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Digital Technology in
Physical Education
www.routledge.com/sport/series/RSPEYS
Digital Technology in
Physical Education
Global Perspectives
PART I
Skill acquisition and assessment: practical
implications of research 17
PA RT I I
Technological influence on models-based practices 87
PA RT I I I
Concepts and critical reflections on digi-t ech in PE 145
PA RT I V
Technological innovations for professional
development 223
Index 277
Figures
physical education to 11–18 year olds for eight years. Maura’s research
interests include the professional development of pre- service and
in-service teachers, outdoor education and outdoor learning, using digital
technologies in PE, self-study of teacher education practices and physical
activity promotion in primary school children.
Aspasia Dania belongs to the Special Teaching Staff of the School of Physical
Education and Sport Science of the University of Athens, Greece, where
she received her Master degree in 2009 and her Doctorate diploma in
2013. Her subjects of specialty are Sport Pedagogy and Methodology
of Physical Education Teaching and she is responsible for planning and
supervising school placement experiences. Her research interests and
publications focus on model- based practice and teacher professional
development within the fields of physical education and sport.
Corina van Doodewaard is a Senior Lecturer in Sport Pedagogy, especially
focused on youth, education and society at Windesheim University of
Applied Sciences in the Netherlands. She teaches and studies the links
between physical educators’ constructions of the body, identity and
inequality issues from a pedagogical and sociocultural perspective. She is
involved in several research projects concerning inclusive physical educa-
tion, empowerment of disadvantaged youth through sports and partici-
pation through sport as identity work.
Gert van Driel is a retired Senior Lecturer and was head of the department
of Physical Education at Windesheim University of Applied Sciences in
Zwolle, the Netherlands. He was the President of the Dutch Association
of PE teachers (KVLO). In his work he focuses on didactics and meth-
odology of modern gymnastics and physical education practices. His
main interest is in movement development, motor learning and digital
technology.
Hong Fu is currently a research associate and instructor in the Department
of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Victoria, Canada. She
completed her doctoral degree in the University of Victoria in 2015
with research interests and experience in teacher identity, teaching and
learning theories, digital portfolio and technology, and preparing teacher
candidates to teach English language learners. She is also involved in
Education Leadership programs for schoolteachers and administrators
outside Canada.
Stephen Harvey is an Associate Professor and the Program Coordinator of
the Online Master of Coaching Education program in the Department
of Recreation and Sport Pedagogy at Ohio University, USA. His
research focuses on teaching and coaching pedagogy through game-
centred approaches and the application of technology to the physical
xii Contributors
[748] Under Cameron of the 92nd as senior colonel—Cadogan who fell at Vittoria
not having yet been replaced.
[749] Viz. Villatte’s and Maransin’s divisions, and Gruardet’s brigade of his own
army, and Braun’s brigade of the Army of the Centre.
[750] On May 1 the three 2nd Division brigades had shown 7,200 bayonets—they
had lost 900 men in action at Vittoria. If we allow for sick and stragglers and other
casual losses, they cannot possibly have had 6,000 men in line on July 5.
[751] All these absurd theories are to be found in Gazan’s reports to Jourdan of
July 4 and 5. See Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 106-7.
[752] The troops of the Army of the North which Foy had collected from the
Biscay garrisons, the brigades of Deconchy, Rouget, and Berlier of which we have
heard so much in a previous chapter.
[753] Foy, Lamartinière, Maucune and Fririon (late Sarrut). There were behind
them the King’s Spaniards and the raw Bayonne reserve.
[754] Dispatches, x. p. 512. The total losses having been 124 on all three days,
Wellington’s ‘no loss’ means, of course, practically no loss.
[755] The clearest proof of Gazan’s resolute resolve not to stand, and of the
complete mendacity of his dispatches concerning his heavy fighting on the 4th-5th
and 7th, is that he returned the total of his losses at 35 killed and 309 wounded.
As he had six brigades, or 13,000 men at least, engaged, it is clear that there was
no serious fighting at all—a fact borne out by Hill’s corresponding return of 8
killed, 119 wounded, and 2 missing in the whole petty campaign.
[756] Cf. Lecestre, Lettres inédites, ii. p. 1037, where the Emperor says on July 3
that he cannot make out what is happening; and that Joseph and Jourdan are
incapables.
[760] Even that he was withdrawing the British Army from Portugal. Lecestre, ii.
998, May 5.
[761] Though he did once make the observation that ‘on ne conduit pas des
campagnes à 500 lieues de distance,’ in a lucid interval.
