Bunnage (2011)

Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Teses CMC Student Scholarship
2011
Public Dollar Private Owners; Tax Subsidies for
New Stadiums in Professional Sports
Grant J. Bunnage
Claremont McKenna College
Tis Open Access Senior Tesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
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Recommended Citation
Bunnage, Grant J., "Public Dollar Private Owners; Tax Subsidies for New Stadiums in Professional Sports" (2011). CMC Senior Teses.
Paper 114.
htp://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/114

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
PUBLIC DOLLAR PRIVATE OWNERS; TAX SUBSIDIES FOR NEW
STADIUMS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

SUBMITTTED TO
PROFESSOR JOSEPH BESSETTE
AND
DEAN GREGORY HESS
BY
GRANT J. BUNNAGE

FOR
SENIOR THESIS
SPRING 2011

APRIL 25, 2011

2

3
CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS
CHAPTERS
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. CINCINACTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 13
3. CLEVELAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21
4. INDIVIDUAL LEAGUE VALUTION AND DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Major League Baseball
National Football League
National Basketball Association
5. CONCLUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
WORKS CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
APPENDIXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. Estimated 2010 Overall League Revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Major League Baseball Valuations Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3. National Football Valuation Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
4. National Basketball Association Valuation Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5. MLB, NFL, NBA Valuations Over Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Tables

1. Proposed New Revenue Expenditures Hamilton County Sales Tax . . . . . . . 15
2. Economic Impact of Proposed Stadium Funding Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Original Financial Plan for the Gateway Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4. Characteristics of Gund Arena and Jacobs Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Major League Baseball Valuation 1991- 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 National Football League Valuations 1991-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7 Table 7. National Basketball Association Valuation 1991-2009 . . . . . . . . . . .37
8. MLB, NFL, and NBA Average Valuation 1991-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

5

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The growing popularity of North American professional sports over the last
twenty years directly coincides with the recent trend of urban communities using tax
dollars to publically subsidize professional football, baseball, and basketball stadiums.
Communities across North America invest substantial amount of public tax dollars in
private facilities in light of a consensus among policy analysts that the economic impact
of the stadium is greatly exaggerated.
1
Sports Economist argue that the actual economic
impact of sports teams in terms of creating new jobs, generating individual spending,
increasing county tax revenues and attracting new business is too small to justify the
large public expenditure for the stadium subsidies.
2

In North America the three dominant professional sports leagues in terms of
overall league revenue are the National Football League; Major League Baseball; and the
National Basketball Association. With the exception of the Green Bay Packers who
operate as the only community owned franchise, professional sports teams in North
America are privately owned. As private entities sports teams are not obligated to
disclose their financial statements making it difficult to know exactly how profitable

1
3. Kevin Delaney and Rick Eckstein, Public Dollars, Private Stadiums: The Battle Over Building Sports
Stadiums (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
2
Robert Baade, Richard Dye. The impact of stadiums and professional sports on metropolitan area
development." Growth & Change 21, no. 2 (Spring 1990). 2-5.

6
owning a professional sports team really is. The now defunct Financial World magazine
published estimates of operating profits and franchise valuations from 1991 to 1998. In
1999 Forbes magazine started publishing the figures in their sports economics section.
Estimates of overall league revenue consistently rank the National Football League,
Major League Baseball and National Basketball Association as the most lucrative sports
leagues in the world
3
.

Figure 1. Estimated 2010 Overall League Revenue in Billions

Public subsidies for the professional sports teams are a relatively new
phenomenon beginning in the early 1990s. In the past sixty years professional sports
have undergone a transformation emerging as a national obsession in the flourishing post
World War II economy. In the 1950s, professional football and baseball teams generally
played in dual purpose privately financed stadiums, equally distributing stadium related
revenue between teams. The primary revenue source came almost entirely within the

3
"CHART OF THE DAY: NFL Players And Owners Are Fighting Over The Biggest Pie In Sports Read
more: http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-biggest-pie-in-sports-2011-3#ixzz1KM9dpnCV". Business
Insider. http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-biggest-pie-in-sports-2011-3. Retrieved 23 April 2011.
9
7
3.8
3.6
0 2 4 6 8 10
NFL
MLB
NBA
English Premier League
Estimated 2010 Revenue (in billions)

7
stadium from ticket sales, limited stadium advertising and concessions. In the 1960s
individual teams began signing lucrative broadcasting contracts that collectively
strengthened the leagues. During the 1970s, broadcasting revenues in the large markets
surpassed stadium revenue although overall league revenue was still dominated by ticket
sales and concessions. A new trend emerged in the 1980s when owners identified
alternative revenue streams most notably the improvement of concession and sports
memorabilia available within the stadium
4
. Team owners found that fans were willing to
pay for improved quality and quantity of concessions and the providers were willing to
compete to have access to the stadiums and fans.
The last twenty years of professional sports have seen unprecedented growth
attributed primarily to lucrative broadcasting contracts and new concession revenue. With
the growth a disproportional amount of new stadiums have been built. Beginning in
1990 fifty Major League Baseball, National Football League and National Basketball
Association teams have the constructed new facilities. The cost of the new facilities in
the three sports eclipsed twelve billion dollars with approximately 65 percent of the funds
coming from public subsides
5
.
The phenomenon of publically subsidizing facilities for professional sports teams
is the direct result of the teams favorable negotiating leverage with the local
governments because of scarcity of franchises controlled by the leagues monopolistic

4
Delaney, Kevin, and Rick Eckstein. Public dollars, private stadiums: the battle over building sports
stadiums. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 24-25
5
Appendix A B and C

