This document summarizes an interview with General Ralph Eberhart, the Commander in Chief of NORAD on September 11, 2001. It discusses NORAD's pre-9/11 focus on threats from outside of North America, lack of training with the FAA, and declining resources. NORAD was primarily focused on responding to threats like Russian bombers and cruise missiles from abroad, not domestic hijackings.
This document summarizes an interview with General Ralph Eberhart, the Commander in Chief of NORAD on September 11, 2001. It discusses NORAD's pre-9/11 focus on threats from outside of North America, lack of training with the FAA, and declining resources. NORAD was primarily focused on responding to threats like Russian bombers and cruise missiles from abroad, not domestic hijackings.
This document summarizes an interview with General Ralph Eberhart, the Commander in Chief of NORAD on September 11, 2001. It discusses NORAD's pre-9/11 focus on threats from outside of North America, lack of training with the FAA, and declining resources. NORAD was primarily focused on responding to threats like Russian bombers and cruise missiles from abroad, not domestic hijackings.
This document summarizes an interview with General Ralph Eberhart, the Commander in Chief of NORAD on September 11, 2001. It discusses NORAD's pre-9/11 focus on threats from outside of North America, lack of training with the FAA, and declining resources. NORAD was primarily focused on responding to threats like Russian bombers and cruise missiles from abroad, not domestic hijackings.
Event: North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) field sitevisit Typeof event: Interview with CINC NORAD (Commander in ChiefNORAD), General Ralph Edward Eberhart DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PA EL, Date: March 1,2004 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown Special Access Issues: Clearance check ISCAP APPEAL 0.2012-042, document no. 29 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29, 2014 TeamNumber: 8 Location: Peterson Air Force Base, Building 2 Participants - Non-Commission: Colonel David Hayden (U.S. Army), Colonel Punch Moulton (U.S. Air Force) Participants - Commission: Team8: J ohn Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown. J ohn Farmer, Miles Kara, Kevin Shaeffer Note: Please refer totherecorded interview for further details. Background: Eberhart hadbeen part of themilitary for 33years on September 11, 2001 (9/11), andhad been afour star general for fiveyears. Please refer totheattached biography for acomprehensive record of Eberhart's career. Debate over the relevance of NORAD: , Thetwo major factors that contributed to thedeclined importance of NORAD's air defense mission were: 1) theSoviet Union development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) - thus changing thelikelihood of atraditional bomber/fighter air attack; and2) afterwards, therelative endof the Cold War threat after thebreak up of the Soviet Union. A common thought that stemmed fromtheabovefactors was that the air defense mission ofNORAD could bedistributed amongst sites that could perform multiple missions. Thepriority was to"recapitalize andre-modernize" the forces for the future. Eberhart noted: "I'veargued both sides of that." [Note: Eberhart was theVice Chief of USAF between 1997and 1999, andthus engaged inthedebate over NORAD funding. He seemed infavor of using regular Air Force assets, vice theNational Guard, for alert duty. Hecommented that it could be"cheaper andbetter" to do so, andwould assist with themodernization of theforce.] Asymmetric threats: SECRET SECRET' 2 According toEberhart, prior to9/11 asymmetric threats were seen aspart of national security's "away game" instead of its "home game". These threats included cruise missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or computer systems threats. Though theclassic attrition warfare ascribed totheCold War was unlikely, asymmetric threats were not scene as adomestic priority for NORAD. Most thoughts ondomestic terrorismwere tied to thecircumstance ofthe Oklahoma City bombing, and thus alaw enforcement issue. NORAD considered itself least prepared torespond tocruise missiles during the Soviet era. Afterwards, with thedisbanding of theSoviet Union, as stockpiles of weapons were less stringently monitored, andas thetechnology to create a"poor man's" cruise missile became disseminated, NORAD considered it possible for terrorist organizations to employ cruisemissiles. This was NORAD's primary terrorist-related concern. Air Sovereignty in name only: Eberhart held thesameconcerns as General Myers upon his ascendancy