FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 16197. March 12, 1920.] CENTRAL CAPIZ, a corporation, petitioner, vs.

ANA RAMIREZ, respondent. Williams & Ferrier for petitioner. Cohn, Fisher & Dewit for respondent. SYLLABUS 1.STATUTES, TITLE OF, MUST CONTAIN WHAT; PHRASE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" IN TITLE OF STATUTE, EFFECT OF; PUBLIC LAND, DEFINED; ACT No. 2874, APPLICATION OF, INTERPRETED. Held: under the facts stated in the opinion (a)That it was the purpose and intent of the Legislature to comply with the provisions of the Jones Law and to limit the application of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public domain. (b)That the phrase "and for other purposes," found in the title of said Act (No. 2874), by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (the Jones Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to, any lands not public. (c)That eliminating the phrase "and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the same must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain." (d)That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land, is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act. (e)That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other courts interpreting the phrase "public lands," that once such lands have been "legally appropriated" by the government or by individuals, they become segregated from the mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to "public lands" operate upon them. (f)That whatever right or authority the Government of the Philippine Islands may have had at any time to assert any right, title or interest in and to the lands involved in this proceeding, whether as a part of the "public domain" or otherwise, was absolutely divested by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, after such lands were registered in the court of land registration under the Torrens system. (g)That under said Act (No. 2874) as entitled, any provision or provisions in the body thereof applicable to lands held under fee title is null and void and of no effect. (h)That inasmuch as said Act (No. 2874) cannot be interpreted to apply to nor include, lands held in fee title, the penal provisions thereof cannot be held to apply to leases, sales, concessions, nor any other transaction by the holders. (i)That by virtue of the provisions of section 127, as well as the general jurisprudence upon that subject, our conclusions herein shall not be held to affect any of the provisions of said Act No. 2874 except those provisions which relate to private agricultural lands, or lands held in private ownership, in contradistinction to lands of the public domain.

DECISION JOHNSON, J p: This is an original action brought in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an interpretation and application of the intent, purpose and scope of Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it affects agricultural lands, privately owned. The only question presented is, whether or not said Act No. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. There is no dispute about the facts. They are admitted. The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about July 1, 1919, the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her plantation, which said contract, by agreement, was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding upon all future owners of the same. In theinterim the execution of said contract and its conversion into a right in rem upon the respondent's property, said Act No. 2874 became effective. The respondent, while admitting said contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed pursuant thereto, bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. It is conceded by the parties that the land involved is private agricultural land, that is, land which is held and owned by the respondent, for which she holds a Torrens title. The defendant answered the petition. To the defendant's answer the petitioner demurred. From an examination of the petition, the answer and the demurrer, it appears that the real issue presented is, whether the said Act (No. 2874) is limited in its application to agricultural lands of the public domain, or whether its provisions also extend to agricultural lands held in private ownership. Inasmuch as the wording of certain sections of said Act (secs. 23,24, 121 and 122) give rise to a possible construction that private lands are included within its terms, and inasmuch as said Act specifically provides that any land coming within its purview cannot be encumbered, alienated or transferred to corporations in which at least 61 per cent of the capital stock does not belong wholly to citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, the respondent, while not desiring to evade her contract, fears to assume the risk of giving effect to her said contract in view of the drastic penalty prescribed, should her action prove unlawful. The penalty provided in section 122 Of said Act includes not only a nullity of the contract but also a reversion of the property and its improvements to the Government. On behalf of the plaintiff it is argued, first, that the intent of the Legislature, gathered from a reading of Act No. 2874 in its entirety, is to provide simply for the sale, lease and other disposition of lands of the public domain; that lands held in private ownership are not affected. thereby; and, second, that even had the Legislature intended to include private as well as public land within the scope of the Act, this intent fails because under the Act as entitled such attempt would be in direct violation of section three of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, which provides that: "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

Examining Act No. 2874 in detail, there can be little question but that it was intended to apply to and regulate the sale, lease and other disposition of public lands only. The title of the Act, always indicative of legislative intent, reads: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes." Section one of such act provides: "The short title of this Act shall be 'The public Land Act.' " Section two, wherein the purpose of the Act is expressly stated, reads: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to lands of the public domain." Section three provides: "While title to lands of the public domain remains in the Government, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act, through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control." It cannot be contemplated that these officers, charged "with carrying out the provisions of the Act," were intended to exercise authority and control over the sale or other disposition of lands hold in private ownership. To the same effect are sections four, five, and eighty-seven of the Act, wherein executive control is vested in the Director of Lands with respect to the survey, appraisal, classification, etc., of lands of the public domain, with authority to prepare rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, and to receive all applications filed pursuant thereto, etc. Sections 105 contains another indication that said Act does not apply to privately owned agricultural lands. Said section provides: "All patents or certificates for lands granted under this Act . . . shall issue in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General, countersigned by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources." The Legislature certainly did not intend that all sales, leases, etc. of privately owned agricultural lands should hereafter be "issued in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands, under the signature of the Governor-General." etc. Section 23, after describing the persons and corporations authorized to purchase any tract of public agricultural lands "disposable under this Act," proceeds: "Provided, further, That citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire public lands as to their own citizens, may, while such laws are in force, but not thereafter . . . purchase any parcel of agricultural land . . . available under this Act." In other words, it is only necessary for other countries to grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the right to acquire "public lands," in order that their citizens may have the right to acquire any land available under this act. This provision would be altogether anomalous had it been the intent to apply Act No. 2874 to lands held in private ownership. Referring again to section two of said Act, we find the following: "That nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed to change or modify the government and disposition of the lands commonly known as 'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Philippine Government, which administration and disposition shall be

governed by the laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted by the Legislature." The purpose of said provision is obvious. Inasmuch as these friar estates and other real property purchased or owned by the Government are subject to its control and disposition equally with lands of the public domain it could be reasonably argued that they should be subject to and governed by the laws applicable to public lands. Through the insertion of the provision above quoted, however, this construction of the Act is avoided. If said Act, by express provisions, does not apply to lands privately owned by the Government, it could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature to make the Act applicable to lands held in private ownership by individuals. The Act nowhere contains any direct or express provision applying its terms to privately owned lands. The doubts of defendant in that regard are caused by inferences drawn from the language used in sections 24 and 121 of the Act. The first paragraph of section 24 provides: "No . . . corporation . . . other than those mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement." Said section as worded, and standing alone, presents some question as to the character of land sought to be included therein. This doubt is dispelled, however, when its provisions are read in connection with other sections of the same chapter. Chapter five, in which section 24 is found, deals with "Sales," and section 25 thereof specifically provides that: "Lands sold under the provision of this chapter must be appraised in accordance with section 114 of this Act." Section 114 confers authority upon the Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to appraise lands or improvements subject to concession or disposition under the provisions of this Act. Inasmuch a8 the Legislature cannot vest authority in the Director of Lands to "appraise" or "sell" lands held in private ownership, it is not presumed it was the intention to include private lands in the Act or subject them in the manner indicated to any such authority. The same observations and the same conclusions apply to section 121 of the Act, where much the same language is used as found in section 24 above quoted. Whatever interpretation said sections 24 and 121 might receive if standing alone, it is clear they cannot prevail against the general intent of the Act, derived not only from the language used but from the machinery adopted for giving effect to its provisions. (See secs. 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, and 115.) We hold, therefore, that the purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Even should the holding of the court upon this question of intent be different, it would not affect the final outcome of the case. Under the Act as entitled, any attempt by the Legislature to insert provisions in the body thereof relating to lands of

private ownership would be in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law and, therefore, null and void. It is provided in section 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress of August 29, 1916): "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Identical provisions to the above are contained in most of the State Constitutions, and have been repeatedly construed. In the States of Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wiacongin and Wyoming, identical provisions are found in the Constitution. The purpose of this legislative restriction, and the evils sought to be remedied thereby, are clearly stated by Sutherland in his valuable work on Statutory Construction. In section 111 he says that: "In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restrictions existed of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combined in order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the State. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, and for other purposes.' "The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved; and not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; so that legislative provisions were steadily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in the title." In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as follows citing and quoting from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143: "The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are well known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by their titles only without requiring them to be read. A specious title

sometimes covers legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents. "An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of several measures no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities defining the objects of this provision: 'It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was: First, to prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.' (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143.) " To the same effect, in the case of Lindsay vs. U. S. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. (120 Ala., 156 [42-1.. R. A., N. S., 7831]), the court said: "The purposes of the constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind when it becomes necessary to determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The exposition of these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which alike limitation prevails." (Then follows quotation from Cooley, supra.) In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) where, in the body of an act, provision was made for something not included in the title, the Supreme Court of California said: "At the least, then, two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is not expressed in the title and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objects of legislation embodied in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body of the act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitution requires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutional requirement. 'The practice,' says the Supreme Court of Missouri, 'of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in their support members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which could command the requisite majority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which

the titles gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These things led to fraud and injury; and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of a constitutional provision.' (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) This provision has been framed in the constitutions of many of the States of the Union; and courts, whenever it has come before them, have liberally construed it as the will of the people in the interests of honest legislation." The authorities are to all intents uniform that this constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 112, states the rule correctly as follows: "The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out, depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to continue notwithstanding that that obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional injunction if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them and only directory. It would in a general sense be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature unless it is clear beyond all question that such was the intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental law to say that it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded." In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk. [Tenn.], 504) Nicholson, C. J., referring to the provision that "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject," said: "This is a direct, positive and imperative limitation upon the power of the legislature. It matters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house on three different days and has received the approval of the governor, still it is not a law of the State if it embraces more than one subject." In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) supra, the court said: "It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable that this provision of the constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void any statute not conforming to it.' "

Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179-180) states that our courts have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory. As heretofore noted, the title of Act 2874, here under construction, reads: "An Act to amend and compile laws relative to lands of the public domain, and for other purposes." In our interpretation of said Act, the words "and for other purposes" contained in its title, must be treated as non-existent. Under all the authorities wherein the requirement "That no bill shall embrace more than one subject which subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill" has been considered, the words "and for other purposes" when found in the title, have been held to be without force or effect whatsoever and have been altogether discarded in construing the Act. Upon this point, Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 173-174, states as follows: "One thing, however, is very plain: That the use of the words 'other purposes,' which has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a view to cover any and everything whether connected with the main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of and avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme Court of New York in a case where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill: 'The words "for other purposes"must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid.' " Sutherland on Statutory Construction, section 122 says: "The phrase 'and for other purposes' expresses no specific purpose and imports indefinitely something different from that which precedes it in the title. It is, therefore, universally rejected as having no force or effect wherever this constitutional restriction operates." (Citing numerous cases). In the case of Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269), an Act was construed by the court reading: "An Act to provide for the preservation of the Muskegon river improvements, and for other purposes." Cooley, C. J., who wrote the opinion, "The Constitution (of Michigan) provides that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. We have heretefore had occasion to consider this section, and have said of it that it ought to be construed reasonably and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation. But the only object mentioned in the title of this Act is the preservation of the Muskegon River Improvements, for which purpose the act authorizes tolls to be levied and expended. "The payment of Beard's claim is in no way connected with this object and the title to the act would apprise neither the legislature nor the public that it covered provisions under which a large sum was to be collected and disbursed to pay for the original construction of

the work. The words 'other purposes' in the title can have no force whatever under the constitutional provision which has been quoted." In the case of Board of Education vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 282) the title of the Act under consideration read: "An Act to establish a permanent Board of Education for the City of Americus and to incorporate the same, and for other purposes." The State constitution prohibited any law which referred to more than one subject, or contained matter different from that expressed in the title of the act. The court said: "Does this not close the door to any force and effect being given the words 'for other purposes?' If these words were once necessary to permit the introduction of matter in the bill, different from what was expressed in the other portion of the title, would not that very thing show now that the bill would thereby become obnoxious to the other clause prohibiting more than one subject matter? The necessity of such words under the provision as it formerly stood to prevent the bill from containing matter different from the title could only arise because such matter is something different from what had already been expressed. It shows that something more than one subject-matter is intended. If so, although it was allowed under the clause as it was formerly, it cannot now be done." Equally may it be said of the Act of the Philippine Legislature here involved, the addition of the words "and for other purposes," contained in its title, can only be explained on the theory that something different was to be included therein from that previously expressed, i. e., "lands of the public domain." Another case where the same conclusion is forcibly expressed is that of Spier vs. Baker, (120 Cal., 370). There the court construed an Act reading: "An Act pronding for general primary elections within the State of California and to promote the purity thereof by regulating the conduct thereof, and to support the privileges of free suffrage thereat, by prohibiting certain acts and practices in relation thereto, and providing for the punishment thereof, and for other purposes." The California State Constitution provides: "Every Act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; but, if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in its title." The court, after citing this constitutional provision, said: "Let us test the title of this act in the crucible furnished by the foregoing provision of the constitution. The legislature, in framing this title, was above all things candid. Upon its very face the lawmaking power challenged the sound policy of this provision of the constitution, and avowedly disregarding it, declared that the purpose of the act was the creation of a primary election law and 'other purposes.' Under the cloak of 'other purposes,' all and every conceivable kind of legislation could hide and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the constitutional provision be set at naught. In this state, when these words 'for other purposes' are found in the title of an act of the state legislature they accomplish nothing, and in reading the title our eyes are closed to them.We then have before us, tested by its title, an act dealing solely with general primary elections, and providing penalties for violating the law relating thereto. Any matters of legislation contained in the body of the act not bearing upon

primary elections must go out; the constitutional provision quoted so declares. Weighing and measuring the legislation found in the act by this test, very many provisions have no place there. It would seem that the legislature, in using the words 'for other purposes' in the title, used those words advisedly, and in good faith lived up to them fully. For the legislation found in section after section of the act can find no justification in its title, save under these words of boundless meaning, 'for other purposes.' " The court, after referring to various matters included in the bill but not specified in the title, said: "Many of these things are totally foreign to any question relating to primary elections, and others are so remotely connected with that subject as to clearly come within the prohibition of the constitutional provision. These matters of legislation, not being embraced within the purview of the title, are void and fall to the ground." Applying the doctrine of the above cases to the Act before us for interpretation, its title must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain." Inasmuch as agricultural lands in the Philippine Islands held in private ownership, under fee title, constitute no part of "the public domain," they cannot come within the purview of Act No. 2874 as it is entitled. The words "public land" are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. In the case of Wilcox vs. Jackson (13 Peters, 498 [10 L. ed., 264] ) the court, in dealing with the matter of public lands, stated: "Whensoever a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any purpose, from that moment the land thus appropriated becomes severed from the mass of public lands; and no subsequent law, or proclamation, or sale, would be construed to embrace it, or to operate upon it, although no reservation were made of it." The above case is quoted and applied in the case of United States vs. Blendoner (122 Fed. Rep., 703, 708) . In U. S. vs. Garreston (42 Fed., 22), the court said: "Such lands comprise the general public domain; unappropriated lands; lands not held back or reserved for any special governmental or public purpose." In the case of Yakima County vs. Tuller (3 Wash., T., 393), the court said that the term "public lands" in a grant of public lands for roads, etc., shall be construed to mean strictly public lands, such as are open to entry and settlement, and not those in which the rights of the public have passed and which have become subject to some individual right of a settler. In the case of Bardon vs. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. (145 U. S., 535). the court said:

" . . . It has long been settled . . . that all land to which any claims or rights of others have attached does not fall within the designation of public lands." The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, in a very elucidated opinion in which the Attorney-General of the United States agreed, held that "friar lands" purchased by the Insular Government formed no part of the "public domain" and were not affected by nor subject to the restrictions of the Act relating to public lands. Section 2 of the Act before us exempts not only "friar lands" f rom its operation but also all lands which have reverted to, or become the property of, the Philippine Government. It is clearly evident, therefore, that under no possible construction of the law can the words "lands of the public domain," used in the title of Act No. 2874, be held to include, or be authorized to include, lands held in freehold. While this is true generally, it is peculiarly applicable to lands held and owned under Torrens title as are the lands of the defendant herein in which all interest of the Government is expressly eliminated. Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496) provides that such registered title "shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern. The judicial-department of the government hesitates to pronounce invalid the Acts of the legislative department, and will not do so until and unless it is shown that the same exceed the authority conferred upon said department or contravene some express or necessarily implied provision of the Organic Law of the state. (Case vs. Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit us. Pearanda, 37 Phil., 155.) In the interpretation and construction of statutes the court should give them the meaning and effect which the legislature intended, unless that meaning and effect is in conflict with the organic law of the land. The question of the validity of the statutes is first determined by the legislative department of the government, and the courts will resolve every presumption in its favor. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is not a question for the courts to determine. If a particular statute is within the constitutional powers of the legislature, it will be sustained, whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute covers a subject not authorized by the fundamental laws of the state, or by the constitution then the courts are not only authorized but are justified in pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise and beneficent such legislation may seem to be. The courts are not justified in measuring their opinion with the opinion of the legislative department of the government, as expressed in statutes, upon the question of the wisdom, justice and advisability of a particular law. The courts have no right to dictate what law shall be adopted by the legislative department of the government, so long as a well defined public policy or an organic act is not violated. (Case vs. Board of Health, and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.) Our conclusions, therefore, from all of the foregoing are: 1.That it was the purpose and intent of the legislature to comply with the provisions of the Jones Law and to limit the application of Act No. 2874 to lands of the public domain;

