Romantic Empiricism Nature Art and Ecology From Herder To Humboldt Dalia Nassar All Chapter
Romantic Empiricism Nature Art and Ecology From Herder To Humboldt Dalia Nassar All Chapter
Romantic Empiricism Nature Art and Ecology From Herder To Humboldt Dalia Nassar All Chapter
DA L IA NA S S A R
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For Clara
No one is prepared to grasp that, both in nature and in art,
the sole and supreme process is the creation of form.
J. W. von Goethe
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
Abbreviations xiii
Note on Referencing xvii
Notes 249
Works Cited 287
Index 299
Acknowledgments
There are many people and organizations who have played a crucial role in
the development of this book. I want first to acknowledge the Australian
Research Council, Discovery Project DP160103769 (2016– 2018), the
Humboldt Foundation grant for experienced researchers (2019–2020), and
the Sydney Social Sciences and Humanities Advanced Research Council,
Ultimate Peer Review grant (2018).
I also want to acknowledge a number of highly innovative and re-
search initiatives at the University of Sydney, which have allowed me to
deepen and expand my work in unexpected and exciting ways: Sydney
Intellectual History Network, Theories and Conceptions of Life from the
19th Century to the Present, and the Multi-Species Justice research in-
itiative. In this regard, I especially want to thank Danielle Celermajer,
Stephen Gaukroger, Daniela Helbig, Jennifer Milam, Cat Moir, David
Schlosberg, Michelle St. Anne, Dinesh Wadiwel, Thom van Dooren, Anik
Waldow, Christine Winter, and Genevieve Wright. There is no doubt
that this book has been shaped by the workshops, reading groups, and
conversations that I have had with them over the years.
I also wish to thank the many wonderful thinkers from whose work I’ve
learned and whose penetrating feedback has nudged me in new directions:
Iain McCalman, Monica Gagliano, Sebastian Gardner, Moira Gatens,
Craig Holdrege, Nigel Hoffmann, Simon Lumsden, Jennifer Mensch,
Lydia Moland, Paul Redding, Ulrich Schlösser, Niels Weidtmann, and my
friend and coeditor on other projects, Kristin Gjesdal. I want to thank Eric
Watkins and Clinton Tolley and the PhD students in the history of phi-
losophy colloquium at the University of California, San Diego. Their gen-
erous comments on an early version of the manuscript were immense, and
I am grateful for their continued support. And, last—but not least—I want
to thank Margaret Barbour, whose openness and interest have allowed us
to undertake exciting new research together.
xii Acknowledgments
I am also grateful to many friends, with whom I’ve had some of the best
conversations over the past years, especially Enite Giovanelli, Tanja Rall,
Stefan Rall, and Kristin Funke. I want to thank Anselma Murswiek for per-
mission to use her wonderful painting, and my parents, Rosette and Talal
Nassar. I especially want to thank Luke Fischer, my favorite conversation
partner and most incisive editor.
Abbreviations
Immanuel Kant
Friedrich Schiller
I have mostly used the FA edition of Goethe’s work, as it is more easily acces-
sible than the other editions. However, references to Goethe’s On Morphology
(Zur Morphologie) are to MA, because in this edition the works appear chron-
ologically, according to their date of publication, and not (as is the case in
FA), according to the date on which they were written. I have also referenced
LA or WA in instances where a work does not appear in FA.
With regard to titles of works, I provide the English and German titles
in my first reference, while in all following references I provide only the
English title. In the case of Humboldt, however, I do the opposite: I refer to
the German title (with an English translation in parentheses at the first men-
tion), and only use the German title thereafter, unless I am specifically citing
an English translation of Humboldt’s works. This has to do with the fact that
Humboldt played a role in translating his work—whether from French to
German, or from German to English—such that some of the translations
often include passages not in the original, use terms that were not employed
in the original, or offer interpretations that further elucidate ideas expressed
in the original.
Introduction
Finding Romantic Empiricism
Romantic empiricism: two words that are not usually placed side by side,
and that seem to suggest opposing philosophical views and tendencies.
Romanticism is often associated with idealism and taken to imply a turn to
the subject and a focus on the subjective conditions of knowledge. The ro-
mantic approach to nature thus tends to be regarded as a form of subjective
constructivism. Furthermore, romanticism is identified with a strong in-
terest in the arts and aesthetic experience. Empiricism, by contrast, is out-
wardly focused and bottom-up, in its view that all knowledge must begin
with what is seen or experienced. In addition, some forms of empiricism ap-
pear from an idealist perspective to be naive: they underestimate the subject’s
creative role in knowledge, or they do not adequately differentiate between
what is given to the senses and what is known through the understanding.
Finally, contrary to romanticism, empiricism rarely pays attention to the
arts and their epistemic significance. In short: romanticism and empiricism
hardly resemble one another, and to place them side by side is to offer a par-
adox of sorts.
The thesis of this book is that romantic empiricism is not an oxymoron
but refers to a philosophical tradition that deserves renewed attention
today. While the roots of romantic empiricism can be traced back to mid-
eighteenth-century France, the tradition achieved its greatest philosoph-
ical sophistication and rigor in Germany in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Inspired by the questions and concerns articulated
by Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1707–1788) and elaborated by Denis
Diderot (1713–1784), thinkers from Johann Gottfried Herder to Alexander
von Humboldt developed a distinctive methodological approach to the study
of nature—an approach that drew significantly on the arts and aesthetic ex-
perience. Through this aesthetic science, the romantic empiricists were able
2 Romantic Empiricism
to deepen and expand their understanding of nature and, as I will show, con-
tribute to the emergence of ecology and ecological thinking more generally.
These thinkers are romantic not only because they were contemporaries
of the Jena romantics, but also, and more significantly, because they de-
veloped an approach to the study of nature in which the arts and aesthetic
experience play a crucial role. They are romantic, in other words, because
they recognized that artistic capacities and devices can transform the way in
which we perceive and think about the world and ourselves within it. They are
empiricist because they emphasize observation and seek to remain with the
phenomena. They are critical of systematic approaches to nature that begin
with an abstract idea or postulate. Instead, they begin with what is seen and
sensed. But they depart from mainstream empiricism in two crucial ways.
On the one hand, like the rationalists, their aim is to arrive at the necessary,
the idea, within the phenomenon. On the other hand, and like the idealists,
they recognize the creative role of the knower.
However, it is important to emphasize that this group of thinkers was not
simply synthesizing various aspects from different philosophical schools or
methodologies. Rather, they developed a coherent approach to the study of
nature, one which does not simply map onto more well-known approaches.
Furthermore, their approach was not only theoretically articulated, but was
also developed through their practice. In fact, their practice often influenced
and transformed their theory. By practice I mean both the study of nature
and their practice as literary critics, artists, appreciators of art, travelers, and
explorers. It would be no exaggeration to describe the romantic empiricists
as thinkers for whom theory and practice were intertwined and deeply
aligned: the one realized in and shaped by the other. Who, then, were the ro-
mantic empiricists?
world and the human place within it.1 This period of critical engagement,
which reached its apex in Germany, remains singular in both its breadth
and its philosophical rigor. It was a time when philosophers, scientists, and
artists worked together to investigate the metaphysical and epistemological
dimensions of the human relation to the natural world and determine their
ethical implications.