8
power, and the institutional alliances between local corporate advocacy groups, and local
government.
Public subsidies for private stadiums have emerged largely because professional
sports leagues are capable of acting as monopolies artificially controlling the location and
existence of the individual teams. The market structure of the leagues allows them to
restrict the number of teams, which is significantly less than cities that are capable of
supporting a franchise. In all three major sports the leagues allow teams to veto the
creation of new franchises or the movement of existing teams into their market areas. In
economic terms, Noll and Zimbalist (1997) identify how the league can control supply
regardless of consumer demand, which further increases the value of the restricted
commodity
6
.
Professional sports teams like businesses are mobile and are constantly looking to
maximum profit enriching the owners. This business practice allows teams to shop local
jurisdictions for the most desirable public subsidy increasing revenue from a new
stadium. Owners are able to exert control over the timing and process of their threatened
moves giving them an absolute advantage when dealing with local governments and
communities
7
.
According to Delaney and Eckstein:
The only certain effective way to give cities and taxpayers a level
playing field in their negotiations with sports teams and leagues is to have

6
Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist. Sports, jobs, and taxes: the economic impact of sports teams and
stadiums. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 237.
7
Clyde Brown and David Paul Local Organized Interest and the 1996 Cincinnati Sports Stadia Tax
Referendum, Journal of Sports & Social Issues 23, no 2 (1999) : 221-224

9
a larger supply of teams. This means changing the fundamental structure
of our professional sports industries. The competitive ideal even allowing
for the necessary cooperative decision making that is required to schedule
a contest agree upon rules and keep records, would mean more team in
more cities a wider range of viewing options for fans and some
redistribution of league profits back to cities and taxpayers.
8

Cities have largely accepted that they must provide teams with new publically
subsidized facilities or lose the franchise to other communities willing to spend public
dollars. Sports teams operating in new facilities today generally pay little or no rent, are
given most or all parking revenue and naming right to the stadium, and are in a few cases
given ticket sale guarantees by the city.
9
The standard financial plan cities propose to the
teams divide the stadium construction expenditure in three components; payments to be
paid directly by team owners out of their pocket; those to be financed through upfront
payments such as naming rights, special seat license, and sale of luxury boxes; and those
to be paid initially from a budget or sale of bonds approved by the local government
10
.
When a team rarely becomes available through expansion or relocation the league is able
to create a situation of competitive bidding from several potential cities giving the
individuals teams a substantial negotiating advantage over the local governments.
Teams owners initiate the negotiation process between the team and local
government by publically demanding public subsidies and strengthen their position by
threaten to relocate the team if their demands are not meet. Although the teams are the

8
Delaney and Eckstein, 108
9
Roger and Zimbalist, 28.
10
Ibid., 30.

10
direct recipients of the subsidies it is the indirect beneficiaries that prove instrumental in
supporting, campaigning and securing the public subsidy. The advocacy group who
support the subsidy are dominated by local corporations composed of elite CEOs who
influence the political process and utilize resources at their disposal to fund the
campaigns. The advocacy groups are less interested in public policy and favor large
visible projects that will attract new corporations and dollars to the city. Corporate
advocates see the stadiums with luxury boxes and club seating as a necessary recruiting
tools. Because the corporate groups receive no direct benefits from the subsidy they have
a greater incentive to lobby and support the subsidy projects.
The corporate advocacy groups generally use two strategies for why local
communities should spend public dollars on the construction of new facilities. The first
claim is that new stadiums will provide tangible economic benefits to the local
community. The second claims that the new stadiums will augment the way the
community views itself, and how others perceive the community
11
. Roger and
Zimbalist (1997) found the most effective path to a new publically subsidized stadium is
to have a unified corporate advocacy group that emphasizes ways in which the stadium
will enhance community self esteem and community collective conscience
12
. The
advocacy organizations success relies on corporate and political relationships to devise a
tax proposal, and privately fund the campaign.

11
Roger and Zimbalist, 35-43.
12
Ibid.,35

11
Whenever public subsides are proposed for private stadiums there is a strong
community resistance. Anti-tax supporters and community activist agree that public
expenditure on sports displaces resources needed elsewhere in the community and absorb
scare government funds which ought to be used for either tax reductions or programs
having a higher social or economic payoff
13
. Under the fundamental principle of taxation
the financial contribution for a public service should be a function of the benefits
received for the constituents. The opposition argues that the economic activity generated
by the sports team is relatively small given the large public investment required, and the
types of jobs beyond the initial construction effort are low paying and seasonal
14
. The
subsidization of stadiums is commonly referred to as corporate welfare, and team owners
were personified as greedy and tightfisted with their own money.
Economist has consistently reported that stadium projects are poor investments
unworthy of public sector efforts and dollars. The projects simply redirect spending from
one activity to another producing only a small increase in economic activity and any jobs
created are low paying service jobs. Despite the overwhelming research showing the
economic impacts of the sports facilities fail to deliver the purposed economic benefits,
North American metropolitan cities continue to build new sports facilities using public
funds
15
. The irony behind the publically financed stadiums is that the average citizens
whos tax dollars end up paying for the stadiums are the least likely to benefit from the

13
DeMause,Neil and Joanna Cagan, Field of schemes: how the great stadium swindle turns public money
into private profit.( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 55
14
Brown and Paul, 23
15
Roger and Zimbalist, 45-48.

