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8/LANGUAGE, THINKING, AND
REASONING:
GETTING INSIDE OUR TALKING
HEADS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LECTURE GUIDE
How Does Language Work? (p. 294)
Do We Think in Words? The Relation between Language and Thought (p.
297)
Reading: Recognizing the Written Word (p. 298)
Thinking and Reasoning (p. 298)
Lecture Launchers
The Influence of Language on Thought
Nonverbal Gestures
Who Talks More: Men or Women?
Web Resources
Center for the Study of Language and Information: http://www-csli.stanford.edu/
Language Learning: http://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/linguistics/learn.jsp
Do Apes Use Language?—The Why Files: http://whyfiles.org/058language/ape_talk.html
Primate Use of Language: http://www.pigeon.psy.tufts.edu/psych26/language.htm
ii. For children who are deaf, learning to sign impedes the ability to
learn to speak.
a. Those who sign make faster progress in speaking.
iii. American Sign Language (ASL) is English translated word-for-word
into signs.
a. ASL bears no resemblance to English; syntax differs
completely.
2. Bilingualism
a. Typically, one language is dominant.
b. As compared to monolinguals, bilinguals:
i. Delayed knowledge of syntactical rules.
a. But this is offset by long-term benefits.
c. If second language is learned early, the two languages use similar brain
structures.
3. Language Deprivation
a. Both nature and nurture are necessary for the development of language.
i. Examples, case studies of language deprivation (e.g., Genie) and
deaf children inventing their own sign language (i.e., homesign).
F. Critical Periods for Language Learning
1. Younger children are better at learning language than are older children.
a. Children exposed to foreign language between 1 and 7 years of old developed
language ability of native speakers.
i. Exposure after the age of 7 produces decreased language ability.
b. Children may be better language learners due to the “less is more” hypothesis.
i. That is, children have more limited information-processing abilities,
fewer analytical skills, and less specific knowledge about how
language works.
ii. Thus, children learn languages more naturalistically and gradually.
G. Theoretical Accounts of Language Acquisition
1. Imitation account—Language is generative.
a. Allows us to create an infinite number of sentences, producing new statements,
thoughts, and ideas never previously uttered.
2. Nativist account—children come into world knowing how language works.
a. Noam Chomsky hypothesized that humans are born with a specific language
organ in the brain called the language acquisition device that houses rules of
language.
b. Critics point out that children learn syntax gradually, and even adults use
grammatically incorrect sentences.
3. Social pragmatics account states that children infer what words and sentences mean
from context and social interactions.
4. General cognitive processing account states that children’s ability to learn language
is a result of general skills that are applied across many situations (e.g., the ability to
perceive and recognize patterns).
5. Evaluating the Theories Scientifically
a. Imitation-based account cannot explain the complexity and generativity of
language.
b. Nativism is not falsifiable and is not parsimonious.
c. The majority of contemporary research is focused on the social pragmatics and
general cognitive processing accounts.
H. Nonhuman Animal Communication
1. Scent marking vs. visual displays vs. vocal communication
Lecture Launchers
Do You Mentally “Hear” Yourself Reading?
Web Resources
The Role of Language in Intelligence: http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/rolelang.htm
Lecture Launchers
Learning to Read: Eye Movements and Developmental Dyslexia
Web Resources
Speed Reading Test Online: http://www.readingsoft.com/
A. Learning to Read
1. To be ready to learn to read we must realize several things.
a. Writing is meaningful.
b. Understand that writing moves in a specific direction (Figure 8.8, p. 312).
c. Learn to recognize the letters of the alphabet.
d. Learn that printed letters correspond to specific sounds.
2. Following the mastery of the above pre-reading insights, two skills must be mastered
to be an expert reader.
a. Learn to recognize how whole printed words look on the page.
i. The average reader uses whole word recognition to read the vast
majority of printed words.
a. Whole word recognition—recognizing common words without
having to sound out each word.
ii. The second strategy is phonetic decomposition—sounding out
words by figuring out the correspondences between printed letters
and sounds.
B. Speed-Reading—A Hoax in Sheep’s Clothing?
1. Speed-reading works—At the expense of our comprehension!
Web Resources
Anagram Server: http://www.wordsmith.org/anagram/index.html
CHAPTER 8
Learning Objectives
Language is a largely arbitrary system of communication that combines symbols (such as words or
gestural signs) in rule-based ways to create meaning. Language can be thought to be comprised of four
levels of analysis: Phonemes, morphemes, syntax, and extralinguistic information. Children begin
language acquisition through a series or steps beginning with babbling, experimenting with phonemes,
word production, and then holophrases.
Language communication in the majority of nonhuman species takes place in the form or either mating
or aggression. Efforts to teach animals language have been largely unsuccessful and even with
considerable training animals have difficulty mastering syntactical rules beyond that of a 2-year old.
For individuals who cannot speak or hear, sign language exhibits all the same features of spoken
language including phonemes, generativity, words, syntax, and extralinguistic information. Sign language
involves the same brain areas involved in processing spoken language, and babies who learn sign
languages pass through the same developmental stages as babies who learn spoken languages. Sign
language acquisition occurs at around the same time as spoken language acquisition if the parents are
‘fluent’ signers. Learning a sign language actually facilitates acquisition of a spoken language.
