1.

GENERAL FACILITY CHECKLIST:

Checklist No. 1. A General 1. A. 1 Hazards Analysis Issue

API RP 14J CHECKLIST

Response

1.A.2 1.A.3 1.A.4 1.A.5 1.B Layout. 1.B.1 1.B.2

Have the following hazards been adequately addressed? (Blowout, Wellhead and process fires and explosions, Pipeline riser failure, Weather, Impacts and collisions, Falling objects, Human error, Sitespecific conditions.) Have methods of eliminating or controlling these hazards been considered? Is there anything unusual about the facility, such as new equipment or processes, complex control, etc., that may require a more thorough safety review? Has the operability of the process been considered in the design? Have safety system testing requirements been defined? Does the design allow these requirements to be met? Have all materials in the process been identified and classified as hazardous and non-Hazardous? (MSDSs, transfer/storage, handling procedures) Are living quarters, control room, radio room, etc., located to reduce exposure to potentially hazardous process equipment, the wellhead area, and from high noise sources and hot exhausts? Are there any fired equipment, compressors, generators, or engine exhaust equipment located where the exhaust could affect helicopters? Is the helideck located on the prevailing upwind side of the platform? Do any pipeline risers come up the structure below the living quarters area? If so, what protection against riser failure has been provided? Has the installation of future equipment, platforms or pipelines been considered? Has the separation of fuel and ignition sources been considered in the layout of platform equipment? Have the sources of ignition been minimized in the process and wellbay areas? Have means of natural ventilation been considered for wellhead areas, pig launchers and receivers, and equipment exhausts? Have the effects of prevailing winds been considered on escaping hydrocarbons or gases from the flares, vents, wells or other equipment? Has routing of hydrocarbon piping through utility and life support areas been minimized? Are the cranes located so the supply boats and laydown areas are reached with a minimum of lifting over process and wellhead areas, or over any equipment or piping which contain hydrocarbons? If this is not possible, has dropped object protection been considered for critical equipment? Have the following requirements been met: Crane cabins(s) located so the crane operator has free view of all areas? Adequate lighting provided for crane operations? Hatches or deck extensions provided for cargo handling? Adequate reach and capacity for process and utility equipment maintenance? Are there two paths of escape?

1.B.3 1.B.4 1.B.5 1.B.6 1.B.7 1.B.8 1.B.9 1.B.10

1.B.11

Egress 1.B.12

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Checklist No. 1.B.13 Hazards Analysis Issue Have the following requirements been met: All doors open in the direction of the escape routes? All stairways, passageways and boat landings are illuminated? Do major passageways and stairs allow for means for the evacuation of personnel on stretchers? Are all escape paths from the quarters adequately protected from fire to allow for safe evacuation of personnel? Have firewater hose stations been positioned outside the quarters to provide maximum coverage and to provide for safe evacuations? Response

1.B.14 1.B.15 1.C Emergency Response/ Medical 1.C.1 1.C.2

1.C.3 1.D Escape and Rescue Survival Crafts/ Lifeboats/ Liferafts 1.D.1 1.D.2 1.D.3 Survival Equipment 1.D.4

Have provisions been made to accommodate personnel in the event of an emergency. Have the following requirements been met: Medical cabinets/kits for each location? Stretchers? Eyewash stands and showers near batteries and near chemical storage and pumping areas? Capability to communicate with the central facility/complex from an unmanned platform? Capability to communicate with vessels or shore? Have provisions been made for emergency care during installation, hook-up and commissioning?

Is the capacity of survival crafts and lifeboats or liferafts sufficient for 100% of the maximum number of personnel on the facility at one time, including visitors? Are the survival crafts/lifeboats/liferafts located in positions to maximize the escape routes provided? Has consideration been given to using knotted ropes as a last-resort form of escape in situations where other means of escape may not be accessible? Have the following requirements been met: Life jackets for maximum number of persons on the platform? Storage bins for the life jackets? If survival kits are being provided for the personnel, has adequate space been provided in the quarters or mustering areas to store these kits?

