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ANSWERS TO FILL-IN-THE-BLANK QUESTIONS
1. position 2. scalar 3. vector 4. distance 5. speed 6. constant or uniform
7. time, t2 8. gravity 9. m/s2 10. centripetal (center-seeking) 11. 4 12. acceleration

ANSWERS TO SHORT-ANSWER QUESTIONS

1. Mechanics.
2. An origin or reference point.
3. Length per time (length/time).

4. A scalar has magnitude, and a vector has magnitude and direction.

5. Distance is the actual path length and is a scalar. Displacement is the directed, straight-line
distance between two points and is a vector. Distance is associated with speed, and
displacement is associated with velocity.
6. They both give averages of different quantities.
7. (a) They are equal. (b) The average speed has a finite value, but the average velocity is zero
because the displacement is zero.

8. Either the magnitude or direction of the velocity, or both. An example of both is a child going
down a wavy slide at a playground.

9. Yes, both (a) and (b) can affect speed and therefore velocity.

10. No. If the velocity and acceleration are both in the negative direction, the object will speed
up.

11. Initial speed is zero. Initial acceleration of 9.8 m/s2, which is constant.
12. The object would remain suspended.
13. Yes, in uniform circular motion, velocity changing direction, centripetal acceleration.
14. Center-seeking. Necessary for circular motion.
15. Yes, we are in rotational or circular motion in space.
16. Inwardly toward the Earth's axis of rotation for (a) and (b).

17. g and vx
18. Greater range on the Moon, gravity less (slower vertical motion).
19. Initial velocity, projection angle, and air resistance.

20. No, it will always fall below a horizontal line because of the downward acceleration due to
gravity.
 21. Both have the same vertical acceleration.
22. Less than 45o because air resistance reduces the velocity, particularly in the horizontal
direction.

ANSWERS TO VISUAL CONNECTION

a. speed, b. uniform velocity, c. acceleration (change in velocity magnitude), d. acceleration

(change in velocity magnitude and direction)

ANSWERS TO APPLYING-YOUR-KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS

1. More instantaneous. Think of having your speed measured by a radar. This is an
instantaneous measurement, and you get a ticket if you exceed the speed limit.

2. (a) The orbital (tangential) acceleration is small and not detected. (b) The apparent motion of
the Sun, Moon, and stars.

3. (a) toward the center of the Earth, (b) toward the axis, (c) zero
4. Yes, neglecting air resistance.
2(11 m)
5. d  ½ gt 2 , so t  2d / g   1.5 s Balloon lands in front of prof. Student gets
9.8 m/s 2

an “F” grade.
6. (a) updraft, slow down, reach terminal velocity later. (b) downdraft, speed up, terminal velocity
sooner.