There are several benefits to mastering two languages. Bilinguals often have heightened
metalinguistic insight; that is, awareness of how language is structured and used. Consequently, they
tend to perform better on language tasks. The age at which people learn a second language is important,
for individuals who learn a second language later in life use different brain areas suggesting that the brain
segregates different, later-learned languages into different regions. There seems to be critical periods of
language development that most influence syntax and pronunciation more than vocabulary as age of
exposure increases. Researcher believe adults try to impose more organization and structure to their
learning making learning more challenging compared to children who learn more naturalistically and
gradually; this is called the ‘less-is-more’ hypothesis.
Two differing viewpoints exist in explaining how language influences our thoughts. The first is the
concept of linguistic determinism, which states that all thought is represented verbally and that, as a
result, our language defines our thinking. However, this viewpoint is mainly discredited by studies that
demonstrate children learn complex tasks before they can talk. The second viewpoint is called linguistic
relativity, and it states that the characteristics of language shape our thought processes. It is also known
as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Some evidence supports this view. Language influences some, but not
all, aspects of perception, memory, and thought.
Reading is considered an automatic process. The average reader uses whole word recognition,
which is a reading strategy that involves identifying common words without having to sound them out
based on their appearance. When we are presented with new words that we do not know, we often use a
second strategy called phonetic decomposition, which is a reading strategy that involves sounding out
words by drawing correspondences between printed letters and sounds.
For children to learn how to read they must recognize and are required to learn several important
skills: (1) that writing is meaningful, (2) that it moves in a particular direction, (3) that they must learn
graphemes, the letters of the alphabet, and (4) that the printed letters correspond to specific sounds. The
average student reads approximately 200 to 300 words per minute. Speed-reading, or reading faster than
400 words per minute results in comprehension rates below 50 percent and discredits the belief that much
can be learned through speed-reading.
Given the amount of information that humans process, cognitive economy is necessary and a
valuable aspect of our cognitive functioning. Cognitive Economy refers to the heuristics, or short-cuts,
necessary to increase our thinking efficiency. Without it we would be unable to attend to information we
need for decision-making. The downside to cognitive economies are that heuristics can lead us to make
costly mistakes.
Humans face many challenges when attempting to solve problems or make decisions. Four hurdles
are often encountered when solving problems: (1) the salience of surface similarities, (2) Mental sets,
(3) Functional fixedness, and (4) context effects.
In George Orwell’s chilling novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, a totalitarian government tries to narrow thought
by shrinking language. The result, called Newspeak, is supposed to wipe out “thoughtcrime” by
obliterating the words needed to commit it. “We’re destroying words—scores of them, hundreds of them,
every day,” boasts a worder in the ironically named Ministry of Truth. “We’re cutting the language down
to the bone.” Words also get new meanings: War is peace, love is hate. (Lest anyone think Orwell’s
projections were pure fantasy, in recent years leaders in our own government have called lying “mis-
speaking,” the wartime killing of civilians “collateral damage,” the accidental killing of American
soldiers by their own side “friendly fire,” nuclear missiles “peacekeepers,” and tax increases “revenue
enhancement.”)
Was Orwell right? Does language provide a mental straitjacket for thought? Can we think only
what we can say? Or does language merely express ideas and perceptions that would exist anyway?
The leading spokesperson for the notion that language shapes thought was Benjamin Lee Whorf
(1897–1941), an insurance inspector by profession and a linguist and anthropologist by inclination. His
theory of linguistic relativity held that (1) language molds habits of both cognition and perception and (2)
different languages point speakers toward different views of reality. Whorf sometimes seemed to believe
that language determines thought in an absolute way. He once wrote, “We dissect nature along lines laid
down by our native languages” (Whorf, 1956). But usually he took the more moderate position that
language has a powerful influence on cognition.
Whorf’s evidence was linguistic and cultural. For example, he noted that English has only one
word for snow, but Eskimos (now called the Inuit) have different words for falling snow, slushy snow,
powdered snow, and so forth. On the other hand, the Hopi have a single noun that refers to all flying
things and beings, with the exception of birds. This word can be used for aphids, airplanes, and aviators.
Thus the Inuit presumably would notice differences in snow that people in other cultures would not, and
Hopis might see similarities between insects and aviators that others would miss. Since Whorf’s time,
other writers have added examples of their own. Chinese, for instance, has at least nineteen words for silk,
but (in keeping with the reticence of the Chinese about discussing sexual matters) it has no common word
for either foreplay or orgasm, making it something of a challenge to do sex surveys in China (Kristof,
1991)! In English, much has been written about how the very word foreplay limits sexual imagination.
Why are all activities other than intercourse merely “fore” play?
Whorf felt that grammar had an even greater influence on thought than did separate words. He
argued, for example, that grammar affects how we think of time. English verbs, he noted, force people to
emphasize when an action took place; you can’t talk about seeing Joan without saying whether you saw
her, see her now, or will see her. But Hopi verbs do not require these distinctions. Instead, they allow a
speaker to convey whether he or she experienced the action personally, observed it, heard about it, or
inferred it. Further, English speakers refer to time as a thing that can be saved, squandered, or spent, or as
something that can be measured; we say time is short, long, or great.
