Richard of St. Victor – De Trinitate bks.

3 & 5
For Trinity Module, Martinmas 2023
Dennis P. Bray

Background
Richard

• Originally from Scotland

• Moved to France first third of 12th century to St. Victor’s
• Best known for his mystical writings, esp. Benjamin Major and Ben. Minor
• Wrote the de Trinitate around 1160-70; worked on it till he died
The abbey of St. Victor

• Started by William of Champeux 1108 after dispute with Abelard

• Augustinian canons regular – i.e., followed the rule of Augustine
• Victorine emphases: sharing all things in common; charity; reason; reflection on trinitarian
dogma.
12th century humanism

• Growth of church-schools and cathedrals

• Influx of classical texts – primarily of Aristotle and a rich Muslim commentary tradition

De Trinitate
• Focused on the first half of the Athanasian Creed:
Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the catholic faith. Which faith unless every one do keep
whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. And the catholic faith is this: that we worship one God in
Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; neither confounding the Persons, nor dividing the Essence. For there is one Person of the
Father; another of the Son; and another of the Holy Ghost. But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost, is all one; the Glory equal, the Majesty coeternal. Such as the Father is; such is the Son; and such is the Holy
Ghost. … For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity; to acknowledge every Person by himself to be God and
Lord; So are we forbidden by the catholic religion; to say, There are three Gods, or three Lords. The Father is made of
none; neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone; not made, nor created; but begotten. The Holy Ghost is
of the Father and of the Son; neither made, nor created, nor begotten; but proceeding. … And in this Trinity none is
before, or after another; none is greater, or less than another. But the whole three Persons are coeternal, and coequal. So that
in all things, as aforesaid; the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped. He therefore that will be
saved, let him thus think of the Trinity.

• This statement is held in the most firm way to believe a thing: by faith – but Richard wants to
know if it can be held by the other two ways of believing: sensing and reasoning
• “…we must always hasten toward a deeper and more profound understanding and pursue it with
every effort and with supreme diligence, so that we may be able to advance daily toward an
understanding of what we hold by faith.” (1.3)
 • Anselmian goals of faith seeking understanding, through necessary reasons (fides quaerens
intellectum via necessarias rationes)
• But always an act of “ardent love” to “seek the face of my Lord”

The argument for the necessity of the Trinity

In 4 main stages, Richard argues for: 1) a single divine substance; 2) at least two divine persons; 3) at
least three divine persons; 4) against four divine persons

Stage one – The divine substance

Single divine substance
Employing a novel cosmological argument, Richard argues that there exists exactly one uncaused
substance.(Bk. I.6-10),
Argument for single divine substance
1. Every possible thing is either eternal or begins to exist in time.
2. Every possible thing either has its being from itself or from a source other than itself.
3. Therefore, every possible thing is either: (i) from itself and from eternity; (ii) from eternity but
not from itself; (iii) neither from itself nor from eternity.
We ought to begin from the kind of realities, about which we can in no way doubt; and through those truths, which we
know through experience, we ought to conclude by reasoning what is necessary for us to think concerning those truths that
are above experience. (1.7)
Argument for a se reality
4. There are things which are neither from themselves nor from eternity (‘contingent reality’).
5. Contingent reality must be caused.
6. If there was nothing which is both from itself and from eternity (‘a se’), then there would be no
cause of contingent reality.
7. If there was no cause of contingent reality, then contingent reality would not exist.
8. But contingent reality does exist.
9. Therefore, necessarily, something a se exists.
In book three Richard will move to the necessity of three Persons. But well before that, he gives an
argument for the possibility of divine Persons proceeding from the a se Person:
It should not seem impossible that there was some being from eternity which is not from itself…What then? Will it be
necessary that that superexcellent nature does not have and cannot have any operation of nature? Will that nature which
gave the fruit of fertility to our nature remain absolutely sterile in itself? And will that nature which bestowed reproduction
to others be sterile and without reproduction?...it seems probable, that in that superessential immutability there is some
being (aliquod esse) which is not from itself and from eternity. (DT 1.9)
10. In created reality a being produces existence by a natural operation.
11. If created reality has natural production, then, possibly, the supreme cause has natural
production.
• Textbook example of analogical reasoning: supposes that the ultimate cause of contingent reality
shares at least some characteristics with its creation.
• Metaphysics of participation: which every effect is contained somehow in its ultimate cause. The
Superexcellent Nature (superexellenti natura) created beings like the sun, and the sun naturally and
 necessarily produces likenesses of itself. That excellence – i.e., the necessary production of a
likeness – must somehow be present in the superexcellent nature.

The divine substance has charity

DT 3.2 – Supreme Charity
12. Necessarily, God has every perfection supremely.
13. Charity is the greatest perfection.
14. Therefore, necessarily, God has the fullness of charity.
Next,
15. Other-love is necessary for charity.
16. At least two persons are necessary for other-love.
17. Therefore, at least two persons are necessary for charity.
An objection:
Even if there were one person alone in the true divinity, nevertheless he would still be able to have, or he would have, charity
toward his creation.

