Center for Security Studies

Myatezh Voina: The Russian

Grandfather of Western Hybrid
Warfare
25 Jul 2016
By Adam Klus for Small Wars Journal

A lot of ink has been spilled over the Russian version of hybrid warfare, but little has been
written about the pioneering work of Evgeny Messner and his flagship concept of myatezh
voina (mutiny or rebel war). Well, Adam Klus is here to solve that problem.
This article was originally published by the Small Wars Journal on 10 July 2016.
Colonel Evgeny Messner
More than two years after the Russian annexation of Crimea we’re arguably past the
point of peak hype on the topic of “Russian hybrid warfare”. Some authors question the
concept altogether, while others see it as a new way of waging war - one in which Moscow
successfully applied in operations against Ukraine. Whereas a lot of ink has been spilled
over this topic it’s somewhat surprising the works of Evgeny Messner and his flagship
concept of myatezh voina has not received much more attention by Western analysts.
Evgeny Messner (1891-1974) served during First World War as an officer in the Tsarist
Army. He later fought against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War.[1] After the Whites
were defeated he immigrated to Yugoslavia. During the Second World War he cooperated
with the Axis powers. Following the war he to immigrated to Argentina where he worked as
an academic and writer.
Messner’s views were very much shaped by the trauma of defeat during the Russian Civil
War where he experienced first-hand fighting against an enemy using irregular warfare,
terror and propaganda on a massive scale. Later, during the Second World War, he saw
from up-close intense guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare in the Balkan cauldron.
After immigrating to Latin America Messner focused on the peripheral and covert conflicts
of the Cold War. He saw them as the primary arena of the confrontation between
superpowers. Messner sought to understand the strategic logic behind various seemingly
disparate events. He was convinced that they were elements of a grand design crafted and
executed by the Communists.
Messner’s Views on the Evolution of Warfare
Messner based conceptualization of the new Communist way of war on several
observations related to the evolution of warfare in general.[2]
The peace–war dichotomy disappears. According to Messner thinking in binary terms
of peace and war had become meaningless. The nature of hostilities between states
increasingly did not conform to distinctive intervals defined by declarations of war and
peace treaties. A de iure state of peace or war may no longer reflect the de facto nature of
a relation between states. The peace-war dichotomy remain valid from a legalistic point of
view but loses the relevance of its politico-military aspect.
Messner observed that Communists think about peace as a period during which no formal
conventional war is being waged. Such definition of peace does not imply cessation of
hostilities between countries. In other words the political objectives (and hostile intentions)
remain unchanged but are being pursued by a different set of instruments and tactics.
A classic frontline does not exist. Messner noted that, just as there was no longer a clear
dividing line between peace and war, there was no clear line demarcating where the
majority of hostilities were taking place. The frontline disappears, making the entire territory
of a state a potential battlefield. Soldiers of the new type of war; terrorists, guerrilla groups,
or propagandists may be operating in various parts of the country they choose to attack.
In their operations they’re much less bound by the conventional geometry of fronts and
configuration of classic lines of supply. One of the key consequences of the disappearing
frontline is that the civilian population is likely to be participating more in actual warfare than
regular armed forces of the attacked state.
Center of gravity has shifted to the psychological domain due to increased vitality of a
states’ physical domain. Another important aspect affecting the evolution of warfare is the
shifting of a center of gravity in a conflict accompanied by an increasing vitality of a state.
Messner observes that during WW2 inflicting heavy damage to enemy’s physical base did
not lead to quick victory. Furthermore the occupation of enemy territory and destruction of
its regular armed forces does not end the conflict - but merely moves it to the next phase
where irregular and unconventional aspects will likely play a central role. The center of
gravity shifts from the physical to the mental domain with victory no longer guaranteed by
success on the battlefield - but instead requiring breaking the enemy’s fighting spirit.
Psychological factors take a central place in contemporary warfare. As was mentioned
above the conflict is no longer about conquering territory but about “conquering souls”.
Both the attacker and defender have to increasingly consider the psychological rather than
physical impact of every major operation. Victories and defeats matter mostly from the point
of view of their psychological impact. Orders are no longer divided into easy and difficult but
into those popular and unpopular among troops.
Conduct of warfare is undergoing increasing vulgarization. Warfare is increasingly based
on irregular and unconventional elements which, on average, represent a lower quality,
lower ethical standards and lower morale. This makes the conduct of war less professional
and more unpredictable. The “dirty-war” becomes a central rather than a lateral aspect of a
conflict leading to its vulgarization and barbarization.
Politico-strategic complexity of a conflict become overwhelming. Complexity of warfare
increases due to the growing number and diversity of parties involved in the fighting.
Conflicts no longer stay local; instead they increasingly attract external actors. The result
is a battlespace with a mosaic of participants operating in shifting configurations. In fact
the process may lead to a situation where the politico-strategic dynamics of the conflict
becomes unintelligible for outsiders.
