Textbook Ebook Sustainability of The Food System Sovereignty Waste and Nutrients Bioavailability Noelia Betoret Ester Betoret All Chapter PDF
Textbook Ebook Sustainability of The Food System Sovereignty Waste and Nutrients Bioavailability Noelia Betoret Ester Betoret All Chapter PDF
Textbook Ebook Sustainability of The Food System Sovereignty Waste and Nutrients Bioavailability Noelia Betoret Ester Betoret All Chapter PDF
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v
vi Contents
2.3 India.......................................................................... 27
2.4 Japan ......................................................................... 27
2.5 Balearic islands, Spain.................................................. 28
3. Lessons for food sovereignty................................................ 29
References............................................................................. 29
CHAPTER 3 Climate change and agriculture: carbon footprint
estimation for agricultural products and labeling
for emissions mitigation .........................................33
V.D. Litskas, D.P. Platis, C.D. Anagnostopoulos,
A.C. Tsaboula, G.C. Menexes, K.L. Kalburtji, M.C. Stavrinides
and A.P. Mamolos
Abbreviations......................................................................... 33
1. Climate change and emissions from agriculture....................... 33
1.1 Climate change............................................................ 33
1.2 Greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and animal
husbandry................................................................... 35
2. Using life cycle assessment and carbon footprint for
emissions estimation........................................................... 36
2.1 Life cycle assessment for agricultural products ................. 36
2.2 Carbon footprint .......................................................... 36
3. Carbon footprint of agricultural products and management
practices for its reduction .................................................... 37
3.1 Carbon footprint of different agricultural products............. 37
3.2 Carbon footprint “hotspots” ........................................... 37
3.3 Carbon footprint reduction ............................................ 39
4. Social, political, and economic aspects .................................. 41
4.1 Market and demand regulate greenhouse gas emissions ...... 41
4.2 Carbon footprint labeling .............................................. 42
5. Beyond carbon footprint, the product environmental
footprint ........................................................................... 43
6. Conclusions....................................................................... 43
References............................................................................. 44
6. Conclusions..................................................................... 122
References........................................................................... 122
Index...................................................................................................195
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Contributors
C.D. Anagnostopoulos
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Ecology and Environmental Protection,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
Lillian Barros
Centro de Investigação de Montanha, CIMO, Instituto Politécnico de Bragança,
Campus de Santa Apolónia, Bragança, Portugal
Ester Betoret, PhD
Instituto de Agroquı́mica y Tecnologı́a de Alimentos, Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientı́ficas, Paterna, Spain
Noelia Betoret, PhD
Universitat Politècnica de València, València, Spain
Ludmi1a Bogacz-Radomska
Adaptive Food Systems Accelerator, Wroc1aw University of Economics, Wroc1aw,
Poland; Department of Biotechnology and Food Analysis, Wroc1aw University of
Economics Wroc1aw, Poland
Alfredo Cassano
Institute on Membrane Technology, ITM-CNR, Rende, Cosenza, Italy
A. Chiralt
Instituto de Ingenierı́a de Alimentos para el desarrollo, Universitat Politècnica de
València, Valencia, Spain
S. Collazo
Instituto de Ingenierı́a de Alimentos para el desarrollo, Universitat Politècnica de
València, Valencia, Spain
Carmela Conidi
Institute on Membrane Technology, ITM-CNR, Rende, Cosenza, Italy
M. D’Alessandro
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Campus of Food Science,
University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
Marco Dalla Rosa, PhD
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Alma Mater Studiorum-Università
di Bologna, Cesena, Forli - Cesena, Italy; Professor, Department of Agricultural
and Food Sciences, Alma Mater Studiorum-Università di Bologna, Cesena, Forli -
Cesena, Italy
Isabel C.F.R. Ferreira
Centro de Investigação de Montanha, CIMO, Instituto Politécnico de Bragança,
Campus de Santa Apolónia, Bragança, Portugal
xi
xii Contributors
Esperanza M. Garcia-Castello
Institute of Food Engineering for Development, IuIAD, Universitat Politècnica de
València, Valencia, Spain
C. Gonzalez-Martinez, PhD
Instituto de Ingenierı́a de Alimentos para el desarrollo, Universitat Politècnica de