1.D.5

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2. PROCESS CHECKLIST:
Checklist No. 2. A. SAFE Chart 2. A. 1 2. A. 2 2. A. 3 2.A.4 2.B Piping, Valves and Instruments. Piping 2.B.1 Hazards Analysis Issue Has a review of the SAFE chart been performed to check for compliance with API RP 14C? Do major process headers such as production, gas lift, and injection headers comply with API RP 14C Section A3.2, and are they covered in the SAFE charts? Has the double PSH/SDV concept for pressure protection of pipelines and manifolds been carefully considered? Has an evaluation been made to determine if SDVs, FSVs, or a combination should be installed on departing pipelines? Response

2.B.2 2.B.3 2.B.4

2.B.5 2.B.6 2.B.7 2.B.8

Have production headers been designed for the maximum pressure of any incoming production well/riser or process stream up to the separator inlet? If not, are there any valves that could isolate the header from the pressure protection? Where spec breaks are found downstream of control valves, is overpressure protection provided before the next downstream block valve or restriction? Are bleed valves installed on segments of piping that can be isolated between block valves? Are there situations where piping may be exposed to temperatures well below or above design due to: Auto-refrigeration of light ends? Failure of a temperature control loop? Is heat tracing specified for piping where water freezing is possible due to accumulation or intermittent service in cold weather? Will the inadvertent operation of a manual or automatic valve or combination of valves (including valve leaks) result in over pressure of piping or equipment? Have connections between the process and service water been avoided? Are all vents and drains specified? Are their ratings consistent with the vessel design pressure and temperature? Are all drains valved and, where required, plugged, capped or blinded? Are double valves provided on regularly used pressure drain connections for vessels with quick-opening valves nearest the vessels? Are vents that are not normally or frequently opened plugged, capped or blinded? Is there an adequate vent (or vent capability) on all vessels that are planned for manual entry? For each check valve, will failure of the check valve to seal result in overpressure or other hazard?

Check Valves 2.B.9

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Checklist No. 2.B.10 Hazards Analysis Issue Are check valves installed and properly located, such as: Downstream of control valves? In pump discharge lines? Where lines tie into common headers? Are the check valves designed to work in the installed position (e.g. vertical/horizontal)? On failure of control medium or signal, does the control valve fail in the least hazardous position? Have provisions been made in the design for failure of a single control valve in which the valve sticks in the opposite position from the design failure position? Will any mode of control valve failure result in overpressuring or other risk to equipment or piping, downstream or upstream? For example: Are upstream vessels between a source of pressure and the control valve designed for the maximum pressure when the valve closes? Can the design temperature be exceeded? Can the pressure rating of the downstream side of self-contained regulators be exceeded? For locked-open or locked-closed valves: What is the justification for having the valve locked? Has a system for communicating the reasons for locking each valve been provided? Are the procedures for unlocking the valve clear? Have any temporary valves been installed to facilitate future tie-ins? Have they been capped, plugged or blinded? Are PSV set points staggered in multiple valve installations? Are provisions made for testing and maintenance of PSVs? Are PSVs sized for the worst case failure scenario, including: Isolation of both liquid and gas outlets? Gas blow-by from upstream separators? Failure of upstream control valves? Thermal relief for fire exposure? Utility failure? Failure of blanket gas regulators? In situations where flow restrictions due to piping, an orifice, or a control valve limit the required capacity of a PSV, have the effects of future modifications been considered? Is PSV installed upstream of the mist eliminator on vessel? Are thermal PSVs installed for fire exposure or liquid expansion on sections of process piping that: Are isolated from other PSVs by automatic valves on an ESD and, Contain large volumes of hydrocarbons or, Are liquid packed? Are thermal PSVs installed for liquid expansion on equipment where an increase in temperature might exist or develop, after shutdown, between the trapped process liquid and its environment? Response

