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The Epochal Event
Transformations in the
Entangled Human,
Technological,
and Natural Worlds
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon
Palgrave Studies in the History of Science
and Technology

Series Editors
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Colby College
Waterville, ME, USA

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Designed to bridge the gap between the history of science and the history
of technology, this series publishes the best new work by promising and
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spectives on issues of current and ongoing concern, provides international
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communication between historians and practicing scientists.

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 Zoltán Boldizsár Simon

The Epochal Event

Transformations in the Entangled Human,
Technological, and Natural Worlds
Zoltán Boldizsár Simon
Bielefeld University
Bielefeld, Germany

Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology

ISBN 978-3-030-47804-9    ISBN 978-3-030-47805-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47805-6

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 Preface: On Connective Concepts

Human activity confronts us today with our cognitive limits. The recogni-
tion that human agency achieved a planetary character, that is, the recog-
nition that our activity became a natural force that transforms the condition
of the Earth system, is at the edge of our understanding. Facing the sheer
scale and the immense consequences of human actions and capacities does
not come easy to most of us. Little wonder that the new situation triggers
contradictory responses. Only in the climate context, responses vary from
climate change denial to apocalyptic fatalism, from lifestyle choices of
reducing carbon footprints to large-scale plans of geoengineering, and
from technology blaming to techno-saviorism.
In a cacophony of voices, scholarly responses represent only a fragment
of possibilities. Even if the natural sciences brought the issue to a broader
awareness in the first place, their voice becomes one among the many
when it comes to responding to the situation. Together with humanities
and social scientific responses, they constitute a larger family of responses
with a specific socio-cultural function to fulfill: scholarly responses do not
simply confront us with the limits of understanding; they also try to over-
come the very limits they identify. In other words, scholarly responses aim
at gaining an understanding of that which seems to defy understanding—
especially in situations we experience as crisis.
This book attempts to sketch a specific type of scholarly response. It
aims at developing an understanding of our recent anthropogenic plane-
tary crisis by creating concepts through which we conceive of the world
and ourselves. So far this is nothing surprising. Many would agree that

v
vi PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS

theoretically oriented work in what we still call today the humanities and
the social sciences is, to a large extent, conceptual work.
The specificity of this book’s approach lies in the intention to encour-
age developing concepts of a peculiar kind. Let’s call them connective con-
cepts. As our current crisis consists of the collision of human and the
natural worlds through advanced technologies, the adequate concepts
through which we apprehend ourselves and the world must be ones that
somehow capture the collision of worlds or reflect on that collision. Such
concepts are connective inasmuch as they have the potential to link,
bridge, and connect knowledge formations that were originally developed
to study the human and the natural worlds separately. In order to live up
to their potential, they need to travel.
As Mieke Bal pointed out two decades ago, concepts “are not fixed”;
“they travel – between disciplines, between individual scholars, between
historical periods, and between geographically dispersed academic com-
munities.”1 The different forms of travel Bal indicates are supposed to
testify the flexibility of concepts. How do connective concepts relate to
Bal’s traveling concepts and their flexibility? On the one hand, connective
concepts are flexible to the extent that they, too, travel across disciplines
and their meanings are constantly being renegotiated. On the other hand,
connective concepts also gesture toward the opposite end by seeking
points of connection and shared meanings through potentially the entirety
of the scholarly landscape, thereby enabling a broader exchange on the
collision of worlds. As compared to traveling concepts, connective ones
have an extra job to do. Whereas Bal’s notion of traveling concepts is pri-
marily a reflection on the work of the humanities (even if she does not
exclude science from the travels), connective concepts, by definition, may
link not only certain disciplines, but, in the most desirable although sel-
dom cases, also the work of the humanities and the work of the sciences.
At times when we both unintentionally act into and deliberately manip-
ulate and engineer what has previously been thought of as the order of
nature, concepts that merely travel are less useful than concepts that also
connect. To stand a chance to comprehend the big picture, our partial
knowledges must be effectively bridged by certain concepts. In fact, even
the question of how exactly we understand the collision of the human and
the natural worlds—whether it makes up one world, whether we keep
thinking about them as distinguishable (and if yes, the way in which we do
exactly), or whether we somehow manage to think of it as one world with
 PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS vii

analytically distinguishable constituents—will likely be decided by the

concepts we create to capture their entanglement.
The collision of worlds is already enhanced into a large-scale connective
concept, even a master concept, if you like: the Anthropocene. Yet, as of
now, the Anthropocene is also a contested concept in a transdisciplinary
debate, invested with several potentially conflicting meanings. The chap-
ters of this book will devote a great deal of attention to exploring the
perplexities and conflicts in debating the concept. What I would like to do
here is to indicate four points about connective concepts by taking a start-
ing point in the notion of the Anthropocene. Let me introduce the points
in the shape of four brief theses.

1. Connective concepts entail a cluster of conceptual innovations. Game-­

changing conceptual innovations hardly concern stand-alone con-
cepts. Rather, they involve a larger cluster or web of interrelated
notions, some of which are newly coined, while others are old ones
invested with new meanings. In the case of the Anthropocene, its
fate as a master concept is tied to the development of further con-
cepts that either reinforce or challenge its plausibility. Hence the fact
that the Anthropocene already comes within a rapidly expanding
web of concepts that intend to capture the current “planetary” and
“anthropogenic” crisis.
2. Connective concepts require mutual knowledge transfer. Concepts
typically emerge locally and become connective ones over the course
of multiple interactions. The Anthropocene as a connective (master)
concept is, for instance, the creation of Earth system science, just as
well as most of its surrounding concepts. The humanities and the
social sciences have begun to rapidly adopt these concepts among
their conceptual tools, renegotiate their meanings, and develop their
own concepts that either function as new surrounding and related
concepts to the scientific ones or as conceptual alternatives. This is
necessary, and conceptual work in this direction is unlikely to halt
anytime soon. As seen from the other side, however, the conceptual
innovations of the humanities and social sciences struggle to find
their way to the scientific vocabulary to a comparable extent. Mildly
put, at the present stage it is only in a limited sense that we can
meaningfully talk about a mutual knowledge transfer in making
sense of the collision of worlds. The reasons are manifold, and some
of them will be touched upon in more details in the chapters that
viii PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS

follow. What needs to be noted here is only the fact that the ideal of
mutuality in knowledge transfer can easily fall short in practice. Yet,
the lack of full mutuality does not mean that partial mutuality is of
no value. Under the condition of contested meanings—and con-
cepts discussed across the disciplinary landscape are extremely prone
to such contestation of meanings—partial mutuality is already
a success.
3. With respect to their reach, first-order and second-order connective con-
cepts can be distinguished. Given the distance from the ideal situation
of achieving a high degree of mutuality in knowledge transfer, it
makes sense to distinguish between two levels in which connective
concepts may work. On the first level, one can find those first-order
connective concepts that resonate with both the natural and life sci-
ences on the one hand and the human and social sciences on the
other. Such concepts are, I believe, what we need, what we are short
of, what we bitterly contest even when we have them, and what may
be seldom and extremely difficult to intentionally develop. As an
example of a truly transdisciplinary reach, one can think of not only
the Anthropocene but also the notion of anthropocentrism, fiercely
debated in the humanities and the social sciences as well as in the
natural and life sciences.2 Second-order connective concepts have a nar-
rower reach. They work, respectively, within the confines of the
natural and life sciences on the one hand and the human and social
sciences on the other. Arguably, much of the conceptual innovations
that emerge locally in disciplines of the human and social sciences
acquire such reach at best. They may resonate broadly enough
within humanities and social scientific scholarship, but they hardly
find their way to the scientific vocabulary. This is especially true of
concepts put forward as alternatives to the Anthropocene, such as
the Capitalocene or the Chthulucene.3
4. Connective concepts are recognized as such only after the fact and by
being used as connective ones. The above categorization of connective
concepts does not entail that each individual concept must live up to
the fullest possible reach within one of the categories. It means only
that connective concepts are typically made use of within the respec-
tive scopes associated with them. As the phrasing of the previous
sentence already indicates, concepts are defined as connective by
virtue of being used as such. Concepts may or may not be developed
with the explicit intention to function as connective ones, but
 PREFACE: ON CONNECTIVE CONCEPTS ix

i­ntention is not what decides their connective character. Nor is the

decisive factor anything like an inherent feature of the concepts
themselves. We are the ones who invest concepts with a connective
character, and we do that only after the fact, only after the formation
of the concepts, by actually putting them to use across the disciplin-
ary landscape as conceptual bridges.

