Asian Journal of Peacebuilding Vol. 11 No.

2 (2023): 311-329
doi: 10.18588/202311.00a392 Perspective

Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup, Its Impact on

Domestic Politics, and a Revolutionary Road
to Democratization?

Narayanan Ganesan

The Myanmar military staged a coup against the elected civilian government in
February 2021. Since then, the country has been in a state of emergency and ruled
by a military junta. Resistance to the coup was swift and widespread, beginning with
the Civil Disobedience Movement that has now morphed into the People’s Defense
Forces. A state of civil war has remained for well over two years now, reversing the
previous trend toward democratic transition. Nonetheless, the democratic interlude
has spawned strong resistance to military rule. The armed conflict and contestation
for power looks set to continue into the medium term and may eventually lead to
domestic political changes toward democratization.

Keywords Myanmar, State Administration Council, Civil Disobedience Movement,

National Unity Government, People’s Defense Forces, Ethnic Armed
Organizations

Introduction
The Myanmar military led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup
against the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led elected government in
February 2021. Since then, the country has been wracked by political violence
and members of the ousted government have gone on to form a National Unity
Government (NUG) in exile. Widespread resistance to the coup in the form of
a Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) has partly morphed into the People’s
Defense Forces (PDFs) at the urging of the NUG. The ensuing widespread
fighting and contested legitimacy has led to a situation where most observers
think that a negotiated settlement between the military and its detractors is
no longer feasible. Interviews with members of the Myanmar diaspora from
Singapore, Thailand, and the United States indicate strong support for the
NUG and a desire to permanently rid the country of military rule. The dozen

© 2023 The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University
ISSN 2288-2693 Print, ISSN 2288-2707 Online
312 Narayanan Ganesan

interviewees were chosen from a pool of Myanmar academics based abroad,

active public office bearers during the democratic transition period, and
Myanmar professionals who left the country after the coup.
Prior to the 2021 coup, Myanmar underwent a seemingly democratic
transition for a decade from 2011 onward, when the military junta in power then
paved the way for a national election in November 2010. That first election was
won by the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) after the
NLD refused to compete in the elections on account of having been deprived
power following its own victory in 1990. Therefore, the 2011 government was
led by ex-military officers with President Thein Sein as the head of government.
Following the NLD’s reregistration as a party and having won forty-three out of
forty-five seats in the 2012 by-elections, it entered parliament as an opposition
party and further strengthened its widespread support base to win the 2015
elections. Led by Aung San Suu Kyi, its popular leader, the party won the elections
again in 2020 by an even larger margin. Conversely, the USDP was weakened and
failed to serve the electoral aspirations of the military. It was against the backdrop
of this humiliating defeat that the military staged a coup citing widespread fraud
albeit international monitors judged the process to be credible.
The literature on democratization and democratic consolidation does
suggest that the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is
neither linear nor irreversible. In fact, countries like Nigeria and Pakistan serve as
prime examples of regression and return to military rule. There is now a growing
body of literature on democratic consolidation and backsliding in Asia (Sridharan
2012; Hanley and Cianetti 2021). There has also been a focus on the importance
of structural conditions and constitutionalism as a means of establishing and
maintaining democracies in Asia (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015; Davis 2017).
In fact, many of the reasons for Myanmar’s backslide into a return to military
authoritarianism was the result of structural deficits in the 2008 Constitution that
was crafted by military strongman General Than Shwe prior to his retirement
(Ganesan 2021). That document empowered the military and allowed it to
maintain a 25 percent bloc presence in the otherwise democratically elected
parliament. It also forbade parliamentary oversight on the military and civilian
supremacy—widely regarded as a key feature of civil-military relations favoring
democratic governance. In fact, contrary to that civilian democratic spirit, the
2008 Constitution sanctioned the overthrow of an elected government in the face
of a perceived threat to the nation or the Constitution itself (Taylor 2009, 498).
Hence, it is arguable that the NLD-led government, despite being democratically
elected, was unable to further the country’s democratization. Unlike the first five
years during the Thein Sein government when Suu Kyi was able to interact with
ranking military officers, she was unable to do so with General Min Aung Hlaing
who operated out of his military compound. During its term of office from 2015
to 2020, the NLD attempted to revise the Constitution and gradually decrease
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 313

military representation in parliament. However, its attempts were thwarted by the

military that opposed the revisions, making such efforts futile.
This article details the current situation in Myanmar domestic politics, more
than two years since the coup. It argues that the course of democratization has
been totally reversed but that the democratic interlude from 2011 to 2020 had
a profound impact on the country’s population. The interlude has led most of
the population to reject a return to military rule. This rejection is manifested
in both the ongoing civil conflict between the military and the PDFs and the
determination of the latter to secure victory through force of arms. Members of
the Myanmar diaspora abroad are supportive of the NUG and deeply involved in
raising funds for the fight against the military. Consequently, the ongoing conflict
is likely to be long and drawn out with contestation for power and control of
territory.
The article is divided into five major sections. The first section briefly traces
the country’s political history and the involvement of the military in governance
since independence. The second section identifies the major post-coup develop­
ments with a focus on the CDM, NUG, and PDFs. The third section documents
the areas where the conflict is the most intense and the fallout from it, including
the large number of casualties and displaced persons. The next section examines
the fate of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) that the previous govern­
ments had undertaken to end conflict with a certain number of Ethnic Armed
Organizations (EAOs) and how it has unraveled. The fifth and final section
identifies the likely future trajectory of the situation and ends with a brief
conclusion.