2.B.11 Control Valves 2.B.12 2.B.13 2.B.14

2.B.15 Locked Valves 2.B.16

2.B.17 Pressure Relief Valves (PSVs) 2.B.18 2.B.19 2.B.20

2.B.21 2.B.22 2.B.23

2.B.24

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Checklist No. 2.B.25 Hazards Analysis Issue In cases where a single PSV protects multiple lines and vessels, are there any scenarios where one component could be isolated from the PSV due to: Maintenance isolation? Plugging from hydrates or sand? Inadvertent closing of a manual valve? Does the PSV setting allow for static head and frictional losses upstream and downstream of the PSV? Application. Have the following general concerns been addressed: Is PSV materials selection consistent with corrosiveness, autorefrigeration, etc.? Is heat tracing required to avoid inlet plugging by congealing/freezing? Are balanced bellows and pilot-operated PSVs avoided in congealing or viscous liquids service? In toxic service, are vents from balanced bellows or pilots routed to a safe location? For PSVs with an upstream rupture disk (PSE): Is the piping between the PSE and PSV continuously vented to atmosphere to prevent pressure build up? If vent contains excess-flow check valve, is a pressure gauge provide? Is PSV capacity derated to 80 percent if an uncertified PSE is installed upstream? Are inlet and outlet line diameters the same or larger than PSV inlets and outlets? Are inlet and outlet line ratings consistent with the PSV nozzle ratings? Are all maintenance isolation valves on PSV inlets or outlets locked open and covered by a locked valve procedure? Is the PSV inlet line pressure drop less than 3 percent set pressure? (Especially review under 50 psig set pressure or complex piping.) Is the maximum built-up back pressure at the PSV outlet less than 10 percent of set pressure? (Less than 50 percent for balanced bellows or pilot operated?) Is the maximum superimposed back pressure at the PSV outlet less than 25 percent of set pressure? (Less than 75 percent for balanced bellows or pilot operated?) Do PSV outlet lines enter the sides or top of the relief header? Are inlet lines off process lines located in active flow portions of the lines, and do they come off the sides or tops of the lines? Where PSV outlet line velocities are greater than 75 percent of sonic, has the superimposed back pressure been adequately evaluated? Have back pressures been calculated for the actual PSV sizes and associated flow rates for the piping configuration installed? For PSVs with atmospheric discharge: Is there adequate liquid capacity above the high level shutdown on vessels to allow time to shut off inflow before liquid is carried over? Are PSV discharges piped to a safe area? Has ignition of the discharge been considered? Response

2.B.26 2.B.27

2.B.28

2.B.29 Piping

2.B.30 2.B.31 2.B.32

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Checklist No. 2.C Flare and Vent System. 2.C.1 2.C.2 2.C.3 Hazards Analysis Issue Have scrubbers been provided where needed to prevent liquid carryover? Are lines self-draining towards the scrubber? Have multiple high and low pressure components been tied into the same flare or vent system, without taking worst case back pressure into account? In flare/vent system design, has provision been made for: Low temperature effects? Line and scrubber supports to withstand acceleration forces created by high velocity liquid slugs? Are flame arresters installed on atmospheric vents? Are they located at the discharge of vents or designed for self-draining of downstream condensation? Are flame arresters accessible for routine inspection and maintenance? Would ignition of the vent not expose personnel to excessive thermal radiation rates? Are flame arresters tested and approved for the specific application? Is purge gas provided for vent and flare headers? Have extinguishing systems been provided for the vent tip? Are open and closed drain systems completely segregated? Are open drains from classified and unclassified areas segregated? Are there any block valves in the drain system located downstream of pressure components that could result in over pressure? Has hydrate plugging been considered? In closed drain systems, have the downstream sump and vent systems been designed to adequately handle the maximum rates from drain valves that are inadvertently left open? Is the header rated for the maximum built-up back pressure due to open drain valves on high pressure components? Are any drains from pressurized process lines and vessels piped directly into atmospheric (open) hydrocarbon drains or sewer systems? On closed drain headers: Is the header material suitable for the maximum and minimum temperatures expected from discharging into it (including autorefrigeration)? Is heat tracing required because the system may receive heavy crude or water (or moisture) which may solidify? Are all vents and drains specified? Are their ratings consistent with the vessel design pressure and temperature? Are all drains valved and, where required, plugged, capped or blinded? Are double valves provided on regularly used pressure drain connections for vessels with quick-opening valves nearest the vessels? Are vents that are not normally or frequently opened plugged, capped or blinded? Is there an adequate vent (or vent capability) on all vessels that are planned for manual entry? Response

2.C.4 2.C.5 2.C.6 2.C.7 2.C.8 2.C.9 2.D Drain system 2.D.1 2.D.2 2.D.3 2.D.4

2.D.5 2.D.6

2.D.7

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Checklist No. 2.E Equipment Pipelines and Risers 2.E.1 2.E.2 2.E.3 2.E.4 Pressure Vessels 2.E.5 2.E.6 2.E.7 Hazards Analysis Issue Response