While this focus on the study of nature, and the human place within it,
was defining for German philosophies at the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the methodologies they employed were not always aligned and, in
some instances, radically differed. Friedrich Schelling, for instance, sought
to “construct” nature on the basis of a priori principles, arguing (on system-
atic grounds) that human culture develops out of nature.2 This contrasts
with philosophies that questioned the goal of systematicity and the method-
ology of construction, which are perhaps epitomized in Friedrich Schlegel’s
statement that “it is equally deadly for the spirit to have a system and not
to have one” (KFSA 2, 173, no. 53). And it also contrasts with nonspecula-
tive approaches to nature and mind (culture), which emphasize experience
and observation and seek to understand both nature and culture in light of a
larger (historical) context—as in the work of Herder.
The romantic empiricists, as the name suggests, belonged to the latter
group, and the four figures that this book investigates are Kant (1724–1804),
especially his Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Goethe (1749–1832),
Herder (1744–1803), and Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859). The cen-
tral claim of Romantic Empiricism: Nature, Art, and Ecology from Herder to
Humboldt is that these thinkers developed a philosophically sophisticated
empiricist approach to the natural world by working together—sometimes as
rivals, but more often than not as teachers and collaborators. While Herder,
Goethe, and Humboldt clearly belong to the romantic empiricist tradition,
Kant’s place within it is more ambivalent, as I will discuss shortly.
Kant, Herder, Goethe, and Humboldt are widely regarded as major fig-
ures of the late Enlightenment, Weimar classicism, and romanticism.3
While Kant continues to be considered the most important philosopher of
the modern period, over the last few years Herder has received ample at-
tention, leading Marion Heinz to describe the current interest as a “Herder
Renaissance.”4 Similarly, Goethe’s philosophical significance has been re-
cently highlighted—especially by Eckart Förster5—while Andrea Wulf ’s
2015 book on Humboldt is just one example of the works that have drawn
attention to his important philosophical legacy.6
4 Romantic Empiricism
However, these figures are rarely studied side by side and seldom consid-
ered as participating in one philosophical project.7 In fact, the opposite is
usually the case: Kant and Herder are often depicted as rivals,8 while Kant
and Goethe are interpreted as contemporaries who misunderstood one
another’s work.9 Even in the case of Herder and Goethe, who cofounded the
Sturm und Drang movement in the late 1760s, little attention has been paid
to connections in their later writings or the similarities in their approaches
to the natural world.10 In turn, while Humboldt’s link to the others is always
acknowledged, it is seldom comprehensively discussed.11
Why might this be the case? For one, the idea that an empiricist tradi-
tion emerged in the midst of the era of German idealism sounds, at least at
first hearing, odd. Furthermore, although there has been a significant rise
of interest in the philosophies of nature that emerged in Germany around
1800, little work has focused on the methodologies that underpin these philo
sophies. Precisely because we assume that all philosophies in Germany at the
turn of the nineteenth century were idealist in some way, we do not make the
effort to examine their methodologies or consider how their methodologies
may have varied.12
Furthermore, in the history of philosophy, as well as in German studies,
romanticism is typically identified with the Jena romantics—the Schlegel
brothers, their journal, the Athenäum, as well as the regular contributors
to their journal, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Friedrich von Hardenberg
(Novalis), Ludwig Tieck, and (sometimes also) Schelling. Thinkers such as
Herder and Goethe—who certainly influenced the romantics13—are usually
regarded as participating in different, sometimes opposed, traditions. This
is above all the case with Goethe, the great representative of Weimar classi-
cism.14 Accordingly, the idea that Goethe—not to mention Kant, Herder, and
Humboldt—was a romantic simply sounds wrong.15
While from one perspective, the identification of romanticism with Jena
romanticism is perfectly acceptable, from another, it is limiting and unneces-
sary. For it implies, first, that romanticism is a historical moment that is long
past and, second, that the ideas that motivated romanticism were only em-
bodied by these few thinkers. Neither claim can withstand scrutiny.
Let us consider Friedrich Schlegel’s famous definition of “the romantic
imperative,” as articulated in Athenäums-Fragment 586. Schlegel writes: “All
nature and science should become art—[and all] art should become nature
and science” (KFSA 16, 134, no. 586). In formulating the romantic impera-
tive, Schlegel was clearly inspired by Herder and Goethe (and perhaps also
Introduction 5
However, even in that work, Kant makes statements that appear to challenge
the view—which I have identified with romantic empiricism—that art has
the power to transform and enrich knowledge. After all, Kant agrees with
Edmund Burke’s distinction between aesthetic pleasure and cognition. Both
argue (for different reasons) that aesthetic pleasure is noncognitive, and thus
cannot contribute to our understanding of nature. To this end, they contend
that as soon as we have cognitive insight into nature (as a botanist does in re-
lation to a plant), the experience of aesthetic pleasure disappears.
Despite Kant’s ambivalence toward romantic empiricism, in the third
Critique he takes a significant step in that direction. In so doing, he
explicates the reasons behind this step as well as the challenges of taking it.
He articulates these challenges in both methodological and epistemolog-
ical terms, homing in on a problem that Buffon had formulated some two
decades earlier.
In 1766, Buffon explained that a key problem facing the student of nature
lies in a dissonance between our cognitive faculties and the processes of na-
ture. While our intellect proceeds linearly—we apprehend one object, then
another, then another, and so on—nature does not. Rather, Buffon writes,
nature “does not take a single step except to go in all directions; in marching
forward, she extends to the sides and above.”17 We see objects as separate and
grasp relations along a linear causal nexus: one thing moves and causes an-
other to move. In nature, however, objects are interrelated, and relations are
manifold and multidirectional. How are we to overcome this epistemological
incommensurability?
Kant rearticulated this difficulty in the third Critique, arguing that the
reason we fail to understand living beings has to do with the character of
our cognitive faculties. The fact that we proceed from one object to the next
means that we can only grasp a certain kind of whole, a whole that is made up
of separate, preexisting parts. A clock is one such whole: the bits and pieces
that make up the clock are produced separately. When they are put together,
we have a clock.
Living beings are not wholes of this sort. Their various parts—the heart,
lungs, veins, and so on—do not emerge separately from one another. Rather,
they emerge in relation to one another and as parts of a living body. This
reveals a certain circularity in the structure of living beings: the parts exist
only through the whole and the whole exists only through the parts. And
this circularity, Kant concludes, makes it impossible for us to properly
grasp them.
8 Romantic Empiricism
In this way Kant (and Buffon before him) explicated how and why our
cognitive tendencies lead us to apprehend the world as composed of separate
objects, whose relations are exclusively linear. He also explicated the kind of
unity that we appear to be incapable of grasping. In so doing, Kant laid out
the epistemological and methodological challenges facing any attempt to
grasp nature as an integrated unity—challenges that the romantic empiricists
sought to overcome.
But Kant did more than simply point to challenges. By placing “beauty and
biology” side by side in the third Critique, he drew a connection between aes-
thetic experience and the study of nature, locating this connection in the re-
flecting form of judgment.18 The implication is that the same form of judging
that we employ in our aesthetic encounter with nature is also at work in our
cognitive encounter with nature. When reflecting judgment turns to under-
standing the natural world, however, it does not result in pleasure (as it does
in aesthetic experience). Still, like the noncognitive (i.e., aesthetic) form of
reflecting judgment, it does not proceed from the a priori concept or prin-
ciple to the observed object. Rather, as Kant puts it, reflecting judgment seeks
to “find the universal for the particular” (AA 20, 211). Its procedure, then,
embodies the bottom-up approach to the study of nature that underlies ro-
mantic empiricism.