Background to the Coup

Certain developments that occurred during the tenure of the NLD-led govern­
ment from 2016 to 2020 laid the groundwork for the military’s unhappiness with
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Some of these reasons involved the popularity
of Suu Kyi and the NLD while others derived from policies associated with the
government that seemingly alienated the military. Then there were challenges
to governance from armed groups that tested the military and placed it in a
defensive position.
There is little doubt that the popularity of Suu Kyi and her leadership of
the NLD rattled the military, and Min Aung Hlaing in particular. Suu Kyi was
widely held in high regard throughout the country and scores of people turned
up wherever she went. Popularly worshipped as Ameh or mother in the Bamar
language, Suu Kyi commanded loyalty with an almost cult like status. Having
been barred from holding the office of the President on account of her husband
and children holding foreign citizenship, the office of State Counselor was crafted
314 Narayanan Ganesan

for her to wield power. Accordingly, appointees to the office of President were
her handpicked confidants as well. The 25 percent appointed military officers
in parliament stood up in unison to protest the creation of her office of State
Counselor to indicate their strong displeasure (Ganesan 2021, 400). Additionally,
the NLD’s legal advisor who was responsible for helping to create the office was
assassinated in broad daylight at Yangon international airport returning from a
trip to Indonesia. A constitutional lawyer by profession, Ko Ni was also rumored
to be planning ways to overcome the rule to bypass the military appointees to
amend the 2008 Constitution with a view to reducing the percentage of appointed
military Members of Parliament—one that the military had sworn to protect
(Mizzima 2017). The Constitution was often cited to justify Min Aung Hlaing’s
actions that would have otherwise been regarded as undemocratic.
The NLD and Suu Kyi understood that the strengthening of democracy
in Myanmar required amending the 2008 Constitution to gradually phase out
appointed military representatives. Accordingly, parliamentary committees were
created and assigned to the task of identifying clauses in the Constitution that
were undemocratic and sought to amend them (San 2020). The efforts came to
naught, though, since the military vetoed the proposals. In fact, such proposals
would never have been ratified by parliament since the process requires a super
majority of 75 percent of the Members of Parliament to vote in favor of it. The
military had always voted as a bloc to secure its own corporate interests. Suu Kyi
was keen to remove what was effectively the military’s veto power on constitu­
tional amendments. This power allowed the military to oppose and deflect policies
that were not in its corporate interests. However, going through the process
sent a clear signal to the population that the NLD regarded the Constitution
as undemocratic. Even during the 2020 election campaign, one of the NLD’s
campaign platforms was amending the Constitution. Such actions made it clear
to the military that Suu Kyi was not prepared to work within the framework
of military dominance over the political process. This constant targeting of the
Constitution alienated the military that regarded it as sacrosanct. Additionally,
General Min Aung Hlaing remained independent from parliament and never
cooperated with it.
Two of the NLD’s other actions infuriated the military. The first of these was
the government’s refusal to convene the National Defense and Security Council
(NDSC) that had a membership of eleven persons drawn from the government
and the military. The military clearly signaled its desire that the NDSC should
have been convened when it regarded situations as threatening the country’s
national security. However, doing so would have allowed the military to declare
a state of emergency and bypass the parliament since it held a majority of six
out of the eleven seats in the NDSC. Hence, throughout the NLD’s five-year
term of office from 2016 to 2020, the NDSC was never convened, even at the
height of the crisis with the violence against the Rohingya Muslims and their
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 315