Are SDVs and FSVs on pipeline risers installed below the lowest process level, or otherwise protected against thermal and/or mechanical damage? Are all connections (i.e., pressure taps) installed on the inboard side of an incoming or departing pipeline SDV? (Depressurization of the pipeline cannot be controlled if an outboard connection fails.) Are suitable provisions made for pressurizing and blowing down of pipelines? Are risers suitably protected from collision from boats? If installed, are shutdown valves located as close to the vessel outlet nozzles as possible? Has automatic or remote manual vapor depressurization been installed for pressure vessels? (If depressurization is utilized, see Section 4.7 of this RP.) Are vessels designed for full vacuum where: Failure of downstream equipment, such as a recycle valve failure on a compressor, could impose a vacuum? Improper pump out or draining could impose a vacuum? Are safety devices (pressure, temperature, level, flow, etc.) installed in locations and with set points that will effectively prevent an unsafe situation before it occurs? For example: Are high (or low) level shutdowns located below (or above) the elevation of the outlet it is trying to protect? Are pressure sensing devices and PSVs located upstream of mesh pads or other restrictions? Are shutdown devices located to allow sufficient time to isolate the source of the problem (e.g., close an SDV) before carryover or blow-by occurs? Are instrument bridle connections located to avoid plugging? Is adequate vacuum protection provided on atmospheric vessels? Have liquid overflow lines been adequately designed to prevent siphoning? Are liquid inlets located to prevent static electricity build up during fillings? Is the pressure rating of pump discharge piping suitable for the greater of: Normal pump suction pressure plus maximum differential pressure developed by the pump (e.g., blocked discharge)? Maximum pump suction pressure (e.g., suction vessel relieving pressure) plus normal differential pressure developed by the pump? Maximum specific gravity of pumped fluid combined with either of the above?

2.E.8

Atmospheric Vessels 2.E.9 2.E.10 2.E.11 Centrifugal Pumps 2.E.12

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Checklist No. 2.E.13 Hazards Analysis Issue Are suction piping and valves rated for full discharge pressure or are other means of suction over pressure provided (e.g., relief valves): Where one pump in a set of parallel pumps is shut down? Where there is an alternate source of pressure equal to pump discharge pressure in the discharge line of a single pump? Where the discharge line volume is sufficient to overpressure the suction piping if the pump is shut down and a suction valve is closed? Is a discharge check valve installed to prevent backflow? Is a minimum flow recycle provided to prevent pump damage due to low flow and overheating? Are multiple seals and inner seal failure sensors installed on high pressure liquid hydrocarbon pumps to minimize leaks? Are startup suction screens provided? Response

2.E.14 2.E.15 2.E.16 2.E.17 Positive Displacement Pumps 2.E.18 2.E.19 2.E.20 2.E.21 2.E.22 2.E.23 2.E.24 2.E.25 2.E.26 2.E.27 2.E.28 2.E.29 Centrifugal Compressors 2.E.30

Is the pump discharge piping protected by a relief valve upstream of the first block valve? Are suction piping and valves rated for full discharge pressure or are other means of suction overpressure provided (e.g., relief valves)? Is there a discharge check valve to prevent backflow? Are start-up suction screens provided? Do all pumps handling combustible or toxic fluids have cast or forged steel fluid ends? If pump is V-belt or chain driven, is there a completely enclosed guard? Are drain and vent connections on pumps handling toxic or combustible fluids tied to the closed drain system? Are pump motors and controls designed properly for the area classification where they are installed? Are both the pump and driver adequately protected from pressure fluctuations by pulsation devices on the suction and discharge of the pump if required? Is the fluid velocity in the suction and discharge piping within the guidelines of API RP 14E? Are both the pump and driver protected by vibration sensors? Are screwed connections adequately braced for vibration? Is suction over pressure protection provided for: Maximum settle-out pressure after a shutdown? Backflow via recycle loop? Surge valve failure? Is discharge over pressure protection provided for: Anticipated changes in molecular weight? Overspeed? Blocked discharge at maximum suction pressure? Is high temperature protection provided for: Loss of process cooling? Changes in molecular weight?

