701R

701R
THE 2024 PHILLIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AT THE PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
THE CASE CONCERNING THE STERREN FORTY
THE REPUBLIC OF ANTRANO

-APPLICANT
THE KINGDOM OF REMISIA

-RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(I) INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii
(II) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................................................x
(III) QUESTIONS PRESENTED.................................................................................................... xi
(IV) STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... xii
(V) SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS .................................................................................................xvi
(VI) PLEADINGS .........................................................................................................................1
A. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE DEPRIVATION OF

NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY TO THIS COURT. ......................................................1
1. ANTRANO IS NOT AN INJURED PARTY IN THE DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY .................1
2. THE CRS DOES NOT IMPUTE ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS ENFORCEABLE BY ANTRANO ..3
3. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY

EXTENDS TO DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF NATIONALS..........................................................5
B. REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DEPRIVED THE STERREN
FORTY OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DCA .........................................5
1. DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF REMISIA ..................................6
2. THE DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP OF THE STERREN FORTY SATISFIED THE APPLICABLE

PRECONDITIONS ....................................................................................................................8
3. THE DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY WAS PROPORTIONAL....... 11
C. ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED SAKI SHAW, A REMISIAN

CITIZEN, ACCESS TO REMISIAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES WHILE SHE WAS HELD
PRISONER IN ANTRANO ......................................................................................................... 14
1. MS SAKI SHAW HAS A RIGHT TO REMISIAN CONSULAR ACCESS .................................... 14
2. ANTRANO IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTEST MS SHAW’S REMISIAN NATIONALITY ............ 16
3. MS SAKI SHAW IS A REMISIAN CITIZEN ........................................................................ 17
i
4. MS SAKI SHAW’S REMISIAN CITIZENSHIP IS DOMINANT OVER HER MOLVANIAN............ 19
D. REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO ALLOW DR MALEX

TO ENTER REMISIA ............................................................................................................... 20
1. REMISIA HAS TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY TO DETERMINE WHO ENTERS ITS BORDERS . 20
2. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO EXERCISE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION ........................... 21
3. UN RESOLUTION 99997 DOES NOT IMPOSE BINDING OBLIGATIONS ON REMISIA ........... 24
(VII) PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................... 27
ii
(I) INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI 20, 6
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 21, 22, 24
13 February 1946
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175, 7

(1961 Convention)
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 21

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (16 December 2

1966) UNTS vol. 999
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946 33 UNTS x

993
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963 14
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 15, 24

Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331
UN PUBLICATIONS
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in 17

the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/36/103, Annex, (II)(a) (1981)
Expulsions of aliens in international human rights law, OHCHR, 21

Discussion paper, Geneva, September 2006
iii
Human Rights Committee, General Observation No. 34, Article 19: 13
Freedom of Opinion and Freedom of Expression
Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of 12

nationality: Report of the Secretary-General, 19 December 2013,
A/HRC/25/28
ILC ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’ UN Doc. A/RES/61/35 22

(2006), 61 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 505, Supp. No 10 (A/61/10)
ILC ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 2

Wrongful Acts’ UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001)
Report of the International Law Commission, UNGAOR, 67th Sess, 7

Supp No 10, UN Doc A/67/10 (2012) 9 at 32-33.
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of 8, 9, 10

Nationality under Articles 5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness HCR/GS/20/05
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 13

Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association on “Violence during
protests is not protected by international human rights law,”19
September 2012
DECISIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND PERMANENT COURT OF

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the 25, 26

Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, International Court
of Justice (ICJ), 21 June 1971
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5, 23, 24
iv
Judgment, Preliminary Objections, ICJ GL No 103, (ICJ 2007), 24th
May 2007
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 2, 4, 5

the Crime of Genocide, (Gambia v Myanmar), Provisional measures,
ICJ GL No 178, (ICJ 2020), 23rd January 2020
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the 24

Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 177
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of 16

America), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 31 March 2004
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. 5, 22

Spain); Second Phase, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 5
February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of 24, 26

the Charter), International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, [1962]
ICJ Rep 151
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), International 15

Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 2001
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 5, 9

Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 9

Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 10

(Nicaragua v. United States of America) (1986) I.C.J. Rep 103
v
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Advisory 6, 9, 18
Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Series B No. 4
North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v Denmark, Merits, 2, 3, 21

Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3, (ICJ 1969), 20th February 1969
Nottebohm, Liechtenstein v Guatemala, Preliminary Objection 6, 20, 18, 17

(Second phase), Judgment, ICGJ 185 (ICJ 1955), 6th April 1955
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 4

(Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 443-
445, paras. 50-55
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 3

the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 2

Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 41–59 (July 18)
DECISIONS FROM THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994, UN 8

Human Rights Committee (HRC), 4 January 1999
Miguel González del Río v. Peru, CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987, UN 12

Human Rights Committee (HRC), 2 November 1992
DECISIONS FROM THE AFRICAN COURT FOR HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS
Konate v. Burkina Faso App 004 of 2013, ACtHPR 12
Actions pour la Protection de l’Homme v The Democratic Republic 4

of Cote D’Ivoire App 001 of 2014, ACtHPR
vi
DECISIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Handyside v United Kingdom, Merits, App No 5493/72, ECHR 5 11
Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) App No 15318/89 24

EHRR 99
Riener v Bulgaria, App No 46343/99, (ECHR 2006) 8
Shebashov v. Latvia, App No. 58822/00 11
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) App No. 126/05 [2012] ECHR 868 13
DECISIONS FROM THE INTER AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Case of the Haitians and Dominicans of Haitan Origin in the 11

Dominican Republic v. Dominican Republic (Order of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights), Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACrtHR)
ARBITRAL AWARDS
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Decision in Case A/18 18, 20

Concerning the Question of Jurisdiction over Claims of Persons with
Dual Nationality, Int'l Legal Materials, 23 RIAA, 489 (1984)
MacKenzie v Germany, 1922-, Opinions of the Mixed Claims 17

Commission. United States and Germany, 7 RIAA, 628 (1922)
Merge Case (U.S. v. Italy) 14 RIAA 236, 247 (1955) 20
Salem Case (USA V Egypt) 2 RIAA, 1161 (1932) 17, 18
vii
MUNICIPAL COURT DECISIONS
Aziz & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] 13
WLR(D) 526
Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v Reagan [1988] 15

859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir)
Haitian Refugee Ctr v Baker [1991] 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir) 15
TREATISES AND TEXT BOOKS
Borchard, E. M. 1915. Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or 15

the Law of International Claims. New York: Banks Law Publishing
Clive Parry, John P Grant, Anthony Parry, and Arthur D Watts (eds), 28
Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law (1986)
Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural 12

Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of
Sovereigns (transl Charles G Fenwick) (1758) (vol 3, 1916)
Griffin, The Right to a Single Nationality, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 57, 63-64 20

(1966).
Katja S Ziegler, ‘Domaine Réservé’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 6

Public International Law (2013)
Ulf Linderfalk, The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern 24

International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Springer 2007). Pp 204-205
Vermeer-Künzli, A. "Diplomatic Protection and Consular Assistance 15

of Migrants." In Research Handbook on International Law and
viii
Migration, edited by V. Chetail and C. Bauloz, 265–280 (Edward
Elgar, 2014).
JOURNAL ARTICLES
D. Donoho, “Relativism versus Universalism in Human Rights: The 10

Search for Meaningful Standards” (1991) 27 Stanford Law Journal
345
I. Nguema, “Human Rights Perspective in Africa” (1990) 11 H.R.L.J 10
Michigan Law Review, Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era: 18

The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 83 MICH. L. REV. 597
(1984).
S. David and Thomas N. Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a 24

Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods”, Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 43, no. 3 (2010): 588-89.
ix
(II) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
By virtue of Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice [“ICJ”], the Court has
jurisdiction in cases which parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter
of the United Nations or in treaties and Conventions in force. Pursuant to Article 40(1) of the
Court’s Rules, the Republic of Antrano [“Antrano”] filed an Application in the Registry of the
Court, instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Remisia [“Remisia”] with regard to a
dispute concerning the differences between the Applicant and the Respondent concerning the
Sterren Forty. The Statement of Agreed Facts [“Compromis”] was jointly communicated by the
Parties to the Court on 15th September 2023.
x
(III) QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A. WHETHER ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE DEPRIVATION OF

THE NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY TO THIS COURT.
B. WHETHER REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DEPRIVED THE
STERREN FORTY OF THEIR REMISIAN CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DCA.

