IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA

AT PAR ES SALAAM

fCORAM: MWARUA. J.A.. SEHEL. J.A. And MASHAKA. J.A.1

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 207 OF 2019

NACKY ESTHER NYANGE APPELLANT

VERSUS
MIHAYO MARIJANI WILMORE 1 st RESPONDENT
MRS. MARIAM WILMORE ... 2nd RESPONDENT

[Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the High Court of Tanzania
(Dar es Salaam Registry) at Dar es Salaam]

(Maqoiqa. J.)

dated the 4th day of June, 2019

in

Civil Case No. 155 of 2015

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

27®September, 2022 & 24* November, 2022

MASHAKA. J.A.:

In this appeal, the appellant is claiming ownership of Plot No. 361

Block G, Hekima Street, Mbezi Beach Area, Kinondoni Municipality in Dar

es Salaam Region, and motor vehicle make Range Rover Evoque with

Registration No. T504 DBV from the respondents.

The suit commenced at the High Court of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam

Registry) on a claim lodged by the second respondent seeking among

other reliefs a declaration that she is the legal owner of Plot No. 361

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Block G, Hekima Street, Mbezi Beach Area, Kinondoni Municipality, Dar

es Salaam Region (the Mbezi property) and vacant possession by the

appellant; and a declaration that she is the lawful owner of the motor

vehicle make Range Rover Evoque with registration no. T504 DBV (the

motor vehicle).

The background of this matter, albeit briefly is as follows: Way

back in August, 2004 the second respondent purchased the Mbezi

property from one John Ruboyana, at that time the first respondent, her

son had graduated from Lincoln University in the USA in 2002.

Thereafter the second respondent looked for a building permit and

started erecting a wall and gates. The first respondent came back to

Tanzania in the year 2004 and she assigned him to supervise the

construction. The second respondent seeing that his son was paying a

high amount of rent somewhere, she told him to finish the construction

of the house and move into the house at the Mbezi property.

The appellant and first respondent celebrated their civil marriage

in 2006 in the USA and moved into the house in 2008 when the house

was semi-finished. It was the contention by the second respondent that

she allowed the first respondent and his family to live in the house while

they were still looking for their own permanent place.

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 The second respondent claimed further that, in the year 2011, the

first respondent approached and requested her to allow him to use the

Mbezi property as security to a credit facility from Bank M Limited and

that the same would be returned on her demand. Again, the first

respondent requested for a second property that is Plot No. 251 Block B,

with Certificate of Title No. 88124 at Ras Dege area, Kigamboni, Temeke

Municipality in Dar es Salaam Region, to be used as security for a

financial obligation related to Telesis Tanzania Limited and that the two

of them had an oral agreement that the first respondent shall return the

documents with an interest of 12 percent per annum. In relation to the

motor vehicle, the second respondent's contention was that in the year

2014, the first respondent gave her as a gift.

Come 2015, the second respondent was informed that the

appellant had instituted a matrimonial cause before the Kisutu Resident

Magistrates' Court. Upon her perusal of the court file, she realised that

the Mbezi property and the motor vehicle were also listed among the

matrimonial properties subject to division of matrimonial assets. That

incident compelled the second respondent to institute a claim before the

High Court vide Civil Case No. 155 of 2015 and among other things, she

prayed for a declaration that she was the lawful owner of the Mbezi

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property and that the motor vehicle was given to her by the first

respondent as a gift.

In her defence, the appellant claimed that the second respondent

purchased the Mbezi property while they were still in America, because

the first respondent being a non-citizen could not own land in Tanzania

and he therefore used the second respondent to purchase the Mbezi

property. She further claimed that when they got married, they

constructed the house together and in 2008 they moved to the Mbezi

property.

After a full trial, the trial court decided in favour of the second

respondent. It held that, the house on Plot No. 361 Block "G" Hekima

Street, Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni Municipality, Dar es Salaam region is the

registered property of the second respondent, supported by the

contents of exhibit PI, the Certificate of Title which is conclusive proof of

ownership in the name of the second respondent. It further held that,

there was evidence that the Mbezi property was bought way back in

2004 before the marriage of the appellant and first respondent; and

thus, the allegation of matrimonial interest was devoid of merit.