flight to neighboring Bangladesh in 2017. Similarly, the Arakan Army fought

strongly against the military in 2019 in Rakhine State after moving from Kachin
State, despite retaining its headquarters in Laiza. The NLD-led government only
allowed for the declaration of a state of emergency in affected townships rather
than the entire state. It knew then that it would lose control of a state under a
state of emergency when administrative power would be handed to the military.
In fact, it was known that Suu Kyi’s advisers on security matters were not from
the military (author’s interview with senior official from the Myanmar Peace
Centre’s Peace Monitoring Mission, Yangon, January 5, 2020).1 She did, however,
benefit from the advice of some NLD members who were ex-military officers
and General Thura Shwe Mann, a high-ranking military officer who chose to
collaborate with Suu Kyi and the NLD-led government.
The military exercised administrative power in several ways. Firstly, and
most importantly, it controlled the Ministry of Home Affairs. Within that
ministry, the General Administration Department (GAD) held the highest-
ranking bureaucrats who controlled the various ministries. Importantly, many
of these ranking bureaucrats had been seconded from the Ministry of Defense
in mid-career. This was a tactic used by Generals Ne Win (who headed the first
military authoritarian government from 1962 to 1988) and Than Shwe to prevent
young officers from holding command positions over active troops and staging
a coup like what happened in Thailand in 1981 in the coup attempt against the
government of Prem Tinsulanond (Samudavanija 1982). A second strategy
was to tightly control the number of cadets recruited for officer training. The
Burmese practice of seconding officers also allowed the military to control the
civil bureaucracy and fuse its interest with those of the military. President Win
Min transferred the GAD from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Office of
the President in 2018. This transfer effectively brought the bureaucracy’s highest
echelon directly under the control of the government rather than the military (The
Irrawaddy 2018). The NLD did, however, appoint senior retired air force officer U
Min Thu to head the GAD after the transfer.
During the NLD-led government’s term, the military was engaged in counter
offensives against two major ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) that led to large
numbers of casualties on both sides. The first of these was against the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) for control of strategic high ground near the Kachin
Independence Organization’s (KIO) headquarters of Laiza. There were intense
battles in 2016 for control of such positions. The second major front was against
the Arakan Army (AA) during its relocation from Kachin State. In that instance
the battles were for control of territory in Chin and Rakhine States. The AA has
strong support within the Rakhine Buddhist community and the inhabitants
of the State have historically had center-periphery tensions against the central
government. Then there was a third widely criticized and indiscriminate offensive
in 2017 against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army that led to the displacement
316 Narayanan Ganesan

of more than 730,000 Muslims as refugees to Bangladesh. These battles left the
military in an uncompromising mood when dealing with the NLD and its refusal
to convene the NDSC.
All these developments collectively pitched the military against the NLD-led
government.2 The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was the extremely
poor showing of the USDP in the November 2020 elections. The overwhelming
popularity of the NLD a second time with an even higher victory margin clearly
meant that the military would have had to endure another five years with a
similar government with stronger legitimacy to boot. In the meantime, the
military’s hope of winning the polls through a political party had been dashed
beyond salvation. It was under such circumstances that the NLD was unable to
convene parliament in January 2021 with its senior leaders arrested. Subsequently,
it was learned that Min Aung Hlaing sought the resignation of President Win
Min but the latter had refused to. Soon afterwards, the military announced the
coup citing widespread electoral fraud that was not investigated causing a threat
to the country and Constitution.

Major Post-coup Developments—CDM, CRPH, NUG, and PDFs

The military coup was rejected by the general population at large. Early signs of
resistance to the coup included street protests and the banging of pots and pans.
When the military began to crack down on these protests, the CDM emerged.
The CDM was led, in particular, by the health and education sectors, and large
numbers of youth were involved in the Movement. As a result of the popularity
of the movement, many services in the public sector became adversely affected.
The imposition of wide-ranging sanctions by the international community led by
the United States and the European Union in response to the coup has included
restrictions on dual use technologies and targeting of senior military officers,
members of their families, and local business cronies. There is some indication
that the withdrawal of investments by large private sector companies, especially
from the oil and gas sector, has had more impact on the military regime, which is
accustomed to sanctions and international isolation (Patton 2023).
The SAC does have some major powers supporting it. Such countries include
China and Russia, in particular, while geographically proximate states like
India and Thailand have continued their bilateral relationship with Myanmar’s
post-coup military government. Such interactions help the SAC achieve some
international recognition and diplomatic support. Both China and Russia have
shielded Myanmar from criticism in international fora. China, that has always
had a strong and multifaceted bilateral relationship with Myanmar that provides
it with fossil fuels and hydroelectric power. China has also been the largest
investor in Myanmar for a long time now and views the country as an important
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 317