C. WHETHER ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED SAKI SHAW, A
REMISIAN CITIZEN, ACCESS TO REMISIAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES WHILE SHE WAS
HELD PRISONER IN ANTRANO.
D. WHETHER REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO ALLOW DR
MALEX TO ENTER REMISIA.
xi
(IV) STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties
The Applicant, Antrano is the Constitutional Republic in the Mahali Archipelago. Its first president
Muna Songida committed his nation to the plight of the stateless persons and was a vocal proponent
of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons in 1954 and the Convention on
Reduction of Statelessness in 1954. Antrano’s current president was also vocal about Remisia’s
deprivation of Citizenship of the Sterren Forty.
The Respondent, The Kingdom of Remisia is a Constitutional Monarchy with a highly revered
Monarch, Queen Khasat. The monarch’s powers include the appointment of the prime minister
and she assents to all legislation before it comes into force. Remisia’s Constitution entitles the
monarch to reverence. Remisia is also a mineral-rich state with copper, emeralds and cobalt in the
Isidre Plateau.
The DCA Act

In light of Remisia’s Constitutional provision for reverence of the Monarch, Remisia enacted the
Disrespect of the Crown Act in 1955 (DCA). The DCA provides for a five-year prison sentence or
deprivation of Citizenship for anyone who insults, defames or threatens the reigning monarch.
Until the Sterren Forty incident, the DCA had only been evoked less than 12 times and no Remisian
national’s citizenship had been annulled.
Upon Ratification of the Convention on Reduction of Statelessness (CRS), Remisia declared that
it intended to retain its Right to deprive nationality in accordance with Article 8(3) of the CRS
exercised through the DCA. Antrano objected to this declaration, terming it as an unlawful
reservation to the CRS.
The ILSA Protests

In 2014, Ms Saki Shaw proposed a cobalt mining joint venture between her company Lithos and
Remisia. The Lithos-Remisia Cooperative (LRC) was formed and it was projected to increase
cobalt mining in Remisia six fold, the mines were approved and employed over 4000 Remisians
xii
but generated a great deal of dust and there were allegations of health and environmental
degradation by one international travel website. These allegations prompted rallies and lectures by
students at the Remisia National University organised as the Isidre League of Students Activists
(ILSA)
LRC applied and obtained four more mining licences and one was denied by Remisia for public
health threats, however, the ILSA organised and called for nationwide strikes at Universities and
high schools. The protest escalated into verbal attacks against Queen Khasat with allegations that
she was responsible for LRC’s environmental degradation. The protest eventually became
disruptive characterised by exchanges with the police, blocking roads to the mines. The climax
was a protest blocking entry and exit at the Sterren Palace.
The Sterren Forty

The Sterren Forty are a group of forty students who were arrested after they staged a protest at the
Sterren Palace of Queen Khasat, blocking entry and exit from the palace. They were subsequently
arrested and presented in Court where they were charged for violating the DCA. The Sterren Forty
were convicted and their Remisian citizenship was stripped away, rendering them stateless. The
deprivation of citizenship of the Sterren Forty was met with backlash from Antrano which
condemned the Action of Remisia and even submitted a memorandum to the UN Secretary-
General alleging that the deprivation could endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security.
The Nationalization by Investment Act.

The Nationalization by Investment Act (NIA) was enacted in Remisia in 2008. This law authorises
the government to grant citizenship to any applicant who purchases real property, contributes to
the National Infrastructure Development Fund, or otherwise makes a direct investment in the
Remisian economy of €500,000 or more. The NIA has two stated purposes: to raise revenue and
to promote foreign investment and international commerce. The law does not require that the
applicant maintain a residence in Remisia. The Home Department of Remisia thereafter announced
the "Naturalization by Investment Program" (NIP), a worldwide marketing campaign which
invited high-net-worth individuals to apply for citizenship under the NIA. The NIP advertisements
xiii
were featured online and in major global financial publications, promoting the benefits of
Remisian citizenship, including the ability for passport holders to live, work, and study in Remisia,
to travel without a visa to 120 countries, and to obtain consular and diplomatic assistance in any
of the 140 countries where Remisia has an embassy or consulate. The NIA has generated over €1.5
billion in gross revenue for Remisia since its inception through the end of 2021.
Ms. Saki Shaw

Saki Shaw was born in 1970 in Molvania, an island nation in the Caribbean Sea. She gained
Remisian citizenship through the National Investment Act (NIA) by contributing €500,000 to the
National Infrastructure Development Fund. She was a good friend of Queen Khasat of Remisia.
As the CEO of Shaw Corp, a multinational minerals and mining conglomerate, and the founder of
Lithos, a mining company, she proposed a joint venture with Remisia to increase cobalt mining
and refining significantly. However, while travelling to Antrano using her Remisian passport, she
was detained by Antranan police based on an extradition request from Molvania. Despite her
demand to exercise her right to speak to the Remisian consul, her request was denied. This denial
of consular access occurred after she presented her Remisian passport at the immigration
checkpoint, was cleared for entry, and was subsequently detained by Antranan police. Remisia
requested to have access to her while she was detained. Tragically, she collapsed in jail and later
died of a heart attack.
UN Resolution 99997
On 11 April, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 99997, which established the
UN Inspection Mission to Remisia (UNIMR). The resolution aimed to investigate the revocation
of citizenship in Remisia and its compliance with international law regarding statelessness.
Remisia protested the resolution, claiming it was unprecedented, illegal, and unwelcome in their
country.
Dr Malex
Dr Tulous Malex, an Antranan national and a world-renowned expert in matters relating to
statelessness, was selected to lead the UN Inspection Mission to Remisia (UNIMR). Dr Malex
holds the Songida Chair in Human Rights Law at the State University of Antrano and is the senior
xiv
legal advisor to the Department of Nationality Rights. On 1 June 2022, UNIMR began its
preliminary research, and on 14 July, Dr Malex submitted a formal request to Remisia to meet
with the Sterren Forty. Remisia refused to allow Dr Malex to enter the country without proper
documentation, claiming that his visit would be unlawful and unjustified meddling in their
domestic affairs.
Antrano deposited a declaration when it acceded to the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations in 1948. In this declaration, Antrano stated that its right under
customary law to exercise diplomatic protection for its nationals remains intact, even in cases
involving the interests of the United Nations. This declaration was not objected to by any member
of the Security Council.
xv
(V) SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
-A-
The Applicant lacks standing in the matter of the deprivation of citizenship of the Sterren Forty
because it is not an injured party in the alleged deprivation. The right to nationality allegedly
violated by Remisia is not owed to Antrano but to the Sterren Forty who are Remisian Citizens.
The alleged breach does not specifically affect Antrano’s interest, any reciprocal obligation owed
to it by Remisia or the Rights of any Antranan Citizens.
Secondly, the CRS does not give rise to erga omnes partes obligations which would be enforceable
by Antrano as a non-injured State. It can be inferred from the flexible provisions of the convention
that it does not intend to attribute erga omnes partes obligations for State parties on deprivation of
citizenship. This is because; unlike the Convention against Torture and the Convention against
Genocide, the CSR has exemptions. The CRS neither deals with Jus Cogens Rights or
Internationally recognised obligations which have been held to give rise to erga omnes obligations.
-B-
Remisia has a sovereign right to deprive citizenship which it exercises as a domaine réservé. The
State’s right to deprive citizenship is recognised in international law and it is only subject to the
following preconditions; enabling legislation, non-arbitrariness and the right to a fair hearing.
These preconditions are satisfied by Remisia’s DCA which was enacted to protect Remisia’s
constitutional foundation which is the reverence of the Monarch. Reverence of the Monarch is a
demonstration of loyalty to the Kingdom of Remisia.
If a human rights test is to be applied, the deprivation of the citizenship of the Sterren Forty was
proportional because of the gravity of the offence they committed in the context of Remisia. The
deprivation is the least intrusive measure for the grave offence committed and does not destroy the
essence of the right to non-arbitrary deprivation of nationality or freedom of expression. Secondly,
permanent deprivation of human rights is not unprecedented or disproportional in instances where
a sentence of 5 or more years is applicable.
xvi
-C-
Antrano's refusal to grant consular access to Ms. Saki Shaw, a Remisian citizen, constitutes a
violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). This breach not
only disregards Ms Shaw's individual right to consular assistance but also contravenes the
principles of sovereignty of the state of Remisia to determine how its citizenship is obtained.
Antrano has no right to contest Shaw’s Remisian citizenship without prior consideration of the
International law principles that apply to citizenship. Despite her dual citizenship, the Respondent
submits that Antrano had to recognise Ms Shaw’s Remisian citizenship which is dominant over
her Molvanian.
-D-
Remisia's denial of entry to Dr Malex aligns with the principle of sovereignty and Remisia’s
inherent right to control its territory enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter. While Remisia
acknowledges its international law obligations, it asserts there is no binding duty to admit Dr.
Malex into Remisia. Antrano's pursuit of diplomatic protection for Dr Malex, based on the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPI), is flawed as the rights
in the CPI are not personal rights owed to Dr Malex but to the United Nations. Antrano's
declaration under Section 23 of the CPI is equally an unlawful reservation because it lacks
compatibility with the treaty's object and purpose.
Additionally, UN Resolution 99997, passed under Chapter VI of the UN Charter is not binding
because it requires Remisia's consent to have a binding effect. The resolution falls short of the
stringent criteria for Chapter VII enforcement, making Remisia's refusal to uphold by not granting
Dr Malex entry within its sovereign rights.
xvii
(VI) PLEADINGS
A. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE DEPRIVATION OF

NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY TO THIS COURT.
Antrano lacks standing to bring the matter of the deprivation of nationality of the Sterren Forty to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) because; [1] It is not an injured party in the alleged
deprivation, [2] The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not give rise to erga omnes
partes obligations which would be enforceable by Antrano as a non-injured State [3] and the
enforcement of internationally guaranteed human rights in the ICJ generally only extends to
diplomatic protection of a State’s citizens. The question of Standing is one of Admissibility, and
the Respondent presents this as a preliminary objection to the admissibility of this application as
provided for under Article 79 of the ICJ Rules of Court.1
1. ANTRANO IS NOT AN INJURED PARTY IN THE DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY
A State can only have standing before this Court as an injured State when it is invoking the
International obligation of another State if the obligation breached is owed to it individually or as
a group if it is specifically affected by the said breach. 2 This is the primary provision on standing
under Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (hereinafter (D) ARSIWA). Consequently, Antrano lacks standing because no
obligation is owed to Antrano by Remisia and Antrano is not affected by the deprivation of
Nationality of the Sterren Forty.
1
ICJ Rules of Court
2
UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001), 53 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, Supp. (No. 10) A/56/10
(IV.E.1)
1
a. The alleged obligations breached are not owed to Antrano.
First, the human rights obligations in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(hereinafter ICCPR) or the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (hereinafter CRS) are
not owed to Antrano but to Remisian Citizens. A State can only invoke the responsibility of another
if a right owed to it is violated as a result of a violation of the interest of the alleging State as it
was in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.3 This is not the case in the present case because
human rights instruments do not give rise to reciprocal obligations. 4
Secondly, the Sterren Forty are citizens of Remisia and Antrano cannot exercise diplomatic
protection over them, this would constitute an actio popularis yet this Court has held in the South
West Africa case and restated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Xua in the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case that no State
may bring a case before the ICJ on behalf of a foreign individual or group to take legal action in
pursuit of public interest and this court has established that that constitutes actio popularis, which
is not a proper basis for standing before it. 5 Antrano therefore, cannot enforce the rights of
Remisian Citizens.
b. The alleged breach of the obligations does not affect Antrano.
The deprivation of nationality of the Sterren forty by Remisia does not affect Antrano specifically.
An injured state is defined in the (D) ARSIWA as a state adversely affected by an internationally
wrongful act.6 Being a party to the ICCPR and the CRS, Antrano would have standing to invoke
3
North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v Denmark, Merits, Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3
4
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain); Second Phase,
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970, ¶ 91
5
South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶
41–59 (July 18) ¶ 88
6
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Gambia v Myanmar, Provisional measures, ICGJ 540 (ICJ 2020), 23rd January 2020
2
the jurisdiction of this Court if the breach of the obligations affected it specifically either as a State
or against its Citizens.7 However, there is no indication of any effect of the deprivation on Antrano.
2. THE CRS DOES NOT IMPUTE ERGA OMNES OBLIGATIONS ENFORCEABLE BY ANTRANO
As an uninjured party, such as Antrano would have standing before this Court only if, being party
to a shared treaty with Remisia, the treaty gave rise to erga omnes or erga omnes partes
obligations, this is provided for under Article 48(1)a of the (D) ASRIRA.8 However, the CRS does
not meet the conditions of an erga omnes partes obligations convention because it is not the
objective of the Convention to give rise to such obligations nor does the convention deal with Jus
Cogens Rights and obligations.
a. It is not the objective of the Convention to give rise to erga omnes obligations
Erga omnes partes obligations in a Convention can be inferred from its objectives. The CRS’s
objectives are not intended to give rise to erga omnes partes obligations to prevent deprivation of
citizenship. In the Advisory Opinion of this Court on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1951, it was held that in “an erga omnes
partes convention, the contracting States have a common interest, that is the accomplishment of
those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the Convention. This can be determined by a
look at the special characteristics of the convention and provisions, these objects furnish elements
of interpretation of the will of the General Assembly and the parties.” 9 These different elements of
the text of the Convention demonstrate the common interest and universal obligations of the
parties, the absence of which is an absence of erga omnes partes obligations.
Both Antrano and Remisia are parties to the CRS, therefore Antrano would have standing before
this Court if that Convention gave rise to erga omnes partes obligations. 10 However, the CRS has
exceptions to the provisions against deprivation of nationality, this is different from the Genocide
7
North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v Denmark, Merits, Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3
8
Articles 48 (D) ARSIWA
9
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23
10
Compromis, ¶ 62
3
Convention that this Court found to be an erga omnes partes Convention in the case of The
Gambia v Myanmar. 11 This is the first indication of the absence of erga omnes obligations.
The CRS makes provisions for the deprivation of citizenship under Article 8(3). This is a strong
indication from the provisions of the Convention that its objective was not to create erga omnes
partes obligations against deprivation of citizenship because of the flexibility and discretion given
to State parties in determining circumstance for deprivation of citizenship. 12 It is not enough that
a common interest exists, erga omnes obligations arise when States bind themselves to specific
standards and obligations which they do not wish any of them to violate.
b. The CRS does not deal with Jus Cogens Rights
The CRS is also differentiable from the Conventions that the Court has found to be erga omnes
partes Conventions because those Conventions deal with jus cogens rights like torture and
genocide, unlike the CRS.13 While making consideration for the extension of the standing of
parties before this Court, the President stated that “standing ought to exist for this particularly
concerned human rights obligation, recognized already early on as creating a common interest” 14
Reduction of statelessness though important, does not constitute a high purpose human right whose
violation should give rise to universal standing before this court.
The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
Advisory Opinion would be a departure from this position that only jus cogens norms can result
in erga omnes obligations. This is because, on top of the International Humanitarian Law
Obligations, the Court also recognised that the right to self-determination gave rise to erga omnes
11
Gambia v Myanmar, Provisional measures, ICJ GL No 178, ICGJ 540 (ICJ 2020), 23rd January
2020, United Nations [UN]; International Court of Justice [ICJ]
12
Actions pour la Protection de l’Homme v The Democratic Republic of Cote D’Ivoire (merits)
(2016) 1 AfCLR. 668 ¶ 51
13
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 443-445, ¶ 50-55
14
ICJ, Reservations to the Genocide Convention (Advisory Opinion) [1951] at 23). p.12
4
obligation.15 However, the right to self-determination is a collective Right similar to the rights
against genocide and other grave breaches whose scale and international recognition warrant their
erga omnes status. The right to nationality does not have this characteristic.
3. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY EXTENDS

