsubjectingtheexerciseofstate
powertothetestofpublicity.Granted,onecanalsonotetheparallelemergenceofglobalmedia,butthese
marketdriven,corporatelyownedoutletsarescarcelyfocusedoncheckingtransnationalpower.Inaddition,
manycountrieshaveprivatizedgovernmentoperatedmedia,withdecidedlymixedresults:ontheonehand,the
prospectofamoreindependentpressandTVandmoreinclusivepopulistprogrammingontheotherhand,the
furtherspreadofmarketlogic,advertiserspower,anddubiousamalgamsliketalkradioandinfotainment.
Finally,weshouldmentioninstantaneouselectronic,broadbandandsatelliteinformationtechnologies,which
permitdirecttransnationalcommunication,bypassingstatecontrols.Together,allthesedevelopmentssignalthe
denationalizationofcommunicativeinfrastructure.[12]
Theeffectsheretooposethreatstothecriticalfunctioningofpublicspheres.Granted,weseesomenew
opportunitiesforcriticalpublicopinionformation.Butthesegoalongwiththedisaggregationandcomplexification
ofcommunicativeflows.Givenafielddividedbetweencorporateglobalmedia,restrictednichemediaand
decenteredInternetnetworks,howcouldcriticalpublicopinionpossiblybegeneratedonalargescaleand
mobilizedasapoliticalforce?Given,too,theabsenceofeventhesortofformalequalityassociatedwith
commoncitizenship,howcouldthosewhocomprisetransnationalmediaaudiencesdeliberatetogetheraspeers?
How,onceagain,canpublicopinionbenormativelylegitimateorpoliticallyefficaciousundercurrentconditions?
(5)Consider,too,thepresuppositionofasinglenationallanguage,whichwassupposedtoconstitutethe
linguisticmediumofpublicspherecommunication.Asaresultofthepopulationmixingalreadynoted,national
languagesdonotmapontostates.Theproblemisnotsimplythatofficialstatelanguageswereconsolidatedat
theexpenseoflocalandregionaldialects,althoughtheywere.Itisalsothatexistingstatesaredefacto
multilingual,whilelanguagegroupsareterritoriallydispersed,andmanymorespeakersaremultilingual.
Meanwhile,Englishhasbeenconsolidatedasthelinguafrancaofglobalbusiness,massentertainmentand
academia.Yetlanguageremainsapoliticalfaultline,threateningtoexplodecountrieslikeBelgium,ifnolonger
Canada,whilecomplicatingeffortstodemocratizecountrieslikeSouthAfricaandtoerecttransnational
formationsliketheEuropeanUnion.[13]
Thesedevelopments,too,posethreatstothecriticalfunctionofpublicopinion.Insofaraspublicspheresare
monolingual,howcantheyconstituteaninclusivecommunicationscommunityofallthoseaffected?Conversely,
insofaraspublicspherescorrespondtolinguisticcommunitiesthatstraddlepoliticalboundariesanddonot
correspondtoanycitizenry,howcantheymobilizepublicopinionasapoliticalforce?Likewise,insofarasnew
transnationalpoliticalcommunities,suchastheEU,aretransnationalandmultilinguistic,howcanthey
constitutepublicspheresthatcanencompasstheentiredemos?Finally,insofarastransnationalpublicsconduct
theircommunicationsinEnglish,whichfavorsglobalelitesandAnglophonepostcolonialsattheexpenseof
others,howcantheopiniontheygeneratebeviewedaslegitimate?Forallthesereasons,andinalltheseways,

languageissuescomplicateboththelegitimacyandefficacyofpublicopinioninapostWestphalianworld.
(6)Consider,finally,theassumptionthatapublicsphererestsonanationalvernacularliterature,whichsupplies
thesharedsocialimaginaryneededtounderpinsolidarity.Thisassumptionisalsocounterfactualtoday.Consider
theincreasedsalienceofculturalhybridityandhybridization,includingtheriseofworldliterature.Consideralso
theriseofglobalmassentertainment,whetherstraightforwardlyAmericanormerelyAmericanlikeorAmerican
izing.Consider,finally,thespectacularriseofvisualculture,orbetter,oftheenhancedsalienceofthevisual
withinculture,andtherelativedeclineofprintandtheliterary.[14]Inallthesecases,itisdifficulttorecognize
thesortof(national)literaryculturalformationseenbyHabermas(andbyAnderson,1991)asunderpinningthe
subjectivestanceofpublicsphereinterlocutors.Onthecontrary,insofaraspublicspheresrequirethecultural
supportofsharedsocialimaginaries,rootedinnationalliterarycultures,itishardtoseethemfunctioning
effectivelytoday.
