56 Case WRes LRev 911
56 Case WRes LRev 911
56 Case WRes LRev 911
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RESCUING JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE REALM
OF POLITICAL RHETORIC
Charles GardnerGeyht
INTRODUCTION
t Professor of Law, Indiana University. I would like to thank Steve Burbank and Alan
Tarr for their comments on earlier drafts.
See, e.g., Symposium, FederalJudicialIndependence, 46 MERCER L. REV. 637 (1995);
Symposium, Independence of the Judiciary, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 565 (2004); Symposium,
Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703 (1997); Symposium, Judicial Independence
and Accountability, 72 S.CAL. L. REV. 311 (1999); Symposium, JudicialReview and Judicial
Independence: The Appropriate Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1998); Sym-
posium, Perspectiveson Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2003); Symposium, Special
Series: Judicial Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 (2002).
2 Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S.CAL. L. REV.
315, 339 (1999).
912 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
3 For a summary of the facts of the Schiavo matter as described in this paragraph, see Ar-
ian Campo-Flores, The Legacy of Terri Schiavo, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 2005, at 26.
4 Sani Dolbee, FrontlineExplores Bush's Religious Bent, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
Apr. 29, 2004, at El (quoting President Bush). For a summary of post-Schiavo threats, see Carl
Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Congress Lets Courts 'Run Amok,' N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2005, at A21.
2006] RESCUING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
5 The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Zale Lecture in Public Policy, Stanford
Univ. (May 9, 2005), (transcript available at http://judiciary.house.gov/medialpdfs/stanford
judgesspeechpressversion505.pdf).
6 Id. It is not entirely clear how Mr. Sensenbrenner thought that the other branches of
government or the American people should punish judges for their decision-making. He went on
to discuss the judicial discipline statute, which authorizes judges to discipline their own for
certain forms of misconduct. But the discipline statute is intra-judicial, and explicitly exempts
complaints about the merits of judicial decisions from its scope. Elsewhere in his speech,
Sensenbrenner proposed to establish an Inspector General for the federal judiciary to promote
fiscal accountability; for a legislator casting about for means short of impeachment to "punish"
judges for their decisions, the creation of a new Inspector General's office would be a felicitous
development.
7 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE 21ST CENTURYJUDICIARY 5 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY].
8 Id. at 12.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
9 Id.
20061 RESCUING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
10See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, Reconsidering Judicial Independ-
ence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 9, 11-14 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
ess." Given these objectives, one may fairly conclude that judges
who are subject to intimidation from outsiders interested in the out-
comes of cases the judges decide lack the independence necessary to
follow the facts and law. At the same time, one may just as fairly
conclude that judges who are so independent that they can disregard
the law altogether without fear of reprisal likewise undermine the rule
of law values that judicial independence is supposed to further.
Judicial accountability is yin to the judicial independence yang.
Although some trumpet judicial accountability as if it were an end in
itself, accountability-like independence-is better characterized as
an instrumental value that promotes three discrete ends: the rule of
law, public confidence in the courts, and institutional responsibility.
First, judicial accountability promotes the rule of law by deterring
conduct that could compromise judicial independence, integrity, and
impartiality. To say that judicial accountability promotes judicial
independence seems counterintuitive. Accountability does, after all,
diminish a judge's literal independence: the judge who is made
accountable to an impeachment process, for example, loses her
"independence" to take bribes with impunity. But properly employed,
accountability merely diminishes a judge's freedom to make herself
dependant on inappropriate internal or external influences that could
interfere with her capacity to follow the rule of law. By deterring
bribery, favoritism, bias and so on, accountability promotes the kind
of independence needed for judges to adhere to the rule of law.
Second, judicial accountability promotes public confidence in
judges and the judiciary. Regardless of whether independent judges
follow the law, if the public's perception is otherwise, reforms calcu-
lated to render judicial decision-making subject to popular or political
branch control are sure to follow, to the ultimate detriment of the rule
of law itself. A system of judicial accountability that reassures a
sometimes-skeptical public that judges are doing their jobs properly
and yet respects the judiciary's independence can forestall resort to
more draconian and counter-productive forms of court control.
11Id. at 14; see also Calvin R. Massey, Rule of Law and the Age of Aquarius, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 757, 760 (1990) (book review) (quoting Geoffrey de Q. Walker for the proposi-
tion that "[a]n independent judiciary is an indispensable requirement of the rule of law");
L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review Symposium on FederalJudicial Inde-
pendence, 46 MERCER L. REv. 637, 638 (1995) (explaining that judicial independence is a
"cornerstone of a free society and the rule of law"); William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law,
2000 Wis. L. REv. 723, 738 (describing judicial independence as "widely seen as critically
necessary to the effective implementation" of a rule of law); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Ac-
countable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 625, 631 (1999)
(noting that "an independent judiciary" is a "necessity" for the rule of law).
2006] RESCUING JUDICIAL A CCOUNTABILITY
InstitutionalAccountability
12 In a short piece written several years ago, Judge Wendell Griffen proposed to subdivide
judicial accountability along comparable lines. See Wendell L. Griffen, Comment, Judicial
Accountabilityand Discipline, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75 (1998) (dividing the issue of
judicial accountability into the three levels of "political accountability, decisional accountabil-
ity, and behavioral accountability").