TO DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF NATIONALS
Lastly, this Court’s limited enforcement of human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and other
human rights treaties is primarily because those instruments do not give rise to erga omnes partes
obligations because they are signed on a purely humanitarian basis. 16 However, the Court has
recently made a shift to allow for the enforcement of human rights only as part of diplomatic
protection, this extension is valid because a State has the responsibility to protect its citizens. 17
However, the Respondent concurs with the dissenting opinion of Judge Xue in The Gambia v
Myanma where he opined that further extension of the enforcement of human rights before this
Court by an uninjured state would not only form the basis for the political use of the Court but also
open up floodgates of human rights claims before this court.18 This should be another consideration
of the court before it enforces the ICCPR and the CRS as erga omnes partes obligations
instruments in this matter. In effect, any human rights violation would be enforceable before this
court, by any State party to any human rights instrument.
B. REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DEPRIVED THE STERREN
FORTY OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DCA
15
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 155
16
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970, ¶ 91
17
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment, Preliminary
Objections, ICJ GL No 103 ¶ 39
18
Gambia v Myanmar, Provisional measures, ICJ GL No 178
5
The Respondent State did not violate International law when it deprived the Sterren Forty of their
citizenship in accordance with the DCA because; [1] Deprivation of citizenship is a sovereign right
of Remisia, [2] The deprivation of citizenship of the Sterren Forty satisfied the applicable
International Law preconditions, [3] and it was proportional by all human rights standards.
1. DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF REMISIA
International Law is based on the principle of sovereignty and recognises that certain matters are
restricted to the domestic jurisdiction of state parties as provided for in Article 2(7) of the United
Nations Charter.19 States therefore have areas and activities they control that are internal and
domestic known as domaine réservé. 20 The sovereign right of a State to determine how its
citizenship is obtained or lost is a domaine réservé. This was held by the Permanent Court of
International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ) in the case of Legal consequences of the Nationality
decree in Tunis and Morocco and by this Court in the Nottebohm case while dealing with
questions of nationality. 21 Deprivation of citizenship is permitted under Article 8(3) of the CRS
and is only prohibited in Article 15 of the UDHR and Article 12(4) of the ICCPR if it is arbitrary.
a. The Sovereign right of a State to grant or deprive Citizenship.
The deprivation of citizenship is a sovereign right that Remisia lawfully exercises as provided in
Article 8(3) of the CRS. Nationality in general is within a State’s internal jurisdiction, this means
that within its territory, a State has the mandate to regulate nationality in any way it deems fit. 22
The International Law Commission report on Statelessness provides that a State has the right to
deprive an individual of their nationality on a ground that is provided for in its legislation. 23 In
light of that wealth of authority, Remisia exercised this sovereign authority by making provisions
19
Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (1945)
20
Katja S Ziegler, ‘Domaine Réservé’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(2013) ¶ 1
21
Nottebohm, Liechtenstein v Guatemala, Preliminary Objection (Second phase), Judgment, ICGJ
185 (ICJ 1955), 6th April 1955 ¶ 20;
22
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Advisory Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Series B No.
4 p.24
23
Report of the International Law Commission, UNGAOR, 67th Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc
A/67/10 (2012) 9 at 32-33.
6
for the deprivation of citizenship in the Disrespect of the Crown Act (hereinafter DCA) for people
who proved to be disloyal to the Monarchy. 24
Article 15 of UDHR and 12(4) of the ICCPR only prohibit arbitrary denationalisation. According
to General Comment 27, arbitrary denationalisation is when a state denationalises its nationals just
for the sake of throwing them out of their country. 25 Besides these pre-conditions of; legislation,
non-arbitrariness and the right to a fair hearing, any State, including Remisia has an internationally
recognised Right to deprive its citizenship.
b. The DCA is Remisia’s Deprivation of Citizenship Legislation
A state is required to have in place appropriate legislation to exercise its right to deprive
citizenship. The DCA satisfies this precondition since it is in line with Article 8(3) of the CRS
which provides for the retention and application of legislation that deprives nationality. 26 The DCA
was enacted in 1955 before Remisia ratified the 1961 CRS. 27 Remisia also made the declaration
required under Article 8(3) that it intended to retain and enforce the DCA even after the ratification
of the CRS.28
The objections to Remisia’s declaration by Antrano and other State parties which termed the
declaration as a reservation are immaterial and erroneous. 29 Remisia’s declaration does not modify
or exclude any provision of the CRS which is the definition of a reservation in Article 2 of the
VCLT. Secondly, there are a limited number of provisions subject to reservations in the CRS as
provided for in Article 17 and they do not include Article 8(3).
Furthermore, The DCA is not inconsistent with the purpose of the CRS because deprivation of
citizenship is not against the purpose of the CRS which is stated in the UNHCR Guidelines on
24
Compromis, ¶ 7
25
CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement) ¶ 21
26
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175, (1961 Convention)
27
Compromis, ¶ 7
28
Compromis, ¶ 62
29
Compromis (Clarifications), ¶ 10
7
Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of Nationality (hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines) as
minimising statelessness by establishing rules on acquisition, renunciation, loss and deprivation of
nationality. 30
The DCA is legitimate legislation because the offences it creates are foreseeable and clear. 31 The
United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRComm) held in the case of Keun-Tae Kim v.
Republic of Korea that laws that limit human rights must be drafted with sufficient clarity and be
publicly available to enable people to adapt their behaviour to them. 32 The DCA provides for the
offence of insulting, defaming and threatening the Monarch and states the punishments to include
five years imprisonment or deprivation of Remisian Citizenship. 33 Terms like threatening,
insulting and defaming have very clear legal interpretations and are used in penal legislation
worldwide.34
2. THE DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP OF THE STERREN FORTY SATISFIED THE APPLICABLE