València, Valencia, Spain
Joanna Harasym, DSc, PhD, MSc
Adaptive Food Systems Accelerator, Wroc1aw University of Economics, Wroc1aw,
Poland; Department of Biotechnology and Food Analysis, Wroc1aw University of
Economics Wroc1aw, Poland
E. Hernandez-Garcı́a
Instituto de Ingenierı́a de Alimentos para el desarrollo, Universitat Politècnica de
València, Valencia, Spain
Urszula Kaim
Adaptive Food Systems Accelerator, Wroc1aw University of Economics, Wroc1aw,
Poland; Department of Biotechnology and Food Analysis, Wroc1aw University of
Economics Wroc1aw, Poland
K.L. Kalburtji
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Agronomy, Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
Andriana Kechagia, MSc
Terrapi World S.L., Ibiza, Spain
R. Lanciotti
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Campus of Food Science,
University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy; CIRI - Agrifood (Interdepartmental Centre of
Industrial Agrifood Research), University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
V.D. Litskas
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Ecology and Environmental Protection,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece; Department of
Agricultural Sciences, Biotechnology and Food Science, Cyprus University of
Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
A.P. Mamolos
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Ecology and Environmental Protection,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
Bruno Melgar
Institute of Food Engineering for Development, IuIAD, Universitat Politècnica de
València, Valencia, Spain
Contributors xiii
G.C. Menexes
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Agronomy, Aristotle University of
Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
C. Menzel
Division of Glycoscience, Department of Chemistry, School of Engineering
Sciences in Chemistry, Biotechnology and Health, KTH Royal Institute of
Technology, AlbaNova University Centre, Stockholm, Sweden
Remigiusz Oledzki
Adaptive Food Systems Accelerator, Wroc1aw University of Economics, Wroc1aw,
Poland; Department of Biotechnology and Food Analysis, Wroc1aw University of
Economics Wroc1aw, Poland
F. Patrignani, PhD
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Campus of Food Science,
University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy; CIRI - Agrifood (Interdepartmental Centre of
Industrial Agrifood Research), University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
D.P. Platis
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Ecology and Environmental Protection,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
Carmen Carla Quiroga Ledezma, PhD
Director, Centro de Investigaciones Agrı́colas y Agroindustriales, Universidad
Privada Boliviana, Cochabamba, Bolivia
Antonio D. Rodriguez-Lopez
Institute for Industrial, Radiophysical and Environmental Safety, ISIRYM,
Universitat Politècnica de València, Valencia, Spain
D. Rodrı́guez Alberto, B.S., M.S.
PhD Candidate, Golisano Institute for Sustainability, Rochester Institute of
Technology, Rochester, NY, United States
Salvador Roig-Coll, MSc
Terrapi World S.L., Ibiza, Spain
M.C. Stavrinides
Department of Agricultural Sciences, Biotechnology and Food Science, Cyprus
University of Technology, Limassol, Cyprus
Silvia Tappi
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Alma Mater Studiorum-Università
di Bologna, Cesena, Forli - Cesena, Italy
T.A. Trabold, B.S., PhD
Department Head, Golisano Institute for Sustainability, Rochester Institute of
Technology, Rochester, NY, United States
xiv Contributors
A.C. Tsaboula
School of Agriculture, Laboratory of Ecology and Environmental Protection,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece
Urszula Tylewicz
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Alma Mater Studiorum-Università
di Bologna, Cesena, Forli - Cesena, Italy
L. Vannini
Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, Campus of Food Science,
University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy; CIRI - Agrifood (Interdepartmental Centre of
Industrial Agrifood Research), University of Bologna, Cesena, Italy
PART
Food sovereignty
I
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CHAPTER
1. Introduction
The second Sustainable Development Goal (SDG2) aims at ending hunger and
ensuring access to food by all, ending malnutrition in all its forms, increasing
agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers, ensuring sustain-
able food production systems, and implementing resilient agricultural practices, as
well as maintaining genetic diversity (UN, 2019). Even though in the past decades,
agricultural productivity has increased, leading to an increase in food, the way in
which it was achieved needs to be adapted to reach SDG2, because it has put pressure
on natural resources and often resulted in negative outcomes such as land degradation,
deforestation, salinization due to irrigation, overexploitation of groundwater, pollution
of water bodies and soil caused by agrochemicals, emission of greenhouse gases,
built-up resistance to pests, and erosion of biodiversity (FAO, 2017a).
