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The Peace Palace, The Hague, Netherlands: The International Court of Justice

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R-06

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE PEACE PALACE,

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

THE 2021 PHILLIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW

MOOT COURT COMPETITION

THE CASE CONCERNING THE J-VID-18 PANDEMIC

THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF APREPLUYA

(APPLICANTS)

V.

THE DEMOCRATIC STATE OF RANOVSTAYO

(RESPONDENTS)

Memorial on Behalf of Applicants

2021
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................I

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................V

STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................................VII

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.....................................................................................X

ISSUE RAISED......................................................................................................................XI

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS............................................................................................XII

STATEMENT OF PLEADINGS............................................................................................1

I. RANOVSTAYO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY FAILING TO HAND OVER MS.


KEINBLAT VORMUND TO THE APREPLUYAN AUTHORITIES AFTER THEY REQUESTED
HER SURRENDER ON 9 JUNE 2018........................................................................................1

[A] Ms. Keinblat Vormund does not fall under the category of a refugee..............1

(a) Ms. Vormund can be excluded under Article 1F (b) of the Refugee
Convention, 1951.
1

(b) There is no fear of persecution.......................................................................3

(i). The elements of persecution aren’t being fulfilled..................................... 3

(ii). The nature of crime committed by Ms. Vormund is of serious character.


3

(iii). The act committed by Ms. Vormund does not fall under exceptions
where prosecution amounts to persecution..................................................................... 4

(c) Ms. Vormund can be extradited to the origin country..................................5

[B] Ranovastayo has violated the international law by interfering in the internal
affairs of Aprepluya..............................................................................................................6

PRAYER FOR RELIEF....................................................................................................XIII

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I
I. TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

1. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), art. 12 cl. (3), 27
June 1981, O.A.U. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58...............................................4

2. Convention Related to Status of Refugees, art. 1 cl. A (2), 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137..................................................................................................................................1

3. Convention Related to Status of Refugees, art. 1 cl. F(b), 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137..................................................................................................................................1

4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art.1 cl. (2), 31 January 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267..................................................................................................................1

5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14 cl. (2), 10 December 1948, U.N.G.A.
Res 217 A (III)...............................................................................................................3

6. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 55 cl. (1), 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S.
261..................................................................................................................................6

7. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 41 cl. (1), 18 April 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95...................................................................................................6

8. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 41 cl. (3), 18 April 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95...................................................................................................7

II. DIGESTS AND BOOKS

1. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, (2005 ED.) 3 VOLS.
[1625].............................................................................................................................6

2. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS,


BUTTERWORTHS: TORONTO, 221-222, (15th ed. 1991).........................................5

3. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), A guide to international refugee


protection and building state asylum systems, Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 27 .
3

4. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and


Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection
Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees2

II
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
5. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Note on the Application of the
Exclusion Clause: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees
........................................................................................................................................6

III. REPORTS AND ARTICLES

1. M. Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering: Minimum Standards of Procedural


Fairness in the Application of the Article 1F Exclusion Clause, 12 Int. J. Refug. Law,
117-127..........................................................................................................................5

2. Paul Behrens, The Law of Diplomatic Asylum–a Contextual Approach, 35 Mich. J.


Int'l L. 319 (2014)..........................................................................................................6

3. UN High Commissioner (UNHCR), The Interface between Extradition and Asylum,


PPLA/2003/05, (November 2003).................................................................................5

4. United Kingdom: Home Office, Exclusion (Article 1F) and Article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention.......................................................................................................1

IV. PERMENANT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1. Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), Judgment, (1950) ICJ Rep 266, ¶226,274...............6

2. Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), Judgment, (1950) ICJ Rep 266, ¶274-275..............6

3. North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark), Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3,
¶74 (February 20)...........................................................................................................4

V. INTERNATIONAL JUDGEMENTS

1. Aguirre-Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 526 U.S. 415........2

2. AH (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, EWCA Civ. 395..........2

3. Al-Sirri v. SSHD & DD (Afghanistan) v. SSHD, UKSC 54.........................................2

4. Bandari v. I.N.S, 227 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000)..................................................4

5. Chanco v. I.N.S, 82 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996)........................................................4

6. Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHL 37, 21.......................3

7. Joined Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B. and D, 2010


E.C.R. I-10979...............................................................................................................1

8. JS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD, UKSC 15.................................................................................2


III
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
9. Kaurr v. I.N.S, No. 97-70678, 1998 WL 416112, at *3 (9th Cir. 1998)........................4

10. Lopez v. I.N.S., 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988)........................................................4

11. McMullen v. INS, 788 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986)..........................................................2

12. R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 WLR 9.........................................3

13. Ramirez v. Canada, 2 FC 306........................................................................................5

14. T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1 WLR 545....................................5

VI. OTHER INTERNATIONAL CASES

1. Re. SK, Refugee Appeal No. 29/91 (RSAA 1992)........................................................5

IV
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Sr. No. Abbreviations Expansion

10. § Section.