12
new facility. New designs for stadiums tend to focus on adding luxury suites and club
seats intended for individual season tickets or corporate entertainment
16
.
The direct economic impact on communities when publically funded facilities are
built at the expense of the taxpayer has been extensively recorded. The focus of this paper
is to examine the impact publically subsidized facilities built in the last twenty years have
on the overall team valuation compared to teams with no public subsidy or no new stadia.
When owners of private teams align themselves with the business interest of
corporate advocacy groups and utilize the bargaining advantage secured by the scarcity of
teams I believe the overall valuation of the teams will prove to be more lucrative for team
owners than when no new stadiums are constructed or stadiums are privately financed.
Each political process between the team and local government is unique structuring the
deals differently. The following two chapters examine the political process and type of
public subsidy given to the Cincinnati Bengals, Cleveland Indians, and Cleveland
Cavaliers.

16
Roger and Zimbalist,141.

13

CHAPTER 2
CINCINATTI

Beginning in the early 1990s, Cincinnati Bengals Owner Mike Brown voiced his
complaints about Riverfront Stadium, the thirty-year-old multipurpose facility the
Bengals currently shared with the Cincinnati Reds. Brown announced his team was
losing money and the only way the team would remain in Cincinnati was if a new larger
stadium was built with public subsides. Brown took his concerns to the city
commissioners and lobbied for a new publically financed stadium which would generate
revenue with added luxury suites and club seats giving the Bengals necessary resources
to compete with other football franchises in free agency.
Four years later, with no stadium plans underway, Brown escalated the conflict
filling a lawsuit against the city which was settled when the city agreed to give the team
an additional 2.75 million dollars per year for the next four years and promised to build
additional luxury suites and club seats at Riverfront Stadium. As part of the settlement
the city renegotiated the terms of the Bengals lease and agreed to have a new stadium in
the works by 1998
17
.

17
stadiums. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 66-69.

14
Shortly after securing the additional payments from the city, Brown publically
announced that the team was being courted by four other cities willing to publically
finance a new stadium. Brown specifically acknowledged that Maryland had agreed in
principal to publically finance a two hundred and fifty million dollar single purpose
stadium in an attempt to lure the franchise from Cincinnati to Baltimore. Days after
Browns latest announcement about the Maryland offer, first term Hamilton County
Commissioner Bob Bedinghaus proposed a unique financing plan to fund a new football
stadium. The plan called for a twenty-year sales tax increase of one cent, which would
pay for the 540 million dollar sports complex, a 300 bed county jail, a small subsidy for a
911 emergency communication center, and a 18% reduction in property taxes (table 1).
The twenty year tax increase in the Bedinghaus plan was the longest and most expensive
sports project ever proposed in the United States, with a total public expenditure of over
700 million with debt service
18
. The plan was also unique in that it was the first proposed
tax increase that combined revenue raising measures with a reduction in property taxes.

18
1. DeMause, Neil and Joanna Cagan, Field of schemes: how the great stadium swindle turns public
money into private profit.( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 55

15
Table 1. Proposed New Revenue Expenditures Hamilton County Sales Tax
19

New Expenditure Per Percent of Tax

Property Tax rollback 40.0
Stadium Cost 35.0
300 bed county jail 15.0
Retirement of other long term debt 6.5
Reduction in real estate transfer tax 2.0
Subsidy for county commissions center operations 1.5

TOTAL 100.00

Fearing that the city would reject the proposal Brown took aggressive action
issuing an ultimatum on June 24 stating if a deal was not reached by June 29 he would
begin exclusive negotiations with the Maryland Stadium Authority to move the Bengals
to Baltimore
20
. Faced with the option of publically subsidizing a new stadium or losing
the franchise, Hamilton County commissioners voted 2-1 to pass two separate .5 % sales
tax increases. Ohio law allows county governments to unilaterally piggyback .5 %
increases on the states 5 % sales tax.
21

The county commissioned the University of Cincinnati to conduct an economic
impact study of the proposed measure. The study found that the construction of the new
stadium would bring the city a one time economic benefit of 1.13 billion, the annual
economic impact of the Bengals operating in the new stadium would be 296 million, the

19
Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist. Sports, jobs, and taxes: the economic impact of sports teams and
stadiums. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 291.
20
Clyde Brown and David Paul Local Organized Interest and the 1996 Cincinnati Sports Stadia Tax
Referendum, Journal of Sports & Social Issues 23, no 2 (1999) 225.
21
Delaney and Eckstein. 45-49.

16
stadium would support 18,461 jobs, and about half of the sales tax increase would be paid
by non Hamilton County residents (table 2)
22
.

Table 2. Economic Impact of Proposed Stadium Funding Project
Impact in millions Stadiums Parking Infrastructure
Total

Direct spending 407.9 75.9 36.0 519.8
Local spending 367.1 68.31 32.40
467.82
Indirect impact 525.48 91.90 45.46
662.39
Total Economic Impact 892.59 160.20 77.87
1,130.66
Number of jobs 14,648 2,582 1231
18,461
.

The public subsidy plan was meet with strong opposition by anti tax groups,
community activist and unified suburban leaders. The group Citizens for Choice in
Taxation composed of anti-tax activist, union leaders, suburban government officials and
Cincinnati City Council member Tom Luken was formed to lobby for the community
opposing public subsidies for to the construction of the stadiums benefiting a handful of
private individuals. The Cincinnati Federation of Teachers joined the group opposing the
tax increase arguing, that a large public expenditure towards the private stadium would
make passing future legislature funding public school overwhelmingly difficult. A survey

22
University of Cincinnati. Center for Economic Education. The Effects of Construction,
Operations and Financing of new Sports Stadium on Cincinnati Economic Growth. January 2 1996
14.