part of its belt and road strategy in mainland Southeast Asia (Ganesan 2018).
Additionally, Myanmar provides China with access to the Indian Ocean, which
is regarded as strategically important given the challenges that it faces in the
South China Sea with other major powers like the United States and Japan. The
northern EAOs have a strong relationship with China and this is especially true
of the Wa and Kokang ethnic groups. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), which
leads the Northern Alliance comprising seven EAOs, has often sought China’s
assistance in brokering peace talks with the Myanmar military (Ganesan 2017).
China has had a special envoy attending to Myanmar for some time now. In the
past it was Sun Guoxiang who was replaced by Deng Xijun in 2022.
The NLD gradually put together a group of parliamentarians that served
as the core of a government in exile. It was called the Committee Representing
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) in reference to the local parliament. The CRPH,
together with some EAOs, then went on to form the NUG which serves as the
official government in exile (Bangkok Post 2021). The NUG maintains a shadow
cabinet and issues statements regularly. It also has coordinators in many countries
that are home to the Myanmar diaspora like Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and
Singapore. Members of the diaspora regularly meet and arrange to raise funds for
the NUG. In early 2023, the NUG reported having raised $100 million by March
and had set a target of $250 million for the year. Singapore is a major source
of funding for the NUG where reportedly some 70 percent of funds are raised
(Thazin and Campbell 2023). A member of the local Myanmar Club (author’s
interview, Singapore, December 25, 2022) mentioned how the bank assigned to
receive the funds electronically was so overwhelmed with transactions that its
website crashed. Apparently, many Myanmar workers including those holding
jobs with modest wages like domestic helpers regularly contribute a significant
portion of their salaries to support the NUG and its activities.3 Fundraising
activities have included the sale of residential properties accumulated by the
military and proposed future residences when the country is liberated from
the SAC. Social media and word of mouth are said to be the main means of
communication among members of the diaspora.
The liberalization of the telecommunications industry by the Thein Sein
government has had a strong impact on the resistance to military rule. The
accompanying digital revolution has allowed Facebook to become the dominant
digital media platform against the SAC. Since Facebook is controlled from
Singapore it is well beyond the reach of the SAC and has even banned Myanmar
military pages from its platform. This technological instrument has strongly
helped the local population and migrant workers abroad to share information
and coordinate actions against the SAC.
In response to armed violence against the domestic population resisting the
SAC, in May 2021 the NUG called for defensive warfare against the military. It
then endorsed the preexisting PDFs. Since then, there has been a proliferation
318 Narayanan Ganesan

of such groups all over the country and many of them regularly stage attacks
against military convoys transporting soldiers, food, and fuel. The groups often
have fancy names like Black Peacock, Cobra Column, Eagle Defense Force, Hawk
Revolutionary Squad, Lion Commando Column, and Urban Owls. Animal
names seem to be popular and many of them also reference their area of control
and operation. The attacks have become much more sophisticated over time
including the use of drones to attack military installations and camps.
A measure of the PDFs’ success is the fact that the military has taken many
casualties and mostly controls the major roads, towns, and garrisons while the
PDFs and EAOs control the great majority of villages in their area of operation.
This year (2023) has been designated as the year when the PDFs hope to score
significant victories against the SAC and have begun offensive operations against
military camps. The most intensive fights have occurred in Chin, Karen, and
Kayah States and Magwe and Sagaing regions. Additionally, the armed struggle
persists within the majority Bamar ethnic community. This is a rather new and
important development since attempts to form Bamar armed groups have failed
after 1988. Hence, this dynamic truly has the potential to provide a strong boost
to interethnic collaboration against military rule. Such a united front has far
greater potential to succeed in a country traditionally wracked by interethnic
distrust and conflict.
Apart from such attacks, the PDFs also have urban units that regularly
target prominent officials and appointees of the SAC. High profile targets have
included the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank and the Deputy Director
of the Union Election Commission (Than Thit 2023). Additionally, the PDFs
have successfully managed to cooperate with some of the major EAOs to obtain
training from them and collaborate on attacks against the military. Such groups
have included the Chin National Front, KIA, Karen National Union (KNU),
Karenni National Progressive Party, and their allied military groups. The SAC,
on the other hand, relies on its militia units as well as armed groups (called
Pyu Saw Htee) to engage the PDFs and control territory. It has also gazetted
organizations resisting the SAC like CDM, CRPH, NUG, and PDFs as terrorist
(Eleven Newsmedia 2021). The PDFs are not without their own internal problems
and there have been accusations of the larger groups committing violence against
smaller ones (Frontier Myanmar 2023). Additionally, many of them operate
rather independently and are not always coordinated or in sync with the NUG
(Lintner 2023). This problem of maintaining control and consolidating gains was
flagged by interviewees who are involved in raising funds for the NUG (author’s
interview with NUG fundraiser, Singapore, March 4, 2023).
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 319