Importantly, when applied to the study of nature, reflecting judgment
becomes analogical. This is because it proceeds on the assumption that na-
ture is a work of art, or, as Kant famously puts it, it proceeds by regarding
nature as if it were a work of art. In other words, reflecting judgment (in this
mode) compares nature with art, and in so doing, sees the one in and through
the other, sees nature as art. Only in this way, Kant contends, can we begin to
order the natural world (arrive at a “system” of nature) and grasp the struc-
ture of organized beings.
Underlying Kant’s turn to the analogy between nature and art is the view
that we can discern organization in nature only if we conceive of nature in
terms of forms. After all, the work of comparing requires forms to com-
pare, forms through which we can discern similarities and distinctions, and
thereby draw connections. Furthermore, by regarding organized beings as
forms in the way that artworks are forms (expressions of a coherent unity), we
are able to see them not as outcomes of contingently connected parts, but as
integrated unities, which—like a piece of music—are inseparable from their
various parts (tone, rhythm, tempo, etc.) but which are also irreducible to
these parts (a piece of music is not reducible to any of its tones, for instance).
Introduction 9
The different parts, in turn, are only meaningful within this unity—as parts
of this whole. Accordingly, the analogy with art enables a new way of seeing
nature—a way that aims to overcome the challenges that Kant (and Buffon)
had outlined.
While Kant’s move to develop a methodology based on analogy and form
was hesitant and one that he did not clearly embrace,19 his contemporaries—
schooled in the works of Buffon and others in the French tradition—had
already for some time been concerned with the questions that prompted
Kant’s introduction of reflective judgment: how can we develop a natural
history that takes account of nature’s diversity without overlooking the sig-
nificant relations between various beings? And how can we grasp organiza-
tion within nature?
In the 1770s, Herder came to the same conclusions that Kant would later
reach: it is only via analogy that we can discern unity in diversity, because
it is only by seeing one thing through another that we can see how it is both
like and unlike the other. Herder, however, took his argument on the role of
analogy further, claiming that cognition itself is analogical. Specifically, he
contends that the relationship between our various cognitive faculties (sensi-
bility, imagination, and understanding) is analogical: they not only work to-
gether, but also intimate, anticipate, and approximate one another. His claim
is that it is only if what is given to sensibility implicitly contains the image of
the imagination, and it is only if the image similarly implicitly contains the
concept of the understanding, that we can properly grasp what is before us
and develop a concept that is not separate from the image or the phenom-
enon—a concrete concept as opposed to an empty universal.
Herder designated this concrete concept Hauptform (main form) and
argued that it is only through the Hauptform that we can discern relations
within nature across vast geographical and historical distances. Importantly,
Herder did not regard the Hauptform as a Kantian regulative ideal, because
it is realized in the world—even if never completely—and it is through its
material expressions that we can grasp it. The question then is, how do we
grasp the Hauptform? Herder’s answer, as we will see, was both illuminating
and surprising—and, like Kant’s turn to art and analogy, points to the signifi-
cance of artistic capacities and devices in the study of the natural world.
10 Romantic Empiricism
Like Herder and Kant, Goethe sought to discern unity in nature through
a comparative approach—one that takes account of both similarities and
differences, and that aims to grasp the form of living beings in relation to
their larger context. Underlying Goethe’s interest in the notion of form was
the view that form is neither a static object nor something that can be simply
seen with the physical eyes. Rather, as Goethe came to formulate it, it must
be discerned with the mind’s eye, or what he called “intuitive judgment
[anschauende Urteilskraft].”
Goethe first articulated the idea of intuitive judgment in response to Kant’s
claim in the third Critique that our discursive form of understanding cannot
proceed intuitively. In contrast, Goethe remarked that he had practiced in-
tuitive judgment throughout his work, both in his comparative anatomy and
in his study of plant metamorphosis. It is through intuitive judgment that he
was able to discover the intermaxillary bone, and it is through intuitive judg-
ment that he grasped the internal coherence of the plant. What makes a judg-
ment intuitive, Goethe explains, is its ability to discern how the sequences
within nature are part of one process of formation. In other words, unlike our
usual procedures of knowing, intuitive judgment can see how what appears
as a merely sequential relation is not only sequential, but is also an expres-
sion of other, nonsequential relations. A plant, for instance, does not develop
only sequentially, from seed to fruit (and finally to seed), but also simultane-
ously, and in two senses: its various parts grow at the same time (as the stem
grows, so do the leaves), and the parts emerge in relation to one another. Thus
although the fruit is the last stage of development, all preceding stages are
working toward achieving it. Accordingly, one can say that the fruit is “al-
ready” in the seed, in the flower, in the root, and that the relation between
fruit and flower, fruit and seed, or fruit and root is not purely sequential, but
also nonsequential and nonlinear.
This nonsequential unity can be discerned, Goethe contends, by
observing the forms of the plant’s different parts—the way in which each of
the plant’s parts expresses its place within the whole and thus its relation to
what precedes and what follows it. This is particularly evident in transitional
stages of development, where aspects of the preceding stage are “carried for-
ward” into the following stage, or vice versa, where aspects of the following
stages are anticipated by what preceded them. For instance, the first petals
that appear might be green—recalling the green of the stem leaves—or leaves
can become increasingly complex on some trees, approaching the shape of a
Introduction 11
branch. By assuming the form of what precedes or follows them, these parts
offer clues to the observer, clues for how to look and what to look for.
While in his early works Goethe had simply spoken of observation, fol-
lowing his encounter with philosophy—in particular his reading of Kant and
friendship with Schiller—he developed a nuanced epistemology and meth-
odology, which was based on his distinction between, as he put it, “seeing
and seeing”—that is, the difference between seeing with the physical eye
alone, and seeing with the physical eye and the mind’s eye simultaneously. To
achieve this second form of seeing, however, requires education. More spe-
cifically, and as I will argue, it requires an aesthetic education in both senses
of the term: an education of our aesthetic or perceptual capacities and an
education in the arts. Intuitive judgment can only be achieved through this
education.
This means that we are not born with intuitive judgment. After all, as
Buffon and Kant had noted, our natural tendency is to judge things in a non-
intuitive way—to regard parts or objects as separate and static, and to see
their relations in purely linear terms. Intuitive judgment is thus a task that
stands before us, and it is our responsibility as knowers to educate our cogni-
tive capacities so that they become intuitive. This responsibility, as I argue, is
not only epistemic, but also ethical, in that how we know—the capacities and
devices we invoke in our attempt to investigate a phenomenon—determines
how the phenomenon will appear to us. In turn, the manner in which the
phenomenon appears—whether it is appears as a machine or as a sentient
being—will inform our behaviors and actions toward it.
Among the four figures, Humboldt is the thinker who is most clearly iden-
tifiable as a “scientist.”20 He is perhaps also the thinker who most vehemently
argued for the significance of art and aesthetic experience. He contended,
for instance, that in order to grasp living beings in their context, the student
of nature must learn to regard nature as a landscape painter. Furthermore,
Humboldt devoted part of the second volume of his five-volume Kosmos
(Cosmos) (1845–62) to tracing the development of science in relation to the
arts. In this way, he both preceded recent efforts in the history of science to
demonstrate the significance of the arts (widely construed) for the develop-
ment of natural-scientific disciplines and practices and offered one of the
first integrated histories of knowledge.21 In turn, although among the four
Goethe is the only figure recognized as an artist, Humboldt was, in a signifi-
cant sense, also an artist.