17
of nearly five thousand Cincinnati residents found little support for public financing;
nearly 60% opposed the construction of a new stadium for the Bengals, with 37 %
favoring such a project; 17% supported the construction of a new stadium; and just 19
%supported a tax increase to pay for such projects
23
. The corporate business
organizations were well aware of the increasing opposition and began to devise a plan to
support the tax increase.
Despite being a modest city of 350,000 residents, Cincinnati had an
overwhelming corporate presence as six fortune five hundred companies were
headquartered in the downtown area. The Cincinnati Business Committee, an elite
business organization composed of the citys top twenty-six CEOs, took the lead
supporting the tax increase. The Cincinnati Business Committee was formed in 1977 and
closely aligned themselves with the local Chamber of Commerce. The Cincinnati
Business Committee made securing the public funds for the proposed stadium their main
priority. The group had a vested interest in projecting the city favorably to prospective
clients and business personnel. The group advocated that a midsized city such as
Cincinnati needed to offer professional amenities to prospective upper level mangers and
executives.
24

The group Citizens for Choice in Taxation was at a substantial disadvantage
lacking the financial resources needed to properly fund a campaign. Nevertheless the
groups strategy was to appeal the impending tax increase and force a referendum. The

23
Clyde Brown, The Campaign by Cincinnati Business Interest for Strong Mayors and Sports Stadia,
Journal of Sports and Social Issues 23, no 2 (March 1999) : 3-4.
24
Delaney and Eckstein, 50.

18
same state law that allowed the unilateral piggyback of the two separate .5 % increases
also guaranteed that citizens could petition for a repeal of the referendum vote
25
. The
anti-tax and community activist group lead by local attorney Tim Mara began the
difficult process of appeal the referendum knowing that there had never successful tax
repeal in Hamilton County history. The group was met with overwhelming support and
with the help of over 500 community volunteers collected 90,000 signatures in two weeks
more than tripling the required amount of 27,000. The groups successful petition forces
a March 1996 referendum of the proposal.
26

Although a county commissioner was the visible spokesperson for the coalition in
favor of new stadiums, it was the corporate community that provided the strategic
guiding force as well as the funding in support of the referendum. The Cincinnati
Business Committee spent more than 1.1 million dollars promoting the sales tax increase
while the Citizens for Choice in Taxation spent less than 30,000 trying to repeal the tax.
The Bengals were they single largest campaign donors contributing more than 300,000
defending the tax increase. The Cincinnati Business Committee financed a well funded
campaign supporting the tax increasing as a civic investment retaining the vitality of the
city keeping it from falling into the ranks of a second class city around the slogan Keep
Cincinnati a Major League City. . While the anti tax group was supported by
individuals and relied on small financial contributions from the community. The unity

25
Brown and Paul, 227.
26
Brown and Paul, 225

19
and support of the corporate community in Cincinnati for raising the sales tax to fund
new stadiums was essential to the success of the campaign.
Ultimately the new proposal named passed with 61 % approval despite the initial
opposition voiced by the local community. The Browns accepted the terms of the new
deal and reassured the city council and voters of their commitment to the project by
contributing 40 million dollars to the project. Of the forty million original pledged by the
team to the project none would come directly from the pocket of owner Mike Browns,
rather from future stadium generated revenue. The team would contribute twenty five
million dollars from revenue in permanent seat license and give the first five million
dollars from the naming rights to the county. The remaining ten million dollars would be
covered using the twenty-five cent ticket surcharge.
According to the agreement, officially Hamilton County would own the stadium
and lease it to the Bengals for 20 years. The Bengals would pay the city 1.1 million
dollars for the first ten years of the lease then the amount dropped to 1 dollar for the
remaining 10 years.
27
Hamilton County was responsible for paying the stadium
operations and maintenance fees, while the Bengals received the revenues from tickets
concession, parking, broadcasting rights, and half of the gate receipts for non-football
events at the stadium. Finally if the team did not sell 50,000 general admission tickets at

27
Brown, 167-173.

20
each of its first twenty home games the county agreed to reimburse the Bengals for the
revenue difference.
28

The Cincinnati Bengals played their first home game of the 2000 season in their
brand new four hundred and fifty million dollar facility. The private stadium was
financed almost entirely by a .5% sales tax collected from the nine hundred thousand
citizens of Hamilton County, Ohio. One sports executive familiar with the deal stated,
The Bengals took the county to the cleaners. The net present value of the
Bengals deal is negative. The county is paying them to stay. The county
pays 100 percent of the maintenance and the Bengals get 100 percent of
the revenues. The county pays all the real estate and property taxes. The
stadium deal in Cincinnati is considered one of the most generous deals
for any professional sports team in the last 20 years.
29

The stadium deal in Cincinnati is considered one of the most favorable in the last
twenty years using generous public subsidies to construct privately owned facilities.

28
29

21

CHAPTER 3
CLEVELAND

In 1973 Cleveland Browns owner Art Modell agreed to a twenty five year lease
extension of Cleveland Stadium, paying the city 13.75 million dollars a year to continue
playing at the dual purpose facility that the team shared with Major League Baseballs
Cleveland Indians. Ten years after the initial agreement Modell demanded a new
publically subsidized stadium arguing that a lack of luxury suit and club seat revenue was
causing the franchise to lose money. Fearing that the Browns would relocate, city
government presented a proposal to the citizens of Cuyahoga County in 1984 to construct
a domed stadium that would serve both the Browns and Indians. The referendum would
fund construction of the new stadium with a countywide property taxes increase but
failed with 65 percent of voters opposing the increase. Unable to secure funding for the
stadium through a public vote, the Maryland Stadium Authority designated 30 million
dollars towards renovations primarily to the addition of luxury seating.
30
The Maryland
Stadium Authority operating as a public corporation of the State was authorized to issue
tax exempt bonds for financing its operations without the voter approval.