[765] See the very interesting pages of Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 142-3.
[766] See Roederer’s account of the interview in Vidal de la Blache, i. pp. 132-3.
Napoleon had suggested him as the best person for the errand.
[769] See especially the caustic paragraphs in Lecestre, ii. 1045, 1047, 1055, to
Clarke and Cambacérès.
[773] Bathurst to Wellington, June 23, Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 17-18.
[776] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 23, from Lesaca, ibid., x. p. 568. Cf. same
to same, x. p. 596.
[780] Called the Mirador (’look-out’), Queen’s, and Principe batteries: there were
others facing sea-ward, which were of no account in this siege, as no attack from
the water-side took place.
[782] The governor surrendered the town on August 1, but retired into the castle
of La Mota, where he capitulated a few days later, just as Rey did in 1813.
[784] Dickson’s diary, July 12, 1813, p. 960 of Colonel John Leslie’s edition of the
Dickson Papers.
[792] See the interesting account of his cross-country ride on June 25-9 in his
Letters from the Peninsula, pp. 167-74.
[794] In detail Jones gives them as twenty 24-pounders, six 18-pounders, four
68-pound cannonades, six 8-inch howitzers, and four mortars.
[799] Why does Belmas, who was very well informed, and used Jones’s book, call
the stormers ‘les Anglais’ and say that they lost 150 men? (Sièges, iv. p. 608). He
knew from Jones that they were Caçadores only (Jones, ii. p. 21), and that their
loss was under 70.
[800] Right column, to attack the cemetery and fortified houses—150 of 5th
Caçadores, 150 13th Portuguese Line, three companies 1/9th Foot, three
companies 3/1st Foot (Royal Scots) all under Hay, Brigadier of the 5th Division.
Left column: 200 of 5th Caçadores, 200 of 13th Portuguese Line, three companies
1/9th Foot—all under Bradford commanding Portuguese independent brigade. Why
did not Oswald use his own Portuguese brigade, but draw on Bradford? Possibly
because Spry’s brigade were discouraged by the failure of their Caçador battalion
on the 15th.
[801] Generally in British narratives called the Cask Redoubt, because wine casks
had been used to revet the shifting sand of which the soil was there composed.
[806] There is a curious contradiction between Jones and Belmas as to the fate
of the Cask Redoubt. The latter says that the British took it—the former that the
garrison abandoned it, though not attacked.
[807] ‘From the looseness of the sand in which the battery was constructed, it
was found impossible to keep the soles of the embrasures sufficiently clear to use
the three short 24-pounders mounted on ship carriages—after a few rounds they
had to cease firing.’ Jones, ii. p. 28.
[808] Burgoyne’s Life and Correspondence, i. p. 267.
[809] Burgoyne, who took out the flag of truce, says that the French officer who
met him on the glacis used very angry words (ibid.).
[810] See Dickson Papers, ed. Col. Leslie, p. 970. The second breach is marked
as ‘Lesser Breach’ on the map.
[811] Burgoyne, whose diary of the siege is one of the primary authorities, says
that in his opinion the mine could have been much more useful than it was. ‘On
the discovery of the drain, I should have immediately have altered the whole plan
of attack. I would have made a “globe of compression” to blow in the
counterscarp and the crest of the glacis, and then at low water have threatened
an attack on the breaches, exploded the mine, and have made the real assault on
the hornwork, which not being threatened had few people in it, and would
undoubtedly have been carried easily.’ There was, he says, good cover in the
hornwork, which would have been easily connected with the parallel, and used as
the base for attacking the main front, with breaching batteries in its terre-plein
and the crest of the glacis. Burgoyne, i. p. 271. But this is wisdom after the event.
[813] For all these details see Belmas, iv. pp. 620-1.
[814] Burgoyne says (i. 369) that the engineers on the 24th settled that the mine
was no more than a signal ‘with a chance of alarming them’. On the 25th it would
seem that a little more attention, but not nearly enough, was given to this useful
subsidiary operation.
[816] This is slurred over in the British narratives except Dickson’s Diary, p. 973.
Belmas gives some account of it, however, though he calls the assailants British
instead of Portuguese (iv. p. 623). They were some companies of the 8th
Caçadores.
[817] Most of this narrative is from Colin Campbell’s long and interesting letter to
Sir J. Cameron, printed on pp. 25-30 of his Life by General Shadwell.
[820] The 38th lost 53 men, the 9th 25, the Portuguese 138 in the side-attack.
Why need Belmas, who had Jones’s book before him, give the total of British
losses as 2,000? (Sièges, iv. 625).