The linguistic differences pointed out by Whorf and others have fascinated students and teachers
for generations. Clearly culture and language are intertwined: English is full of sports metaphors (“I
scored some points with my boss,” “She plays hardball in negotiations”), whereas French is rich in food
metaphors (un navet, “a turnip,” means a bad film, and C’est la fin des haricots! “This is the last of the
stringbeans,” is equivalent to “It’s the last straw”) (Halpern, 1991). But does language shape thought, or
does it merely reflect cultural concerns? Critics note that it is easy enough to describe in English what the
various Inuit words for snow mean or how Hopis conceive of time, despite linguistic differences. Within a
culture, when a need to express some unlabelled phenomenon arises, speakers easily manufacture new
words. Like the Inuit, English-speaking skiers need to talk about several kinds of snow, so they speak of
powder, corn, and boilerplate (ice).
Linguistic evidence alone cannot prove that language determines, or even influences thought. Do
the Inuit perceive snow differently from people who have fewer words for it? Do Hopis experience time
differently because of their grammar? We cannot know, unless linguistic evidence is supplemented by
psychological evidence, and unfortunately, the few psychological studies that have been done have been
inconclusive, mainly because of difficulties in studying this question.
Yet the theory of linguistic relativity, which has sometimes seemed deader than a dinosaur, keeps
springing back to life. Within a language, it is easier to process some words and grammatical
constructions than others; it is reasonable to assume, then, that it is easier to think certain thoughts in one
language than another, because of the words and grammatical constructions the languages require (Hunt
& Agnoli, 1991). Further, recent research suggests that languages may, at the very least, influence the
acquisition of specific mental skills, by guiding attention in particular directions.
For example, Irene Miura and her colleagues (Miura et al., 1988; Miura & Okamoto, 1989) argue
that linguistic differences can help explain why Asian children tend to outperform English-speaking
children on tests of numerical ability. In many Asian languages, names of numbers reflect a base-10
system: the label for 12 is “ten-two,” the label for 22 is “two ten(s)-two,” and so forth. These names may
help children understand numbers and simple arithmetic. In a study of Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and
English-speaking American first-graders, Miura and her associates (1988) had children stack blocks to
represent five different quantities. White blocks stood for single units and blue blocks for tens units. Each
child had two chances to show the numbers. Most of the Asian children could express all five numbers in
more than one way, for example, 12 as either 12 white blocks or 1 blue block and 2 white ones. But only
13 percent of the American children could do the same; most simply used a collection of white blocks.
Further, on their first try most of the Asian children used patterns corresponding to written numbers, for
example, 2 tens and 8 ones for 28. But only 8 percent of the American children did so. Of course, these
results do not prove that linguistic differences are responsible for the differences in math achievement. It
is interesting, though, that bilingual Asian-American students tend to score higher in math achievement
than do those who speak only English (Moore & Stanley, 1986).
Finally, language affects social perceptions (Henley, 1989). In the previous sentence, you read the
name of a psychologist. Would you be at all surprised to learn it was Nancy Henley? Feminists have long
observed that in much of our writing, humanity is male and women are outsiders, the “second sex.” This
is why they have long objected to the use of men or mankind to refer to humanity, and he to refer to any
person, sex unspecified.
Language, then, can influence thinking, reasoning, and social stereotypes. It allows us to
manipulate symbols rather than objects. It directs our attention. It allows us to create detailed plans for the
future. But the degree to which linguistic differences between cultures result in different ways of thinking
and perceiving remains an open question.
The study of nonverbal gestures and their meaning has received extensive research attention in
psychology, sociology, and communication. Through basic research we know a great deal about what
gestures convey, how they are culturally variable, and how they act as cues to emotional and other
internal states of a communicator. Roger Axtell, former international business executive and now
professional speaker and author, has cataloged a variety of gestures and their appropriate uses in cultures
around the world. His collection of examples shows clearly that an intended message may not always be
communicated successfully. Some common miscommunicated meanings include:
• The “two-fingered salute.” In most of the contemporary world flashing the index and middle
finger in a “V” shape, palm outward, signifies “victory” or “peace” (depending on the vintage of
the communicator). However, in England, Australia, and several other countries, a simple turn of
the wrist (flashing the sign with the palm toward the communicator) changes this gesture to a
highly insulting one: a two-fingered version of our “one-fingered salute.”
• “The fig.” Brazilians clench their fists with a thumb jutting between the index and middle fingers
to signal good luck and help in warding off evil spirits. In Greece and Turkey, however, this same
gesture is quite insulting, whereas in Holland and Tunisia it has sexual connotations.
• “Hook ‘em Horns.” Texans, especially Austinites, know that an outstretched index and pinky
finger signal a cheer for the University of Texas Longhorns to do well on the playing field. This
same gesture signals a curse in Africa, a good luck sign in Brazil, and an Italian chide that the
recipient is being cuckolded.
• Signaling that someone is “crazy” can take on a variety of forms. In Germany it is done by
rotating the forefingers back and forth around one’s temples. Italians send the same message by
tapping their hands to their foreheads. To complicate matters, in Holland a forefinger to the
temple means “intelligent” whereas a forefinger to the forehead signals “crazy.” The common
North American gesture of a circular motion around the temple actually signals “There’s a phone
call” among Argentineans.
• “Nice job!” Flashing a “thumbs up” to a friend usually signals that the person has done well or
that the communicator wishes good luck. In Australia, however, it is considered the equivalent of
the “two-fingered salute” discussed above, whereas in Japan it signals “five,” in Germany it
indicates “one,” and in Bangladesh it is considered obscene.