Understanding the Concept of Myatezh Voina
Messner was convinced that the Communists had perfected a new type of unorthodox
warfare which allowed them to challenge, and possibly defeat, the West without fear of
provoking direct military confrontation. Based on his observations he gradually developed
the concept of myatezh voina (MV).[3]
Most of Messner’s thinking about MV can be found in; “The Face of Modern War” (###
########### #####, 1959), “Mutiny – the Name of the Third World War” (##### — ###
####### #########, 1960), “Mutiny-war” (###########, 1971).[4] Though the first position
does not explicitly refer to MV it constituted an important integral element for understanding
the concept.
Key Characteristics of Myatezh Voina
Unconventional and unorthodox. The tactical, operational and strategic art of MV focuses
on unconventional methods and instruments, such as betrayal, terror, or disinformation.
Classic conventional military plays a marginal role at best. The hallmark feature of MV is
the widespread use of diverse acts of violence such as armed robberies, hostage taking,
hijackings or piracy.
Strategic design remains highly ambiguous. To notice and understand MV one has to see
the grand strategic design behind seemingly random and unconnected acts of violence.
If MV is properly executed, the victim of the attack may not even realise, or at least reach
sufficient political consensus, that it’s a target of a massive well-coordinated campaign
waged by the enemy. One has to first see the strategic logic connecting, for instance,
violent manifestations, labor strikes, series of hostage takings and guerrilla attacks.
Professionally planned and executed. Despite the seemingly chaotic and amorphous nature
MV is waged in a systematic and thought-through fashion. It’s professionally planned,
organised and executed by a dedicated strategic command center. Though individual
events may seem spontaneous, even irrational, the role of emotions and improvisation on
the strategic level is reduced to minimum.
Protracted and gradualist in nature. Unlike revolution, which is both rapid and radical, the
MV is protracted and gradualist in nature. It avoids actions which, due to their severity and
scale, could stiffen an enemy’s resolve and strengthen self-defence instincts. The escalation
curve of MV is not too steep and aims for a gradual paralysis of the enemy while avoiding
causing a sudden panic. The latter could cause a risk of fuelling rather than extinguishing a
target’s willingness to fight. The cumulative level of violence exerted during a MV campaign
consists of multiple smaller-scale attacks spread through space and time rather than few
large acts of violence.
Guided by core tenets of warfare. Despite unorthodox (heretic) character, MV remains, at
its core, subject to the basic principles of warfare. Messner explicitly underlines such factors
as; the importance of surprising the enemy, the pivotal role of intelligence, striving to win at
the lowest possible cost, and maintaining initiative. Thus MV does not represent a paradigm
shift in warfare but rather a novel manifestation of the old principles of warfighting.
Based on nihilist principles. Though MV may be waged to advance a specific ideology,
e.g. communism, its philosophical principles are grounded in nihilism. One of the key
characteristics of the strategy is that it does not recognise values, laws or conventions,
including those of the ideology it’s used to advance. The amoral and nihilist nature is one of
the key characteristics making MV so dangerous. Though in principle the strategy can be
applied by any sufficiently skilled and resourced strategic actor it’s naturally less well suited
for Western liberal democracies.
Psychological domain is of utmost importance. Centrality of a psychological realm is
the most important characteristic of MV. First, the ultimate objective of the strategy is to
influence, in a favourable manner, the psyche of the enemy. Second, propaganda is an
essential instrument of the strategy. Third, kinetic operations are planned and executed
based on their psychological impact. Finally the intelligence effort is very much focused on
researching key cultural, psychological or sociological vulnerabilities of the adversary.
Objectives of Myatezh Voina
MV is fought mainly in the psychological realm. Every action, tactical, operational or
strategic, is considered primarily through its potential impact on enemy’s morale. As
Messner puts it metaphorically; MV aims at “fission of an enemy’s psyche” and “occupation
of the enemy’s soul”. In practical terms the main objective is to psychologically incapacitate
the adversary. Whether it will be achieved through demoralization, intimidation or
instilling doubt and confusion will be a function of circumstances. The key purpose of MV
psychological operations is to render the enemy psychologically unable to resist.
Messner proposes, in order of importance, the following list of objectives to be pursued by
an actor waging MV:
Destruction of enemy’s morale Defeat of enemy’s most active groups; e.g. army, guerrilla,
activists Capturing or destroying objects of high psychological value Capturing or destroying
objects of high material value Affecting morale of enemy’s allies
Actors of Myatezh Voina
One of the main features of MV is the large variety of actors engaged in its conduct. They
may consist of demonstrators, agitators, propagandists, criminals, saboteurs, terrorists,
guerrillas, and irregular fighters. The opportunistic and eclectic nature of the strategy makes
the list open-ended. Regular army units may also participate in MV but unlike in a classic
conventional confrontation they will play only an auxiliary role. Messner classifies MV actors
into four broad categories:
Revolted masses (######## #####) – large groups of agitated civilians staging public
protests and creating social unrest Crypto/Covert-forces (######## #######) – groups
and individuals acting covertly across a broad spectrum of violent activities ranging from
sabotage to acts of terrorism Resistance movements (######## #########) – irregular
units attacking the enemy using primarily guerrilla tactics Regular armed forces
Each category represents different levels of skills, reliability and violence. An actor may shift
between different categories and respectively move up and down the spectrum of violence.