Civil Conflict, Casualties, and Displacement

For more than two years now Myanmar has been wracked by violence. Both the
SAC and the NUG regard each other as enemies to be defeated through force of
arms. In this regard, the consensus is that the window has closed for any sort of
negotiated settlement. The United Nations (UN) Special Envoy for Myanmar,
Noeleen Heyzer, openly made this judgement call after her last visit to meet
with Min Aung Hlaing in March 2023 (Besheer 2023). In light of her inability
to influence the ongoing negative political developments in Myanmar the UN
announced that she will step down from her appointment when it expires on June
12, 2023. Interviewees from the Myanmar diaspora generally felt the same way
and foresaw protracted conflict for the medium term.4 The military, to minimize
its losses of personnel and equipment, has increasingly resorted to the use of
fighter aircraft and attack helicopters to engage the PDFs and EAOs. The regular
razing of villages perceived to be allied with the NUG has also led to significant
displacement of civilians.
In terms of absolute numbers, a report from the Peace Research Institute
Oslo indicates that at least 6,337 civilians have been killed since the coup in
February 2021 (Min Zaw Oo and Tennesson 2023). Then there are internally
displaced persons that the UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs estimates at
approximately 1.8 million persons (Eleven Newsmedia 2023). There are an
additional approximately 18,000 political detainees in the prisons, according
to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, which keeps track of the
numbers of dead and detained citizens. These numbers are staggering and keep
increasing all the time. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to the displaced
has also become an issue. The UN and Japan’s Nippon Foundation has long aided
displaced persons. The latter is the vehicle of Yohei Sasakawa who was appointed
as the Special Envoy of the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in
Myanmar by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2013 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan 2015). Since then, Sasakawa has been active with various efforts in Japan
and, in late 2022, successfully helped reaffirm the truce between the AA and the
Myanmar military that was orally agreed to in October 2020 before the election
(Sai Wansai 2022).
The Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN), which convened a meeting
in Jakarta shortly after the coup in April 2021, came up with the Five Point
Consensus plan that was aimed at the cessation of violence, consultations with
all stakeholders, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the appointment and visit
of a special envoy representing the regional organization (to be discussed later).
In fact, the attempted delivery of humanitarian aid after a long wait, to serve as
an ice breaking gesture to Taunggyi in the Southern Shan States, failed after the
convoy was attacked and had to abort the mission in May 2023 (The Irrawaddy
320 Narayanan Ganesan

2023a). Thailand, which regards itself as the country most affected by the
situation in terms of refugees and migrants, appointed its own special envoy and
began brokering talks with the SAC in December 2022 at a meeting in Bangkok (to
be discussed later). Thailand is also dependent on migrant labor and fossil fuels
from Myanmar that are essential for its economy.

Collapse of Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

During the democratic transition from 2011 onward, succeeding governments
attempted to consolidate the peacemaking process with the EAOs. These
attempts had been made on a piecemeal basis since 1988 when the military tried
to stave off multiple challenges to its legitimacy. These challenges included the
8888 Uprising for democracy that was violently suppressed and the collapse of
the Burmese Communist Party. The latter led to the formation of many EAOs
representing the Wa and Kokang ethnic groups located close to the border with
China. The Thein Sein government inaugurated the Myanmar Peace Centre in
2012 and appointed a lead negotiator to oversee the efforts. This attempt partly
paid off when eight out of the sixteen EAOs that the government engaged in
negotiations signed on to a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October
2015, just before the election. The NCA was celebrated with great fanfare in
the capital Naypyitaw and many senior diplomats that included UN Secretary
General Ban Ki Moon witnessed the signing. The KNU that signed on to the NCA
served as the anchor to the agreement which was regarded as a real breakthrough
since it is a large EAO with a sizeable army that has engaged the military since the
time of political independence. Nonetheless, other large and important EAOs like
the KIA/O (whose bilateral ceasefire agreement collapsed in June 2011) and the
UWSA (that opted out of the process) were not part of the NCA.
Then, after Suu Kyi’s NLD-led government took control of parliament in
2016 it managed to add two more EAOs to the original list and increased the
number of groups to ten. The Myanmar Peace Centre was then renamed the
National Reconciliation and Peace Centre and Suu Kyi appointed her own
personal physician, Dr. Tin Myo Win, as the lead interlocutor. However, little
progress was achieved beyond the two additional groups that signed on to the
NCA. In fact, the NCA was being sidelined even by the groups that had signed it
since little progress was made and, under the NLD-led government, the military
often dealt with the EAOs independently. Hence, unlike the previous government,
the NLD’s policies towards the EAOs were not coordinated with the military
(Ganesan 2021). It then appeared as if there were three parties with independent
positions in the process. The NCA itself was fraying, too, and KNU units were
beginning to engage the military again in Karen State.
More recently, the KNU has openly called for an end to military rule in the
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 321

country (The Irrawaddy 2023b). This pronouncement is especially significant

since the KNU anchored the NCA, as mentioned earlier. This development means
that the NCA has effectively ended with the attendant consequences of renewed
fighting. The KIA and the KNU are the two largest EAOs after the UWSA
that has essentially argued for the continuation of its earlier bilateral ceasefire
arrangement signed in 1989 with the collapse of the Burmese Communist Party.
Additionally, both groups have been at the forefront of training for the PDFs and
conducting joint operations with them. In this regard, members of the Bamar
majority ethnic group are now cooperating with the EAOs against the military.
While the ongoing situation appears to have led to better relations between
a Bamar majority that is opposed to military rule and the EAOs, how long or
sustained such collaboration will last remains to be seen. The majority-minority
divide is a very old and deeply ingrained one in Myanmar that has previously
been exploited by the military.5 Nonetheless, at least for now, the PDFs appear to
be benefiting from the experience and training provided by the EAOs, while the
NCA has collapsed.