[824] ‘The men, panic stricken, turned and could never be rallied,’ writes Frazer
next day (p. 204). ‘One party, I believe of the 9th and 38th, went up to the breach
and then turned and ran away,’ says Larpent (p. 200). Neither saw the actual
assault in the dark.
[825] So at least he wrote to Castaños on the 24th: ‘j’espère que cette affaire est
finie.’ Dispatches, x. p. 564.
[828] Permission was given to leave four guns behind in the main breaching
batteries and two on Monte Olia, to keep up a semblance of continued attack.
Dispatches, x. p. 566.
[829] The British officer in command in the trenches, Major O’Halloran, was court
martialled, but acquitted. It was proved that he had given the correct orders to the
Portuguese captains of the companies on guard, who had not obeyed them. All
the prisoners except 30 were Portuguese.
[837] The gendarmerie were those who had come from the ‘legions’, employed in
1811-12-13 as garrisons in Northern Spain. They were embodied in units, horse
and foot, and used as combatants (as at the combat of Venta del Pozo, for which
see p. 71).
[838] As Table XVI in the Appendix shows, Foy’s division received two of Sarrut’s
regiments: Cassagne’s (now Darmagnac’s) took all the French infantry of the old
Army of the Centre: Villatte’s (now Abbé’s) was given two of Abbé’s regiments of
the Army of the North: Conroux’s division absorbed Maransin’s independent
brigade: Barbot’s (now Vandermaesen’s) received two regiments of the Army of
the North: Daricau’s (now Maransin’s) got half Leval’s ‘scrapped’ division, Taupin
the other half of it: Maucune absorbed one of Vandermaesen’s old regiments,
Lamartinière one of Sarrut’s.
[840] 2nd Léger of same, which suffered heavily at Vittoria while under Sarrut.
[842] Not only the Afrancesados but some of the Army of the North troops
withdrawn from the Biscay garrisons had a poor record, and had disgusted Foy in
his recent Tolosa fight. These were high-numbered battalions, recently made up
from the Bayonne conscript reserve.
[843] The best proof of the efficiency of the bulk of Villatte’s corps is that when
Vandermaesen’s and Maucune’s divisions were cut to pieces in the battles of the
Pyrenees, Soult made up a new brigade for each of them out of the Reserve.
Joseph’s French Guards fought splendidly at San Marcial. The Germans were very
steady veteran troops.
[845] See above, p. 533. Jourdan to Joseph, July 5. The memorandum had been
made over to Soult. Cf. Clere, Campagne du Maréchal Soult, p. 46, and Vidal de la
Blache, i. p. 182.
[846] One asks oneself why Soult did not give Reille the Maya attack, saving him
two-thirds of his journey, and send D’Erlon to join Clausel at St. Jean-Pied-du-Port,
by a march much shorter than Reille was asked to make.
[847] It is said that persons acquainted with the country told Soult to send the
whole column round by Bayonne, on account of the artillery, but that he refused.
As a matter of fact, Lamartinière’s division and some of the guns did go that
détour, owing to the broken bridge.
[857] Vittoria and light companies of Doyle, La Union, and Legion Estremena.
[861] See the very interesting letter of Bainbrigge of the 20th, printed as an
Appendix to the regimental history of that corps, p. 390.
[862] Bainbrigge says that it was 7 a.m. before the regiment reached the Linduz,
but that it was an hour earlier is demonstrated by the fact that they heard firing at
Roncesvalles after arriving. Now Byng’s fight on the Leiçaratheca began at 6 a.m.
Therefore Ross was on the Linduz earlier.
[863] What became of this Spanish company? Captain Tovey of the 20th (see
history of that corps, p. 408) says that the French ‘made the Spanish picquet, who
were posted to give us intelligence, prisoners, without their firing a shot’. Another
account is that having seen Ross arrive, they quietly went off to rejoin their
brigade, without giving any notice.
[864] There is a curious and interesting account of all this in the Memoirs of
Lemonnier-Delafosse, aide-de-camp to Clausel, who was twice sent to stir up
Barbot, whose conduct he describes in scathing terms (pp. 212-14). Clausel says
that the 50th stormed the Leiçaratheca. That it stormed an abandoned position is
shown by the figure of its losses. What Clausel does not tell can be gathered from
Byng’s workmanlike dispatch to Cole, in Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 128-9.