This book is an effort to develop such a connective concept: the epochal

event. The concept reflects the emerging societal experience of time that
epochal changes are taking place all around us. Against the backdrop of
the technology-driven collision of the human and the natural worlds, it
attempts to capture the transformative character of threshold events that
trigger previously unimaginable epochal transformations.

Bielefeld, Germany
Zoltán B. Simon
Leiden, The Netherlands

Notes
1. Mieke Bal, Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 24.
2. In the larger debate on anthropocentrism, the humanities are typically advo-
cating an anti-anthropocentric stance. Chapter 4 engages with the question
of anthropocentrism in more details.
3. More on these alternatives in Chapter 3.

Bibliography
Bal, Mieke. Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002.
 Acknowledgments

Not many friends knew that I was working on this book. The reason for
this is very simple: neither did I. Around the end of 2018, I started to
work on an article, which, over time, became a long article. Then it became
a very long one—so long, after a while, that at some point I began to
entertain the idea of the book format. And now here we are.
Writing this book coincided with the blossoming of my collaboration
with Marek Tamm on various related projects. I am indebted to Marek
and our discussions of many themes and ideas that feature in the coming
pages. The final shape of the text greatly benefited also from the com-
ments of the reviewers, pointing at potential pitfalls and indicating ways to
strengthen arguments. Very many thanks to Julia Filimonova for drawing
the brilliant picture for the cover and for Megan Laddusaw at Palgrave for
managing this project through all its stages, from proposal to the pub-
lished book.

xi
 Contents

1 Prelude to a New Epochality  1

2 A Perplexing Appeal to History 11

3 The Entangled Human-Technological-­Natural World 33

4 Epochal Thinking and Anthropogenic Catastrophe 53

5 The Historical Event 79

6 The Epochal Event 97

7 Coda: A World of Epochal Transformations 119

Index137

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Prelude to a New Epochality

Abstract An emerging societal experience of time conceives of changes in

epochal terms. Epochal claims increasingly dominate the ways in which we
think about transformations both of the world and of knowledge produc-
tion about the world. To a certain extent, the latter seems self-evident:
insofar as we think that epochal changes are around us, it seems reasonable
to claim that we need epochal changes in our modes of thinking to be able
to come to terms with the vastness of the changes themselves. In briefly
introducing the emergence of a new epochality, that is, a new kind of
epochal thinking, the chapter touches upon some of the core themes of
the book: the perception that human capacities are reaching an unprece-
dented scale; the entanglement of the human, technological, and natural
worlds; the shift toward thinking in planetary terms; and the necessity to
develop a knowledge regime attuned to the new conditions. Finally, the
chapter ends with an outline of the book.

Keywords Epochal change • Epochality • Experience of time

• Human • Technology • Nature • Planetary • Transdisciplinarity

© The Author(s) 2020 1

Z. B. Simon, The Epochal Event, Palgrave Studies
in the History of Science and Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47805-6_1
2 Z. B. SIMON

The New Epochality

We are living in an age unlike anything the world has ever seen. This is not
a claim I wish to advance but a societal experience of time that I think we
need to understand. The new experience of time is historical in a specific
way: it conceives of changes in epochal terms. Not in the most familiar
sense though, not in the sense of historical epochs as we know them.
Epochal thought is emerging today in a way that was simply inconceivable
before human capacities came to be perceived in terms of a planetary-scale
agency that brings about transformations in the condition of the Earth
viewed as an integrated system.
Such human agency lurks behind an unprecedented biodiversity loss,
the alteration of the climatic conditions of the planet, and the potential to
manipulate and create both non-organic and organic life-forms through
advanced technologies (artificial intelligence, digital life-forms, genome
editing, cloning, and so on). All this, either separately or together, is
expected to launch epochal changes on a planetary scale, entangle the
human and the natural worlds through advanced technology, and kick off
transformations with potentially unpredictable consequences that the
human mind is not even equipped to grasp. What we can grasp, however,
is the societal experience of the epochal transformations that we are likely
to bring about. This book is an effort to come to terms with a potentially
new kind of epochal thinking—rooted in the perception of anthropogenic
planetary changes—that endows even certain towering events with epochal
attributes.
But let’s not get too ahead of ourselves and begin with the most funda-
mental experiences. There is arguably a growing sense that epochal changes
are taking place around us in practically all domains of life. Following the
invention of nuclear weaponry and the experiences of the Second World
War, we have been said to enter the atomic age. Then came the space age,
and subsequently the information age, while we have been undergoing a
digital revolution, which is now already old news in light of the fourth
industrial revolution that brings together the digital of the third industrial
revolution with physical systems. Perhaps some would argue that it is a
feature of postmodernity (understood in epochal terms as a societal or
socio-cultural condition) that industrial revolutions appear to come lately
in sequels, much like Hollywood blockbusters. Yet there is a chance that
these claims would fall on deaf ears, as today postmodernity itself as an era
is gone, and the intellectual period when postmodernism was a prominent
 1 PRELUDE TO A NEW EPOCHALITY 3

and fashionable mode of thinking (not be confused with postmodernity)

is also passé. It seems we have now entered the Anthropocene, with our
eyes scanning the horizon for the coming posthumanity.
Anyone can add their favorite epochal claims to the ones listed here. I
also add one by writing this book and arguing that coming to terms with
our new epochality, that is, with our age of the epochal, so to speak, requires
some sort of an intellectual sea change. Besides, this claim will fit
quite smoothly with a tendency in present-day scholarship that reproduces
the broader societal experience of time on its own scale. Given that schol-
arly endeavors take place within the broader societal space, it is not much
of a surprise that the wider societal sentiment of the epochal boils down to
epochal claims concerning knowledge production. In regard to knowl-
edge production, we have gotten used to framing intellectual endeavors as
outlines of colossal challenges that demand responses which entail tre-
mendous changes in our modes of thinking.
Again, my intention is not to point fingers. I have been exercising such
scholarship before, and this book is no exception. I only want to raise aware-
ness of the fact that this is what we are doing, oftentimes without knowing
it. We are of course very well aware of the customary academic turns that
typically argue for refocusing attention and aim at rethinking, refiguring,
and reinventing that which already exists. Epochal claims, however, aim at a
much higher goal; they demand changes on the level of wholesale knowl-
edge formations. And, to a certain extent, this scholarly reproduction of the
wider societal experience may even be self-evident. For insofar as we think
that epochal changes are around us, it seems reasonable to claim that we
need epochal changes in our modes of thinking to understand them.
Here are a few examples. To begin with, consider Donna Haraway’s
discussion of “the almost incomprehensible increases in human numbers.”
More concretely, Haraway refers to “a 9 billion increase of human beings
over 150 years, to a level of 11 billion by 2100 if we are lucky,” which
“cannot be explained away by blaming Capitalism or any other word start-
ing with a capital letter.” Instead, the new situation points onward to the
need “to think together anew across differences of historical position and
of kinds of knowledge and expertise.”1 Haraway’s implied take on the
necessity of new knowledge formations is nevertheless less explicit than
that of Elizabeth Ermarth (in a context that does not have much to do
with planetary-scale changes). In her book History in the Discursive
Condition, published less than a decade ago to synthetize her work from
the two previous decades, Ermarth puts forward the argument that the
4 Z. B. SIMON