12 Romantic Empiricism
14 Romantic Empiricism
Still, the third Critique might seem like a strange first station in our
story. It was published some five years after the appearance of the first two
volumes of Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of History of Humanity [Ideen zur
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit] (1784–1791), and in the same
year as Goethe’s essay Metamorphosis of Plants [Versuch die Metamorphose
der Pflanzen zu erklären]. Furthermore, it is a hesitant text. This wavering is
perhaps most evident in Kant’s claims regarding the scientific status of tele-
ological judgment. On the one hand, he claims that the reality of organized
beings demands that we “subordinate” all mechanism to teleology, and that
teleological judgment is “indispensable” for scientific inquiry (AA 5, 379;
398). On the other hand, he describes teleological judgment as “problem-
atic,” and (just after emphasizing its indispensability) concludes that that we
are under an “obligation” to subordinate teleological judging to judging ac-
cording to mechanical principles (AA 5, 370; 415).
However, it is precisely in this hesitation, in Kant’s small steps forward,
followed by sudden retreats, that both the significance and the radicality
of romantic empiricism becomes evident. For Kant’s hesitation evinces
the challenges facing any attempt to develop a bottom-up account of
nature, which aims to arrive at more than the mere collection of unrelated
data. In the third Critique Kant’s goal was to achieve “interconnected em-
pirical laws,” “interconnected experience,” and an “empirical system of
nature” (AA 20, 204; 217; 215; see also AA 5, 183). Thus, in contrast to
his earlier writings, where the aim was to legislate necessity onto nature,
the third Critique seeks to “find” necessity in nature: discern unity in
the multiplicity, integrity in diversity, coherence in empirical phenomena
(AA 5, 179).
Kant’s hesitations, then, should not throw us off but provide us with illu-
minating insights into the challenges facing the project, and into how it can
potentially succeed. While Kant makes some important headway in this di-
rection, he refuses to take the final step. In his wavering, he stops short of
developing a clear stance regarding the place of organization in nature, and
perhaps more poignantly, of articulating the scientific status of teleological
judging. His contemporaries, by contrast, do take the crucial step of devel-
oping a science inspired and underpinned by the methodologies and insights
of aesthetic forms of judgment. Accordingly, in considering Kant’s relation-
ship to and differences from Herder, Goethe, and Humboldt, we will be
better able to understand how and why they took that final step—and assess
their success in taking it.
Setting the Stage 15
What does the analogy with art imply? It implies, first, intention, purpose,
or idea. A work of art is brought forth with a purpose or idea in mind. This
idea grants it unity. Thus to ask readers to conceive of nature as art is to ask
them to regard nature as if it were unified through an idea or intention.
But this is not all, and, as I will argue, it is not the crucial element in the
analogy between nature and art. For a work of art is a composition. This
means, first, that each of its parts is essential to the whole. We cannot take a
chord out of a symphony and expect that it will be the same symphony. Each
part, in other words, is necessary. And its necessity is connected to its dis-
tinctiveness. We cannot replace one chord with another. Accordingly, each
chord—in its singularity—plays an essential role. This shows that a work of
art involves a certain kind of togetherness of its parts: each, in its distinctive
way, works with all the other parts to bring about the whole.
The work of art is thus the outcome of its distinctive, conjoined, and nec-
essary parts. But the reverse is also true. For although the parts make up the
whole, they do not exist outside of or prior to the whole. A chord in a sym-
phony assumes a distinctive meaning in relation to the (idea of the) whole, as
part of the whole. The same holds for colors or shapes in a painting. Just as the
painting depends on its specific colors, lines, shapes, so also these colors, lines,
and shapes depend on the whole painting. This dependence is both metaphys-
ical and epistemological: the parts assume a specific meaning in light of (the
idea of) the whole; and they can only be understood in relation to the whole.
Following his claim that nature should be regarded as art, Kant goes on to
say that this idea gives us a “maxim by which to observe nature and to hold
its forms together [die Formen der Natur damit zusammen zu halten]” (AA
20, 205). The implication is that by regarding nature as art, the crucial aim is
not so much to see nature as the realization of an intention or purpose, but
rather to hold the forms of nature together. This, after all, is what is required
for grasping a work of art.
When we view a painting, we do not consider the different parts that make
up the whole in isolation (the colors, shapes, lines, brushstrokes, etc.). Rather,
we see them in their relation to one another; we hold them together, and
thereby discern how each part—in its distinctive way—works with the other
parts and contributes to the whole. Similarly, when we listen to a piece of
music, we do not hear one sound, irrespective of what precedes or follows it.
Rather, again, we hold the parts together. The listener hears every part as part
of the whole. Each phrase is heard both in its distinctiveness and in its rela-
tion to the whole. Otherwise, the phrase would be mere noise. Accordingly,
Setting the Stage 19
the listener must hear every phrase as an expression of the whole, which
means that in listening to the particular, one is also listening to the whole—
beholding the whole. Put differently, the listener must hear the whole in every
one of the piece’s phrases. The whole thus emerges in and through the parts,
even though it underpins the parts and their relations. It does not exist be-
yond or outside of them, but only in them and their relations.
The same, Kant suggests, is necessary for grasping nature as a unity. To
discern nature’s unity requires us to consider the different parts of nature not
only as individuals, but also as members of an integrated whole to which they
contribute in distinctive but related ways. It also requires us to see how the
whole (nature) emerges in and through the parts. In other words, it demands
that we regard the different parts of nature as expressions of nature’s unity.
By invoking an analogy between nature and art, then, Kant is asking his
readers to see nature differently—to see nature’s parts as expressions of unity,
and to see this unity as emerging in and expressed through the various parts.
In viewing nature as art, we seek to discern the ways that different beings
exhibit a structural similarity, and how this similarity points to an integrity
in nature. This implies that what we are looking for are not mere parts, so to
speak, but expressions or forms—parts that manifest the whole through their
distinctive form, in the same way that a phrase in a piece of music expresses
and points to the whole work.
This, I suggest, is the crucial element of the analogy between nature and
art in the First Introduction. And while this analogy is not prominent in
the published Introduction, the emphasis on form and structure remains
throughout the Critique of Teleological Judgment. In the opening section
(Section 61), for instance, Kant invokes the “structure [Bau] of a bird” in
order to introduce the reader to teleological judgment. For, he explains, it
is the bird’s structure that cannot be grasped through efficient causality and
mechanical principles. He writes:
if one adduces, e.g., the structure of a bird, the hollowness of its bones,
the placement of its wings for movement and of its tail for steering, etc.,
one says that given the mere nexus effectivus in nature, without the help
of a special kind of causality, namely that of ends (nexus finalis), this is all
in the highest degree contingent [zufällig]: i.e., that nature, considered as
mere mechanism, could have formed itself in a thousand different ways
without hitting precisely upon the unity in accordance with such a rule,
and that it is therefore only outside the concept of nature, not within it,
20 Romantic Empiricism
that one would have even the least ground a priori for hoping to find such
a principle. (AA 5, 360)
Kant’s claim is that from the perspective of efficient causality and mechan-
ical physics, the structure of the bird appears “contingent.” In other words,
from that perspective there is nothing necessary about the different parts
that make up the bird. In the Introduction, Kant had articulated the problem
that the third Critique aims to address in terms of contingency in nature, and
the need to make the contingent appear lawful—i.e., necessary (AA 5, 176).