1. ¶ Paragraph.

21. Annex. Annexure

2. Art. Article.

31. Cir Circuit

3. cl. Clause.

6. Doc. Document

18. ECHR. European Commission on Human Rights

13. ECR European Court Reports

5. ed. Edition

4. et al. And others

15. EWCA England and Wales Court of Appeal.

27. Hon’ble. Honourable

11. ICJ. International Court of Justice

8. Id. Ibidem

17. ILC. International Law Commission

23. L.R Law Report

28. No. Number

32 OAU Organisation of African Unity

9. p. Page No.

22. Rep. Reports

16. SAF Statement of Agreed Facts

V
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

19. SCHSL. Residual) Special Court for Sierra-Leone

26. Trib. Tribunal

14. UKSC United Kingdom Supreme Court

24. UN. United Nations

20. UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees

12. UNTS United Nations Treaty Series

7. v. Versus

30. VCCR Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

29. VCDR Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

25. WHO. World Health Organization

VI
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND

The United Republic of Aprepluya is a developed parliamentary democracy with a population


of 3 million and a GDP of €160 billion. Beauton, its capital city is located 50 kms from its
western border. It has a thriving banking and financial sector. Apart from this, Aprepluya also
has an active tourism industry. Beauton features many grand casinos and museums. Segura
Province, 100 kms away from Beauton also has mountain villages and folklore. Aprepluya
generated Gross Tourist Receipts of €7.5 billion every year from 2013-17 and about 25% of
total tourist influx was from neighboring state of Ranovstayo. Because of this reason
Ranovstayo has established a consulate in Segura Province, primarily to support its tourists.

The Democratic State of Ranovstayo has a population of 25 million and GDP of €1 trillion.
Its capital city is Bogpadayo and its economy is centered on petroleum, agriculture and
manufacturing sector.

THE INITIAL OUTBREAK

Habard, located 8 time zones away from both these states, in March 2018 reported cases of a
viral respiratory condition resembling Pneumonia. It was identified as a virus, code-named J-
18 (previously unknown) and the disease as J-VID-18. By March 31, 2018, six patients died
of J-VID-18.

VACCINE DEVELOPMENT

A worldwide race for vaccine development started as there was a possibility of worldwide
pandemic because of the nature of virus which was airborne. Aprepluya’s National
Bioresearch Laboratory (hereinafter N.B.L.) located in Segura Province, and Ranovstayo’s
Central Biodefense Institute, located in Bogpadayo and 20 other research institution started
vaccine development by 10th April, 2018.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT AND PANDEMIC OUTBREAK

The research team at N.B.L was made to sign a non-disclosure agreement and prosecution on
non-compliance, regarding anything happening inside the lab in the process of vaccine
development. By 15th April, 2018, the virus had already spread to almost whole of Habard
and it was declared that the virus was capable of human to human transmission. Facts
released by Habard were accepted by Aprepluya and Ranovstayo. On 20 th April, 2018,
W.H.O declared J-
VII
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
VID-18 as a public health emergency. Recommendations were issued under articles 15-49 of
the International Health Regulations. Travel and trade restrictions were not recommended.

Ranovstayo conducted a risk assessment from 15-22nd April, 2018 and on the basis of
recommendations subsequently made restricted entry for people of certain countries into their
territory. The president of Ranovstayo then addressed the country explaining the scheme. The
same was informed to W.H.O on 23rd April, 2018. Aprepluya only adopted basic measures
like use of masks and social distancing. Subsequently on 15th May, 2018, when total no. of
worldwide cases had reached 15,273, W.H.O declared a global pandemic.