• Responds by employing the notion of ordered charity (caritas ordinate)

18. If God supremely loves someone who is unworthy of supreme love, then God’s charity would
be disordered.
19. It is impossible for God’s love to be disordered.
20. Therefore, God could not have supreme charity for a person unworthy of supreme charity.
21. A created person is unworthy of supreme charity.
22. Therefore, God could not have supreme charity for a created person.

Stage Two – Necessity of Two Divine Persons

Three arguments for the necessity of at least two divine persons, using the notions of goodness,
happiness, and glory.
The argument for plurality from goodness (3.2)
23. Necessarily, a divine person has perfect charity.
24. To have perfect charity, a divine person must love another as much as he loves himself.
25. A divine person’s self-love is supreme.
26. Therefore, a divine person must love another person supremely.
27. Only a divine person is worthy of supreme love.
28. Therefore, a divine person must love another divine person.
29. Therefore, there are at least two divine persons.

The first argument for plurality from happiness (3.3)

30. A divine person is supremely happy.
31. Supreme pleasantness (jocunditas) is necessary for supreme happiness.
32. Supreme charity is necessary for supreme pleasantness.
 33. At least two divine persons (a giver of love and a receiver) are necessary for supreme charity.
34. Therefore, there are at least two divine persons.

The second argument for plurality from happiness (3.3)

35. Necessarily, a divine person has perfect charity.
36. For his charity to be perfect, a divine person must have other-love equal to his self-love.
37. A divine person’s self-love is supreme.
38. Therefore, a divine person must love another with supreme love.
39. Only a divine person is worthy of supreme love.
40. Therefore, a divine person must love another divine person.
41. Therefore, necessarily, there are at least two divine persons.

The argument for plurality from glory (3.4)

42. If there is only one divine person (‘DP1’), then he has no other with whom to share all his
perfection.
43. If DP1 has no other with whom to share all his perfection, then either DP1 is unable to share, or
is unwilling.
44. DP1 is not unable to share all his perfection.
45. DP1 is not unwilling to share all his perfection.
46. Therefore, DP1 is willing and able to share all his perfection.
47. Therefore, DP1 shares all his perfection.
48. DP1 can only share all his perfection with another divine person.
49. Therefore, there are at least two divine persons.
• The heart of this argument is the dilemma which forces the objector to choose between God’s
inability to share, or his unwillingness.

Stage Three – Necessity of Three Divine Persons

Before turning to the necessity of three divine persons, Richard spends some time on their full equality
and full unity. (3.6-11)

• Response to Abelard and Roscelin

The argument for three divine persons from goodness (3.11)

50. Supreme charity is entirely perfect.
51. A person’s desire that his beloved love another, third person, is a perfection of love.
52. Necessarily, divine persons have supreme charity.
53. Therefore, DP1 desires that DP2 love DP3.
54. Therefore, necessarily, there are at least three divine persons.

The argument for three divine persons from happiness (3.12)

55. If there are only two divine persons, then neither has a partaker of his excellent joy.
56. If neither of two divine persons has a partaker of his excellent joy, then either (i) one or both
cannot have a partaker, or (ii) one or both does not want a partaker.
57. But both (i) and (ii) are deficiencies (of divine power and goodness, respectively).
58. If a divine person was deficient, then the other person(s) would grieve.
 59. But, necessarily, divine persons are supremely happy.
60. Therefore, both divine persons are able and willing to have a partaker of their joy.
61. Therefore, necessarily, there are at least three divine persons.
• when lover S1’s love is requitted by S2, then S1 experiences joy; this joy is distinct from a
person’s love for his beloved. That is, DP1’s joy is a result of his loving and being loved by DP2,
and so cannot be part of that love.

The argument for three divine persons from glory (3.13)

62. If a divine person were unable to have a co-beloved, then he would have a cause for shame.
63. If DP1 or DP2 has a cause for shame, then he does not have the fullness of glory.
64. But, necessarily, divine persons do have the fullness of glory.
65. Therefore, DP1 and DP2 are able to have a co-beloved.
66. Therefore, necessarily, there are at least three divine persons.
• Premise 65 speaks of the ability to have a co-beloved. That ability does not just refer to the
power to love a third, but to the power and desire to love a third. If a divine person were missing
either the power or will to love a third, then he would be unable to have a co-beloved.
Richard summarizes his work in the first three stages:
if […] we acknowledge that any one person in the true divinity is of a benevolence so great that he desires to have none of
those riches or delights that he refuses to share, of a power so great that nothing is impossible for him, and of a happiness so
great that nothing is difficult for him, then, consequently, it is necessary to confess that there cannot be lacking a Trinity of
divine persons.” (3.14)
Taking himself to have established solid reasons for believing three persons necessarily exist in divinity,
Richard moves to his final stage, arguing that there cannot be four or more.