7. Escaping air stabilizes chute – prevents rocking.

8. Streamlines. Prevents air blocking.

ANSWERS TO EXERCISES
1. 7 m
2. 5 m south of east
3. v = d/t = 100 m/12 s = 8.3 m/s
4. 1.6 m/s
5. t = d/v = 7.86  1010 m/ 3.00  108 m/s = 2.62  l02 s. Speed of light (constant).
6.. t = d/v = 750 mi/(55.0 mi/h) = 13.6 h
7. (a) d = v t = (52 mi/h)(1.5 h) = 78 mi (b) v = d/t = 22 mi/0.50 h = 44 mi/h
(c) v = d/t = 100 mi/2.0 h = 50 mi/h
7. v = d/t = 7.86  1010 m/ 2.62  l02 s = 3.00  108 m/s. Speed of light (constant).
8. (a) d/150 s. (b) d/192 s., (c) d/342 s. Omission. d inadvertently left out. Assuming 100 m,
(a) 100 m/150 s = 0.667 m/s. (b) 100 m/192 s = 0.521 m/s. (c) 200 m/ 342 s = 0.585 m/s.
9. (a) v = d/t = 300 km/2.0 h = 150 km/h, east. (b) Same, since constant.
10. (a) v = d/t = 750 m/20.0 s = 37.5 m/s, north. (b) Zero, since displacement is zero.
11. a = (vf – vo )/t = (12 m/s – 0)/6.0 s = 2.0 m/s2
12. (a) a = (vf – vo )/t = (0 – 8.3 m/s)/1200 s = –6.9  10–3 m/s2
(b) v = d/t = (5.0  103 m)/(1.2  103 s) = 4.2 m/s (Needs to start slowing in plenty of time.)
13. (a) a = (vf – vo )/t = (8.0 m/s – 0)/10 s = 0.08 m/s2 in direction of motion.
(b) a = (12 m/s – 0)/15 s = 0.80 m/s2 in direction of motion.
14. (a) (a) 44 ft/s/5.0 s = 8.8 ft/s2, in the direction of motion. (b) 11 ft/s2, (c) -7.3 ft/s2
(b) a = (88 ft /s – 44 ft /s)/4.0 s = 11 ft /s2 in direction of motion.
(c) (66 ft /s – 88 ft /s)/3.0 s = –7.3 ft /s2 opposite direction of motion.
(d) a = (66 ft /s – 0)/12 s = 5.5 ft /s2 in direction of motion.
15. No, d = ½ gt 2 = ½ (9.8 m/s2) (4.0)2 = 78 m in 4.0 s.
16. v = vo + gt = 0 + (9.8 m/s2)(3.5 s) = 34 m/s
17. d = ½ gt2, t = sq.root [2(2.71 m)/9.80 m/s2] =7.4 s
18. d = ½ gt2. t as in 17. 4.3 s – 2.5 s = 1.8 s.
19. (a) ac = v2/r = (10 m/s)2/ 70 m = 1.4 m/s2 toward center.
(b) ac /g = (1.4 m/s2 )/(9.8 m/s2 ) = 0.14 or 14%‚ yes.
20. 90.0 km/h = 25.0 m/s. ac = v2/r = (25.0 m/s)2/500 m = 1.25 m/s2.
21. 0.55 s. Vertical distance is the same.
22. 45o – 37o = 8o, so 45o + 8o = 57o.
Another random document with
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consisting of the Norfolk Regiment and King’s Shropshire Light
Infantry, under Colonel Hasler of the Buffs.
The attack commenced at 8 p.m., lasted for two and a half hours,
and was a failure. The firing was heavy and the attempt was
resolute enough, but as the locality was difficult for our guns the
Buffs employed prolonged rapid fire as a substitute and succeeded in
repulsing the onslaught. Major E. H. Finch Hatton, D.S.O., and
Captain F. C. R. Studd were wounded in the action, two men were
killed and five wounded.
The battalion remained in these trenches till the 13th October and
suffered several casualties. In fact, each day added a few to the
killed and wounded, and each day brought to light some good
quality in the men. The first name in the regiment to be brought to
notice for gallantry was No. 9967 Corpl. Randall who, himself
wounded, on the 2nd October showed great courage in attending to
Pte. Hamilton under fire. Hamilton, however, did not survive. The
stretcher bearers, too, were proved to be a most gallant set of men
—stretcher bearers always are somehow. The sight of the pain and
mutilation of others seems to bring out a sort of ferocious
tenderness on the part of those who protect and assist the maimed.
Pte. Medway was conspicuous even amongst these devoted fellows.
Particularly heavy firing along the whole line and including
reserves occurred on the 9th October. The church at Vailly was
struck and ten horses belonging to the regimental transport were
killed close to it. The hospital also suffered.
Early in October it appeared to Sir John French that it was
advisable to withdraw the army from the Aisne and strongly
reinforce the forces in the north with a view to outflanking the
enemy and so making him withdraw from his position. In fact, each
army at this time was trying to outflank the other, because frontal
fighting, owing to the complete system of entrenchments in vogue
on both sides, was found to bring no practical results. This
accounted for the fact that in a very short time flanks ceased to
exist, for one soon rested on the sea and the other on neutral
Switzerland. French’s first attempt at outflanking was rendered
abortive by the German capture of Antwerp, and so the war
developed into a fierce struggle for the coast, which may be said to
have commenced on the 11th October and continued till the 17th
November; the enemy’s idea being to seize Calais and the Channel
ports and so make up for their failure to capture Paris.
This struggle is sometimes called the Battle of Flanders, but it in
reality included several fights, the chief of these being collectively
described as the Battles of Ypres, 1914. Of course, the great move
from the Aisne to the neighbourhood of St. Omer and Hazebrouck
took time, and it was not till the 19th October that the move was
completed. General Foch, whose headquarters were at Doullens, at
this time commanded all French troops north of Noyon and our
Commander-in-Chief had arranged with him a general wheel of
troops to the right, in order to menace the German flank; this
arrangement was made before the fall of Antwerp. It brought the
English 7th Division to Ypres; caused heavy fighting for the 3rd
Division about Givenchy, which lasted for three weeks; moved the
4th Division to the north and 6th to south of the town of
Armentieres, and was the immediate cause of the flight which
followed at Radinghem.
Antwerp fell on the 9th October, and this event released 90,000
enemy troops, and the Germans also at this time brought four fresh
Army Corps from their Eastern or Russian front, and so the English
Army and that part of the French one which was in its
neighbourhood were facing greatly superior numbers. As far as the
Buffs were concerned they were relieved in their trenches on the
Aisne by French troops on the 12th of the month, marched to
Bazoches with the rest of the 16th Brigade and there entrained for
Cassel, which they reached on the 13th. The relief of the trenches at
Vailly was carried out successfully, but not altogether without
difficulty. The enemy seemed to have an idea of what was going on
and fired a number of flares, and a searchlight was also seen. The
wheels of the transport were, however, covered with straw, as was
the floor of the pontoon bridge over the river, in order to deaden
noise. The French took up their position very quietly and very
quickly, and the battalion re-crossed the Aisne at 2.15 a.m., the last
of the brigade marching by Rouge Croix and Oultersteene.
The 16th Brigade was directed to Bois Grenier on the 17th as
reserve to the division. The 17th was also sent here and the 18th to
Armentieres, about four miles to the north. During the morning,
however, as hostile firing was heard and observed, certain
alterations were made by the 6th Division by order of superior
authority, and it took up and constructed a defensive position along
a new line: the 17th Brigade on the left, 18th in the centre and 16th
on the right from Croix Marechal to Rouge de Bout—French cavalry
being on the right again.
On the 18th October the 17th and 18th Brigades advanced to
ascertain what the enemy was doing about Perenchies, le Paradis
and La Vallée, and to discover his strength, and in connection with
this movement the 16th Brigade was ordered to send one battalion
towards La Vallée and Bacquart. The Buffs were selected and the
York and Lancasters were sent to Bridoux to cover their right flank.
At 10.30 on this Sunday morning the Buffs debouched from Grand
Flamengrie Farm with orders to seize the line of the Hameau de Bas-
La Vallée road, but not to get seriously involved. B, C and D
Companies deployed, with A in reserve.