Ingeneral,then,publicspheresareincreasinglytransnationalorpostnationalwithrespecttoeachofthe
constitutiveelementsofpublicopinion.[15]Thewhoofcommunication,previouslytheorizedasaWestphalian
nationalcitizenry,isoftennowacollectionofdispersedinterlocutors,whodonotconstituteademos.Thewhat
ofcommunication,previouslytheorizedasaWestphaliannationalinterestrootedinaWestphaliannational
economy,nowstretchesacrossvastreachesoftheglobe,inatransnationalcommunityofrisk,whichisnot
howeverreflectedinconcomitantlyexpansivesolidaritiesandidentities.Thewhereofcommunication,once
theorizedastheWestphaliannationalterritory,isnowdeterritorializedcyberspace.Thehowofcommunication,
oncetheorizedasWestphaliannationalprintmedia,nowencompassesavasttranslinguisticnexusofdisjoint
andoverlappingvisualcultures.Finally,theaddresseeofcommunication,oncetheorizedasasovereign
territorialstate,whichshouldbemadeanswerabletopublicopinion,isnowanamorphousmixofpublicand
privatetransnationalpowersthatisneithereasilyidentifiablenorrenderedaccountable.

RethinkingthePublicSphereYetAgain
Thesedevelopmentsraisethequestionofwhetherandhowpublicspherestodaycouldconceivablyperformthe
democraticpoliticalfunctionswithwhichtheyhavebeenassociatedhistorically.Couldpublicspherestoday
conceivablygeneratelegitimatepublicopinion,inthestrongsenseofconsideredunderstandingsofthegeneral
interest,filteredthroughfairandinclusiveargumentation,opentoeveryonepotentiallyaffected?Andifso,how?
Likewise,couldpublicspherestodayconceivablyrenderpublicopinionsufficientlyefficacioustoconstrainthe
variouspowersthatdeterminetheconditionsoftheinterlocutorslives?Andifso,how?Whatsortsofchanges
(institutional,economic,culturalandcommunicative)wouldberequiredeventoimagineagenuinelycriticaland
democratizingrolefortransnationalpublicspheresundercurrentconditions?Wherearethesovereignpowers
thatpublicopiniontodayshouldconstrain?Whichpublicsarerelevanttowhichpowers?Whoaretherelevant
membersofagivenpublic?Inwhatlanguage(s)andthroughwhatmediashouldtheycommunicate?Andvia
whatcommunicativeinfrastructure?
Thesequestionswellexceedthescopeofthepresentinquiry.AndIshallnotpretendtotrytoanswerthemhere.
Iwanttoconclude,rather,bysuggestingaconceptualstrategythatcanclarifytheissuesandpointthewayto
possibleresolutions.
Myproposalcentersonthetwofeaturesthattogetherconstitutedthecriticalforceoftheconceptofthepublic
sphereintheWestphalianera:namely,thenormativelegitimacyandpoliticalefficacyofpublicopinion.AsIsee
it,theseideasareintrinsic,indispensableelementsofanyconceptionofpublicitythatpurportstobecritical,
regardlessofthesociohistoricalconditionsinwhichitobtains.Thepresentconstellationisnoexception.Unless
wecanenvisionconditionsunderwhichcurrentflowsoftransnationalpublicitycouldconceivablybecome
legitimateandefficacious,theconceptlosesitcriticaledgeanditspoliticalpoint.Thus,theonlywaytosalvage
thecriticalfunctionofpublicitytodayistorethinklegitimacyandefficacy.Thetaskistodetachthosetwoideas

fromtheWestphalianpremisesthatpreviouslyunderpinnedthemandtoreconstructthemforapostWestphalian
world.