On the dispute regarding the motor vehicle, the trial court held

that, the exhibit P2 the motor vehicle registration card proves that it was
solely owned by the second respondent. It therefore ordered the

appellant to peacefully vacate the house on Plot No 361 Block "G"

Hekima Street, Mbezi Beach, Kinondoni Municipality, Dar es Salaam

Region.

Dissatisfied, the appellant preferred the present appeal basing her

complaints on the following grounds:

1. That the trial court erred to not find collusion between the
respondents to deprive the appellant the interest/right over Plot
No. 361, Block G, Hekima Street as the appellant had matrimonial
interest in it

2. That the trial court erred in law and fact in not holding that the
plaintiff failed to prove on balance o f probabilities her ownership
over Plot No. 361, Block G, Hekima Street and that the 2nd
defendant had matrimonial interest.

3. That the trial court erred in law and fact in not considering that
gift inter vivos has to be proved by deed o f gift and that the motor
vehicle with Registration No. T504DBV remained matrimonial
property and title did not pass to the first respondent

4. The trial court erred in law by neglecting the contribution o f the

appellant to the acquisition o f the motor vehicle thereby acquiring
matrimonial interests.

5. That the trial court erred in law in not holding that what was given
during good times cannot be taken back during bad times and that

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 the house in Plot No. 361 Block G, House No. 30, Hekima Street,
Mbezi Beach Area in Dar es Salaam remains to be matrimonial
home.

6. That the trial court erred in law and fact in not holding that the
appellant has contributed to the acquisition and development o f
Plot No. 361, Block G, Hekima Street, Mbezi Beach area thereby
acquiring matrimonial interests.

7. That the trial court erred in law and fact for failure to evaluate
evidence tendered by the appellant in acquiring and developing of
the matrimonial home located at Plot No. 361 Block G, House No.
30, Hekima Street Mbezi Beach Area, Dar es Salaam while ignoring
the collusion plea between the respondents herein.

8. That the High Court erred in law ordering eviction o f the appellant
within one month.

On 2nd June, 2022, the second respondent raised a notice of

preliminary objection and for the reasons which will shortly come to light

we find no need to recite the points thereof.

When the appeal was placed before us for hearing on 27th

September, 2022 the appellant was represented by Mr. Ally Hamza,

learned counsel, whereas the first and second respondents were

represented by Ms. Raya Said Nassir and Mrs. Crescencia Rwechungura,

learned advocates respectively. At the onset, Mrs. Rwechungura

abandoned the notice of preliminary objection and prayed for hearing of

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the appeal to proceed. Consequently, the notice of preliminary objection

was marked withdrawn.

Mr. Hamza commenced by adopting the contents of his written

submission and prayed to abandon ground 5, and to argue grounds one

and two separately, three and four, and six and seven conjointly.

Beginning with ground one, Mr. Hamza submitted that, the first

respondent and the appellant were husband and wife respectively and

were living at the Mbezi property. When the second respondent became

aware that the appellant initiated divorce petition and included the

Mbezi property as a matrimonial asset subject to division, she

immediately commenced a backdoor procedure colluding with the land

officer to procure a Certificate of Title with respect to the said property

in her name. He thus argued that there were no any correspondences

between the land officer and second respondent which were tendered

during the trial to prove that she commenced the process of getting a

title deed prior to the petition of divorce. He concluded his argument on

this ground with the principle of equity that who comes to seek equity

must come with clean hands and the second respondent had dirty hands

as she colluded with the land officer to defeat the appellant's interest in

the Mbezi property.

 Mr. Hamza submitted on ground two that, the second respondent

completely failed to discharge her burden of proof as required by the

law. That she was required to prove not only that the title deed was in

her name but how she obtained the same, bolstering his position with

the case of Africarriers Limited v. Millenium Logistics Limited,

Civil Appeal No. 185 of 2018 (unreported). However, Mr. Hamza

conceded that title in land is prima facie evidence of ownership but only

when there is no allegation of fraud or collusion, that was in line with

section 33(1) of the Land Registration Act, [Cap 334 R.E 2002]. He

further claimed that in obtaining the title deed there was fraud and

collusion between the second respondent and the first respondent,

supporting his assertion with the case of Leopold Mutembei v.