[866] I confess that I doubt these figures. Martinien’s lists show the 27th Line
with seven officer-casualties, the 1st Line with two, the 25th Léger with three, the
130th with two. Fourteen officer-casualties ought to mean more like 280 than 100
casualties of all ranks. In the whole Pyrenean campaign the French army lost 120
officers to 12,300 men—nearly 30 men to each officer. Clausel asks us to believe
that at Roncesvalles the proportion was one officer to twelve men! Yet, of course,
such disproportion is quite possible.
[867] While we have quite a number of good personal narratives of the fight on
the Linduz, I have found for the fight on the Leiçaratheca nothing but the official
reports of Clausel, Byng, and Morillo, save the memoirs of George L’Estrange of
the 31st and of Lemonnier-Delafosse, who is interesting but obviously inaccurate,
since he says that the French regiment which carried the hill was the 71st. Not
only was it the 50th, as Clausel specially mentions, but 71 was a blank number in
the French Army List.
[868] Four, not five, because the light company of the 20th was absent with the
other light companies far to the right: so the wing was only four companies
strong, or three deducting Tovey’s men. Wachholz forgets this.
[870] Tovey fortunately wrote a narrative of this little affair, which may be found
in the history of the 20th, p. 408. He says: ‘The enemy’s light troops opened so
galling a fire that Major-General Ross called out for a company to go to the front.
Without waiting for orders I pushed out with mine, and in close order and double-
quick cleared away the skirmishers from a sort of plateau. They did not wait for
us: on reaching its opposite side we came so suddenly on the head of the enemy’s
infantry column, which had just gained a footing on the summit of the hill, that the
men of my company absolutely paused in astonishment, for we were face to face
with them. The French officer called to us to throw down our arms: I replied
“bayonet away,” and rushing on them we turned them back down the descent.
Such was the panic and confusion caused by the sudden onset, that our small
party (for such it was compared to the French column) had time to regain the
regiment, but my military readers may rest assured that it required to be done
double quick.’
[871] This ditch had been cut by the Spaniards in 1793 as an outer protection to
their redoubt on the Linduz.
[873] The 6th Léger, 69th (2 battalions), 76th, and 36th show casualties, the rear
regiments (39th and 65th) none. Nor does Maucune’s division. Similarly on the
British side none of Anson’s or Stubbs’s battalions contribute to the list.
[874] As we have seen already, Clausel puts his loss at the Leiçaratheca at 160,
to Byng’s and Morillo’s 120. At the other end of the line Ross’s brigade had lost
216 men—139 of them in the 20th, 31 in the 7th, 42 in the 23rd, 4 in the
Brunswick company. [I know not where Napier got his strange statement that this
company lost 42 men: their captain, Wachholz, reports 2 killed and 2 wounded.]
Foy’s six front battalions had lost 10 officers and 361 men. The total Allied loss
was about 350, there having been a few casualties among Campbell’s Portuguese
and among the Spaniards at Orbaiceta. The total French loss was not less than
530. Both figures are very moderate. Cole estimated the French casualties at
2,000 men! Soult wrote that he had almost exterminated the 20th, whose total
loss had been 139.
[878] Cole to Murray, Linzoain, July 26th. Wrongly dated July 27th in
Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 124.
[879] See diary of Dr. Henry, who was at Elizondo, and notes how all the senior
officers rode out eastward (p. 161).
[881] One from each battalion plus the odd company of the 5/60th attached to
each 2nd Division brigade.
[882] See Hope’s Military Memoirs, p. 319. Sceptical observers with telescopes
said that the objects seen were droves of bullocks.
[885] Mr. Fortescue (History of the Army, ix. p. 258) thinks that the 34th got up
in time to join in their last struggle. But Bell of that regiment says ‘we laboured on,
but all too late—a forlorn hope—our comrades were all killed, wounded, or
prisoners. The enemy had full possession of the ground.’ Bell’s Rough Notes, i. p.
103.
[888] All this is most difficult to follow, our numerous sources contradicting each
other in matters of detail in the most puzzling fashion. For this part of the
narrative I have used, beside the dispatch of William Stewart, the books of Moyle
Sherer of the 34th, who commanded the Aretesque picquet and was taken
prisoner—Sir George Bell of the same regiment, Cadell of the 28th, Hope and
Sergeant Robertson of the 92nd, Patterson of the 50th, the two anonymous
diarists ‘J. S.’ and the ‘Scottish Soldier’ of the 71st, besides D’Erlon’s and
Darmagnac’s original dispatches, lent me by Mr. Fortescue. I take it that each
authority may be followed for the doings of his own corps, but is of inferior weight
for those of other units. Patterson says that the 34th was at one time in close
touch with the 50th, Cadell that the 28th and 92nd worked together, while Hope
says that the 28th was only seen by the 92nd right wing after it had ended its
terrible first entry into the fight. Patterson says that he saw O’Callaghan of the
39th fighting along with the 50th in the third episode of the combat, when,
according to other sources, that regiment had already retreated south toward the
valley with the 34th. Stewart’s dispatch only speaks of the 28th and 34th retiring
in that direction, not the 39th. A confused fight has left confused memories. I
cannot be sure of all the details.