THE CONSPIRACY

On 3rd June, 2018 a twitter account was made with the title @J18atNBL where in a tweet it
was claimed that certain workers at N.B.L had developed symptoms of the virus and that
Aprepluyan government was trying to put a shroud on the same. The tweet was traced back to
a N.B.L lab technician Ms. Keinblat Vormund. Before she could be apprehended by
Aprepluyan police, she took shelter inside Ranovstayo Consulate in Segura Province. She
submitted a hand written letter explaining her stand to the consul. The consul was not present
in his office but allowed Ms. Vormund to stay in an empty room inside the Consulate.

THE DIPLOMATIC ISSUE

On 4th June, 2018 Ranovstayo expressed dissatisfaction that Aprepluyan government did not
inform it about worsening condition of virus in its territory. Further Ranovstayo declared that
it was considering Ms. Vormund as an applicant for asylum. Subsequently Aprepluya was
added in the list of “high risk countries” by Ranovstayo and Ranovstayo restricted entry from
Aprepluya. Ranovstayo also recalled all its non-essential diplomats from Consulate. On the
other side Ms. Vormund was charged with certain offences. On 9 th June, 2018, Aprepluya
objected to the severe steps taken by Ranovstayo. On 10th June, 2018, Ranovstayo issued a
statement considering its actions as necessary steps for public good.

THE POTENTIAL TERROISM THREAT

On 19th June, 2018, Aprepluya and Ranovstayo received intelligence reports from
INTERPOL that a terrorist organization Friends of Justice (FoJ) was planning an attack,
possibly an airstrike.

INITIAL OUTCOME

On 23rd June, 2018, Ranovstayo announced permanent closure of its consulate at Segura

VIII
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
Province. It recalled all its diplomats back to Ranovstayo. Tourist unrest also began which led
to massive losses to Aprepluya.

THE PLANE CRASH

In the morning of 26th June, 2018, a Mantyan Aircraft (an airline service in Aprepluya)
crashed in the forest near border. The incident report was issued by Beauton Air Force Chief
which claimed that the aircraft was actually shot down by the Air Force because it did not
respond to the safety regulations. An independent inquiry was also commissioned by
Aprepluya, carried out by International League for Safety in Aviation (I.L.S.A). In its report
it was reported that the plane that was shot down was actually carrying Ms. Keinblat
Vormund and her friend who were trying to seek asylum in Ranovstayo.

IX
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to the declaration deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations under
article 36(2) of the statute of the International Court of justice, by the state of Aprepluya on 7
January 2002 and the state of Ranovstayo on 10 march 2003 recognizing the ipso facto and
without special agreement the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and pursuant to the
application filed by Aprepluya on 12 July 2018 with the court and the counter claim filed by
Ranovstayo on 16 July 2018 and the request dated 3 August 2020 by both the parties to
continue the Court proceedings, the State of Aprepluya submits to the jurisdiction of the
Court.

X
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

ISSUE RAISED

-I-

RANOVSTAYO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY FAILING TO HAND


OVER MS. KEINBLAT VORMUND TO THE APREPLUYAN AUTHORITIES
AFTER THEY REQUESTED HER SURRENDER ON 9 JUNE 2018

XI
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Ranovstayo violated international
law by failing to hand over Ms. Keinblat Vormund to the Aprepluyan authorities after they
requested her surrender on 9 June 2018 since Ms. Keinblat Vormund does not fall under the
category of a refugee and can be excluded under Article 1 clause F(b) of the Convention on
Status of Refugees and subsequently, Ranovstyo interfered in the internal affairs of
Aprepluya by considering the application of diplomatic asylum Article 55 clause (1) of
VCCR and Article 41 clauses (1) and (3) of VCDR.

XII
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

STATEMENT OF PLEADINGS

I. RANOVSTAYO VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW BY FAILING TO HAND OVER MS.


KEINBLAT VORMUND TO THE APREPLUYAN AUTHORITIES AFTER THEY
REQUESTED HER SURRENDER ON 9 JUNE 2018.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Ranovstayo violated
international law by failing to hand over Ms. Keinblat Vormund to the Aprepluyan
authorities after they requested her surrender on 9 June 2018 in the light of two reasons,
[A] Ms. Keinblat Vormund does not fall under the category of a refugee, and [B]
Ranovsatyo interfered in the internal affairs of Aprepluya by considering the
application of diplomatic asylum.

[A] Ms. Keinblat Vormund does not fall under the category of a refugee.