Statistics are overwhelming: 821 million people are undernourished; nearly 151
million children under five are stunted, over 50 million are wasted at increased risk
of morbidity and mortality, whereas 41 million are overweight or obese; more than
1.9 billion adults are overweight or obese, whereas 462 million are underweight
(WHO, 2018a). More than 41 million people die every year due to noncommunica-
ble diseases: over 17 million from cardiovascular diseases, 9 million from cancer,
3.9 million from respiratory diseases, and 1.6 million from diabetes (WHO, 2018b).
To decrease these trends, enough sustainable food should be supplied, and
healthy and safe diets, as well as a variety of foods such as vegetables, fruits, whole
grains and cereals, dairy foods, and animal- and plant-based proteins, which have
been processed to remove antinutrients or components within foods that interfere
with nutrient absorption, should be eaten to provide energy requirements and suffi-
cient macro- and micronutrients and bioactive compounds. The consumption of
nutrient-poor foods high in energy, saturated and transfats, added sugars, and salt
should be limited (HLPE, 2017). Nowadays, food is intended not only to nourish
and prevent nutrition-related diseases but also to improve physical and mental
well-being.
Food contains major (proteins, lipids, and carbohydrates) and minor (vitamins
and minerals) substances, which are necessary to maintain life and allow growth
and reproduction. These substances provide energy, contribute to structure, and
regulate biological processes; about 45 of these substances are considered essential
to human life and must be supplied in the diet. Food also contains bioactive
compounds that are phytochemicals, i.e., nonessential, which may have health-
promoting properties on the whole body or specific tissues or cells due to their
capability to modulate metabolic processes.
farmers, whereas others crops grow wild, but they represent unique sources of
genetic material to improve and develop novel crops and foods that will meet the
actual needs that the human race is facing (FAO, 2019). These species are less
demanding of their environment and so offer stronger resilience to climate change
and food insecurity. In addition, since they are more resistant to stressful events,
their levels of essential minerals, vitamins, and bioactive compounds are higher
and their macronutrient profiles of fat, protein, and carbohydrate are also better
than those of commercial crops (Tapia and Fries, 2007). Ancient farmers took
advantage of natural plant adaptations to extreme environments to domesticate a
unique group of crops and combined their cultivation with the use of complex
irrigation canals, terraces, crop rotations, intercropping, livestock, cropping tech-
niques, and soil preservation practices (Flores et al., 2003).
Some domesticated, semidomesticated, and wild species from the Andes and the
Amazonia are presented, which were selected due to their nutritional and functional
properties, as well as their capacity for adaptability to harsh environments. Some of
them played an important role in the diet and traditional medicine of ancient cultures
and have caught attention worldwide lately. Therefore, some research has been
carried out to identify their chemical composition and the effects of those
compounds on nutrition and health through in vitro and in vivo trials to verify the
attributes traditionally granted to those species; however, there is still much to be
done to confirm or refute them. It is worthwhile to bear in mind that sometimes
reported data may vary among authors due to several reasons, such as the variety
or ecotype, growing environment, harvesting and processing conditions, sample
preparation, analytical methods, and data processing and presentation.
4. Andean grains
Andean grains, together with potato, were staple foods of pre-Hispanic cultures.