While there he did not mention efficient causality and mechanism, but fo-
cused on the a priori laws of the understanding, here he is pointing to “certain
things” that appear contingent from the perspective of mechanical physics
and efficient causality.3 Furthermore, while in the Introduction, Kant iden-
tifies contingency with the fact that the a priori laws of the understanding
cannot legislate for every empirical law, here he is specifically speaking of
mechanism and efficient causality. The question is: what is the precise rela-
tionship between the a priori laws of the understanding and mechanism and
efficient causality?
This question has been hotly debated in the literature, and for good
reason. On the one hand, Kant identifies efficient causality and mechanism
with the a priori laws of the understanding at various points in the text.
In Section 70, for instance, he notes that the mechanical principle “is pro-
vided . . . by the mere understanding a priori.” In Section 71, he states that
mechanism follows the order of the “sensible world,” which is furnished
by the transcendental structures of experience (AA 5, 389).4 On the other
hand, mechanism and efficient causality appear to be far more determining,
far more concrete, than the a priori laws of the understanding.5 While this
may be the case, Kant’s claims imply that mechanism and efficient causality
go hand in hand with the a priori laws of the understanding, such that even
if they do tell us a lot more about empirical nature, their foundation is—ul-
timately—a priori.
Nevertheless, even if a priori and empirical laws (i.e., the laws of the un-
derstanding and mechanism and efficient causality, respectively) work hand
in hand, they remain insufficient to explain all aspects of nature, in that they
leave certain parts of nature underdetermined or contingent. This brings us
back to Kant’s claim that the bird’s structure has been left underdetermined,
not simply by the laws of the understanding, but also by efficient causality
Setting the Stage 21
and the mechanical laws of motion. What does this tell us about the meaning
of contingency?
It tells us that it is the structure of the bird that is contingent. In other words,
it points us to the unity between the various parts of the bird—its tail, the
placement of its wings, the hollowness of its bones, and so on—and claims
that, from the perspective of efficient causality and mechanism, this unity is
highly unlikely. From that perspective, the specific parts of the bird and their
relations appear entirely accidental. There is nothing necessary about these
particular parts, or about their relationship. In the place of the specific bone
structure, or the tail, or the wings, something else—entirely different—could
have emerged. Ultimately, then, Kant’s claim is that if we consider the bird’s
structure according to efficient causality and the laws of mechanics, we find
nothing necessary in either these parts, or in their relation and specific com-
bination, i.e., in the whole. They could have been otherwise.
However, to simply state that this combination is highly unlikely does not
tell us much about the bird—its structure, its parts, their various functions
and relations, its health and well-being, its connection to other beings, its
connection to its context, and so on. Thus, while regarding it as “contingent”
may be appropriate from one perspective (that of general mechanics), it is
inappropriate from another perspective: the perspective that seeks to order
and classify nature. If our goal, in other words, is to discern relations between
nature’s parts, see connections between forms, then efficient causality and
mechanism are of no use.
This is precisely where reflecting judgment becomes crucial. By seeing
the bird as a work of art, reflecting judgment considers the bird’s various
parts as expressions of an integrated unity. From this perspective, they ap-
pear interconnected, with each part playing a distinctive role in the bird as
a whole. The hollowness of the bird’s bones, the specific placement of its
wings, its feathers, its size and overall structure, all appear to be variations
on a theme, parts of one whole. In other words, when considered in light of
the whole, the hollowness of the bird’s bones appears to be essential, just like
its wings—both of which clearly go hand in hand. As such, the various parts,
and their placement, no longer appear contingent or arbitrary. Rather, they
appear to be working together to enable the bird to achieve flight. In this
way, reflecting judgment begins to discern a necessity in the parts, to regard
them not as accidental, but as essential, to the bird. (It is as if the bird has
been purposively constructed to achieve the end of flight.)
22 Romantic Empiricism
teleological judgment is rightly drawn into our research into nature, at least
problematically, but only in order to bring it under principles of observa-
tion and research in analogy with causality according to ends, without pre-
suming thereby to explain it. (AA 5, 360)
Setting the Stage 23
there be some common ground in order for us to regard the one as a symbol
of the other? Kant’s answer is yes, but his aim is to draw out a form of sym-
bolic representation that has—thus far—been largely ignored. For, as he
explains, “between a despotic state and a handmill there is . . . no simi-
larity” (AA 5, 352). What he means is that there are no shared material
properties between the two: there is nothing in their material makeup that
should lead us to see the one (the hand mill) as a symbol of the other (the
despotic state).
This property-based use of analogy is, of course, the more widely known
form of analogical reflection, and the one that Kant had discussed in his
lectures on logic. In that context, he describes analogy as a form of a poste-
riori knowledge not unlike induction. Induction proceeds by determining
universal characteristics and categorizing particulars under these universal
concepts. Analogical inference, by contrast, proceeds from particular to total
similarity between two things. While inductive inference is based on the prin-
ciple of universalization such that what belongs to many things of the genus
also belongs to the remaining ones, analogical inference is based on the prin-
ciple of specification: it concerns the attributes or properties of two different
entities. In the “Dohnau Logic” (1780s), he puts it in the following way:
I infer according to analogy thus: when two or more things from a genus
agree with one another in as many marks as we have been able to discover,
I infer that they will also agree with one another in the remaining marks
that I have not been able to discover. . . . I infer, then, from some marks to all
the other ones, that they will also agree in these. (AA 24, 772)
In the “Hechsel Logic,” he provides the example of the earth and moon to
explicate this kind of analogy. They are the same kind of entity (i.e., celestial
bodies), and they share several features (e.g., they have valleys and moun-
tains). On this basis, we can go on to infer that they share additional features,
e.g., the earth has water, so the moon may also have water. Of course, this
analogy turned out to be wrong—and this is why analogical inference must
always stand to be corrected.7
As presented in the lectures on logic, then, analogy involves comparing
the attributes or properties of different entities and, on the basis of shared
properties, making an inference to unknown properties. It is this concep-
tion of analogy that Kant wants to depart from in the third Critique when he
Setting the Stage 25
claims that there is “no similarity” between the despotic state and the hand
mill. The question then is: on what basis can we draw an analogy?
Kant’s claim is that the similarity has to do with the way we reflect on them.
When we reflect on a constitutional monarchy, we proceed from the whole to
the part, and this permits us to appeal to the symbol of an organized being. In
the case of an individually governed monarchy, by contrast, we proceed from
part to whole, and thereby appeal to the mechanical metaphor of a hand mill.
The symbolic relation, then, is connected to our mode of reflection.
This, Kant contends, is also the case for the relation between beauty and
morality. The symbolic relation between them does not rest on shared prop-
erties; rather, it has to do with our manner of reflecting on them. While our
experience of beauty involves harmony between understanding and imag-
ination, our experience of morality involves harmony between reason and
will. On the basis of the harmony in our experience of the two, Kant argues,
we discern a symbolic relation between beauty and morality—such that
beauty is a symbol of morality.8
While this makes some sense, it does not fully account for why we should
reflect on the objects in the same way. After all, there is a reason behind my
proceeding in a particular way, a reason that has to do with a structural simi-
larity between the despotic state and the hand mill, on the one hand, and the
constitutional monarchy and the animate body, on the other. Accordingly,
although they do not share material properties (as the earth and the moon
do), they do share a crucial structural similarity, and it is this similarity that
permits us to reflect on them in a particular way—and thereby draw an
analogy.