2.That the phrase "and for other purposes," found in the title of said Act (No. 2874), by virtue of the provisions of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (the Jones Law), cannot be interpreted to include, nor be made applicable to any lands not public; 3.That eliminating the phrase "and for other purposes" from the title of said Act, the same must be considered and treated as though reading: "An Act to amend and compile the laws relative to lands of the public domain;" 4.That lands held in freehold or fee title, or private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act. 5.That it is the uniform holding of the United States Supreme Court, and of other courts interpreting the phrase "public lands," that once such lands have been "legally appropriated" by the Government or by individuals, they become segregated from the mass of public lands, and no law or proclamation thereafter made or issued relating to "public lands" operate upon them. 6.That whatever right or authority the Government of the Philippine Islands may have had at any time to assert any right, title, or interest in and to the lands involved in this proceeding, whether as a part of the "public domain" or otherwise, was absolutely divested by virtue of the provisions of section 38 of Act No. 496, after such lands were registered in the court of land registration under the Torrens system. 7.That under said Act (No. 2874) as entitled any provisions or provisions in the body thereof applicable to lands held under fee title is null and void and of no effect. 8.That inasmuch as said Act (No. 2874) cannot be interpreted to apply to, nor include, lands held in fee title, the penal provisions thereof cannot be held to apply to leases, sales, concessions, nor any other transaction by the holders. 9.That by virtue of the provisions of section 127, as well as the general jurisprudence upon that subject our conclusions herein shall not be held to affect any of the provisions of said Act No. 2874 except those provisions which relate to private agricultural lands, or lands held in private ownership, in contradistinction to lands of the public domain. Therefore, having demonstrated that said Act No. 2874 does not apply to lands of the respondent, and there being no objection to the form of the remedy prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without any finding as to costs. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions TORRES, J., with whom concurs ARAULLO, J., concurring: Inasmuch as it does not appear what action or remedy is prayed for and the petition is only concerned with the interpretation of Act No. 2874, I concur with the foregoing decision.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987.] BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, SANTIAGO EISMA, MIRUFO CELERIAN, JOSE SAYSON, CESAR TABILIRAN, and MAXIMO ADLAWAN,petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE MELQUIADES B. SUCALDITO, RUFINO LABANG, MENELEO MESINA, ARTURO GUILLERMO, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPACITIES AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY AND STATE PROSECUTOR, and ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents. DECISION SARMIENTO, J p: The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the then Circuit Criminal Court sitting in Pagadian City, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) and various provisions of the Revised Penal Code, commenced by the respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. On June 16, 1971 and October 8, 1971, respectively, we issued temporary restraining orders directing the respondents (in both petitions) to desist from further proceedings in the cases in question until further orders from the Court. At the same time, we gave due course to the petitions and accordingly, required the respondents to answer. The petitions raise pure question of law. The facts are hence, undisputed. cdll On September 26, 1970, the private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a complaint with the respondent City Fiscal, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1-70 thereof, for violation of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows. xxx xxx xxx SPECIFICATION NO. I That on or about October 10, 1969, above named respondents, conspiring and confabulating together, allegedly conducted a bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the Province of Zamboanga del Sur; that it was made to appear that Tabiliran Trucking Company won the bidding; that, thereafter, the award and contract pursuant to the said simulated bidding were effected and executed in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company; that, in truth and in fact, the said bidding was really simulated and the papers on the same were falsified to favor Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by the

private secretary of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle, formerly confidential secretary of the latter; that said awardee was given wholly unwarranted advantage and preference by means of manifest partiality, that respondent officials are hereby also charged with interest for personal gain for approving said award which was manifestly irregular and grossly unlawful because the same was facilitated and committed by means of falsification of official documents. SPECIFICATION NO. II That after the aforecited award and contract, Tabiliran Trucking Company, represented by respondent Cesar Tabiliran, attempted to collect advances under his trucking contract in the under his trucking contract in the amount of P4,823.95 under PTA No. 3654; that the same was not passed in audit by the Provincial Auditor in view of the then subsisting contract with Teoson Trucking Company; which was to expire on November 2, 1969; that nevertheless the said amount was paid and it was made to appear that it was collected by Teoson Trucking Company, although there was nothing due from the latter and the voucher was never indorsed or signed by the operator of Teoson Trucking; and that in facilitating and consummating the aforecited collection respondent officials, hereinabove cited, conspired and connived to the great prejudice and damage of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur. 1 xxx xxx xxx On the same date, the private respondent commenced Criminal Case No. 2-71 of the respondent City Fiscal, another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx That on or about April 8, 1970, a bidding was held for the construction of the right wing portion of the Capitol Building of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, by the Bidding Committee composed of respondents cited hereinabove; that the said building was maliciously manipulated so as to give wholly unwarranted advantage and preference in favor of the supposed winning bidder, Codeniera Construction, allegedly owned and managed by Wenceslao Codeniera, brother-in-law of the wife of respondent Bienvenido Ebarle; that respondent official is interested for personal gain because he is responsible for the approval of the manifestly irregular and unlawful award and contract aforecited; and that, furthermore, respondent, being a Member of the Bidding Committee, also violated Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, by making it appear in the very abstract of bids that another interested bidder, was not interested in the bidding, when in truth and in fact, it was not so. 2

xxx xxx xxx On January 26, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 4-71 of the respondent Fiscal, a prosecution for violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: LLphil xxx xxx xxx That on or about April 4, 1967, in Pagadian City, said respondent testified falsely under oath in Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC CAD REC. NO. N-468, for registration of title to Lot No. 2645 in particular; That respondent BIENVENIDO EBARLE testified falsely under oath during the hearing and reception of evidence that he acquired said lot by purchase from a certain Brigido Sanchez and that he is the owner, when in truth and in fact Lot 2545 had been previously acquired and is owned by the provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur, where the provincial jail building is now located. 2.That aforesaid deceit, false testimony and untruthful statement of respondent in said Cadastral case were made knowingly to the great damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur in violation of aforecited provisions of the Revised Penal Code. 3 On February 10, 1971, finally, the private respondent filed a complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 5-71 of the respondent Fiscal, an action for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Articles 171 and 213 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: xxx xxx xxx We hereby respectfully charge the above-named respondents for violation of Sec. 3, R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Articles 171 and 213, Revised Penal Code and the rules and regulations of public bidding, committed as follows: 1.That on June 16, 1970, without publication, respondents conducted the so-called "bidding" for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga del Sur; that said respondents, without any valid or legal ground, did not include or even open the bid of one Jesus Teoson that was seasonably submitted, despite the fact that he is a registered duly qualified operator of "Teoson Trucking Service," and notwithstanding his compliance with all the rules and requirements on public bidding; that, instead, aforecited respondents illegally and irregularly awarded said contract to Cesar Tabiliran, an associate of respondent Governor Bienvenido Ebarle; and

2.That in truth and in fact, aforesaid "bidding" was really simulated and papers were falsified or otherwise "doctored" to favor respondent Cesar Tabiliran thereby giving him wholly unwarranted advantage, preference and benefits by means of manifest partiality; and that there is a statutory presumption of interest for personal gain because the transaction and award were manifestly irregular and contrary to applicable law, rules and regulations. 4 xxx xxx xxx The petitioner initially moved to dismiss the aforesaid preliminary investigations, but the same having been denied, he went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Melquiades Sucaldito presiding, on prohibition and mandamus (Special Case No. 1000) praying at the same time, for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin further proceedings therein. The court granted preliminary injunctive relief (restraining order) for which the Anti-Graft League filed a motion to have the restraining order lifted and to have the petition itself dismissed. On May 14, 1971, the respondent, Judge Sucaldito, handed down the first of the two challenged orders, granting Anti-Graft League's motion and dismissing Special Case No. 1000. On June 11, 1971, the petitioner came to this Court on certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (G.R. No. 33628). As we said, we issued a temporary restraining order on June 16, 1971. Meanwhile, and in what would begin yet another series of criminal prosecutions, the private respondent, on April 26, 1971, filed three complaints, subsequently docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, and CCC XVI-8-ZDS of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pagadian City, for violation of various provisions of the AntiGraft Law as well as Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, as follows: prLL xxx xxx xxx That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, and appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree by consanguinity. CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 xxx xxx xxx

That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: "c.That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed." required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS, as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity. CONTRARY TO LAW. 6 xxx xxx xxx That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: "c.That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed." required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece Elizabeth Ebarle, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree affinity. CONTRARY TO LAW. 7 xxx xxx xxx Subsequently, on August 23, 1971, the private respondent brought I.S. No. 6-71 of the respondent Pagadian City Fiscal against the petitioner, still another proceeding for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, thus: xxx xxx xxx First Count:

That on or about December 1, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENlDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave MARIO EBARLE, son of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as SECURITY GUARD in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well knew that the latter is related with him in the third degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law. Second Count: That in January, 1970, at Pagadian City, Gov. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE replaced JOHNNY ABABON who was then the incumbent Motor Pool Dispatcher in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur with his nephew-in-law TERESITO MONTESCLAROS relative by affinity within the third Civil degree, in violation of the Civil Service Law, this knowingly causing undue injury in the discharge of his administrative function through manifest partiality against said complaining employee. Third Count: That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ELIZABETH EBARLE MONTESCLAROS, daughter of his brother, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well know that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and said appointment is in violation of the Civil Service Law. Fourth Count: That on or about January 22, 1970, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave ZACARIAS UGSOD, JR., son of the younger sister of Governor Ebarle, his relative by consanguinity within the third degree, an appointment as Architectural Draftsman in the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur although he well know that the latter is related with him in the third degree of consanguinity. Fifth Count: That on February 5, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extended and gave TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, his relative by affinity within the third degree, an appointment as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew then that the latter was not qualified to such appointment as it was in violation of the Civil Service Law, thereby knowingly granting and giving unwarranted advantage and preference in the discharge of his administrative function through manifest partiality.