For instance an individual may start as a demonstrator (i.e. revolted masses category),
then start engaging in acts of sabotage (i.e. crypto-army category), and later join a guerrilla
movement (i.e. resistance movement category). The process may also work in reverse.
How to Defend Against Myatezh Voina?
According to Messner, the foundation of a defensive effort against MV has to be based
on acknowledging the threat actually exists, i.e.: the various violent events are connected
and represent a strategic assault launched by a sophisticated adversary. This requires a
fundamental change in the mental and conceptual framework used in the West to be able to
identify and name a novel threat.
Philosophical underpinnings of a defensive strategy have to be based on the same
principles as MV. To illustrate this point Messner uses a comparison with revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary warfare. He points out that to be successful the counter-revolution
has to be based on revolutionary not reactionary principles i.e.; it should take a form of “re-
revolution”. According to Messner one of the key reasons why White forces were defeated
during the Russian Civil War was the fact that they tried to fight the Reds through classic
counter-revolutionary tactics. He also gives the example of General Francisco Franco,
Spanish Civil War, who in turn used a different set of revolutionary principles (i.e. fascism)
to defeat the Communist revolution in Spain.
Thus to counter MV one should not simply defend against it but rather wage a form of
own MV aimed at the attacker. Such counter-myatezh strategy has to encompass all
state domains to address a broad spectrum of potential attacks. This in turn may require
a pan-national mobilization. This should not be confused with classic militarization of
society based on putting citizens through military training and calling up reservists. Instead
one should see it rather as “weaponization” of society itself, i.e. using society’s different
functions as means for waging war.
One of the most important issues seen by Messner is the need for changing ethical
standards to make counter-myatezh effective. He effectively proposes to apply war-
time standards, for instance; potential hostages should not be rescued at any cost but
rather seen as POWs and not rescued at any cost. Overall the ethics should be “limited to
minimum”. The defender should actively reduce potential asymmetry in ethical standards to
counter the nihilistic threat of MV. In his prescription Messner goes as far as to propose the
creation of SMERSH[5]-like organization, which would effectively fight terror with terror.
He also provides some practical advice on the “division of labor” amongst a defender’s
security apparatus:
Internal troops should target insurgents and guerrillas Counter-intelligence and secret police
should target terrorists and saboteurs Propagandists should target propagandists
Though rudimentary in nature, the advice highlights an important issue of the need for the
defender to develop sufficiently broad spectrum of instruments.
Conclusions
Messner’s works, despite being more than half a century old, certainly have not lost their
relevance. On the contrary, many of his ideas remain central to contemporary discussions,
especially those revolving around the “hybrid theme”, e.g.:
Coordinated use of multiple unconventional and irregular actors to achieve strategic
objectives Skilful application of ambiguity to provide the attacker with plausible deniability
and obfuscating the very fact of the attack taking place Need for development of
comprehensive defensive strategy based on whole-of-government and whole-of-society
approach critical role of psychological and information factors in warfare
Given the breadth and depth of Messner’s insights, one would expect his works to
claim a more prominent place in all analyses and discussions related to “Russian hybrid
warfare”. This is especially true when compared with the hype surrounding (otherwise very
interesting) a 2013 article by Russian General Valery Gerasimov concerning the tendency
toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace.[6]
At the very least, Messner’s work should figure as a staple element in any “hybrid
flavored” analyses, particularly those related to Russian views on the subject. At most his
observations can provide a solid conceptual framework which can serve as an essential
building block in thinking about the evolution of modern unconventional warfare.
End Notes
[1] Messner reached a position of chief of staff in the Kornilov Division in the Wrangle Army
[2] Naturally questions of actual novelty and validity of Messner’s observations should be a
subject of scholarly debate
[3] The literary English translation means “mutiny war”, one can also find it being translated
as “rebel war”
[4] The three works can be found in: #.#. #######, ###### ####, ###### ###########!.,
Mockba 2005.
[5] SMERSH (1943-1946) was a Soviet umbrella organization unifying efforts of three
military counter-intelligence agencies. It was notorious for its ruthless but effective modus
operandi.
[6] Gerasimov, V., “######## ##### # ###########”, ######-############ ######, 27
February 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632, accessed 2 July 2016.
About the Author
Adam Klus is a consultant and researcher focusing on the questions of economic security
and economic warfare. He is also currently participating in the Countering Hybrid Warfare
track of the Multinational Capabilities Development Campaign in cooperation with the
Finnish Defence Forces. Adam is pursuing a PhD degree at the University of Eastern
Finland where he researchers economic threats posed by state proxies and non-state
actors.

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