What this means is that symbolic presentation must be connected to
the objects and their respective structures—if not to their material proper-
ties.9 On this basis, Kant goes on to write that analogy is a “carrying over
[Übertragung] of reflection on one object of intuition to another, quite dif-
ferent concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond”
(AA 5, 352–53). In other words, analogy involves “carrying over” the rules
of (reflecting on) one object onto another (perhaps nonpresentable) object,
with the goal of presenting the second object. The analogy is thus based on
the rules of reflecting. However, these rules are connected to the (structure
of the) objects. By applying the rules of reflecting on one object onto another
(lesser known, or perhaps nonpresentable) object, we gain (further) insight
into the second object.
26 Romantic Empiricism
WARM BATHS.
ACCIDENTS.
To make a Lotion. The eye to be bathed, by means of a soft piece of linen rag,
with this lotion frequently; and, between times, let a piece of linen rag, wetted
in the lotion, be applied to the eye, and be fastened in its place by means of a
bandage.
The white lily leaf, soaked in brandy, is another excellent remedy
for the bruises of a child. Gather the white lily blossoms when in full
bloom, and pot them in a wide-mouthed bottle of brandy, cork the
bottle, and it will then always be ready for use. Apply a leaf to the
part affected, and bind it on either with a bandage or with a
handkerchief. The white lily root sliced is another valuable external
application for bruises.
280. If a child fall upon his head and be stunned, what ought to be
done?
If he fall upon his head and be stunned, he will look deadly pale,
very much as if he had fainted. He will in a few minutes, in all
probability, regain his consciousness. Sickness frequently
supervenes, which makes the case more serious, it being a proof that
injury, more or less severe, has been done to the brain; send,
therefore, instantly, for a medical man.
In the mean time, loosen both his collar and neckerchief, lay him
flat on his back, sprinkle cold water upon his face, open the windows
so as to admit plenty of fresh air, and do not let people crowd around
him, nor shout at him, as some do, to make him speak.
While he is in an unconscious state, do not on any account
whatever allow a drop of blood to be taken from him, either by
leeches or by bleeding; if you do, he will probably never rally, but will
most likely sleep “the sleep that knows no waking.”
281. A nurse sometimes drops an infant and injures his back;
what ought to be done?
Instantly send for a surgeon; omitting to have proper advice in
such a case has frequently made a child a cripple for life. A nurse
frequently, when she has dropped her little charge, is afraid to tell
her mistress; the consequences might then be deplorable. If ever a
child scream violently without any assignable cause, and the mother
is not able for some time to pacify him, the safer plan is that she send
for a doctor, in order that he might strip and carefully examine him;
much after-misery might often be averted if this plan were more
frequently followed.
282. Have you any remarks to make and directions to give on
accidental poisoning by lotions, by liniments, etc.?
It is a culpable practice of either a mother or nurse to leave
external applications within the reach of a child. It is also highly
improper to put a mixture and an external application (such as a
lotion or a liniment) on the same tray or on the same mantle-piece.
Many liniments contain large quantities of opium, a teaspoonful of
which would be likely to cause the death of a child. “Hartshorn and
oil,” too, has frequently been swallowed by children, and in several
instances has caused death. Many lotions contain sugar of lead,
which is also poisonous. There is not, fortunately, generally sufficient
lead in the lotion to cause death; but if there be not enough to cause
death, there may be more than enough to make the child very poorly.
All these accidents occur from disgraceful carelessness.
A mother or a nurse ought always, before administering a dose of
medicine to a child, to read the label on the bottle; by adopting this
simple plan many serious accidents and much after-misery might be
averted. Again, I say let every lotion, every liniment, and indeed
everything for external use, be either locked up or be put out of the
way, and far away from all medicine that is given by the mouth. This
advice admits of no exception.
If your child has swallowed a portion of a liniment containing
opium, instantly send for a medical man. In the mean time, force a
strong mustard emetic (composed of two teaspoonfuls of flour of
mustard, mixed in half a teacupful of warm water) down his throat.
Encourage the vomiting by afterward forcing him to swallow warm
water. Tickle the throat either with your finger or with a feather.
Souse him alternately in a hot and then in a cold bath. Dash cold
water on his head and face. Throw open the windows. Walk him
about in the open air. Rouse him by slapping him, by pinching him,
and by shouting to him; rouse him, indeed, by every means in your
power, for if you allow him to go to sleep, it will, in all probability, be
the sleep that knows no waking!
If a child has swallowed “hartshorn and oil,” force him to drink
vinegar and water, lemon-juice and water, barley-water, and thin
gruel.
If he have swallowed a lead lotion, give him a mustard emetic, and
then vinegar and water, sweetened either with honey or with sugar,
to drink.
283. Are not Lucifer Matches poisonous?
Certainly, they are very poisonous; it is therefore desirable that
they should be put out of the reach of children. A mother ought to be
very strict with servants on this head. Moreover, lucifer matches are
not only poisonous but dangerous, as a child might set himself on
fire with them. A case bearing on the subject has just come under my
own observation. A little boy, three years old, was left alone for two
or three minutes, during which time he obtained possession of a
lucifer match, and struck a light by striking the match against the
wall. Instantly there was a blaze. Fortunately for him, in his fright, he
threw the match on the floor. His mother, at this moment, entered
the room. If his clothes had taken fire, which they might have done,
had he not thrown the match away, or if his mother had not been so
near at hand, he would, in all probability, have either been severely
burned, or have been burned to death.
284. If a child’s clothes take fire, what ought to be done to
extinguish them?
Lay him on the floor, then roll him either in the rug or in the
carpet, or in the door-mat, or in any thick article of dress you may
either have on, or have at hand—if it be woolen, so much the better;
or throw him down, and roll him over and over on the floor, as by
excluding the atmospheric air, the flame will go out: hence, the
importance of a mother cultivating presence of mind. If parents were
better prepared for such emergencies, such horrid disfigurations and
frightful deaths would be less frequent.
You ought to have a proper fire-guard before the nursery grate,
and should be strict in not allowing your child to play with fire. If he
still persevere in playing with it when he has been repeatedly
cautioned not to do so, he should be punished for his temerity. If
anything would justify corporal chastisement, it would surely be such
an act of disobedience. There are only two acts of disobedience that I
would flog a child for—namely, the playing with fire and the telling of
a lie! If after various warnings and wholesome corrections he still
persists, it would be well to let him slightly taste the pain of his doing
so, either by holding his hand for a moment very near the fire, or by
allowing him to slightly touch either the hot bar of the grate or the
flame of the candle. Take my word for it, the above plan will
effectually cure him—he will never do it again! It would be well for
the children of the poor to have pinafores made either of woolen or
of stuff materials. The dreadful deaths from burning, which so often
occur in winter, too frequently arise from cotton pinafores first
taking fire.[268]
If all dresses, after being washed, and just before being dried,
were, for a short time, soaked in a solution of tungstate of soda, such
clothes, when dried, would be perfectly fire-proof.
Tungstate of soda may be used either with or without starch; but
full directions for the using of it will, at the time of purchase, be
given by the chemist.
285. Is a burn more dangerous than a scald?
A burn is generally more serious than a scald. Burns and scalds are
more dangerous on the body, especially on the chest, than either on
the face or on the extremities. The younger the child, of course, the
greater is the danger.
Scalds, both of the mouth and of the throat, from a child drinking
boiling water from the spout of a tea-kettle, are most dangerous. A
poor person’s child is, from the unavoidable absence of the mother,
sometimes shut up in the kitchen by himself, and being very thirsty,
and no other water being at hand, he is tempted in his ignorance to
drink from the tea-kettle: if the water be unfortunately boiling, it will
most likely prove to him to be a fatal draught!