30
DeMause, Neil and Joanna Cagan, Field of schemes: how the great stadium swindle turns public money
into private profit.( Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008) 10-12.

22
When Modells initial 20-year lease was set to expire he renegotiated a 30 year
lease extension with the Stadium Authority. According to the agreement Modells newly
formed Stadium Corporation, assumed responsibility from the city for facility expenses
and gained control of stadiums operations. The Bengals would play in the stadium rent-
free and were guaranteed the revenue from parking, concessions, advertising and any off-
season activities held at the facility. Once the Stadium Corporation gained control of the
facility their first order of business was constructing new luxury suites, club seats and a
state of the art scoreboard. Modell refused to share any of the new revenue generated by
the privately financed renovations with the Cleveland Indians the stadiums other tenet.
The Indians insisted that the city was favoring the football team by granting them all the
luxury seat revenue and demanded a publically subsidized stadium where they could
control the luxury suites and club seating revenue.
The city eventually agreed in principal to the Gateway Project that by 1997 would
construct Jacobs field for the Indians and Gund Arena for the NBAs Cleveland
Cavaliers. Initially Modell believed that his revenues would not be endangered when the
Indians left, but shortly after, requested an issue be placed on the ballot to provide a 175
million dollar tax subsidy to renovate Cleveland Stadium. The county refused to
accommodate his request and Modell announced later that year during the 1995 football
season that he had signed a deal to relocate the team to Baltimore.
After the announcement and impending departure of the Browns, Cleveland was
an aging Midwestern city desperate to retain their remaining professional sports teams.
Cleveland Tomorrow, an exclusive organization comprised the cities top 50 CEOs,

23
concerned that the city would no longer remain a desirable corporate location and became
involved in the Gateway Project. Thomas Vail the publisher of the local newspaper the
Plain Dealer and founder of Cleveland Tomorrow reflected on the organizations
beginnings;
It started in the early 1980s aimed broadly at economic development and
economic growth of the region. It was an organization keyed up by a study done
by a consultant who was contracted by a group of four or five CEOs in town,
who said We are Rust Belt; we are sliding; we need an assessment of where our
big gaps are because of economic competiveness. Cleveland really doesnt have
a strategic, powerful, business oriented organization to do this. These Issues are
not falling fully within the Chamber of Commerce; they are not fully public
agency types of task. We need an organization with some clout to take on these
Strategies
31
.

Cleveland Tomorrow made securing public financing for the stadium their top
priority. Similarly to the Cincinnati Business Committee, Cleveland Tomorrow saw the
new stadium as a way to enhance the communities image, helping companies recruit top
personnel, and provide some economic spin off for their own corporations.
32
Tom
Chema, a local lawyer, was appointed the head of the stadium coalition and along with
the CEOs of Cleveland Tomorrow proposed the Gateway Project. The project would
include an indoor basketball arena and baseball stadium located in downtown Cleveland.
Using focus groups commissioned by the governor, Chema found that the public
overwhelmingly opposed a sales or property tax increase, however they were moderately
supportive of publically financing the project if the funds came from a sin tax on

31
32

24
alcohol and tobacco. According to Chema the a sin tax would bring in an estimated 16
million in the first year of implementation and decline over time, with the assumption
that the higher tax and other social trends might decrease alcohol and tobacco sales
33
.
Chema spent close to a year convincing city commissioners that the sin tax would
generate an economic resurgent in the downtown area. The proposal was ultimately
placed on the ballot in 1990. At election time the Gateway proposal had an estimated
cost of 344 million (Figure 3), which Chema would later acknowledge, was just a guess.
In an interview he admitted,
It is stupid to say a figure because I didnt know. I didnt have a clue what
this project was going to cost because we had no money no organization nothing.
I didnt have a design, all I knew was that in Chicago and Baltimore they were
building stadiums for a certain amount. I took the numbers and ramp it up for
inflation for a couple of years and I take a look at labor cost in those cities
compared to Cleveland and I put in a function for labor and throw in 20 million
for property and voila I get 344 million.
34

33
Ibid, 73.
34
Delaney and Eckstein, 73-74

25
Table 3. Original Financial Plan for the Gateway project

After the announcement of the proposed tax increase, early pools showed
considerable opposition to the proposal. Citizens in neighborhoods outside the downtown
area did not want to see their tax dollars go toward the private stadium rather they
generally preferred the money be spent on quality of life projects such as parks,
sanitation, public safety and improved school
35
. The poor quality of the public schools
was an especially important civic issue in Cleveland. According to some estimates the

35
Delaney and Eckstein, 75
Source of cost and revenues Amount (in
millions)
Anticipated cost

Stadium construction 110
Arena construction 223
Land acquisition 197
Land for future development 134
Financing and working capital 202

TOTAL 343.5

Anticipated Revenues

Total Private Investments 174
Luxury seats 99.0
Cleveland Tomorrow 20.0
Property loans
Interest earnings
Sin tax commitment
38.5
Total 343.5
16.5
169.