II.SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 (b), R.A. 3019 That on August 19, 1967, respondent BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, taking advantage of his position caused, persuaded, induced, or influence the Presiding Judge to perform irregular and felonious act in violation of applicable law or constituting an offense into awarding and decreeing Lot 2545 of the Pagadian Public Lands subdivision to him who, according to the records of the case, failed to establish his rights of ownership pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Law and the Public Land Act, it appearing that the Provincial Government of Zamboanga del Sur as and is a claimant and in adverse possession of Lot 2545 whereon the Provincial Jail Building thereon still stands. III.SPECIFICATION FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 171 (4), REVISED PENAL CODE First Count: That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statement in a narration of facts by accomplishing and issuing a certificate, to wit: "c.That the provisions of law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed." required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to TERESITO MONTESCLAROS, husband of his niece ELIZABETH EBARLE, as Motor Pool Dispatcher, Office of the Provincial Engineer of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of affinity and is in violation of the Civil Service Law. Second Count: That on or about December 18, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, then and there unlawfully and feloniously made untruthful statements a certificate, to wit: "c.That the provisions of the law and rules on promotion, seniority and nepotism have been observed." required by law in such cases, in support of the appointment he extended to ELIZABETH EBARLE-MONTESCLAROS, as Private Secretary in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, although he well knew that the latter is related with him within the third degree of consanguinity, and is in violation of the Civil Service Law. CONTRARY to aforecited laws. 8

xxx xxx xxx On September 21, 1971, the private respondent instituted I.S. No. 7-71 of the said City Fiscal, again charging the petitioner with further violations of Republic Act No. 3019 thus: xxx xxx xxx First Count: That on or about December 2, 1969, in Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give his brother benefits and privileges BONINDA EBARLE, wife of his brother Bertuldo Ebarle, the former being his relative by affinity within the second civil degree, an appointment as LABORATORY TECHNICIAN in Pagadian City, although he well knew that the latter is related to him in the second degree by affinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law. Second Count: That on or about January 1, 1970, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and privileges JESUS EBARLE, nephew of said respondents, and appointment as DRIVER of the Provincial Engineer's Office, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Jesus Ebarle is related to him within the third civil degree by consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law. Third Count: That on or about November 1, 1969, at Pagadian City, BIENVENIDO EBARLE, Provincial Governor Zamboanga del Sur, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously extend and give unwarranted benefits and privileges PHENINA CODINERA, sisterin-law of said respondents, an appointment as CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT in the Office of the Provincial Governor, Pagadian City, although he well knew that Phenina Codinera is related to him in the second civil degree of consanguinity and is not qualified under the Civil Service Law. ALL CONTRARY TO AFORECITED LAW. Please give due course to the above complaint and please set the case for immediate preliminary investigation pursuant to the First Indorsement dated August 27, 1971 of the Secretary of Justice, and in the paramount interest of good government. 9 xxx xxx xxx The petitioner thereafter went to the respondent Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, the Honorable Asaali Isnani presiding, on a special civil action (Special Civil Case No. 1048) for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction. The respondent Court

issued a restraining order. The respondent Anti-Graft League moved to have the same lifted and the case itself dismissed. On September 27, 1971, Judge Isnani issued an order, dismissing the case. On October 6, 1971, the petitioner instituted G.R. No. 34162 of this Court, a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. As earlier noted, we on October 8, 1971, stayed the implementation of dismissal order. Subsequently, we consolidated both petitions and considered the same submitted for decision. Principally, the petitioner relies (in both petitions) on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," 10 preliminary to their criminal recourses. At the same time, he assails the standing of the respondent Anti-Graft League to commence the series of prosecutions below (G.R. No. 33628). He likewise contends that the respondent Fiscal (in G.R. No. 34162), in giving due course to the complaints notwithstanding the restraining order we had issued (in G.R. No. 33628), which he claims applies as well thereto, committed a grave abuse of discretion. He likewise submits that the prosecutions in question are politically motivated, initiated by his rivals, he being, as we said, a candidate for reelection as Governor of Zamboanga del Sur. cdrep We dismiss these petitions. The petitioner's reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order No. 264 has no merit. We reproduce the Order in toto: MALACAANG RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES MANILA BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264 OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.

WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or reminded of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented and prosecuted; WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the failure to observe the formal requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and particularity the charges or offenses being aired or denounced, and to file the complaint with the proper office or authority; WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, the Administration believes that many complaints or grievances could be resolved at the lower levels of government if only the provisions of law and regulations on the matter are duly observed by the parties concerned; and WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated and punished, it is equally compelling that public officials and employees be given opportunity afforded them by the constitution and law to defend themselves in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and regulations; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines. by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order: 1.Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing, subscribed and sworn to by the complainants, describing in sufficient detail and particularity the acts or conduct complained of, instead of generalizations. 2.Complaints against presidential appointees shall be filed with the Office of the President or the Department Head having direct supervision or control over the official involved. 3.Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with the proper department or agency head. 4.Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in case of municipal officials, and with the municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of barrio officials. 5.Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the corresponding local board of investigators headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the case of those appointed by the President which should be filed with the Office of the President.

6.Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials or employees can be soonest removed or otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or indicated in like manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted. Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy. (Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS President of the Philippines By the President: (Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR Executive Secretary 11 It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The Order itself shows why. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. prcd The first perambulatory clause states the necessity for informing the public "of the procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials and employees should be presented and prosecuted." 12 To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation of administrative charges against erring government officials. And in fact, the aforequoted paragraphs are but restatements thereof. That presidential appointees are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, for instance, is a reecho of the long-standing doctrine that the President exercises the power of control over his appointees. 13 Paragraph 3, on the other hand, regarding subordinate officials, is a mere reiteration of Section 33 of Republic Act No. 2260, the Civil Service Act (of 1959) then in force, placing jurisdiction upon "the proper Head of Department, the chief of a bureau or office" 14 to investigate and decide on matters involving disciplinary action. Paragraph 4, which refers to complaints filed against elective local officials, reiterates, on the other hand, the Decentralization Act of 1967, providing that "charges against any elective provincial and city officials shall be preferred before the President of the Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial governor or the

secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective barrio official before the municipal or secretary concerned." 15 Paragraph 5, meanwhile, is a reproduction of the provisions of the Police Act of 1966, vesting upon a "Board of Investigators" 16 the jurisdiction to try and decide complaints against members of the Philippine police. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. Furthermore, the fact is that there is no reference therein to judicial or prejudicial (like a preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal) recourse, not because it makes such a resort a secondary measure, but because it does not intend to serve as a condition precedent to, much less supplant, such a court resort. To be sure, there is mention therein of "court action[s] [being] pursued forthwith by the interested parties," 17 but that does not, so we hold, cover proceedings such as criminal actions, which do not require a prior administrative course of action. It will indeed be noted that the term is closely shadowed by the qualification, "after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted," 18 which suggests civil suits subject to previous administrative action. It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or employees . . . removed or otherwise vindicated." 19 If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused," "convicted," or "acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material in construing the intent of the measure. LibLex What is even more compelling is the Constitutional implications if the petitioner's arguments were accepted. For Executive Order No. 264 was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution in which legislative power was vested exclusively in Congress. The regime of Presidential lawmaking was to usher in yet some seven years later. If we were to consider the Executive Order law, we would be forced to say that it is an amendment to Republic Act No. 5180, the law on preliminary investigations then in effect, a situation that would give rise to a Constitutional anomaly. We cannot accordingly countenance such a view. The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question. A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. 20 The "complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved party himself. 21

For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. The next question is whether or not the temporary restraining order we issued in G.R. No. 33628 embraced as well the complaint subject of G.R. No. 34162. It is noteworthy that the charges levelled against the petitioner whether in G.R. No. 33628 or 34162 refer invariably to violations of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code. That does not, however, make such charges identical to one another. llcd The complaints involved in G.R. No. 34162 are, in general, nepotism under Sections 3(c) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019; exerting influence upon the presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur to award a certain parcel of land in his favor, over which the provincial government itself lays claims, contrary to the provisions of Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 3019; and making untruthful statements in the certificates of appointment of certain employees in his office. On the other hand, the complaints subject matter of G.R. No. 33628 involve charges of simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand for certain public works projects, in breach of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft statute; manipulating bids with respect to the construction of the capitol building; testifying falsely in connection with Cadastral Case No. N-17, LRC Cad. Rec. N-468, in which the petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a piece of land, in violation of Articles 182, 183, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code; and simulating bids for the supply of gravel and sand in connection with another public works project.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining orders are LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners. It is so ORDERED. Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ ., concur.