PRECONDITIONS
Remisia’s Right to deprive citizenship is only subject to the prohibition of arbitrariness under
Article 12(4) of the ICCPR and the precondition of a fair hearing under Article 8(4) of the CRS.
These preconditions are what Remisia has bound itself to in International law while exercising its
sovereign right to determine matters of Nationality. In the advisory opinion of the PCIJ in the case
of Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, it was held that a state exercising its
domaine réservé mandate is only subject to international obligations it binds itself to in reference
to that mandate.35 We submit that Remisia satisfied the said obligations.
30
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of Nationality under Articles
5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness HCR/GS/20/05 ¶ 1
31
Riener v Bulgaria App No 46343/99 (Application No) (2007) 45 EHRR 32
32
Keun-Tae Kim v. Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994, UN HRComm, 4 January 1999
33
Compromis, ¶ 7
34
Uganda Penal Code Act Section.180, Section 1503 of Title 18, United States Code, Section.4 of
United Kingdom Public Order Act 1986
35
4 p.24
8
However, contrary to conventional Human Rights obligations, the obligations of a State exercising
its sovereign right cannot be subject to the same standard set down in the Siracusa principles on
the Rights in the ICCPR. For example, this court referred to applicable international humanitarian
law before resorting to human rights law while considering the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.36 The respondent therefore prays
that the court relies on the lex specialis of deprivation of Citizenship to judge this matter.37 The
CRS and the UNHCR Guidelines put into consideration the delicate balance between national
interests and individual human rights and should be the basis for this court’s determination of this
matter.38
a. The DCA is not arbitrary because it is necessary for the protection of the Vital
Interests of Remisia.
The only instance where the deprivation of citizenship would be abusive is if it is done arbitrarily
against Article 12(4) of the ICCPR. Arbitrary denationalisation according to General Comment
27 on the ICCPR is when a state denationalises its nationals just for the sake of throwing them out
of their country.39 The DCA and its use against the Sterren Forty is not arbitrary because it is
intended to punish the disloyal to Remisia whose actions are prejudicial to the Vital interest of
Remisia. This is a legitimate purpose provided in Article 8(3) (a)ii of the CRS.
The interpretation of Vital Interest stated in the UNHCR guidelines includes a State’s
constitutional foundation as a basis for vital interests.40 The Remisian Constitution makes
provision for the reverence of the monarch and it is that constitutional element that gives credence
36
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 106, 135
37
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.
226.
38
5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness HCR/GS/20/05
39
CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement) ¶ 21
40
5-9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness HCR/GS/20/05
9
to the DCA. 41 Reverence of the Monarch in a Monarchy is an undisputed condition for Loyalty to
the state and whoever violates it is “violating the most sacred of compacts and exhibits a base
ingratitude.”42 An attack on the Monarch in Remisia is equivalent to treason or terrorism in gravity
and is a display of lack of allegiance which is the basis for nationality. 43
In Remisia, a constitutional monarchy, protection of the reverence of the Monarch is a vital interest
upon which the exception under Article 8(3) was rightfully invoked and the Sterren Forty’s
Citizenship deprived. 44 Although the protection of the Monarch may not be considered a vital
interest in the eyes of “Nation-States.” This court should be cognisant of the fact that there can be
no fully universal concept of human rights and it is necessary to take into account the diverse
cultures and political systems of the world. 45 Therefore the deprivation of the citizenship of the
Sterren Forty was not arbitrary.
b. The Sterren Forty were given a fair hearing.
The Sterren Forty were afforded a fair hearing which is the only pre-conditions for the deprivation
of Citizenship in Article 8(4) of the CRS. It requires that the national legal system must make
available to the individual whose citizenship is threatened to be deprived an effective and fair
hearing before a competent court.46 This is a requirement to show that due process is followed
while exercising State authority as was required of the Dominican Republic in the case of the
41
HRC, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General,
19 December 2013, A/HRC/25/28, ¶ 13
42
Clive Parry, John P Grant, Anthony Parry, and Arthur D Watts (eds), Encyclopaedic Dictionary
of International Law (1986)
43
HRC, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the Secretary-General,
19 December 2013, A/HRC/25/28, ¶ 7
44
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America) (1986) I.C.J. Rep 103
45
D. Donoho, “Relativism versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for Meaningful
Standards” (1991) 27 Standford Law Journal 345 Nguema, “Human Rights Perspective in Africa”
(1990) 11 H.R.L.J;
46
Article 8(4) CRS
10
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitan Origin in the Dominican Republic v. Dominican Republic by
the IACHR. 47
The Sterren Forty were arrested at the Queen’s Palace and were charged under the DCA, they were
then prosecuted in Remisian courts of law, from the trial court and even appealed the decision in
the Supreme Court.48 This practice met all the conditions set in the European court in the case of
Shebashov v. Latvia where the court stated that for a fair hearing, the person must have a
possibility of challenging the measure complained of and of having the relevant issues examined
with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic forum offering
adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality. 49
3. THE DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY WAS PROPORTIONAL
The Respondent submits that the deprivation of the citizenship of the Sterren Forty was
proportional. The human rights test to limitations on rights applied by the HRComm is that in
accordance with Article 19 of the ICCPR, any restriction on human rights must cumulatively meet
the following conditions: it must be provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in
paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of Article 19, and it must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose. The
first two have been addressed in the lex specialis on deprivations, therefore the Respondent shall
address the last requirement of necessity and proportionality.
The deprivation of citizenship was proportionate as a punishment for the disloyalty to the State
exhibited by the Sterren Forty within Remisia’s margin of appreciation for the rights affected.50
Proportionality has been defined by the African Court for Human and People’s Rights (ACtHPR)
in the case of Lohe Issa Konate v Burkina Faso as requiring an administrative authority when
exercising a discretionary power to maintain a proper balance between any adverse effects that its
47
Case of the Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic v. Dominican
Republic (Order of the IACHR), Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR)
48
Compromis, ¶34
49
Shebashov v. Latvia, App No. 58822/00
50
Handyside v United Kingdom, Merits, App No 5493/72, ECHR 5
11
decision may have on the rights, liberties or interests of the person and the purpose which it
pursues.51 The ACtHPR raised three questions that must be answered to determine proportionality;
whether there are sufficient reasons to justify the measure, whether the measure is the least
intrusive and whether the measure destroys the essence of the rights in the covenant. 52
a. There are sufficient reasons to justify the deprivation of citizenship
The Sterren Forty were not merely protesting, they attached the Queen's palace and formed a
human chain around the entrance blocking entry and exit, thereby threatening the person of the
Queen and the Stability of the Monarchy. 53 Protests of this kind have prehistorically been the
starting points for the dethroning of monarchs in Swaziland for example, the coup in Sudan and
undermining democracy in the United States of America. This was done despite the uninterrupted
peaceful protest that the students had held across Remisia. Reverence for the Monarch is the
foundation of loyalty and State stability in a monarchy which is important for the demonstration
of allegiance to a State.54 The actions of the Sterren Forty threatened the foundation of the Monarch
and are equivalent to terrorism or treason which is the gravest of disloyalty to the State. 55
b. The deprivation of citizenship is the least restrictive
Firstly, although permanent limitations on rights are generally considered disproportionate as was
held in the HRComm in the case of Miguel González del Río v. Peru,56 this form of deprivation
of national Rights is not unprecedented, the European Court has upheld permanent
disenfranchisement under Italian law for offenders sentenced to more than five years imprisonment
51
Konate v. Burkina Faso App 004 of 2013, ACtHPR. ¶ 149
52
ibid
53
Compromis, ¶ 30
54
Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the
Secretary- General, 19 December 2013, A/HRC/25/28, ¶ 13
55
Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the
Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns (transl Charles G Fenwick) (1758) (vol
3, 1916) 52
56
Miguel González del Río v. Peru Communication No. 263/1987, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/46/D/263/1987 (1992).
12
in the case of Scoppola v. Italy.57 The gravity of the offence and the length of the maximum
sentence in that case were considered, similarly, the gravity of the actions of the Sterren Forty vis
vie the vital interest of Reverence of the Reigning Monarch ought to be considered.
Secondly, there is also State practice where States have exercised their Right to deprive citizenship
regardless of the implications of human rights because of the offence's gravity. For example;
France, Australia, Ireland and the United Kingdom all made the declaration under Article 8(3) of
the CRS. In 2018, the United Kingdom’s court of appeals in Aziz & Ors v Secretary of State for
the Home Department upheld deprivation of Citizenship for a group of men convicted of sexual
activities with a child and trafficking which were considered repugnant behaviour against the
British public Interest.58
c. The deprivation of citizenship does not destroy the essence of the rights in the
Covenant
The HRComm observed that limitations on rights should not destroy the essence of those rights. 59
The Respondent submits that the DCA and its enforcement do not destroy the essence of the right
to protection from arbitrary deprivation of Nationality and freedom of expression owed to
Remisian Citizens.60 This is demonstrated by the fact that the Sterren forty were afforded a fair
hearing, therefore Remisia protected their right from arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 61
Secondly, despite the existence of the DCA, Remisian citizens freely exercise their right to
peacefully protest without interruption. Violence during a protest is not protected by International
law as stated by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly, Maina Kiai. 62 The protestors in Remisia are only interrupted and arrested, not because
57
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) - 126/05 [2012] ECHR 868 (22 May 2012)
58
Aziz & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] WLR(D) 526,
59
Human Rights Committee, General Observation No. 34, Article 19: Freedom of Opinion and
Freedom of Expression, ¶ 33
60
ICCPR Article 12(4), Article 19
61
Compromis, ¶ 33
62
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Statement of the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association on
“Violence during protests is not protected by international human rights law,”19 September 2012
13
of their opinions about the Cobalt mines, but because of disruptive behaviour like blocking roads,
defaming the queen and barricading entry and exit of the palace. 63
C. ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED SAKI SHAW, A REMISIAN