• “Pointing” is accomplished in North America and Europe by using the index finger. In Malaysia
the thumb is preferred, whereas in Japan and China an open hand is used.
• The “hand sweep.” Moving one’s hand and arm across a table in a sweeping motion signals
“someone is stealing” in Latin American countries. In Peru, this same gesture means “pay me.”
• Extending the palm of the hand toward someone might be a way of saying “no more” or “no
thanks.” In Greece, however, it is an extremely insulting gesture mimicking shoving dirt (and
other brown matter) into someone’s face.
Axtell, R. E. (1991). Gestures: The do’s and taboos of body language around the world. New York: Wiley.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). The repertoire of nonverbal behaviour: Categories, origins, usage, and coding. Semiotica, 1, 49–
98.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1972). Hand movements. Journal of Communication, 22, 353–374.
Women talk a lot more than men, right? A long-standing stereotype of the socially gifted, talkative
woman is contrasted with the stereotypical male: somewhat guarded, less social, and less talkative. Do
experimental data bear these stereotypes out? In 2006, Louann Brizendine, founder and director of the
University of California, San Francisco’s Women’s Mood and Hormone Clinic, published The Female
Brain. In it was a claim that women speak an average of 20,000 words per day, nearly three times the
mere 7,000 spoken by men. This seemingly sensational claim was immediately questioned by James
Pennebaker, a psychologist at University of Texas, Austin. In a series of studies (prior to the publishing of
Brizendine’s controversial book) at schools in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, researchers used an
electronically activated recorder to record samples of male and female students’ talking for 17 hours per
day. From the samples of 396 students (210 females and 186 males) it was estimated that women and men
speak roughly the same number of words per day. Women were found to speak an average of 16,215
words per day whereas men speak 15,669. This result does not even approach statistical significance, and
calls into question Brizendine’s claim. Moreover, Pennebaker’s findings indicate that the stereotypes of
the talkative woman / reserved man are simply psychomythology. A discussion of these findings will
nicely illustrate how sound psychological experimentation can lead to the truth. Additionally, most
students hold these stereotypes, and this discussion should elucidate the power of stereotypes—some
students who, even when faced with strong scientific evidence to the contrary, will maintain their views.
The idea of subvocal speech, where thought is mediated via moving the vocal tract below hearing level,
was an idea posited by behaviourist John Watson. Although the idea that all thought is predicated on
mastery of language raises some issues, many (if not most) people report that they “mentally hear” the
words that they read while reading to themselves. Ask students if they hear (or listen to) themselves while
reading—many may not realize that they do. A discussion of how language can lead to producing
thoughts and reasoning can flow from this question.
As noted in the text, many cognitive (e.g., symbolism, meaning, recognition) skills require fine-tuning in
order for a person to learn how to read. Another skill that often goes unappreciated in the development of
reading is proper and accurate eye movements. Reading text involves a series of quick, jutting eye
movements called saccades, with intervening fixations. We are not usually aware of these movements, but
if you’ve ever watched someone’s eyes while they are reading, the saccadic “jumping” of the eyes is quite
conspicuous. In order to read effectively, a person’s eye movements must be precisely controlled. As with
most other facets of development, some variability is apparent among children in developing this skill,
and some people actually never appear to attain the high-performance eye movement control necessary
for good reading ability. This developmental deficiency is thought by some researchers to manifest as
dyslexia, a selective impairment of reading and spelling abilities without a deficit in general intelligence.
Indeed, through careful reading and eye movement experiments involving dyslexics and normal controls,
the voluntary component of saccade control was demonstrated to differentiate dyslexics from controls
(e.g., Bednarek et al., 2006; Ram-Tsur et al., 2006). The result of this slight imperfection in eye
movement timing is that information from the text is not in register with eye-movement mediated visual
input. To approximate the difficulty encountered by a person with dyslexia while reading, have students
rotate their book (or other reading material) 90 degrees (clockwise or counterclockwise is fine). This way,
students will have to read from either up to down, or vice versa (not the usual left-to-right). The most
noticeable change in reading performance is a decrease in reading speed.
Lecture/Discussion: Intuition
Psychologists have long been interested in understanding reasoning, problem solving, and decision
making. But the other, “softer” side of this cognitive coin is the study of intuition; how we develop a “gut
feeling” or “sense” about a judgment, situation, or another person. Far from relying on an aching bunion
or creaky joint to understand intuition, scientists have recently put the notion to the test.
Antonio Damasio and his colleagues at the University of Iowa College of Medicine studied 6
people who had damage to the ventromedial sector of the prefrontal cortex and 10 people who did not.
This area of the brain is responsible for storing information about emotional experiences and is also
involved in decision making. Armed with $2,000 in fake money, the participants were presented with four
decks of cards and were told they could turn over cards from any deck during the course of a game.
Unbeknownst to the participants, two decks were rigged to produce lower immediate rewards but a higher
overall payoff, whereas the other two decks yielded short-term, large payoffs but at the price of greater
total losses. Participants flipped cards at will while being monitored for GSR as an indicator of
nonconscious (or conscious) anxiety. After the first 20 rounds the research team questioned the
participants, and did so again after each subsequent 10 rounds, in order to determine when the participants
became conscious of the best strategy to win.