to the position of CINC NORAD, which included thenotion that NORAD could only provide "token sovereignty" for CONUS airspace. They both believed theability tohave air traffic control and aerospace control was undergoing aprocess of atrophy. He commented that it was very difficult to express theimportance of thethreat before 9/11, but had developed aNAASC (North American Air Surveillance Council) to address this concern. TheNAASC was ableto stopanFAA proposal to disable the ability to track primary targets onradar, andNORADIF AA attempted to create afunding-sharing arrangement. Themoney was allotted with theassumption that GPS (global positioning satellite) technology would replace theradar technology. Eberhart stated that NORAD went onrecord, viatheNAASC, for theneed to sharetheair surveillance financial burden across theDoD (Department of Defense) andtheDoT (Department of Transportation). He commented: "Without 9/11wewould have likely lost that fight. Everyone agreed, but didn't want topay for it or thought that new technology would come online" toreplace thetechnical difficulties. Succinctly, Eberhart opinedthat if 9/11 had not occurred therewould havebeen no fmancial will topay for new radar capability. J oint FAAINORAD training: Eberhart explained that prior to 9/11 therewas not much interest between the FAA andNORAD to shareinexercises. The FAA priority was to servethe economic needs of theair traffic, whereas NORAD at times would be seenby theFAA as infringing onthis priority by theuseof air spacein exercises. Eberhart noted that prior to 9/11theroleof theFAA innational securi ty was to vector NORAD assets towards atarget inbound to CONUS. SECRET- SECREl' 3 Pre-9f11 law enforcement events: Eberhart explained that therole ofNORAD in CONUS events is torespond in support of thelead federal agency, just astheNational Guard, aspart of themilitary, supports law enforcement incertain events. NORAD's external focus canbeattributed partially tono documented indication of athreat akinto the 9/11 attacks having reached aCINC NORAD. Matrix of primary threats pre-9f11 : Oneof theprimary threats Eberhart was aware ofpre-9111 was the"slimchance" that thepolitico-military events inRussia would destabilize tothepoint at which an attack would beinitiated. This possibility necessitated constant vigilance over theADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zones).. Another primary concern at NORAD was its important role astheeyes andears of theu.s. external drug mission. Thedifference between NORAD's projected missions and the9/11 attacks, according toEberhart, was that in fulfilling NORAD's air sovereignty anddefense missions, whether insupport of other U.S. agencies or not, the threats NORAD was tasked with always originated fromoutside of CONUS, andin externally originated events there ismoretimeto coordinate asuccessful response. To illustrate NORAD's focus, Eberhart commented that NORAD had never "set up" aCAP (Combat Air Patrol) programprior to 9/11 because it was animpractical tactic for useincountering thetypes of air threats NORAD was tasked with defending against, such as longrange air-to-surface missiles. Theonly practical anddeveloped response would havebeen that which NORAD practiced for - toneutralize theICBM's airborne delivery systembefore launch. Further, Eberhart noted that themission to intercept an airborne intercontinental threat at 0.8mach does not translate tothe law enforcement mission that has now been tasked toNORAD by thePresident. Regarding theFAA's rolein air defense, Eberhart noted that hebelieves the FAA thought 1) airport security would have been more robust; and2) that any hijack would havebeen a"classic" hijack. Both thesemisconceptions led totheir lack of preparedness on9/11. Moving towards 9/11 in history: Eberhart explained that it quickly became obvious tohimafter thefall of the Soviet Union, through the oldWarsaw pact posturing andthe "saber rattling" of Sadaam Hussein, that theworld was "far more dangerous" than it had been. But because of the separation of theocean fromthesethreats, Eberhart had always viewed themilitary as fighting an"away game" intheMiddle East andinEastern Europe. When hecameto . NORAD in2000, hewas concerned withballistic missile defense. Hewas also concerned SECItE'f' SECRET 4 with "finding away ahead with cruise missile defense", andstopping theatrophy of the radar capability. Eberhart commented to Commission staff that he still does not know "exactly what theintelligence community had" regarding thepossibility of anattack likethat of 9/11, but ifthe intelligence community had hadinformation that postulated