56

FLORENTINA VILLAHERMOSA, petitioner and appellant,

vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent
and appellee.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL LAW;

ClTIZENSHIP; "JUS SANGUINIS," AS PREDOMINATING
FACTOR.—After the Constitution, mere birth in the
Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother does not
ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship, and jus sanguinis
instead of jus soli is the predominating factor on questions of
citizenship.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MINOR CHILDREN OF MOTHERS WHO

ARE FILIPINO CITIZENS; WHEN TO BE DEEMED
FILIPINO CITIZENS.—Under paragraph 4, section 1, of
Article IV of the Constitution, minor children of mothers who
are citizens of the Philippines do not become Filipino citizens
until they shall have, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REPATRIATION OF FILIPINA;

EFFECT ON CHILDREN.—Commonwealth Act No. 63 does
not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her children
acquire Philippine citizenship.

4. ID.; ID.; DEPORTATION; POSTERIOR CHANGE OF

STATUS; EFFECT ON ALIEN'S LIABILITY FOR
DEPORTATION.—Any change of status after his illegal entry
can not affect the legality of an alien's detention for purposes
of deportation.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Rodas, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Victoriano V. Valle for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and
Solicitor Francisco Carreon for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of Honorable Sotero Rodas,

Judge of the Manila Court of First Instance, deny-

542

542 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

ing the writ of habeas corpus requested by Florentina

Villahermosa on behalf of her son Delfin Co, who is under
detention by the immigration authorities for purposes of
deportation.
In the night of March 24, 1947, a party of sixty-nine Chinese
landed clandestinely on the shores of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur,
in an attempt to evade our immigration laws. Leading them was
Delfin Co, a young man, 18 years old, born in Paniqui, Tarlac,
of a Chinese father named Co Suy, alias Yu Kui, and Florentina
Villahermosa his wife. Co Suy died in July, 1940, and in
February, 1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China on board
the S/S Cushman as a Chinese repatriate, in company with his
relative Co Chi Pe. However, due to financial difficulties in
China he took steps to return; but having met a Chinese (Co
Soon Tiong), who informed him of a plan to smuggle their
compatriots into this country, he agreed to lead the party to
Ilocos Sur where his mother had relatives who could render
valuable assistance. The voyage was undertaken; but
unfortunately, the immigrants were discovered and apprehended
immediately after arrival, and on the 27th day of March, Delfin
Co was examined by the Commissioner of Immigration. Formal
investigation of the case began on April 10, 1947. Four days
later, the corresponding board recommended that said Delfin Co
be deported to China as a Chinese citizen. The Commis-sioner
of Immigration agreed with the board, and, acting on this
recommendation, rendered a decision ordering deportation of
Delfin Co.
It appears that on April 29, 1947, Florentina Villahermosa,
after knowing the apprehension of her son Delfin, filed in the
civil registry of Tarlac under Commonwealth Act No. 63 an
oath of allegiance for the purpose of resuming her Philippine
citizenship which she had lost upon her marriage to Co Suy. On
the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
Florentina, it was contended before the immigration authorities
that Delfin, being a minor, followed the citizenship of

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VOL. 80, MARCH 31, 1948 543

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

his mother, and was a national not subject to deportation. These

contentions were overruled. They were repeated before the
court of first instance in this habeas corpus proceeding and were
likewise rejected. Appellant stresses the same defense.
There are two reasons why Delfin Co must be returned to
China. First, he is not now a Philippine citizen; and second,
granting that he is, at the time he entered this country from
China he was a Chinese subject to deportation, and any
subsequent change in his status can not erase the taint of his
unlawful, surreptitious entry.
Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those
who are citizens of the Philippines, as follows:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the

time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents
who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been
elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
 citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Delfin Co's claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all,

on paragraph 4 of the above section. But, being a minor he has
not had the opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship, and
therefore he is as yet an alien, his father being a Chinese.
1
We have heretofore held ( ) that, after the Constitution, mere
birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother
does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that jus
sanguinis instead of jus soli is the predominating factor on
questions of citizenship, thereby rendering obsolete the decision
in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., and U. S. vs. Lim
Bin, 36 Phil., and similar cases on which petitioner's counsel
relies.

________________

1 Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, No. 47616, September 16, 1947; 45 Off.
Gaz., 1269.