Those participants without brain damage began to show signs of anxiety before picking cards
from the losing decks, and began to avoid those decks, although consciously they were not yet aware that
they were losers. By the 80th round 7 of the 10 normal participants consciously knew to avoid the losing
decks, and although the remaining 3 did not reach that insight, they nonetheless continued to make
advantageous choices. The 6 brain damaged participants, however, continued to pick from the losing
decks, never expressed a hunch that something was amiss, and never showed signs of anxiety. In short,
the intuition or unconscious knowledge that arose in the normal subjects was absent in the impaired
group; there never arose a “sense” or “feeling” of what was going on.
One study digs deeper to the roots of intuition. A team of researchers led by David Skuse, a
psychiatrist at the Institute of Child Development of University College in London, found evidence
suggesting intuition is an inherited trait passed from fathers to their daughters. Skuse and his colleagues
defined intuition in terms of social skills, such as the ability to decode nonverbal communication or
recognize socially appropriate behaviour. Although the research team has not identified a gene (or genes)
responsible for these abilities, their patterns of evidence suggest a specific chain of inheritance. The
parents of 88 girls with Turner’s syndrome (characterized by a single X chromosome) were asked to rate
their daughters on various measures of social intelligence, such as awareness of other’s feelings, skill at
following instructions, or awareness of offending others. The researchers next determined whether each
girl’s single X chromosome had come from her father or mother. The results revealed that those girls who
had inherited the mother’s chromosome scored worse on the measures of “intuition” than did those
receiving the X from their fathers.
Parents of normal boys and girls were also asked the same questions. The boys, compared to the
normal girls, scored lower on the measures of social intuition: Like all boys, they also received their X
chromosome from their mothers. Furthermore, the researchers also compared the responses of the
Turner’s syndrome girls with those of normal boys and girls on a battery of neuropsychological measures.
Turner’s syndrome girls who received their X chromosome from their mothers scored worse on tests that
required extensive planning or the inhibition of urges; normal boys also scored worse on the inhibition
measures (but not the planning tasks).
Brown, D. (June 12, 1997). Women inherit intuition from dads, researchers say. Austin American-Statesman, A1, A6.
Stein, R. (March 9, 1997). Intuition affects sensible choices, researchers find. Austin American-Statesman, A25.
People sometimes believe in things they ought not to, such as flat Earths, cheese moons, or their own
invulnerability. But forming and clinging to misbegotten beliefs may itself be a consequence of some
fundamental cognitive processes, such as how information gets encoded in memory or what happens to a
disrupted attentional system.
Dan Gilbert, of Harvard University, has been exploring the problem of “believing what isn’t so”
for several years. In explaining the process by which such belief takes place he invokes the thinking of
Rene Descartes and Baruch Spinoza, both of whom wrote quite a bit about how information is perceived
and stored in a mental system. Descartes argued that information is first comprehended, and then in a
subsequent step, a truth value is assigned to it: We decide to accept or reject the information as being true.
This would suggest, of course, that we can easily entertain ideas (indefinitely, perhaps...putting them up
in a mental guest room, so to speak) without necessarily putting stock in them. If comprehension
(understanding) of information and endorsement (acceptance or rejection) are two distinct steps, humans
should be able to hold an idea without believing it.
Spinoza adopted a different position on the nature of belief, arguing that comprehension and
acceptance of information are accomplished in a single initial step, only later to be followed by
certification or rejection of the information. This view holds that the very act of receiving information
entails assigning a belief to it [“this information is true” (or false, as the case might be)], which only later
can be substantiated or “unbelieved”. Quite unlike Descartes, then, Spinoza argued that ideas could not be
entertained, “beliefless,” in a cognitive system, but rather are believed upon first being received into the
cognitive system.
How to disentangle these competing predictions? Notice that both, if allowed to run their course,
would lead to the same outcome: The acceptance or rejection of information as being true. The difference
lies in when the belief is assigned, either in a Spinozan first step or in a Cartesian second step. Gilbert
reasoned, then, that disrupting a belief system in action would be the only way to tell which system
(Spinozan or Cartesian) was at work. If Descartes was correct, disrupting the system between steps should
have no effect on cognition: We would be left holding a collection of ideas that had not yet been assigned
truth values. If Spinoza was correct, however, disruption should produce a very pronounced tendency: We
should be left believing information to be true (since it was automatically tagged with a truth valued upon
entering the cognitive system) when in some cases it is not.
To test these ideas, Gilbert and his colleagues asked research participants in one of several
experiments to learn some (fictitious) Hopi language terms. Participants saw a Hopi/English word-pairing
flash on a computer screen (such as “A monishna is a star,” “A rirg is a valley,” or “A neseti is a bee”),
which was followed by a brief pause, and then followed by one of three outcomes: The word “True”
(signaling that the preceding pairing was accurate), the word “False” (indicating that the preceding
pairing was incorrect), or a blank screen. Note that Descartes and Spinoza are still neck-and-neck at this
point. Either account of belief would argue that participants could take in the information (untouched, as
Descartes would have it, or believed as true, as Spinoza would have it) and then correct it based on the
True or False cue later given (which would mean assigning a belief in the Cartesian system, or
revising/substantiating an existing belief in the Spinozan system). However, the researchers asked
participants to do one additional task. On some trials participants were asked to press a button if they
heard a particular tone. This additional task served to tax their available cognitive resources, making it
more difficult to perform the correction step of integrating the true/false cues with the prior information.