It is clear that the twin sets of complaints are characterized by major differences. When, therefore, we restrained further proceedings in I.S. Nos. 1-71, 2-71, and 4-71, subject of G.R. No. 33628, we did not consequently stay the proceedings in CCC-XVI-4-ZDS, CCC XVI-6-ZDS, CCC XVI-8-ZDS, and I.S. Nos. 6-71 and 7-71, the same proceedings we did restrain in G.R. No. 34162. This brings us to the last issue: whether or not the complaints in question are tainted with a political color. It is not our business to resolve complaints the disposition of which belongs to another agency, in this case, the respondent Fiscal. But more than that, and as a general rule, injunction does not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions. 22 The rule is subject to exceptions, to wit: (1) for the orderly administration of justice; (2) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (4) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (5) because the statute relied on is constitutionally infirm or otherwise void. 23 We cannot perceive any of the exceptions applicable here. The petitioner cries foul, in a manner of speaking, with respect to the deluge of complaints commenced by the private respondent below, but whether or not they were filed for harassment purposes is a question we are not in a position to decide. The proper venue, we believe, for the petitioner's complaint is precisely in the preliminary investigations he wishes blocked here. LLpr

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 132251. July 6, 2000.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAELITO LIBRANDO, LARRY SURDILLAS and EDDIE PURISIMA, accused-appellants. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Pamplona Genito & Valdezco for accused-appellants. SYNOPSIS Edwin Labandero was killed after he was mauled by herein accused-appellants, namely: Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. Aileen, the victim's 8-year old child, who was with his father at the time of the attack, identified the three men. From the original charge of homicide, an information for murder was filed against the three accused. They pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The trial court did not give credence to their story, thus, convicted them beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration, unless such corroboration is expressly required by law. In this case, as noted by the trial court, Aileen's testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. During the trial, the child positively identified the three accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Further, the Court was not inclined to consider the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The trial court, however, did not err in considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the three accused. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court finding the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with modification on the increased compensation for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased.

to give credence to the latter's testimony. It is basic that in the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of police officers are given full faith and credence as they are presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties. 4.ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS; WHEN SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION. The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. 5.ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; QUALIFICATION OF CHILD WITNESS; CASE AT BAR. It is well established, however, that any child regardless of age can be a competent witness if he can perceive and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. As noted by the trial court, Aileen during the trial was not only a picture of innocence and honesty but was possessed with a strong power of observation and recall. When asked to identify the three (3) accused, she pointed to each of the accused, identifying them by their nicknames, with nary a hesitation. Clearly, Aileen's lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 6.CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; NIGHTTIME AND UNINHABITED PLACE; WHEN CONSIDERED AS ONE. The trial court did not err in considering the nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance. In the case of People vs. Santos (91 Phil. 320 [1952]) it has been held that if the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity. 7.ID.; MURDER; CIVIL INDEMNITY; COMPUTATION FOR THE LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF THE DECEASED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. This Court has consistently fixed the indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased by taking into account the victim's net income at the time of his death and his probable life expectancy. Hence Net earning capacity = 2 (80 age of victim at time of death) /3 x net income (i.e., gross annual income less living expenses). In the absence of proof showing the deceased's living expenses, however, net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. Consequently, the proper formula for the net earning capacity of the deceased in the absence of proof showing his living expenses would be Net earning capacity = 2 (80 age of victim at time of death) /3) x Gross Annual Income (GAI) less Living Expenses estimated to be 50% of GAI. In the case at bar, it was established during trial that the victim, Edwin, was thirty-six (36) years of age at the time of his death with a gross annual income of P45,000.00 and a net yearly income of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). A careful perusal of the records, however, reveal that the P30,000.00 net yearly income of the deceased appears to be merely an estimate pegged by the trial court. Consequently, Edwin Labandero's loss of earnings should be computed by multiplying the life expectancy or 2/3 x [80 age of victim at the time of death] with his gross annual income less 50%. Accordingly, applying the said formula, his loss of earnings amounts to P659,992.50 since 2/3 x [80 36] x (P45,000 P22,500) 29.333 x (P22,500) = P659,992.50.

SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT; GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL; RATIONALE. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal since it is in a better position to appreciate the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, having observed their deportment and manner of testifying unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 2.ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; GAINS IMPORTANCE ONLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT IS SUSPECT. While it is true that only Raelito Librando was shown to have any motive to assault the deceased, nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that crimes have been attributed to persons who appear to have no reason for committing them as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders. Motive gains importance only when the identity of the culprit is suspect. 3.ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICER, WHEN GIVEN FULL FAITH AND CREDIT; RATIONALE. As between accused-appellants and their defense witness, Tranilla, and prosecution witness PO2 Dencing, the Court is more inclined

DECISION

(+) irregular hematoma approximately 8 x 13 cm the right parietal area lacerated wound approximately 6 cm at the mid auricular area left extending to the pre-auricular area, left (+) bilateral preorbital hematoma (+) 0.5 x 2 cm irregular hematoma at the right upper and lower lateral aspect of the lips (+) blood clots of nasal cavities (+) confluent hematoma approximately 5 x 7 cm at the left upper pre-auricular area

DE LEON, JR., J p: Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima assail the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 50, convicting them beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. prLL The facts of the case are as follows: On December 11, 1996, Edwin Labandero brought his eight (8) year old daughter Aileen to market in Barangay Bunga, Don Salvador Benedicto, Negros Occidental. On their way home, Edwin, Aileen and a relative, Fernando de los Santos, traversed a hilly portion of the trail leading to Barangay Purok Maisan of the same town when they met accusedappellants Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. Raelito inquired from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando and without any warning hit Edwin with a piece of wood. Eddie Purisima followed suit and delivered another blow to Edwin. Edwin ran but he was chased by Raelito. Thereafter, the three men took turns hitting Edwin with pieces of wood until the latter fell and died. Although it was already dark at that time, Aileen had no trouble identifying the accused-appellants since Edwin was carrying a lighted torch. While the men took turns in mauling the deceased, Edwin, Fernando took Aileen with him and ran to report the incident to the Barangay Captain. Barangay Kagawad Alfredo Loar testified that he is a member of the Sangguniang Barangay of Don Salvador Benedicto, Negros Occidental. On the evening of December 11, 1996, a fellow Barangay Kagawad, Reny Kondi, informed him that a person had been killed. When Loar proceeded to the house of Rosalina Jiminea, a former Kagawad of theSanggunian, he saw a man and a small girl making a report of the killing. Loar identified the small girl whom he saw in the house of Rosalina Jiminea in the evening of December 11, 1996 as Aileen Labandero. 1 Police Officer 2 Sereno Dencing testified that on December 11, 1996, he was the investigator on duty at the D.S. Benedicto Police Station. At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening, Fernando de los Santos, accompanied by Kagawad Loar reported that Edwin Labandero was killed by three men. The following day, PO2 Dencing proceeded to the scene of the crime and saw the remains of Edwin Labandero lying prostrate on the ground with a wooden pole, about thirty-four (34) inches long on his neck. 2 The postmortem examination of the deceased showed the following findings: Gross: (+) post mortem rigidity Head: (+) 12 x 14 irregular open fracture at the occipital area extending towards the left parietal area with extensive brain lacerations and irregular meninges protruding to the surface area (+)depressed irregular fracture approximately 5 x 7 cm at parietal area 13 cm the right parietal area

Abd: (+) Irregular linear abrasion approximately 0.5 x 13 cm at the left subcostal area Ext: (+) confluent abrasion approximately 0.5 x 0.5 cm in diameter at the dorsal aspect of right hand between the proximal portion of 2nd and third phalanx CAUSE OF DEATH: Cerebral Hemorrhage secondary to extensive brain laceration secondary to open fracture at the occipito-parietal area, Left." 3 Dr. Neil Paz Natu-el, the physician who conducted the postmortem examination, testified that most of the injuries inflicted on the deceased were on the head and his death was due to the massive bleeding in the brain resulting in brain laceration. Dr. Natu-el did not discount the possibility that the injuries were inflicted by more than one person. 4 Mrs. Eda Labandero, widow of the deceased, Edwin Labandero, spent the sum of P13,000.00 for her husband's funeral expenses. She later presented during trial a summarized list of her expenses and the income of her husband. On December 12, 1996, Raelito voluntarily surrendered himself to the police who came looking for him at his father's house while Eddie and Larry were invited for questioning at the police headquarters. The three men were asked to participate in a police line up during which Aileen was asked to identify her father's assailants. According to PO2 Dencing, Aileen positively identified Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima as her father's assailants. 5 After the line up, however, only Raelito was detained while Larry and Eddie were released. Nevertheless, ten days later, Larry and Eddie were again invited to the police headquarters. It was then that they were arrested and detained.