2.E.31

2.E.32

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Checklist No. 2.E.33 Hazards Analysis Issue Is there chance of mechanical damage from: Liquid carryover? Surge? Reverse rotation? (Are check valves installed on each stage discharge?) Air entry into machine? Excessive Speed? (Is overspeed cutout provided?) Is the potential for a leak and fire limited by providing: Remote shutdown? Isolation valves? Are shutdown valves located outside of any enclosure? For centrifugal compressor seal oil systems with overhead seal oil and run down lube oil tanks: Is overflow protection provided for the seal oil overhead tanks? Are all overhead seal oil tanks designed for maximum seal oil pump discharge pressure for compressor trains with multiple stages on a common shaft? Has the effect of seal oil dilution on the seal oil overhead tank level control scheme been considered when processing a gas stream containing heavy gas components? For centrifugal compressor seal oil systems with backup seal oil pumps: Is the power supply independent so that the pump will function regardless of the cause of compressor shut-in? For all compressor seal oil systems: Is seal oil degassing tank vent line capacity adequate to handle blow-by from a seal oil trap? Is the seal oil reservoir designed to prevent static charge accumulation? Response

2.E.34

2.E.35 2.E.36

2.E.37

2.E.38

Positive Displacement Compressors 2.E.39

2.E.40

2.E.41

2.E.42

Is overpressure protection provided for: Backflow through recycle loop? PSVs for low pressure stages sized for maximum recycle. Consideration of parallel machines. Restriction to limit recycle flow high-pressure machines. Blocked discharge (PSV required)? Is protection provided to reduce the possibility that the design temperature is exceeded from: Loss of cooling? Feed or recycle gas> Cylinder jacket cooling water. Running on total recycle? Low suction pressure? Is protection provided to reduce the possibility of mechanical damage from: Liquid carryover? Air entry into machine? Are shutdown valves located outside of any enclosure?

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Checklist No. Heat Exchangers 2.E.43 Hazards Analysis Issue Is adequate overpressure protection provided for: Shutoff against maximum pressure source? Upstream, downstream, thermal expansion (trapped cold side). External fire contingency? Tube leak or rupture? Can design temperatures be exceeded from: Maximum upstream temperature at source? Bypassing of upstream heat removal equipment? Loss of flow on cold side? Are shell and/or tubes rated for vacuum, where required? Response

2.E.44

2.E.45

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3. SYSTEMS CHECKLIST:
Checklist No. 3.A Surface Safety System. Shutdown Valves 3.A.1 3.A.2 Hazards Analysis Issue

API RP 14J CHECKLIST

Response

Have valve testing requirements been accounted for in the valve actuator and pilot valve configuration? In the access to the valve? Are external environmental conditions considered in the shutdown valve design? For example, Salt air corrosion of actuator spring return. Mechanical damage to pilot valve or solenoid valve. Damage or corrosion to air accumulator tank, if used. Damage or corrosion to pneumatic or hydraulic tubing and connections. Have Hand/Off/Auto control switches been specified? If so, can the safety system override the motor left in the Hand position?

Motor Control 3.A.3 Input Sensors (Transmitters, Transducers, Switches) 3.A.4 3.A.5 3.A.6 3.A.7 System Hardware 3.A.9 3.A.10

Does the installation of sensors put priority on minimizing process lags, eliminating plugging and freeze-up problems, etc.? Are isolation valves in plain sight and accessible for operation? On critical sensors, can the process signal to the sensor be independently checked (by a pressure gauge, for example)? Can sensors be easily and accurately calibrated? Are low flow detection devices located in continuously active flowstreams? Are process control and safety systems separated? Have components that could hinder or defeat the shutdown function through improper adjustment been identified and minimized and a system implemented to prevent unauthorized or undocumented changes? Is the system designed to clearly indicate its status (i.e. normal/bypass, running/tripped, system fault/system O.K., etc.? Can the system give clear (first out) indication of the cause of shutdown? Where maintenance bypasses are used, do they bypass the minimum number of functions to allow on-line maintenance? Have timed bypasses been considered? Has the system logic considered offsite conditions (i.e. shutdown on adjacent platforms, bridge landing ESD stations, import/export pipeline upset, utilities failure, etc.).? Where the operator is required to manually respond to emergency conditions, has consideration been given to the following: Does he/she have sufficient information to correctly interpret the condition? Is the information presented in a simple, direct format allowing for stressful conditions which may be present? Do alarm settings, location of controls, etc., allow enough time to respond?