Consider,first,thequestionoflegitimacy.Inpublicspheretheory,aswesaw,publicopinionisconsidered
legitimateifandonlyifallwhoarepotentiallyaffectedareabletoparticipateaspeersindeliberationsconcerning
theorganizationoftheircommonaffairs.Ineffect,then,thetheoryholdsthatthelegitimacyofpublicopinionisa
functionoftwoanalyticallydistinctcharacteristicsofthecommunicativeprocess,namely,theextentofits
inclusivenessandthedegreetowhichitsrealizesparticipatoryparity.Inthefirstcase,whichIshallcallthe
inclusivenesscondition,discussionmustinprinciplebeopentoallwithastakeintheoutcome.Inthesecond,
whichIshallcalltheparitycondition,allinterlocutorsmust,inprinciple,enjoyroughlyequalchancestostate
theirviews,placeissuesontheagenda,questionthetacitandexplicitassumptionsofothers,switchlevelsas
neededandgenerallyreceiveafairhearing.Whereastheinclusivenessconditionconcernsthequestionofwho
isauthorizedtoparticipateinpublicdiscussions,theparityconditionconcernsthequestionofhow,inthesense
ofonwhatterms,theinterlocutorsengageoneanother.[16]
Inthepast,however,thesetwolegitimacyconditionsofpublicopinionwerenotalwaysclearlydistinguished.
SeenfromtheperspectiveoftheWestphalianframe,boththeinclusivenessconditionandtheparitycondition
wereyokedtogetherundertheidealofsharedcitizenshipinaboundedcommunity.Aswesaw,publicsphere
theoristsimplicitlyassumedthatcitizenshipsetthelegitimateboundsofinclusion,effectivelyequatingthose
affectedwiththemembersofanestablishedpolity.Tacitly,too,theoristsappealedtocitizenshipinordertogive
fleshtotheideaofparityofparticipationinpublicdeliberations,effectivelyassociatingcommunicativeparitywith
thesharedstatusofpoliticalequalityinaterritorialstate.Thus,citizenshipsuppliedthemodelforboththewho
andthehowoflegitimatepublicopinionintheWestphalianframe.
Theeffect,however,wastotruncatediscussionsoflegitimacy.Althoughitwentunnoticedatthetime,the
Westphalianframeencourageddebateabouttheparitycondition,whiledeflectingattentionawayfromthe
inclusivenesscondition.Takingforgrantedthemodernterritorialstateastheappropriateunit,anditscitizensas
thepertinentsubjects,thatframeforegroundedthequestionofhowpreciselythosecitizensshouldrelatetoone
anotherinthepublicsphere.Theargumentfocused,inotherwords,onwhatshouldcountasarelationof
participatoryparityamongthemembersofaboundedpoliticalcommunity.Engrossedindisputingthehowof
legitimacy,thecontestantsapparentlyfeltnonecessitytodisputethewho.WiththeWestphalianframe
securelyinplace,itwentwithoutsayingthatthewhowasthenationalcitizenry.
Today,however,thequestionofthewhocannolongerbesweptunderthetable.Undercurrentconditionsof
transnationality,theinclusivenessconditionoflegitimacycriesoutforexplicitinterrogation.Wemustask:if
politicalcitizenshipnolongersufficestodemarcatethemembersofthepublic,thenhowshouldthe
inclusivenessrequirementbeunderstood?Bywhatalternativecriterionshouldwedeterminewhocountsasa
bonafideinterlocutorinapostWestphalianpublicsphere?
Publicspheretheoryalreadyoffersaclue.InitsclassicalHabermasianform,thetheoryassociatestheideaof
inclusivenesswiththeallaffectedprinciple.Applyingthatprincipletopublicity,itholdsthatallpotentially
affectedbypoliticaldecisionsshouldhavethechancetoparticipateontermsofparityintheinformalprocesses
ofopinionformationtowhichthedecisiontakersshouldbeaccountable.Everythingdepends,accordingly,on
howoneinterpretstheallaffectedprinciple.Previously,publicspheretheoristsassumed,inkeepingwiththe
Westphalianframe,thatwhatmostaffectedpeopleslifeconditionswastheconstitutionalorderoftheterritorial
stateofwhichtheywerecitizens.Asaresult,itseemedthatincorrelatingpublicswithpoliticalcitizenship,one
simultaneouslycapturedtheforceoftheallaffectedprinciple.Infact,thiswasnevertrulyso,asthelonghistory
ofcolonialismandneocolonialismattests.Fromtheperspectiveofthemetropole,however,theconflationof
membershipwithaffectednessappearedtohaveanemancipatorythrust,asitservedtojustifytheprogressive
incorporation,asactivecitizens,ofthesubordinateclassesandstatusgroupswhowereresidentontheterritory

butexcludedfromfullpoliticalparticipation.