“modern condition” has been replaced by a “discursive condition.” She

argues that “the departure from modernity signals a tectonic change radi-
cal enough to suggest that even the tools of thought must change if we are
to keep up with ourselves in any vital or creative way.”2
Less than ten years later, however, there are not many left who still
think that we are in anything like a “discursive condition.” Yet, perhaps
even more of us think that we are witnessing “a tectonic change radical
enough” to rewrite previous knowledges, even though the reasons for
thinking so may be other than Ermarth’s. It makes sense then to return to
potentially more future proof final examples, ones that reflect the plane-
tary concerns integral to the coming chapters. One of the first things to
mention in this context is the human-induced mass extinction of species.
In their 1996 book The Sixth Extinction, Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin
argue that the recognition of a sixth mass extinction in Earth’s history
demands an epochal change in the constitution of knowledge. They claim
that “we are in the midst of a seismic shift in thinking about the nature of
ourselves and the world we live in. It is no hyperbole to describe the mag-
nitude of the shift as an intellectual revolution.”3 Then, in the context of
anthropogenic climate change—and in a more moderate and less alarmist
tone—Tracey Skillington even better captures the way in which epochal
claims about the world and knowledge production on the world hang
together. In her recent book Climate Justice and Human Rights,
Skillington writes that “the anticipation of grave environmental catastro-
phes fundamentally alters ways of being in and thinking about this world.”4
Again, anyone can add their favorite epochal claims concerning the
scholarly world of knowledge production. But before all this begins to
look too much like a parody (with respect to both scholarship in the age
of epochal thinking and the age itself as some sort of a meta-epoch), I
must make it perfectly clear that the phenomenon is genuinely serious. We
are so invested in advocating our particular epochal claims that we fail to
see the big picture of what exactly we are doing. More importantly, in fail-
ing to see how we advance epochal thought in the scholarly world, we also
fail to understand that which we somewhat automatically and habitually
reproduce: the larger pattern of thought, the broader societal mentality
that conceives of the world not merely in terms of accelerating changes (as
recent social theories hold) but in terms of non-continuous epochal
transformations.5
To avoid misunderstandings, there is nothing wrong with the scholarly
reproduction of the epochal. The relative unawareness about it is a bit
 1 PRELUDE TO A NEW EPOCHALITY 5

more problematic though. I intend to remedy this situation to the extent

of bringing to the fore a category of thought already implicit in our age of
the epochal. The ultimate aim of this book is to account for the emergence
of events which are perceived as having the capacity to kick off epochal
changes. I call them epochal events. Achieving this aim implies two supple-
mentary undertakings. First, I need to outline the general conditions
under which such epochal events can emerge. This means that—on a more
general level—I have to account for the peculiarities of the new kind of
epochal thinking that permeates societal and scholarly imagination since
the middle of the twentieth century. Second, being subjected to the very
thinking that I examine, I will end up advancing scholarly claims concern-
ing knowledge production—claims that must also come out as epochal,
very much in the fashion of the aforementioned examples, although hope-
fully more self-consciously.6

The Structure of the Book

To briefly foreshadow the gist of the coming pages, its epochal claims
concern the necessity of venturing into a transdisciplinary knowledge
regime designed to study the new constellation of the entanglement of the
human, the technological, and the natural worlds.
Through developed technologies, human activity is merged today with
the natural world to the extent that planetary-scale transformations emerge
within an entanglement of worlds. The entanglement—and the growing
awareness of the human element being effective in planetary changes—
provides the context in which epochal thought gains new life. Yet we
struggle to understand even the stakes of the entanglement if we remain
constrained by our disciplinary knowledge formations that have been
established on the premise of studying the human and the natural worlds
separately. If these worlds appear to us as intertwined and interconnected
today, then we need to develop the matching knowledge regime that
brings together and connects humanities and social scientific scholarship
with the work of the natural and life sciences. As many approaches with
which the coming pages enter into a discussion already argue along similar
lines, the question is not that of whether it is necessary to gesture toward
a transdisciplinary direction in knowledge production. The question is
rather how exactly to do so.
This book intends to develop an answer to the above question by expli-
cating the epochal event as a connective concept with a transdisciplinary
6 Z. B. SIMON

appeal. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 sets the stage by arguing

that at times when a new kind of epochal imagination pervades both pub-
lic and scientific discourses, there is an appeal to history. The appeal turns
out to be a concern not of history as disciplinary knowledge but of history
as a mode of thinking. Besides, it entails a demand for history to renegoti-
ate itself, that is, to renegotiate the narrowly understood disciplinary epis-
temology of historical studies and whatever we mean by history today. All
in all, amidst epochal changes in the entangled human-technological-nat-
ural world, an appeal to history must be an appeal to develop the kind of
historical thinking that is able to make sense of transformations in a more-­
than-­human world.
The task of Chapter 3 is to explore that which evokes a potentially
renewed historical thinking: the entanglement of the world of human
affairs, the technological domain, and the natural world. Focusing on the
Anthropocene debate, the chapter pays special attention to the question of
how technology qualifies as a systemic element in the overall entangle-
ment. It also features a sustained argument for the necessity of developing
concepts that enable us to come to terms with the entanglement—con-
cepts through which we can be able to see that there is an entanglement
in the first place. Such concepts need to be connective concepts, that is,
concepts that find resonance across the disciplinary landscape and gesture
toward the possibility of developing the knowledge formations adequate
for studying the entanglement of the human, technological, and natu-
ral worlds.
Chapter 4 outlines the emergence of the new epochality in post-Second
World War societies. It argues that a new kind of epochal thought is being
constituted since the middle of the last century, since humanity’s self-­
authored existential catastrophe—within the context of the entangled
human-technological-natural world—became thinkable. The chapter
introduces three instances of the new epochal: first, the ongoing human-­
induced sixth mass extinction event mentioned earlier7; second, the poten-
tial transgression of planetary boundaries, in which the notion of “planetary
boundaries” attempts to identify a safe operating space for humanity
within the frontiers that mark the conditions of the planet that, to our
present knowledge, support human life8; and third, the prospect of a tech-
nological singularity, the potential event of creating greater-than-human
general intelligence, likely entailing an intelligence explosion in creating
increasingly greater intelligences in an accelerating pace.9 In relation to
the three instances of the new epochal, the chapter also ventures into a
 1 PRELUDE TO A NEW EPOCHALITY 7