CITIZEN, ACCESS TO REMISIAN CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES WHILE SHE WAS HELD
PRISONER IN ANTRANO
Every citizen of a foreign State has the right to consular assistance upon their arrest in a foreign
State as provided for in Article 36(1)b of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(hereinafter VCCR)64 This right was violated by Antrano when it denied Ms Saki Shaw access to
the Remisian Consular assistance upon her arrest in Antrano.65 The Respondent submits that
Antrano’s actions constitute a violation of International law because [1] Ms Saki Shaw has a right
to Remisian Consular access since [2] she has Remisian nationality. [3] Antrano as a third-party
State is not entitled to contest her Remisian nationality. Alternatively, [4] the Respondent submits
that her Remisian nationality is dominant over her Molvanian and therefore should have been
recognised by Antrano.
1. MS SAKI SHAW HAS A RIGHT TO REMISIAN CONSULAR ACCESS
The Respondent avers that Ms Shaw as a foreign national had a right to consular assistance when
she was arrested in Antrano. Her right was violated when she was not afforded Remisian consular
assistance despite Antrano knowing it.
a. The Right to Consular Access
Consular access is provided for in positive international law under Article 36 of the VCCR.66 The
right entails allowing foreign nationals to communicate with and receive assistance from their
consular officers when detained or facing legal issues in a host country as was interpreted by this
court in the case of Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America).
63
Compromis, ¶ 29
64
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, Article 36.
65
Compromis, ¶ 43
66
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963, Article 36.
14
Consular access includes notification without delay, communication on matters of personal
welfare, and facilitating legal representation. 67
The Respondent submits that the right to consular access can be requested by both the individual
and the State.68 In this case, both Ms Shaw and Remisia had a right to demand that Antrano respect
Ms Shaw’s right to consular access. To the extent that the plain language of Article 36(1) (b) leaves
any room for doubt as to its meaning, the travaux preparatoires to the VCCR clearly show that
the framers of the treaty intended Article 36 to confer individual rights to consular notification and
access.69
The right to consular access can be enforced by a State through the exercise of diplomatic
protection.70 This is because the inherent right of a State to safeguard its citizens abroad is a
quintessential expression of sovereignty. 71 Therefore, in cases where the State’s national is a victim
of a wrongful act such as denial of the right to consular assistance, the State can espouse the claim
and treat it as if it were its own by exercising diplomatic protection. 72
b. Ms. Saki Shaw’s right to Remisian consular access was violated by Antrano
The Respondent submits that Ms Shaw’s Right to Remisian consular access was violated by
Antrano. This is because Ms Shaw demanded to exercise her right under the VCCR to speak with
the Remisian Consul, which request was denied. 73 On March 18th, the Ambassador of Remisia
requested to meet Ms Shaw, a request that was also denied by Antrano. 74 These facts are in pari
materia with the Avena case where Mexico was equally denied access to the 52 nationals on its
67
Borchard, E. M. 1915. Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International
Claims. New York: Banks Law Publishing.
68
Haitian Refugee Ctr v Baker [1991] 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir) (a treaty must directly
accord enforceable rights); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v Reagan [1988] 859
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir).
69
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969
70
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2001, p. 494 ¶ 77
71
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, Estonia v Lithuania, Judgment, PCIJ Series A/B No 76, ICGJ
328 (PCIJ 1939), 28th February 1939
72
Vermeer-Künzli, A. "Diplomatic Protection and Consular Assistance of Migrants." In *Research
Handbook on International Law and Migration*, edited by V. Chetail and C. Bauloz, 265–280
(Edward Elgar, 2014).
73
Compromis at ¶ 43
74
Compromis at ¶ 45
15
request.75 This denial of access directly contravenes Article 36 (1) (a) of VCCR which provides
that consular officials shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and have
access to them.
As stated in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), it is
not merely the failure to notify, but the arrest and detention of Ms Shaw with the continuous stifling
of her access to Remisian consular services that is unlawful. 76 By denying Ms Saki Shaw the right
to communicate with the Remisian consulate, even when Remisa expresses interest, Antrano
violated Ms Shaws' right.77
Ms Shaw holds Remisian citizenship, the Respondent contends that given this status quo,78
Antrano was obligated to promptly facilitate her consular access upon her request. However,
contrary to this expectation, Antrano impeded all avenues on the ground that it did not recognize
Ms Shaws Remisian citizenship obtained by naturalisation.
2. ANTRANO IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTEST MS SHAW’S REMISIAN NATIONALITY
Although a State has a right to determine the laws that govern its territory, this sovereign right is
subject to other international obligations as was held in the case of Nationality Decrees Issued in
Tunis and Morocco.79 Validity of citizenship at the international level is regulated by customs
such as those set out in the Nottebohm case on effective nationality. 80 However, Antrano did not
apply or consider any of these but rather arbitrarily stated that it does not recognise Citizenship by
naturalisation. 81
75
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. the United States of America), Judgment, I. C.
J. Reports 2004, p. 12, ¶ 30
76
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. the United States of America), Judgment, I. C.
J. Reports 2004, p. 12, ¶ 30
77
Compromis ¶ 45
78
Compromis ¶ 19
79
4
80
185 (ICJ 1955), 6th April 1955
81
Compromis ¶ 43
16
Secondly, international law principles dictate that in instances of dual nationality, a third state
lacks the right to dispute the claim of one of the two States whose national is involved in the case
by invoking the nationality of the other State.82 In the Salem case (USA V Egypt), the court held
the same opinion while asserting that the Egyptian Government could not assert against the United
States the potential continuation of George Salem's Persian nationality. 83
Similarly, Antrano lacked the rights and authority to adjudicate on the validity of Saki Shaw's
nationality or align with Molvania in this matter. The rationale as per the Salem case emphasizes
that in a case of dual nationality, the two States are sovereign entities with the right to resolve
which of the two nationalities should take precedence. 84 Antrano should not have assumed the role
of an arbitrator to reject Shaw's Remisian citizenship, but rather, it should have acknowledged her
possession of dual nationality.
3. MS SAKI SHAW IS A REMISIAN CITIZEN
a. Remisia has a sovereign right to determine the acquisition of citizenship.
It is within the purview of each sovereign State to decide, through its legislative framework, the
regulations governing the acquisition of its nationality. 85 This position was upheld by this Court in
the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) where the Court held that every sovereign State
has a right to decide on how its citizenship is obtained because the granting of citizenship is an
exercise of its international sovereignty. 86 This principle was also applied in the Salem case (USA
V Egypt) in discerning whether Salem was of USA, Egyptian or Persian nationality. 87
82
MacKenzie v Germany, 1922-, Opinions of the Mixed Claims Commission. United States and
Germany, p. 628.
83
Salem Case (USA V Egypt) 2 RIAA, 1161 (1932) p.1188
84
Salem Case (USA V Egypt) 2 RIAA, 1161 (1932) p 25
85
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of
States, G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103, Annex, (II)(a) (1981)
86
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala); Second Phase, International Court of Justice
(ICJ), 6 April 1955
87
The Salem Case (USA V Egypt) (1932) RIAA 1161 p 25/78
17
From the facts of this case, it is clear from the domestic law of Remisia that a person can acquire
citizenship by naturalisation through investment.88 This is as long as the requirements in the
Naturalization by Investment Act (NIA) and the “Naturalisation by Investment Program” are met.
Ms Shaw has not only successfully invested nationwide in Remisia but she also has a home there.
In this regard, indeed, Ms Shaw is a national of Remisia which in effect guarantees her right to
Remisian consular access.
While the Nottebohm case firmly established that States are not compelled to recognize certain
actions of other States, International law still recognises dual nationality although it gives
precedent to the dominant nationality of a person. 89
b. Ms. Saki Shaw Satisfied the Conditions for Obtaining Remisian Citizenship.
International Law recognises the existence of dual citizenship and indeed protects it. 90 The
respondent submits that Ms Shaw although originally a Molvanian, obtained Remisian Citizenship
by Naturalization by satisfying the pre-conditions in the Naturalisation by Investment Act.91
Since a State can determine the conditions for the acquisition of Citizenship, Ms Remisian's
Citizenship became valid the moment she satisfied those conditions.
The respondent is well aware that a State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are
entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of
making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's genuine connection with the State.
Nothing from the facts can demonstrate that the respondent has not fulfilled this requirement and
therefore Antrano should recognise the rules laid down by Remisia regarding citizenship by
investment.
The NIA establishes criteria that create the legal bond of nationality that establishes a genuine
connection between Remisia and Ms Shaw. The Nottebohm case should also be distinguished from
88
Compromis at ¶ 11-12
89
Michigan Law Review, Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modern Era: The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 83 MICH. L. REV. 597 (1984).
90
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Decision in Case A/18 Concerning the Question of
Jurisdiction over Claims of Persons with Dual Nationality, Int'l Legal Materials, vol. 23, p. 489,
1984
91
Compromis (Clarifications) ¶ 3
18
the present facts. In that case, it is clear that economic considerations were not put in place and
only looked at the purpose of naturalisation. The Court deduced that Nottebohm’s naturalisation
lacked the genuineness requisite to an act of such importance if it is to be entitled to be respected
by a State in the defendant's position as there was no bond of attachment with Liechtenstein. His
naturalisation was obtained to substitute his status as a national of a belligerent State for that of
the national of a neutral State.
However, under the NIA, someone can acquire citizenship by naturalisation by purchasing real
property, contributing to the National Infrastructure Development Fund, or otherwise making a
direct investment in the Remisian economy, of [€500,000] or more. 92 This is exactly what was
done by Ms Shaw hence making her a national of Remisia. And is proof of a bond of nationality.
In 1930, The Hague Convention, specifically Article I of the Convention relating to the Conflict
of Nationality Laws, incorporated a provision stipulating that the law formulated by a State to
identify its nationals "shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with.
International custom and the principles of law generally recognized about nationality." It is the
bond of nationality between the individual and a State that exclusively confers upon that individual
the right of consular protection. 93 The Respondent asserts that Miss Saki Shaw is, in fact, a citizen
of Remisia, thereby warranting her entitlement to Remisian consular access under Article 36 of
the VCCR upon entering Antrano. Ms Shaw's genuine link is with Remisia since she left Molvania
in 2012.
4. MS SAKI SHAW’S REMISIAN CITIZENSHIP IS DOMINANT OVER HER MOLVANIAN
If a person has dual citizenship like Ms Shaw, international law recognises the dominant
citizenship.94 The doctrine of dominant and effective nationality rests on two fundamental
principles that reflect a contemporary view of the link of nationality. First, the concept of
nationality embodies more than a tenuous legal bond asserted by municipal law. Nationality,
92
Compromis at ¶ 11
93
Jennings, R. Y. "General Course on Principles of International Law." In *Collected Courses of
the Hague Academy of International Law*, vol. 121, 323–514 (Brill Nijhoff, 1967).
94
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Decision in Case A/18 Concerning the Question of
Jurisdiction over Claims of Persons with Dual Nationality, Int'l Legal Materials, vol. 23, p. 489,
1984.
19
according to the International Court of Justice, is a "legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence
of reciprocal rights and duties." 95 It is, by nature, incapable of division between two or more
States.96 Second, nationality is a product of personal choice and action. The conduct of the
individual furnishes the only sound juridical foundation for the recognition of a single nationality.
In the Merge Case (U.S. v. Italy),97 the Italian-U.S. Conciliation Commission noted that to
determine dominant citizenship, the court should look at among other things the; habitual
residence along with the conduct of the individual in his economic, social, political, civic and
family life, as well as the closer and more effective bond with one of the two States. These create
a genuine link between the individual and the State. Ms Shaw’s genuine link is with Remisia
because she left Molvania in 2012 and has made substantial contributions to Remisia’s
development and satisfied the conditions in the NIA.
D. REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO ALLOW DR