Respondents may argue that Ms. Vormund is a refugee under Article 1A (2)1 of the
1951 Convention. The Refugee Convention provides the framework for international
refugee protection2 and the subsequent 1967 protocol3 expands the scope of this
definition to include people who have been displaced after 1951. However, Ms.
Vormund can be denied the status of a refugee since, (a) she can be excluded under
Article 1F (b), (b) there is no fear of persecution, and consequently, (c) she can be
extradited to the origin country.

(a) Ms. Vormund can be excluded under Article 1F (b) of the


Refugee Convention, 1951.

Article 1F (b) applies in cases where there are serious reasons for considering that the
individual has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee. 4 Article 1F serves to protect the
integrity of the institution of asylum.5 The following criteria must be fulfilled for the
crime to fall under the clause (b) of Article 1F: (i) there must be serious reasons for
considering that the individual has committed a criminal offence; (ii) the offence has
to

1
Convention Related to Status of Refugees, art. 1 cl. A (2), 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
2
United Kingdom: Home Office, Exclusion (Article 1F) and Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, (July 1,
2016), https://www.refworld.org/docid/58b017e4391.html.
3
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art.1 cl. (2), 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
1
4
Convention Related to Status of Refugees, art. 1 cl. F(b), 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
5
Joined Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B. and D, 2010 E.C.R. I-10979.

2
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
be serious; (iii) the offence has to be non–political; (iv) the offence has to have been
committed outside the country of refuge.6

‘Serious reasons’ has an autonomous meaning and is stronger than ‘reasonable


grounds’ and therefore strong or clear and credible evidence has to be present and
then considered.7 In order to engage the exclusion provisions, the evidence should not
be tenuous, inherently weak or vague, and should support a case built around more
than just suspicion.8 Additionally, where there are serious reasons for considering that
an individual committed the act or crime, it must be established that the person
intended to engage in the conduct (intent) and was aware that certain consequences
would follow in the ordinary course of events (knowledge). 9 In determining whether a
particular offence is sufficiently serious to justify his loss of protection, the Court
must take all facts and matters10 into account including the nature of the act, the nature
of the penalty and whether most jurisdictions would consider it a serious crime11.

A ‘serious non-political crime’ is a crime not committed out of ‘genuine political


motives’, not directed toward the ‘modification of the political organization or
structure of the state’ and with no direct ‘causal link between the crime committed and
its alleged political purpose and object’.12 Crime committed ‘outside the country of
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee’ would include country of
origin or another country.13

In the present case, Ms. Vormund committed a serious crime in the origin country by
not adhering to the non-disclosure agreement14 and disclosing confidential information
by creating fake twitter account 15. This information was further re-published 16 without
any reliability thereby, creating a situation of public disorder. Further, she was
charged

6
7
Supra, note 2.
Al-Sirri v. SSHD & DD (Afghanistan) v. SSHD, UKSC 54 (2010).
8
JS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD, UKSC 15 (2010).
9
Supra, note 2.
10
AH (Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, EWCA Civ. 395 (2012).
11
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4,
(February 2019) https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteria-
determining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html.
12
McMullen v. INS, 788 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986); Aguirre-Aguirre v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
13
Supra, note 11.
14
SAF ¶6.
2
15
SAF ¶18.
16
Id.

3
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
with serious offences under the National Penal Code.17 Hence, Ms. Vormund can be
excluded from seeking asylum.

(b) There is no fear of persecution.

A person fleeing from legitimate criminal prosecution or punishment, rather than


persecution, is not normally a refugee18. Therefore a clear line has to be established
between persecution and prosecution. Accordingly it can be claimed that Ms.
Vormund was trying to flee from the fear of prosecution and not persecution, and
therefore the protection provided to her in accordance with that provided to a refugee,
is illegitimate because (i) the elements of persecution are not being fulfilled, (ii) the
nature of crime committed by Ms. Vormund is of serious character, and (iii) the
acts committed by Ms. Vormund does not fall under exceptions where
prosecution amounts to persecution.

(i). The elements of persecution aren’t being fulfilled.

The 1951 convention has adopted liberal interpretation of the term ‘persecution’
and includes (a) risk for reasons of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion’, and (b) threat to life or freedom as
given under Article 33 clause 1 of the Convention. 19 The requirement that an
applicant for refugee status had to have a “well-founded” fear of persecution if he
was returned to his own country meant that there had to be demonstrated a
reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be so persecuted.20 Further, the ill-
treatment that he fears is of a sufficiently grave nature as to amount to
persecution.21

In the present case, the charges framed against Ms. Vormund are not those that
would amount to ‘persecution’ as neither of the ingredients has been fulfilled.