Likely Future Trajectory of Developments

As the situation stands at the time of writing, Myanmar is mired in deep conflict.
The evidence thus far is that morale is high in the NUG and among members
of the Myanmar diaspora abroad who support and fund it. For the first time in
the country’s history an EAO-led armed challenge to the military has evolved in
Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, and Chin States. Magwe and Sagaing regions are also areas
with strong resistance to the military together with parts of the Shan States. The
sentiment that the citizens of the country do not wish to live under a military
authoritarian regime appears strong. Those who have taken up arms as members
of the PDFs have also learned to work alongside the ethnic minorities. With
neither the NUG nor the SAC seemingly prepared to negotiate and bring an end
to the armed conflict, the situation is likely to persist for the medium term.
Most members of the Myanmar diaspora who were interviewed are of the
opinion that the SAC will try to remain in power at any cost. It was thought that
unless the ground results indicate more than overwhelmingly a military loss
in the fight against the PDFs, the SAC will not stand down from its policy of
achieving its goals through armed violence. The SAC does have China and Russia
for international diplomatic support. Additionally, both countries also supply the
SAC and military with weapons. More recently, Russia has increasingly supplied
Myanmar with fighter aircraft and attack helicopters that have been used when
the military is involved in large scale attacks or to extricate its personnel from
PDF and EAO attacks (Ganesan 2022). A senior interviewee (author’s interview
with NUG fundraiser, Singapore, March 4, 2023) noted that the strategic goal of
322 Narayanan Ganesan

the NUG is to cut off the highway linking Yangon and Naypyitaw. The isolation
of Naypyitaw together with its SAC-linked elite and families is seen as another
situation under which the SAC may come to the negotiating table.
There are ongoing external efforts at mediation although it is unclear whether
such efforts will be successful. The first of these efforts is coordinated by the
ASEAN through its current chair, Indonesia. As early as April 2021, shortly after
the coup, ASEAN leaders met with Min Aung Hlaing in Jakarta and signed on
to the Five Point Consensus. Under the terms of this arrangement there was to
be an immediate end to the conflict, negotiations between all stakeholders, the
provision of humanitarian aid, the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy, and
the visit of the special envoy to Myanmar. However, the Five Point Consensus
has come to naught and previous special envoys from Brunei and Cambodia
have been unable to meet with all the local stakeholders, including, in particular,
Suu Kyi, who has now been sentenced to a thirty-three-year jail term for charges
brought against her by the SAC. Both the SAC and the NUG have neither the
interest nor the intention to work toward a ceasefire and negotiated settlement
and are keen on a military victory. Consequently, ASEAN’s early intervention has
been unsuccessful with divisions among member states on how to deal with the
situation (Rising and Cheang 2022). The organization’s current chair, Indonesia,
has pursued more quiet diplomacy and the country’s President Joko Widodo
and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi claim to have succeeded in negotiating
with all parties discreetly (Baharudin 2022). However, thus far no evidence of
such success has emerged. In fact, an ASEAN aid convoy with diplomats from
Indonesia and Singapore was attacked near Taunggyi in the Southern Shan States
while attempting to deliver much needed humanitarian aid through the ASEAN
Humanitarian Aid (AHA) Centre. A militia group allied with the SAC has been
blamed for the attack and the mission was aborted.
There is a second ongoing attempt by Thailand to broker a negotiated
settlement. This attempt began with a visit by the Thai Foreign Minister, Don
Pramudwinai, to Yangon in November 2021 and the appointment of a special
envoy, Pornpimol Kanchanalak, to coordinate the process. Since then, Thailand
has organized meetings with Myanmar non-governmental organizations based
in Thailand and Myanmar to broaden the contact base (Ganesan 2023). Perhaps
Thailand, which is the most directly affected by the Myanmar conflict in the
form of refugees and migrants, will be able to better deal with the situation.6
The country is also heavily reliant on fossil fuels from Myanmar, especially gas
from the offshore Yadana field in the Gulf of Martaban. Labor from Myanmar is
equally important in the agriculture and fisheries, construction, manufacturing,
and service sectors.7 Hence, the spillover effect of the conflict has created a
situation that requires a response. Additionally, Thailand has always preemptively
dealt with situations affecting it in mainland Southeast Asia, like its alliance with
the United States during the Second Indochina War to deal with the threat of
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 323

revolutionary communism from Vietnam. Then following the communist victory

and United States withdrawal from the region in 1975, it aligned with China to
secure an external guarantor to its safety and security (Paribatra 1987). Toward
the conclusion of the Third Indochina War, it was again Thailand that launched
a policy of friendship and economic development with Vietnam in 1988 under
the civilian government led by Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Hence,
the country has a long history of independently attending to its own national
security interests. While the Thai policy treats both the SAC and the NUG as well
as displaced Myanmar citizens fairly, it does confer legitimacy on the SAC, which
is anathema to ASEAN. According to a Thai National Security senior adviser
(author’s interview, Bangkok, February 27, 2023), Thailand hopes to be able to
reset its bilateral policy toward Myanmar on a more positive track like it did with
Vietnam in the 1990s.