918 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
nine states with judicial salary commissions that have the authority to
make binding salary determinations), decide whether and when to
adjust judicial salaries upward.13 Second, the federal judiciary is ac-
countable for its operations both to Congress, which is authorized to
regulate court size, structure, practice, procedure, and jurisdiction,
and to the judiciary itself, insofar as Congress has delegated to the
courts the authority to self-administer and promulgate its own rules of
practice and procedure.
Of the three objectives of accountability discussed earlier (promot-
ing the rule of law, public confidence, and institutional responsibil-
ity), institutional accountability is most closely connected to the third,
institutional responsibility, by rendering the judiciary responsive to
the needs of the public it serves as a separate branch of government. It
can, however, serve all three objectives. For example, in 1891, when
Congress restructured the judiciary to establish circuit courts of ap-
peals, it rendered the judiciary, as a branch, more responsive to the
public need for greater access to appellate courts. But it also provided
a more effective system to correct district court errors (thereby pro-
moting the rule of law) and addressed growing concerns that district
judges had become too despotic (so restoring public confidence).
It bears emphasis that the three genera of judicial accountability
discussed here are defined and circumscribed with reference to the
conduct each seeks to control. Thus, "institutional accountability" is
limited to measures aimed at making the judiciary answerable for, or
otherwise improving, its administration as a branch. If devices
typically aimed at promoting institutional accountability-such as
congressional oversight of court budgets or jurisdiction-are
deployed instead to control judicial decision-making on specific
issues, they are better classified in the context of decisional
accountability mechanisms.
Institutional accountability has its limits. Among the states, many
constitutions create explicitly independent judiciaries with powers of
self-administration that enable state courts to resist encroachments
from their legislatures to a greater extent than their federal court
counterparts. 1 4 In the federal system, the scope of legislative power is
quite broad but still subject to several limits. First, the U.S. Constitu-
13 JUSTICE INJEOPARDY, supra note 7, at 85 (discussing the twenty states with judicial sal-
ary commissions, nine of which have the authority to issue binding salary determinations absent
formal legislative branch disapproval).
14 Michael L. Buenger, Of Money and JudicialIndependence: Can Inherent Powers Pro-
tect State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979, 1026 (2004) ("The revision of judi-
cial articles over the last fifty years illustrates the shift from relying on the legislature for the
institutional structure and authority of courts, toward anchoring such matters directly in the
constitution [sic] and the body of the judiciary itself.").
20061 RESCUING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
BehavioralAccountability
language of the statute might logically benefit from the more detailed
guidance of the Code of Conduct, the federal courts have eschewed
that approach in favor of regulating conduct under the general statu-
tory standard, and cross-referencing applicable sections of the Code
only rarely.27
Like institutional accountability, behavioral accountability has its
limits. Congress and state legislatures may impeach and remove
judges for malfeasance. Impeachment is, however, an exceedingly
cumbersome process, and is available to redress only the most serious
forms of misconduct, on the order of "Treason, Bribery, and other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors. ,,28 To promote behavioral account-
ability for lesser forms of misconduct, Congress has used its regula-
tory authority over the courts to establish mechanisms for judicial
discipline and disqualification, but Congress arguably lacks the power
to enforce those mechanisms itself, and so has delegated that task to
the judiciary. 29 At the state level, the final appeal from decisions of
judicial conduct organizations are ordinarily heard by the state su-
preme court (in forty-one states) or a court specially designated to
hear disciplinary matters (in nine states), which insulates judicial dis-
cipline from legislative branch control. 30 The judiciary, in turn, has
limits on its enforcement authority too. Although state judiciaries are
typically authorized to remove judges for misconduct, the federal
judiciary is not.3' Moreover, disciplinary actions of state and federal
judiciaries are subject to the strictures of their constitutions, such as
DecisionalAccountability
41 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003).
2006] RESCUING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABIi.TY
42 Unda Greenhouse, Judges Seek Aid in Effort To Remain Independent, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 1998, at A20.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
45 Lawrence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 294-95 (2005).
46 Robert Marus, Moore Loses Final Appeal To Save Job as Chief Justice, UNITED
BAPTIST PRESS, May 4,2004.
47 See Greenhouse, supra note
42.
2006] RESCUING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 929
4 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) ("Judges,
as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record
is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not
supported by clear and convincing proof of 'actual malice."').
49 Id. at 486 ("The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that there is a significant differ-
ence between proof of actual malice and mere proof of falsity, and that the requisite additional
proof was lacking in this case."); 50 Am. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 33 (2004) ("Actual malice
cannot be imputed merely because the information turns out to be false. An erroneous interpre-
tation of the facts does not meet the standard of actual malice.").
50See GEYH, supra note 20.
930 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
51 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE 102 (DeCapo Press 1970) (1805) (statement of Justice
Chase) (emphasis omitted).
52 id.
53 Id. (emphasis omitted).
54 Id. at 383.
"" Id. at 81.
56 Id.
20061 RESCUING JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
65 See GEYH, supra note 20; see also Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial
Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the
Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003) (discussing Congress's approach toward judicial autonomy).
66 GEYH, supra note 20.
67 See Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 955 (2006) (arguing that the taxonomy presented here overlooks
many factors that make judges insufficiently accountable); William P. Marshall, Judicial Ac-
countability in a Time of Legal Realism, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 937, 945 (2006) (questioning
whether one can clearly identify decisional errors and, further, whether it is wise to punish
judges for all such errors).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 56:4
CONCLUSION