Today,however,theideathatcitizenshipcanserveasaproxyforaffectednessisnolongerplausible.Under
currentconditions,onesconditionsoflivingdonotdependwhollyontheinternalconstitutionofthepolitical
communityofwhichoneisacitizen.Althoughthelatterremainsundeniablyrelevant,itseffectsaremediatedby
otherstructures,bothextraandnonterritorial,whoseimpactisatleastassignificant(seePogge,2002:11216,
13944).Ingeneral,globalizationisdrivingawideningwedgebetweenaffectednessandpoliticalmembership.
Asthosetwonotionsincreasinglydiverge,theeffectistorevealtheformerasaninadequatesurrogateforthe
latter.Andsothequestionarises:whynotapplytheallaffectedprincipledirectlytotheframingofpublicity,
withoutgoingthroughthedetourofcitizenship?
Here,Isubmit,isapromisingpathforreconstructingacriticalconceptionofinclusivepublicopinioninapost
Westphalianworld.AlthoughIcannotexplorethispathfullyhere,letmenotetheessentialpoint:theallaffected
principleholdsthatwhatturnsacollectionofpeopleintofellowmembersofapublicisnotsharedcitizenship,but
theircoimbricationinacommonsetofstructuresand/orinstitutionsthataffecttheirlives.Foranygiven
problem,accordingly,therelevantpublicshouldmatchthereachofthoselifeconditioningstructureswhose
effectsareatissue(Fraser,2005).Wheresuchstructurestransgressthebordersofstates,thecorresponding
publicspheresmustbetransnational.Failingthat,theopinionthattheygeneratecannotbeconsideredlegitimate.
Withrespecttothelegitimacyofpublicopinion,then,thechallengeisclear.Inorderforpublicspheretheoryto
retainitscriticalorientationinapostWestphalianworld,itmustreinterpretthemeaningoftheinclusiveness
requirement.Renouncingtheautomaticidentificationofthelatterwithpoliticalcitizenship,itmustredraw
publicitysboundariesbyapplyingtheallaffectedprincipledirectlytothequestionathand.Inthisway,the
questionofthewhoemergesfromunderitsWestphalianveil.Alongwiththequestionofthehow,which
remainsaspressingasever,it,too,becomesanexplicitfocusofconcerninthepresentconstellation.Infact,
thetwoquestions,thatofinclusivenessandthatofparity,nowgohandinhand.Henceforth,publicopinionis
legitimateifandonlyifitresultsfromacommunicativeprocessinwhichallpotentiallyaffectedcanparticipate
aspeers,regardlessofpoliticalcitizenship.Demandingasitis,thisnew,postWestphalianunderstandingof
legitimacyconstitutesagenuinelycriticalstandardforevaluatingexistingformsofpublicityinthepresentera.
Letmeturn,now,tothesecondessentialfeatureofacriticalconceptionofpublicity,namely,thepolitical
efficacyofpublicopinion.Inpublicspheretheory,aswesaw,publicopinionisconsideredefficaciousifandonly
ifitismobilizedasapoliticalforcetoholdpublicpoweraccountable,ensuringthatthelattersexercisereflects
theconsideredwillofcivilsociety.Ineffect,therefore,thetheorytreatspublicitysefficacyasafunctionoftwo
distinctelements,whichIshallcallthetranslationconditionandthecapacitycondition.Accordingtothe
translationcondition,thecommunicativepowergeneratedincivilsocietymustbetranslatedfirstintobinding
lawsandthenintoadministrativepower.Accordingtothecapacitycondition,thepublicpowermustbeableto
implementthediscursivelyformedwilltowhichitisresponsible.Whereasthetranslationconditionconcernsthe
flowofcommunicativepowerfromcivilsocietytothepublicpower,thecapacityconditionconcernstheabilityof
theadministrativepowertorealizethepublicsdesigns,bothnegatively,byreininginprivatepowers,and
positively,bysolvingitsproblemsandorganizingcommonlifeinaccordwithitswishes.
