The Devil'S Blessing: Harry Truman and International Control of The Atomic Bomb, SEPTEMBER 1945-JUNE 1946
The Devil'S Blessing: Harry Truman and International Control of The Atomic Bomb, SEPTEMBER 1945-JUNE 1946
The Devil'S Blessing: Harry Truman and International Control of The Atomic Bomb, SEPTEMBER 1945-JUNE 1946
A Master’s Thesis
by
DERYA DUMLU
June 2007
To The Peacemakers
THE DEVIL'S BLESSING:
HARRY TRUMAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ATOMIC
BOMB,
SEPTEMBER 1945- JUNE 1946
by
DERYA DUMLU
in
June 2007
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.
---------------------------------
Asst. Prof. Edward Kohn
Supervisor
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.
---------------------------------
Asst. Prof.
Examining Committee Member
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in History.
---------------------------------
Prof. Dr.
Examining Committee Member
---------------------------------
Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel
Director
ABSTRACT
Dumlu, Derya
MA, Department of History
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Edward P. Kohn
June 2007
Truman's policy concerning the atomic weapons is worthy of academic scrutiny. This
work focuses on the ten-month period from September 1945 to June 1946, during
which American government initiated the international control of the atomic energy.
Truman's domestic and foreign policy regarding this issue was influenced by several
external and internal factors, including the supporters and opponents of the
opinion and the Soviet conduct in different parts of the world. The focus of the thesis
is President Truman and the shift in the foreign policy. The main argument revolves
around how the president saw the international control, what factors affected his
decisions and which actors were involved. From Secretary of War Stimson's proposal
the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee meeting in June 1946, Truman
pursued policies that were in support of the international control. To come to this
iii
newspaper editorial were used as well as the secondary sources following a
chronological order.
Key Words: International Control of the Atomic Bomb, Nuclear Weapons, Harry S.
iv
ÖZET
Şeytanın Lütfu:
Harry Truman ve Atom Bombasının Uluslararası Denetimi,
Eylül 1945- Haziran 1946
Dumlu, Derya
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Dr. Edward P. Kohn
Haziran 2007
Sovyet idaresi de dahil olmak üzere bir çok etken bu konuyla ilgili iç ve dış
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is only fair to start with expressing my gratitude to Dr. Kohn for his
him, it would be impossible to write this thesis. Also, I'd like to offer my gratitude to
Dr. Roberts for his ever open door for crying girls.
My faithful friend Doğuş made it possible for me to keep going. She listened,
smiled and brought light. I don't know what I would have done without her.
Gülşah, and Kara; thank you for not talking to me early in the morning, making me
I thank Mike and Aimee Wuthrich, who have always been hospitable and
generous. They provided movies and wisdom when i felt like pulling my hair out.
I cannot forget Bahadır, Alev and Defne Çeliktemur, who supplied the
sanctuary I needed in the times of ultimate boredom. Little Defne, your birth brought
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Harry S. Truman became the president of the United States of America late in
the afternoon on April 12, 1945. The death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt left Truman
in charge of an unfinished war and the Manhattan Project, one of the biggest military
projects in American history. Even though Truman, as senator and the chairman of
the Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, had attempted to inspect
the nature of this project which demanded millions of dollars, Truman later withdrew
his demand for an investigation after being assured of the project’s importance and
secrecy by Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson. In a very short time after
becoming president, indeed, the very day after, James Byrnes, the former director of
weapon, the atomic bomb. When Stimson talked to Truman on April 25, the course
of the conversation was markedly different than those they had previously
exchanged. Stimson said, “[w]ithin four months we shall in all probability have
1
completed the most terrible weapon ever known to human history, one bomb of
which could destroy a whole city.”1 This was three months before the first
The bomb had primarily been developed in response to the threat posed by
Nazi Germany and the war in Europe, which raged during the years of Roosevelt’s
presidency. Roosevelt, the architect of the project, apparently never expressed doubt
or hesitations regarding the usage of the bomb, as Stimson notes: “at no time, from
1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other
responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in
war.”2 By the time the bomb had been completed, however, the situation had
changed dramatically. The war in Europe had come to a halt and Roosevelt had died
before ever learning of the success of his two-billion dollar project. The Pacific War
was still at hand, however, and the decision of whether or not to use the bomb in the
war was left to Truman. The weight and responsibility of such a decision was
reflected in the statements made by those who tested the bomb in Alamogordo, New
Mexico on July 15, 1945. They, too acknowledged its deadly power. J. Robert
Oppenheimer, for example, a theoretical physicist and the scientific director of the
Manhattan Project, later recalled that testing day: “I remembered the line from the
Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he
should do his duty and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, 'Now,
I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.' I suppose we all thought that one way
1
Henry Stimson, “Memorandum discussed with the President, April 25, 1945, Stimson Diary”, Yale
University Archives, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/3b.pdf.
2
Henry L. Stimson, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold war,
1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245.
2
or another."3 For Truman, however, there was even more to consider than the bomb’s
capacity to kill.
Before any decision was made about using the bomb, Truman and other
statesmen had to determine whether or not the Russians should be informed about it,
a deliberation which drew heated debates. Secretary of War Stimson delivered the
Conference in July Truman casually told Joseph Stalin about the invention of a new
powerful bomb without going into any further details. In return, Stalin casually
expressed the hope that it would be used against the Japanese as the Pacific War as
the only front remaining in World War II. Truman shared the same mentality with
Roosevelt and Churchill that this new device was simply a weapon: “I regarded the
bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.”4 On
August 6, 1945, “Little Boy” was detonated over Hiroshima and three days later “Fat
Man” over Nagasaki. On August 15, Japan announced its unconditional surrender to
The debates over why Truman dropped the bomb have been going on since
August of 1945. There are many arguments on the subject coming from different
schools of thought. In The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb Gar Alperovitz argued
that the bomb was dropped for political, rather than military, reasons and thus was
not necessary to end the war with Japan. He contended that the bomb was dropped as
a message to the Russians, not to end the war in the Pacific. On the other hand, some
historians, like John Lewis Gaddis, in the book The United States and the Origins of