Pollen, seeds and inflorescences samples, and pictorial figures were found in archeo-
logical sites dated thousands of years ago.
But though the civil strife was ended, the injury it had inflicted was well nigh
incurable. It is to be reckoned chief among the causes of the weakness in after
years that made it possible—and, in the judgment of some, necessary and
justifiable—for the British government to thrust in its strong hand and subvert the
independent but [156]tottering republic that it might substitute therefor a more
stable colonial administration. The treasury had been impoverished. Taxes were
uncollected and irrecoverable. Salaries and other public liabilities were heavily in
arrears. Worse than all these, the republic had forfeited the confidence of other
nations to that degree that no one believed in its stability. Even its nearest
neighbor and sister republic, the Orange Free State, no longer desired union,
preferring to stand alone before the constant menace of the Basutos rather than
to be joined with a country wherein efficient government seemed to have
perished. To make matters still worse, the discord among the whites was turned
to advantage by their colored foes.
When the several factions in the Transvaal united on Mr. Pretorius as their
executive head, in 1864, the white population, all told, did not exceed 30,000—
less than one person to three square miles—while the blacks in the same
territory numbered hundreds of thousands. During the three years succeeding
1861 the prevailing anarchy made it impossible to give attention to cessions of
land agreed to by the Zulu chiefs. In consequence, the boundaries had not been
fixed, and these districts remained unoccupied by the [157]whites. With the
restoration of something like order in 1864, the government realized that its
relations with some of its native neighbors required definition and formal
settlement. This was successfully done, and the lines mutually agreed upon
between the whites and the native authorities were duly marked.
A leading spirit among the Zulus of this time was Cetawayo, a chief of
remarkable subtlety and power. In less than two months after the settlement and
marking of boundaries in the southern region of the Transvaal Cetawayo found
some pretext for repudiating his bargain, appeared on the borders of Utrecht at
the head of a Zulu army, in February, 1865, and removed the landmarks so
lately set up. During the negotiations that followed, Cetawayo did not appear at
any conference, but the presence of his force on the border so far affected the
final settlement that the boundary was changed near the Pongolo River,
restoring a small district in that region to Zululand.
This was a time of perpetual struggle with the blacks. Some of the tribes had
been made tributary to the Republic, others were practically independent, and
with these frequent and cruel wars were waged. Unspeakable atrocities were
[158]perpetrated on both sides—the Kaffirs slaughtering without mercy such white
families as they were able to surprise in a defenseless state, and the Africanders
inflicting vengeance without mercy when they came upon the savages in kraal or
mountain stronghold.
The whites could always defeat the natives in a pitched battle, but to hold so
vast a number in subjection was beyond their power. And they seem to have
relished everything connected with an expedition against the blacks but the
expense; they had an invincible dislike to paying taxes for any purpose.
The public treasury was in a state of chronic emptiness. The paper currency
depreciated more and more till in 1870 its purchasing value [159]was only twenty-
five per cent of its face value. Public works and proper internal administration
were unknown. Largely, every man’s will was his law, which he was disposed to
enforce upon others—whether black or white—by the strong hand.
In 1872 Mr. Pretorius became cordially disliked by the people and was forced to
resign the presidency, because he had accepted the finding of the arbitration
which awarded the diamond fields to Nicholas Waterboer instead of to the
Transvaal Republic. His successor, Mr. Burgess, a native of Cape Colony and
an unfrocked clergyman of the Dutch Reformed Church, was an unfortunate
choice. Learned, eloquent and energetic, he was nevertheless deficient in
practical business wisdom and in political acumen, and he was much distrusted
by the burghers on account of his theological opinions. Some of them charged
that he was guilty of maintaining that the real Devil differed from the pictures of
him in the old Dutch Bibles, in that he had no tail. For this and worse forms of
heterodoxy he was blamed as the cause of the calamities experienced by the
nation during his presidency. Mr. Burgers is said to have formed many visionary
though patriotic plans for the development [160]of his country and the extension
of the Africander power over the whole of South Africa, but his people were not
of the sort that could appreciate them, nor had he command of resources
sufficient to carry them out.