IV. Battle of Armentieres: Action at Radinghem

Before reaching the above line the battalion got orders to take the
village of Radinghem.
Just beyond this village is a fairly high ridge or plateau on which
stands the Chateau de Flandres, and there is a wood on the edge of
the plateau screening the house from the village, the distance
between this wood and the south edge of the village being about
three hundred yards.
Brevet Colonel Julian Hasler was in command of the forward or
firing line which advanced through Radinghem, seized the ridge and,
pushing on, took the Chateau where severe hand-to-hand fighting
occurred. But soon considerable German reinforcements coming up,
the Buffs had to abandon the Chateau itself, though they still clung
to the edge of the wood.
During the attack Company Sergeant-Major Brady, with nineteen
men of C Company, on surmounting a piece of rising ground,
suddenly found himself about two hundred yards from a German
battalion in close order. Each Buff had three hundred rounds of
ammunition, and one of the most beautiful displays of rapid firing
ever made was the result: that particular German battalion was very
quickly “put out of action,” as they say on field days. The successful
attack on the Chateau de Flandres was immensely helped by Major
Bayley’s company of the York and Lancaster Regiment, which had
worked its way round to take the enemy in flank; so that when these
men approached, the enemy had hastily to withdraw. Without a
doubt the Buffs owe very much to this gallant company.
At 6.10 p.m. the situation was looking serious, but after a German
counter-attack had been repulsed things became better. Then orders
came to hand over Radinghem to some French cavalry and to
withdraw. When the Frenchmen arrived, however, they were found
to be only 130 strong, so the Buffs and York and Lancaster
consolidated themselves on the south edge of the village and settled
in for the night. The artillery, a mixed brigade under Lt.-Colonel
Humphrey, had most nobly supported the infantry during the day.
Later on, when the regiment had more experience, they found that
the devotion to duty shown by the Gunners at Radinghem was quite
a normal state of things with that arm, and was so looked for as a
matter of course that notice was hardly taken of their excellent
work, but in this, almost their first battle of the war, praise of the
Gunners was in every man’s mouth.
On the 19th touch was obtained with the 18th Brigade at the
railway crossing east of Bas Champs. At 3 p.m. the 16th Brigade was
ordered to withdraw to Bois Grenier and to leave one battalion only
at Radinghem. The consequence of this was of course that, the York
and Lancaster being withdrawn, the Buffs were left alone to occupy
the lines which last night had been constructed for both regiments.
The morning of the 20th opened with very heavy artillery fire
from the enemy’s guns of large calibre, and then the German
infantry pressed very heavily. About 2 p.m. Colonel Hasler was badly
wounded,[3] and command of the front line devolved on Major
McDouall. At 3 p.m. the artillery reported that the Germans were
advancing along the two roads from Le Maisnil leading to
Radinghem. This meant that the Buffs would probably be
surrounded, as touch with the 18th Brigade and French cavalry had
failed, and indeed it was ultimately found that these troops had been
driven back. At 3.35 and again at 4 o’clock McDouall reported that
the situation was very serious, but that he was holding on; that the
machine guns were knocked out, the trench on his left hitherto held
by C Company had been captured and that he was “in a tight
corner.” He received orders to retire company by company, and
replied that it was very difficult, but that “We will do the best we
can.” At 4.50 came a message from the brigade to hold on at all
costs and promising the support of two companies of the York and
Lancaster. The Headquarter party of the battalion manned a
barricade in the village and McDouall retired, the work being carried
out in a most soldierly manner, and at 7 p.m. the promised help
arrived, followed half an hour later by the brigadier himself, who
ordered the front of the village to be held, unaware that both flanks
were exposed. A staff officer of the division, however, shortly arrived
who was acquainted with the situation, and he directed the
retirement of the Buffs, which was carried out without trouble, as
the enemy was not enterprising and appeared to have had enough
of the battalion. At 1 a.m. on the 21st the rear guard cleared the
village, and that morning Grand Flamengrie Farm was reached again
and billets resumed.
In this action the Buffs lost Lieuts. J. D. Phillips, R. McDougall, M.
Noott and R. S. Glyn killed, and Colonel J. Hasler and Lieuts. G. F.
Hamilton, C. C. Stanfield and Orwan wounded. Of the rank and file
17 were reported killed and 62 missing, but these were undoubtedly
all or nearly all killed; 57 were wounded. The regiment earned great
praise for the stand it made at Radinghem, and, though it will be
impossible in this history accurately to chronicle each honour and
reward as conferred, it is interesting to note that on the 28th
November No. 8922 Sgt. J. McNeir was awarded the D.C.M. for the
gallant manner in which he brought up his platoon to the support of
B Company at Chateau de Flandres, near Radinghem, on the 20th
October, 1914, and that:—
“On the 20th October, 1914, at Chateau de Flandres, near
Radinghem, Sergeant Forwood continued to serve his machine guns,
after the officer in charge had been killed, until all the team and
both the guns had been knocked out by heavy artillery, himself
being wounded in five places. He crawled in and reported the
situation.” Sergeant Forwood was awarded the D.C.M., and the
incident is described by a General Officer, who later on commanded
the 6th Division, as being typical of the fierce fighting at this time.
On the 23rd October a heavy attack developed at dawn against
the Shropshire and York and Lancaster battalions and part of the
line, which consisted of isolated trenches only, was rendered
untenable by machine guns which the shape of the ground enabled
the enemy to bring up. This attack was a very bold one and
Germans were actually bayoneted in the trenches, and two hundred
dead were counted opposite one of the Shropshire defences.
At one time there was a gap just east of Bridoux, caused by some
of the trenches being lost and others still held, and matters were in
rather a confused state, so, to clear up the situation, Lieut. G. R.
Thornhill’s platoon of the Buffs, under the direction and guidance of
Major Clemson of the York and Lancaster Regiment, was pushed
forward from the Touquet-La Boutillerie road by some dongas
running south. There appeared to be no enemy in the gap, and on
approaching one of the trenches Thornhill and his men rushed
forward to secure it, when he and several of his followers were shot
down by a concealed machine gun. Indeed, only ten returned,
bringing with them seven wounded men, but they were obliged to
leave Thornhill, who was actually in the trench, and several others.
Pte. Pearce made a manly effort at rescue and managed to drag Pte.
Bull in, but could not reach his officer. Both A and C Companies
employed the bayonet on this day, counter-attacking in front of the
Shropshire and the Leicestershire trenches.
It is not so very long ago that many thoughtful army officers were
of opinion that the days of the bayonet were over for ever; but then,
of course, no one at all dreamed in the summer of 1914 that soldiers
would again fight in iron helmets or throw grenades, and there have
been many similar surprises during this war.
There seems to be no doubt that from the 23rd to the 25th of
October the situation of the 16th Brigade was very critical, and
indeed Br.-General Ingouville-Williams twice reported that this was
the case. The reason was that the line held was not continuous and
it was impossible to make it so, on account of the great number of
Germans who were attacking. It was therefore resolved to construct
a proper line of trenches 100 yards or so south of the Touquet-La
Boutillerie road and to withdraw into it; but as, during the whole of
the 23rd, the Leicestershire right flank was being enveloped, new
dispositions were made by Brigadiers Williams and Congreve in
consultation; they resolved that the Leicestershire should hold their
trenches east of the railway and then bend back along it—a most
prominent salient and with a poor field of fire, but the best that
could be done till the new trenches were ready for occupation.