MALEX TO ENTER REMISIA
The principle of sovereignty enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter mandates States to exercise
certain rights known as domaine réservé over matters that are within the State’s internal
jurisdiction.98 It was in the exercise of this right to territorial sovereignty that Remisia denied Dr
Malex, an Antranan entry into its territory. 99 The Respondent therefore submits that Remisia’s
actions did not violate international law because [1] Remisia has a sovereign right to determine
who enters its borders. [2] Antrano lacks the Standing to exercise diplomatic protection in this
matter and [3] UN Resolution 99997 does not impose binding obligations on Remisia.
1. REMISIA HAS TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY TO DETERMINE WHO ENTERS ITS BORDERS
95
185 (ICJ 1955), 6th April 1955 p.23
96
Griffin, The Right to a Single Nationality, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 57, 63-64 (1966).
97
Merge Case (U.S. v. Italy) 14 R. Intl. Arb. Awards 236 (1955).
98
Charter of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI (1945) Article 2(7)
99
Compromis, ¶ 58
20
A State’s exercise of sovereignty over its territorial boundaries was stated to be a sovereign right
that a State is entitled to in the case of the North Sea Continental Shelf. 100 Every sovereign State
consequently has the inherent and exclusive right to determine who enters its territory and under
what conditions. 101 This right allows States to safeguard their national security, protect their
citizens, and maintain control over their borders.102 Remisia's decision to deny Dr Malex, an
Antranan citizen entry into its territory was an exercise of this sovereign right within its domestic
jurisdiction as mandated under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.
However, this Right as a domaine réservé to control who enters a country is subject to other
international law obligations that Remisia assumes as was held by the PCIJ in its advisory opinion
on the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco.103 For example, nationals of Remisia
have a right of entry into their country as per Article 12 of the ICCPR. Asylum seekers also have
the right of entry into a country until their status is processed according to Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention. 104 The Respondent submits that there are however no binding international
obligations that require it to admit Dr Malex.
2. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO EXERCISE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
The Applicant seeks to enforce rights owed to the United Nations by Remisia as a result of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (hereinafter CPI).105 The
Respondent submits the Applicant cannot exercise diplomatic protection in this matter because the
rights in the CPI are not personal rights owed to Dr Malex. The Applicant’s reservation to Section
23 of the Convention is also contrary to the purpose of the CPI.
100
North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v Denmark, Merits, Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ
150 (ICJ 1969), 20th February 1969, United Nations [UN]; International Court of Justice [ICJ] ¶
19
101
Expulsions of aliens in international human rights law, OHCHR, Discussion paper, Geneva,
September 2006, p 1
102
International Organization For Migration, 'Human Rights Of Migrants: An Overview - State
Sovereignty and human rights' (accessed on 2nd Jan 2024).
103
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Advisory Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Series B
No. 4 p.24
104
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series,
vol. 189, p. 137 Section 23
105
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946,
21
a. Diplomatic Protection only extends to the protection of the Personal Rights of
Nationals
Diplomatic protection can only be invoked before the ICJ by a State for violation of rights owed
to its citizens. This principle is provided for in Article 1 of the ILC Draft Article for Diplomatic
Protection.106 It was also applied by this Court in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited case.107 The Respondent submits that Antrano has no right to exercise
diplomatic protection as far as the rights in the CPI are concerned because those rights are not
individual rights owed to Dr Malex but to the United Nations according to Section 23 of the CPI.108
The Respondent acknowledges this court's decision in the Reparation for injuries incurred in
the service of the United Nations case where it was held that both a State and the United Nations
could exercise diplomatic protections for persons whose rights have been violated in the exercise
of international functions. 109 Unlike the facts at hand, the Reparations for injuries case was
considering the right to life owed to the UN official being enforced by their nation and the United
Nations.110 The facts of the current matter are that the Rights for which the applicant seeks to
exercise diplomatic protection are not a violation of Dr Malex’s individual rights but the United
Nations as an organisation.111 Therefore the custom set in the Reparations case is distinguishable.
The Respondent submits that this Court’s practice in Ahmadou Sadio Diallo where it was held
that if no right of a citizen has been violated, then no right of a State has been violated either is
106
ILC ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’ UN Doc. A/RES/61/35 (2006), 61 UN GAOR
Supp. (No. 49) at 505, Supp. No 10 (A/61/10)
107
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970,
108
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946 Section
23
109
Reparation for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations, 1 December 1949,
A/RES/365,
110
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970,
111
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946 Section
23
22
applicable in this matter.112 That case is closely related to this matter because it was in the exercise
of the right owed to the United Nations in the CPI that Dr Malex was denied entry into Remisia.113
Similarly, it was the right of Mr Sadio’s company that was affected by Congo’s actions when the
Court held that Guinea had no standing.114 The Applicant seems to be aware of this legal position,
given the fact that they place an impermissible reservation on Section 23 of the CPI which provides
that the rights in that treaty are not individual. 115
b. The Declaration made by Antrano is an unlawful reservation.