the Cold War, 1941-1947, argue that the atomic bomb was used in accordance with
3
J. Robert Oppenheimer on the day of Trinity Test, quoted in Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 15.
4
Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Decision, (New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc. 1955)
3
why it was invented, that is as a weapon. Furthermore, the rationale for why the
bomb was detonated in Japan informs scholars about the way Truman saw the war,
the Japanese, and the Russians. He is thus often labeled with the stereotype of being
a militaristic president, a Cold Warrior, and a supporter of the arms race. However,
in the midst of such arguments and stereotypes, there is a short period of time which,
In 1945, there was not a Cold War, or a nuclear arms race. Even though
defender of the nuclear arms race, the months before the declaration of the Truman
doctrine reveal that Truman was seeking a way to provide an international forum for
the control of the atomic bomb. Truman and other American officials were well
aware of the implications of the bomb’s usage in the post-war world and became
concerned immediately after the Japanese surrender. The reality of the atomic bomb
was not a light burden to carry. The end of the war left the United States of America
with unheard-of military power. The politicians, the scientists, the soldiers and the
President were all looking into the future world with an awareness of the atomic
bomb and its potential ramifications. The months between September 1945 and June
1946 is a period when Truman searched for both domestic and international support
for his initiative concerning the international control of the atomic bomb. In
September 1945, Secretary of War Stimson suggested that the United States would
initiate talks leading to the international control of atomic weapons. The proposal
concerning this issue. However, in June 1946, the attempts failed when, during the
4
meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United States and
the Soviet Union could not agree on the method of international control during.
In the historiography of the origins of the Cold War, there appears to be three
approach. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Herbert Feis, and Louis J. Halle can be counted
among the traditionalist historians. The main arguments of traditionalism are: Stalin's
aggressive and expansionist actions cause the Cold War, until 1947 American
foreign policy was passive and defensive, the United States did not pursue its own
interest and after World War II America embraced universalism and rejected the
By the end of the 1950s, the antithesis of the traditionalist approach came
with William Appleman Williams. Williams argued that Open Door policy the
United States pursued created the basis for the American empire. Following
Williams' work, many revisionist works appeared especially after the Vietnam War
and American actions in the Caribbean. Gar Alperovitz, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko,
Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber and Barton Bernstein can be counted among the
revisionist scholars. The revisionists argued that the Truman administration dropped
the atomic bombs not only to end the war with Japan but also to give a warning to
the Soviet Union about their ambitions in the Far East and in the Eastern Europe.
Then, in the early years of the Cold War, America created a rhetoric of “winning
weapon” to intimidate the Russians. The Revisionists also argued that the atomic
diplomacy increased the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Thus, the main arguments of the revisionist approach are: Soviet Union was not the
5
Edward Crapol, “Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War,” The History Teacher,
Vol. 20, No. 2. (Feb., 1987): 251-262.
5
only culprit of the Cold War, America had its own economic and politic agenda, and
therefore America did not pursue a passive and innocent foreign policy.6
In the last decade, the new synthesis for the historiography of the origins of
Johns Lewis Gaddis and George Herring gave eclectic interpretations of this period.
economics for its political goals, Stalin was an opportunist, United States at times
exaggerated the external danger and there exists and American empire.7 In this
spectrum of interpretation, the current work would fall into a category between
post-war environment was created both by Americans and the Soviets. Thus, Soviets
were not the only responsible party. It is postrevisionist, since there is more emphasis
put on the individuals and less on the economics. Therefore, this study should be
The period from September 1945 to June 1946 thus occupies a unique place
in the history of the post-war world since these months witnessed the ambiguity of
the international atmosphere, foreshadowed the Cold War and encompassed the
efforts for the international control of the atomic bomb. However, the rise of the
Cold War after the war dominates the history of the time between the dropping of the
atomic bomb in August 1945 and the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. This poses
several problems to the study of this period. First of all, historians tend to
thus minimizing the uniqueness of the actors and the events of this period. Secondly,
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
6
the assumption that the origins of the Cold War go back to the World War I makes
stubborn character without giving him the space to react to other persons and
incidents is also an obstacle to the analysis of this ten-month period. Lastly, hindsight
of the Cold War is also a problematic feature, which encourages the historian to
interpret every event as a sign leading inevitably to the arms race and nuclear
deterrence. Keeping these biases in mind, there are several books and articles
should be noted, however, that none of the sources deal exclusively with the issue
the historiography of the Cold War. His book, The United States and the Origins of
the Cold War, is a definitive work on the subject. Gaddis mostly focuses on the
internal affairs and domestic opinion in relation to the foreign policy. His main
argument is that the American policy makers were bound by domestic politics more
so than their Russian counterparts. Therefore, Gaddis tends to put the blame on the
shoulders of Russia and Stalin. Even though his work is crucial, his bias as a strong
offers one of the best-researched and well-written pieces concerning the international
control of atomic energy, concluding that American foreign policy moved away from
atomic diplomacy in 1946. Another book by Gaddis The Long Peace, a collection of
essays previously published or presented by the author, focuses on how the USA and
the USSR managed to achieve a long peace, i.e., an absence of war, during what is
called the Cold War. Gaddis’s argument is crucial for this thesis in that he argues that
7
the leaders of both countries were extremely reluctant to use the bomb as a threat or
occasions, Truman never considered using the weapon after 1945. Furthermore,
Gaddis scrutinizes the atmosphere, which naturally impacted the view of the policy
makers, within the United States and in Europe. In his latest book We Now Know,
Gaddis looks at the Cold War from a post-Cold War perspective and analyzes the
nuclear weapons, which, taking an unusual approach, addresses why the United
States did not intend to start a preventative war while it had a monopoly over nuclear
weapons. Even without taking into account his important remarks on the
international control of the atomic bomb during the presidency of Truman, Gaddis’s
archives.