discussion of several key themes, ranging from the question of anthropo-

centrism to the way in which the future appears as a threat. The central
significance of Chapter 4 lies with the fact that it is within the epochal
thought emerging in the shadow of anthropogenic catastrophe that cer-
tain events achieve an epochal character.
Whereas the chapters mentioned so far are devoted to big questions
concerning the larger context and the condition of possibility of epochal
events, the subsequent two are explicitly devoted to the conceptualization
of the epochal event as a category of a renewed historical thought. Chapter 5
begins the conceptual work by turning to the closest available category to
which the epochal event can be measured: the historical event. In mapping
existing conceptualizations of the historical event, the chapter focuses on
the relationship between event and novelty and on the transformative
potential of events. Three distinct notions of the historical event receive
special attention: Rolf Gruner’s analysis of the historical event as an exer-
cise in analytic philosophy; William Sewell’s thoughts on historical events
that transform social structures; and Hayden White’s “modernist” event.
Chapter 6 situates these notions of the historical event with the new
instances of the epochal introduced in Chapter 4. Over the course of
building a contrast, the epochal event proves to be a distinct category—
that is, not merely a historical event of a larger scale and a bigger scope—
endowed with the following characteristics: first, epochal events are
hyper-historical, meaning that the transformations they induce open up a
“new reality”; second, they are perceived as having a potential to intro-
duce thereby a radical temporal break interpreted in terms of temporal
incommensurability; third, they exceed the confines of human experience.
To condense all this (and more) into a digestible takeaway message, the
chapter attempts to develop a definition of the epochal event.
Finally, in place of a conclusion, the coda returns to the big picture with
a dual objective. On the one hand, it reviews related efforts that, in one
way or another, grapple with conceptualizing a world of epochal transfor-
mations in a more-than-human world. On the other hand, it muses over
the possibility of learning to inhabit such a world. As the final contention
of the book, the coda suggests that inhabiting a world of epochal transfor-
mations might mean nothing other than learning to navigate carefully
among oftentimes contradictory imperatives.
8 Z. B. SIMON

Notes
1. Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 6–7.
2. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering
the Tools of Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), xii.
3. Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, The Sixth Extinction: Patterns of Life and
the Future of Humankind (New York: Anchor Books, 1996), 223.
4. Tracey Skillington, Climate Justice and Human Rights (New York: Palgrave,
2017), 2. The Anthropocene debate across disciplines—introduced prop-
erly in the next chapters—features countless claims concerning the necessity
of epochal changes in knowledge production. So does this book.
5. For the most influential sociological theory of acceleration, see Hartmut
Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity, trans. Jonathan Trejo-­
Mathys (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). For a rival sociologi-
cal interpretation—sensing that what is stake is more than acceleration—see
Ulrich Beck, The Metamorphosis of the World (Cambridge: Polity, 2016). The
coda will return to Beck’s theory in the context of discussing endeavors that
share the main imperative of this book and grapple with providing a concep-
tual understanding of an age of epochal transformations. For my more
detailed discussion of Rosa’s theory in the terms outlined above, see Zoltán
Boldizsár Simon, History in Times of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for the
21st Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 181–183.
6. Whether the growing societal and scholarly sense of witnessing epochal
transformations can be confined to Western societies, to the experiences of
the rich, or generally speaking to the experiences of those who can afford to
experience the world in such terms is of course an open question.
Globalization makes it difficult to argue for confining claims concerning
societal tendencies to the Western world, let alone, to certain social groups
within the Western world. At the same time, the categories of the humani-
ties and the social sciences that point to various inequalities within social
worlds make it difficult to advance general claims concerning large-scale
societal tendencies, not to mention extending them over the globe. There is
no easy way out of this trap. I am inclined to leave the issue unresolved by
making peace with the fact that even if I attempted a resolution it would be
bitterly challenged and everyone would situate the outreach of this epochal
sentiment as they themselves would consider it adequate.
7. See also Stuart J. Pimm and Thomas M. Brooks, “The Sixth Extinction:
How Large, Where, and When?,” in Nature and Human Society: The Quest
for a Sustainable World, eds. Peter H. Raven and Tania Williams (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press, 2000), 46–62; Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth
Extinction: An Unnatural History (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
 1 PRELUDE TO A NEW EPOCHALITY 9

8. Johan Rockström et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe

Operating Space for Humanity,” Ecology and Society 14, no. 2 (2009): art.
32; Will Steffen et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development
on a Changing Planet,” Science 347, no. 6223 (2015): 1259855.
9. The term was put into wider circulation by Vernor Vinge, “The Coming
Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era,” in
Vision-21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace,
Proceedings of a symposium cosponsored by the NASA Lewis Research
Center and the Ohio Aerospace Institute, Westlake, Ohio, March 30–31
(1993), 12–13. For a broader introduction to the theme, see Murray
Shanahan, The Technological Singularity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015).

Bibliography
Beck, Ulrich. The Metamorphosis of the World. Cambridge: Polity, 2016.
Ermarth, Elizabeth Deeds. History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the
Tools of Thought. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.
Haraway, Donna J. Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2016.
Kolbert, Elizabeth. The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History. London:
Bloomsbury, 2014.
Leakey, Richard, and Roger Lewin. The Sixth Extinction: Patterns of Life and the
Future of Humankind. New York: Anchor Books, 1996.
Pimm, Stuart J., and Thomas M. Brooks. “The Sixth Extinction: How Large,
Where, and When?,” In Nature and Human Society: The Quest for a Sustainable
World, edited by Peter H. Raven and Tania Williams, 46–62. Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, 2000.
Rockström, Johan et al. “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating
Space for Humanity.” Ecology and Society 14, no. 2 (2009): art. 32.
Rosa, Hartmut. Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity. Translated by
Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.
Shanahan, Murray. The Technological Singularity. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2015.
Simon, Zoltán Boldizsár. History in Times of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for
the 21st Century. London: Bloomsbury, 2019.
Skillington, Tracey. Climate Justice and Human Rights. New York: Palgrave, 2017.
Steffen, Will et al. “Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a
Changing Planet.” Science 347, Issue 6223 (2015): 1259855.
Vinge, Vernor. “The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the
Post-Human Era.” In Vision-21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in
the Era of Cyberspace, 11–22. Proceedings of a Symposium Cosponsored by the
NASA Lewis Research Center and the Ohio Aerospace Institute, Westlake,
Ohio, 30–31 March 1993.
 CHAPTER 2

A Perplexing Appeal to History

Abstract The emergence of a new epochality entails an appeal to history,

but the epistemological foundations of the discipline of history do not
enable adequate responses. Whereas twenty-first-century thinking con-
ceives of epochal changes in the context of human activity being inextrica-
bly intertwined with nature through technology, disciplinary history has
been institutionalized in the nineteenth century on the premise of study-
ing a specifically human world. The chapter resolves this question by argu-
ing that the appeal to history concerns a mode of thinking that cannot be
reduced to a narrowly understood disciplinary epistemology. In Western
modernity, historical thinking conquered not only the human but (through
the idea of evolution in biology and gradual Earth history in geology) also
the natural world. The modern distribution of work in writing human and
natural histories, respectively, by history and the sciences, however, can
hardly be maintained. Accordingly, the appeal to history as a mode of
thinking is accompanied today by a demand to develop a new kind of his-
torical thinking attuned to studying a more-than-human world (more-­
than-­human as seen from disciplinary history).