Principal Assistant Registrar of Titles, Ministry of Lands,

Housing and Urban Development and Another, Civil Appeal No. 57

of 2017 (unreported).

Arguing in support of grounds three and four, Mr. Hamza

contended that the first respondent testified that he gave the motor

vehicle to the second respondent as a gift and therefore it belonged to

her, while the motor vehicle was acquired during the subsistence of the

marriage and it was purchased using family funds. Therefore, he

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reasoned that the first respondent could not transfer it to the second

respondent without involving the appellant. In addition, he submitted

that there was no documentary evidence conferring the gift. With

regard to the evidence of the second respondent that her son wrote a

letter informing her that he gave her a motor vehicle as a gift, the

learned counsel challenged that evidence contending that the said letter

was never tendered during trial. He referred us to the case of Wayi

Atilio and Another v. Elvira Ojali, Civil Appeal No. 023 of 2009

(unreported) that oral words coupled with delivery and gift by deed are

the only modes available at common law for an inter vivos grant of a

gift. Thus, he faulted the trial court for failing to hold that the appellant

had matrimonial interest in the motor vehicle.

Submitting on grounds six and seven, Mr. Hamza argued that the

first respondent and the appellant solemnized their civil marriage in

2006 and thereafter commenced construction and moved to the Mbezi

property in 2008. The appellant contributed to the development of the

matrimonial house as evidenced by DW2 and exhibits Dl, D2, D3, D4

and D5, the receipts for the purchase of building materials. He

contended that this evidence was never cross examined by the

respondents, supporting his contention with the cases of Kilanya

General Supplies and Exaud Augustino Kwayu v. CRDB Bank

Limited & Two Others, Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2018 and Nelson

Onyango v. Republic, Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 2017 (both

unreported). He argued further that in line with the principle in Bi.

Hawa Mohamed v. Ally Sefu [1983] T.L.R 32 that the appellant being

the legal wife of the first respondent when the Mbezi property was

constructed, she has morally and materially contributed.

On ground eight, Mr. Hamza submitted that, the trial court failed

to consider the welfare of the children when it ordered for the vacant

possession of the appellant and issuance of one-month eviction notice

which was patently unjust. He, thus prayed the appeal to be allowed

and the decision of the trial court be reversed.

In reply, Ms. Nassir commenced by defining the term collusion in

respect of ground one, referring the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition

and the case of Twazihirwa Abraham Mgena v. James Christian

Basil (As administrator of the Estate of the Late Christian Basil,

Kiria, Deceased), Civil Appeal No. 229 of 2018 (unreported) that the

allegation of fraud has to be pleaded and proved on a higher degree of

probability than that required in normal civil cases. She argued that the
alleged collusion brings confusion as it is not clear if it was between both

respondents or the second respondent and the land officer.

On ground two, Ms. Nassir submitted that the appellant knew the

second respondent was the lawful owner of the Mbezi property as the

same was purchased before her marriage to the first respondent. In

addition to that, it was registered in the name of the second respondent

and the certificate of title conferred ownership. She supported her

argument with the case of Leopold Mutembei (supra). She concluded

that the appellant failed to put forward evidence to prove that the Mbezi

property was indeed a matrimonial property citing the case of Habiba

Ahmadi Nangulukuta and Two Others v. Hassan Ausi Mchopa

and Another, Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2022 (unreported) that

matrimonial assets are those properties acquired by one or other spouse

before or during their marriage, with the intention that there should be

continuing provisions for them and their children during their joint lives.

On ground three and four, Ms Nassir referred us to pages 571 -

572 of the record of appeal that the said motor vehicle was registered in

the name of the second respondent as she was given a gift by the first

respondent. She argued that, there is no law that a gift must be proved

by a deed and in terms of section 60 of the Law of Marriage Act, that

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where any of the property is in the name of either spouse there is a

rebuttable presumption that property belongs to him/her, and the

appellant stated that she did not have any proof that the said motor

vehicle was registered in the name of the second respondent, claiming

that the motor vehicle was bought through the family account, though

there was no proof to establish the existence of such an account.