286. What are the best immediate applications to a scald or to a
burn?
There is nothing more efficacious than flour. It ought to be thickly
applied, over the part affected, and should be kept in its place either
with a rag and a bandage, or with strips of old linen. If this be done,
almost instantaneous relief will be experienced, and the burn or the
scald, if superficial, will soon be well. The advantage of flour as a
remedy is this, that it is always at hand. I have seen some extensive
burns and scalds cured by the above simple plan. Another excellent
remedy is cotton wool. The burn or the scald ought to be enveloped
in it; layer after layer should be applied until it be several inches
thick. The cotton wool must not be removed for several days.[269]
These two remedies, flour and cotton wool, may be used in
conjunction; that is to say, the flour may be thickly applied to the
scald or to the burn, and the cotton wool over all.
Prepared lard—that is to say, lard without salt[270]—is an admirable
remedy for burns and for scalds. The advantages of lard are: (1) It is
almost always at hand; (2) It is very cooling, soothing, and
unirritating to the part, and it gives almost immediate freedom from
pain; (3) It effectually protects and sheathes the burn or the scald
from the air; (4) It is readily and easily applied: all that has to be
done is to spread the lard either on pieces of old linen rag, or on lint,
and then to apply them smoothly to the parts affected, keeping them
in their places by means of bandages—which bandages may be
readily made from either old linen or calico shirts. Dr. John Packard,
of Philadelphia, was the first to bring this remedy for burns and
scalds before the public—he having tried it in numerous instances,
and with the happiest results. I myself have, for many years, been in
the habit of prescribing lard as a dressing for blisters, and with the
best effects. I generally advise equal parts of prepared lard and of
spermaceti cerate to be blended together to make an ointment. The
spermaceti cerate gives a little more consistence to the lard, which, in
warm weather, especially, is a great advantage.
Another valuable remedy for burns is, “carron oil;” which is made
by mixing equal parts of linseed oil and lime-water together in a
bottle, and shaking it up before using it.
Cold applications, such as cold water, cold vinegar and water, and
cold lotions, are most injurious, and, in many cases, even dangerous.
Scraped potatoes, sliced cucumber, salt, and spirits of turpentine,
have all been recommended; but, in my practice, nothing has been so
efficacious as the remedies above enumerated.
Do not wash the wound, and do not dress it more frequently than
every other day. If there be much discharge, let it be gently sopped
up with soft old linen rag; but do not, on any account, let the burn be
rubbed or roughly handled. I am convinced that, in the majority of
cases, wounds are too frequently dressed, and that the washing of
wounds prevents the healing of them. “It is a great mistake,” said
Ambrose Paré, “to dress ulcers too often, and to wipe their surfaces
clean, for thereby we not only remove the useless excrement, which
is the mud or sanies of ulcers, but also the matter which forms the
flesh. Consequently, for these reasons, ulcers should not be dressed
too often.”
The burn or the scald may, after the first two days, if severe,
require different dressings; but, if it be severe, the child ought of
course to be immediately placed under the care of a surgeon.
If the scald be either on the leg or on the foot, a common practice
is to take the shoe and the stocking off; in this operation, the skin is
also at the same time very apt to be removed. Now, both the shoe and
the stocking ought to be slit up, and thus be taken off, so that neither
unnecessary pain nor mischief may be caused.
287. If a bit of quicklime should accidentally enter the eye of my
child, what ought to be done?
Instantly, but tenderly remove, either by means of a camel’s-hair
brush or by a small spill of paper, any bit of lime that may adhere to
the ball of the eye, or that may be within the eye or on the eyelashes;
then well bathe the eye (allowing a portion to enter it) with vinegar
and water—one part of vinegar to three parts of water, that is to say,
a quarter fill a clean half-pint medicine bottle with vinegar and then
fill it up with spring water, and it will be ready for use. Let the eye be
bathed for at least a quarter of an hour with it. The vinegar will
neutralize the lime, and will rob it of its burning properties.
Having bathed the eye with the vinegar and water for a quarter of
an hour, bathe it for another quarter of an hour simply with a little
warm water; after which, drop into the eye two or three drops of the
best sweet oil, put on an eye-shade made of three thicknesses of linen
rag, covered with green silk, and then do nothing more until the
doctor arrives.
If the above rules be not promptly and properly followed out, the
child may irreparably lose his eyesight; hence the necessity of a
popular work of this kind, to tell a mother, provided immediate
assistance cannot be obtained, what ought instantly to be done; for
moments, in such a case, are precious.
While doing all that I have just recommended, let a surgeon be
sent for, as a smart attack of inflammation of the eye is very apt to
follow the burn of lime; but which inflammation will, provided the
previous directions have been promptly and efficiently followed out,
with appropriate treatment, soon subside.
The above accident is apt to occur to a child who is standing near a
building when the slacking of quicklime is going on, and where
portions of lime, in the form of powder, are flying about the air. It
would be well not to allow a child to stand about such places, as
prevention is always better than cure. Quicklime is sometimes called
caustic lime: it well deserves its name, for it is a burning lime, and if
proper means be not promptly used, will soon burn away the sight.
288. “What is to be done in the case of Choking?”
Instantly put your finger into the throat and feel if the substance
be within reach; if it be food, force it down, and thus liberate the
breathing; should it be a hard substance, endeavor to hook it out; if
you cannot reach it, give a good smart blow or two with the flat of the
hand on the back; or, as recommended by a contributor to the
Lancet, on the chest, taking care to “seize the little patient, and place
him between your knees side ways, and in this or some other manner
to compress the abdomen [the belly], otherwise the power of the
blow will be lost by the yielding of the abdominal parietes [walls of
the belly], and the respiratory effort will not be produced.” If that
does not have the desired effect, tickle the throat with your finger, so
as to insure immediate vomiting, and the consequent ejection of the
offending substance.[271]
289. Should my child be bitten by a dog supposed to be mad, what
ought to be done?
Instantly well rub for the space of five of ten seconds—seconds, not
minutes—a stick of nitrate of silver (lunar caustic) into the wound.
The stick of lunar caustic should be pointed, like a cedar-pencil for
writing, in order the more thoroughly to enter the wound.[272] This, if
properly done directly after the bite, will effectually prevent
hydrophobia. The nitrate of silver acts not only as a caustic to the
part, but it appears effectually to neutralize the poison, and thus by
making the virus perfectly innocuous is a complete antidote. If it be
either the lip, or the parts near the eye, or the wrist, that have been
bitten, it is far preferable to apply the caustic than to cut the part out;
as the former is neither so formidable, nor so dangerous, nor so
disfiguring as the latter, and yet it is equally as efficacious. I am
indebted to the late Mr. Youatt, the celebrated veterinary surgeon,
for this valuable antidote or remedy for the prevention of the most
horrible, heart-rending, and incurable disease known. Mr. Youatt
had an immense practice among dogs as well as among horses. He
was a keen observer of disease, and a dear lover of his profession,
and he had paid great attention to rabies—dog madness. He and his
assistants had been repeatedly bitten by rabid dogs; but knowing
that he was in possession of an infallible preventive remedy, he never
dreaded the wounds inflicted either upon himself or upon his
assistants. Mr. Youatt never knew lunar caustic, if properly and
immediately applied, to fail. It is, of course, only a preventive. If
hydrophobia be once developed in the human system, no antidote
has ever yet, for this fell and intractable disease, been found.