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544 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

Nevertheless, it is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being

a Filipina, Delfin Co should likewise be a Filipino.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon
repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine
citizenship. It would be illogical to consider Delfin as
repatriated like his mother, because he never was a Filipino
citizen and could not have reacquired such citizenship.
While his Chinese f ather lived, Delfin was not a Filipino.
His mother was not a Filipina: she was Chinese. After the death
of such father, Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until
she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April, 1947. After that
reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a Filipina
within the meaning of paragraph 4, section 1 of Article IV of
the Constitution; but, according to that same Organic Act, he
had to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority.
Until he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the
2
Chinese citizen that he was at the time of his father's demise ( ).
It does not help petitioner's case to assert that as a mother
she has a right to retain custody of her minor son and to keep
him here. Where such son has violated the immigration laws
and rendered himself liable to deportation no rule or principle
should frustrate the Government's action by the interposition of
the mother's right to custody. This consideration becomes
stronger where, as in this case, the re-assumption of Philippine
citizenship by Villahermosa has all the earmarks of an attempt
to impede the banishment of Delfin Co, who by the way,
besides being guilty of violating our laws, has not shown any
signs of eagerness to adopt our ways of life,

________________

2 The debates of the Constitutional Convention show that the child born of a
Filipino mother married to a foreigner "is not yet a Filipino" and "will be one. if
he prefers to be so upon reaching the age of majority". (Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 209.)

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VOL. 80, MARCH 31, 1948 545

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

This petition is moreover to be denied on the strength of

precedents heretofore established, because Delfin was a Chinese
when he arrived here; and any posterior change of status can not
affect the legality of his detention for purposes of deportation.
In Juan Co vs. Rafferty, 14 Phil., 235, a Chinaman claimed
the right to enter the Islands, and being refused by the customs
officials, gave bond that he would present himself for
deportation if the claim were disallowed. While under bond, he
was adopted as a son by another Chinaman domiciled herein, in
legal form. Held: He is subject to deportation, because such
adoption had no effect upon his right to enter or to remain in the
Islands. This Court said that the status of an immigrant and his
right to stay here is to be determined as of the time of his entry
(U. S. vs. Ju-Toy, 198 U. S., 253, 263) and that he could not do
afterwards anything to render valid what was originally an
illegal entry.

"A Chinese person, not a merchant at the time he applies to enter the
Islands, will not be permitted to remain here upon the theory that he
became a merchant during the time he was waiting f or the decision of
the proper authorities." (Tan Guam Sien vs. Collector of Customs, 31
Phil., 56.) (See also U. S. vs. Chan Sam, 17 Phil., 448.)

We declare that Delfin Co is not now a Filipino. We also declare

that he having entered this country surreptitiously is subject to
deportation.
The decision of the lower court denying his petition for
habeas corpus is affirmed. With costs.

Parás, Pablo, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

I hereby certify that the Chief Justice voted to affirm the

decision. PARÁS, J.

HILADO, J., concurring:

I concur in the foregoing decision. Besides, I will only point out

that petitioner, by the very purpose for which she filed the oath
of allegiance mentioned therein,

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546 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

made herself unworthy and disqualified to be repatriated under

Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Section 4 of said Act provides that repatriation shall be
effected by merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (now Republic of the
Philippines) and registration in the proper civil registry.
Allegiance requires the person pledging it, among other things,
to respect and obey the laws of the country to which the pledge
is made. But here the person taking the oath of allegiance did so
for the express purpose of legalizing, so to say, a most serious
violation of the immigration laws of the Philippines by her son:
An oath of allegiance taken for that end is, if anything, an
affront to the sovereign, besides the criminal responsibilities it
entails.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

The majority decision fails to abide by one of the elemental

rules of law, enunciated by human wisdom.
That rule is stated in article 18 of the Civil Code as f ollows:

"Children, while they remain under parental authority, have the

nationality of their parents."

That rule is reaffirmed by the Naturalization Law, No. 2927, as

amended by Act No. 3448. It provides that children under 20
years of age and residing in the Philippines shall become
citizens upon naturalization of their parents.
The rule is founded on human nature. Because minor
children depend on their parents for their sustenance, support
and protection, it stands to reason that they should follow the
nationality of said parents. They have to live under the same
roof with their parents and as near enough to them to enjoy
parental care and protection. Minor children have to follow
their parents wherever the latter, by political, moral, mental and
economic exigencies, have to establish their abode.
To accept the majority's position is to justify its inevitable
consequences, one of them being the possibility