26
schools were 150 million in debt and only 8 percent of Cleveland residents would
eventually earn a college degree
36
.
Opposition for the new tax increases also came from the United Auto Workers
union, the tobacco and alcohol industries. The Auto Workers Union feared their
manufacturing plants located close to the site of the proposed project would be seized by
eminent domain. The tobacco and alcohol industries were understandably concerned that
the tax increase would jeopardize their future earning. The proposal reaffirmed working
class and poor Clevelanders suspicions that when it came to matters of public policy and
decision making in the city, they were the first effected because tobacco and liquor sales
fall disproportionally on those with lower incomes. In a trend shown in Cincinnati case
study, the groups opposing the tax increase were disorganized with no united front. The
lack of resources and political influence could not compare to corporate advocacy groups.
Cuyahoga County commissioners approved a public private partnership to
develop the Gateway Project. The 50/50 partnership included 174 million of privately
financed commitments to the Gateway Project. To finance the public portion of the 344
million developments the commissioners placed an initiative on the May 8 ballot seeking
voter approval of small excise tax on the purchase of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes.
37

Ultimately, a well-run well financed campaign spearheaded by the corporate community
convinced the voters that the project was in the community interest and the tax passed by

36
37
DeMause and Cagan, 361.

27
a narrowly 1.2 percent margin.
38
Cleveland Tomorrow lead by Tom Cheam, acting as the
main advocates and the city government were able to turn initial public sentiment against
tax increase into a vote for tax increase.
With public funding in place designs were completed for the new baseball
stadium and basketball arena that increased from the election time estimate of 344 to 430
million. The Cleveland Cavaliers were primary responsible for the increase in cost
because the team had been content in their arena in Richfield roughly halfway between
Cleveland and Akron. The Cavaliers Owners, the Gund brothers were hesitant to move
back to the city because they would lose significant parking revenues. The political
realities made the Cavaliers indispensable to the entire project Chema knew who had the
leverage.
39

Another factor contributing to the increased cost was that the Cavaliers paid no
rent for their first few years in the arena. The agreement gave the Cavaliers a yearly
credit of 1.5 million dollars to compensate for potential losses in parking revenues
resulting from moving back in the city. The Cavaliers kept all the parking revenues from
the new stadium and applied the yearly credit towards future rent payments. Eventually
Gateway was unable to pay the bills. There simply was not enough sin tax revenue to
cover the soaring cost of the project. On December 15,1995 the Cleveland Plain Dealer

38
39
Noll and Zimbalist, 360-365.

28
reported the total cost would be 148 million which represented a 97.3 percent overrun of
the original figure approved by votes.
40

Table 4. Characteristics of Gund Arena and Jacobs Field
41

Characteristic Gund Arena Jacobs Field

Start date 1991 1991

Opening date 1994 1994

Seating capacity 20,562 42,865

Club seats 2,000

2,04
Suites 92
122
Estimated cost (millions) 75
128
Final estimated cost (millions) 157
180
Overrun (percent) 109.3
40.6
Team Investment (millions) 41.6
63.5

Eventually Gateway was unable to pay the bills. There simply was not enough sin
tax revenue to cover the soaring cost of the project. Contractors were not getting paid and
many joined together in lawsuit against Gateway Project, the City of Cleveland, and
Cuyahoga County, alleging fraud because Gateway was approving expenditures when the

40
11. Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist. Sports, jobs, and taxes: the economic impact of sports teams and
stadiums. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997)
41
Noll and Zimbalist, 361-362

29
board knew it as out of money. The unpaid bills increased from 12 million to 18 million
in just a few months, and after six additional months an internal accounting audit
concluded that the total amount of unpaid bills would be 30 million
42
.
When the losses surpass 30 million dollars Cuyahoga County was forced to slash
its operating budget by 11 percent. In 1995 the a surging economy increased tax revenue
generated by the county and as one official explains,
Your cutting 11 percent where you really needed 9 and the tax revenue are
not growing. The economy went bang and took off so the county caught a break.
It had a lot of cash and it just wrote a check. I wont say we didnt miss the 30
million but the county was in a very good financial position.
Orchestrated the allocation of public dollars for private stadia.
43

The Gateway Project is another example of how private owners used the threat of
relocation to secure public financing for public stadiums. Corporate advocacy groups
strategically aligned themselves as indirect beneficiaries of the public subsidy and
successfully influenced tax initiatives through the local governments.

42
.Delaney and Eckstein, 73.
43
5. Rosentraub, Mark. Cost of Professional Sports and Whos paying for it (New York: Basic Books,
2007): 220-224.

30

CHAPTER 4
INDIVIDUAL LEAGUE SUBSIDY AND VALUATION DATA

Major League Baseball

Founded in 1869, Major League Baseball is the highest level of professional
baseball in the North America composed of thirty teams that play in the National and
American League. The American League is contains of fourteen teams compared to
sixteen in the National League. Both leagues arrange the teams in the three subdivisions;
Central, East, and West. The American and National League began as independent rival
corporate entities that meet in an end of the year championship called The World Series.
Recently in 2000 the two separate legal entities were formally dissolved forming a single
league.
Starting in the early 1990s, Major League Baseball saw a transformation building
fourteen new publically financed stadiums for the professional teams benefiting the
handful of principal owners. The Los Angeles Dodgers and San Francisco Giants are the
only two teams in the league that privately financed their new stadium in the past twenty
years. The remaining six professional baseball teams have had no new Stadium built in
the last twenty years.
To examine how stadiums built with public subsidies increase in overall valuation
over the past twenty years compared to teams with privately financed stadium or no new

31
stadium the league was divided into three categories;1 Teams with no New Stadium or
Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a new Stadium with no public subsidy, 3 Teams
with a new publically subsidized stadium. By calculating the average per team valuation
increase and actual average dollar increase for each of the three categories the I can
compare the figures in the three categories to answer if teams with publically financed
stadiums valuations increase faster than those with privately financed or no new stadium
at all.