The Respondent contends that Antrano's declaration, pursuant to Section 23 of the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, imposes no obligations
on Remisia or the United Nations, irrespective of any absence of initial objection by either party. 116
We rely on the compatibility test drawn from the ICJ in the Reservation to the Convention on
Genocide case.117 The Court introduced a major criterion that considers whether the reservation
was “compatible with the object and purpose” of the treaty. A reservation is considered
incompatible when it affects substantive provisions of the treaty or the underlying reason why a
treaty was negotiated.118
When a declaration pursues an objective that, in consideration of the object, purpose, and practice
of Contracting Parties, yields results incongruent with the instrument, such a declaration is deemed
invalid. In Loizidou v. Turkey, the main issue was the validity of Turkey's reservation limiting the
European Court of Human Rights' jurisdiction to events within its national territory. 119 Turkey
argued the incidents occurred in Turkish overseas territory, excluding them from the Court's
112
Objections, ICJ GL No 103, ICGJ 52 (ICJ 2007), 24th May 2007, United Nations [UN];
International Court of Justice [ICJ]
113
Compromis (Clarification), ¶ 58
114
ibid
115
116
117
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1951), 15.
118
S. David and Thomas N. Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive
Methods”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 43, no. 3 (2010): 588-89.
119
Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) App No 15318/89 EHRR 99
23
competence. The Court rejected this, emphasizing the ECHR's aim for uniform human rights
standards and declaring Turkey's reservation on jurisdiction invalid.
Antrano’s Reservation to Section 23 is intended to usurp the right given to the United Nations by
other States to enforce the rights in the CPI.120 Sections 23 and 20 of the CPI are intended to
prevent individual claims for the privileges and immunities within that instrument. Just like
cooperate personality rights in the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case, the rights in this instrument are
intended to benefit the United Nations and not individuals. 121 This intention is repeated in sections
20 and section 23 is referred to in the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the 1989
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations case.122 A reservation to
the contrary goes against the purpose of the convention. 123
3. UN RESOLUTION 99997 DOES NOT IMPOSE BINDING OBLIGATIONS ON REMISIA
UN Resolution 99997 does not impose binding obligations on Remisia, especially as it is not
promulgated under Chapter VII of the Charter, and, its language underscores the requirement for
consent before its operations and enforcement can commence against Remisia. Resolution 99997
is passed under Chapter VI and it requires the consent of Remisia to attain the same status and
binding nature as a recommendation. 124
a. The Language of the Resolution is not binding and requires Remisia’s consent to take
effect
120
Ulf Linderfalk, The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer 2007). Pp 204-205
121
Objections, ICJ GL No 103, ICGJ 52 (ICJ 2007), 24th May 2007, United Nations [UN];
International Court of Justice [ICJ]
122
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 177
123
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
1155, p. 331, Article 19
124
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), International
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151
24
Not all UN Resolutions are inherently deemed binding on sovereign States. In this Court’s decision
in in Legal Consequences for States of the Conditioned Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the Court
emphasises that the language of a Security Council resolution requires careful analysis before a
definitive determination can be reached regarding its binding effect.125 Given the nature of the
powers delineated in Article 25, the assessment of whether these powers have been effectively
exercised is contingent upon a case-by-case examination, taking into account the terms of the
resolution in question, the deliberations leading to its formulation, the invoked Charter provisions,
and, broadly, all pertinent circumstances.126
Ultimately, it cannot be said that it is the same for the UN Security Council to “urge, call upon, or
encourage” parties to a conflict to take certain action as to “demand” that same action be taken or
“decide” that they should behave a certain way. The first three verbs do not convey a sense of legal
obligation, the last two do. The language employed in Resolution 99997 merely "calls upon"
Remisia to cooperate.127 The use of the term "call upon" necessitates explicit consent, particularly
when dealing with sovereign States.
This implies that Remisia is not automatically bound by the resolution, the mission necessitates
consent to initiate any operations, and the State's exercise of its right to refuse cannot be construed
as unlawful, particularly considering its status as a sovereign State. The CPI acknowledges the
need for this consent because although it requires support for UN officials on a mission, it does
not waive the State’s right to require them to have a visa under Section 25.128
Remisia did not consent to the Security Council Resolution because, unlike Antrano, it was not a
member of the Security Council, and the fact it did not object to the passing of the Resolution is
immaterial. 129 This is because, in many instances, the consent of parties has been required for the
UN mission to operate even if there was no objection per se at the time the resolution was being
125
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory Opinion 21 July
1971 ICJ Reports, ¶ 114
126
ibid p.53
127
Article 2 of Resolution 99997, Appendix A of the Compromis.
128
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 13 February 1946
129
Compromis, ¶ 48
25
made as was held in the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia. 130
The Legal Consequences decision is of much relevance here because the resolution there, just as
the case is in the current facts was adopted without a dissenting vote. In his second and final report
on the plan for an emergency international Force of 6 November, the Secretary-General, in
paragraphs 9 and 10, stated: "While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the Force with
the consent of those parties which contribute units to the Force, it could not request the Force to
be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government
of that country.” 131
b. The UN has enforcement mechanisms for its Resolutions
The responsibility conferred to the UN Security Council in the matter of the Sterren Forty is
"primary", not exclusive. This primary responsibility is conferred upon the Security Council, as
stated in Article 24 of the UN Charter, "to ensure prompt and effective action". To this end, it is
the Security Council which is given the power to impose an explicit obligation of compliance if
for example it issues an order or command to an aggressor under Chapter VII. It is only the Security
Council which can require enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor as was stated by
this court in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations case.132
In a case such as the present, the members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security
Council the primary role of maintaining international peace and security. This matter should
therefore be left to enforcement and resolution by the UN Security Council itself and not Antrano.
This is what was envisaged by the member States as can be inferred from the 1954 Repertoire of
the Practice of the Security Council.133
130
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory Opinion 21 July
1971 ICJ Reports, ¶ 114 p.53
131
ibid
132
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), International
Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, [1962] ICJ Rep 151 p.10
133
Article 24 of the UN Charter
26
(VII) PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Kingdom of Remisia respectfully requests this Honourable Court to adjudge and declare that:
A. The Republic of Antrano lacks standing to bring the matter of the Deprivation of
Citizenship of the Sterren forty before this Court.
B. Remisia did not violate international law obligations when it deprived the Sterren forty of
their Remisian citizenship.
C. Antrano violated international law when it denied Saki Shaw, a Remisia Citizen, access to
Remisian Consular representatives while she was held prisoner in Antrano.
D. Remisia did not violate international law by refusing to allow Dr Malex to enter Remisia.
Respectfully Submitted
8th January 2024
Agents of Remisia
27

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THE 2024 PHILLIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION

THE CASE CONCERNING THE STERREN FORTY

THE REPUBLIC OF ANTRANO

THE KINGDOM OF REMISIA

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

(I) INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... iii

(II) STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................................................x

(III) QUESTIONS PRESENTED.................................................................................................... xi

(IV) STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................... xii

(V) SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS .................................................................................................xvi

(VI) PLEADINGS .........................................................................................................................1

A. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO BRING THE MATTER OF THE DEPRIVATION OF

1. ANTRANO IS NOT AN INJURED PARTY IN THE DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY .................1

3. THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED HUMAN RIGHTS ONLY

1. DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF REMISIA ..................................6

2. THE DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP OF THE STERREN FORTY SATISFIED THE APPLICABLE

3. THE DEPRIVATION OF NATIONALITY OF THE STERREN FORTY WAS PROPORTIONAL....... 11

C. ANTRANO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW WHEN IT DENIED SAKI SHAW, A REMISIAN

1. MS SAKI SHAW HAS A RIGHT TO REMISIAN CONSULAR ACCESS .................................... 14

2. ANTRANO IS NOT ENTITLED TO CONTEST MS SHAW’S REMISIAN NATIONALITY ............ 16

3. MS SAKI SHAW IS A REMISIAN CITIZEN ........................................................................ 17

D. REMISIA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY REFUSING TO ALLOW DR MALEX

1. REMISIA HAS TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY TO DETERMINE WHO ENTERS ITS BORDERS . 20

2. ANTRANO LACKS STANDING TO EXERCISE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION ........................... 21

3. UN RESOLUTION 99997 DOES NOT IMPOSE BINDING OBLIGATIONS ON REMISIA ........... 24

(VII) PRAYER FOR RELIEF ....................................................................................................... 27

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI 20, 6

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175, 7

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 21

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (16 December 2

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946 33 UNTS x

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963 14

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United 15, 24

Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in 17

Expulsions of aliens in international human rights law, OHCHR, 21

Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of 12

ILC ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’ UN Doc. A/RES/61/35 22

ILC ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 2

Report of the International Law Commission, UNGAOR, 67th Sess, 7

UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 5: Loss and Deprivation of 8, 9, 10

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 13

DECISIONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND PERMANENT COURT OF

Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the 25, 26

Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo, 5, 23, 24

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 2, 4, 5

Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the 24

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of 16

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. 5, 22

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of 24, 26

LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), International 15

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 5, 9

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 9

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 10

North Sea Continental Shelf, Germany v Denmark, Merits, 2, 3, 21

Nottebohm, Liechtenstein v Guatemala, Preliminary Objection 6, 20, 18, 17

Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 4

Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 3

South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 2