Dissenting Opinions
Dissenting Opinions
Dissenting Opinions
1-1953
Dissenting Opinions
Jesse W. Carter
Recommended Citation
Jesse W. Carter, Dissenting Opinions, 4 Hastings L.J. 118 (1953).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol4/iss2/5
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DISSENTING OPINIONS
By JUSTICE JESSE W. CARTER
Of the Supreme Court of California
form and substance, the collective, composed and edited view of the majority.
In a dissenting opinion, however, the judge is on his own, and can express
his personality, his philosophy and his uncensored convictions. Dissenting
opinions are powerful weapons against error; they frequently explain the
majority opinion. When there is a dissenting opinion, the attorney for the
losing side can be assured that the case has received a thorough airing in
the conference room and that the majority opinion is not a one-man decision
blindly concurred in by the other justices. Judges are human beings and
donning the judicial robe does not evaporate their human feelings. The
conference room is not a prayer meeting where everyone is expected to nod
"Amen"; it is more like a battleground where opposing philosophies meet
in hand-to-hand combat. Every single member of the general public and
every member of the bar should want a "fighting judge" who will do his best
to see that justice is done. There are two sides to almost every question;
an attorney can not always be on the winning side nor can any single member
of the general public rely on always being on the side of the majority.
The law is not an exact science, and a group composed of three, five,
seven or nine men with different backgrounds, beliefs, social, economic and
political philosophies can not be expected to think alike. That they should
think alike is not a sound objective to be attained. The great merit of the
common law has been the balance between the two opposite needs of the
legal system: stability in the law, and evolution of legal principles to conform
to changing economic and social conditions. If all men thought alike and if
all men were afraid of change, there would be no progress and no endeavor.
The law can not, and must not, stand still while the rest of the world moves on.
One of the important roles played by the dissenting opinion in the
development of American jurisprudence is its effect on legislation. For
example, the dissent of Mr. Justice Iredell in Chisholm v. Georgia' became
part of the supreme law of the land in the Eleventh Amendment' to the
Federal Constitution. One of my own dissents was instrumental in securing
an amendment to a section of the civil code having to do with the community
or separate character of a recovery of damages for personal injuries received
by a married woman. 3 I have been led to believe that my dissenting opinions
with respect to the use of illegally obtained evidence in California courts
may be given favorable attention by the Legislature of California so that the
California rule may be brought into line with that which prevails in the
federal courts. My dissenting opinion on the denial of a hearing by the
Fish and Game Commission7 it was held by the majority of the Supreme Court
of California that this state could constitutionally, by statute, exclude aliens
who were residents of this state from fishing in its coastal waters. I dissented.
The case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States and there
reversed in line with my dissent. An excellent example of a dissenting
opinion which later became the law is found in the case of Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis,s where the United States Supreme Court held, Mr. Justice
Stone dissenting, that a statute requiring a compulsory flag salute by school
children did not unconstitutionally restrict freedom of religion. This case
was overruled four years later by West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette,' which followed the reasoning of Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in the
Minersville case. There are many other examples which might be set forth
here. I am desirous only of calling your attention to the roles which have
been played, and will always be played, by the dissenting opinion.
Another role played by the dissenting opinion is that it is a forecast of
things to come. The writers of dissents are usually men who look forward-
not back, nor to the immediate present-but to the future.
In an article written by Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he said:10
"Holmes, perhaps better than anyone either before or after him, pointed
out how illusory was the lawyer's search for certainty. Law is not what has
been or is-law in the lawyer's sense is the prediction of things to come,
the prediction of what decree will be written by designated judges on specified
facts. In layman's language law is the prediction of what will happen to you
if you do certain things. This was the lesson Holmes taught; and every
lawyer knows that it is sound. . . .Uncertainty is increased when new and
difficult problems under ambiguous statutes arise. And when constitutional
questions emerge, the case is, as we lawyers say, 'at large.' For the federal
constitution, like most state constitutions, is not a code but a rule of action-
a statement of philosophy and point of view, a summation of general prin-
ciples, a delineation of the broad outlines of a regime which the Fathers.
designed for us.
"These are the things that Holmes summed up when he described the
lawyer's continuing and uncertain search for certainty. They indeed suggest
why philosophers of the democratic faith will rejoice in the uncertainty of
the law and find strength and glory in it.
"Certainty and unanimity in the law are possible both under the fascist
and communist systems. They are not only possible; they are indispensable;
for a complete subservience to the political regime is a sine qua non to
judicial survival under either system. One cannot imagine the courts of
Hitler engaged in a public debate over the principles of Der Fuehrer, with
a minority of one or four deploring or denouncing the principles themselves.
'30 Cal.2d 719, 185 P.2d 805 (1947).
8310 U.S.586 (1940).
9319 U.S. 624 (1943).
1032 J.A. JuD. Socy., 104, 107.
122 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
before them. They will prove their worth by showing their independence
and fortitude. Their dissents or concurring opinions may salvage for tomor-
row the principle that was sacrificed or forgotten today. . . In these critical
days leaders in every walk of life must dare choose publicly and with pride,
our constitutional scheme of things in all its applications. They must dare
choose it above all lesser things and reject the easy invitation of expediency
or complacency. When the leaders make that choice, men of lesser stature
and affairs will dare stake their all for freedom."
To my mind it is of far greater importance that a man raise his voice
in defense of the right as he sees it than that a court should be subjected to
ridicule because that man has seen fit to speak with the courage of his con-
victions. Freedom of speech is one of the greatest rights guaranteed to the
individual by the Bill of Rights and is an essential ingredient of any
democracy. It applies no less to the dissenting judge than it does to the
average citizen. An extensive survey of the roles played by the dissenting
opinion would lead inevitably to the conclusion that freedom of the minority
to give expression to social, economic and political philosophies that differed
from those subscribed to by the majority of any court has promoted democ-
racy to a much greater degree than has the prestige of the court been threat-
ened or harmed by ridicule because of the conflict of views expressed by
members of the court. Be that as it may, since courts are an indispensable
part of the democratic process, the same right to freedom of expression
should be accorded judges as is accorded legislators or the executive in their
respective fields-if differences of opinion exist as to what the law is, those
differences should be stated, as history has shown that the view expressed
by the minority often becomes the view of the majority. As Archibald Mac-
Leish wrote: