UNITY JOURNAL

Volume III, February 2022

Unity Journal
Vol. III, 109-120, 2022
Doi: https://doi.org/10.3126/unityj.v3i01.43319
Prithvi Narayan Shah Research Center
Directorate General of Military Training, Nepali Army
Kathmandu, Nepal

How Can Classical War Philosophies Solve Modern Security Challenges?

Umesh Gurung Shrestha

Abstract that the statesmen and military planners of

today can still find inspiration in the age-old
As the world is moving into the third decade battlefield concepts, such as political-military
of the 21st century, it is ever more filled with relationship, intelligence, deception, indirect
uncertainties and complexities per se. The approach, battle avoidance, and center of
scope of security agencies has grown beyond gravity, to resolve conflicts and improve the
just protecting the state from external and condition of global peace.
internal security threats. Instead, military
forces have to face a whole new domain of Keywords: conflicts, insurgency, military,
security challenges, unlike those from a few philosophy, security, strategy, terrorism,
centuries ago. Irregular and hybrid warfare has warfare
replaced the conventional way of battlefield
confrontation between the state armies. The 1. Setting the Background
global rise in insurgency, terrorism, civil The history of the world is built on wars and
wars, failed states, and humanitarian crises conflicts. The outcomes of war significantly
have made the security landscape even more affect the international order and the condition
volatile. In this context, modern problems of global peace. Although states no longer
require modern solutions. However, most of fight conventional warfare, the military forces
these contemporary solutions to our security and law enforcement agencies today have to
challenges can be traced back to classical deal with a different breed of security threats
war philosophies. This article attempts to within and beyond borders. Non-state actors
explain the emerging forms of conflicts and like terrorists and insurgents are increasingly
irregular security threats, and how those war shaping fourth-generation warfare (4GW).
theories and strategies are more effective in As a result, the current security landscape has
managing them. It starts by reviewing the key become quite volatile, uncertain, complex,
ideas of selected classical military thinkers and ambiguous (Kuo, 2007). This entirely
such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Frederick II, new domain of security challenges is unlike
Clausewitz, Jomini, and Liddell Hart. The anything the states had witnessed before.
latter part of the article discusses their present
relevance and analyses recurring American Despite the advancement of information
experiences with low-intensity conflicts like technology and revolution in military affairs,
insurgency and terrorism from the perspective the basic nature of war has remained the same
of classical war philosophies. It is observed throughout the ages. Much of the analogies

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to contemporary security challenges can be 2. Decoding Classical War Philosophies

traced back to classical war philosophies.
Modern history has little to offer when it War philosophies are the means of gaining
comes to prescribing appropriate strategies insight into the complex phenomenon of
for irregular and hybrid war scenarios. The modern warfare. They provide a conceptual
American experiences with Vietnam, Iraq, framework to understand the nature of
and recently, Afghanistan show that warfare emerging security challenges and provide
requires strategic rethinking. The surge in strategic guidelines to resolve the current
global and regional terrorism, insurgency, and future security problems. Classical war
civil wars, failed states, and humanitarian philosophies are rich in wisdom, but they are
crises constitute the face of security challenges hard to interpret at the same time. This section
in the 21st century. But the current and future briefly discusses the key war strategies and
developments in the conduct of warfare will theories penned and practiced by notable
always carry the tints of ancient and medieval military thinkers like Sun Tzu, Machiavelli,
history (Grygiel, 2014). Frederick the Great, Clausewitz, Jomini, and
Liddell Hart.
Analyzing the strategic environment from the
eyes of classical war strategists offer more 2.1 Sun Tzu
effective solutions to modern-day conflicts Sun Tzu is the greatest war philosopher of
rather than just leaving it to the fate of trial all time. His classic work on The Art of War
and error. Such war philosophies are not is still as relevant as when he first wrote it
only applicable in battlefield and military almost 2500 years ago. It is a must-read
academies but, most importantly, statecraft philosophy in military academies across
(McNeilly, 2015). History is forever indebted the globe. Today, its principles have grown
to the ideas put forth by great military thinkers beyond the scope of military warfare to
such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, address crises and conflicts faced by modern
and others. Most of these treatises are societies and states.
centuries old but still offer a timeless piece of
The Art of War describes how to be victorious
advice that is relevant today.
in decisive battles and wars. Surprising
This article attempts to appreciate the as it may seem, Sun Tzu was not a big fan
classical war philosophies and examine how of direct military confrontation. Instead,
they contribute to understanding the evolving he focused on the philosophy of winning
dimensions of security. The following section without fighting and recommended the use of
organizes and reviews the selected strategic statecraft by means of political, diplomatic,
thoughts. Then it proceeds to discuss and and economic efforts to ensure the state’s
analyze their continuing relevance in the light victory. He believed that war should be used
of modern security challenges, especially as a last resort and advocated an indirect
insurgency and terrorism. An extensive approach to exploit the flaws and weaknesses
portion of secondary resources, like books, in the enemy’s plans and strategy. This is
journal articles, magazines, and such, were known as “wise war strategy”, where military
consulted by the author to address the means are used in non-combative methods to
research question and justify the topic. overwhelm the enemy with surprise, speed,

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deception, and intelligence to win the battle conscription, who were more reliable and
before it begins (McNeilly, 2015). obedient than the hired mercenaries (Gilbert,
1986).
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
Sun Tzu placed greater importance on the Machiavelli’s works on The Prince, The Art of
use of intelligence and deception to win War, and The Discourses were revolutionary
wars. War is a mind game that could be won in their own right. Even when war tactics
by distorting the opponent’s perception of improved technologically over the years, his
reality. For instance, when able to attack, you theories remain relevant. Although widely
must seem unable to do so; when nearby, give shunned by critics, his ideas were admired
them the impression that you are far away, by Clausewitz, who deemed him to possess
and vice-versa (Critzer, 2012). Eventually, sound judgment in military matters. A rather
the successful execution of these strategies critical man himself, Clausewitz recognized
depends on the nature of military leadership. Machiavelli’s idealism in forming his own.
Throughout The Art of War, Sun Tzu has
emphasized the role of a general or leader, his 2.3 Frederick the Great
appointment, and professional independence Frederick the Great (1712-1786) laid the
which is central to understanding the nature foundation of modern Germany during his
of political and military relationships even rule as the Prussian King in the 18th century.
today. This is further illustrated later in the His military strategies featured the perfection
article. of ancient warfare and the beginning of
a modern era of combat with the French
2.2 Niccolò Machiavelli Revolution. As a philosopher-king, Frederick
Machiavelli (1460-1527) marked a period portrayed himself as anti-Machiavellian,
of transition from ancient warfare to the arguing that statecraft should be driven by
medieval and successive modern era of ethical values and means should be balanced
political thought. According to him, victory with ends (Gray, 1999).
was the only thing that mattered in war.
Therefore, the commander should not The Prussian army reached the height of its
hesitate to use any means possible to defeat military glory during Frederick’s regime.
the enemy completely if it ends the war He advised his generals to befriend the
quickly. In his own words, war should be neutral countries against the common enemy
short and sharp. Although his ideas were and always wage an offensive war. The
morally controversial at the time, he triggered attack should be deliberately planned, well-
a wave of changes in the theory and practice rehearsed, and perfectly executed. All the
of contemporary warfare. while, the operation should remain highly
confidential (Phillips, 1985).
Machiavelli pushed for military reforms
by associating warfare with policy matters Frederick introduced several military reforms
of the state. He considered confidence, by focusing on the composition and discipline
loyalty, and discipline as the preconditions of his military. He valued the quality of the
to victory in war. Therefore, he emphasized army over its quantity. While he took good
that the government should have a citizen- care of his soldiers, he also put a tight leash
army composed of its own citizens through on the troop. His practical model of statecraft

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inspired successive generations of military 1999). The wisdom lies in knowing when to
generals and theorists and continues to shape stop. In general, Clausewitz did not attempt
the modern world order even today. to define warfare in terms of a specific set
of military instructions. The philosophical
2.4 Carl von Clausewitz approach in writing On War makes his work
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was unique and timeless, which is still applicable
a Prussian military general who wrote in the context of modern security challenges.
extensively on war and strategy based on
the observation of Napoleon and Frederick’s 2.5 Antonie Henri de Jomini
military campaigns. His On War still remains As a contemporary of Clausewitz, Antonie
the most detailed and influential war treatise Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) provides an
to date. Clausewitz (1832, as cited in Paret, eye into the transformation of warfare during
1986) stressed the political nature of war, the Napoleonic era. He wrote and published
stating that “war is a mere continuation of several books on military strategies for which
politics by alternative or military means” (p. he is regarded as the father of modern strategy.
200). The political goal must be clear before His work on the Summary of the Art of War
waging war. He viewed military forces as published in 1838, is the most remarkable
means to political ends. There is too much contribution to modern military theories and
at stake to leave warfare as an autonomous practice.
military act. Therefore, Clausewitz argued
for domination of political leadership over Jomini was a master strategist and practitioner
military objectives in the conduct of war. of war himself. He wrote extensively on
the operational and tactical levels of war.
This political-military relationship reveals He perceived the battlefield in geometrical
three main elements of war, viz. the people, terms and preferred to call it the “theater
the military, and the government, collectively of operations.” Like Clausewitz’s center of
known as the “trinity of forces.” Each of them gravity, Jomini believed that the fundamental
has its own tendency of war. The popular principle and key to success lie in
opinion and attitude of people, professional concentrating forces at the enemy’s decisive
military capabilities, and the policy direction points. In other words, he emphasized striking
of the government interact with each other with greater offensive force at the weakest
to determine the nature and progression of and most vulnerable point of the enemy to
events in war (Howard, 2002). create maximum damage (Malik, 1999).
One of the key tenets in Clausewitz’s strategy Similar to Sun Tzu, Jomini was also aware of
is the “center of gravity.” He believed wars the complex nature of political and military
could be won by attacking at the enemy’s source relationships. He argued that military
of strength with speed and concentration of leadership should be independent to take
forces. However, Clausewitz warns against care of military matters without any political
getting carried away with victory to the or bureaucratic interference. Jomini was
extent of exceeding the “culminating point.” largely driven by the desire to create a system
If the military pushes its offense beyond the for waging wars successfully. Though not
culminating point of attack, it will not be able without flaws, his theories and principles still
to maintain a strong defensive position (Gray, influence military thought and practice.

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2.6 B. H. Liddell Hart 3. Understanding Modern Security

As uncertainty was looming over the conduct Challenges
of warfare during the First World War,
The global security environment has changed
Basil Liddell Hart (1895-1970) emerged
drastically over the centuries. An alliance of
as an influential military strategist in the
world power has ensured peace to a certain
western world. He was particularly critical
level, but many security challenges still exist.
of Clausewitz’s offensive approach to war
Although wars may no longer be fought
that led to devastating consequences. Against
conventionally, the states still find themselves
this backdrop, Liddell Hart echoed Sun Tzu
tangled in conflicts within and beyond
and Jomini, stating that war must be fought
borders. New forms of security threats are
intelligently, effectuating, as a consequence,
emerging, which are multidimensional in
the least damage possible.
nature with far-reaching consequences that
Liddell Hart was the mind behind the cripple the nation-states. As a result, the
indirect approach and mechanized warfare modern security landscape is becoming
(blitzkrieg) in the Second World War. He increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex,
focused on the strategy of least resistance to and ambiguous, abbreviated as VUCA (Kuo,
achieve an advantageous position, rendering 2007).
battles unnecessary for a decisive victory.
The world order has become quite dynamic
His contribution to military thought lies in
after the Second World War. States no longer
reorganizing Sun Tzu’s ideas of surprise,
seem to wage active wars but continue to rock
speed, deception, and intelligence in the
the boat with proxy wars, further stretching
form of an indirect approach to war. He
the grounds for conflicts. The United States
was against direct confrontation because it
of America dragged itself into the Vietnam
triggers resistance from the other side. Instead
War (1955-1975) which turned out to be one
of striking with greater force at the enemy’s
of the bloodiest conflicts in the history of
center of gravity, it is wise to take the least
warfare. America is still unable to justify its
expected route or the line of least resistance
involvement in Vietnam. The whole country
(Malik, 1999). His thesis of the indirect
was divided on whether the war was necessary
approach serves as a blueprint for 21st-
at all (Tucker, 2011). On top of that, the U.S.
century strategic decisions securing a special
military suffered badly despite being heavily
mention in modern strategic discourse.
armed compared to Vietnamese guerrillas.
It is worth noting here that strategy is not This marked the evolution of unconventional
just about winning wars; it is about resolving irregular and hybrid warfare that has become
conflicts and ensuring lasting global peace a de facto form of confrontation between the
and order. But there seems to be a lack of states today.
consensus regarding its approach. Without
The Soviet Union had a bitter experience with
consolidating these different philosophies, it
Afghanistan in the 1980s that eventually led
is impossible to effectively find a way out of
to its collapse in 1991. There was a significant
the modern security crisis.
increase in insurgency and terrorism in the
following years, notably the rise of Osama
bin Laden and his al-Qaeda. The 9/11 attack

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on the World Trade Center turned out to be 4. Return of Classical War Philosophies in
a major eye-opener, not only for the U.S. Modern World
government and military but for the entire
world. Subsequently, America declared the As the new form of conflicts and irregular
“War on Terror” and invaded Afghanistan in security threats continue to rise globally,
2001. After 20 years of fighting against the the study of warfare has become even more
Taliban insurgents, it proved to be yet another critical. Wars are fought with arms but won
strategic failure on the part of America. with strategies and tactics. The classical
Everything is back to ground zero. military ideas discussed earlier in the article
have withstood the test of time. Although
Modern warfare has grown beyond the scope the battlefield dimension has changed
of Clausewitz’s trinity of forces. Non-state significantly in recent decades, several
actors like terrorists, insurgents, warlords, strategic concepts retain their validity even in
militias, and private security contractors are the face of modern security challenges.
increasingly shaping the conduct of warfare
while the states are taking a back seat (Jordan 4.1 Political and Military Relationship
et al., 2016). This evolution of terrorism Military forces and security agencies are
and insurgency mark the Fourth Generation built on a strictly defined chain of command
Warfare (4GW). According to Martin van featured by the principle of unity of command.
Creveld (1991, as cited in Sloan, 2012, p. 71), This authoritative culture is inducted into the
the post-colonial world saw an increase in the cadets from the basic training throughout
number of low-intensity conflicts that have their service. However, the complex politico-
led to a rise in the number of failed states, military relationships in the matters of
humanitarian crises, and civil wars. Military national security and war undertakings make
intervention alone is not enough to deal it difficult for the military to maintain their
with this situation because war is no longer political effectiveness (Lamb, 2010). A well-
fought by the states and armies but rather by functioning state is defined by the nature of the
insurgents, terrorists, and guerrillas. Unlike relationship between its military and political
conventional warfare, the 4GW requires the establishment. There is a long-standing
use of all aspects of national power (political, debate regarding each of their respective
economic, social, and military) to resolve roles in statecraft and warfare. Military plans
conflicts effectively (Critzer, 2012). and actions have to align with the policies of
the government. It is the role of the political
The main security challenge for modern leadership to create a favorable environment
societies, states, and armies is hybrid in for its army and provide strategic direction
nature. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the during crises and wartime (Malik, 1999).
ongoing tensions with Ukraine and NATO, Machiavelli’s push for conscription to raise a
the Syrian Civil War, and the emergence of disciplined and loyal citizen-army highlights
ISIS are a few contemporary instances of the importance of political direction in
hybrid warfare in the 21st century (Cîrdei, organizing and mobilizing the military for
2017). This situation calls for a rethinking enhancing national security as a whole.
of strategies and tactics to solve the
modern security challenges. Classical war However, this relationship should not be
philosophies offer a better solution. confused with the political micromanagement

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of military affairs. This is exactly what 4.2 Trinity of Forces

happened in the Vietnam War. The then U.S. When a state goes to war, it is not only the
President Lyndon Johnson and his secretary army that is involved but also the government
of defense, McNamara, went over the lines and the people. In other words, the nature of
in calling shots during the war. Johnson war can be understood in terms of the trinity of
had every right to do so as the commander forces, including the people, the military, and
in chief, but he overplayed his role. They the government. According to Clausewitz,
maintained close supervision over the each of them represents dominant tendencies
details of war-making that limited the role of war that define its dynamics. The 9/11 attack
of military commanders on the battlefield. and the Bush Administration’s declaration
Johnson often reviewed the target lists to be of the Global War on Terror reignited the
hit by the U.S. bombers, limited the number significance of Clausewitzian Trinity in the
of raids and sorties, and even imposed rules 21st century. Due to the prevalence of non-
of engagement (RoE) for the soldiers. Such state actors in insurgency and terrorism, the
political considerations seriously crippled primary trinity of forces (passion, chance, and
the effectiveness of the U.S. troops. Johnson reason) is more relevant than the secondary
and his staff made a mess out of the global trinity (people, military, and government) in
military superpower by sending the military irregular warfare. Security crisis appears, and
to fight with one hand tied behind their back then war breaks out when the equilibrium
(Cohen, 2012). in this trinity is disturbed. Therefore, this
trinity of forces works as a framework in
However, it is not desirable to leave matters
understanding the nature of modern security
of war entirely to the discretion of military
challenges.
authorities alone. Modern security challenges,
like insurgency and terrorism, are increasingly These forces should remain in balance at all
becoming political. The ultimate goal is long- times to provide strategic direction guidelines
lasting peace, not violence. The use of military for decisive operations. Although America
force is not always the answer. Clausewitz went to war with massive international
viewed war as a continuation of politics, thus support and popular will, there was no
a political objective, and the military as only clear understanding of what they hoped to
the means to an end. Frederick rejected the achieve. Failing to learn from the Vietnam
Machiavellian idea of ends justifying the War, America went knee-deep in Afghanistan
means because it disturbed the international without good reason and lost public support
order and promoted a vicious circle of war. for its military actions (Fleming, 2016).
Victory without balance between means and For most Americans, the involvement in
ends might lead to consequences as bad as Afghanistan was simply not worth it. As a
that of defeat (Gray, 1999). result, the trinity collapsed, and the Afghan
war turned out to be yet another strategic
The role of political leadership should be to
failure for the global superpower.
reduce the friction of war, not exacerbate it
with excessive interference. Therefore, instead The context and actors of war have changed,
of overriding military leadership, Clausewitz but its nature remains the same. The condition-
saw greater value in a collaborative effort based approach considers the entire spectrum
where each plays their respective role.

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of war to include all actors (both state and military presence is favorable but not at the
non-state) and the intensity of conflicts, cost of a cataclysm. Commanders must know
notably in the Middle East. This approach when to practice their military supremacy
marks the departure from traditional threat- and when to withhold. In insurgencies, the
based or “who is the enemy” to capabilities- primary goal is not to control territory but to
based strategy, focusing on “how” the enemy win the hearts and minds of the population
fights (Glavy, 2002). This holistic approach affected by the conflict.
to defensive strategy can help the security
forces to develop, maintain, and enhance An indirect approach is relevant even today
their capabilities to solve future security as one can subdue their enemy into defeat
challenges. before the battle begins. At the strategic and
operational level, the troops that implement
4.3 Use of Indirect Approach elements of speed, surprise, and deception
The threat of a nuclear war has been can fight and win a low-intensity conflict.
imminent in recent times. While it is
4.4 Intelligence and Deception
impossible to envision how future conflicts
may occur, it is most likely to be won by the As discussed earlier, wars are not won
side that can mobilize its military prowess solely based on military force. Going to
accurately, dismantling the enemy’s center wars without the right information can
of gravity without provoking resistance from have serious, long-term consequences.
the opposition. This strategy of penetrating The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the
the enemy at its core and dislocating its result of basic intelligence failure. The U.S.
defenses is not new. Like Sun Tzu, Liddell- intelligence agencies alleged that Saddam
Hart emphasized the psychological aspect Hussein’s team was developing weapons of
of conflict to formalize and practice tactics mass destruction (WMD) and had ties with
that he dubbed as indirect approach (Malik, al-Qaeda. Sparsely informed U.S. President
1999). George W. Bush (2003), then sanctioned the
Iraq invasion and sent a coalition of 177,194
Being armored with the latest weaponry troops for “disarmament of Iraq’s WMD, the
is not the only factor that determines one’s liberation of the Iraqi people, and suppression
victory. In fact, the consequences may be of Saddam’s support for terrorism.” In reality,
just the opposite. Wars and conflict can be no such weapons existed. Although the
averted altogether with the use of the indirect invasion started as conventional warfare, it
approach. The Cuban Missile Crisis serves as eventually transformed into an insurgency.
an embodiment of this classic military tactic. From Machiavelli’s probing eyes, it was
The then U.S. President John F. Kennedy bound to happen as American forces lacked
could have reacted to the threat by directly detailed knowledge about its physical and
invading the Latin American country. Instead, human terrain (Lebovic, 2010).
he made the rational choice as prescribed
by Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart’s ideas of an The U.S.-led coalition could not gather
indirect approach to avoid the escalation of information from credible sources, spending
the Cold War into a nuclear war by pledging billions in the invasion that led to nothing.
not to invade Cuba (McNeilly, 2015). A strong McNeilly (2015) points out that Sun Tzu
specifically used the term “foreknowledge”

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to understand the enemy’s capabilities and their soldiers but millions in resources. One
intentions which is equivalent to intelligence of the biggest failures in history was the
in contemporary military jargon. Military Vietnam War which lasted over 20 years.
intelligence was of great value to Jomini as Similarly, when the Bush Administration
well. He went one step ahead of Sun Tzu in declared the “war on terror” in 2011, it was
terms of its collection and analysis. At the thought to be over quickly without taking a
time when the horse was the fastest means toll on the nation’s military and resources.
of transportation, and the highest point of The initial military action indicated that the
observation was a hilltop, he came up with victory in Iraq and Afghanistan would come
the idea of air observation or surveillance for soon. As the insurgency continued to increase
an advantage on the battlefield (Hittle, 1947). in the Middle East, the U.S. got more involved
This closely resembles the use of drones for in the conflict. Machiavelli was aware of the
surveillance in modern times. costs of prolonged warfare; that’s why he
justified the use of overwhelming force to
As crucial as gathering reliable intelligence cut the wars short and decisive. There are no
is, the art of spreading disinformation is strict rules in modern warfare. Sun Tzu had
vital to staying on top of the game. Both already diagnosed this ability of war to lead
Sun Tzu and Machiavelli advocated for the to unforeseen consequences, which is why he
use of deception to mislead and manipulate conceptualized the tenet of battle avoidance
one’s enemies, thus gaining the upper hand. in his Art of War (Critzer, 2012).
Pulling off a successful deception requires
skill and discipline. Frederick concealed his Even after deciding to go to war, it should be
intentions even from his own officers until “short and brisk” to achieve an advantageous
the time of execution. The art of deception in peace as soon as possible, as prescribed
the Allies was neatly arranged such that the by Frederick the Great. For this reason,
majority of German officers were not wary he instructed his generals to focus on only
of the blitzkrieg invasion until a few hours one enemy at a time and warned against
later. This element of surprise wards off the penetrating too deep into the enemy’s
enemies and falters their attack plans. territory. To coordinate the political-military
relationship, it was necessary for him to
In recent times, the practice of deception has assume the role of a soldier-king to align the
become challenging due to democracy and military strategy with the state’s policies (Telp,
a need for openness. Since all the countries 2004). These classical strategies could have
are under heavy media scrutiny, deceiving helped save countless lives and resources had
the enemy can be quite difficult but not they avoided the war or concluded it shortly.
impossible. The U.S. economy took a drastic hit after the
4.5 Battle Avoidance war, and a cycle of inflation was unleashed.
The verdict on who won the Vietnam War is
The best way to avoid the consequences of
still under debate. But one thing is for certain:
war is to avoid it in the first place. But since
The Americans were outraged that soldiers
conflict is inevitable in human civilization,
were dying over a lost cause. Even those who
wisdom lies in knowing when to wage
argue the U.S. won the war agree that it was
war and when to withdraw. War is a costly
a sour victory.
undertaking in which nations not only lose

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Unlearning from their experience in Vietnam, gravity is of prime importance in counter-

the U.S. military repeated the history in insurgency operations to understand their
Afghanistan. It began after the 9/11 attacks, sources of strengths, weaknesses, and
in which over 3000 people in the US lost their vulnerabilities.
lives. Thus began one of the longest wars in
history. Forbes (2021) reports that the cost The center of gravity concept works both
of war in Afghanistan exceeded $2 trillion ways. Osama bin Laden and his brainchild
in the last two decades. Countless civilian al-Qaeda carried out one of the deadliest
and military lives were lost. Over 2,500 US terrorist attacks in history. The 9/11 attack at
soldiers and more than 47,000 civilians were America’s economic power hub, the “center
killed, in addition to several unaccounted of gravity”, exposed the greatest military
casualties. The war was simply not worth it. superpower’s vulnerability. The US reacted
Following the exit of American troops, the by declaring war on terror and headhunt of
country has once again been ruled by Taliban bin Laden who was ultimately killed in 2011.
militants, rendering the past 20 years’ worth Despite his death, global terrorism is rising,
of army endeavors futile. The war was a and the extremist militant group is still active,
strategic failure that could never be won led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The center of
(Seldin, 2021). gravity in modern conflicts is rarely physical
in nature, making it more elusive and difficult
4.6 Center of Gravity to pinpoint (Gerges, as cited in Echevarria
The proliferation of militant extremist groups II, 2007, p.186). Al-Qaeda and other jihadist
in recent decades signifies the evolution of organizations are driven more by ideologies
decentralized warfare driven by non-state than a person. As a result, they still continue
actors. As a result, the concentration of violent to be a threat.
forces at the enemy’s center of gravity, as
The main political goal of insurgency is to
theorized by Clausewitz, is no longer a viable
gain legitimacy that depends on the will and
option because there is no definite physical
support it receives from the population. The
point to start with (Echevarria II, 2007).
need to win people’s “hearts and minds” is
Although military planners struggle with its
critical to conducting successful counter-
practical application in the modern context
insurgency operations and countering
of irregular warfare, the concept of center of
any other forms of irregular warfare. The
gravity still holds some validity even today.
British handled the Malayan insurgency by
Clausewitz defined the center of gravity as the identifying the critical factors to defeat the
enemy’s power hub that can be their armies, enemy. These critical factors were based on
capital, or allies. Interestingly enough, the analysis of the center of gravity (guerilla
Jomini’s concept of attacking at decisive forces) and critical vulnerabilities (civilian
points closely resonates with Clausewitz’s support) of the insurgents. By depriving the
center of gravity. Modern strategist Admiral insurgents of their main source of popular
J.C. Wylie (as cited in Echevarria II, 2007) support, the guerilla forces gradually
argues that it is not only about the strengths withered (Mallette, 1997). America tried to
but also the critical vulnerabilities (p. 178). follow a similar model of counter-insurgency
Therefore, analysis of the enemy’s center of operations in Vietnam but in vain.

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5. Conclusion old concepts, including, but not limited to,

the political-military relationship, use of
This study tries to emphasize that military intelligence and deception, indirect approach,
prowess alone is no longer sufficient to battle avoidance, the trinity of forces, and the
guarantee decisive victories in modern-day center of gravity.
conflicts and warfare. America’s recurring
experiences with its war on terror and Despite the changes in the context, intensity,
counter-insurgency operations are evident and actors of conflicts, the underlying
of the fact that direct military confrontation nature of war and the struggle for power
is neither feasible nor desirable to deal with and legitimacy remain constant. Classical
irregular threats and security challenges of war philosophies continue to retain validity
terrorism, insurgency, civil wars, failed states, in the current and future security landscape.
and humanitarian crises. Unlike conventional Historical events and experiences offer a
warfare, these are low-intensity conflicts plethora of statecraft and military wisdom to
increasingly dominated by non-state actors, solve modern security challenges for long-
making the contemporary security landscape lasting peace. While seeking solutions to
more volatile and uncertain—the evolution future problems, one needs to look at the past
of the 4GW calls for strategic rethinking in and learn from their predecessors because
terms of contemporary theory and practice of war is more about peace than the use of force
warfare. But modern history has very little and violence.
to offer in this regard. The statesmen and
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