[889] The statement in Napier and succeeding writers that the wounded of the
right wing of the 92nd formed a bank behind which the French advance halted,
and stood to receive the fire of the left wing of that same corps, whose bullets hit
many of its comrades, comes from the narrative of Norton of the 34th (Napier, V.
appendix, p. 442), who was some way off. That the troops which came up were
the right wing 71st, and not the left wing 92nd, seems to me proved by the
narrative of Hope of the 92nd, who distinctly says that the right wing were
relieved by the 71st, and that the left wing were still holding the Maya position
and under Stewart, who had just arrived, along with the left wing of the 71st
(Military Memoirs, p. 210).
[890] He himself in his dispatch only says that it was after 1 p.m.
[894] Stewart’s dispatch says that it was the 82nd who fought with stones.
[895] This was not the brigade to which the 82nd belonged, but the reserve
brigade of the 7th Division, short of one of its units, the 3rd Provisional.
[899] Wellington’s letter to Graham, giving the false report that D’Erlon had been
repulsed at Maya, is dated at 10 p.m. The letter to O’Donnell must be a little later,
as it repeats this error, but adds that a note has come in from Cole, saying that he
was heavily engaged at noon. Dispatches, x. pp. 566-7.
[904] This letter in Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 124-5, is there wrongly
dated July 27th (for 26th). Cole, of course, was no longer at Linzoain on the 27th.
[906] Picton to Murray, 8.30 p.m., Supplementary Dispatches, xviii. pp. 121-2.
[912] The tall hat is vouched for by George L’Estrange of the 31st, and Wachholz
from Ross’s brigade, the furled umbrella by Bainbrigge of the 20th, all eye-
witnesses, whose narratives are among the few detailed accounts of this retreat.
[914] See Quartermaster-General to Picton, enclosing letter for Cole, sent off
from Lesaca on July 23 (Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 112-13), which must
have reached Picton at Olague on the 24th.
[915] This seems a more controvertible plea. Orders went out from Lesaca on the
23rd, and must have reached Picton not very late in the day on the 24th.
Supposing he had marched from Olague on the afternoon of the 24th, he would
have been at Zubiri (only 6 miles off) on that same night, or even at Viscarret.
And from Zubiri to Roncesvalles is not an excessive day’s march for the 25th,
especially when firing was to be heard at the front.
[916] The remaining four were in the Caçador battalion of Stubbs’s Portuguese
brigade.
[917] Unfortunately all French losses are given en bloc for the six days July 27 to
August 1, and the casualties of each day cannot be disentangled. The casualties of
Maya and Roncesvalles can be ascertained, but not those of the subsequent days.
[918] Viz. about 6,000 of Cole’s division, 5,000 of his own, 1,700 of Byng’s
brigade, 2,500 of Campbell’s Portuguese at Eugui, only a few miles away, and
something under 4,000 of Morillo’s Spaniards.
[920] Napier says (v. p. 225), and all subsequent historians have followed him,
that Picton originally intended to place Cole on a line between Oricain and Arleta,
i. e. on the low back-slope of the ridge. This seems to me almost incredible, as
this ground is all running downhill, completely commanded by the much loftier
crests about the Col. Surely no one, according to the tactical ideas of 1813, would
take up a defensive position half-way down a slope whose summit is abandoned to
the enemy. I can find no authority save Napier (who was not in the battle) for this
curious statement. And I am justified, I think, in holding that the San Miguel hill
was the place where Picton intended to place Cole, by the narrative and sketch-
map of Wachholz of Ross’s brigade, who places the first position of the 4th
Division on a well-marked hill immediately to the right of Villaba, and close to the
3rd Division’s ground at Huarte. This must mean San Miguel.
[921] R. Hill’s, Ponsonby’s, the Hussar brigade, and D’Urban’s Portuguese, Fane’s
brigade, which was observing on the side of Aragon, did not arrive this day.
[924] Clausel in his report says that he arrived in time to see the 4th Division
cross the hill of Oricain.