In fact, the weak and disordered condition of the republic exposed its own
people—many of whom were British subjects—to immediate and frightful
danger. Moreover, it constituted a danger to all the European communities in
South Africa. In the event of two such chiefs as Sikukuni and Cetawayo joining
forces against the [161]whites and prevailing, as they seemed able and likely to
do, over the frontier civilization in the Transvaal Republic, nothing could prevent
them from moving in strength against the Free State on the south, and Natal on
the southeast, and later, against Cape Colony itself.
It was not without cause, therefore, that the British government resolved to avert
the threatened conflict. There were two possible ways of doing this. Britain might
have taken the field as a friendly ally, making common cause with the Transvaal
Republic against a common danger, and leaving its independence intact. The
other way was to annex the Transvaal territory, subvert its republican
government, and give it the status and administration of a British colony. There
is no record to show that the British government ever entertained the thought of
acting as the ally of the republic. On the contrary, Sir Theophilus Shepstone was
appointed as imperial commissioner to visit the scene of danger and examine
into the state of the country. He was secretly instructed and authorized to
proclaim the immediate annexation of the Transvaal territory to the British
dominions in South Africa in case he deemed it necessary for the general safety
[162]to do so, and if, in his judgment, a majority of the people would favor the
step.
After three months spent in observing and studying the situation Sir Theophilus
Shepstone, acting under the secret instructions given him, on the 12th of April,
1877, declared The Transvaal Republic annexed, for protection, to British
dominions in South Africa. His act was indorsed officially by the resident British
High Commissioner at the Cape, and by the Secretary of the Colonial Office in
England. In 1879 the Territory was declared a crown colony of Great Britain.
Thus, in the third contact of Boer and Briton, an independent republic was
deprived of its independence by the self-same power that had guaranteed it in
1852, and was reduced to the status of a crown colony without the formal
consent of its people and against the protests of many of them.
Before closing this chapter of events connected with this arbitrary and startling
measure, it will be well to consider some further facts which belong to the setting
in which the act should be viewed. Mr. Burgers, the president, had repeatedly
warned the people that unless certain reforms could be effected they must lose
their independence. They agreed with him, but did nothing [163]to carry out the
necessary reforms, nor would they pay taxes. Mr. Burgers was not strong with
any party in the country. One section of the people were for Paul Kruger, his rival
candidate for the approaching presidential election. Another party—principally
English settlers—favored annexation. Besides, he had estranged the great body
of the people by his heterodox opinions in theology. Being helpless, Mr. Burgers
recorded his personal protest against annexation and returned to the Cape,
where he lived on a pension granted him in consideration of his having spent all
his private fortune in the service of his country.
Mr. Kruger—then the vice-president, the entire executive council, and the
volksraad, all protested against the annexation; and delegates were sent to
London to carry the protest to the foot of the British throne. The mass of the
people made no resistance at the time, nor did they express much displeasure;
but, a little later, a large majority of them signed a petition praying for a reversal
of the act of annexation. Their temporary acquiescence in the loss of
independence was due, no doubt, to the depressing fears that had so lately
burdened them, and a sense of [164]relief in knowing that now the Kaffir invasion
that had threatened their very existence would be repelled by the military power
of Great Britain. [165]
[Contents]
CHAPTER XI.
THE AFRICANDERS’ FIRST WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
Notwithstanding their native love of independence, and their protest to the British
throne against the act of annexation, the Africanders of the Transvaal might have
acquiesced in the British rule had they been fairly treated. There was a good
promise of peace at first. The finances of the country were at once relieved by
the expenditure of English money in liberal amounts. Numbers of the leading
Africanders retained their official positions at the request of the British
commissioner, Sir Theophilus Shepstone. It is only reasonable to suppose that
the people at large would have settled down to permanent content as British
subjects had the affairs of the newly constituted colony been administered to the
satisfaction of the leaders.