Andrew Fontaine’s History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to
the Korean War, 1917-1950 is a very short book which, nevertheless, makes a
relevant point which demands attention. Fontaine focuses on the argument that
Truman never intended to use the bomb as a diplomatic tool against the Soviets;
however, the bomb gave him ground to maneuver his policies if the Soviet side
became tough. The first part of the thesis reveals in part Truman’s perception of the
examines the developments within the state during the first decade of the Cold War
in his book A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National
state, thereby providing a more accurate perspective about the policies that followed.
8
Though the period focused on in this thesis is covered in the book, Hogan devotes
only about ten pages to the international control of the atomic bomb as the bulk of
the book is devoted to the Cold War development. Still, Hogan’s diplomatic history
is helpful in that it gives an account of the dealings between the Republicans and the
Democrats and between the civil and military authorities at this time.
Gregg Herken, likewise, is a historian who focused on this period with his
book, The Winning Weapon: the Atomic Bomb in the Cold War. In this work, the
four-year journey of the bomb, from the fall of 1945, right after Hiroshima, until the
detonation of the hydrogen bomb in Russia in 1949 and its aftermath during 1950,
was considered, with an emphasis on the first years of the weapon. He mainly argues
that Truman’s efforts to turn the control of the bomb over to the civilians were
defeated by the apparent victory of the McMahon Act8. Although he states that the
group of policy-makers believed in sharing the scientific knowledge with the Soviets,
Herken also makes a point that the Baruch Plan ended all hope for serious
Herken concludes that the Truman administration justified the status quo, i.e. the
monopoly of the bomb in the hands of the United States, with the collapse of the
Leffler is a short account of the origins of the Cold War, dating from 1917 to 1953.
The way the author roots the Cold War in the first half of the twentieth century is
important as a counter argument for the current study, since the author claims that
Truman possessed a Cold War mentality before 1946. However, even though the
8
McMahon Act, formally Atomic Energy Act of 1946, determined how the nuclear energy and
technology would be used and directed in the United States. Most importantly, the act established that
nuclear weapons and energy would be controlled by the civilian authorities rather than military. The
act, which was sponsored by Senator Brien McMahon, was signed by President Truman in August
1946, and went into effect in January 1947. For further information see S. J. Ball, “Military Nuclear
Relations between the United States and the Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act,
1946-1958, The Historical Journal Vol. 38, No. 2. (Jun., 1995): 439-454.
9
arguments will be considered as reference points, it should be kept in mind that this
book lacks a wide range of primary sources. Joseph I. Lieberman's book, The
provides quotations from many important figures of the time. Even though the
analytical work and the perspective of this book is not satisfactory for use as a
for the study at hand as through them one can see the importance of prominent actors
and also grasp the environment they were in and the paths they followed. Dean
Acheson was one of the key actors of this period. David S. McLellan’s book Dean
Acheson: the State Department Years contains a separate chapter on Dean Acheson’s
years as the undersecretary of state from 1945 to 1947. McLellan talks about how
Acheson was involved in the formation of the domestic control of the bomb and how
he was in favor of a rapprochement in relations with the USSR. The chapter devoted
to this period of Acheson’s career is one of the most detailed histories of the
development of this period including the context of public opinion and the
frame a plan for the international control of the atomic bomb. Steven M. Neuse’s
although it does not contain much about the period leading to Acheson-Lilienthal
most important figures of the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy
important figure and also provides a detailed account of the development of this ten
10
month period in James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the
Nuclear Age.
The biographies of Truman himself do not address this specific time period of
his presidency. William E. Pemberton’s Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold
Warrior devoted fewer than twenty pages to the international control of the bomb
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though the book did give the reader valuable insight
about Truman’s dilemma between domestic and foreign policy. Other biographies
like The Man from Missouri by Alfred Steinberg, Mr. President: Truman by William
Hillman, and Harry S. Truman: a Life by Robert H. Ferrell include virtually nothing
about the subject matter. Other biographical works including Plain Speaking, an
Former President Views the Nation and the World by Gregory W. Sand, The Truman
biased accounts since they tend to justify the works of Truman because of their
kinship with him. However, these biases can illuminate the personal and emotional
aspects of the president if the historian is able to see through the subjectivity. On the
other hand, Truman written by David McCullough outlines the situation the thirty-
third president was in after the end of the World War II by describing where Truman
stood as a president who was trapped in the midst of post-war domestic affairs and
the advent of a new super power. Although McCullough’s account of this ten-month
period occupies but a few pages in his book, he succeeds in portraying the
covering this period is Robert J. Donovan’s Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of
Harry S. Truman. Even though Donovan uses historical research methods and
11
employed in the writing of this book. The drawbacks of the scholarship, however, are
not significant enough to destroy the potential of the book as a secondary source.
he inevitably discusses the developments of late 1945 and early 1946. He devotes
two chapters to issues such as Truman’s view of Russians, the development leading
to Baruch Plan and the plan itself. Yet, the work is not to be relied on too heavily
There are also some articles written regarding various aspects of the issue
which are worthy of mention in the historiography. To begin with, “The Quest for
during these years, emphasizing the international control efforts during the Truman
claiming that the failure of the negotiations showed mutual mistrust. Secondly,
Edward Johnson scrutinizes the approaches of the Truman and Attlee governments,
focusing mainly on the meeting of three leaders in late 1945 and arguing that both
Henry B. Ryan’s article titled “A New Look at Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech” is
related to this significant document of the early Cold War years. Lastly, “The
American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War,
1945-1948” by Melvyn P. Leffler covers how the politicians and the policy makers
saw national security in the post-war setting of Europe and the world. The article
12
points out the several different aspects of concern for the government at this time
Along with the secondary sources, this study will rely on primary documents
including diaries, memoirs, state papers and newspaper editorials. The memoirs of
Wallace and Arthur Vandenberg offer the insider’s perspective on how important
actors of the time perceived the potentials of the atomic bomb. However, the fact that
the memoirs were written with the hindsight should be kept in mind. The letters and
diary entries of J. Robert Oppenheimer shed light on how the scientist himself was
affected by Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and how his view changed in the
between decision-makers, meetings and files reveal the primary concerns, aims and
York Times and The Chicago Tribune reflect the view of two influential newspapers
of the time. These two newspapers were chosen to reflect positions of two opposing
camps concerning the international control. The former paper was more supportive
of the international control and collaboration with other countries. The latter was
Considering that this time period has not been studied in depth by historians, the
During the analysis of this period, in chapter two, I will discuss how the
matter of international control of the atomic bomb came into being. This section will
deal with the perspectives of the different actors involved in both decision-making
and opinion forming, and also what initial steps were taken by the Truman
administration. In the third chapter, the rise of opposition and the changing dynamics
13
in domestic and foreign policy will be put forward in an attempt to point out the
change of direction in the policy making process. Lastly, the fourth chapter deals
with the appointment of Baruch, the ramifications of this appointment and the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission meeting in June. In the fifth chapter, I will
conclude the thesis with a review of what followed the collapse of the talks in the
summer of 1946, a look at the importance and ramifications of this study and a
14
CHAPTER II
the United States was confronted with one of the biggest dilemmas in its history.