Inthepast,thesetwoefficacyconditionswereunderstoodinthelightoftheWestphalianframe.Fromthat
perspective,boththetranslationconditionandthecapacityconditionwerelinkedtotheideaofthesovereign
territorialstate.Aswesaw,publicspheretheoristsassumedthattheaddresseeofpublicopinionwasthe
Westphalianstate,whichshouldbeconstituteddemocratically,sothatcommunicationflowsunobstructedfrom
weakpublicstostrongpublics,whereitcanbetranslatedintobindinglaws.Atthesametime,thesetheorists
alsoassumedthattheWestphalianstatehadthenecessaryadministrativecapacitytoimplementthoselawsso
astorealizeitscitizensaimsandsolvetheirproblems.Thus,theWestphalianstatewasconsideredtheproper
vehicleforfulfillingboththetranslationandcapacityconditionsofpublicsphereefficacy.

Here,too,however,theresultwastotruncatediscussionsofefficacy.AlthoughtheWestphalianframefostered
interestinthetranslationcondition,ittendedtoobscurethecapacitycondition.Takingforgrantedthatthe
sovereignterritorialstatewastheproperaddresseeofpublicopinion,thatframeforegroundedthequestionof
whetherthecommunicativepowergeneratedinthenationalpublicspherewassufficientlystrongtoinfluence
legislationandconstrainstateadministration.Theargumentfocused,accordingly,onwhatshouldcountasa
democraticcirculationofpowerbetweencivilsocietyandthestate.Whatwasnotmuchdebated,incontrast,
wasthestatescapacitytoregulatetheprivatepowersthatshapeditscitizenslives.Thatissuewentwithout
saying,aspublicspheretheoristsassumed,forexample,thateconomieswereeffectivelynationalandcouldbe
steeredbynationalstatesintheinterestofnationalcitizens.Engrossedindebatingthetranslationcondition,
theyapparentlyfeltnonecessitytodisputethecapacitycondition.WiththeWestphalianframeinplace,the
latterbecameanonissue.
Today,however,theseassumptionsnolongerhold.Undercurrentconditionsoftransnationality,thecapacity
conditiondemandsinterrogationinitsownright.Wemustask:ifthemodernterritorialstatenolongerpossesses
theadministrativeabilitytosteeritseconomy,ensuretheintegrityofitsnationalenvironment,andprovidefor
thesecurityandwellbeingofitscitizens,thenhowshouldweunderstandthecapacitycomponentofefficacy
today?Bywhatmeanscantherequisiteadministrativecapacitybeconstitutedandwherepreciselyshoulditbe
lodged?Ifnottothesovereignterritorialstate,thentowhatorwhomshouldpublicopinionontransnational
problemsbeaddressed?
Withrespecttothesequestions,existingpublicspheretheoryaffordsfewclues.Butitdoessuggestthatthe
problemofpublicitysefficacyinapostWestphalianworldisdoublycomplicated.Acriticalconceptioncanno
longerrestrictitsattentiontothedirectionofcommunicativeflowsinestablishedpolities,wherepublicityshould
constrainanalreadyknownandconstitutedaddressee.Inaddition,itmustconsidertheneedtoconstructnew
addresseesforpublicopinion,inthesenseofnew,transnationalpublicpowersthatpossesstheadministrative
capacitytosolvetransnationalproblems.Thechallenge,accordingly,istwofold:ontheone,hand,tocreatenew,
transnationalpublicpowersontheother,tomakethemaccountabletonew,transnationalpublicspheres.Both
thoseelementsarenecessaryneitheraloneissufficient.Onlyifitthematizesbothconditions(capacityaswell
astranslation)willpublicspheretheorydevelopapostWestphalianconceptionofcommunicativeefficacythatis
genuinelycritical.
Ingeneral,then,thetaskisclear:ifpublicspheretheoryistofunctiontodayasacriticaltheory,itmustrevise
itsaccountofthenormativelegitimacyandpoliticalefficacyofpublicopinion.Nolongercontenttoleavehalfthe
pictureintheshadows,itmusttreateachofthosenotionsascomprisingtwoanalyticallydistinctbutpractically
entwinedcriticalrequirements.Thus,thelegitimacycritiqueofexistingpublicitymustnowinterrogatenotonly
thehowbutalsothewhoofexistingpublicity.Orrather,itmustinterrogateparityandinclusivenesstogether,
byasking:participatoryparityamongwhom?Likewise,theefficacycritiquemustnowbeexpandedto
encompassboththetranslationandcapacityconditionsofexistingpublicity.Puttingthosetworequirements
together,itmustenvisionnewtransnationalpublicpowers,whichcanbemadeaccountabletonewdemocratic
transnationalcircuitsofpublicopinion.