Keywords Historical thinking • Historicization • Disciplinary confines

• Epistemology • Anthropocene • More-than-human

© The Author(s) 2020 11

Z. B. Simon, The Epochal Event, Palgrave Studies
in the History of Science and Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47805-6_2
12 Z. B. SIMON

Setting the Stakes

Historical events are, so to speak, already history. The pivotal role they
played in modern historical thinking is now occupied by another kind of
event. Historical events are history at least in two respects: first, in the
sense of being a fundamental category of historical thought as applied to
the ever-changing realm of human affairs, and second, in the sense that we
tend to think of historical events only retrospectively, only as events that
already took place. In both respects, the notion of the historical event
seems far too narrow to adequately capture the ways in which twenty-first-­
century thinking conceives of events that signal momentous change.
The events that fascinate present-day imagination are what I call epochal
events. By this, I mean events conceived of as markers of epochal transfor-
mations that escape the confines of the course of human affairs and apply
prospectively just as well as retrospectively. In the coming chapters, I
attempt to mold the notion of the epochal event into a conceptual shape
and explicate it as an emerging category of a new kind of historical think-
ing. For now, the question that must be answered goes as follows: what
could it possibly mean that the scope of transformative events extends
beyond the human world and even into the future?
To begin with, the aspect of surpassing the scale and scope of the
human world does not mean that epochal transformations no longer con-
cern the human world whatsoever. It rather means that the primary (but
not exclusive) context of the epochal event is the human world as entan-
gled with the natural world through technology. The entanglement of the
human, the technological, and the natural worlds as the primary context
of the epochal event is not merely an extension of the human world over
the natural or vice versa. It represents a qualitative shift in the way we
frame our thinking and look at the world and ourselves. Then, as to the
aspect that epochal events can be recognized not only retrospectively but
also prospectively, it does not entail any claim about knowing the future
the very same way as one can claim to have knowledge of the past.1 It
merely points to the way in which epochal events—in the context of a
human-technology-nature entanglement—are expected to take place in
the future due to runaway technological changes and anthropogenic
transformations in the Earth system.
The prospects are largely familiar by now. On a smaller scale, we are
already sadly accustomed to news about biodiversity loss or massive plastic
waste in the oceans and in the stomachs of seabirds. Human-induced
 2 A PERPLEXING APPEAL TO HISTORY 13

climate change, its present effects, and its dire future consequences gain
broader and broader publicity day by day. A new vocabulary consisting of
phrases such as “carbon footprint” is quickly taking root (at least among
those who can afford to care), just as well as a general awareness that fail-
ing to reduce carbon emissions is likely to lead to undesired and even cata-
strophic changes both in the condition of the planet and in human
societies.
Anthropogenic transformations in nature are not the only prospects to
receive growing publicity these days. The perils of artificial intelligence—
both in military or everyday use—and the potential of AI technologies to
turn democratic ways of life into authoritarian regimes already pertain the
wider societal consciousness to one extent or another. Human enhance-
ment technologies are becoming increasingly applied in the medical
domain, and even those who somehow miss public debates on the ethics
of human enhancement are most probably familiar with the even stronger
prospect of a transhuman and more-than-human future due to cinematic
and online streaming experiences. Some technological prospects may look
more plausible than others, while the potential changes triggered by tech-
nology look desirable and apocalyptic at the same time. But all differences
aside concerning the desirability of transformations, hardly anyone doubts
that advanced technologies bring about spectacular changes.
On a larger scale, however, and on the conceptual level, we still need to
come to terms with the big picture of ongoing planetary-scale changes. At
stake is not simply the aggregate of all particular changes in each domain
separately. What we need to grasp is the nature and the specific character
of transformations in the human-technology-nature matrix, which is pre-
cisely what the epochal event intends to achieve as a conceptual category.
Rendering the concept intelligible and feasible is, however, a long journey.
This chapter sets out on the journey by posing the following question: is
there any discipline in our current knowledge regime that could claim
expertise in mapping a world of self-made epochal transformations and
comprehend it as an overall condition framing our lives?

The Confines of Disciplinary Codes

History seems like a self-evident candidate. As is well known, exploring
and understanding change in the world of human affairs has been the
expertise of the institutionalized discipline of history in Western moder-
nity. As French historian Marc Bloch famously claimed in the middle of
14 Z. B. SIMON

the last century in The Historian’s Craft, the discipline of history is con-
cerned with investigating and understanding human beings in time.2 A
few decades later, Ernst Breisach rather naturally echoed this definition in
his seminal study on the history of historiography, claiming that “history
deals with human life as it ‘flows’ through time,”3 meaning a tiptoeing
between accounting for both change and continuity in the human world.
Or, to have a more recent example that also reflects current trends, in her
book on the constitution of the discipline, Sarah Maza writes that “most
historians would probably agree that their task is twofold: to explain the
unfolding of change in the past, and to make the people and their places
of the time come alive for their readers.”4
On this basis it seems plausible to claim that, inasmuch as the question
of change over time is at stake and inasmuch as the human world is
involved in recent epochal imaginaries, they entail an appeal to history.
Yet, inasmuch as change concerns a more-than-human world in today’s
epochal thought, disciplinary understandings of history become less use-
ful. Due to the emphasis on the human in disciplinary epistemology,
escaping the confines of the human world entails that we also need to
escape the confines of the expertise of historical studies. And the case
remains the same even when bracketing the primacy of change over time
and trying to look for conceptions of historical work other than that of
Bloch, Breisach, and Maza.
In the first half of the last century, Robin G. Collingwood sharply
opposed the idea that historical knowledge is concerned with change over
time. The alternative view he offered was that history is the knowledge of
human thoughts and the human mind (studied through the manifesta-
tions of human thoughts in events and actions).5 In that, Collingwood was
in deep agreement with Giambattista Vico’s foundational insight from the
eighteenth century, according to which humans can have knowledge of
that which is made by humans, and, consequently, history (as the course
of affairs) can be known precisely because it is made by humans and is a
distinctly human history.6 This view of historical knowledge, needless to
say, separates knowledge of the human world and knowledge of the natu-
ral world perhaps even more sharply than the views introduced earlier.
Consequently, it may be even less promising for efforts that try to under-
stand transformations in the entangled human-technological-­natural world.
In arguing that recent challenges posed by anthropogenic climate
change mark the collapse of the modern distinction between natural his-
tory and human history—and in briefly reviewing the history of the
 2 A PERPLEXING APPEAL TO HISTORY 15

distinction with a focus on the ideas of Vico, Croce, and Collingwood—

Dipesh Chakrabarty came to the same conclusion a decade ago.7 At its
theoretical and epistemological core, the discipline of history is simply
designed to understand the ever-changing human world. Despite the
rather obvious appeal to history in the recent rise of epochal thinking, the
theoretical foundations of historical studies do not seem to allow a suffi-
cient engagement with the task. History, in the shape we came to know it
in Western modernity, appears to be part of the very challenge to which we
seek to respond.
But if not history, then which discipline is suited for making sense of
transformations in the entangled human-technological-natural world?
Well, it is very likely that none of the disciplines as we know them. All
disciplines find themselves today in the same situation as historical studies
do. The changes in the world of human affairs, the natural world, and the
technological domain seem to be intertwined in ways so complex that
neither the humanities and the social sciences nor the STEM disciplines
and the life sciences are able to comprehend them by relying solely on
their own methods and categories. The respective analytical tools of the
modern disciplines have been created to enable them to study some of
these worlds and domains, but they are simply not designed for making
sense of the entanglements of these worlds and domains or for under-
standing anything like an overall constellation of their entanglement.
Yet there is the undeniable appeal to history in the recent rise of epochal
thought. It forces me to have a closer look at the question, even at the cost
of disregarding respectable foundational theories of disciplinary historical
scholarship.