Ms. Nassir, thus subscribed to the finding of the trial court that

there was no any contribution of the appellant towards the acquisition of

the motor vehicle. She distinguished the case of Bi. Hawa Mohamed

(supra) with the present appeal and prayed to the Court to consider the

case of Gabriel Nimrod Kuijwila v. Theresia Hassan Malongo,

Civil Appeal No. 102 of 2018 (unreported).

On grounds six and seven, Ms Nassir argued that the second

respondent stated that she assigned the first respondent to supervise

the construction of Mbezi property. Though DW3 testified that he was

hired by the appellant and first respondent who were living in the said

house, she argued that living there was not conclusive proof of

ownership of the said Mbezi property. She concluded that, the second

respondent only allowed the appellant and first respondent to reside in

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that house and make any necessary improvements to make the place

more comfortable for their stay.

In respect of ground eight concerning the order of eviction, Ms

Nassir submitted that the trial court correctly ordered vacant possession

after thirty days as it was proved that the appellant was a trespasser,

reinforcing her argument with the case of Avit Thadeus Massawe v.

Isidory Assenga, Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2017 (unreported). Therefore,

she urged the Court to dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.

In reply to ground one, Ms. Rwechungura submitted that in her

defence, the appellant did not mention any conspiracy, fraud or collusion

by the second respondent to deny her the right to own the property in

dispute. Further, she argued that during trial, the trial court framed five

issues and there was no issue regarding collusion and fraud, hence

ground one being a new ground, she implored the Court that the same

be disregarded. More so, she maintained that, it is correct the

certificate of title was obtained after the petition of divorced was filed,

but the appellant admitted that the Mbezi property was registered in the

name of the second respondent. Also, she claimed that the receipts

tendered were in the name of the second respondent and in terms of

IB
section 40 of the Land Act, the second respondent is deemed to be the

owner of the property.

In ground two, Ms. Rwechungura claimed that, the second

respondent proved on balance of probabilities that she was the owner of

the Mbezi property by the certificate of title which is conclusive proof of

ownership.

Ms. Rwechungura further submitted on grounds three and four,

that the first respondent is the biological son of the second respondent

and he transferred the motor vehicle to his mother as a gift. Section 15

of the Road Traffic Act provides that the names appearing on the

registration card is a proof of ownership of the motor vehicle. She

further argued that the appellant failed to prove how the motor vehicle

was purchased by the money from the family account; taking into

account section 60 of the Law of Marriage Act that there is a rebuttable

presumption of the property owned by either spouse.

On grounds six and seven, Ms. Rwechungura contended that, the

appellant in Civil Appeal No. 169 of 2019 (unreported) between Nacky

Esther Nyange v. Mihayo Marijani Wilmore, she lost her appeal as

she failed to prove her contributions on the acquisition of the Mbezi

property and whether it was a matrimonial home.

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 Ms. Rwechungura supported the order of the trial court in ground

eight, and argued that the appellant and the first respondent were

divorced, not living together and therefore she was properly ordered to

vacate the house in dispute.

In a brief rejoinder, Mr Hamza claimed that the issue of collusion

and fraud was raised by the appellant in her pleadings in paragraphs 15

and 16 of the written statement of defence of the appellant and hence

this ground should not be disregarded. On the issue of procuring the

certificate of title, Mr. Hamza argued that the same was procured after

the institution of the petition of divorce. He reiterated his submission

and prayed the appeal to be allowed with costs.

Having considering the rival arguments and submissions of the

proficient legal minds, it is worthy to note from the outset that this

appeal originated from the dispute over ownership of the Mbezi property

and the motor vehicle. We will thus confine our deliberations on the

issue of ownership which is the essence of this appeal and not on the

matrimonial interests and contribution of spouses towards the

acquisition of the said properties. As the issue of matrimonial and

division of assets acquired during subsistence of marriage was properly

dealt with in Nacky Esther Nyange v. Mihayo Marijani Wilmore

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(supra). It is our stance that the appeal is not centred on the

contribution and development of the alleged disputed properties.

In determining the grounds of appeal, the complaint in ground

one, is whether there was collusion in obtaining the Certificate of Title in

respect of the Mbezi property. Having revisited the record of appeal,

there is no doubt that the appellant in her written statement of defence

raised the issue of collusion between the first respondent and second

respondent with an intent to deprive her rights to the division of

matrimonial assets as correctly argued by Mr. Hamza. On the other

side, Ms. Rwechungura maintained that the issue of collusion is a new

ground as it was not one of the issues framed by the trial court. Despite

the fact that the issue of collusion was not among the framed issues,

this Court being the first appellate court is entitled to re-evaluate the

evidence and give its own findings - see Future Century Limited v.