Stage Four – Impossibility of Four Divine Persons

Richard gives two arguments against the possibility of four (or more) divine persons: one from the
notion of processions, and one from an analysis of charity.

Argument against four divine persons from processions

The argument from processions is quite long, developed throughout Bk. V.1-15. We may outline the key
moves in a six-step argument,
67. There is at least one, and no more than one, divine person who only gives being to other divine
persons.
68. There is at least one, and no more than one, divine person who only receives being from other
divine persons.
69. There is at least one, and no more than one, divine person who both gives and receives being
from other divine persons.
70. If there is a fourth divine person, he would either (i) only give being to other divine persons, (ii)
only receive being from other divine persons, or (iii) both give and receive being from other
divine persons.
71. But (i), (ii), and (iii) are impossible for a fourth divine person.
 72. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a fourth divine person.
• Premise 67 is supported by three sub-arguments (Bk. V.3): (i) a cosmological argument, (ii) an
argument from the Platonic chain of being, and (iii) an argument from a vicious infinite regress.

• Richard next shows that there is only one such person: all other beings must come from DP1
because he is self-existing. But if all other beings – both actual and possible – come from DP1,
then no other being can have the property ‘only gives being’: only DP1 gives being and does not
receive it. This mode of being is incommunicable (incommunicabilis existentia), it cannot be shared
with any other person. Giving being to others is DP1’s distinguishing, or ‘personal’, property.
• Premise 68 continues with the impossibility of an infinite series. If there were no divine person
who only receives being, then there would be an infinite number of divine persons, each giving
existence to the next one down the line. But Richard rejects the possibility of an actual infinite
series.
• Richard applies the principle of maximal unity to argue why there can be only one person who
only receives being. If there were several divine persons who only receive being but do not give
it, then those persons would not be ‘immediately’ united with each other. For example, if DP3
and DP4 both receive being but do not give it, then they do not share anything with each other.
Without sharing with one another, DP3 and DP4 cannot supremely love one another. But divine
persons do love one another supremely; therefore there cannot be two (or more) persons who
only receive being – there can only be one such person.
• Premise 69 argues for a middle term between the previous two, i.e., a divine person who both
receives and gives being: there are only two divine inter-personal causal relations: giving being,
and receiving it. Therefore, there are only three possible modes of being: (i) giving alone, (ii)
receiving alone, and (iii) both giving and receiving. We have seen that DP1 only gives and that
DP3 only receives. Therefore DP2 must have the last remaining mode, receiving and giving
being.
• To show why there cannot be a fourth person sharing DP2’s mode of being, Richard employs an
aesthetic argument. If there are four (or more) divine persons, then some of them share more in
common than others:
Personal Property
DP1 Gives being
DP2 Gives being & Receives being
DP3 Receives being

Personal Property
DP1 Gives being
DP2 Gives being & Receives being
DP4 Gives being & Receives being
DP3 Receives being

• Three divine persons each have exactly one property in common with any other. DP1 and DP3
have in common the property of ‘having only one property’ (in Richard’s words, they ‘gaze at
one another as opposites.’1).

1
Trin., V.14 (Evans, p. 307; Ribaillier, pp. 211-212, l. 8-11).
 • If there are four persons, then DP2 and DP4 share two properties with each other, while sharing
only one with DP1 and DP3. In this scenario, DP2 and DP4 share a closer kinship with one
another than with the others. Such a scenario is morally dubious and mathematically incongruous
and, therefore, not supremely beautiful.
• Premises 70-72 complete the processions argument. Step 4 iterates the three possible modes of
being, which we already saw in 69. 71 explains that any person with one of the three possible
modes of being would be identical to one of the first three persons. If DP4 existed, then he
would be identical to DP1, DP2, or DP3 – in other words, DP4 would not actually be a distinct
person, but be one of the other three. Therefore, as 72 concludes, DP4 is impossible.

Argument against four divine persons from charity

Richard finishes The Argument with an analysis of love, summarized this way,
73. There are only three possible modes of other-love: (i) gratuitous, (ii) owed, (iii) both gratuitous
and owed.
74. DP1 alone has only gratuitous love.
75. DP3 alone has only owed love.
76. DP2 alone has both gratuitous and owed love.
77. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a fourth divine person.
Love is gratuitous when someone gladly bestows love to a person from whom he did not receive any favors. Love is owed
when someone requites nothing but love to the person from whom he freely receives it. And love is a combination of both
when by loving in both ways a person freely receives love and freely bestows it. (5.16)

• Gratuitous (gratuitus) love is given to the beloved not in response to anything the beloved had
previously given. Owed (debitus) love is the love requited in response to gratuitous love.
Richard identifies the divine persons with their mode of loving,
Surely each of the three divine persons and their love are not distinct things? Surely, for each of these persons, being is not
distinct from loving, nor is loving distinct from being?...Therefore, for any of the three, their person will be identical to their
love… (5.20)

• Employs divine simplicity to argue that each person is his mode of loving; therefore a fourth
divine person would just be identical to one of the first three.