Adille v. CA, 157 SCRA 455

241 Phil.
487
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988 ]
RUSTICO ADILLE, PETITIONER, VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA
ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO,
JOSEFA ASEJO AND SANTIAGO ASEJO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SARMIENTO, J.:
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of

controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that has led not only to
protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like
strained relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that
likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural
values and institutions, where, as one observer notes, wealth and its
accumulation are the basis of self-fulfillment and where property is held as
sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his property," says this modern
thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody
that threatens his possessions will arouse his most passionate enmity."[1]
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values; the
burden of reconstructing the social order is shouldered by the political
leadership -- and the people themselves. The parties have come to this Court
for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief
pursuant to the decree of law.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision[2] appealed from:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [Th]e land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of

Albay located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq.
m. originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private
property; she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one
Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an only child, herein
defendant, Rustico Adillo; in her second marriage with one
Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs, - now,
sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro
to certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but
she died in 1942 without being able to redeem, and after her
death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant
repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed
of extra-judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir
and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that he was
able to secure title in his name alone also, so that OCT No.
21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his name,
that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise
had failed, his half-brothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed
present case for partition with accounting on the position that he
was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed, - and
this is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs,
Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant
counterclaimed for her to vacate that, -
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained

defendant in his position that he was and became absolute
owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and
also condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is
because of this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that
trial Court erred in:
"I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the

property;
II. … not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in

possession of the portion of the property to vacate the
land, p. 1, Appellants' brief.
which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on

the basis of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should be
maintained.[3]
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,[4] and ruled for
the plaintiffs-appellants, the private respondents herein. The petitioner now
appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Appellate Court's decision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having

given due course to the petition, directed the parties to file their briefs. Only
the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private respondents having
failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for decision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of

dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its
redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of
Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving
the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his

share alone.[5] While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the
property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make
him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing
state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to

collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners.[6] There is no doubt
that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil
Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other
co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the
thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so
much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share
of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.

While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be
compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-
heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto
in his name.[7] But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner
the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating
a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over
the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-
brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and
for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to
the property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of
acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if
there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of

the private respondents. The Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the

person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the
registration of the property. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole
heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed
preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to
defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the
property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the
property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had
constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil
Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and
must act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the
Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative, the
petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property
and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to
have assumed the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-
heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as
the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the same whether it
is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the private
respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription

bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by another (co-
owner) following the required number of years. In that event, the party in
possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership is
ended.[8] In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the
petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents was
presented in 1974. Has prescription, then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of

co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required
by law.[9]
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these
requisites. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership;
on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark
by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore
be said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership.
Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a
portion of the land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains
to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession
of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after
the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of

title,[10] but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish a shield for fraud.[11] It is therefore no argument to say that the act
of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents’ claims
commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While actions to
enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,[12] reckoned from the
date of the registration of the property,[13] we, as we said, are not prepared
to count the period from such a date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub
rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning
with his fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of
extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother
Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name
also."[14] Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private respondents
commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioner's act of
defraudation.[15] According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came
to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the litigation."[16]
Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be

pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed
waived,[17] and here, the petitioner never raised that defense.[18] There are
recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why
they apply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the

respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The Decision sought
to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
[1] GREENE, FELIX, THE ENEMY 234 (1971).
[2]Gatmaitan, Magno, Acting Pres. J.; Domondon, Sixto and Reyes,

Samuel, JJ., Concurring.
[3] Rollo, 14-15.
[4]Solidum, Arsenio, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Albay,

Civil Case No. 5029.
[5] CIVIL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.
[6] Supra, art. 489.
[7] Supra, art. 1607.
[8]The modes of terminating a co-ownership other than by prescription are

partition (CIVIL CODE, arts. 494; 1079, 1082), merger or consolidation,
and loss of the thing (3 Manresa 486).
[9]Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v.

Camumot, 40 Phil. 857 (1920).
[10] Pres. Decree No. 1529, sec. 31.

[11] Amerol v. Bagumbaran, G.R. No. 33261, September 30, 1987.
[12] Supra.
[13]Gerona v. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153

(1964).
[14] Rollo, id., 14.
[15] Gerona v. De Guzman, supra.
[16] Rollo, id., 18.
[17] RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 2. A party need not plead the statute
of limitations in a responsive pleading (or motion to dismiss) where the
complaint itself shows that the claims have prescribed [Ferrer v. Ericta, No.
L-41767, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)]. Likewise, it has been
held that where the defendant had no way of knowing that the claim
advanced by the plaintiff had prescribed, his failure to invoke the statute (in
his answer or motion to dismiss) does not constitute a waiver of such a
defense [Guanzo v. Ramirez, 32 Phil. 492 (1914)]. In another case, we said
that prescription need not be pleaded specifically in an answer where the
evidence itself shows that prescription bars the plaintiff's claims [Philippine
National Bank v. Perez, No. L-20412, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 270
(1966); see also Chua Lanko v. Dioso, 97 [Phil. 821 (1955); Philippine
National Bank v. Pacific Commission House, No. L-22675, March 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 766 (1969)].
[18] Rollo, id., 18.
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241 Phil.

In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of

x x x [Th]e land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of

Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained

"I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the

II. … not ordering the partition of the property; and

III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in

which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on

We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having

Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of

There is no merit in this petition.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his

Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership.

The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the

This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription

We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of

Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

[1] GREENE, FELIX, THE ENEMY 234 (1971).

[2]Gatmaitan, Magno, Acting Pres. J.; Domondon, Sixto and Reyes,

[3] Rollo, 14-15.

[4]Solidum, Arsenio, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Albay,

[6] Supra, art. 489.

[7] Supra, art. 1607.

[8]The modes of terminating a co-ownership other than by prescription are

[9]Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v.

[10] Pres. Decree No. 1529, sec. 31.

[13]Gerona v. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153

[14] Rollo, id., 14.

[15] Gerona v. De Guzman, supra.

[16] Rollo, id., 18.

[18] Rollo, id., 18.

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