Table 5. Major League Baseball Valuation 1991- 2009

1991 Valuation 2009 Valuation Percent Change Dollar Increase
(millions) (millions) (Per Team) (Total) (Average)
MLB
1 850 (6 teams) 3435 302 % 304 % 430
2 260 (2 teams) 1188 388 % 356 % 464
3 1415 (14 teams) 5813 317 % 310% 314
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Key 1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years 2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy
3= New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy

The six teams with no new stadium constructed in the past 20 years, had the
lowest per team average valuation increase of 302 percent with an average dollar increase
of 430 million per team from 1991 to 2009. The fourteen teams that have built a new
stadium in the last twenty years with publically subsidy had a per team average valuation

32
increase of 317 percent and the average dollar increase of 314 million per team. The Los
Angeles Dodgers and San Francisco Giants who privately financed their new stadia
recorded the highest per team valuation increase of 388 percent as well as the most
valuable dollar increase average of 464 million per team.

Figure 2. Major League Baseball Valuations Over Time

0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1991 Year Valuations 2009
MLB Valuations Over Time
MLB No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years (6 teams)
MLB New Stadium with no public subsidy (2 teams)
MLB New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy (14 teams)
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e

i
n

T
e
a
m

V
a
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a
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s

(
M
i
l
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s
)

33
National Football League

The National Football League founded in 1920 is the highest level of American
Football in the United States. The league consists of thirty two teams divided into the
American Football Conference and National Football Conference. Each conference is
divided into four division containing four teams each. The National Football League is
the most attended sports leagues in world with an average fan attendance of 66,960 per
game. The National Football leagues television and radio rights are the most lucrative
sports broadcasting commodity in the United States with the Super Bowl consistently
ranking as the most watched television show of the year.
Similar to the analysis of Major League Baseball to examine how stadiums built
with public subsidies overall valuation increased over the past twenty years compared to
teams with privately financed stadium or no new stadium the league was divided into
three categories;1 Teams with no New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a
new Stadium with no public subsidy, 3 Teams with a new publically subsidized
stadium.

34
Table 6 National Football League Valuations 1991-2009

(millions) (millions) (Per Team) (Total) (Average )
1 1856 (13 teams) 13,597 651 % 632% 903
2 260 (2 teams) 2,364 886. % 806% 1052
3 1488 (12 teams) 12,612 752. % 747% 927
_____________________________________________________________________________________

The National Football League teams had the most dramatic increase of the three
leagues examined. The thirteen teams with no new stadia in the last 20 years had the
least per team average valuation increase of 651 percent with a dollar average dollar
increase of 903 million per team. The twelve teams with new publically subsidized
stadia had an per team average valuation increase of 752 percent and a average dollar
increase of 927 million per team. Lastly the two teams with privately funded stadia had
the highest per team average valuation increase of 886 percent with an average dollar
increase of 927 million per team.

35

Figure 3. National Football Valuation Over Time

0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
1991 Year Valuations
2009
NFL Valuation Over Time
NFL No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years(13 teams)
NFL New Stadium with no public subsidy (2 teams)
NFL New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy (12 teams)
I
n
c
r
e
a
a
s
e
T
e
a
m

V
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s

(
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
)

36
National Basketball Association

The National Basketball Association founded in 1946 is the highest level
professional basketball in North America. The leagues consist of thirty franchised clubs,
twenty nine in the United States and the Toronto Raptors in Canada. The thirty teams in
the National Basketball Association are divided into two conferences the Eastern and
Western Conferences. Within each of the two conferences are three divisions with five
teams each. During the regular season each team plays 82 games, 41 at home and 41
away. The National Basketball Association is the newest of the three major North
American professional sports leagues studied.
Again to examine how stadiums built with public subsidies overall valuation
increased over the past twenty years compared to teams with privately financed stadium
or no new stadium the league was divided into three categories; 1 Teams with no New
Stadium or Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a new Stadium with no public subsidy,
3 Teams with a new publically subsidized stadium.

37
Table 7. National Basketball Association Valuation 1991-2009

(millions) (millions) (Per Team) (Total) (Average)

1 406 (5 teams) 2012 448 % 394% 321
2 269 (3 teams) 1097 497 % 306% 276
3 1135 (17 teams) 6606 562% 482 % 321
_____________________________________________________________________________________

The National Basketball Association has the least valuable franchise on average
of the three professional teams studied. The five teams with no new stadia for the past
twenty years had a per team average valuation increase of 448 percent with a actual
average dollar increase of 321 million. The three teams with privately financed stadia had
a per team average valuation increase of 497 percent and an actual average dollar
increase of 276 from 1991 until 2009. Lastly the seventeen teams with new stadium built
with public subsidies had the highest per team average valuation increase of 562 percent
and a average actual dollar increase of 321 million.

38

Figure 4. National Basketball Association Valuation Over Time

0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
NBA Valuations Over Time
NBA No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years (5 teams)
NBA New Stadium with no public subsidy (3 teams)
NBA New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy (17 teams)

39
CONCLUSION

This paper examined the relationship between types of public stadium subsides
and professional sport overall valuations for the past twenty years. Valuation estimates
were gathered from 1991 until 2009 for each individual team in the three most lucrative
professional sports leagues in the world; the National Football League, Major League
Baseball, and National Basketball Association. The fundamental question was whether
teams with publically subsidized stadiums increase in valuation more than teams with
privately financed stadium.
Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the political process behind the new stadium
initiatives not just their outcomes. In both cases the sports team who had the most the
gain financially did not lead the battles to build the facilities. The generous subsides in
both Cincinnati and Cleveland are examples of how non sports corporations can
obfuscate their vested interest in the public subsidy and advocate the communities
interest. It is clear that publically subsidized sports facilities do not exists because they
are financially valuable assets in their own, they exists because most cities have decided
that a subsidized team is better than no team at all.
To examine how stadiums built with public subsidies increase in overall valuation
over the past twenty years compared to teams with privately financed stadium or no new
stadium the league was divided into three categories;1 Teams with no New Stadium or
Arena in last 20 years, 2 Teams with a new Stadium with no public subsidy, 3 Teams