But, instead of following a policy dictated alike by wisdom and righteousness, the
very opposite seems to have been the rule observed in [166]the attempt to govern
these new and most difficult subjects of the British crown. A number of mistakes
—so called—were made which, as even Canon Knox Little admits, were a
sufficient justification of the Africander leaders in plotting and agitating against
the British connection.
The first of these mistakes was the too early recall of Sir Theophilus Shepstone,
who had so deftly managed the bloodless though arbitrary annexation, who knew
the country well and was much respected by the people. In place of his rule as
special commissioner was substituted an administration under Sir Bartle Frere as
governor of Cape Colony and British High Commissioner for South Africa. There
being no representative government in the Transvaal after annexation, the
administration became, perhaps necessarily, autocratic both in form and in spirit.
Sir William Owen Lanyon, who had been appointed governor of the Transvaal,
was an officer of some renown in dealing successfully with native uprisings, but
proved totally unfit for the delicate management required in governing the
Africanders. He has been described as haughty and arrogant in mind, indisposed
to excuse the rudeness of the Transvaal farmers, and incapable of tolerating the
social equality so dear to them. [167]His swarthy complexion, also, made against
his popularity, for it suggested the possibility of a strain of black blood in his veins
—a blemish unpardonable in the eyes of any slaveholding people. Under his rule
complaints were ignored, taxes were levied and peremptorily collected by
distraint, and soon the latent discontent broke out into open and active
disaffection.
The second mistake—if it does not deserve a harsher name—was the failure to
institute the local self-government by representatives promised by Sir Theophilus
Shepstone when he proclaimed annexation. The text of that part of the
proclamation reads thus:
“And I further proclaim and make known that the Transvaal will remain a separate
government, with its own Laws and Legislature, and that it is the wish of her Most
Gracious Majesty that it shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible
with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of the people. That
arrangement will be made by which the Dutch language will practically be as
much the official language as the English. All laws, proclamations and
government notices will be published in the Dutch language; and in the courts of
law the same may be done at the option of suitors to a [168]case. The laws so in
force in the State will be retained until altered by competent legislative authority.”
CECIL J. RHODES.
Not one of these promises was ever fulfilled. The volksraad was never convened.
The promised constitution of local self-government was never promulgated.
Instead of redeeming these promises the Transvaal was put upon the status of a
crown colony in 1879, and the legislature proposed for it was to consist of some
crown officials and six members—all to be the nominees of the governor.
Mr. Bryce, in his “Impressions of South Africa,” calls this failure to redeem a
promise authoritatively made as a concession to a people whose independence
was being arbitrarily subverted, a “blunder.” Canon Little uses a still softer term,
calling it a “mistake”; and adds, “It was given in good faith, and in good faith was
received. Sir Theophilus Shepstone tried to fulfill it. He at once submitted his
views as to the necessary legislative arrangements. No action whatever was
taken on it, either by Conservatives or Liberals, and his dispatch is probably lying
uncared for in the Colonial Office now!”—(1899.)
One real and very serious blunder was committed, if one judges of it from the
view point of the policy intended to be pursued in the Transvaal by the British
government. The Africanders had accepted, under protest, the act of annexation
mainly because they were in mortal fear of the Zulus. That reason for submission
the British proceeded to remove by overthrowing the Zulu power.
In the northeast Sir Garnet Wolseley defeated Sikukuni and established what
promised to be a permanent peace. In 1879 Sir Bartle Frere inflicted a like
reverse upon Cetawayo, in the southeast, and so completed the subjugation of
the Zulus. The blunder in taking this course declared itself when, after subduing
the natives at great cost of blood and treasure, the British found that in so doing
they had relieved the Africanders of the one fear that thus far had prevented
them from reasserting their independence.