Granted,thejobisnoteasy.Butonlyifpublicspheretheoryrisestotheoccasioncanitserveasacriticaltheory
inapostWestphalianworld.Forthatpurpose,itisnotenoughforculturalstudiesandmediastudiesscholarsto
mapexistingcommunicationsflows.Rather,criticalsocialandpoliticaltheoristswillneedtorethinkthetheorys
corepremisesconcerningthelegitimacyandefficacyofpublicopinion.Onlythenwillthetheoryrecoverits
criticaledgeanditspoliticalpoint.Onlythenwillpublicspheretheorykeepfaithwithitsoriginalpromiseto
contributetostrugglesforemancipation.

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Publishedin:Theory,Culture&Society2007(SAGE,LosAngeles,London,NewDelhi,andSingapore),Vol.
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[1]See,forexample,Bowen(2004),Guidryetal.(2000),Mules(1998),Olesen(2005),Stichweh(2003),Tololyan
(1996),Volkmer(2003),Werbner(2004).
[2]See,aboveall,Habermas,StructuralTransformationofthePublicSphere(1989)especiallypp.516,140and
222ffandBetweenFactsandNorms:ContributionstoaDiscourseTheoryofLawandDemocracy(1998),
especiallypp.35979.
[3]ThephraseprintcapitalismisnotHabermass,butBenedictAndersons(1991).
[4]BlackPublicSphereCollective(1995),BrooksHigginbotham(1993),Eley(1995),Gole(1997),Landes(1988),
James(1999),Rendall(1999),Ryan(1990,1995),Soysal(1997),Young(1987),Warner(2002).
[5]AnearlyformofthiscritiquecanbefoundinLuhmann(1970).SeealsoAronowitz(1993),Garnham(1995),
GerhardsandNeidhardt(1990),Warner(1993).
[6]AccordingtoWilliamE.Scheuerman(1999a),forexample,Habermasoscillatesinconsistentlybetweentwo
antitheticalstances:ontheonehand,arealistic,resigned,objectivelyconservativeviewthatacceptsthegrave
legitimacyandefficacydeficitsofpublicopinioninreallyexistingdemocraticstatesontheother,aradical
democraticviewthatisstillcommittedtoovercomingthem.IsuspectthatScheuermanmaywellberight.
Nevertheless,forpurposesofthepresentargument,IshallstipulatethatHabermasconvincinglynegotiatesthe

tensionbetweenfactandnorminthedemocraticstate.
[7]Somescholarsdoraisethesequestions.Forgenuinelycriticaltreatments,seeBohman(1997,1998)andLara
(2003).
[8]Heldetal.(1999),Rosenau(1997,1999),Scheuerman(1999b),Schneiderman(2001),Slaughter(2005),
Strange(1996),Zacher(1992).
[9]HardtandNegri(2001),Pangalangan(2001),Sassen(1995),Strange(1996).
[10]AleynikoffandKlusmeyer(2001),Beiner(1995),Benhabib(2002,2004),Husband(1996),Linklater(1999),
Preuss(1999).
[11]Cerny(1997),Germain(2004),Heldetal.(1999),Helleiner(1994),Perratonetal.(1997),Schulze(2000),
Stettingetal.(1999),Stiglitz(2003).
[12]Heldetal.(1999)CammaertsandAudenhove(2005),Dahlgren(2005),McChesney(1999,2001),
Papacharissi(2002),Yudice(2004).
[13]Adrey(2005),Alexander(2003),Knig(1999),Patten(2001),Phillipson(2003),PayrowShabani(2004),Van
Parijs(2000),Wilkinson(2004).
[14]Appadurai(1996),DeLucaandPeeples(2002),Hannerz(1996),Jameson(1998),Marshall(2004),Yudice
(2004).
[15]HabermashashimselfremarkedmanyofthedevelopmentscitedabovethatproblematizetheWestphalian
presuppositionsofpublicspheretheory(seeHabermas,2001).
[16]Certainly,theseconditionsarehighlyidealizedandneverfullymetinpractice.Butitispreciselytheir
idealizedcharacterthatensuredthecriticalforceofpublicspheretheory.Byappealingtothestandardof
inclusivecommunicationamongpeersthetheorywasabletocriticizeexisting,powerskewedprocessesof
publicity.Byexposingunjustifiedexclusionsanddisparities,thetheorywasabletomotivateitsaddresseesto
trytoovercomethem.
TransnationalizingthePublicSphere

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