Policy Brief - Esfahani.finaldfas
Policy Brief - Esfahani.finaldfas
Policy Brief - Esfahani.finaldfas
Policy Brief 2
No 2, September 2008
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Policy Brief
For example, based on Blanchard and Gali's estimate, the 60 to 70 percent per annum price rises over the past two years are responsible for about 2 percentage points decline in U.S. GDP growth, which has taken the economy to the verge of recession this year. Another 50 percent price increase in case of a military attack (assuming it remained contained) could reduce the GDP by a further 1.6 percent and make a recession virtually unavoidable. The dollar equivalent of this reduction in GDP is almost $230 billion dollarsnot at all a trivial amount. This is, of course, only the cost to the U.S. economy and does not include the cost to other countries or the cost of a military action itself. More importantly, it does not include the human and economic cost to ordinary Iranians. The effects of oil price rises on other oil importing economies in terms of percentage change in CPI and GDP are generally in the same range of the impact on the U.S. economy (Kilian, 2008). But, for oil exporting countries, the effect of an increase in oil prices is in fact positive, unless the price hike reflects a cost push rather than a demand rise. Iran, for example, stands to earn almost $1 billion dollars more for every dollar increase in the price of oil. However, when aggravation of tension between Iran and the Western powers raises the oil price, it entails substantial costs for Iran as well. Insurance costs rise for the country's imports and exports, including both oil and non-oil trade. Also, the U.S. and its allies are more likely to extend and intensify their economic sanctions on Iran. The exact costs of sanctions are difficult to measure, but they are certainly non-trivial. One detailed study of the unilateral U.S. sanction on Iran estimates the cost in the 1990s and early 2000s to be about one percent of GDP, or the equivalent of U.S. $6 billion (Torbat, 2005). Intensified sanctions that are supported by the EU can entail much higher costs, perhaps as much as 3 to 5 times. In addition, if tensions lead to a military attack on Iran, then Iran may not be able to export its oil for a while and the costs in terms of economic resources and human life could be enormous. The economic costs could reach about 5-10 percent of GDP, or $30 to $60 billion, which is a huge sum for a middle income country like Iran.1 For Iran, put together, these costs are likely to far outweigh the benefits of an increase in oil prices induced by an increase in U.S.Iran tensions. The high costs of tensions and sanctions show that it would be best for everyone involved if U.S.Iran relations were to take a less confrontational direction. But, the question is whether there are any feasible alternatives of this kind. If there are good alternatives, what are the costs and risks for each country? Should the U.S. initiate dtente policies with Iran, or should it continue its tough stance until the Islamic Republic modifies its behavior or shows willingness to take the first steps? Addressing these questions requires a perspective on the nature of tensions between the U.S. and Iran. The issues most highlighted in the news are the U.S. claims that Tehran supports terrorism and has been trying to obtain nuclear weapons, thus threatening the vital interests of the U.S. and its allies, especially Israel, in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, as many analysts have argued convincingly, the regime in Iran is a rational actor and there are
1. In the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and Iran-Iraq war, Iran's per capita GDP fell by about 37 percent. By the late 1980s, the per capita income was about 50 percent of the level that it would have been if Iran had grown at the average rate for developing countries. The estimated 5-10 percent decline in Iran's GDP in case of a military attack assumes that the attack will not turn into a major or prolonged war.