TANESCO, Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2009 (unreported).

The next question is, whether the procurement of the Certificate of

Title was through collusion of the second respondent and the first

respondent or the second respondent and the land officer as argued by

Mr. Hamza. As correctly submitted by Ms. Nassir, the term collusion is

defined under the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition as follows:

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 "An agreement between two or more persons to
defraud a person o f his rights by the forms of
law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law. It
implies the existence o f fraud o f some kind, the
employment o f fraudulent means, or o f lawful
means for the accomplishment o f unlawful
purpose."

In that context for the allegation of collusion to stand, fraud must

beproved. Referring to the case cited by Ms. Nassir, Twazihirwa

Abraham Mgena v. James Christian Basil (As administrator of

the Estate of the Late Christian Basil Kiria, Deceased) (supra),

the Court held that;

"This is a pure allegation o f fraud which in civil

proceedings ought to be specifically pleaded and
proved on a higher degree o f probability than
that which is required in ordinary civil cases."

In the light of the above stand, the appellant was required to

prove the allegation of fraud on a higher degree of probability. Looking

through the evidence of the appellant during trial, she failed to prove

the serious allegations against the respondents on a higher degree of

probability than a balance of probabilities which is normally applied in

civil cases. We find that the appellant failed to prove collusion thus this

ground fails.

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 On ground two, the complaint is whether the ownership of Mbezi

property was proved on balance of probabilities. It is trite law and

indeed straightforward that he who alleges carries the burden to prove

as stipulated in section 110 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 6. The second

respondent maintained that she was the lawful owner of the Mbezi

property while the appellant alleged that the said property was a

matrimonial asset. In the case of Paulina Samson Ndawavya v.

Theresia Thomas Madaha, Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2017 (unreported),

this Court held that;

"It is equally elementary that since the dispute

was in civil case, the standard o f proof was on a
balance o f probabilities which simply means that
the Court will sustain such evidence which is
more credible than the other on a particular fact
to be proved."

On the strength of our position above, the second respondent

tendered a Certificate of Title which was admitted in evidence as exhibit

PI. Both learned advocates had a consensus that the Certificate of Title

is conclusive proof of ownership of land. We, equally subscribe to that

position, supported by Leopold Mutembei v. Principal Assistant

Registrar of Titles and Two Others (supra) cited with approval the

following excerpt from the book titled "Conveyancing and

Disposition of Land in Tanzania" by Dr. R. W Tenga and Dr. S. J

Mramba, Law Africa, Dar es Salaam, 2017 at page 330 that:-

"...the registration under a land titles system is

more than mere entry in a public register; it is
authentication o f the ownership of, or a legal
interest in, a parcel o f land. The act o f
registration confirms transaction that confer,
affect or terminate that ownership or interest.
Once the registration process is completed, no
search behind the register is needed to establish
a chain o f titles to the property, for the register
itself is conclusive proof o f the title."

With the present appeal, apart from the exhibit PI, the second

respondent adduced evidence that she purchased the Mbezi property

from John Ruboyana, on the 16th August, 2004 and even the appellant

agreed that the said property was purchased by the second respondent

before her marriage to the first respondent. Further to that, Mr. Hamza

challenges ownership of the second respondent on the claim that, the

property at hand was the matrimonial property. In Agatha Mshote v.

Edson Emmanuel and Ten Others, Civil Appeal No. 121 of 2019

(unreported), we had this to say: -

"On this, we have considered that the success o f

the appellant's case did not depend on the

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 credibility o f the respondents and instead the
burden o f proof never shifts to the adverse party
until the party on whom the onus lies, discharges
the burden. It does not cease on account o f the
weakness o f the case o f the adverse party. "

On the strength of the above extract, the onus of proof lies on the

one who alleges. Since the appellant alleged that the Mbezi property

was a matrimonial property then she had a burden to prove that fact.