On the 24th October loud cheering was heard in this direction,
and it was feared that the Leicestershire had been rushed, and a
company of the Buffs and another of the York and Lancaster were
immediately deployed to take the supposedly successful enemy in
flank. Verbal reports came in during the morning to Brigade H.Q. at
La Touquet that the Leicestershire battalion had been forced to
retire, that some posts had been surrounded and that no officers
were left. This account, however, fortunately proved to have been
exaggerated. The enemy had, in fact, made a small gap in the line,
occupying the railway, but the good old battalion from Leicestershire
had quickly closed it and, though it had suffered severely, it still held
its own and was moreover in touch with the King’s Shropshire Light
Infantry.
On the 25th the withdrawal of the whole brigade to the newly
made trenches which had been carefully prepared was carried out
without a hitch, but in most unpleasantly wet weather.
The student, interested in the tactical movements of military
forces, rarely thinks of weather and other little details, but to the
poor suffering soldier weather, punctual or fairly punctual delivery of
rations (not forgetting the rum), baths, clean clothes, nature of
shelter by day and night, and even the phases of the moon seem
almost of more importance than the chance of a few casualties.
C.S.M. Stone and Sgt. Stock had been highly complimented
during these last few days, as was Corpl. Marsh for his good
reconnoitring work; but this occurred to the N.C.O.’s and men of the
Buffs so frequently from 1914 to 1918 that it is impossible to refer to
all acts of devotion and gallantry. It may well be noted, however,
that on the 25th October C Company was resolutely attacked, the
enemy getting within seventy yards of their trench, and that Captain
E. B. Chichester showed all the gallantry of his English ancestry,
cheering on his men and showing a noble example till he fell
mortally wounded. D Company gallantly repulsed German attacks at
8 and at 9 o’clock and then retired to a prepared position in rear.
The Buffs’ casualties this day were Captain Chichester and Lieut.
Stock killed, Lieuts. R. W. Homan and Child wounded, five other
ranks killed, twenty wounded and two missing.
About this time the discovery seems to have been made that
officers could be supplied not only from civilians in England, but
from highly trained, very gallant and thoroughly reliable non-
commissioned officers, who were daily adding to their war
experience; so Company Sergeant-Majors (C.S.M.) Nesbit and Stone,
Sgts. Corrall, Stock and Orwin, and a little later on Company
Quarter-Master Sergeant (C.Q.M.S.) Sayer, C.S.M. Kesby, C.S.M.
Price, and Sgts. King, Hallan and Harris were promoted to be 2nd
Lieutenants. Most of them, alas, were sent out of the regiment,
which was a great blow, but of course the needs of the Army as a
whole must always be the first consideration.
RADINGHEM
 On the 5th November the death took place of Major-General R. G.
Kekewich,[4] C.B., Colonel of the Buffs; General the Right
Honourable Sir Arthur Paget,[5] P.C., G.C.B., K.C.V.O., was appointed
to succeed him.
On the 15th November Colonel H. C. de la M. Hill, the
commanding officer, was invalided home and Major McDouall
temporarily took over the battalion. This was the first of a long
series of changes in the command, which was the common fate of
all units.
After the very strenuous attack by the Germans had died away
the 1st Battalion had a longish spell of comparative quiet. Casualties,
which in one of our frequent minor wars would have made a stir,
were of regular occurrence and almost taken for granted; the
records show almost every day something like two killed and five
wounded, and drafts to replace these good fellows were fairly often
arriving from England. Later on the relief of units actually in the
trenches by others in rear occurred at short intervals, but it may be
noted here that on the 24th November the Buffs, when relieved by
the Shropshire Light Infantry, had been no less than four weeks and
six days in the front line, east of Bois Grenier.
During the winter the wet weather, followed by frosts, caused the
sides of the trenches to fall in, and the low-lying nature of the
country made it impossible to drain them properly; so it was
decided, as a temporary measure, to abandon the ditches
themselves and build and man breastworks in lieu. These were
generally placed just in rear of the old works so that the latter could
be reoccupied when the weather improved.
Of course, the long, dull and dreary trench warfare was not
entirely without incident. A poem by Captain C. W. Blackall[6]
describes in graphic verse how one of the ration carriers being a
little late in slipping into the safety of the trench was bowled over by
the enemy and was at first supposed to be dead, but he managed
after a while to crawl in somehow and in spite of his agony he
brought in his sack of bacon with him. That is the sort of spirit
which, when it animates everyone in an army, renders that force
absolutely unconquerable. It has often been the same. On the
Indian frontier once a Buff soldier was apparently killed. Someone
bent over him to take any possible last message. The man was in
agony and shot in the stomach, but he could just speak. “Where’s
my bloody rifle?” was all he said.
On St. George’s Day, 1915, the enemy had the audacity to stick
out a flag at their sap head and on it was inscribed the words “Gott
strafe England.” 2nd Lieut. Corrall, Sergt. Vigors and Pte. Russell
disapproved of this, as showing an improperly defiant attitude, so
they crept out and triumphantly brought it in with them.
The Army Commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, inspected the
battalion in the spring and was much struck with the smart turn-out.
Such is custom and the result of training and education. The Buffs
must be smartly turned-out, and conditions and circumstances have
nothing to do with the matter.
It was on the 3rd May that the 1st Battalion and the rest of the
16th Brigade first heard of the German gas attacks, which occurred
north-east of Ypres and to which reference will be made in the next
chapter. Precautionary measures were taken, but the second battle
of Ypres did not greatly affect the troops so far south of the town as
was the 6th Division, but about 1,500 shells fell into Armentieres on
the 6th May. On the last day of this month a move was made to the
neighbourhood of Bailleul and Poperinghe—the village of
Wittenhoek, four miles south of the latter town, being the Buffs’
billet.
On the 2nd June it so happened that the 2nd Battalion, whose
adventures are now to be related, were in Poperinghe, and so, in the
nature of things, a meeting, which will be referred to later, had to be
arranged.
It must be remembered in reading the foregoing pages, and
indeed in studying the next chapter also, that the enemy was, during
the last quarter of 1914 and early in the next year, making a well-
organized and very determined attempt to gain Calais and the coast
of the English Channel, and that enormous masses of men were
devoted to this effort, as well as artillery vastly superior in weight of
metal to that which our side could then by any possibility bring to
bear. The English lines of communication ran across the Channel,
and it is a maxim of war that if such lines are lost the army that
relies on them must either win an overwhelming victory or surrender.
If Calais had been won by the Germans the connection between
England and her armies would have been to a great extent severed,
for how could reinforcements, munitions and necessaries daily cross
the Channel under heavy and continuous fire, and repeated and
constant attacks from submarine bases?
At Radinghem and at Ypres then, our regiment was helping to
defend England from a dreadful and unprecedented disaster, and
Men of Kent must further consider that to a certain extent, at any
rate, the Buffs were, more than any other regiment, defending their
own homeland, for if hostile batteries of modern long-range guns
could have been planted on Cape Gris Nez, not only would Dover
harbour and dockyard have been destroyed, but, knowing the
Germans as we do now, we may be pretty certain that Hythe,
Folkestone, Sandgate and perhaps Deal would soon have been in as
ruinous a condition as were, a little later, Rheims, Arras and Ypres.
Leaving the 1st Battalion for a while doing its duty in the
neighbourhood of Poperinghe, we will now turn our attention to the
story of the 2nd Battalion from India.
 CHAPTER II