On December 20, 1996, Fernando de los Santos executed an affidavit before Judge Julito Las Pias, Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Murcia, San Salvador, Benedicto, Negros Occidental implicating Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima in the killing of Edwin Labandero. 6 Thereafter, a criminal complaint for homicide was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Murcia, San Salvador, Benedicto against Raelito Librando, Eddie Purisima and Larry Surdillas. 7 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gerardo Diaz, however, recommended on February 24, 1997 that the charge in the information be changed from homicide to murder. 8Hence, on the same day, an information for murder was filed against Raelito Librando, Eddie Purisima and Larry Surdillas by 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Villaflor before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. No bail was recommended for the three accused. 9 Upon arraignment, Raelito Librando, Eddie Purisima and Larry Surdillas pleaded not guilty. Raelito Librando testified that in the morning of December 11, 1996 he went to Barangay Bunga, Salvador Benedicto, Negros Occidental, to have his corn milled. He then met an inebriated Edwin Labandero who tried to ask for a loan from him. Raelito, however, had no money at that time so he was not able to loan money to Edwin. Raelito's refusal to grant loan angered Edwin who began to mutter veiled threats against him. 10 On his way home to Barangay Purok Maisan later that same day, Raelito who happened to be with his co-accused and neighbors Eddie Purisima and Larry Surdillas, chanced upon Edwin. Since they were traversing a steep road, the three men were walking in a column with Raelito at the rearmost end. As they were descending the hilly portion of the road, Edwin suddenly appeared and said in their dialect, "Is that you, El?" after which Edwin proceeded to swing a piece of wood at Raelito. Fortunately, Raelito managed to evade the blow and grabbed the piece of wood from Edwin. Edwin, however, got hold of another piece of wood with which to hit Raelito. Before Edwin could hit Raelito with the piece of wood, Raelito hit him causing Edwin to drop the wood he was holding. Each time Edwin tried to grab a piece of wood and fight back, Raelito hit him. Raelito admitted that he only stopped hitting Edwin when the latter could no longer stand up and fight back. 11 Raelito claims that his co-accused did not have a hand in the killing of the deceased Edwin Labandero, and that they merely happened to pass by on their way home at the scene of the crime. Raelito further claims that Fernando de los Santos was indeed with Edwin at that time but the child Aileen was not with him. Raelito added that Fernando ran away when the fight started. 12 Eddie Purisima, for his part, testified that when he saw Edwin Labandero on the night of December 11, 1996, Edwin was naked from waist up and was carrying a piece of wood. Edwin inquired as to the whereabouts of Raelito and after seeing the latter, struck him with the piece of wood. Frightened, Eddie Purisima ran away.13 Larry Surdillas corroborated the story of Raelito Librando and Eddie Purisima. Larry claimed that he was on his way home to Barangay Purok Maisan with Raelito and Eddie when they chanced upon Edwin on the lonely trail leading to their barangay. Seeing them,

Edwin inquired as to the whereabouts of Raelito. When told that Raelito was following behind, the deceased drew near and asked, "Rael, is that you?" after which he immediately tried to strike Raelito with the piece of wood he was holding. As Raelito and the deceased struggled with the piece of wood, Larry and Eddie ran away. Like Raelito Librando, Larry admitted that Fernando de los Santos was present at that time but claimed that the child, Aileen, was not around. 14 Although it was around 7:00 o'clock in the evening at that time and neither Edwin nor Fernando was carrying a torch, Larry claimed that he clearly saw Edwin holding a piece of wood which the latter used in hitting Raelito. 15 Finally, Elpidio Tranilla, a resident of Purok Maisan, testified that he was at the residence of Junior Librando, Raelito's father, when the police arrived looking for Raelito. Tranilla himself was invited to the police station to participate in the police line-up. Tranilla corroborated the story of the accused-appellants that the child, Aileen, failed to identify the accused-appellants although the line-up process was done twice since she kept pointing to all the six (6) men in the line up when asked to identify her father's assailants. 16 The trial court, however, did not give credence to the story of the accused-appellants and on December 19, 1997, convicted them beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court declares the accused namely RAELITO LIBRANDO y RICAFORT, EDUARDO PURISIMA y LACATANG and LARRY SURDILLAS y PORRAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place, considered only as one, and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of all the accused, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused are declared solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the late Edwin Labandero, the following amounts: 1.The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; 2.The sum of P13,000.00 as reimbursement of funeral expenses; 3.The sum of P293,000.00 as compensatory damages for the deceased' unearned income. 17 Accused-appellants now contend that: I.The RTC erred in finding that the accused Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima have participated in the killing of Edwin Labandero;

II.The RTC erred in failing to hold the accused Raelito Librando guilty of homicide only and in failing to appreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstances of a) incomplete self defense and b) voluntary surrender We shall deal with the issues seriatim. Cdpr Accused-appellants maintain that Raelito Librando has already accepted full responsibility for the death of Edwin Labandero by admitting that it was he alone who inflicted the injuries on the deceased which resulted in the death of latter. Accused-appellants Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima point out that they have no reason to assault the deceased since they never had any quarrel with Edwin. They further stated that the police blotter entry only pointed to Librando as the perpetrator of the crime and that only one piece of wood was recovered at the scene of the crime. The appeal is bereft of merit. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal since it is in a better position to appreciate the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, having observed their deportment and manner of testifying 18 unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. While it is true that only Raelito Librando was shown to have any motive to assault the deceased, nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that crimes have been attributed to persons who appear to have no reason for committing them as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders. Motive gains importance only when the identity of the culprit is suspect. 19 In the case at bar, eight (8) year old Aileen Labandero has categorically stated that accusedappellants Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima had a hand in the gruesome killing of the deceased. Aileen testified that the three men Raelito, Eddie and Larry took turns in hitting the deceased, Edwin, with pieces of wood. Aileen had no trouble identifying the three accused since her father, Edwin, was carrying a lighted torch at the time he was assaulted. Although the torch fell to the ground when the deceased was hit by the three accused, the torch continued to burn providing adequate illumination for the child to identify her father's assailants. Accused-appellants, nevertheless, insist that Aileen failed to identify them during the police line up since at the time she was asked to identify the assailants, she pointed to all the men in the police line up as the perpetrators of the crime. Accused-appellants' contention is corroborated by the witness Elpidio Tranilla who said that when Aileen was asked to identify her father's assailants, she pointed to all the six (6) men in the line up. When asked to do the identification for the second time, Aileen again pointed to all the six (6) men. 20

Accused-appellants' allegation, however, is belied by the following testimony of PO2 Sereno Dencing: Q:Now, let talk about the police line-up, you said that the suspect in the line up you ask Aileen the daughter to identify them, is that what you mean? A:Yes, Your Honor. Q:And what is the result of the identification was the child able to identify the three (3) accused? A:The child positively identified the two (2) other suspect Raelito Librando, she identified it because they are neighbors, Your Honor. COURT: Q:You are referring the child and the three (3) accused or some of the accused? A:Yes, Your Honor. Q:Now, was the child was able to name the full name of the accused when she identify them? A:Only the first name she identify the suspect. Q:When the child identify the accused did she mention the full name and complete first name or the child only mention the nickname? A:By their names, Your Honor. Q:What do you mean? A:She identify she said is Larry the other is Eddie during the line up. Q:So, what you are saying is she referred to the accused in their nicknames? A:Larry, full name. Q:So, Eddie is the first name of Purisima and the child only refer as Larry? COURT: Q:She did not mention the complete name of accused Larry? WITNESS: A:Yes, Your Honor. Q:She did not mention the complete name of the accused Larry? A:No, your Honor. 21 As between accused-appellants and their defense witness, Tranilla, and prosecution witness PO2 Dencing, we are more inclined to give credence to the latter's testimony. It is basic that in the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of police officers are given full faith and credence as they are presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties. 22 The defense laments that while Aileen was presented as one of the witnesses for the prosecution during trial, she was not presented as a witness during the preliminary examination. The defense raises the possibility that the child's testimony may have been "coached" since the prosecution could have presented Fernando de los Santos as a witness but chose to present the child Aileen instead. We see no reason how the non-presentation of Fernando de los Santos as a witness affects the veracity of the child's testimony in any way. After all, the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of