While walking the London Hospitals, upwards of thirty-five years
ago, I received an invitation from Mr. Youatt to attend a lecture on
rabies—dog madness. He had, during the lecture, a dog present
laboring under incipient madness. In a day or two after the lecture,
he requested me and other students to call at his infirmary and see
the dog, as the disease was at that time fully developed. We did so,
and found the poor animal raving mad—frothing at the mouth, and
snapping at the iron bars of his prison. I was particularly struck with
a peculiar brilliancy and wildness of the dog’s eyes. He seemed as
though, with affright and consternation, he beheld objects unseen by
all around. It was pitiful to witness his frightened and anxious
countenance. Death soon closed the scene!
I have thought it my duty to bring the value of lunar caustic as a
preventive of hydrophobia prominently before your notice, and to
pay a tribute of respect to the memory of Mr. Youatt—a man of talent
and genius.
Never kill a dog supposed to be mad who has bitten either a child,
or any one else, until it has, past all doubt, been ascertained whether
he be really mad or not. He ought, of course, to be tied up, and be
carefully watched, and be prevented the while from biting any one
else. The dog, by all means, should be allowed to live at least for
some weeks, as the fact of his remaining will be the best guarantee
that there is no fear of the bitten child having caught hydrophobia.
There is a foolish prejudice abroad, that a dog, be he mad or not,
who has bitten a person ought to be immediately destroyed; that
although the dog be not at the time mad, but should at a future
period become so, the person who had been bitten when the dog was
not mad, would, when the dog became mad, have hydrophobia! It
seems almost absurd to bring the subject forward; but the opinion is
so very general and deep rooted, that I think it well to declare that
there is not the slightest foundation of truth in it, but that it is a
ridiculous fallacy!
A cat sometimes goes mad, and its bite may cause hydrophobia;
indeed, the bite of a mad cat is more dangerous than the bite of a
mad dog. A bite from a mad cat ought to be treated precisely in the
same manner—namely, with the lunar caustic—as for a mad dog.
A bite either from a dog or from a cat who is not mad, from a cat
especially, is often venomous and difficult to heal. The best
application is immediately to apply a large hot white-bread poultice
to the part, and to renew it every four hours; and, if there be much
pain in the wound, to well foment the part, every time before
applying the poultice, with a hot chamomile and poppy-head
fomentation.
Scratches of a cat are best treated by smearing, and that freely and
continuously for an hour, and then afterward at longer intervals,
fresh butter on the part affected. If fresh butter be not at hand, fresh
lard—that is to say, lard without salt—will answer the purpose. If the
pain of the scratch be very intense, foment the part affected with hot
water, and then apply a hot white-bread poultice, which should be
frequently renewed.
290. What is the best application in case of a sting either from a
bee or from a wasp?
Extract the sting, if it have been left behind, either by means of a
pair of dressing forceps, or by the pressure of the hollow of a small
key—a watch-key will answer the purpose; then, a little blue (which
is used in washing) moistened with water, should be immediately
applied to the part; or, apply a few drops of solution of potash,[273] or
“apply moist snuff or tobacco, rubbing it well in,”[274] and renew from
time to time either of them: if either of these be not at hand, either
honey, or treacle, or fresh butter, will answer the purpose. Should
there be much swelling or inflammation, apply a hot white-bread
poultice, and renew it frequently. In eating apricots, or peaches, or
other fruit, they ought to, beforehand, be carefully examined, in
order to ascertain that no wasp is lurking in them; otherwise, it may
sting the throat, and serious consequences will ensue.
291. If a child receive a fall, causing the skin to be grazed, can you
tell me of a good application?
You will find gummed paper an excellent remedy; the way of
preparing it is as follows: Apply evenly, by means of a small brush,
thick mucilage of gum arabic to cap paper; hang it up to dry, and
keep it ready for use. When wanted, cut a portion as large as may be
requisite, then moisten it with your tongue, in the same manner you
would a postage stamp, and apply it to the grazed part. It may be
removed when necessary by simply wetting it with water. The part in
two or three days will be well. There is usually a margin of gummed
paper sold with postage stamps; this will answer the purpose equally
well. If the gummed paper be not at hand, then frequently, for the
space of an hour or two, smear the part affected with fresh butter.
292. In case of a child swallowing by mistake either laudanum, or
paregoric, or Godfrey’s Cordial, or any other preparation of opium,
what ought to be done?
Give, as quickly as possible, a strong mustard emetic; that is to
say, mix two teaspoonfuls of flour of mustard in half a teacupful of
water, and force it down his throat. If free vomiting be not induced,
tickle the upper part of the swallow with a feather; drench the little
patient’s stomach with large quantities of warm water. As soon as it
can be obtained from a druggist, give him the following emetic
draught:
Take of—Sulphate of Zinc, one scruple;
Simple Syrup, one drachm;
Distilled Water, seven drachms:
To make a Draught.
Smack his buttocks and his back; walk him, or lead him, or carry
him about in the fresh air; shake him by the shoulders; pull his hair;
tickle his nostrils; shout and holla in his ears; plunge him into a
warm bath and then into a cold bath alternately; well sponge his
head and face with cold water; dash cold water on his head, face, and
neck; and do not, on any account, until the effects of the opiate are
gone off, allow him to go to sleep; if you do, he will never wake again!
While doing all these things, of course, you ought to lose no time in
sending for a medical man.
293. Have you any observations to make on parents allowing the
Deadly Nightshade—the Atropa Belladonna—to grow in their
gardens?
I wish to caution you not on any account to allow the Belladonna—
the Deadly Nightshade—to grow in your garden. The whole plant—
root, leaves, and berries—is poisonous; and the berries, being
attractive to the eye, are very alluring to children.
294. What is the treatment of poisoning by Belladonna?
Instantly send for a medical man; but, in the mean time, give an
emetic—a mustard emetic;—mix two teaspoonfuls of flour of
mustard in half a teacupful of warm water, and force it down the
child’s throat; then drench him with warm water, and tickle the
upper part of his swallow either with a feather or with the finger, to
make him sick; as the grand remedy is an emetic to bring up the
offending cause. If the emetic have not acted sufficiently, the medical
man when he arrives may deem it necessary to use the stomach-
pump; but remember not a moment must be lost, for moments are
precious in a case of belladonna poisoning, in giving a mustard
emetic, and repeating it again and again until the enemy be
dislodged. Dash cold water upon his head and face; the best way of
doing which is by means of a large sponge, holding his head and his
face over a wash-hand basin, half filled with cold water, and filling
the sponge from the basin, and squeezing it over his head and face,
allowing the water to continuously stream over them for an hour or
two, or until the effects of the poison have passed away. This
sponging of the head and face is very useful in poisoning by opium,
as well as in poisoning by belladonna; indeed, the treatment of
poisoning by the one is very similar to the treatment of poisoning by
the other. I, therefore, for the further treatment of poisoning by
belladonna, beg to refer you to a previous Conversation on the
treatment of poisoning by opium.
295. Should a child put either a pea or a bead, or any other
foreign substance, up the nose, what ought to be done?
Do not attempt to extract it yourself, or you might push it farther
in, but send instantly for a surgeon, who will readily remove it, either
with a pair of forceps, or by means of a bent probe, or with a director.
If it be a pea, and it be allowed for any length of time to remain in, it
will swell, and will thus become difficult to extract, and may produce