aterrorist group would attack anurban setting with anaircraft, then that information would been passed toNORAD. Further, according to Eberhart, NORAD didpostulate an air attack fromabroad prior to 9/11, but inall theproposed scenarios: 1) theaircraft would be squawking; 2) theairlinepilots would beincockpit control, not theterrorists; and 3) NORAD would have asubstantial period of timetoreact, andtopass ROE through the appropriate National Command Authority. TheRussian threat re-emergent: Theposturing that was present on9/11 was respondent to Russian military operations, andEberhart commented that there was intrinsic experiential value to posturing tomeet thepotential threat fromtheRussian operations. 9/11: Eberhart received acall at 6:45AM MDT (Mountain Daily Time, or 8:45AM EDT) fromCMOC's Command Director (CD) that informed himof theongoing circumstance ofa suspected hijacking on theEast Coast. Hewas toldthat this was anon- exercise. Hewent tohis office, and sawtheCNN broadcast ofthe World Trade Center explosion; Heasked if theaircraft that was suspected of impacting theWorld Trade Center was thesame aircraft that was asuspected hijack, andwas told that they were not. Eberhart commented that there was apparently "great confusion inthe system". After the second impact, it was "obvious" toEberhart that therewas anongoing andcoordinated terrorist attack. Heattempted to contact the Chairman of theJ oint Chiefs of Staff (CJ CS), but was unable sincethe CJ CS was airborne at thetime. Sohe immediately contacted higher command authority at thePentagon. Eberhart stayed at Building 1(US Space Command, which hewas also theCommander of), sincehedidnot want to loose communication. Hewent to theCheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) later in themorning. After Otis ANGB scramble: Eberhart had trust in thecommanders ofthe sectors and theauthority at CONR, andthus hadno involvement with vectoring the fighters. He didnotethat ifhe heard (while monitoring thedecisions of his commanders) anorder hedidnot agree with, he would counter theorder; but for most incidents hehas confidence inhis commanders. He noted that incross-border operations hetakes more of anactiverole. Eberhart stayed incommunication with General Myers. Hebelieves hemoved his operations to Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) at approximately SECltET" 8ECRET 5 9:30EMT. Hebelieves that hewas traveling to CMOC whileboth Delta Flight 1989[On 9/11, Delta 1989was mistakenly reported hijacked.) andUnited Airlines Flight 93(VAL 93) [UAL 93crashed inPennsylvania at 10:03:11(NTSB).] wereongoing events. He believes hereported toCheyenne Mountain asUAL 93was ongoing. Langley at Battle Stations: Eberhart noted that onhis communication loop it had"quieted down" before he made thedecision to goto CMOC. Langley scramble and the rebirth of AAL 11: Eberhart hadnoknowledge of thecircumstance that initiated thescramble of the Langley fighters. Hewas only made aware of the circumstance recently. [Note: Commission staff believes that afalserumor that AAL 11was still airborne after 8:46:40 EDT (NTSB time of impact) andheaded enroute to Washington, D.C. was thecause for theLangley scramble. This is evident through analysis of theNEADS Mission Crew Commander recording fromposition MCC Op 2.] Threat to Chicago: Eberhart recalls concern over responding with capable assets to anaircraft that was reported headed towards Chicago. Eberhart informed Commission staffthat he believed the Sears Tower was alikely target. American Airlines Flight 77 (AAL 77) [Impact at thePentagon at 9:37:45 (NTSB)]: Eberhart recalls that General Arnold, Commander of Continental United States Aerospace Defense Region (CONR), gave information that aplane "might have been" in thevicinity of Washington, D.C. Authority for Interceptor Operations (AFIO): Eberhart hadnocomment ontheLangley fighters AFrO [Also known as Quad 7, since afighter transponds "7777" when declaring AFIO] declaration, and only noted that when afighter achieves certain levels of mach theweaponry onthe fighters may not work upon arrival toatarget. Delta 1989 and the circumstance with VAL 93: Commission staff represented toEberhart partial results of its investigation. Eberhart commented that Delta 1989andUAL 93may havebeen interchanged. He commented that heunderstands that there is "support" for this theory. Vice President's order: SECltEr SECRET 6 Eberhart noted that the VP order occurred slightly prior to his arrival at CMOC. Henoted that heindicated by theway theorder was input through theNORAD communications systemthat anairliner would have to display a"hostile act" before