These participants, however, provided an answer to the riddle of belief. When later polled they showed a
particular pattern of errors; namely, they were left believing propositions that should have been revised
(i.e., those tagged as “False”) as being true. Given the controls of the experiment, the only way to account
for this outcome is that the information must have been encoded as true upon first being read (just as
Spinoza argued). Because these resource-depleted subjects were disrupted from performing Spinoza’s
second task (certifying or, in these cases, rejecting the previously-believed information), they were left
believing what they ought not to.
The implications of this research are startling. For example, as Dan Wegner and his colleagues
have shown, it may help explain the workings of innuendo. When presented with information that may or
may not be correct, our Spinozan belief system compels us to endorse that information upon
comprehension. If our cognitive resources are later disrupted we may be unable to correct our initial
comprehension. Similarly, this research may help explain why belief perseverance takes place. If the
stage of correcting initial information is subject to disruption, we may be left clinging to beliefs even in
the face of clearly disconfirming evidence. Finally, these results fly in the face of what your parents
always told you. Far from “not believing everything you read,” it seems that we can’t escape that fate.
Gilbert, D. T. (1993). The assent of man: Mental representation and the control of belief. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.),
Handbook of mental control (pp. 57–87). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107–119.
Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Malone, P. S. (1990). Unbelieving the unbelievable: Some problems in the rejection of false
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 601–613.
Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social perception: Biased attributional processes
in the debriefing paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 880–892.
Wegner, D. M., Wenzlaff, R., Kerker, R. M., & Beattie, A. E. (1981). Incrimination through innuendo: Can media questions become
public answers? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 822–832.
To demonstrate functional fixedness, gather a number of household items, such as an egg carton, film
container, baby food jar, nail, paper clip, baking cup, empty toilet paper roll, piece of string, paper napkin,
clothes pin, safety pin, Band-aid, and cotton ball. You may wish to have several of each item depending
on how many students are in your class.
Arrange the class in small groups and have each group choose several items. Their task is to
brainstorm as many new uses for their items as possible in the time allowed. For four or five items, allow
10 to 15 minutes. Have each group report their results to the class.
The following discussion should allow you to reinforce ideas about the nature of creativity and the
meaning of functional fixedness. If a person suggests using a baby food jar to store small items such as
buttons, this is still fixating on the function of the jar as a container. A more creative suggestion would be
to break the jar and use a piece for cutting, or to draw around it to make a circle.
Uriel Halbreich, UB professor of psychiatry and gynecology and obstetrics, and an expert in
psychopharmacology, hormonal disorders and behaviour, has reported that the performance of
postmenopausal women on certain tests measuring the ability to integrate several cognitive functions
improved significantly after a course of estrogen-replacement therapy (ERT).
It was found that low levels of estrogen may impair some cognitive functions, while
estrogen-replacement therapy may help improve certain thinking and biological brain processes, and also
may play a role in elevating mood, results of studies involving postmenopausal women conducted by
researchers at UB have shown.
Post-menopausal women and women of child-bearing age were given a wide variety of tests that
measure different areas of cognitive functions according to Halbreich. The women were then given
estrogen for 60 days, and there appeared to be a significant improvement. This increase in cognitive
ability was correlated with the plasma levels of estrogen. The results indicated that integrative abilities,
reaction times and short-term verbal memory of many of the postmenopausal women improved after
estrogen therapy. Halbreich believes that estrogen may help maintain some functions that typically
decline with age or menopause.
We often have lapses in critical thinking as we speak and write. A fallacy is a belief or argument that rests
on invalid or false inference, that is logically unsound. Fallacies are often used unintentionally, but they
are also used intentionally when an effort is being made to deceive or mislead the listener or reader.
1. “If you know about BMW, you either own one or you want one.”
What’s wrong with this statement? It is an example of the fallacy called false alternatives. It is also
called dualistic or black-and-white thinking and bifurcation. The fallacy occurs when it is presumed that a
classification is exclusive or exhaustive. It often takes the form of overlooking alternatives that exist
between two polar opposites.
Here is another example of false alternatives written by an educator who was suggesting that
children should begin public school at the age of four and that high school should end after the eleventh
year: “Twelfth grade has become a bore for able students and a holding tank for the rest.”
2. “I asked my doctor why my mouth was so dry and he told me that it was because my saliva glands are
not producing enough saliva.”
What do you think of the doctor’s diagnosis? This is an example of the fallacy of begging the
question, or circularity. The fallacy occurs when the solution to a problem is a restatement of the
problem, or, an argument for a proposition is equivalent to the proposition, such as “He throws tantrums
all the time because he has a terrible temper.” Diagnoses of mental disorders are sometimes considered to
beg the question: “Why is he so nervous and agitated?” “He has generalized anxiety disorder.” “What
does that mean?” “It means that he has anxiety and apprehension.”
Here is another example that may seem ridiculous, but when things such as this occur in the
context of speech or writing, they often sound all right, maybe even impressive: “Bodies fall because they
have a downward tendency.”
3. “He is an innocent man. He was tried before a jury of his peers and the prosecution was unable to
prove him guilty.”
Is the assumption of innocence justified? This is an example of the fallacy called appeal to
ignorance. This fallacy occurs when it is argued that because we cannot prove a proposition to be true, it
must be false; or if we cannot prove a proposition to be false, it must be true.