THE 2nd BATTALION TAKES ITS SHARE

I. Returns to England

T
he opening of hostilities found the headquarters of the 2nd
Battalion at Wellington in India. It was, like most units which
have been some time abroad, a very fine body of men, in spite of
the fact that Wellington is not exactly a training centre and that
three detachments were provided by the battalion. Very early in the
war it was called upon to send home, to the assistance of the new
armies in course of formation, some of the most useful members of
the battalion staff and many of the very best sergeants. Training
was, however, continued, and in November orders arrived to sail for
England on being relieved by Territorial troops, who had quite
forgotten apparently that they were home service soldiers only,
directly England wanted them abroad.
On leaving the East the Buffs had to leave behind a depot which
consisted of a few men passed unfit, all the women and children,
and the property of the messes, regimental institutes, Army
Temperance Association and rifle ranges; this was under the
command of Captain Howard Smith. The only things that went home
with the fighting men were the Colours and the mess silver.
The battalion embarked at Bombay on the 16th November on the
Cunard ship Ultonia, which was old, slow and dirty, and fearfully
overcrowded owing to the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire regiment
being also on board. The ship was under convoy together with
thirty-three others, and the whole made Plymouth instead of
Southampton on the 23rd December, after making a wide detour in
the Atlantic to avoid submarines. The Buffs were bundled off their
ship in great haste and without their kits; they got off somehow to
Winchester, where they found themselves on a cold, bleak down, in
pouring rain and with but very meagre equipment—cooking-pots
being one of the very many items that were deficient. An Army
Service wagon or two ultimately came along and threw some
blankets upon the wet ground, and some bread and meat on top of
them, and went away; but of course their drivers were not
responsible for cooking-pots. Christmas, 1914, may have been a
merry one in many places, even in the trenches to a certain extent,
but it is doubtful if the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs ever spent a more
miserable one. Certainly Captain Tomlinson’s company got plum
puddings, but that was the one bright spot.
The battalion, together with the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, 2nd East
Surrey and the 3rd Middlesex, all from India, found itself in the 85th
Infantry Brigade under Br.-General A. J. Chapman, C.B., who had
Captain C. J. Deverell for brigade major. The brigade was part of the
28th Division—Major-General Bulfin, C.V.O., C.B. Captain L. Fort, and
afterwards Lieut. the Hon. P. G. Scarlett, was appointed staff captain
to the 85th Brigade.
Military exercises of an intensive kind were, of course, the daily
lot of the men while at Winchester, particularly so because the latest
pattern rifle (not used in India) had just been issued to them. A
furlough of three clear days to 25 per cent of the soldiers at a time
was, however, granted, so that those just returned from India, after
a foreign tour of nearly ten years, might get a glimpse of their
friends before starting for a new and sterner foreign service. A few
drafts of new men arrived, but it must be understood that these
reinforcements for each and all of the battalions during the four
years under consideration were of such frequent occurrence as to
render constant reference to them both tiresome and superfluous. It
may easily be understood that the strength of a unit must constantly
be varying. A hard-fought action would reduce the numbers
enormously, as well as did the regular drain by death, wounds and
disease during the weary trench work.
 The only events worthy of record during the stay at Winchester
were a violent squall which did great damage to the tents on the
28th December, and a grand inspection of the division by His Majesty
the King accompanied by Lord Kitchener on the 12th January, 1915.
The battalion moved into billets in the city on the 6th January, the
officers being accommodated in Winchester College.[7]
It is only fair to note here that the newly issued boots were not of
proper quality: the heels came off and the nails went through. Later
on, in France, the men experienced a good deal of quite
unnecessary hardship on account of their boots, which to an infantry
soldier are only of second importance to his weapons. Some one
was to blame, of course, presumably the contractor, and it seems
that in every war these men must make their fortunes at the
expense of the soldier.
Most judges agree that English soldiers are seldom seen to such
perfection of training and physique as in India, and the infantry of
the 28th Division was entirely composed of units from that country,
so that all who saw these troops prior to embarkation for France
agreed that no finer body of infantry had ever taken the field.
The start was made on the 16th January, on which day the
division marched to Southampton, and a trying march it was; though
well timed and arranged by the staff, sufficient consideration was not
given to the length of the journey by foot, the state of the weather
nor the weight each soldier had to carry.

II. Arrives on Western Front

Next day the Buffs embarked for Havre, for the Channel ports
were safe enough by this time. On the 21st they detrained at
Hazebrouck and marched to Rouge Croix (4½ miles N.E.), after one
of those terrible French railway journeys, during which sanitary
arrangements are non-existent. The battalion now became a fighting
unit in the great struggle that was raging round Ypres.
 It is good in winter time to have plenty of warm clothing and
protection from the weather, but the kits at this period were terribly
heavy to carry. Later on regular parties were told off to take what
was required from the billets to the trenches and so on, but at first
the soldier, in addition to his regular sixty-two pounds’ weight of kit,
was burdened with a fur coat, gum boots and spare sandbags, all
very excellent things to have with one, but a bit of a job to get over
the ground with.
On the 28th January the brigade was inspected by the
Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by the Prince of Wales. During
the month of February the Germans made several more or less
determined attempts to pierce the British line near Ypres, and
sometimes with partial success. On the 4th of the month the 85th
Brigade, being at Ouderdom, received news that their comrades of
the 83rd were being attacked south-west of the city, so two
battalions started at once to the rescue, and these were followed
two hours later by the Buffs and Middlesex, who entered the place
and remained in readiness in the cavalry barracks.
The 5th February brought some counter-marching. At 4.30 a.m.
the battalion started to march back again to Ouderdom as being not
wanted and was then told to stand by in readiness to move again, as
the 84th Brigade was now in trouble to the south of Ypres. This
march, however, was not performed till the following day, by the
evening of which both the Buffs and East Surreys were back in the
cavalry barracks, and from there they went into the trenches, the
Buffs’ Headquarters being at Ferme Chapelle.
The experience of the next few days was a terrible one; the
trenches, which had just been taken over from the French, were in
very bad condition indeed: they were knee-deep in water, and with
parapets so rotten as not to be bullet proof. Very soon this state of
things had its effect and numbers of the men were suffering from
swollen feet and frost-bite.