the a shoot down order would occur. Eberhart believes that General Findley informed himof theVP order. He reacted that to shoot-down anairplane based on its location was an extreme act. The order had already been communicated down chain when hearrived at CMOC, sohecommunicated to CONR that they should still look for ahostile act. He viewed his direction as specificity, not countermanding. Eberhart noted that theburden of making thedecision topass anorder authorizing the engagement of acommercial airliner "pales incomparison to theburden ontheperson who would pull thetrigger" - Eberhart used this comment to indicate that heunderstands that there is "no onewho wants to do this less than the fighter pilot". Hecommented that if thepilot saw"the nose down, no landing gear, high speed" - then this couldbeconstrued as ahostile act; but nomatter what thecircumstance, thepilot would look towards his command for anindication of what todo. Eberhart assumed that theorder was passed to the level of the fighter pilot. "Rules of engagement areonly good if those engaged know therules". Eberhart spent time in thedays thereafter 9111on efforts to formulate proper and formal specificity of ROE to bepassed tohis commands. Weapons-free: Eberhart noted that General Worley didnot have the authority to give a "weapons-free" order. Eberhart commented that aNORADpilot is not under Worley's command, andthus would not operateunder that order. Further, theAndrews AFB pilots under Worley's command should haveknown that Worley didnot have that authority, andthus would ideally have still lookedtowards ahigher command authority for specificity and direction. Eberhart commented that afighter pilot istrained only to become weapons-free after ahostile target is identified. Eberhart noted that the fighters' Command andControl eC2) through NEADS rested onhis authority; whereas the air traffic control of the fighters rested with theFAA. Eberhart noted that despite the communication difficulties there is almost always away tocommunicate through relays tothefighter pilots. DEFCON 3 declaration: Eberhart explained that therewas adebate over the advantages anddisadvantages of declaring DEFCON 3, andbelieves thePentagon initiated theDEFCON 3transition. Eberhart commented that DEFCON 3was not intended for the attacks of9/11, andthus could have complicated theresponse tothe attacks. Eberhart did not think it would have . "done anything for us" within CONUS. [Commission staff believes General Myers was SECRET SECRET 7 responsible for DEFCON 3inorder to increase thereadiness posture of U.S. global forces inlight of thepossibility that theCONUS attacks would befollowed by attacks on U.S. forces abroad.] Eberhart conunented that "Transition ROE didn't changewhat wehad already told them(pilots)". [According to theLangley pilots' Commission interview Transition ROE certainly had asignificant effect ontheir thought process.] SCATANA: Eberhart was concerned onthe"unintended casualties" of declaring SCATANA - the military was not prepared and/or postured to take over theUnited States airspace since therewere still ongoing lawenforcement andgeneral aviation aircraft airborne. He directed theNORAD planning officeandtheFAA representative to write amodified SCATANA that allowed for certain necessary flights. Eberhart called SCATANA a "Cold War relic", andnoted that SCATANA is designed to sterilize anarea for the purpose of aircraft identification asfriend or foe; thus, intheevent of an air attack by the Russian military, theRussians would not beabletouseU.S. navigational aids totheir advantage. . Post-9/11: Eberhart noted that theevents of 9/11were discussed at thetactical, strategic and operational levels of NORAD. Time-distance warning was recognized as afactor that "complicated the day"; which ledtotheDEN (Defense Event Network) line, liaisons between theFAA andthemilitary andgreater radar inter-operability. Further, thealert base missions were evaluated inconjunction with key infrastructure andmajor population centers. Certain "air defense levels" were developed that could beimplemented within time intervals (twenty minutes beingthequickest possible escalation of an air defense level). This ledto recommendations towards ''tiered air defense alert levels" - levels that servealongtermgoal for appropriate responses provided tothePresident given escalating air defense threats. Eberhart noted that it isnecessary for thedata link system- which allows for target identification tobepassed fromoneIn systemto another - to beimplemented directly fromthe FAA toNEADS, andfromNEADS to theintercepting fighter aircraft. Timelines of events