Here is another example: “There has never been any scandal about this candidate for prime
minister. Therefore, he must be an honest, moral person.”
4. “If you don’t pick up your clothes before you go to bed at night, pretty soon you’ll be knee-deep in
dirty clothes.”
Is that the way it is? This is an example of the fallacy called slippery slope; certain applications of it
have been called the domino theory. The argument is that if the first in a possible series of steps or events
occurs, the other steps or events are inevitable.
Here is an example from a letter to the editor of a metropolitan newspaper. The writer was responding
to an article discussing the morality of euthanasia in the case of a person with an advanced case of
multiple sclerosis: “If we allow this to happen, where do we stop? Who would decide at what point
someone should die? Do we give them poison the moment they know they have multiple sclerosis or
cancer, before they have any suffering?”
5. “TV can’t be harmful for children because it occupies their attention for hours and keeps them off the
streets.”
Is this argument against the idea that TV can be harmful for children convincing? It is an example of
the fallacy called irrelevant reason. This fallacy occurs when the argument given to support a proposition
has little or no relevance to the proposition.
Here is another example: “Conservationists have suggested that we could conserve fuel by
increasing the tax on gasoline. But more taxes, whether they’re paid by the oil companies or passed on to
the consumer at the pump, will not produce one more barrel of oil.”
6. “I don’t see how she can get elected. No one I know is going to vote for her.”
What’s wrong with this argument? This is the fallacy called hasty generalization. It occurs when an
isolated or exceptional case is used as the basis for a general conclusion. In more statistical language, it is
making a conclusion about a population based on information obtained from a sample that is biased or too
small. It is an error of inductive reasoning—going from the particular to the general when it is not
justified by the evidence.
Another example is attributed to the brother of a former president of the United States: “I never read a
book by a woman because I never met a woman who had sense enough to write a book.” (Either he hasn’t
met very many women, in which case the sample is too small, or the ones he has met are a biased sample.
Of course, there is the possibility that he is a devout sexist.)
7. “If socialized medicine will result in better and lower-cost healthcare, shouldn’t the same logic be
applied to automobiles? Wouldn’t nationalization of the auto industry produce better and lower-cost
cars? And if we nationalized auto mechanics, wouldn’t we get better and less-expensive repairs?”
These words were spoken in rebuttal after Senator Kennedy had called for national health insurance
in a speech at a meeting of the United Auto Workers. Does the speaker’s argument make sense? It
represents the fallacy called questionable analogy. In questionable analogy an attempt is made to make
two situations seem more similar than they actually are.
Another example is from a state senator who was using the crucifixion as a rationale for capital
punishment:
“Where would Christianity be if Jesus got 8 to 15 years with time off for good behaviour?”
Nonverbal behaviour is often taken for granted, probably because it occurs so effortlessly in our
interactions that we fail to notice it. It provides such a valuable aspect of communication, however, that it
is definitely noticed when it is missing. You can illustrate the importance of nonverbal behaviour to your
students with a simple demonstration.
Start by drawing a simple dichotomy between verbal channels of communication and nonverbal
channels. The verbal channel is easy; it is the words used, or perhaps a transcript of them. Ask your
students to list the nonverbal channels of communication as you write them on the blackboard. The first
response will usually be a generic “body language,” but tell them to be more specific; body language is a
catch-all term incorporating many nonverbal channels. In short order you should find that students list
facial expressions, eye contact, vocal cues (mainly tone of voice), and gestures, and with a little prodding
they will add touch, interpersonal distance, speech dysfluencies, posture, gait, or appearance (such as hair
or clothing style) as ways of communicating nonverbally. Seeing the board fill up with one verbal means
of communication and 5 to 8 nonverbal channels will illustrate clearly the importance of nonverbal
behaviour.
After generating these ways of communicating, illustrate what kind of information each adds to a
message. This will take some acting on your part, but it is easy to master with a little practice. Start by
saying a very emphatic message (“I’m absolutely thrilled to be here today!”) while keeping all other
channels of communication constant. In other words, hold your body perfectly still (arms at your side),
keep a neutral facial expression, and say the words in a monotone. It should be clear that although the
verbal channel is quite enthusiastic, the nonverbal channels belie the impact of the message. Next repeat
the message, adding the appropriate vocal inflections and tone cues, but keeping all other channels
constant. Add a happy facial expression in the next iteration, and finally repeat the gushing message with
inflection, a happy face, and a broad sweep of your arms. Your students will get the idea that words
actually “say” very little; most of this message is carried by other channels.
A variation on this idea is suggested by Richmond and McCroskey, focusing on the vocal
channel. You can demonstrate this yourself or by enlisting the help of 4 or 5 students willing to ham it up
in front of the class. Consider the following phrases: “Gee, thanks,” “This turned out to be a fine day,” “I
just love it when you do that,” “Way to go, dude,” “I would like nothing better,” “Wow, this is fun,”
“Wonderful,” “That’s my favourite,” “Truly awesome,” “Real nice,” “This stinks,” and “Rhonda’s a real
winner, isn’t she?” Ask your students to say each phrase using a variety of vocal styles, and have the class
comment on the change in meaning that results. In each case the most obvious difference will come from
the use of sarcasm, where the vocal inflection runs opposite to the verbal content. But many of these
phrases (as well as others you might generate that are more specific to your university or to your class)
can carry other meanings as well. For example, “Real nice” can convey sarcasm, sincerity, or sexuality
depending on how it is delivered. Like the facial expression demonstration described earlier, these are fun
and easy ways to introduce the topic of nonverbal behaviour.