III. “O” Trench

 The brigade front at this time was intersected at right angles by
the Ypres-Comines Canal, which divided it into what were known as
the Right and Left Sections of Defence. Immediately north of the
canal the Left Section of Defence was entrusted to the Buffs and 3rd
Royal Fusiliers, these battalions relieving each other as ordered; and
the south or the Right Section of Defence to the 2nd East Surrey and
the 3rd Middlesex. Each section had its own battalion headquarters.
A small part of the southern section was also held by one company
of the Buffs (Captain Worthington). The other battalions of the
brigade were in somewhat similar conditions to the Buffs, and were
daily and rapidly being reduced in fighting strength and efficiency,
chiefly through frost-bite and sickness. So serious had things
become owing to this reduction in fighting strength that, by the 13th
February, it was decided to relieve the brigade, and to withdraw it to
recoup and refit as soon as other troops were available to replace it
in the line.
It had already been decided by the higher command that a part
of the line then being held by the 3rd Middlesex and the 2nd East
Surrey, south of the canal, was to be shortened by the construction
of new trenches a little in rear of trenches “O” and “P.” This work
had already been started, and was, on the night of the 14th
February, being continued by the 3rd Middlesex, which temporarily
withdrew the garrisons from “O” and “P” trenches for the purpose of
digging, leaving those trenches in charge of small covering parties
only.
The Germans, who up till then had been showing very little local
activity, unexpectedly raided and captured “O” trench and prevented
its reoccupation by the Middlesex; without delay they reversed the
parapet, wired the front on our side and took all necessary steps for
resisting any attempts at recapture.
During the night 14th/15th February the Buffs were relieved by
the 3rd Royal Fusiliers from their unenviable position in the trenches
as recorded above, and were withdrawn a short distance to Chateau
Rosenthal (Bedford House), on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, to rest. By
the time the reliefs had been completed and the battalion had
settled down to rest the night was far spent.
Shortly before dawn alarming rumours reached Battalion H.Q.
that the enemy had broken through the Middlesex and were
advancing on Ypres. Colonel Geddes reported accordingly to Brigade
H.Q., and the battalion was at once turned out in readiness for any
eventuality. Soon after daybreak orders were received to move out
and hold the canal bank south-east of Langhof. Although fairly
heavily shelled en route, the battalion crossed the canal without loss
and assembled on the north side, under cover of the canal
embankment. Here it was subsequently joined by the brigadier and
some of the brigade staff and remained awaiting developments
throughout the rest of the morning.
About 2.30 p.m. the 2nd East Surrey, assisted by as many of the
Middlesex as it had been possible to collect, were ordered to
recapture “O” trench. No arrangements had apparently been made
for artillery support, and moreover this attack had to be made over
ground deep in mud, devoid of any cover and without any previous
reconnaissance or guides. From the Buffs’ rendezvous nothing could
be seen of what was taking place on the far side of the
embankment, where the attack had been launched. About 4.30 p.m.
the Buffs (less one company which remained with the brigadier in
reserve) were ordered to reinforce the East Surrey, who, owing to
extremely heavy losses, were reported to be held up and unable to
make further progress. As the leading company of the Buffs broke
cover it came under artillery fire which caused many casualties,
including its commander, Major F. S. Reeves, wounded, and Lieut. R.
M. Heywood, killed. Neither the whereabouts of the East Surreys nor
the direction of the objective were known, and by this time darkness
was fast approaching. However, the three companies continued the
advance in the dusk and by good fortune came up with some of the
East Surreys, who, having reached a point some five hundred yards
from the objective, were unable to advance any further. The Buffs
passed through them and continued to advance until they reached a
point about three hundred yards from the objective, which by this
time, however, was completely hidden in the darkness which had by
now intervened. At this point a subaltern of the East Surrey
Regiment, who had lost his platoon, was met, and he volunteered to
act as guide. The leading company again pushed on, but, owing to
the difficulty of keeping touch and maintaining direction in the dark,
a part of the battalion found itself held up by wire and suffering
heavy losses from fire from more than one direction. At this juncture
Colonel Geddes wisely determined to withdraw the battalion, which
was only done with the greatest difficulty.
Whilst the above operations were in progress, half a battalion of
the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, sent from the 84th Brigade, had
arrived in the dark at the rendezvous on the canal bank, where the
brigadier and the reserve company of the Buffs (Major R. E. Power)
were waiting. As nothing was known of the military situation, nor of
the whereabouts of the Buffs nor of the East Surrey Regiment, from
whom no reports had been received since dark, the brigadier
ordered the reserve company of the Buffs to go out and find the rest
of the battalion. He himself started with them. After going a short
distance they came across a building full of wounded which was
found to be the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Section of Defence, then
occupied by the headquarters of the 3rd Middlesex Regiment. Here a
guide was procured, and the company proceeded in the direction in
which the remainder of the battalion and the 2nd East Surrey had
gone. Before it had gone far, however, it luckily met Colonel Geddes
returning. The battalion (less half Major Power’s company, detached
to occupy a front-line trench) reached the canal about 10.30 p.m.,
and was sent back at 1 a.m. to Chateau Rosenthal to get a meal and
rest.
During the morning of the 15th February, 1915, a conference was
held at Brigade H.Q., and it was decided to renew the attack on the
lost trench “O” on that night. The brigadier at first decided to carry
out this operation with the Buffs and East Surrey Regiment only, but
these two battalions had together only about three hundred men
available, owing to the casualties of the previous day and the losses
sustained during the recent tour in the trenches. Two companies of
the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (84th Brigade) were, therefore,
added to this small force, which was placed under command of
Colonel Geddes. In the written orders issued to units it was stated
that “O” trench was to be retaken at all costs and held until reliefs
arrived. The G.O.C. 28th Division stated that the 85th Brigade,
which, owing to the severe losses from fire and sickness already
incurred, was to have been at once withdrawn from the line and sent
back to recoup and refit, would not be relieved until the lost trench
“O” had been recaptured.
At 7 p.m. the Buffs (less half D Company)[8] and 2nd East Surrey
Regiment (less one and a half companies) assembled at the place
ordered, that is, on the road junction on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, 620
yards south of the canal. From this point the column, led by the
Buffs, marched via the road leading east towards Oosthoek, as far as
the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Sections of Defence, where the 2nd
Northumberland Fusiliers (less two companies) joined and followed
in reserve. Leaving here at 7.40 p.m. and moving in file, closed up,
the column was skilfully guided some two thousand yards across
country by Lieut. J. A. H. Wood, 2nd East Surrey, to the position of
deployment (the north-east end of a spinney about 150 yards north
of “O” trench), which was reached without opposition or casualties
at about 8.40 p.m. On reaching the position of deployment the