Potential Longer-Term Problems

Most members of the Myanmar diaspora interviewed appear confident that with
the general support of the population at home and diaspora abroad it is simply
a matter of time before victory over the SAC is achieved. Nonetheless, they do
acknowledge that the victory will take time and even when achieved several
serious problems will persist. The first of these, which is as old as the country
itself, is territorial consolidation and control. Even if all the PDFs abide by the
directives of the NUG to relinquish territorial control in favor of more centralized
administration, it is unlikely that the EAOs will cede control of their territories.
While a federal and less centralized structure may persuade some of the EAOs
that are currently working alongside the PDFs, the groups that have remained
aloof from the NCA, like the Wa and the Kokang, are unlikely to cede control.
Those territories have evaded state control for a long time and are likely to
continue to do so (Davis 2022). Hence, even optimistic interviewees acknowledge
that the country may not retain its current territorial boundaries in the future.
Both internal boundaries between states and regions and even international
boundaries may be subjected to change.
The second major issue that needs to be addressed is the future of majority-
minority relations between the ethnic Bamar and the others. Bamar hegemony
has been a hallmark of previous governments, and while post-conflict settlement
is likely to treat the minorities and their leaders better, many minority groups
have deep and strong resentment against the Bamar for the suffering they have
endured as lesser citizens without any meaningful autonomy in their states or
homeland. This hatred had in the past been expressed even against Suu Kyi
notwithstanding her general popularity within the country. Similarly, there have
been accusations that some of the EAOs use Bamar members of the PDF as
324 Narayanan Ganesan

fodder when engaging the military. While such accusations may not be true, they
serve to highlight how minority perspectives are colored by their past experiences
that will, in turn, bear on their future judgements and willingness to cooperate
even within a federal structure. To many ethnic minorities and EAOs, federalism
simply involves their ability to exert control over their own kind within a specified
territory and retain their arms as well.8 Naturally, such a practice will simply be
unacceptable since security and foreign policy has always been the prerogative of
the central government even in the most liberal federal structural arrangements.
Conversely, there is also emerging evidence of greater interaction and social
cohesion between the Bamar majority and ethnic minorities in community-led
efforts of coping with the post-coup situation (Aung Tun 2022).
The final issue that was mentioned in the interviews is the role of the military.
While the SAC and military juntas of the past are reviled for their abuse of power
there is acknowledgement that the military has a legitimate role to protect the
country’s territoriality and sovereignty against foreign states and interests. The
need to construct a military that is subservient to a civilian government is viewed
as a necessity but one fraught with problems given the military’s past record
of simply usurping power through the force of arms (author’s interview with
members of the Myanmar Club, Singapore, March 4, 2023). The mention of these
problems does indicate some amount of foresight, although the focus of the NUG
and the PDFs for now is to simply defeat the SAC. Afterall, such a scenario must
first be obtained before there can be any form of a reconstituted state and state-
society relations.

Conclusion
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has led to widespread resistance and
conflict in the country. There is now a parallel NUG government in exile that
is determined to defeat the military junta in power. The NUG draws on elected
representatives from the NLD and the EAOs. Since May 2021, at the urging of
the NUG, armed groups called PDFs have sprouted all over the country. These
PDFs have successfully engaged the SAC and its allied militias in armed conflict.
In 2023 they have even started attacking military outposts and camps, leading to
significant territorial control. The involvement of members of the Bamar ethnic
majority in the resistance to military rule is a notable development and one that
has not occurred since the failure of the 1988 student-led uprising. Military
columns are regularly ambushed and attacked from the air through drones (Kyi
Sin 2023). The military has responded in turn with violence that has included
airborne attacks with fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships. The torching
of villages that are perceived to be supportive of PDFs has led to widespread
property damage. All in all, the ongoing conflict has led to many civilian
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 325