on 9/11: According to Eberhart, thetimelines developed for NORAD of the 9/11 attacks indicate that there were difficulties with notification andwith communicating ROE. Eberhart commented that though thosetimelines "were not exactly correct" they were used to address theoperational faults of theday. Eberhart stated that in"noway" werethetimelines created as a"falsification of thetruth", andthat they were compiled withbest intent. Commission staff represented to SECRET SECRET 8 Eberhart thetimelinefacts that havebeen compiled by itsresearch. Eberhart, after being presented with these facts, commented that hedoes not knowwho was tasked with compiling thetimelines for NORAD, andthat whenever NORAD is shown that there is something wrong with thetimeline, they adjust it. He commented that "no onehas ever discussed that with mebefore", regarding thedifferences between theNORAD official timeline andthe facts uncovered by Commission staff. [Note: Upon further interviews at NORAD, Commission staff learned that Eberhart was briefed ontheNORAD timeline in advance of Commission interviews, andthis briefing was basedon thetimelinedelivered to Commission staff onFebruary 23, 2004. Eberhart denied inthecourse of this interview that hehad ever been exposed to theaforementioned timeline.] Eberhart also statedthat thenewest NORAD timeline [delivered to Commission staff onFebruary 23,2004] was likely theresult of his "standing order" to correct the record of events whenever possible. Commission May 2003 Hearing: Eberhart reviewed theprepared statement of General Arnold prior to it being sent to theCommission. Hehas also reviewed atranscript of thehearing, but said hehadno rolein creating thetimeline that was presented [Thetimeline presented to the Commission in May of2003 was compiled by Colonel Scott (ret.) ofCONR]. Eberhart stated that he spoke with General McKinley (thecurrent Commander at CONR) following thehearing, andwas not pleased. Recommendations: Eberhart believes the"biggest challenge right now iswhat arethey (terrorists) thinking about doing that we're not practicing for or equipped for". Eberhart commented that within that challenge there is adilemma between confidence for theAmerican people, deterrence against theaggressor, andtheground truth of capability. Eberhart has concerns over a"complacent crew" in anaircraft who might have terrorist intentions. Eberhart opined that the effort to unify thelanguage between theFAA and NORAD has been successful. Heisworried however that over time this relationship may become less proactive, Eberhart commented that theNational Guard ownership ofthe NORAD mission is appropriate, andthat thereis no reason to move themission back to theactive duty military. Eberhart noted that for the"budgeted years" there isenough resource to execute thecurrent NORAD mission. Eberhart commented that hehas found thequality of theintelligence information sharing tobe"very good". Hehas found great value in interrogation of terrorists at Guantanamo Bay and inlawenforcement intelligence sharing. ~ECRE'F SECRE' f 9 Eberhart commented that heknows of no need fromNORAD for achange in Posse Comitatus, but that if aneedpresented itself then it will bechanged. Eberhart commented that thereis currently ascramble plan that has been developed sothat fighter pilots know exactly how toreachthe likely air patrol areas unless they arepaired with aspecific target. These efforts have been coordinated with the FAA. Eberhart "personally thinks" that theground to air defense measures that arein place currently areappropriate, andthat theefforts made toimplement suchmeasures on individual event bases areongoing, considered for each event, and also appropriate. 9/11 in American history: Eberhart hopes thewar onterrorismwill bewon, andthat therewill beno animosity to aspecific ethnicity. Hebelieves that theU.S. will know it has won when the roots - poverty andunemployment - that spawn terrorismare attacked. Follow up: Eberhart was not aware that NORAD issued theCommission anew timeline after its CONR interviews. Eberhart reviewed General Arnold andColonel Scott's prepared statements for theCommission hearing inMay of2003. General McKinley briefed Eberhart on thehearing. Eberhart didnot focus or participate inany high level reconstruction of theattacks for review andrelease totheAmerican public immediately thereafter 9/11. He answered Commission staff that hewas not involved in any effort to "spin" theevents of 9/11. Eberhart answered Commission staff that there isno reason in his knowledge that Commander Marr would not represent theground facts ofthe 9/11 attacks to theCommission. ECRET