3.A.11 3.A.12 3.A.13 Logic Philosophy 3.A.14 3.A.15

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Checklist No. Logic Development 3.A.16 3.A.17 3.A.18 3.A.19 3.B Electrical System Area Classification 3.B.1 3.B.2 3.B.3 3.B.4 Hazards Analysis Issue Do all elements of the shutdown system, including controls on packaged units, follow the same philosophy? Has the control logic provided positive lockout after shutdown? Does the tripped indication inform the operator that a reset step is required? Is the reset procedure clear and simple, reducing the need for resetting several different pieces of equipment? Is first out annunciation indicated? Response

3.B.5 3.B.6 3.B.7 3.B.8

3.B.9

Are extents of Class 1, Division 1 and Division 2 areas clearly shown on area classification plans and elevations? Are flammable liquids, gases, and vapors handled, processed, and stored away from areas in which unclassified equipment is located? Has vapor tight design/construction of walls and barriers that form division boundaries been confirmed? Have drilling and recompletion-remedial work been considered in the electrical equipment layout? (During drilling/well workover operations, all available deck space is often used for extra tanks, piping trailers, logging equipment, etc. This equipment could compromise the normal operating conditions on which Area Classifications are based ) Has normal maintenance been considered in determining area classification? Is process gas being used as supply for instruments? If so, was this considered in determining area classification? Have decisions been made involving whether or not any areas should be classified as enclosed and whether all enclosed areas are adequately ventilated in determining area classifications? If adequate ventilation and/or pressurization is the technique used to reduce area classification or de-classify an area, is there a source of fresh air outside the classified area? If so, has automatic shut-off of electrical power to potential arcing devices been provided on detection of loss of ventilation pressurization resulting in an accumulation of gas or vapors? Are combustible gas detection devices used to reduce the classification of enclosed areas? If so, do they shut-off electrical power to all devices which would not be suitable for the classified area if gas detectors had not been installed? Have equipment certification/labeling/listing requirements (e.g., NRTL listing) been checked? Is all electrical equipment installed in classified locations suitable for the location? Are Class 1 gases and vapors grouped and identified per Table 3.5 of API RP 500 (e.g. Group A, B, C or D)? If so, are thermal ratings of electrical devices in accordance with NEC Table 500-3(d)? Have Hand/Off/Auto control switches been specified? If so, can the safety system override a motor left in the Hand position? Has access to emergency shutoff devices been considered in design? Do all disconnect switches and breakers have lockout provisions?

Equipment 3.B.10 3.B.11 3.B.12 3.B.13 3.B.14 3.B.15

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4. FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM CHECKLIST:
Checklist No. 4.A Process Area Fire and Gas Detection 4.A.1 Hazards Analysis Issue Response

4.A.2 4.A.3 4.A.4 4.A.5 Fire and Gas Protection 4.A.6 4.A.7

Does the detection system provide the following: Isolation of the hydrocarbon sources? Indication of the location of undesirable event? Activation of an adequate audible/visual alarm system? If fusible loop heat detection is used, have zone layout and panel construction allowed for periodic testing and inspection? Is fusible loop tubing well protected from mechanical damage, especially in well bays? If optical flame detection is used, does the installation avoid false alarms due to lightning, flares, etc.? (False alarms undermine operator confidence and encourage system bypassing/ignoring.) Is the bypass status of the fusible loop panel indicated to the operator at all times? Has deluge been considered for any vessel, header, equipment or wellhead areas that contain high inventories of hydrocarbons? If a deluge system is installed: Are deluge valves installed to permit testing? If deluge valves are isolated or bypassed, is this properly indicated to the operator? Have provisions been made to prevent plugging of deluge lines and valves due to sediment or corrosion products? Has the use of firewalls been considered to separate the higher risk areas, such as fire equipment, from the unfired process equipment and storage tanks: (Has the use of firewalls between decks been considered as well?) Can the effectiveness of firewalls be compromised in any way, such as by a door remaining open? Can all areas of the platform be protected from two different directions? (Protection methods could include fire hose, fire monitors, wheeled extinguishers, etc.) If provided, are fire monitors located in the most effective locations? Will the stream path be blocked by any other equipment such as a wellhead, a manifold or structural member? Can a person easily get to and away from the monitor? Are fire hoses located near all stairways and exits? Are dry chemicals on the structure compatible with their intended use? Is there an ABC dry chemical extinguisher or equivalent located on at least one stairway exit from the helideck? (There must be one at all fueling stations.) If the platform is manned, is there a fire pump(s) capable of maintaining the water discharge at the required rate and pressure? (The system could include the deluge, fire monitors and fire hoses.) Is the fire pump caisson(s) protected from collision? Do the AFFF reels have the capability to switch between a water stream only and a water-foam stream?