There were many voices with clashing opinions entering into the debate over how to
handle this newfound power. On the one side the politicians wanted to use the atomic
bomb as the ultimate weapon and a means by which to create the world America
wanted. The words of Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado reveal the extremity of
some opinions in this camp: “God almighty in His infinite wisdom [has] dropped the
atomic bomb in our lap,… with vision and guts and plenty of atomic bombs…. [we
crisp.”9 On the other side, there were several different figures from politicians,
statesmen and scientists who were aware of the power of the atomic bomb and saw
the danger it could pose in the future. These two different camps of opinion
determined the shaping of American domestic and foreign policy for the months
ahead.
9
Senator Edwin C. Johnson quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the
Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245.
15
The American public as a whole actually knew very little about the bomb.
The secrecy of the Manhattan Project and the scientific complexity of nuclear
physics made it almost impossible to create a solid and sane public opinion on the
issue. Other than the knowledge of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even most of the
politicians did not understand the strength and the implications of the atomic bomb.
extremity and uncertainty. This quest, which began in August of 1945, reached a
turning point in November 1945 with the Truman-Attlee-King declaration, the first
step towards the international control of the atomic bomb in the post-war era. The
developments over these four months demonstrate that even though Truman was
establish civilian domestic and international control of the bomb in September. The
This chapter will deal with the developments of this time period both inside and
developments in the United States at the time is the perspectives of the various
actors, including statesmen, scientists and military figures, who either endorsed or
different places in terms of their proximity to the bomb debate. Secretary of War
Henry Lewis Stimson was one the men closest to the issue. Stimson was an
experienced statesman, who was involved in the government during the presidencies
16
finally Harry Truman. President Roosevelt appointed him as the supervisor of the
Manhattan Project, which made him one of the most knowledgeable politicians on
the development and usage of the atomic bomb. Stimson did not see the bomb purely
responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk.”10 In general, Stimson was in line with
the perspective of the scientists in that he endorsed the international control of the
atomic bomb. However, he was also aware of the political atmosphere in the Soviet
Union, which concerned him regarding the efficacy of any international control. It
the totalitarian nature of the government. However, he believed that the instability of
Russia should not become an excuse to prolong the American monopoly, but should
only function as a condition that requires precaution. In the end, Stimson concluded
that the atomic bomb should be controlled internationally despite the uncertain
situation and the role of the atomic bomb quite differently from his colleagues. He
concluded that the struggle to sustain the nuclear monopoly would become the very
thing that would lead to an arms race, since “any demand by us for an internal
resented that it would make the objective we have in view less probable.”12 It was
possible that an initiative coming from the United States would cause acceleration in
10
Henry Lewis Stimson quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 248.
11
Sherwin, Martin J. “The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy
Policy and Diplomacy.” The American Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 4. (Oct., 1973), pp. 945-968.
12
Henry Stimson, Henry Stimson to Harry S. Truman, Accompanied by a Memorandum, September
11, 1945, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers (Truman Presidential Museum and Library,
1945), http://www.trumanlibrary.org.
17
developing the bomb in Russia. But, Stimson argued that withholding from such an
action might instigate “a secret armament race of a rather desperate character.” The
risk needed to be taken because “if we fail to approach them now and merely
continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip,
their suspicions and their mistrust of our purposes and motives will increase.”13 As a
result, the Secretary of War proposed that the United States, Great Britain and
Canada would approach the Soviet Union to mutually stop further bomb
would be obtained forbidding the use of atomic energy for military purposes.14 This
government, but most harbored significant concerns regarding the sharing of such
Vincent Forrestal, had reservations concerning the international control of the atomic
Until we are very sure that it is the sense of the people to make
disposition of this knowledge even to our Allies it seems to me that it
is a step that should be considered most carefully and taken only after
complete study and reflection so that the charge may never be leveled
that it was done on impulse.15
Forrestal favored the idea that the United Nations would appoint the United
States as the “trustee of all information regarding the atomic bomb.”16 Only under
these circumstances, according to Forrestal, could the United States agree to use the
atomic bomb in line with the directions of the international organization. The
Secretary of the Navy was not alone in this line of thought; the Joint Chiefs of Staff
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
James V. Forrestal quoted in Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1980), 31
16
Stimson quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 249.
18
were also reluctant to approve an information exchange. While they agreed that the
general scientific knowledge of building the bomb was widely known, the know-how
of how to actually build it was still a secret the United States possessed. They saw an
armament race as inevitable and sharing any knowledge with the Russians would
only hasten the process. The skepticism towards Russia was a pattern among the
military staff. The Chief of Staff to the president, Admiral William D. Leahy, was
also against sharing any information regarding the building of the bomb and was
on Stimson’s proposal with favor because of the way the Soviet Union acted during
and after World War II. Their cynicism regarding what the Soviet Union might do
with such a powerful weapon overrode fears of the possibility of a future arms race
On the other end of the equilibrium, and more closely aligned with
Stimson’s view, were the non-political actors. The scientists, the brains behind the
atomic bomb, were strongly in support of international control and, after Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, they tried to shift both public opinion and foreign policy in this
direction. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who was the scientific director of the Manhattan
Project, was doubtlessly the most influential of the nuclear scientists in the political
and physicists went to listen to Oppenheimer's speech, a speech which the majority,
when asked, claim to have remembered years later. Oppenheimer first criticized the
secrecy and control under which the scientific research was conducted, arguing that it
17
Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman (Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1996), 130.