[926] All this from the very interesting narrative of Clausel’s aide-de-camp
Lemonnier Delafosse (p. 220), who bore the first message to Soult, and was (like
his chief) much irritated by the Marshal’s caution and refusal to commit himself.
Clausel had got a completely erroneous notion of the enemy’s intentions—like Ney
at Bussaco.
[931] French critics expressed surprise that Wellington did not tell Pack to fall on
Clausel’s flank and rear. But the 6th Division, attacking from Olague, would have
been out of touch with the rest of the army, and Wellington did not believe in
attacks by isolated corps uncombined with the main army, and unable to
communicate with it. See Dumas’ Campagne du Maréchal Soult, p. 163.
[940] Reports of Maucune and Lamartinière dated August 3rd and 4th.
[942] There is a most curious and difficult point in this history of the first phase
of the action. Clausel says, and he is of course a primary authority, that though
Conroux was already deeply engaged with the 6th Division, ‘was being fired on
from all sides, was suffering severe losses, and had already had one of his
brigadiers disabled’ [Schwitter], he told him that he must join in the attack
‘swerving to the left so as to mount the hill in the direction originally assigned to
him’, which was done and Conroux immediately repulsed. I cannot see how this
was physically possible. How could Conroux, if already disadvantageously engaged
with the 6th Division, and ‘fired at from all sides’, break off this fight and attack
any point of the hill of Oricain? If he had gone away in that direction, who was
there to hold Sorauren against Pack’s people, who were pressing in on it, and (as
Clausel says) only a musket-shot away from it? As far as I can make out, Conroux
must have been sufficiently employed in fending off Pack and maintaining
Sorauren, so as to cover the flank of the other divisions, for the next hour or two.
No other authority but Clausel gives any hint that Conroux got away from Pack
and joined in the general assault. And I am constrained to think that Clausel
(strange as it may seem) is making a misstatement—and that when Conroux is
said to have been ordered to attack the hill by swerving to the left, he can only
have been keeping off Pack. I note that Vidal de la Blache and Mr. Fortescue try to
accept Clausel’s story, but that General Beatson (With Wellington in the Pyrenees,
pp. 170-2) ignores it.
[943] I include, in reckoning Picton’s force at Bussaco, his own division and the
three battalions of Leith’s first brigade which brought him help. In Cole’s Oricain
figures are reckoned the 4th Division, Byng’s brigade, Campbell’s Portuguese, and
two Spanish regiments.
[945] This exceptional use of grenadiers in the skirmishing line, I get from an
observation of Bainbrigge of the 20th, who expresses his surprise that the troops
with whom he was engaged, though acting as tirailleurs, were not light infantry,
but men in tall bearskin caps like the Guard, ‘some of the finest-looking soldiers I
ever met’ (p. 400).
[946] The 10th Caçadores, Campbell’s light battalion, was a very weak unit of
only 250 bayonets.
[947] Clausel’s report of August 2.
[949] The fourth battalion of the brigade, the 1/40th was detached below on the
Spaniards’ Hill.
[951] The Buffs lost only 2 men, the 1st Provisional (2/31st and 2/66th) only 5—
so can hardly have been engaged,—but the 1/57th had 63 casualties.
[952] The above narrative is reconstructed from Reille’s two reports (the
divisional report of Lamartinière, however, is useless) and from narratives of
Stretton of the 40th in Maxwell’s Peninsular Sketches, and Mills in the history of
the regiment by Smythies.
[953] There is little about this affair in the British narratives. Diarists were rare in
the 6th Division. The only point of interest I found in them is the mention of mule-
guns used by the French.
[954] Larpent, p. 221. Cf. Napier, v. p. 226: ‘That will give time for the 6th
Division to arrive, and I shall beat him’—words true in thought but perhaps never
spoken by Wellington.
[967] Expressed most clearly, perhaps, in the Orders issued by the Chief of the
Staff, Gazan, to the Corps-Commanders on July 29: ‘L’intention du Général en Chef
est de se porter avec toute l’armée sur la communication de Pampelune à St.
Estevan.’
[970] Ibid., Q.M.G. to Hill, p. 152. In this Da Costa’s brigade is called the Conde
de Amarante’s division, but Campbell had not yet joined Da Costa.
[973] These guns did not belong to Brandreth’s battery, the divisional artillery of
the 6th Division, but oddly enough to Cairnes’s battery, which belonged to the 7th.
See Duncan’s History of the Royal Artillery, ii. p. 190.
[976] That the firing began at dawn immediately is stated by Larpent, p. 210.