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Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

of a fratricidal battle, should the nation of one happen to be at

war with that of the other. One shudders at the mere thought
that parents, as soldiers of one belligerent nation, should fire in
murderous battle against their own children fighting in the
enemy trenches, while the children aim their guns at the very
authors of their lives.
 There is unanimity of opinion that petitioner Florentina
Villahermosa is a Filipino citizen. There is no question that she
was born of Filipino parents in Lapog, Ilocos Sur, in March,
1905. She is living in Paniqui, Tarlac, the province of
Ambassador Romulo. Since her birth she has resided in the
Philippines. She never went to China. She is a widow. She is the
mother of Delfin Co, a minor of 18 years. She is the mother of
another minor named Benjamin Co, who is living with her.
There should not be any question that under the above
mentioned elemental rule of law and under express statutory
provisions, Delfin Co follows the nationality of his mother. His
mother is a Filipino citizen. Delfin Co is a Filipino citizen.
When on July 8, 1940, her Chinese husband died, Florentina
Villahermosa must have felt that she regained her Filipino
citizenship. She was ignorant of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, so she failed to file the oath of
allegiance required by it. Because her son came into trouble,
she happened to learn about the legal requirement on March 25,
1947, and took the oath which was filed on the 29th of the same
month with the civil registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac.
That the purpose of said oath of allegiance is, by her
repatriation, to keep her son at her side and within the folds of
this country, appears to have provoked some indignation, as if
petitioner has committed a crime or, at least, a reprehensible
act. There is absolutely no ground for taking such an attitude.
Petitioner had only exercised a right expressly granted to her by
law. The statutory provision does not deal with motives or pur-

548

548 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

poses. It is as impersonal as the constitutional provisions

guaranteeing fundamental rights without taking into
consideration the purposes and motives for the exercise of said
rights.
That petitioner had exercised a right expressly granted to her
by law f or the benefit of her son or f or the purpose of
protecting him against an action harmf ul to him, is only logical.
There is nothing objectionable in her taking advantage of the
law to give tangible expression to her maternal love, which is,
without any doubt, universally considered the most sublime
feeling nature has infused in human hearts. The feeling is so
elemental that it is not unknown even to the lowest phila of the
animal kingdom. That even the fiercest wild animals are not
devoid of such feeling is a wonder that cannot fail to move the
most indifferent person. Many perceive in that fact the
operation of an infinite intelligence taking care of all living
things.
That petitioner had only obeyed the mandates of nature, that
she yielded to an unconquerable feeling, the one most praised.
by moralists, defied by spiritual and religious leaders, the
subject of glowing eulogium in eloquent prose and inspired
poetry, whenever and. wherever liter ature has flourished,
instead of causing criticism, should only merit panegyric and be
acclaimed, she having followed the noblest impulses of her
nature.
Since his birth on May 31, 1928, Relfin Co has been a
resident of the Philippines until February 2, 1946, when,
probably yielding to the youthful lust for ad venture, without
the consent or knowledge of his mother, he stealthily went to
China. Having returned on March 24, 1947, to the Philippines,
his place of residence, It is only natural that he should want to
remain here and that his mother should exert all efforts so that
he should not go away again. By the repatriation of Florentina
Villahermosa, Delfin Co became ipso facto a Filipino citizen. As
a resident of the Philippines and as A Filipino citizen, he is
entitled to stay.

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VOL. 80, MARCH 31, 1948 549

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

The unfortunate fact that a character by the name of Co Soon

Tiong was able to persuade him to help smuggle a bunch of
Chinese into this country, by landing them in Lapog, Ilocos Sur,
in consideration of a free passage to the Philippines, is no
reason. to deprive him of the right to remain in the country of
which he is a resident and a citizen.
There are indications that he is entitled to more pity than
blame, by his failure to resist the wiles of a scheming person,
who took undue advantage of his immaturity. His anxiousness
to return to his country and be at his mother's side must have
been too strong for him to refuse a free passage, a mere pittance
when, as amply publicized, to secure entrance of Chinese
immigrants, middlemen or procurators earn thousands of pesos
per person.,
Did Delfin Co commit any crime or offense punishable by
law? If he did, let him be prosecuted and sentenced through due
process of law, and if deportation is the punishment provided by
law by competent courts of justice, let the judgment be rendered
and enforced. But it is admitted on all sides that there is no law
punishing the act of Delfin of rendering help to the smuggling
of a bunch of Chinese in question. If he did not commit any
crime or offense, only a subverted sense of justice may justify
punishing him with deportation.
We vote, with the revocation of the appealed order of the
lower court, to declare null and void the order of the
Commission on Immigration deporting Delfin Co to Amoy,
China.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