corroboration unless such corroboration is expressly required by law. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. 23 Accused-appellants apparently have reservations as to the competency of the child as a prosecution witness. It is well established, however, that any child regardless of age can be a competent witness if he can perceive and perceiving can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The child's competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. 24 As noted by the trial court, Aileen during the trial was not only a picture of innocence and honesty but was possessed with a strong power of observation and recall. When asked to identify the three (3) accused, she pointed to each of the accused, identifying them by their nicknames, with nary a hesitation. Clearly, Aileen's lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Accused-appellants, nevertheless, contend that only Raelito Librando should be held liable for the crime since it was only Raelito who was identified as the perpetrator of the crime in the police blotter report and there was only one piece of wood recovered at the crime scene. The contention deserves scant consideration. While it is true that only Raelito was identified by name in the police blotter entry, nevertheless, it was stated in the same police blotter that three persons had a hand in the killing of the deceased. 25 Although Eddie and Larry were not mentioned by name in the police blotter as perpetrators of the crime, they were positively identified by the child, Aileen, during trial. As regards the fact that only one piece of wood was recovered at the crime scene, suffice it to say that the perpetrators of a crime do not usually leave as exhibits the instruments used in its commission. In any event, the presentation or non-presentation of the weapons in evidence is not vital to the cause of the prosecution. Anent the second assignment of error, accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self defense in his favor. Accused-appellant Raelito Librando claims that he was "waylaid" by the deceased, Edwin Labandero, on his way home. He was forced to defend himself when the deceased tried to hit him with a piece of wood but, unfortunately, in the process of defending himself from the blows delivered by the deceased, he accidentally killed the latter. The trial court, however, has already considered the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor not only of Raelito Librando but also of the two other accusedappellants, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima. The trial court noted that after the crime was reported to the police, a certain Officer Buenaventura proceeded to the house of the father of Raelito. The father called Raelito and the latter voluntarily presented himself to the police and was thereafter apprehended. The Court, however, is not inclined to consider the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense in Raelito Librando's favor. To avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self defense, there must be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. In the case at bar, prosecution witness Aileen testified that it was in fact the said accused-

appellant who after inquiring from Edwin the whereabouts of Fernando, delivered the first blow without any warning to the deceased. The severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased as well as the fact that Raelito who admitted that he was of bigger built than the deceased, could hardly present any evidence of injuries allegedly inflicted on him by the deceased belie his claim of self defense. The trial court did not err in considering the nighttime and uninhabited place as just one aggravating circumstance. In the case of People vs. Santos 26 it has been held that if the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity. Finally, it has not escaped our notice that the trial court awarded compensation, for loss of earning capacity the sum of P293,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased victim, Edwin Labandero, although it used the formula enunciated in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA. 27 In the aforesaid case, we based the amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased on two factors, namely, (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. The first factor is based on the formula (2/3 x 80 age of the deceased at the time of his death = life expectancy) which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality. With regard to the second factor, we have so stated that damages consist not of the full amount of the earnings of the deceased earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the living expenses." Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earnings but rather the loss of that portion of earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is the total of the earnings less the living expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. Consequently, in all succeeding cases, 28 this Court has consistently fixed the indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased by taking into account the victim's net income at the time of his death and his probable life expectancy. Hence Net earning capacity = 2 (80 age of victim at time of death)x net income (i.e. gross annual income less living expenses) 3 In the absence of proof showing the deceased's living expenses, however, net income is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. 29 Consequently, the proper formula for the net earning capacity of the deceased in the absence of proof showing his living expenses would be

Net earning capacity = 2 (80 age of victim at time of death)x Gross Annual Income (GAI) less Living Expenses estimated 3to be 50% of GAI In the case at bar, it was established during trial that the victim, Edwin, was thirty-six (36) years of age at the time of his death with a gross annual income of P45,000.00 and a net yearly income of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00). A careful perusal of the records, however, reveal that the P30,000.00 net yearly income of the deceased appears to be merely an estimate pegged by the trial court. Consequently, Edwin Labandero's loss of earnings should be computed by multiplying the life expectancy or 2/3 x [80 age of victim at the time of death] with his gross annual income less 50%. Accordingly, applying the said formula, his loss of earnings amounts to P659,992.50 since 2/3 x [80 36] x (P45,000 P22,500) 29.333 x (P22,500) = P659,992.50 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 50 finding accused-appellants Raelito Librando, Larry Surdillas and Eddie Purisima guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and holding them solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the deceased victim, Edwin Labandero, the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P13,000.00 as reimbursement of funeral expenses and P293,000.00 as loss of the deceased's earning capacity is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the compensation for the loss of earning capacity of the said deceased is hereby increased to P659,992.50. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO,respondents. AQUINO, J.:p The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides: SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.) The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads: That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic) Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted. The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-todo individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The preamble of the decree is quoted below: WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country; WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class; WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice. It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order. On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it

unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to commit such acts. Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.) The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50). WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-8782 April 28, 1956 MARCELINO B. FLORENTINO and LOURDES T. ZANDUETA, petitionersappellants, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondent-appellee. Marcelino B. Florentino for appellants. Ramon de los Reyes for appellee. JUGO, J.: The petitioners and appellants filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition for mandamus against respondent and appellee, Philippine National Bank, to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines, to pay an indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage on certain properties. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which reads as follows: Parties herein represented by counsel, have agreed on the following facts: 1. That the petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus interest, the same having been incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954;. 2. That the said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties;. 3. That the petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953; and. 4. That on December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to accept petitioner's offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate; The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, which provides: SEC. 2. Section two of the said Act (Republic Act 304) as amended by Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred, is further amended to read: SEC. 2. The Treasurer of the Philippines shall, upon application of all persons specified in section one hereof and within one year from the approval of this Act, and under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, acknowledge and file requests for the recognition of the right of the salaries or wages as provided in section one hereof, and notice of such acknowledgment shall be issued to the applicant which shall state the total

amount of such salaries or wages due the applicant, and certify that it shall be redeemed by the Government of the Philippines within ten years from the date of their issuance without interest: Provided, That upon application and subject to such rules and regulations as may be approved by the Secretary of Finance a certificate of indebtedness may be issued by the Treasurer of the Philippines covering the whole or a part of the total salaries or wages the right to which has been duly acknowledged and recognized, provided that the face value of such certificate of indebtedness shall not exceed the amount that the applicant may need for the payment of (1) obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement. The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to accept the same for settlement" refers to all antecedents "the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," or only the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. The contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is that said qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent. Incidentally, it may be stated that one of the purposes of Republic Act No. 879 was to include veterans of the Philippine Army and their wives or orphans among the beneficiaries of the Backpay Law, Republic Act No. 304, in recognition of their great sacrifices in the resistance movement. as shown by the following quotation from the Congressional Record: . . . This particular bill, House Bill No. 1228, has been filed by this public servant for three objectives: First, to serve as a source of financial aid to needy veterans, like crippled or disabled veterans, and to their wives or orphans. Secondly, to give recognition to the sacrifices of those who joined the last war, and particularly to those who have given their all for the cause of the last war. And thirdly, to eliminate the discrimination that has been committed either through oversight, or on purpose, against the members of the Philippine Army, the Philippine Scouts, and guerrillas or the so-called civilian volunteers, who joined the resistance movement. (Congressional Record No. 61, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session, May 6, 1953, page 74; quoted in Appellant's brief, pages 13-14.). Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, as done by the appellee, still there are cogent and powerful reasons why the qualifying clause should be limited to the last antecedent. In the first place, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned

or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional, for it would amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one. The other reason is found in the Congressional Record, which says: Mr. TIBLE: On page 4, lines 17, between the words "this" and "act", insert the word "amendatory". Mr. ZOSA: What is the purpose of the amendment?. Mr. TIBLE: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the provision of section 2. I believe, gentleman from Cebu, that section 2, as amended in this amendatory bill permits the use of backpay certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government. (Congressional Record No. 64, 2nd Congress, 4th Regular Session May 11, 1953 page 41; quoted in Appellants brief, p. 15.). As there would have been no need to permit by law the use of backpay certificates in payment of debts to private persons, if they are willing to accept them, the permission necessarily refers to the Government of the Philippines, its agencies or other instrumentalities, etc. Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their backpay certificates and used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304. The case of Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil., 608 (July 11, 1952), is different from the present one. In the Diokno case, his debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was incurred on January 27, 1950. He brought the action on November 10, 1950, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 (section 2), which was approved on June 18, 1948; that is, one year and almost eight months before Diokno could not avail himself of the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 304, because said section provides that the application for recognition of backpay must have been filed within one year after the approval of said Act No. 304, and the debt must be subsisting at the time of said approval, Diokno having incurred the debt on January 27, 1950, and brought action on November 10, 1950. It was, therefore, discretionary in the Diokno case for the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation to accept or not his backpay certificate in payment. The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, held that the phrase "who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement" qualifies only its immediate antecedent and does not apply to the Government or its agencies. The appellee asserts in his brief that the Secretary of Justice, in his letter of June 19, 1953, remarked that the clause "who may be willing to accept such settlement" refers to all antecedents, including the Government and its agencies. We are not impressed with this