19
was against the very nature of science, which aims for the good of all and shares
Then he compared the atomic weapons to the Nazis, asserting that both should be
If you approach the problem and say “We know what is right and we
would like to use the atomic bomb to persuade you to agree with us,”
then you are in a very weak position and you will not succeed,
because under those conditions you will not succeed in delegating
responsibility for the survival of men. It is a purely unilateral
statement; you will find yourselves attempting by force of arms to
prevent a disaster.18
instead of a unilateral action by the United States, and the establishment of an atomic
stick to the truth unconditionally, preserve the fraternity of scientists and not to
forget that they were all, first and foremost, men.19 Oppenheimer's speech was, to a
great extent, an expression of how the scientists viewed the atomic bomb and its
future. His opinions were very influential because he was the leading scientist of the
Manhattan Project and therefore one of the men who was responsible for the creation
However, Oppenheimer20 was not the only one who raised his voice against
the monopoly of the atomic bomb. Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist who specialized in
atom and quantum physics, stated that technology had reached such a level as to
remove any room for defense. Therefore, as early as August 1945, Bohr defended
international control that would be effective only with “free access to all scientific
18
Robert J. Oppenheimer, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, eds. Alice Kimball Smith
and Charles Weiner (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1980), 320.
19
Ibid., 315-325.
20
Oppenheimer also had a meeting with the President revealing his opinions about the issue. See
“Memo of Conversation with Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and Dean Acheson”, September 25, 1945.
Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 1945.
20
information and the granting of the opportunity of international supervision.”21
Moreover, many scientists not only favored international control but, taking it a step
further, spoke against the bomb itself. In a book titled One World or None, the
prominent scientists of the time combined their articles on different aspects of the
atomic bomb and made a case against the bomb and its usage. In this book, Philip
painting a picture of the death and destruction that had occurred in Hiroshima. Leo
Szilard22, the physicist who conceived of the nuclear chain reaction, considered
that, with international collaboration, this was a feasible solution: “if the United
States, Russia, and other nations actually set up such an arrangement, an atomic arms
time, joined their colleagues in making a public statement against the bomb. In the
elimination of all atomic weapons and argued that the danger of this new weaponry
stood above any kind of benefits its possession may provide: “the common interest of
all in the prevention of atomic warfare would seem immensely to overshadow any
21
Niels Bohr, “Science and Civilization” in One World or None, eds. Dexter Masters and Katharine
Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), X.
22
Szilard was the one who drafted the letter sent to President Roosevelt by Einstein. Szilard
approached Einstein after writing it and convinced the well-known scientist to sign it..
23
Leo Szilard, “Can We Avert an Arms Race by an Inspection System?” in One World or None, eds.
Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), 61.
24
J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The New Weapon: The Turn of the Screw” in One World or None, eds.
Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), 25.
25
Einstein was the physicist who wrote a letter to President Roosevelt informing him about the
possibility of a new destructive weapon and urging him to start a project to develop the atomic bomb.
However, after the end of the war, he became a strong defender of nuclear disarmament. The letter is
available at:
[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?docu
mentdate=1945-03-25&documentid=3-5&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1]
21
asserted that the only way to escape a devastating war was for individual
should take place, according to Einstein, so that we can “have some assurance that
we shall not vanish into the atmosphere, dissolved into atoms, one of these days.”26
encourage a similar public opinion on the issue thereby putting pressure on the
As mentioned above, the military figures that were close to the foreign
Department director of the Manhattan Project, Major General Leslie R. Groves was
one of the strongest figures on the opposing front. He did not support any form of
exchange of information with the Soviet Union. Groves advised that United States
should maintain its superiority “until all of the other nations of the world are as
anxious for peace as we are. And by ‘anxious for peace,’ I mean in the heart and not
expressed his opinion to the president, taking a stance in accordance with that of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and seeing the atomic bomb as weapon that made the world
more secure for the United States and other nations in the presence of unpredictable
governments.
Groves was not alone in his skepticism. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes,
who was one of the most influential political figures of the 1940s in America, joined
Groves in his reluctance to share information and control. Byrnes served in all three
26
Albert Einstein, “The Way Out.” in One World or None, eds. Dexter Masters and Katharine Way
(McGraw: Hill Book Inc., 1946), 76.
27
The New York Times, September 22 and November 8, 1945.
22
branches of the government as a senator, governor, Supreme Court justice and,
finally, as the secretary of state between 1945 and 1947. For Byrnes, the atomic
weapon was a device to make the Russians easier to deal with. Even though he
agreed with the scientists that other nations would develop their own atomic weapons
eventually, Byrnes did not think that it was wise to hasten this process with an
information exchange: “I felt that if any nation were opposed to submitting atomic
violations, then the longer we could keep the bomb out of the hands of that nation,
the better it would be for the people of the world.”28 For Byrnes, the scientists did not
possess the knowledge to make comments on how to use the bomb. The politics of
the bomb was to be left to the government, which should not hasten to take any
definitive measure concerning the control of the atomic bomb, the weapon which
could be used to shape the United States foreign policy in the near future.29
However the opinions of the Secretary of State were not even endorsed by
some members of his own department, starting with his Undersecretary Dean G.
Acheson. Acheson, who played a key role in defining American Cold War foreign
Truman in 1945. Since his chief Byrnes was out of Washington most of the time,
Acheson found himself as the acting Secretary of State quite often. This gave more
power to Acheson than his predecessors and, thus, he became one of the most
Furthermore, he was the middleman between Truman and Byrnes, influencing both
endorsed and emphasized the scientists’ conclusion that the scientific facts of nuclear
28
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), 265.