4.A.8

4.A.9 4.A.10 4.A.11

4.A.12 4.A.13 4.A.14 4.A.15 4.A.16 4.A.17

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Checklist No. 4.A.18 Hazards Analysis Issue If fire-fighting clothing is provided, are the responsible personnel trained in its use? (Past experience indicates that fire-fighting clothing and equipment are burdensome and awkward to those who are not properly trained in their use.) Response

4.B Buildings and Enclosures. Fire and Gas Detection 4.B.1 4.B.2 4.B.3

4.B.4 4.B.5 4.B.6 4.B.7 4.B.8 Fire and Gas Protection 4.B.9 4.B.10 4.B.11 4.B.12 4.B.13 4.B.14 4.C Quarters Fire and Gas Detection 4.C.1 4.C.2 Fire and Gas Protection 4.C.3 4.C.4 4.C.5

Do zone layouts of building fire detection systems provide for clear identification of alarm source? Are normally unattended areas covered? Is the system compatible with platform alarms for other facilities within the same area of operation? Alarm tones? Manual stations? Alarms transmitted to central points? Does a detector fault initiate an alarm? Are air intakes located to minimize ingestion of smoke or flammable gases and located in unclassified locations? Have combustible gas detectors been considered for air intake areas? Is there sufficient back-up power (e.g., a battery) to the electrical source supplying the detection system? Are manual fire alarm stations located at each exit? Have provisions been made to maintain and test the detection system? Has consideration been given to the isolation of air intakes if fire or gas is detected? Does gas detection isolate electrical power to eliminate ignition sources? Is an automatic inverting or extinguishing agent system installed? Is a time delay provided to allow personnel to escape before the system is discharged? Are all pathways to exits free of obstructions? Are windows, doors and the material in firewalls of the same fire or blast rating as the firewalls? If an enclosure contains a potentially explosive substance, has a means of venting the explosion been provided?

Are heat detectors located in hallways adequately spaced? Are smoke detectors located in each sleeping room? Do equipment and other rooms contain potential ignition sources? Can the audible fire/smoke alarm(s) be prominently heard from all locations within the quarters? Are fire and smoke barriers fitted in appropriate positions in the void spaces of the quarters ceilings to prevent migration? Are all escape paths from the quarters adequately protected from fire to allow for safe evacuation of personnel? Have the appropriate number and type of portable or semi-portable fire extinguishers been provided within the quarters?

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Checklist No. 4.C.6 Hazards Analysis Issue Have firewater hose stations been positioned outside the quarters to provide maximum coverage and to provide for safe evacuations? Response

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API RP 14J CHECKLIST

5. MECHANICAL CHECKLIST:
Checklist No. 5.A Construction Materials 5.A.1 5.A.2 5.A.3 5.A.4 5.B Piping 5.B.1 5.B.2 5.B.3 5.B.4 5.B.5 5.B.6 5.B.7 5.B.8 5.B.9 5.B.10 5.C Quarters General Layout and Design 5.C.1 5.C.2 5.C.3 5.C.4 5.C.5 Hazards Analysis Issue Have steel materials been used in hydrocarbon service, where feasible (no aluminum, brass, cast iron, etc.)? Are materials in sour service in accordance with NACE requirements? Are material specifications in accordance with ANSI B31.3 and ASME Boiler and Pressure Code Section VIII? Are there other special requirements for materials which should be addressed? Have stresses and movements due to thermal expansion or contraction been considered in piping systems? On piping that operates above 160F, has adequate thermal protection for personnel been provided? Are all vent, flare and relief lines self-draining? Have all packing vents, vents from pilot-operated PSVs, etc., been routed to a safe location outside of any enclosure? Have dead legs been avoided to prevent corrosion? Are all walkways free of obstructions? Have the number and length of high pressure pipelines that cross the working areas been minimized? Are supports on PSV discharge piping designed for the fluid reaction force when the PSV operates? Is there access to critical valves for operation and maintenance? Is all piping in vibrating service adequately supported? Has screwed piping been avoided? Response