40
with a new publically subsidized stadium. By calculating the average per team valuation
increase and for each of the three categories the I was able to test my hypothesis to
answer if teams with publically financed stadiums valuations increase faster than those
with privately financed stadium.
For Major League Baseball
The average valuation increase for teams with publically subsidized stadiums was
302 percent compared to 388 percent increase for teams with privately financed stadiums,
which rejected my hypothesis
For the National Football League
651 percent compared to 886 percent increase for teams with privately financed stadiums
once again rejecting my hypothesis.
For National Basketball Association
which was the only league that confirmed my hypothesis.

41
For All Leagues
which rejected my hypothesis.

Table 8. MLB,NFL, and NBA Average Valuation 1991-2009

(million) (million) (Per Team) (Total) (Million)

1 3112 (24 teams) 19044 467% 443% 551
2 789 (7 teams) 4649 590% 489% 506
3 4038 (43 teams) 24401 543% 513% 520
_____________________________________________________________________________________

From the case studies it is clear that when owners of private teams align
themselves with the business interest of corporate advocacy groups and utilize the
bargaining advantage secured by the scarcity of teams they are able to secure public
subsidies for new stadiums. While the teams with public subsidy did not have a greater
percent change increase as much as those with privately financed the stadium, every

42
league the valuation increase percent change was greater when teams had a new stadium
with public subsides than when teams had no new stadium.
For Major League Baseball
302 percent compared to 317 percent increase for teams with no new stadium in the past
20 years.
For the National Football League
20 years.
For National Basketball Association
20 years.
For All Leagues
20 years.

43
Figure 9. Percent Change in Valuation From 1991-2009

302
651
448
467
388
886
497
590
317
752
562
543
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
MLB NFL NBA ALL 3
NO new Stadium New Stadium NO Subsidy New Stadium Public Subsidy

44

0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
All 3 Sports Valuation Over Time
NFL No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years
NFL New Stadium with no public subsidy
NFL New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy
MLB No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years
MLB New Stadium with no public subsidy
MLB New Stadium or Arena with Public Subsidy
NBA No New Stadium last 20 years
NBA Stadium with Public NO Subsidy
NBA Stadium with Public Subsidy
I
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V
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(
m
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s
)

45
WORKS CITED
Books
DeMause, Neil, and Joanna Cagan. Field of schemes: how the great stadium swindle
turns public money into private profit. Rev. and expanded ed. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2008.

Delaney, Kevin J., and Rick Eckstein. Public dollars, private stadiums: the battle over
building sports stadiums. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2003.

Noll, Roger G., and Andrew S. Zimbalist. Sports, jobs, and taxes: the economic impact
of sports teams and stadiums. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
1997.
DeMause, Neil, and Joanna Cagan. Field of schemes: how the great stadium swindle
turns public money into private profit. Rev. and expanded ed. Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2008.

Rosentraub, Mark S.. Major league losers: the real cost of sports and who's paying for it.
New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1997.

Electronic Documents
Baade, Robert A., and Richard F. Dye. "The impact of stadiums and professional sports
on metropolitan area development." Growth & Change 21, no. 2 (Spring90 1990):
1. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 25, 2011).
Brown, Clyde, and David M. Paul. "The Campaign by Cincinnati Business Interests for
Strong Mayors and Sports Stadia." Social Science Journal 37, no. 2 (April 2000):
161. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 25, 2011).
Brown, Clyde , and David Paul . "Local Organized Interest and the 1996 Cincinnati
Sports Stadia Tax Referendum, ." Journal of sports & social issues 23, no. 2
(1999): 218-239.
Kalich, Veronica Z. "A public choice perspective on the subsidization of private industry:
A case study of three cities." Journal of Urban Affairs 20, no. 2 (Summer98
1998): 199. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed April 24, 2011).

46

University of Cincinnati. Center for Economic Education. The Effects of Construction,
Operations and Financing of new Sports Stadium on Cincinnati Economic
Growth. January 2 1996 14.

Websites
"CHART OF THE DAY: NFL Players And Owners Are Fighting Over The Biggest Pie In Sports Read
more: http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-biggest-pie-in-sports-2011-
3#ixzz1KM9dpnCV". Business Insider.http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-biggest-pie-
in-sports-2011-3. Retrieved 23 April 2011.

47
APPENDIX A
Professional Sports Team Valuation over Time
(million) (million) (Per Team) (Total) (Average )
MLB
1 850 (6 teams) 3435 302. % 304 % 430
2 260 (2 teams) 1188 388. % 356 % 464
3 1415 (14 teams) 5813 317. % 310% 314
NFL
1 1856 (13 teams) 13597 651.% 632% 903
2 260 (2 teams) 2,364 886. % 806% 1052
3 1488 (12 teams) 12,612 752. % 747% 927
NBA
1 406 (5 teams) 2012 448. % 394% 321
2 269 (3 teams) 1097 497. % 306% 276
3 1135 (17 teams) 6606 562.% 482 % 321
ALL 3 Sports
1 3112 (24 teams) 19044 467% 443% 551
2 789 (7 teams) 4649 590% 489% 506
3 4038 (43 teams) 24401 543% 513% 520
Key
1= No New Stadium or Arena in last 20 years
2= New Stadium or Arena with no public subsidy

48

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