29
Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Decision (New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc. 1955), 87.
23
physics should not be, and indeed were not, under American monopoly. There was
no doubt that the Russians were working on the development of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the Undersecretary of State noted that any effort to exclude the
The Joint development of this discovery with the U.K. and Canada
must appear to the Soviet Union to be unanswerable evidence of an
Anglo-American combination against them… It is impossible that a
government as powerful and power conscious as the Soviet
Government could fail to react vigorously to this situation. It must and
will exert every energy to restore the loss of power which this
situation has produced.30
regarding the future of the weapon also appeared in the media and the public realm.
Two prominent newspapers of that time, The New York Times and Chicago Daily
Tribune, reflected the views of two different perspectives of the people who were
knowledgeable enough about the bomb to offer such opinions. The former paper took
a more liberal stance by supporting the international control of the atomic bomb, and
thereby aligning with the scientists and the statesmen who favored negotiations with
other countries. However, the latter was more conservative and isolationist,
approving of the American nuclear monopoly and siding with those who were not
willing to negotiate with the Soviets. The New York Times published information
about nuclear energy and radioactive elements to enlighten the public as early as
September 1945. The dangers of owning a nuclear arsenal and the possibility that
any willing nation might obtain one were some of the concerns of the editors of The
New York Times. Regarding these issues, they were unwilling to put the
responsibility on the shoulders of either the politicians or the scientists alone, but
30
David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.,
1976), 63.
24
The world has been enriched with a discovery and an invention which
should be hailed as the dawn of a new era, yet, for the moment, we
can think chiefly of death and destruction. The only crumb of comfort
that can be extracted from the situation in which we find ourselves is
the growing realization that this world cannot risk a global war waged
with atomic explosives.31
dangers of its existence no matter which country owns it, The New York Times took
its place among the supporters of global control of some sort both within and outside
the country.
different approach to the debate on the future atomic policy. While The Chicago
Daily Tribune also recognized that it was impossible to hold the basic scientific
knowledge back and while the editors of the paper were open to the idea of scientific
exchange as long as the secrets of engineering and the industry were not revealed,
their support of such an international forum for control was not nearly as
collaboration, their distrust of Russia appeared so strong that the very existence of
Russians in this exchange would paralyze the future plans for the bomb. As a result
of said distrust, The Chicago Daily Tribune was quite reluctant to support this
prospect fully: “We can be reasonably certain, that the Russians will grasp anything
we offer but will hide anything of significance that their own scientists may discover,
particularly if it has military value.”32 Furthermore, the editors argued that it was not
possible to avoid the disadvantage as being the party that possessed the most
knowledge, since America would be the side who would sacrifice more to make the
international control possible. The paper left the public with a vague and open-ended
consent: “If the exchange is to produce any benefits, the information has to be
31
“Can the Secret Be Kept?” The New York Times, September 19, 1945.
32
“Controlling the Atom,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, October, 9, 1945.
25
disseminated to the whole scientific community of the world, for no one can predict
what scientist is going to take a given piece of information and use it as a stepping
stone.”33 Therefore, The Chicago Tribune possessed views mostly opposite of those
of The New York Times because of its distrust of the Russians. This view was shared
Truman. Harry S. Truman, born in Missouri, served in the Infantry Division in World
Missouri senator under the banner of the Democratic Party in 1934 with the support
career since it put him in a position to be considered a vice presidential candidate for
the 1944 elections. Roosevelt chose Truman as his running mate, replacing the
candidacy of Henry Wallace and the two won the election by a large electoral vote
margin. On April 12, 1945, Eleanor Roosevelt summoned him to the White House,
informing Truman that the president was dead. When he became president, Truman
had been the vice president less then three months. Roosevelt did not inform his vice
As top of the executive branch of the government, and the man who ordered
the dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he was responsible
for shaping the foreign policy about the bomb. While Truman was serving as vice
president under Franklin D. Roosevelt, he was not informed about the Manhattan
Project. The sudden death of President Roosevelt put the burden of ending the war,
the use of the bombs and the leading of post-war America and the world on the
33
“Controlling the Atom,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, October, 9, 1945.
34
David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 405-467.
26
shoulders of the new president. The future of the atomic bomb was not the sole
concern of the American government at the time. The sudden end of the war with
Japan left the country with uncertainty in the domestic arena. There were many loose
ends to tie up for Truman including concerns over the following laws and issues: the
Second War Powers Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, relief for veterans, taxes,
National Health Program, etc. Furthermore, the field of foreign policy had changed
dramatically as the world was now composed of a war-stricken Europe, two global
powers, and the United Nations. Where the atomic bomb fell in the wide scope of
these issues was not clear. The bomb could be used as a means to better ends, but at
the same time, it could end up being the very reason for the development of a more
unstable and dangerous world. Furthermore, the American public was still ignorant
about the bomb, aside from their knowledge of its destructive power demonstrated in
two Japanese cities. President Truman was ultimately responsible for America's
place in this world. Therefore, one of the suggestions brought forth in early
September 1945 was to begin general training of the American public concerning the
about an elaborate Russian spy network36 operating in Canada and the United States
concerning the atomic weapons. Truman was not surprised and was not willing to
take any action that might cause a permanent damage in Soviet- American
35
“The President’s Message,” The New York Times, September 7, 1945.
36
Igor Gouzenko was a cipher clerk for the Soviet Embassy in Canada and was caught with 109
documents concerning the Soviet espionage activities in the West. The documents revealed the Soviet
Government's attempts to steal the nuclear secrets. It is believed that Gouzenko's testimony led to the
prosecution of Klaus Fuchs, who was a theoretical physicist in the Manhattan Project. Fuchs testified
that he shared the secrets of the Fat Man with the Soviets. Furthermore, in Fuchs's prosecution Harry
Gold’s name emerged, a man who was a key witness in the trials of David Greenglass and Ethel and
Julius Rosenberg.