Many people, both in England and in South [170]Africa, regarded the annexation
of the Transvaal as final. But leading members of the Liberal party, then in
opposition, had emphatically condemned it, and this had raised hopes in the
Transvaal Africanders and their sympathizers in England that when Gladstone
came into power again the things which they regarded as wrong would be
righted. Such hopes were doomed to disappointment.
In 1880 the Liberals carried the country and took office in April of that year.
Guided by information derived from the crown officials in South Africa, the new
ministers were misled as to the measure of discontent in the Transvaal, and
declared that the act of annexation would not be reversed.
This flat refusal brought matters to an immediate issue. The Transvaal burghers,
though they had continued to agitate and protest and memorialize the throne,
had waited with considerable patience for three years, hoping for either a
restoration of their independence or—as the next best thing—the instituting of
such a representative local government as had been promised them by the
imperial authorities. But now the new Liberal government, after using the
Transvaal grievances for electioneering purposes, [171]had refused to consider
and redress those grievances; the military administration of a mere crown colony
continued in full force under the detested Sir William Owen Lanyon; and there
appeared to be no hope that the promises made to mollify their indignation when
their independence was being subverted would ever be fulfilled.
It has been said, in extenuation, that the British government of this time was too
busy with other pressing matters to give the attention necessary to a correct
understanding of the condition, and the rights and the wrongs, of the Transvaal
Africanders. And it has been said, in further extenuation, that there was an
honest intention on the part of the government to fulfill the promises made—
some time—as soon as the authorities could get to it. Be that as it may, at the
end of three years, which had brought no betterment of their state, the burghers
concluded that their protests and their patience had been wasted, and
determined to wait no longer.
The first battles of this war were little more than skirmishes. The British troops
were scattered through the country in small detachments, which the Africanders
—every man of whom was a marksman and an experienced fighter—found it
easy to either cut off or drive before them to positions that could be fortified.
The nearest available British troops, besides those already in the Transvaal,
were in Natal. General Sir George Colley, governor of that colony, raised what
force he could and marched northward to check the uprising. Before he could
enter the Transvaal, however, Commandant-General Joubert crossed the border
into Natal and took up a strong position at Laing’s Nek. This now historic spot is a
steep ridge forming the watershed between the Klip River, a tributary of the Vaal,
and Buffalo River, a confluent of the Tugela, which flows into the Indian Ocean.
Here a sanguinary battle was fought on the 28th of January, 1881. The British
attacked the Africanders with great spirit, but Joubert’s position was invulnerable.
The ridge protected his men from the artillery fire of the British, [173]while they, in
charging up the slope, were cut down by the accurate rifle fire of the Africanders,
and forced to retreat. On the 8th of February, in the same neighborhood, on the
Ingogo heights, the British were again defeated after suffering severe loss.
General Colley now decided to seize by night Majuba Hill, which is really a
considerable mountain, rising nearly 2,000 feet above Laing’s Nek, and
commanding that ridge for the purpose of artillery fighting. On the night of
February 26th, leaving the main body of his army in camp, and unaccountably
forgetting to order it to advance on the enemy so as to divert attention from his
tactical movement, General Colley led a smaller division to the top of Majuba Hill.
The burgher force was thrown into temporary dismay when they first observed
British soldiers in that commanding position. But when there was no advance
against them in front, and no artillery fire from the top of Majuba, they sent out a
volunteer party to storm the hill. The story of that charge has gone into history to
stay as an example, on the one side, of rugged bravery and splendid courage
achieving victory, and on the other of equal bravery and courage strangely
betrayed by some one’s blunder into defeat and [174]ruinous disaster. Why the
main force of the British army was not ordered to co-operate in the movement,
why there were no entrenchments thrown up on the hill, why the order, “Charge
bayonets,” so eagerly looked for by the British soldiers on the hill-top, was never
given, General Colley did not live to tell—no one else knew. The Africanders
scaled the hill, shooting as they went up every man that showed on the sky line—
themselves protected by the steep declivities above them, and carried the hill-
top, routing and almost annihilating the British force. General Colley and ninety-
two of his men were killed, and fifty-nine were made prisoners.