Matrimonial properties are those acquired by one spouse or the other or

both spouses with the intention that there should be a continuing

provision for them and their children during their joint lives - see Bi

Hawa Mohamed v. Ally Seif (supra) and Gabriel Nimrod Kurwijila

v. Theresia Hassani Malongo, (supra).

Since the appellant alleged that the said house is a matrimonial

asset, she ought to have proved that the said plot was acquired by

herself or the first respondent or both with the intention that the same

should provide for their family during their joint life. It is evidenced from

the record that, the appellant alleged that the said plot was bought by

her husband, the first respondent and registered in the name of the

second respondent as he was not a citizen of Tanzania capable of

owning land in Tanzania. However, the said assertions were mere

allegations since she has not backed up with any evidence. Furthermore,

the Mbezi property was bought before the appellant and the first

respondent got married. Thus, it cannot qualify to be a matrimonial

property as correctly argued by Ms. Nassir and Ms. Rwechungura that

the appellant failed to prove that the Mbezi property was a matrimonial

property and we find that there is no valid reason whatsoever to disturb

the findings of the trial court.

In respect of grounds three and four whether the motor vehicle

was a matrimonial asset, the trial court held that, the said vehicle was

registered in the name of the second respondent who testified that the

said motor vehicle was given to her, as a gift by her son the first

respondent. We find that exhibit P2 speaks so loud and clear. The

argument and evidence of the appellant that the said motor vehicle is

matrimonial property which was registered in the name of the first

defendant is devoid of merit. Mr. Hamza questioned the findings of the

trial court arguing that the motor vehicle was matrimonial property and

that the transfer of the motor vehicle registration card to the name of

the second respondent was meant to deprive the appellant her rights in

the said motor vehicle. While Ms. Nassir contended that there is no law

which provides that gift inter vivos has to be proved by presence of a

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deed and Ms. Rwechungura cemented that the registration card is

conclusive evidence of ownership.

In line with the submissions of Ms. Nassir and Ms. Rwechungura,

we find with no doubt that exhibit P2, the registration card of the motor

vehicle proved that the second respondent was the registered owner of

the said motor vehicle as stipulated in section 15 of the Tanzania Road

Traffic Act which states that: -

"The person in whose name a motor vehicle or

trailer is registered shall, unless the contrary is
proved, be presumed to be the owner o f the
motor vehicle."

On the issue of gift inter vivos, since the said motor vehicle had

already been registered in the name of the second respondent, the deed

of gift inter vivos would have no evidential value when compared to the

registration card as per section 15 of the Road Traffic Act. In addition,

there was no evidence adduced by the appellant to prove that the said

motor vehicle was purchased through the family funds let alone prove

the existence of the family account. We, therefore have no reason to

fault the findings of the trial court. This ground also is unfounded.
 Concluding with ground eight on the legality of the eviction order,

the trial court ordered the appellant to peacefully vacate the Mbezi

property within a month from the date of the judgement Mr. Hamza

faulted the order as unfair while Ms. Nassir reasoned that the order was

justified as the appellant was a trespasser. Ms. Nassir cited the case of

Avit Thadeus Massawe v. Isidory Assenga, (supra) where, the

Court held that: -

"Lastly, it is obvious that the immediate remedy

available to a successful party who has been
unjustifiable dispossessed o f a certain property is
to recover it back so as to enable him have a
peaceful enjoyment o f it That is not achievable
unless the trespasser is evicted or ejected from
the property..."

Based on the above excerpt, the trial court" was justified to order

immediate eviction from the Mbezi property as the appellant was not the

owner of the said property. We earlier stated that this appeal originated

from the suit challenging ownership. Having been proved that she was

a trespasser, the appellant cannot seek refuge behind the welfare of the

children to continue living at Mbezi property. In that regard, the trial

court correctly ordered eviction within one month from the date of the

judgment to the appellant. We find this ground is meritless.

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 In fine, this appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed

with costs.

DATED at DAR ES SALAAM, this 22nd day of November, 2022.

A. G. MWARUA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

B. M. A. SEHEL
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

L. L. MASHAKA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL

Ttie Judgment delivered this 24th day of November, 2022 in the

presence of Mr. Reuben Robert learned counsel for the Appellant, Ms.

Raya Nasir, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent and in the presence

of the 2nd Respondent, is hereby certified as a true copy of the original.

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