Buffs, under Major L. I. B. Hulke, having previously fixed bayonets,
silently deployed into line to the left, in single rank, without
extending, and lay down in the deep mud. The East Surreys, acting
in a similar manner, formed a second line twenty yards in rear with
the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers some fifty yards behind them.
Selected scouts of the Buffs were sent out to reconnoitre and cut the
enemy’s wire and to report on the intervening ground, which was
quite unknown to all those about to take part in this attack. Such
complete silence had been maintained during the advance and
deployment that the presence of the column was unknown to the
enemy until a prearranged artillery bombardment of his trenches
commenced at 8.55 p.m. The shells all appeared to take effect
against the main German position, and consequently well beyond
the immediate objective. They unfortunately had the undesired
effect of putting the defenders on the qui vive, for they at once
manned the trench “O,” sent up flares, which revealed the position
of the attacking force, and opened on it a withering fire from rifles,
machine guns and trench mortars.
The time ordered for the assault was 9 p.m., and the right of the
Buffs was detailed to direct. Immediately the enemy opened fire it
was apparent from the shells which, following one another in quick
succession, burst immediately behind and close to the Buffs, that the
enemy had the exact range. Realizing this, Major Hulke at once gave
the order to advance. Just in front of the Buffs the ground sloped
somewhat steeply downwards towards the objective for about fifty
yards. Nothing could have been finer than the dash and the steady
determination with which the whole line, like one man, arose and
went forward down this slope. The configuration of the ground, and
the unhesitating manner in which the order to advance was carried
out, undoubtedly saved the battalion from serious losses at this
stage, as the more quickly the advance down the slope was made
the higher above the men’s heads rained the storm of shells and
bullets on to, and beyond, the position which the battalion had just
vacated.
From the bottom of the slope the advance had to be made across
heavy ground, ankle deep in mud and devoid of cover, for a distance
of about 120 yards, the last part of which was up a steep incline.
Except for the enemy’s flares it was pitch dark. Against the heavy
frontal fire from the trench, and enfilade machine-gun fire from the
left flank, the battalion forged ahead with magnificent determination,
and in spite of serious casualties, most of which were sustained
when the level ground at the foot of the first slope was reached,
fought its way through the wire and finally assaulted and gained a
footing in the trench. The enemy, who had kept up a heavy fire until
the Buffs were within ten yards of the trench, disappeared in the
dark, apparently down a communication trench and also towards the
western end of “O” trench.
 Major C. L. Porter was wounded and many other ranks killed and
wounded during the attack, but ten officers and about sixty other
ranks succeeded in entering the trench. Major Hulke immediately
reorganized and distributed these along the trench, starting from the
extreme left, and arranged for the protection of the right flank by
the construction of a sandbag traverse, which was built, under fire
from rifle and bombs, under Captain Morgan’s supervision, assisted
by Lieut. Laing. A considerable number had already been wounded;
parties had to be employed in repairing and strengthening the
parapet, whilst others had to be told off to assist those detailed to
man the parapet, in clearing the jammed rifles and supplying them
with cleaned ammunition. When all these deductions from the sixty
odd other ranks who had succeeded in gaining a footing in the
trench had been made, it was found that only sufficient men
remained to hold about fifty out of a probable two hundred yards of
trench. Whilst the above arrangements were in progress the enemy
started sniping and throwing bombs, apparently from a
communication trench and from the western end of “O” trench,
which was still in their hands. Bombs at that time were weapons of
warfare of which the 28th Division had had no previous experience
whatever, and owing to the darkness, the non-provision of maps and
lack of previous information about, or knowledge of, the trench, it
was very difficult to locate the places from which the enemy were
throwing them and sniping. However, Captain F. W. Tomlinson,
Captain L. Fort and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell discovered the
whereabouts of a party of the enemy’s bombers and rushed it;
demolished the sandbag wall, from under cover of which bombs
were being thrown, and cleared the enemy out of the trench.
Captain Tomlinson seized the bayonet of one of the enemy, who
turned tail. Captain L. Fort, who a few days previously had shown
the greatest courage and resource whilst in charge of an officers’
reconnoitring patrol, was killed, and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell was
severely wounded in this gallant enterprise, which undoubtedly
saved many lives and further casualties in the battalion, as the
enemy afterwards ceased bombing and apparently withdrew.
 Owing to the mud, with which everybody and everything was
smothered, a large number of the rifles became jammed and
unserviceable. After holding on for three hours, as the promised
support had not arrived the position of the Buffs was by now
(midnight) somewhat critical. Major Hulke therefore sent 2nd Lieut.
J. A. Wood (2nd East Surrey), accompanied by No. 9522 Pte. W. J.
White, to report the situation to Colonel Geddes, and eventually the
former returned, guiding a company of the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. He
reported that both the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd East
Surrey had lost their way in the dark, and that the former had been
now ordered to follow the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. They did not,
however, arrive at “O” trench before the Buffs were relieved.
As soon as the company of the Suffolks had taken over the
portion of the trench the Buffs were holding, they had to work their
surplus men along the trench beyond the sandbag traverse which
the battalion had built, and extend them further to the right. In
trying to do this they met with considerable opposition from parties
of the enemy, who were in the western part of the trench. As the
officer in command of this company appeared to meet with some
difficulty in overcoming this opposition, Major Hulke offered to
remain with his handful of men until it got sufficiently light to see
what the real situation was. This offer, however, was refused, and, in
accordance with the orders issued, Major Hulke therefore withdrew
the Buffs, leaving in charge of the Suffolks any wounded who were
unable to be removed without stretchers—of which there were none
available. Great difficulty was experienced in carrying out the
withdrawal over the fire-swept morass which had to be crossed, lit
up, as it was, by almost incessant star-shell and flares. By crawling
through the mud between the flares, a few yards at a time, and by
lying down as flat as possible whilst any light remained, was the only
way of proceeding, but many lives, including Sgt. Rosam, were lost
during the first part of the withdrawal: although the distance was
not more than 150 yards, it took half an hour to reach the original
place of deployment.
 After a few hours’ rest in the cavalry barracks in Ypres the
battalion marched into scattered billets in and around Reninghelst.
On the same afternoon the services of 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing were
asked for to act as guide to another brigade detailed on that night to
recapture “O” trench, which the enemy had again taken possession
of very shortly after the Buffs had been relieved. In spite of his
arduous experiences of the previous night’s fighting and want of
rest, 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing undertook this hazardous enterprise, and
carried it out successfully.