With regret I am constrained to disagree with the views of the

majority. I shall briefly state the reasons for my dissent.
1. Article 18 of the Civil Code is. explicit in its provision
that "Children, while they remain under parental authority, have
the nationality of their parents." Delfin

550

550 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

Co has become, in my opinion, a Filipino citizen by reason of

his mother's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship after her
husband's death. I see no difference, and no valid reason for
differentiating, between a legitimate child of a Filipino mother
by a deceased foreign father and a Filipino mother's illegitimate
child. The latter under the rules of international law as well as
the Civil Code takes the citizenship of its mother.
The intention of the framers of the Constitution to withhold
Philippine citizenship from the child of a Filipino mother and
an alien father until the child reaches the age of majority, does
not create an exception to the general rule. It is my humble and
considered opinion that the deferment of conferring Filipino
citizenship on such a child extends only to those cases in which
both parents are alive and retain their foreign nationality, or
where the father having died, the mother has not chosen to
regain her original citizenship.
It is not good law which prevents the minor child of a citizen
of the country, a child to whom by law and by nature she owes
protection, from joining its parent. I do not believe that the
Constitutional Convention could ever have contemplated such
an inadmissible and irrational situation.
I do not share the apprehension of some members of the
Court that if a child like Delfin Co should follow the citizenship
of her mother his citizenship would be at the mercy of being
changed as often as its mother changes her citizenship by
marriage or otherwise. If that should happen, there is nothing
wrong or ridiculous about it On the contrary, I think it is more
in accordance with natural law. That is what happens in the case
of an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother marrying a
foreigner or obtaining another citizenship; and there is in this
connection no perceptible difference between an illegitimate
child and a legitimate child whose father is dead. If a mother
can and wants to change her citizenship daily, certainly it is
natural rather than

551

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Villahermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration

queer that her minor child, which. depends upon her for care
and support, should not be left stranded.
 2. The decision says: "This petition is moreover to be denied
on the strength of precedence heretofore established, because
Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and any posterior
change of status can not affect the legality of his detention for
the purposes of deportation." I do not think this doctrine is
applicable to the present case. The principle established by the
decisions cited on this point is that an immigrant can not take
advantage of his unlawful entry to acquire the conditions
imposed by the immigration laws. In the language of this Court
(U. S. vs. Chan Sam, 17 Phil., 448-456), "to say to him
(immigrant) that if by any means he can gain an unlawful entry
in the Islands he will be relieved of the consequences flowing
from his unlawful act if at any time after he gains his unlawful
entrance he changes his status and assumes the occupation of
one of the privileged classes, would be to set a premium on the
unlawful but successful evasion by Chinese laborers of the laws
prohibiting their entrance into the Islands." And in Tan Guan
Sien vs. Collector of Customs, 31 Phil., 56, the Court had the
same idea when it said, "The law does not contemplate that
Chinese persons may, by one method or another, gain an
entrance into the territory of the United States without the
'section six certificate', and after such entrance become such a
merchant, and then as such, insist upon his right to remain." In
these two cases, and in the case of Juan Co vs. Rafferty, 14
Phil., 235, in which the immigrant was adopted by a resident
while the immigrant's right to enter was under investigation, the
changes in the immigrant status were effected by him or with
his intervention and could not have been accomplished in his
absence.
In the case at hand the conversion of the immigrant to
Philippine citizenship was entirely independent of his will and
of his presence in the Philippines. The bond

552

552 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Fuentebella vs. Ocampo

that binds the petitioner and her child existed before the latter
entered the Philippine territory and not from the date of her
 repatriation only. It is the legal and absolute right of the
immigrant's mother to reclaim her Philippine citizenship
regardless of any mental reser vation, her motives or her
attitude toward her country The legality of her reacquisition 01
Philippine citizenship is nowhere challenged. Assuming then
that Delfin Co.; nationality follows, that of his mother, as we
believe it does, has Go forfeited his right to be with her as a
result of his entering the Philippines unlawfully? I know of no
law which sanctions such punishment f or an immigrant's fault,
If, on the other hand. the theory is that the immigrant must first
be purged of his sin by deportation after which he may be
allowed to come back and settle here, the Court would be
adopting an empty ceremony that would lead to no useful
purpose nor enhance the prestige of the administration of law.

FERIA, J.:

I concur in this dissenting opinion.

Judgment affirmed..

_____________

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