The Modern Project of Historicizing Nature

and the Human World Alike

Having this closer look means, somewhat paradoxically, approaching “his-

tory” in a broader sense. As a general historical sensibility or as a general
historical mode of thinking—as an either unreflective or very much con-
scious mental operation of making sense of individual occurrences within
a larger configuration or scheme of change over time that we tend to
invest with meaning—history has not been confined to professionalized
historical studies in the modern world. What this means is that even if the
overall constellation of the entangled human, technological, and natural
16 Z. B. SIMON

worlds is no expertise of history as an institutionalized discipline, changes

in the entangled words may nevertheless be approached by a mode of
thinking that is not anchored in disciplinary protocols.
Being “historical” has not been a quality attributed solely to the world
of human affairs in Western modernity. The natural and the human worlds
have acquired their respective “historical” character and have been histo-
ricized thoroughly side by side over the last two centuries or so. True
enough, the work of historicization has been carried out typically by disci-
plines with restricted scope concerning both worlds. But once a sense of
historicity has been developed as a mode of thinking that makes sense of
the world by integrating individual occurrences into larger schemes of
developmental processes, nothing, in principle, fell out of its range.
Everything, and literally everything, irrespective of whether it concerned
the human or the natural world, could be subjected to the operation of
historicization: everything could be made sense of as being prone to
change and as being the product of developmental processes that bring
together change over time on the one hand (in terms of stages of develop-
ment) and a deep temporal continuity (in the substance of development)
underlying all changes on the other.
In some sort of a distribution of work, in about the same broadly con-
strued time period around the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of
the nineteenth century,8 the historicization of planet Earth has become
the task of geology, the historicization of the life on planet Earth has
become associated with biology, while the historicization of human life
and the social world has become the domain of the professionalized disci-
pline of history (and, with some delay, of sociology). While geology told
the story of Earth history through periods just like the discipline of history
told the story of human societies, biology conceived of life in terms of
evolutionary processes. Both made sense of their object of study along the
same developmental temporality as history did with respect to the histori-
cized human world.
The recognition that historical thinking and the operation of historici-
zation is not limited to the human world is gaining momentum lately.
Against the backdrop of the long reign of disciplinary codes and epistemo-
logical foundations, historians and theorists of history have begun to
revisit the scope of historicization. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to sug-
gest that this growing momentum has something to do with the increas-
ing recognition of the entanglement of the human, technological, and
natural worlds. Such recognition may be the impulse behind studies that
 2 A PERPLEXING APPEAL TO HISTORY 17

intend to illuminate the deep connection that binds together modern

knowledge production in a shared temporality by which both the human
and the natural sciences attempted to make sense of the world. Christophe
Bouton claims along these lines that the concept of “development” might
have been transferred to historical time from already existing conceptual-
izations of biological time,9 while David Schulz argues that geological
time had a profound impact on the development of historical thinking and
the professionalization of the discipline of history.10 What is more, those
who previously thought that the operation of historicization is confined to
the human world tend to reconsider their position lately. On this note, let
me quote Frederick Beiser a bit more extensively:

In stressing the need for a broad definition of historicization – one that

includes the natural and human sciences – I depart from Ernst Troeltsch’s
definition, which I too readily followed in my The German Historicist
Tradition. According to Troeltsch, the attempt to historicize our thinking is
limited to “all our thinking about man, his culture, and sciences.” The prob-
lem with restricting the definition of historicization to the human sphere is
that we ignore the parallel program in the natural sciences. We then blind
ourselves to two important facts. First, some of the most stunning results of
historicization are found in the natural sciences. I know of no better exam-
ple of historicization than Darwin’s thesis in Chapter XIII of the Origin of
Species that all true biological classification is “genealogical,” i.e., based on
lines of descent rather than “some unknown plan of creation.” Second, his-
toricization in the natural sciences has sometimes had a profound impact on
the human sciences. Consider, for instance, the influence of Kant’s
Allgemeine Weltgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels on the young Herder,
who applied the lessons he learned from Kant’s cosmology to literature and
language.11

It cannot be emphasized enough that reconsiderations like this happen in

an intellectual atmosphere already occupied with a transdisciplinary debate
on the Anthropocene. Although it is not my task here to meticulously
argue for a direct causal link between the Anthropocene debate and efforts
to recalibrate the scope of historical thinking, it seems rather evident that
such present-day issues provide at least an impetus for addressing the
question of the limits of our historical sensibility (or their lack thereof).
Besides, the Anthropocene debate perfectly testifies to a recent resurgence
of history as a mode of thinking across the disciplinary landscape. It is time
to introduce the notion properly.
18 Z. B. SIMON

Historical Thinking Across Disciplines

The notion of the Anthropocene emerged in the context of Earth system
science. It intends to capture the extent to which anthropogenic changes
take place in the integrated system of the Earth and, simultaneously, to
denote a new geological epoch in Earth history as indicated by strati-
graphic evidence of such human-induced changes in the Earth viewed as a
single system of physical and social processes. Only two decades prior to
Grimes giving the title Miss Anthropocene to her fifth studio album, the
notion has been put into wider circulation by Paul Crutzen’s two brief
articles, the first co-authored with Eugene Stoermer in 2000 and the sec-
ond published in Nature in 2002.12 Enhancing the inextricable merging
of the human and the natural worlds into a concept kicked off two decades
of intense discussion of the Anthropocene, practically across the entire
scholarly landscape. With respect to the question of disciplinary work, two
tendencies can be distinguished in the debate. On the one hand, the
notion facilitated the recognition both in the humanities and the social
sciences and in the natural and life sciences that there is a necessity to
jointly develop conceptual tools adequate for the task of approaching the
intertwinement of changes in the human and the natural worlds.13 On the
other hand, the recognition of joint work is just as often accompanied (in
weaker versions) and opposed (in stronger versions) by a tendency in the
humanities to offer alternatives to what they conceive of as a reigning sci-
entific understanding of the Anthropocene.14
The position of this book affiliates with the former tendency aiming at
joint work. It seems to me that the conditions of possibility for such col-
laboration are already provided by the fact that both nature and the realm
of human life have been profoundly historicized in the last two centuries
or so. Historians who recognize the necessity of joint work and try to
overwrite disciplinary codes have good arguments to support their view.
Libby Robin at least rather self-evidently remarks right at the onset of her
article on the role of history in the Anthropocene that “historians are not
alone in studying the past”: “as time-scales get longer and documents give
way to different kinds of archives, scientific enquiry takes over the study of
the past, and histories are written by scientists.”15 According to Robin, by
compelling us to consider “the role of humanity as a historical force for
change in planetary systems,” the Anthropocene “demands both geologi-
cal and historical time-scales, and writes planetary and human histories
together.”16 And that could hardly be possible by means other than
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
"Well, he seems so."
Pooh was thoughtful when he heard this, and then he murmured to
himself:

But whatever his weight in pounds, shillings, and ounces,

He always seems bigger because of his bounces.

"And that's the whole poem," he said. "Do you like it, Piglet?"
"All except the shillings," said Piglet. "I don't think they ought to be
there."
"They wanted to come in after the pounds," explained Pooh, "so I let
them. It is the best way to write poetry, letting things come."
"Oh, I didn't know," said Piglet.