27
relations.37 A few days later, Truman gave a message to Congress on the atomic
bomb. The president started his October 3rd speech on how the bomb dramatically
differed from previous weapons and how it could be used as a means to establish
world peace. To use the bomb for the “future welfare of humanity,” the battle was to
be fought on two fronts: the domestic and the international. In relation to domestic
members appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate. The activities
and the basic principles under which the commission was to operate should be
determined by Congress and anything related to the raw materials of nuclear energy
With this in mind, Truman asserted that the international control of the
production and restraint of atomic weapons was too urgent to wait upon the
the discussions about the bomb should include “an effort to work out arrangements
covering the terms under which international collaboration and exchange of scientific
information might safely proceed.”39 With this message, although Truman declared
this approach would take place nor did he take a step towards Stimson’s proposal for
immediately approaching the Soviet Union. Yet, this message revealed that Truman
37
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 253.
38
Harry S Truman, Message to Congress on the Atomic Bomb, October, 3, 1945, University of
Maryland, http://www.honors.umd.edu/HONR269J/archive/Truman451003.html.
39
Harry S Truman, Message to Congress on the Atomic Bomb.
28
was aware of a possible nuclear arms race and despite the strong reaction among his
The end of the war left Truman with expanded executive power, power
atomic energy. The Congressmen were not very sympathetic to the idea of
stated that, “I think we ought to keep the technical know-how to ourselves as long as
possible.”40 Republican Senator Vandenberg agreed that America should retain its
monopoly until the existence of “absolute free and untrammeled right of intimate
inspection all around the globe.”41 Representative Chester E. Merrow put the
opinions of many congressmen into words with the following statement: “Why
anyone should desire to make available the knowledge we have acquired by our
reluctant to approve international control not only because of the desire to limit
executive power and to make the most of the two billion dollars poured into the
Manhattan Project, which many saw as being wasted if information were shared, but
also the skepticism how the Soviet Union might use the bombs. Senator Vandenberg
claimed that it would be unthinkable to share the secret with the Soviet Union
Raymond Willis likewise expressed this distrust clearly: “we know that we shall use
40
Richard Russell quoted in Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 129.
41
Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, (Westport: Greenwood Press
and Publishers), 221.
42
Chester E. Merrow quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 255.
43
Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 221.
29
leaders of other nations.”44 The majority of the legislative branch was thus opposed
maneuvering his foreign policy, since without the support of the Congress, it would
There were, however, some Congress members who grasped that it was
impossible to keep the other nations from developing their own nuclear bombs in the
next decade with or without American help. Jerry Voorhis told the House that “if I
believed for one moment that it was possible for the United States to keep the secret
[…] that is what I would be doing.”45 Even Senator Vandenberg would later
acquiesce on this point and started to support international control on the condition of
infallible inspection was made possible. However, the supporters were still in a
minority and most senators and congressmen tended to think that by the time other
nations developed their atomic weapons “we shall […] be too far ahead of them they
will be afraid to use the secret they have discovered.”46 When it became public that
the Truman administration was preparing to divulge the information upon the advice
of Secretary Wallace, a telegraph of the poll among the Congressmen was published
in The New York Times, revealing the opposition: fifty-five out of sixty-one
the public’s reaction to the future international control of atomic weapons. Even
monopoly over nuclear weapons would not last, they were still reluctant to share the
44
Raymond Willis quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 255.
45
Jerry Voorhis quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 256.
46
Vandenberg The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 224.
47
The New York Times, September 29, 1945.
30
knowledge. A survey conducted in September, 1945, showed that eighty-two percent
of Americans expected other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons and
eighty-five percent were in favor of retaining the monopoly as long as possible. The
polls in August and September also divulged that seventy percent of those questioned
were against the idea of turning the control of nuclear weapons over to the United
Nations.48 Thus, the Truman administration had to overcome both congressional and
place in September, 1945. The foreign ministers of the United States, the USSR,
Great Britain, France and China met in London to shape peace treaties for Finland,
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and all former German satellites. Even though America
did not oppose the Soviet Union controlling these countries while the war was going
on, with the end of the war, the conditions of the Yalta conference were to be
honored by holding free elections.49 American officials were aware that the United
States did not possess the power to influence the events taking place in these
countries directly, however, with diplomacy they hoped to convince the Russians to
be loyal to the Yalta accord. Secretary Byrnes went to London armed with this
strategy of pressuring the Russians through diplomacy, a strategy which was also
shared by the President. Byrnes hoped that American possession of the bomb could
48
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 257.
49
Protocol and Proceedings of the Crimea Conference provided that:
To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three
governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in
Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,
(a) to establish conditions of internal peace;
(b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;
(c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the
population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments
responsive to the will of the people; and
(d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The Yalta Conference, February, 1945. Available at:
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm Accessed on January 15, 2007
31
be used as leverage against the Russians, hopes that proved to be empty when the
Russian foreign minister Molotov did not respond favorably to American demands.
The conference was disappointing because the ministers could not agree on any of
the issues related to the free elections, the status of China and France in the post war
thought that, by being uncompromising, the Russians were after the uranium reserves
in the Belgian Congo.51 The outcome of the London Conference was the
American monopoly over the atomic bomb was not going to be as effective of a
diplomatic weapon as American statesmen had thought. However, despite the failure
of the London Conference, in a cabinet meeting in October, Truman was not ready to
give up diplomacy, as stated in Wallace’s diaries: “the president made the point that
we were not going to let the public know the extent to which the Russians had tried
our patience but that we were going to find some way to get along with the
Russians.”52
The London Conference left a bitter taste in the mouths of the American
international control. Secretary Byrnes was worried that any attempt for premature
control might result in further reluctance in honoring the Yalta Accord on the Soviet
side. Byrnes thought that the Russians might want to see concrete efforts for
international control before the issue of former German satellites was settled.
Furthermore, the secretary did not find it feasible to establish a workable control
50
Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, 136-138.
51
The Belgian Congo possessed one of the richest uranium reserves of the time. In later years, other
rich reserves were found. However during and immediately after the World War II, Congo was one of
the only places where high quality uranium was known to be present.