5.C.6 5.C.7 5.C.8

Is a suitable fire wall provided on the side facing the process area? Are there at least two primary means of escape from each floor? Do exits give ready access to life-saving equipment? Have adequate medical treatment facilities been provided? Is the entrance to the treatment facility situated to allow the easy transport of a person on a stretcher? Are the following designed to meet building requirements for width, height, incline, etc.: Stairways? Aisles and passageways? Hatches? Railings? Elevators, if applicable? Has adequate space been made available to store personnel protective gear, such as life vests, emergency breathing apparatus, etc.? Have walkways on the exterior sides of the quarters building opposite the operational areas been considered to provide safe avenues of egress? Has the use of windows, especially on the process side of the quarters, been minimized as much as possible?

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API RP 14J CHECKLIST

Checklist No. Construction and Materials 5.C.9 5.C.10 Emergency Exits 5.C.11 5.C.12 5.C.13 5.C.14 Lighting 5.C.15 5.C.16 5.C.17 5.C.18 Utilities 5.C.19 5.C.20 5.C.21 Hazards Analysis Issue Have fireproof materials been used for construction of the quarters? Have non-skid materials been used on stairs and in entry ways? Shower and washing areas? Are exits on the same floor located as far opposite each other as practical? Are the exit paths laid out in such a way as to avoid dead ends? Do common areas exceeding 300 ft 2, or having an occupancy capacity of 50 persons or more, have a minimum of two doors, located at opposite sides of the room? Do the doors used for emergency exits open outward in the direction of escape? Are they equipped with safe opening mechanisms? Are all exits properly marked and lighted? Has adequate lighting been provided at all entry ways, passageways and stairs? Is emergency lighting along exit ways located such that evacuation of the quarters can be executed safely? Is emergency lighting provided in essential areas (such as the medical treatment room, offices and galley) to allow for continued operation or proper execution of emergency procedures? In the event of total power failure, including main and emergency, have provisions been made for lighting in the quarters to facilitate an orderly exit? Have the hazards associated with any fuel gas to the quarters been addressed? Is there an alarm installed on the incoming fuel gas system to detect pressure loss/increase? Do hot water heaters have a combination thermal/pressure valve that is set to relieve at the water tank design working pressure or 126 psig and 210F, whichever is the lesser? Does the relief vent terminate at a safe location outside the building? Are gas-fired heaters equipped with an automatic shutoff and manual reset for fuel gas and pilot gas upon loss of the pilotflame? If storage spaces are provided within the quarters, have provisions been made to eliminate the storage of flammable or toxic materials there? Response

5.C.22 5.C.23 5.D Helidecks. General Design D.1 5.D.2

5.D.3

Is the helideck designed to accommodate the largest sized helicopter expected to land on it? Has consideration been given to handling two helicopters if the need arises? Is the approach path obstruction free? Have any obstructions been adequately marked? Have precautions been taken so that a crane that can reach the approach path will not be operating during landings and takeoffs? Has a non-skid type surface that adheres to the deck been used?

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API RP 14J CHECKLIST

Checklist No. Accessories 5.D.4 Hazards Analysis Issue Have the following requirements been met: Safety fence or solid safety shelf around the perimeter of the helideck? Tie-down rings for the applicable number of helicopters? Wind indicator? Lighting (for night operations)? If a fueling system is being provided, is it located on a separate level from the helideck? Is it located so as to minimize the risk of damage in the event of a helicopter crash? Have the following requirements been met: Non-skid surfaces on all steps and landings for stairs and ladders? Railings around permanent openings in the decks, walkways, platforms and stairways? Have railings with toeboards been provided for any area on the outside perimeter of all decks or passageways (with the exception of the helideck) which are located over frequented areas and/or are over open sea? Response

5.D.5 5.E. Structural 5.E.1

5.E.2

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