Tigger had been bouncing in front of them all this time, turning round
every now and then to ask, "Is this the way?"—and now at last they
came in sight of Kanga's house, and there was Christopher Robin.
Tigger rushed up to him.
"Oh, there you are, Tigger!" said Christopher Robin. "I knew you'd be
somewhere."
"I've been finding things in the Forest," said Tigger importantly. "I've
found a pooh and a piglet and an eeyore, but I can't find any
breakfast."
Pooh and Piglet came up and hugged Christopher Robin, and
explained what had been happening.
"Don't you know what Tiggers like?" asked Pooh.
"I expect if I thought very hard I should," said Christopher Robin, "but
I thought Tigger knew."
"I do," said Tigger. "Everything there is in the world except honey and
haycorns and—what were those hot things called?"
"Thistles."
"Yes, and those."
"Oh, well then, Kanga can give you some breakfast."
So they went into Kanga's house, and when Roo had said, "Hallo,
Pooh," and "Hallo, Piglet" once, and "Hallo, Tigger" twice, because he
had never said it before and it sounded funny, they told Kanga what
they wanted, and Kanga said very kindly, "Well, look in my cupboard,
Tigger dear, and see what you'd like." Because she knew at once
that, however big Tigger seemed to be, he wanted as much kindness
as Roo.
"Shall I look, too?" said Pooh, who was beginning to feel a little
eleven o'clockish. And he found a small tin of condensed milk, and
something seemed to tell him that Tiggers didn't like this, so he took it
into a corner by itself, and went with it to see that nobody interrupted
it.
But the more Tigger put his nose into this and his paw into that, the
more things he found which Tiggers didn't like. And when he had
found everything in the cupboard, and couldn't eat any of it, he said to
Kanga, "What happens now?"
But Kanga and Christopher Robin and Piglet were all standing round
Roo, watching him have his Extract of Malt. And Roo was saying,
"Must I?" and Kanga was saying "Now, Roo dear, you remember
what you promised."
"What is it?" whispered Tigger to Piglet.
"His Strengthening Medicine," said Piglet. "He hates it."
So Tigger came closer, and he leant over the back of Roo's chair, and
suddenly he put out his tongue, and took one large golollop, and, with
a sudden jump of surprise, Kanga said, "Oh!" and then clutched at
the spoon again just as it was disappearing, and pulled it safely back
out of Tigger's mouth. But the Extract of Malt had gone.

"Tigger dear!" said Kanga.

"He's taken my medicine, he's taken my medicine, he's taken my
medicine!" sang Roo happily, thinking it was a tremendous joke.
Then Tigger looked up at the ceiling, and closed his eyes, and his
tongue went round and round his chops, in case he had left any
outside, and a peaceful smile came over his face as he said, "So
that's what Tiggers like!"

Which explains why he always lived at Kanga's house afterwards,

and had Extract of Malt for breakfast, dinner, and tea. And
sometimes, when Kanga thought he wanted strengthening, he had a
spoonful or two of Roo's breakfast after meals as medicine.
"But I think," said Piglet to Pooh, "that he's been strengthened quite
enough."

CHAPTER III
IN WHICH A Search Is Organdized, and Piglet Nearly Meets the
Heffalump Again
Pooh was sitting in his house one day, counting his pots of honey,
when there came a knock on the door.
"Fourteen," said Pooh. "Come in. Fourteen. Or was it fifteen? Bother.
That's muddled me."

"Hallo, Pooh," said Rabbit.

"Hallo, Rabbit. Fourteen, wasn't it?"
"What was?"
"My pots of honey what I was counting."
"Fourteen, that's right."
"Are you sure?"
"No," said Rabbit. "Does it matter?"
"I just like to know," said Pooh humbly. "So as I can say to myself:
'I've got fourteen pots of honey left.' Or fifteen, as the case may be.
It's sort of comforting."
"Well, let's call it sixteen," said Rabbit. "What I came to say was:
Have you seen Small anywhere about?"
"I don't think so," said Pooh. And then, after thinking a little more, he
said: "Who is Small?"
"One of my friends-and-relations," said Rabbit carelessly.
This didn't help Pooh much, because Rabbit had so many friends-
and-relations, and of such different sorts and sizes, that he didn't
know whether he ought to be looking for Small at the top of an oak-
tree or in the petal of a buttercup.
"I haven't seen anybody today," said Pooh, "not so as to say 'Hallo,
Small,' to. Did you want him for anything?"
"I don't want him," said Rabbit. "But it's always useful to know where
a friend-and-relation is, whether you want him or whether you don't."
"Oh, I see," said Pooh. "Is he lost?"
"Well," said Rabbit, "nobody has seen him for a long time, so I
suppose he is. Anyhow," he went on importantly, "I promised
Christopher Robin I'd Organize a Search for him, so come on."
Pooh said good-bye affectionately to his fourteen pots of honey, and
hoped they were fifteen; and he and Rabbit went out into the Forest.
"Now," said Rabbit, "this is a Search, and I've Organized it——"
"Done what to it?" said Pooh.
"Organized it. Which means—well, it's what you do to a Search, when
you don't all look in the same place at once. So I want you, Pooh, to
search by the Six Pine Trees first, and then work your way towards
Owl's House, and look out for me there. Do you see?"

"No," said Pooh. "What——"

"Then I'll see you at Owl's House in about an hour's time."
"Is Piglet organdized too?"
"We all are," said Rabbit, and off he went.

As soon as Rabbit was out of sight, Pooh remembered that he had

forgotten to ask who Small was, and whether he was the sort of
friend-and-relation who settled on one's nose, or the sort who got
trodden on by mistake, and as it was Too Late Now, he thought he
would begin the Hunt by looking for Piglet, and asking him what they
were looking for before he looked for it.
"And it's no good looking at the Six Pine Trees for Piglet," said Pooh
to himself, "because he's been organdized in a special place of his
own. So I shall have to look for the Special Place first. I wonder
where it is." And he wrote it down in his head like this:
ORDER OF LOOKING FOR THINGS

1. Special Place. (To find Piglet.)

2. Piglet. (To find who Small is.)
3. Small. (To find Small.)
4. Rabbit. (To tell him I've found Small.)
5. Small Again. (To tell him I've found Rabbit.)