IV. Trench Warfare near Ypres

On the 19th February the battalion was attached to the 3rd

Division and went into billets at Locre, marching to Westoutre for
baths and clean clothes. There was a regular system in working this
necessary ablution arrangement. Men cast off their filthy
underclothing, which was taken from them, and after a bath, clean
underclothes, which had once belonged to other people, were
provided and the old ones were never seen again by the original
owners. At first this caused a certain amount of grumbling amongst
careful men, who were liable to become possessed of somewhat
more ragged articles than they handed in, but it was soon found that
things generally came right in the long run.
A new line of trenches were occupied on the 22nd, and these
were found to be much preferable and more desirable in every way
than those last occupied. There is no doubt that the French were
more careless as regards the cleanliness as well as the general
efficiency of their trenches than were our own people, and it seems
that the 2nd Buffs were rather unfortunate in very frequently
relieving our Allies instead of other British troops. These new and
better works were at Kemmel, and the battalion alternated between
this place and Locre till the 23rd March, when it was billeted at
Dickebusch. Captain A. S. Cresswell was killed by a sniper on the
12th March.
 On the 10th April, after a trying turn at St. Eloi, the battalion
marched to Zonnebeke and relieved the 153rd French Regiment, the
85th Brigade having three battalions in the front line, with the Buffs
in the centre, three companies in the fire trenches and one in
support. About the middle of the line was the Broodseinde cross-
roads, where the enemy’s trenches approached very close to our
own, at one point to within five feet. This portion of the field is upon
a plateau which commands the Ypres road, and was of great tactical
importance. Forward of a trench which lay to the south-west of the
cross-roads, the enemy had that morning rushed a parallel in which
the French had laid a mine that was to have been fired before they
handed over. After blocking this mine up, the enemy had retained
possession of that part of the work in which it had been laid. Of this
fact the French were either ignorant or, at any rate, they made no
report of it. Two attempts were made to dislodge them, in which
Captain Hood, Lieut. Whitaker (both of whom were wounded) and
2nd Lieut. Chapman did good work.
In the meantime the Germans had established a heavy trench
mortar in a position, secure from our artillery, from which they
brought a merciless fire to bear on our lines, especially on B
Company which was on the cross-roads. This was the 2nd Battalion’s
first experience of this weapon. Serious damage was done to the
parapets and many casualties resulted. During this four days’ tour 1
officer and 22 other ranks were killed and 4 officers and 62 other
ranks wounded. The battalion was relieved by the 3rd Royal Fusiliers
on the morning of the 14th and marched back to billets at St. Jean,
about one mile east of Ypres. A and D Companies were sent into the
reserve dug-outs west of Zonnebeke, but rejoined at St. Jean the
next day. After another short turn in the trenches the battalion on
the 21st found itself bivouacked in open fields near St. Jean, where
shelters and dug-outs were arranged for, because the town of Ypres
was now being too heavily shelled for troops to make use of billeting
accommodation there, or, in fact, to pass through the town at all.

V. Second Battle of Ypres

 The second battle of Ypres has brought more obloquy and ill-fame
on the German nation than even Marathon brought glory to the
Athenians. It appears to have been well understood by scientific
men that a noisome and poisonous gas could be so carried down
wind that no man could breathe its suffocating fumes and live for
long, and further that he must die in agony. At the ineffectual
conference at the Hague it had been arranged between the
representatives of the several nations, including Germany, that the
use of such a disgusting and brutal weapon should be barred
between civilized enemies, and nobody thought any more about it,
but the German beast is not a gentleman and he ruled that the
brave old days when foeman fought with a chivalrous regard for his
opponent were to cease, at any rate as far as the much-vaunted
Fatherland was concerned, and so this battle which we are now to
consider goes down in history as the first great combat in which
unfair and blackguardly methods were adopted.
 Imperial War Museum Crown Copyright
YPRES FROM NEAR MENIN GATE
The commencement of this tremendous battle is best described in
Sir John French’s own words, which are here quoted from his
despatches: “It was at the commencement of the Second Battle of
Ypres on the evening of the 22nd April that the enemy first made
use of asphyxiating gas.
“Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre’s
request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on
the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres
were posted as follows:—
“From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the
Poelcappelle road, a French division.
“Thence, in a south-easterly direction towards the Passchendaele-
Becelaere road, the Canadian division.
 “Thence, a division took up the line in a southerly direction east of
Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another division
continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the corps on its
right.
“Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve
about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional
Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An infantry
brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses
on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.
“Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French
division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time.
Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been
seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and
Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had
been made east of the Ypres-Staden railway, in which these
asphyxiating gases had been employed.
“What follows almost defies description. The effect of these
poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line
held by the French division mentioned above practically incapable of
any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what
had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from
sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying
condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be
abandoned, together with about 50 guns.
“I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least
blame to the French division for this unfortunate incident.
“After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged
and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they
have been placed throughout the course of this campaign, it is quite
superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I
would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the
world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a