That the troops were under arms before daylight is noted by the anonymous
Soldier of the 42nd, p. 199. The attack by the 6th Division on Sorauren was
appreciably before the descent of Cole and Byng from the heights of Oricain.
[979] Maucune’s 34th Léger reports 13 officers and 531 men prisoners out of a
strength of 773. Why does Captain Vidal de la Blache, usually accurate, give this
as Maucune’s total loss in prisoners? (cf. p. 251). His other battalions contribute
another 550. Conroux’s 55th and 58th Line give respectively 282 and 348
prisoners—the other regiments smaller but appreciable lists of captured.
[980] Interesting accounts of this fight may be found in the narratives of Wood of
the 82nd, Green of the 68th, and Wheeler of the 51st—all in Inglis’s brigade. They
are, however, most confused, none of them having much notion of how or where
they came into the general scheme of the fight. All speak of the steepness of the
ground.
[981] I cannot make out for certain when Le Cor’s Portuguese joined Dalhousie
on the 30th, coming from the Marcalain road, where they had been placed on the
previous evening. Probably not early, as they had 64 casualties only (mostly in 2nd
Caçadores), while the other brigades had 200 apiece. The fact that the losses are
nearly all in the light battalion shows that a skirmishing pursuit was the task of Le
Cor’s men.
[982] Clausel’s report is (perhaps naturally) very reticent, and would give a
reader who had no other sources to utilize a very inadequate account of the day’s
work—no one could possibly gather from it that Conroux lost 600 prisoners and
Vandermaesen 300, or that the whole corps was in great disorder. For a picture of
Conroux’s division scattered over the hills, and its general storming at the
fugitives, see Lemonnier-Delafosse, p. 232.
The hours at which events took place on Clausel’s wing are hard to settle. I
follow him in making the artillery begin to play on Sorauren long before 7, the
infantry attack soon after that hour, and the loss of Sorauren about 9.
[983] So Lamartinière, who admits that there was ‘un peu de désordre’ but
confesses much less than Foy, for whose account see Girod de l’Ain, p. 221.
[985] So Foy. Reille thinks that it was Sarrasibar, 3 miles farther east.
[987] See Vidal de la Blache, p. 280, for complaints by the French maires of
atrocities committed.
[990] All this in Q.M.G. to Hill, &c., in Supplementary Dispatches, viii. pp. 154-5,
where it is stupidly printed after the evening orders given at 9 p.m.
[991] Soult says by way of Zubiri, Eugui, and Lanz, which seems a vast circuit—
this march must surely have been made on the preceding evening: in the dark it
would hardly have been possible.
[992] 75th Line. Darmagnac says in his report that its colonel attacked the
second position without orders. Martinien’s lists show that it lost 16 officers—
presumably therefore over 300 men.
[993] See casualty tables in Appendix. Maransin had no losses, having never
been engaged. Hill made an astounding blunder in estimating his total loss at 400
in his report to Wellington. Nine British and 36 Portuguese officers were hit—
exactly the same number as the French officer-casualties.
[997] Supplementary Dispatches, viii. p. 154, written at Ostiz, 30th July, many
hours after the preceding note to Alten, also written on the 30th but from Villaba.
It is endorsed by G. Murray, Lizaso, 11 a.m., 31st July.
[998] One battalion and one cavalry regiment, see above, p. 681.
[1001] In his report, as he explains, ‘je m’occupai de déblayer la route, qui était
encombrée d’équipages et de cavalerie.’
[1002] D’Erlon in his report of August 3 says that ‘the majority of the enemy’s
soldiers were drunk,’ an involuntary tribute to their wild pluck.
[1003] The 7th Division had a steep scramble and a tough fight; see the diary of
Green of the 68th, p. 162.
[1004] A fact mentioned only by D’Erlon and by Rigaud’s history of the 5/60th,
Fitzgerald’s corps.
[1010] Who were picked up by Reille some miles north of Santesteban, having
been sent forward on the Sumbilla road overnight, in charge of the convoy of
wounded. See Reille’s Report.
[1011] Reduced to five battalions, since it had detached one regiment to the
head of the column, and was short of two battalions which had escaped by
Almandoz, and one which had escaped by Zubiri and Eugui following Foy. See
above, pp. 699-700.
[1012] The chasseur regiments only—the dragoons having escorted the artillery
to Roncesvalles. Place in the column not quite certain—but see the narrative of
Lemonnier-Delafosse for P. Soult’s presence.
[1016] Napier (v. p. 243) and Stanhope (pp. 71-2) both say that they had the
anecdote from the Duke himself—but wrote many years after 1813. But Larpent’s
absolutely contemporary diary also has the tale (p. 218) written down on August
3, only two days after the supposed event.