"Which makes it look like a bothering sort of day," thought Pooh, as

he stumped along.
The next moment the day became very bothering indeed, because
Pooh was so busy not looking where he was going that he stepped
on a piece of the Forest which had been left out by mistake; and he
only just had time to think to himself: "I'm flying. What Owl does. I
wonder how you stop——" when he stopped.
Bump!
"Ow!" squeaked something.
"That's funny," thought Pooh. "I said 'Ow!' without really oo'ing."
"Help!" said a small, high voice.
"That's me again," thought Pooh. "I've had an Accident, and fallen
down a well, and my voice has gone all squeaky and works before I'm
ready for it, because I've done something to myself inside. Bother!"
"Help—help!"
"There you are! I say things when I'm not trying. So it must be a very
bad Accident." And then he thought that perhaps when he did try to
say things he wouldn't be able to; so, to make sure, he said loudly: "A
Very Bad Accident to Pooh Bear."
"Pooh!" squeaked the voice.
"It's Piglet!" cried Pooh eagerly. "Where are you?"
"Underneath," said Piglet in an underneath sort of way.
"Underneath what?"
"You," squeaked Piglet. "Get up!"
"Oh!" said Pooh, and scrambled up as quickly as he could. "Did I fall
on you, Piglet?"
"You fell on me," said Piglet, feeling himself all over.
"I didn't mean to," said Pooh sorrowfully.
"I didn't mean to be underneath," said Piglet sadly. "But I'm all right
now, Pooh, and I am so glad it was you."
"What's happened?" said Pooh. "Where are we?"
"I think we're in a sort of Pit. I was walking along, looking for
somebody, and then suddenly I wasn't any more, and just when I got
up to see where I was, something fell on me. And it was you."
"So it was," said Pooh.
"Yes," said Piglet. "Pooh," he went on nervously, and came a little
closer, "do you think we're in a Trap?"
Pooh hadn't thought about it at all, but now he nodded. For suddenly
he remembered how he and Piglet had once made a Pooh Trap for
Heffalumps, and he guessed what had happened. He and Piglet had
fallen into a Heffalump Trap for Poohs! That was what it was.
"What happens when the Heffalump comes?" asked Piglet
tremblingly, when he had heard the news.
"Perhaps he won't notice you, Piglet," said Pooh encouragingly,
"because you're a Very Small Animal."
"But he'll notice you, Pooh."
"He'll notice me, and I shall notice him," said Pooh, thinking it out.
"We'll notice each other for a long time, and then he'll say: 'Ho-ho!'"
Piglet shivered a little at the thought of that "Ho-ho!" and his ears
began to twitch.
"W-what will you say?" he asked.
Pooh tried to think of something he would say, but the more he
thought, the more he felt that there is no real answer to "Ho-ho!" said
by a Heffalump in the sort of voice this Heffalump was going to say it
in.
"I shan't say anything," said Pooh at last. "I shall just hum to myself,
as if I was waiting for something."
"Then perhaps he'll say, 'Ho-ho!' again?" suggested Piglet anxiously.
"He will," said Pooh.
Piglet's ears twitched so quickly that he had to lean them against the
side of the Trap to keep them quiet.
"He will say it again," said Pooh, "and I shall go on humming. And
that will Upset him. Because when you say 'Ho-ho' twice, in a gloating
sort of way, and the other person only hums, you suddenly find, just
as you begin to say it the third time—that—well, you find——"
"What?"
"That it isn't," said Pooh.
"Isn't what?"
Pooh knew what he meant, but, being a Bear of Very Little Brain,
couldn't think of the words.
"Well, it just isn't," he said again.
"You mean it isn't ho-ho-ish any more?" said Piglet hopefully.
Pooh looked at him admiringly and said that that was what he meant
—if you went on humming all the time, because you couldn't go on
saying "Ho-ho!" for ever.
"But he'll say something else," said Piglet.
"That's just it. He'll say: 'What's all this?' And then I shall say—and
this is a very good idea, Piglet, which I've just thought of—I shall say:
'It's a trap for a Heffalump which I've made, and I'm waiting for the
Heffalump to fall in.' And I shall go on humming. That will Unsettle
him."
"Pooh!" cried Piglet, and now it was his turn to be the admiring one.
"You've saved us!"
"Have I?" said Pooh, not feeling quite sure.
But Piglet was quite sure; and his mind ran on, and he saw Pooh and
the Heffalump talking to each other, and he thought suddenly, and a
little sadly, that it would have been rather nice if it had been Piglet
and the Heffalump talking so grandly to each other, and not Pooh,
much as he loved Pooh; because he really had more brain than
Pooh, and the conversation would go better if he and not Pooh were
doing one side of it, and it would be comforting afterwards in the
evenings to look back on the day when he answered a Heffalump
back as bravely as if the Heffalump wasn't there. It seemed so easy
now. He knew just what he would say:
Heffalump (gloatingly): "Ho-ho!"
Piglet (carelessly): "Tra-la-la, tra-la-la."
Heffalump (surprised, and not quite so sure of himself): "Ho-ho!"
Piglet (more carelessly still): "Tiddle-um-tum, tiddle-um-tum."
Heffalump (beginning to say Ho-ho and turning it awkwardly into a
cough): "H'r'm! What's all this?"
Piglet (surprised): "Hullo! This is a trap I've made, and I'm waiting for
a Heffalump to fall into it."
Heffalump (greatly disappointed): "Oh!" (After a long silence): "Are
you sure?"
Piglet: "Yes."
Heffalump: "Oh!" (nervously): "I—I thought it was a trap I'd made to
catch Piglets."
Piglet (surprised): "Oh, no!"
Heffalump: "Oh!" (Apologetically): "I—I must have got it wrong,
then."
Piglet: "I'm afraid so." (Politely): "I'm sorry." (He goes on humming.)
Heffalump: "Well—well—I—well. I suppose I'd better be getting
back?"
Piglet (looking up carelessly): "Must you? Well, if you see
Christopher Robin anywhere, you might tell him I want him."
Heffalump (eager to please): "Certainly! Certainly!" (He hurries off.)
Pooh (who wasn't going to be there, but we find we can't do without
him): "Oh, Piglet, how brave and clever you are!"
Piglet (modestly): "Not at all, Pooh." (And then, when Christopher
Robin comes, Pooh can tell him all about it.)
While Piglet was dreaming this happy dream, and Pooh was
wondering again whether it was fourteen or fifteen, the Search for
Small was still going on all over the Forest. Small's real name was
Very Small Beetle, but he was called Small for short, when he was
spoken to at all, which hardly ever happened except when somebody
said: "Really, Small!" He had been staying with Christopher Robin for
a few seconds, and he started round a gorse-bush for exercise, but
instead of coming back the other way, as expected, he hadn't, so
nobody knew where he was.
"I expect he's just gone home," said Christopher Robin to Rabbit.
"Did he say Good-bye-and-thank-you-for-a-nice-time?" said Rabbit.
"He'd only just said how-do-you-do," said Christopher Robin.
"Ha!" said Rabbit. After thinking a little, he went on: "Has he written a
letter saying how much he enjoyed himself, and how sorry he was he
had to go so suddenly?"
Christopher Robin didn't think he had.
"Ha!" said Rabbit again, and looked very important. "This is Serious.
He is Lost. We must begin the Search at once."
Christopher Robin, who was thinking of something else, said:
"Where's Pooh?"—but Rabbit had gone. So he went into his house
and drew a picture of Pooh going on a long walk at about seven
o'clock in the morning, and then he climbed to the top of his tree and
climbed down again, and then he wondered what Pooh was doing,
and went across the Forest to see.

It was not long before he came to the Gravel Pit, and he looked
down, and there were Pooh and Piglet, with their backs to him,
dreaming happily.

"Ho-ho!" said Christopher Robin loudly and suddenly.

Piglet jumped six inches in the air with Surprise and Anxiety, but
Pooh went on dreaming.
"It's the Heffalump!" thought Piglet nervously. "Now, then!" He
hummed in his throat a little, so that none of the words should stick,
and then, in the most delightfully easy way, he said: "Tra-la-la, tra-la-
la," as if he had just thought of it. But he didn't look round, because if
you look round and see a Very Fierce Heffalump looking down at you,
sometimes you forget what you were going to say. "Rum-tum-tum-
tiddle-um," said Christopher Robin in a voice like Pooh's. Because
Pooh had once invented a song which went:

Tra-la-la, tra-la-la,
Tra-la-la, tra-la-la,
Rum-tum-tum-tiddle-um.

So whenever Christopher Robin sings it, he always sings it in a Pooh-

voice, which seems to suit it better.
"He's said the wrong thing," thought Piglet anxiously. "He ought to
have said, 'Ho-ho!' again. Perhaps I had better say it for him." And, as
fiercely as he could, Piglet said: "Ho-ho!"
"How did you get there, Piglet?" said Christopher Robin in his
ordinary voice.
"This is Terrible," thought Piglet. "First he talks in Pooh's voice, and
then he talks in Christopher Robin's voice, and he's doing it so as to
Unsettle me." And being now Completely Unsettled, he said very
quickly and squeakily: "This is a trap for Poohs, and I'm waiting to fall
in it, ho-ho, what's all this, and then I say ho-ho again."
"What?" said Christopher Robin.
"A trap for ho-ho's," said Piglet huskily. "I've just made it, and I'm
waiting for the ho-ho to come-come."
How long Piglet would have gone on like this I don't know, but at that
moment Pooh woke up suddenly and decided that it was sixteen. So
he got up; and as he turned his head so as to soothe himself in that
awkward place in the middle of the back where something was
tickling him, he saw Christopher Robin.
"Hallo!" he shouted joyfully.
"Hallo, Pooh."
Piglet looked up, and looked away again. And he felt so Foolish and
Uncomfortable that he had almost decided to run away to Sea and be
a Sailor, when suddenly he saw something.
"Pooh!" he cried. "There's something climbing up your back."

"I thought there was," said Pooh.

"It's Small!" cried Piglet.
"Oh, that's who it is, is it?" said Pooh.
"Christopher Robin, I've found Small!" cried Piglet.
"Well done, Piglet," said Christopher Robin.