(ii). The nature of crime committed by Ms. Vormund is of serious character.

Article 14(2) of UDHR provides exception to clause (1) and subsequently, does not
extend to people who have fled their country of origin as a result of having
committed serious non-political crime.22 Article 14 makes it clear people cannot be

17
SAF ¶32.
18
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), A guide to international refugee protection and building
state asylum systems, Handbook for Parliamentarians N° 27, (2017)
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a9d57554.html 19 Supra, note 11.
20
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 WLR 9 (1998).

3
21
Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, UKHL 37, 21 (2000).
22
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14 cl. (2), 10 December 1948, U.N.G.A. Res 217 A (III).

4
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
granted asylum simply to avoid prosecution for “non-political crimes or acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” Further, the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights in its article 12 clause (3) protects every
individual from persecution and grants right to seek and obtain asylum in other
countries in accordance with the law of those countries and international
conventions.23 It is an established principle of law that due regard should be given
to the practice of states whose interest are specially affected24.

In the present case, the crime for which Ms. Vormund has been charged with is of
serious nature25 and punishment regarding the same is in proportion to the crime.
Further, here the interest of Aprepluya has been overlooked by denying it to
surrender a person accused of serious crime under its domestic laws.26

(iii). The act committed by Ms. Vormund does not fall under exceptions
where prosecution amounts to persecution.

There are certain conditions where prosecution amounts to persecution and in order
to determine this it will be necessary to refer to the laws of the country concerned
which may not be in conformity with accepted human rights standards. 27 Courts
uniformly recognize that a State’s prosecution of its citizens does not automatically
equate with persecution, and often explicitly articulate this ‘distinction between
legitimate criminal prosecution and persecution based on a protected ground’ 28 and
implies that the two are ‘readily distinguishable’ 29. The person accused of crime
committed will fall under the category of a refugee if the penal prosecution in itself
amount to persecution and there is a well-founded fear of persecution. 30 In addition
to this, the government of every sovereign nation has a legitimate interest in
investigating criminal activity31 and has the right to prosecute individuals accused
of criminal behaviour32.

23
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), art. 12 cl. (3), 27 June 1981,
O.A.U. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.
24
North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark), Judgment, (1969) ICJ Rep 3, ¶74 (February 20).
25
SAF ¶32.
26
SAF ¶34.
27
Supra, note 11.
28
Bandari v. I.N.S, 227 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000).
29
Kaurr v. I.N.S, No. 97-70678, 1998 WL 416112, at *3 (9th Cir. 1998).
30
Supra, note 11.
31
Chanco v. I.N.S, 82 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996).

4
32
Lopez v. I.N.S., 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988).

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
In the present case, Ms. Vormund does not fall under the category of refugee but is
merely a fugitive from justice as she escaped from the police investigation 33 and
consequently did not adhere to the law of the land. Further, there was only fear of
being prosecuted for the alleged crime34. The United Republic of Aprepluya being
a developed parliamentary democracy35 will follow the due course of law in
prosecuting a criminal and has a right to prosecute individuals accused of criminal
activity.

(c) Ms. Vormund can be extradited to the origin country.

Extradition and asylum overlap and intersect in various ways, if the person whose
extradition is sought is a refugee or asylum-seeker 36 and decision on an extradition
request must be in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement37. However, the
principle of non-refoulement does not apply to those who are not deserving of
international protection under Article 1F.38 Article 1F(b) was meant to be directly
linked to extradition, so that it would automatically apply to any crime that could
give rise to the surrender of a fugitive under extradition law.39

In relation to the standard of proof and evidentiary requirement for extradition,


varying criminal standards of proof of guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ are applied
which should be ‘lower than the balance of probabilities’ 40, ‘probable cause’41 or
‘evidence pointing strongly to guilt’42. Actual proof or conviction of a crime is not
needed in order to exclude a person from protection under the 1951 Convention 43. In
asylum procedures, there are normally no limitations as to what kind of information
is admissible as evidence for the purposes of exclusion 44. Additionally, extradition
treaties and conventions require the requesting State to submit a description of the