observation of the Secretary, for we believe that his Opinion No. 226, series of 1948, correct for the reasons we have stated above. In the present case, Marcelino B. Florentino incurred his debt to the Philippine National Bank on January 2, 1953; hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897. In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellee is ordered to accept the backpay certificate above mentioned of the appellant, Marcelino B. Florentino, in payment of his above cited debt to the appellee, without interest from December 27, 1953, the date when he offered said backpay certificate in payment. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is ordered. Paras, Bengzon, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-30375 September 12, 1978 JOSE ESCRIBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. DAVID P. AVILA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato (First Branch) and SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, respondents. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. M. C. Sicat for private respondent. AQUINO, J.: This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to conduct the preliminary investigation of a complaint for written defamation. On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province (now North Cotabato) a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato (now the province of Sultan Kudarat). The complaint was subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge David P. Avila. It was supported by the affidavit of Acting Governor Simeon Datumanong. In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was broadcasted on August 26, 1968 by a radio station at Cotabato City, that "Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live (fixed) in this province" criminal Case No. 5283). Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary investigation. He received complainant's evidence. On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside. The respondents were required to answer the petition. No restraining order was issued. On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of March 29, 1969. In that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause to believe that" libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably committed the same". Judge Avila ordered the arrest of Escribano, fixed the bail at three thousand pesos, and referred the case to the city fiscal of Cotabato for the filing of the corresponding information. A warrant of arrest was issued on March 31. Sometime before April 16 the city fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano. On August 10, 1970 this Court issued a resolution restraining Judge Avila from proceeding with the arraignment of Escribano.

The issue is whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. Petitioner Escribano, in support of his contention that the city fiscal of Cotabato is the only functionary empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation of the libel charge, invokes the following provisions of the charter of Cotabato City, Republic Act No. 2364, as amended by Republic Act No. 3332: SEC. 23. The city attorney His compensation powers and duties. The provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred nine to the contrary notwithstanding, the city shall have an attorney who shall be the chief legal adviser of the city. ... The city attorney shall have the following powers and duties: xxx xxx xxx (f) He shall investigate an charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused. ... (g) He shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances triable in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, and the municipal court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to Criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals. He cites the ruling in Sayo. vs. Chief of Police 80 Phil. 859; Montelibano vs. Ferrer and Benares, 97 Phil. 228, and Guerrero vs. Ferrer, 106 Phil. 1163, that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations. He also invokes the following provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, approved on June 19, 1965, and which do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written defamations: Preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article. On the other hand, complainant Pendatun and respondent Judge rely on section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court to support their view that the Court of First Instance of Cotabato could conduct the preliminary investigation: SEC. 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance. Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and investigation conducted by the of the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the municipal judge referred

to in the second paragraph of section 2 hereof for preliminary examination and investigation, or himself conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding sections, and should be find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged, he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding information. Was it intended by Republic Act No. 4363, in specifying that the preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations may be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or the municipal court of the city or capital of the province, where the criminal action may be filed to exclude the Court of First Instance from conducting such preliminary investigation and to entrust that power exclusively to those fiscals and courts? (Libel by means of radio is a written defamation under article 355 of the Revised Penal Code). As admitted by the petitioner, the purpose of the amendment is to prevent the complainants in written defamation cases from harassing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311; p. 11, Memorandum, p. 11 3, Rollo). The rule is that in construing a statute the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of a law are important factors to be considered in its construction (2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 885886, cited in Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131, 145). Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the enumeration in the amendatory law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for written defamation was designed to divest theordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the proper Court of First Instance of that same power. Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel. Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People vs. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue Of the Criminal action in a remote or distant place. Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippines Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec vs. De Guzman 93 Phil.

933). To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 laid down the following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil actions in written defamations: * 1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. 2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published. 3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published. 4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published. The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a public officer or a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed or first published. Congress did not confine the amendatory law to laying down the guidelines for the venue of criminal and civil actions. Since, as already noted, its purpose is to minimize the filing in municipal courts of out-of-town libel suit this the lawmaking body, in order to attain that objective, deprived the ordinary municipal courts of the power to conduct. the preliminary investigation of a criminal action for written defamation. In other words, the amendment contains not only the rules limiting the venue of the criminal and civil actions to the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous matter is printed and first published, or where the offended party held office or resided at the time the libel was committed, but it also specifies that the preliminary investigation should be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where the action may be instituted. (See People and Navarro vs. Hechanova, L-26459, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 101). It should be repeated that the amendment, in specifying those who may conduct the preliminary investigation, deprived the ordinary municipal court of that power in cases of written, defamations. And it should be recalled that the power of the ordinary municipal court to conduct such preliminary investigations under the old law facilitated the filing of libel cases in remote municipal courts and the consequent harassment of the accused. That purpose of the amendment has nothing to do with the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases cognizable by it. To retain that power of the Court of First Instance would in a way be an implementation of the purpose of the amendment, which is to prevent complainants from harassing and embarrassing the accused with libel suits in distant municipalities.

Therefore, it can be stated without fear of successful contradiction that the lawmaking body, by means of that amendment, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought to strip the ordinary municipal court (not the municipal court ee of the provincial capital or the city court) of its power to hold a preliminary investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of something else not mentioned, applied in Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18; De la Rosa vs. Revita Santos, 10 Phil. 148, 149; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Tavora vs. Gavina, 79 Phil. 421, 435; In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 51; In re Estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil. 167; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340, 357; Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo 94 Phil. 949, 953; Gomez vs. Ventura, 54 Phil. 726; Mendenilla vs. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534, 539; Canlas and Manila Pencil Co. vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 712, 716; Lao Oh Kim vs. Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139). Under that canon of legal hermeneutics, where a statute directs the performance of certain acts by a particular person or class of persons, it implies that it shall not be done otherwise or by a different person or class of persons (82 C.J.S. 667668). That maxim is not a rule of law. It is just a tool of statutory construction or a means of ascertaining the legislative intent. It is not of universal application and is not conclusive. It cannot be used to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the lawmaking body (82 C.J.S. 668). The maxim is inapplicable if there is some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the statute, so that the absence of any mention of such other will not exclude it (82 C.J.S. 670). The maxim does not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice win follow by not so including them (Springer vs. Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. 845, 227 U.S 189; People vs. Manahan, 115 Phil. 657,6681). The maxim is no more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive" (Manabat vs. De Aquino, 92 Phil. 1026, 1027). The maxim cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win best effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it (82 C.J.S. 593) It is reasonable to surmise that the Court of First Instance was not mentioned due to inadvertence. That oversight is not unusual since preliminary investigations are usually conducted by municipal courts and fiscals. In practice, a preliminary investigation by the Court of First Instance is the exception, not the general rule.

In this connection, it is pertinent to cite the recent ruling that the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct a pre investigation is derived from the constitutional provision that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce" (Sec. 1[3], Art. 111, now Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution; Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz, L-34038, June 18,1976 and five other cases, 71 SCRA 356). Implicit in that provision is the constitutional grant of power to the judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. That which is plainly implied in the language of a law is as much a part of it as that which is expressed (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil 41, 45, 90). The term "judge" embraces a judge of the Court of First Instance. Its coverage is not restricted to judges of inferior courts. The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct a p investigation of criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation. However, the exercise of that power is tied up with the rules on the venue of a criminal action for written defamation. That power is lodged in the Court of First Instance of the city or province where the libelous article was printed or first published or where the offended party actually resided, or where the offended public official held office, at the time of the commission of the offense. Escribano's contention that in chartered cities the city fiscal has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigations is not correct. While section 23(f) of the Charter of Cotabato City (Republic Act No. 2364) empowers its city attorney to "investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of laws and city ordinances and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary complaints against the persons accused", that power is not exclusive. Section 78 of the same charter provides that the municipal or city court of Catabato City "may also conduct preliminary investigations for any offense, without regard to the limits of punishments", a provision which is found in section 87 of the Judiciary Law and in section 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. That same power is found in the last sentence of section 41 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of Manila, which took effect on June 18, 1949 or after Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 859 was decided. But that provision is not found in Commonwealth Act No. 326, the charter of Bacolod City, under whichMontelibano vs. Ferrer. 97 Phil. 228 and Guerrero vs. Ferrer, 106 Phil. 1163 were decided, nor is it found in the old Manila Charter contained in the Revised Administrative Code. Hence, in the Sayo, Montelibano and Guerrero cases, it was held that the city court could not conduct pre investigations. (See Callanta vs. Villanueva, L-24646 and 24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377). WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.