Hadi Salehi Esfahani is Professor of Economics, Director of the Global Studies Initiative in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, and Director of Academic Affairs for the Center for Global Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. In addition, he currently serves as the Editor of the Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, and is President of the Middle East Economic Association. He also has worked for the World Bank as a visiting staff economist and consultant. Professor Esfahani received his B.Sc. in mechanical engineering from Tehran University, and Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley. His theoretical and empirical research is in the field of political economy of development, focusing in particular on the Middle East and North Africa region. He has published numerous articles on the role of politics and governance in fiscal, trade, and regulatory policy formation. His articles have appeared in journals The Economic Journal, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Development Economics, International Economic Review, Oxford Economic Review, and World Development, among others. Forthcoming research: "Is the World Flat? Differential Regulation of Domestic and Foreign-Owned Firms," with Elizabeth Asiedu, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance "Explaining Trade Policy in the Middle East and North Africa," with Lyn Squire, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance A Reexamination of the Political Economy of Growth in MENA Countries, in M. Hashem Pesaran and Jeffrey B. Nugent, The Growth Performance of MENA Economies
deeper motives behind its policy decisions (see, for example, Takeyh, 2006). The leaders of Iran ultimately want to preserve their regime and enhance its influence internally and externally, especially in the Middle East. It is precisely the latter objective of the Iranian regime that has come into conflict with the economic and geopolitical interests of the U.S. to maintain its hegemonic reach in the region. The nature of this conflict and the two sides' responses to it are largely shaped by the history of U.S. interventions in Iran and the region, and by the process through which the Islamic Republic was established (Kinzer, 2008). Since its inception, the Islamic Republic has been under attack internally and externally and has sought to defend itself, sometimes using excessive means. At the same time, the extreme security concerns and the excesses of the early years after the Islamic Revolution curtailed the regime's access to highquality human resources and restricted its policy options. Under those circumstances, the rulers of Iran used the external conflicts with Iraq and the U.S. as a means of regimenting internal political actors and marshalling public support for the government. They also sought to build their military power and form alliances with opponents of the U.S. outside the country. In recent years, the institutions of the Islamic Republic have taken stronger root, but the regime also has come under greater security threats from the U.S.. In response, the Islamic Republic has found it imperative to assert its interests in the region more aggressively. Acquiring nuclear technology also has become an important means of enhancing internal confidence and rallying Iranians behind the regime.2 This would not necessarily lead to a build up of a nuclear arsenal. In fact, most Iranian leaders seem to understand full well that the arms race that a nuclear Iran might trigger in the region could destabilize the country's neighborhood and ultimately cost them heavily. Rather, their objective seems to be developing the Islamic Republic's capabilities as a regional power in order to gain respect at external negotiating tables as well as in internal politics. In this context, as McFaul, Milani, and Diamond (2006-2007) argue, further threats and sanctions are likely to be counter-productive in curbing the Islamic Republic's use of unconventional means to ensure its security and enhance its power. A more fruitful approach seems to be a move in the opposite direction: full engagement of the regime and recognition of its strengths, while demanding that it moves away from policies that threaten the security of other countries in the Middle East. The offer could consist of U.S. assistance in the economic and technological development of the country and recognition of Iran as a power that can help guarantee the security of the region in cooperation with its neighbors and the U.S.. Some variation of this approach could be initiated by the U.S. and would very likely be feasible and acceptable to Iran, given the potentially significant economic and political gains to both sides.
2. A similar obsession developed in Iran in the mid-twentieth century with regard to iron and steel technology. Even the Shah, who was wholeheartedly pro-West, seemed to believe Iran was being denied the "mother technology" and its economic development was suffering as a result. So, he made a deal with the Soviets, whom he viewed as enemies, to build a steel mill in Esfahan. The steel mill came at a high cost and was based on outdated and inefficient technology, but it quelled the Iranians' thirst for the technology. The parallel with the policy of acquiring nuclear technology in recent decades is difficult to miss. 2008 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. All rights reserved. The Center for Global Studies does not take positions on public policy issues. The views presented in Policy Briefs do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center.
References
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Jordi Gali. 2007. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks: Why are the 2000s so Different from the 1970s?" MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 07-21. McFaul, Michael, Abbas Milani, and Larry Diamond. 2006-07. "A Win-Win U.S. Strategy for Dealing with Iran," The Washington Quarterly, 30.1: 121138. Kilian, Lutz. 2008. "A Comparison of the Effects of Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks on Output and Inflation in the G7 Countries," Journal of the European Economic Association, 6.1: 78-121. Kinzer, Stephen. 2008. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, 2nd Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons. Klare, Michael T. 2008. "Anatomy of a Price Surge", The Nation, June 20. Takeyh, Ray. 2006. Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY: Time Books. Torbat, Akbar. 2005. "Impacts of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran," The World Economy, 28.3: 407-434.
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Policy Brief 2
No 2, September 2008
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