[1018] Some good diarists had been wounded at Sorauren, and fail us after the
28th July.
[1019] One of the French officers killed on August 1, Hutant of the 59th, is
registered as ‘tué en défendant l’aigle.’ Now with such absurdly small casualty lists
as those shown above, the eagle can only have been in danger if the regiment
was ‘on the run.’
[1021] Reille says in his report that the order ‘halt,’ issued at the head of the
column, was repeated down the column of dragoons and turned in the noise and
confusion into ‘demi tour’. Whereupon the rear regiments thought the column was
cut off, and galloped back in panic. ‘Halte’ is not very like ‘demi tour’—but there
was no doubt about the panic.
[1022] We learn from Lamartinière’s report that it was one of the 118th regiment.
[1023] He declares in his report that he never heard of the trouble until nightfall.
[1027] D’Erlon complains that he found no French troops whatever facing the
bridge—i. e. the 118th and Maucune had disappeared long before his front
battalion got up. The battalions engaged were the 5th Léger and 63rd and 64th
Line—whose officer-casualties for that day were 1 killed and 8 wounded.
[1029] All these marches are mainly detailed from the excellent narrative of
Quartermaster Surtees of the 3/95th, pp. 223-6, supplemented by that of Captain
Cooke of the 1/43rd.
[1035] Some, therefore, of P. Soult’s chasseurs must have been with the
rearguard.
[1039] Probably also we must add the responsibility for Hill and the 2nd Division
being at Elizondo this day, owing to the false march which they had made—on
Wellington’s orders—from the Puerto de Arraiz to the Velate road.
[1049] Wellington thought this the most desperate and gallant charge he had
ever seen. Dispatches, x. p. 591.
[1050] Report of Clausel, August 2. ‘Les troupes relevées n’ayant pu, malgré les
efforts des généraux Conroux et Rey, s’arrêter sur la position indiquée, et s’étant
jetées sur celles qui repoussaient l’attaque de la direction d’Échalar, il s’ensuivit un
peu de confusion, et on fut obligé de les laisser aller jusqu’à l’hauteur de la
division Taupin.’
[1052] ‘Devant la division Maransin je n’ai vu que des tirailleurs,’ says Clausel.
From the sequence of brigades in the 7th Division, I think these must have been
Lecor’s people.
[1053] Cooke, i. p. 320. Both he and Surtees mention that the evicted French
battalion was the 2nd Léger—a fact not to be found in the reports of Lamartinière
or of Reille.
[1054] The total French loss was probably not very great—as happens when
troops give at once, and are not pursued. Conroux’s division only records 5 officer-
casualties, Vandermaesen’s 8—which should mean a total casualty list of 300 or
so. But it is astonishing to find Reille reporting that Maucune lost only about 20
men; if so, the flank-guard cannot have stood at all.
[1058] 6,440 to be exact. Of which 4,708 were British and 1,732 Portuguese. The
latter figure is worked out from the detailed Portuguese returns in Appendix No.
XXI, and is perceptibly lower than Wellington’s original estimate of 2,300:
stragglers no doubt had been rejoining.
[1061] After D’Erlon was removed to command the Army of the Centre, this
division was at different times under Remond and Semélé.
[1063] 3rd Léger, properly belonging to Lamarque’s brigade from Catalonia, was
short of four companies left in garrisons.
[1064] The second battalions of these corps were left behind, along with the
11th and 20th Ligne, two squadrons of 4th Hussars, one of 24th Dragoons, the
3/5th Léger, and some 250 Italian Light Horse, to hold down the kingdom of
Valencia.
[1066] The other Guards’ Brigade, 1st and 3rd batts. of 1st Guards, was left at
Oporto and did not rejoin till August.
[1070] These figures are estimated from what was still surviving of each unit
when Soult reorganized the army in July 16. The Royal Guards infantry had then
2,019 men, the line cavalry 64 officers and 500 men, the line infantry 1,168,
though it had lost over 300 men at Vittoria and a much greater number from
desertion. I take it that to allow 300 extra men at the battle for the Guard infantry,
100 more for the Line cavalry, and 800 more for the Line infantry cannot be far
out.
[1071] About 40 prisoners of the 1/71st are lost among the general total of 223
‘missing and stragglers’: these were the only actual prisoners lost in the battle.
See p. 416 of this volume.
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*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A HISTORY OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR, VOL. 6, SEPTEMBER 1, 1812-AUGUST 5, 1813
***