Richmond, V. P., & McCroskey, J. C. (1995). Nonverbal behaviour in interpersonal relations (3rd ed.). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn
and Bacon.
A fairly large number of people believe that animals have language abilities. Most scientific data on the
point, however, indicate that animals communicate, but do not use a complicated system of symbols and
syntax to convey ideas. The following three questions can be used by students as an informal survey of
people (including fellow students, parents, etc.) regarding the issue of animal language:
Students can potentially learn a great deal by teaching those that they survey (presumably there will be
many people who may not grasp the vast difference between animal communication and human
language). Additionally, the answers to #3 may be interesting, enlightening, and even humorous.
The sentences presented contain words that are spelled identically, but have different pronunciations and
meanings (these kinds of words are called homographs). This leads to potentially ambiguous reading of
the sentences! However, most readers of English are extremely adept at reading the sentences, probably
due to the context in which the words are used. In any case, students can use these 12 sentences as a sort
of survey to be conducted on their fellow students. The idea is to have the subjects read each sentence
aloud and determine whether any errors (even pauses could be interpreted as errors) occur. Each sentence
should be presented individually, so as not to allow subject to “preread” the sentences. Additionally,
subjects should attempt to read a sentence immediately after being presented with it. Total errors made
should be tallied. If the homographs were indeed completely ambiguous, then we would expect errors in
pronunciation for every sentence (a total of 12 errors). Most subjects will probably not exhibit this kind of
error rate! A list of all homographs in the English language can be found at this website:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_English_homographs
1-page response essay: The well-known researcher in artificial intelligence, Walter Fritz, has a view of
the relationship between language and thought that can be summarized by this statement, “We certainly
don't think in words. For if we did, we would have to learn everything we know, our lifelong experience,
anew when learning another language! I read a lot in English, Spanish and German: books, articles, e-
mails. Often, when I try to think of where I got specific information from, I discover that I don’t even
know in which language I read it.” (from ebook “Intelligent Systems and Their Societies”:
http://www.intelligent-systems.com.ar/intsyst/index.htm).
Have students evaluate this statement critically using evidence presented in the book on linguistic
determinism and / or linguistic relativity.
As stated in the text, reading is automatic. Therefore, attributes of the text other than the word itself are
largely ignored when reading. This selectivity is apparent when performing the Stroop task. Go to
http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/java/ready.html for an interactive example of Stroop task stimuli—
if you do not have the ability to go online in your classroom, you can either print colour copies from this
site or assign the website as an Out-of-Class assignment in preparation for class. Enlist one or two student
volunteers. If you are using the hard copy version, be sure to have a timekeeping device handy. The
website will automatically calculate time. The student’s task is to first go through the list of words,
simply reading them all as fast as s(he) can. Be sure to make a note of the elapsed time. Then, ask the
student to go through the list a second time, naming the colour of each word (not the word itself). This is
usually considerably more difficult than the first task, and should manifest as an elapsed time increase
(plus quite a few errors!).
Objective: To demonstrate how psychological set (e.g., stating the problem) can interfere with the
generation of solutions to problems
Materials: See Handout Master 8.1
Procedure: Ask students to think about a problem; the problem may be a corporate problem (e.g., crime
or pollution) or a personal problem (e.g., poor grades). Using the handout, each student should reword or
describe the problem in several different ways. This may open some doors in terms of solutions. Next,
students should develop at least two solutions to the problem.
Think of a problem. Describe it concisely, then list four alternative ways to describe the difficulty.
Alternate 1:
Alternate 2:
Alternate 3:
Alternate 4:
Describe the problem from the point of view of other parties involved:
Describe two solutions to this problem, indicating how these solutions are influenced by the particular
statement of the problem you have chosen:
1. In the English language, are there more words beginning with the letter r or more words with the
letter r appearing as the third letter?
First position
Third position
2. In the English language, are there more words beginning with the letter k or more words with the
letter k appearing as the third letter?
First position
Third position
________ %
________ courses
WEB RESOURCES
Language
TableContents
Reading
Speed Reading Test Online:
http://ww.readinsoft.com/
Students should get a kick out of this Web site, given that the text exposes the fact that evidence for the
effectiveness of speed reading is basically nonexistent.
ERSTES BUCH.
DER
BUCHDRUCKERKUNST
1450—1500.
EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS ERSTE BUCH. [←]
Älteste Spuren der Vervielfältigung. Die Manuskripte. Der Metall- und Holzschnitt.
Die Kunstschulen. Die xylographischen Werke. Die Vorbedingungen für die
Erfindung der Buchdruckerkunst.
In dem Gesagten liegt schon, dass wir es hier nicht mit einer
urplötzlich aus dem Kopfe des Erfinders entsprungenen, bereits
vollständig gewaffneten Erscheinung zu thun haben. Viel eher passt
der einfache Vergleich mit einem, schon in den ältesten Zeiten
gelegten Samenkorn, das, sich selbst überlassen, zwar gekeimt und
Blätter getrieben hatte, aber erst unter der aufmerksamen Pflege des
verständigen Gärtners die schönsten Blüten spendete.