In the meanwhile additional British troops were hurrying to the scene of conflict,
under command of Sir Evelyn Wood. What the outcome would have been of
further hostilities between the Africanders and the greatly increased British force
no one can tell. The sudden and surprising action of the British government, that
put an end to the war, was not based upon any estimate of the probable issue of
continued conflict, but altogether upon the moral aspects of the situation as seen
by Mr. Gladstone and his associates in the British cabinet. Before Sir Evelyn
Wood could strike a single blow toward wiping [175]out the disgrace of Majuba
Hill, the home government, on the 5th of March, 1881, ordered an armistice, and
on the 23d agreed to terms of peace by which the Transvaal was restored to its
former political independence in all regards, save that it was to be under the
suzerainty of the British crown.
In August, 1881, a more formal convention was held at Pretoria, when it was
agreed that the Transvaal government should be independent in the
management of its internal affairs; that the Republic should respect the
independence of the Swazies, a tribe of natives on the eastern border of the
Transvaal; that British troops should be allowed to pass through the territory of
the Republic in time of war; and that the British sovereign should be
acknowledged as suzerain of the Republic and have a veto power over all
treaties between the government of the Transvaal and foreign nations.
Several of the stipulations in this convention were very distasteful to Paul Kruger
and other leading spirits in the Transvaal, and also to the volksraad. Negotiations
for desired changes were continued until 1884, when, on the 27th of February, a
revision called the London Convention [176]was made and signed, formulating the
obligations of the Republic as follows:
RAAD ZAAL (GOVERNMENT BUILDING), PRETORIA.
The Sovereign of Great Britain was to have, for the space of six months after
their date, a veto power over all treaties between the Republic and any native
tribes to the eastward and westward of its territory, and between it and any
foreign state or nation except the Orange Free State.
And the Republic was to accord to Great Britain the treatment of a most favored
nation, and to deal kindly with strangers entering its territory.
Nothing whatever was said in this latest convention of the suzerainty of the
British Sovereign mentioned in that of 1881, and, as this instrument, negotiated
in London with Lord Derby, the Colonial Secretary, was understood to take the
place of all former conventions, the Africanders of the Transvaal have contended
very reasonably that the omission is sufficient evidence of the renunciation of
suzerainty by the British government. Furthermore, by the London Convention of
1884, the British crown for the first time conceded to the Transvaal the title of
“The [177]South African Republic,” by which name it has ever since been
designated in all diplomatic transactions and correspondence between it and
other states. [178]
[Contents]
CHAPTER XII.
THE AFRICANDER REPUBLICS AND BRITISH
POLICY.
The only reply of the Liberal government [179]was to the effect that
the annexation, and the refusal to reverse it, had been due to
misapprehension of the facts; that the officers of the crown in South
Africa, partly through ignorance and partly through prejudice, had
reported that there was no such passionate desire for independence
among the Africanders as was pretended by their leaders, and as
was proved to exist by the uprising; that as soon as the facts were
known it became the duty of a liberty-loving people like the English
to honor their own principles by the immediate retrocession of the
Transvaal without waiting to first avenge defeats and vindicate the
military superiority of Great Britain; and that a great country better
illustrated her greatness by doing justice and showing mercy, even at
great cost to herself, than by taking a bloody revenge for reverses
suffered on the fields of war in trying to enforce a policy now seen to
be morally wrong.
The South African Republic emerged from its brief and successful
struggle for independence impoverished and in a state of political
chaos, but rejoicing, nevertheless, in a sense of national freedom,
and more than ever confident that it enjoyed the special favor of
Heaven. The old constitution, or Grondwet, was revived, the
volksraad was convoked, and an election was held, resulting in the
choice of Mr. Paul Kruger to be president. Mr. Kruger immediately
[182]planned for bold and far-reaching movements on three sides of
the republic’s territory.