33
SAF ¶ 20.
34
SAF ¶21.
35
SAF ¶1.
36
UN High Commissioner (UNHCR), The Interface between Extradition and Asylum, PPLA/2003/05,
(November 2003), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3fe846da4.html.
37
Convention Related to Status of Refugees, art. 33 cl. (1), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
38
Supra, note 36.
39
JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS, BUTTERWORTHS: TORONTO, 221-222,
(15th ed. 1991).
40
Ramirez v. Canada, 2 FC 306 (1992).
41
Re. SK, Refugee Appeal No. 29/91 (RSAA 1992).
42
T. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1 WLR 545 (1995).
43
Supra, note 36.
44
M. Bliss, ‘Serious Reasons for Considering: Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness in the Application of

5
the Article 1F Exclusion Clause, 12 Int. J. Refug. Law, 117-127 (2000).

6
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
allegations against the fugitive.45 Further, the consequence of exclusion under
Article 1F is that the State concerned is under an obligation to extradite or prosecute
the applicant.46

In the present case, extradition of Ms. Vormund can be sought by Aprepluya since it
provided the description of allegations against the former 47 and she falls under the
exclusion clause of 1951 Convention.

[B] Ranovastayo has violated the international law by interfering in the


internal affairs of Aprepluya.

The fundamental principles of international law generally do not specifically recognize


the principles of extra-territorial jurisdiction that is granting of diplomatic asylum. 48The
diplomatic representative must examine the question whether the conditions required
for granting asylum are fulfilled. 49 Further, it is a principle rule of International law that
states may not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction outside their territory, i.e. abroad,
and because diplomatic missions are also “abroad”, States must refrain from exercising
their jurisdiction in the premises of diplomatic missions. 50 The principles of
international law do not recognize any rule of unilateral and definitive qualification by
the State granting diplomatic asylum.51 The grant of diplomatic asylum is a decision
which derogates from the “territorial sovereignty” of the receiving state.52

VCDR does not specifically contain the provision of diplomatic asylum but Article 41
clause (1) provides that it is the duty of all persons who enjoy privileges and
immunities under the Convention to respect the laws of the receiving State and not
interfere in their internal affairs.53 The same is stated under Article 55 clause (1) of
VCCR.54 In the Asylum Case55 the Court opined that an asylum is a form of
‘intervention’ and this must count as one of the most explicit considerations of
diplomatic interference by the ICJ.56 The duty

45
Supra, note 36.
46
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clause: Article
1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, (September 4, 2003),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html.
47
SAF ¶ 32.
48
Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), Judgment, (1950) ICJ Rep 266, ¶226,274 (November 20).
49
Id.
50
HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, (2005 ED.) 3 VOLS. [1625].
51
Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), Judgment, (1950) ICJ Rep 266, ¶226,274 (November 20)
52
Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), Judgment, (1950) ICJ Rep 266, ¶274-275 (November 20)
53
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 41 cl. (1), 18 April 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
54
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 55 cl. (1), 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
6
55
Supra, note 48, at ¶226.
56
Paul Behrens, The Law of Diplomatic Asylum–a Contextual Approach, 35 Mich. J. Int'l L. 319 (2014).

7
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS
of non-interference is joined by Article 41 clause (3) of the VCDR that specifically
addresses the use of mission premises and imposes further obligations on diplomatic
agents that the premises must not be used in any manner incompatible with the
functions of the mission as laid down in the Convention or any other agreements.57

In the present case, Ranovstayo has interfered in the internal matters of the Aprepluya
since there was a criminal investigation going on Ms. Vormund and granting her shelter
in the consulate58 and considering her applicant for asylum59 resulted in intervention in
internal matters of Aprepluya. This function of the consulate was outside its scope as
the consulate was established only for the purpose of extending help to the nationals of
the sending State.60

57
58
ViennaConvention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 41 cl. (3), 18 April 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
SAF ¶22.
59
SAF ¶25.
60
SAF ¶3.

7
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in light of issues raised, arguments advanced, and authorities cited, The United
Republic of Aprepluya respectfully requests this court to adjudge

I.

That Ranovstayo violated international law by failing to handover Ms. Keinblat Vormund to
the Aprepluyan Authorities after they requested her surrender.

AND/OR

Any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests of justice,
equity, and good conscience.

Respectfully

Submitted, Agents of the Government of the United Republic

of Aprepluya

XIII

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