casualties and a staggering number of displaced persons. It has also led to the
collapse of the NCA that was supposed to end ethnic insurgency.
There appears to be little incentive for either the SAC or the NUG to work
towards a politically negotiated settlement of any kind. Both parties appear intent
on achieving their goals through armed conflict. Consequently, the situation
in Myanmar is closer to that of civil war and it is expected to be drawn out for
the next three to five years. Efforts to resolve the situation politically through
the efforts of ASEAN have been unsuccessful thus far. Thailand has initiated
its own bilateral policy to bring about internal political reconciliation as well.
The latter process is still ongoing and subject to recalibration depending on the
new government that comes into power after the recently concluded national
elections. Members of the Myanmar diaspora abroad are strongly supportive
of the NUG and have helped raise funds for the armed efforts against the SAC.
Nonetheless, there is no certainty which party will emerge victorious and how
the conflict will eventually be resolved. For now, it would appear that, for all
intents and purposes, the eventual outcome of the conflict will be determined by
the Myanmar people alone. The post-conflict situation will certainly throw up
new challenges associated with early statehood like territorial consolidation and
sovereignty.
The Myanmar case confirms that the transition from military authoritarian
rule to a democratic one is not unilinear and is subject to setbacks. In this
regard, the trajectory is a familiar one witnessed in countries like Nigeria and
Pakistan. In the Myanmar case democratic transition was thwarted in the main
by structural constraints associated with the 2008 Constitution that was crafted
by the military. Hence, structural conditions and constitutionalism were simply
lacking in the case of Myanmar for democratic consolidation as argued by Pop-
Eleches and Robertson (2015) and Davis (2017). Those constraints made it
impossible for the NLD-led government headed by Suu Kyi to even attempt to
amend the constitution to overcome them. The super majority of more than 75
percent of the parliamentary vote required for it was simply out of reach since the
military that controlled 25 percent of the seats always voted as a bloc to protect its
own corporate interests.
The widespread and determined resistance to the coup and the ongoing
conflict between the military and its opponents in the PDFs and the EAOs may
lead to the eventual displacement of the military from domestic politics. In this
regard, the decade-long democratic interlude has unleashed a common desire for
the return to democracy and away from military authoritarian rule. Hence, it is
arguable that the country’s political culture has been significantly altered in favor
of democratization. It has undergone a transformation from an observer culture
to a participatory one as Almond and Verba (1963) would have described it .
Systemic changes arising from this transformation augur the potential to achieve
democratization through negotiated settlement with a weakened or reformed
326 Narayanan Ganesan

military. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Suu Kyi will be part of
any post-conflict settlement. This observation is on account of her age and the
likely unwillingness of the PDFs and the EAOs to submit themselves to the sort of
top-down micromanagement that she was frequently accused of in the past.

Acknowledgements
Funding for this article was provided by a Peace Research Project Grant from the
Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University. The author would like
to thank Michael Montesano and the two anonymous referees for their useful
comments on earlier drafts of the article.

Notes
1. This opinion was first provided by a senior Myanmar scholar based in Yangon with
access to high-ranking public officials. It was subsequently confirmed by an adviser to both
the Myanmar Peace Centre and the National Reconciliation and Peace Center during an
interview on December 26, 2019.
2. This rift between the military and the NLD was confirmed by a senior adviser to the
Myanmar Peace Center (author’s interview, Yangon, January 5, 2020). He noted, however,
that the rift is never acknowledged in public.
3. It was mentioned that active funding by Myanmar migrant workers has allowed
fundraisers to nudge the NUG into better coordination and improve their profile.
Apparently, night life in Myanmar’s major cities is robust enough to serve as a distraction
for local youth in their opposition to the SAC (author’s interview with Myanmar Club
executive, Singapore, March 4, 2023).
4. This was the consensus of a dozen interviewees from the Myanmar diaspora based
in Singapore, Thailand, and the United States who have actively participated in or closely
monitored Myanmar’s domestic politics.
5. This was the view of a Kachin medical doctor (author’s interview, Bangkok, February
26, 2023) who arranged to treat refugees with assistance from the United States in the Thai
border town of Mae Sot.
6. This was the view of a senior adviser to the National Security Council of Thailand
(author’s interview, Bangkok, December 30, 2022).
7. This was the view of two Thai academics (author’s interviews, Bangkok, December 29
and 30, 2022 and March 3, 2023) who specialize in Myanmar and bilateral relations. One
of them noted the intensely personal nature of relations between the military elites in both
countries, including the relationship between Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and
General Min Aung Hlaing, while the other observed that Thai political elites underestimate
the domestic resistance to military rule in Myanmar.
8. Most negotiators from the Myanmar Peace Centre under the Thein Sein government
and the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre under the NLD-led government
 Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup 327

admitted that EAOs will always retain arms as a fallback position. There is a strong absence
of mutual trust between the EAOs and the military, and even during the democratic
interlude, EAOs formed political parties have taken advantage of the situation to further
their ethnic group interests rather than work toward complete political contestation
through elections.

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Narayanan Ganesan is Professor of Southeast Asian politics at the Graduate School of Peace Studies
at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University, Japan. His teaching and research interests
are on issues of intrastate and interstate conflict in Southeast Asia. His most recent major publication
is the edited book International Perspectives on Democratization and Peace (London: Elsevier, 2020).
Email: ganesan@hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

Submitted: June 02, 2023; Revised: August 27, 2023; Accepted: September 01, 2023