52
Henry A. Wallace, The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942-1946, ed. John
Morton Blum (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1973), 502.
32
scheme because of the technical difficulties.53 The London Conference and the
public opinion influenced Truman as evidenced in his first post-war speech delivered
on October 27th in New York, a speech which also contained a clear message to the
Soviet Union that the bomb was not a priority in the postwar treaties:
Even though this speech was perceived as a step back from the commitment
took the issue of peace settlement and how much he knew international control
would not be possible without public support. An editorial in The New York Times
interpreted this Navy Day speech as indicative of a step toward the control, not
backing away from it. The editors pointed out that, even though at that time it was
not possible to share the details about the manufacturing of the bomb, “the United
States looks forward to the free exchange of fundamental scientific information with
all nations, which presupposes and guarantees that these nations will reciprocate in
Forrestal eloquently described where Truman stood on the issue: “passionate but
desirous of making peace as soon as possible, but was at the same time reluctant to
relinquish an element of American power which might help shape the final
settlement.”56 Consequently, Truman had to ascertain that the Soviets would comply
53
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 268.
54
Ibid.
55
“America’s World Policy,” The New York Times, October 29, 1945.
56
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Letter to President Truman from the Department of
Agriculture Cautioning Truman not to Give the Russians the Formula to the A-Bomb, September 25,
1945. Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 1945.
33
with measures taken to control the bomb, an assurance which could not be
guaranteed until they took steps to keep their previous promises. As much as the
the very same speech on October 27th that there would be a meeting with the
Canadian and the British prime ministers concerning international control of the
bomb.57 The first full session of the United Nations General Assembly was to be
gathered in London in January, 1946 and something was to be done before then.
When British Prime Minister Attlee offered to come to Washington with his
Canadian counterpart, King, Truman announced that the meeting would take place in
Vannevar Bush, who became the chairman of the National Defense Research
committee in 1940 and a year later the director of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development, which controlled the Manhattan Project. Five days before the
arrival of the prime ministers, Bush presented his ideas to Secretary Byrnes. Bush
wrote that the basic American intention was to avoid a future nuclear arms race that
might lead to war. The difficulty was the suspicious stance of the Soviet Union. Bush
thought the answer was “to make the agreements in such a manner that it will be in
Russia’s interest to keep them.”58 Therefore, Bush suggested a three-step plan which
would require confirmation from all parties after completion of each step. The first
step was to invite the Russians to join the British and the Americans to create an
57
Harry S. Truman, Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City,
October, 27, 1945, the College of William and Mary,
http://www.wm.edu/hwrc/worksheets/docelectronics.html.
58
Bush quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 60.
34
circulate the scientific information on the nuclear physics. This first step was to
function as a security check for the Americans so that the Russian intentions and
level of commitment could be exposed, while the Americans were not making a
sacrifice since the scientific knowledge had already been acquired by the Russians.
The second step constituted a more concrete measure toward real control.
which would have the authority to inspect the facilities and laboratories in the
countries that undertook nuclear research. This commission would assume its
functions gradually, so that the United States would not find itself in a
disadvantageous position by revealing industrial secrets. After the second step was
finalized, all the nations would agree on the third step, that being that the stockpiling
only. The Commission was also responsible at this stage in overseeing the procedure
and preventing any alteration. Bush suggested that until the full plan was perfected,
the United States would keep gathering the materials that were necessary for the
additional step provided by the State Department, on November 15th, 1945, Truman,
Attlee, and King accepted the plan and called for the creation of a United Nations
59
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 59-61.
35
evasions.60
relinquishment of the American nuclear monopoly. The declaration also clarified that
these works would be undertaken step by step upon the completion of each phase. If,
at any level, the Soviet Union failed to comply with the international agreement, the
United States had the right to withdraw. Although, it was true that the plan and the
bomb and thereby revealed the positive intentions of the American government in the
post-war world. This declaration showed where Truman stood in the spectrum of
opinions in that, despite the unclear stance of the declaration, Truman had still made
the Truman Administration was in favor of the international control of the atomic
bomb and took concrete steps to realize this goal. A look at the two newspapers
considered in this thesis also reinforce that these moves were understood to be
definite measures toward international control of the bomb and reveal the highly
In November 1945, The New York Times reported on Mr. Attlee’s visit and
stated that it was a only a matter of time before the other nations would build their
atomic bombs. The editorial article clarified for the nation once more that there was
no scientific secret about the bomb, but that “merely some processes of manufacture”
were left unknown. After stating this, the paper strongly urged the exchange of
information initiated by Britain, Canada and the United States in order “to make sure
that bombs are never again put to use.”61 In this way the world would ensure that
60
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War,271-272.
61
“Mr. Attlee’s Mission,” The New York Times, November 11, 1945.
36
science would never be employed to do evil on earth. After defending the exchange
of information, the editors pointed out that such an action would require serious
commitment and sacrifice from every member of the United Nations, and that the
On the other hand, The Chicago Daily Tribune had a more conservative
approach. The editorial of November 17th accused the leftists of trying to get Truman
to “open atomic plants to the Russian copyists.”63 The editors of the paper argued
that those who favored international cooperation were self-contradictory and desired
to give the most powerful weapons of the history to the Russians, whose
aggressiveness had been proven in Europe, the Balkans, Korea and Manchuria.
However, they were satisfied with President Truman’s actions and urged him to
acquire Greenland, which had strategic importance. The stance of this paper reveals
the anxiety of American people and, by extension, most of the politicians. The very
existence of the bomb created an insecure world in which the United States should
build a safe zone for itself. The bomb was not to be shared.
to be the first concrete step towards the international control of atomic energy, and
therefore a turning point in the post-war global politics. President Truman had
heeded the advice of many, such as Stimson, Acheson and the scientists, and had
taken steps to assure a more secure world brought forth by information exchange.
However, Truman maintained his cautious stance by approving a plan in which the
control would develop in phases and thus leave room to maneuver. This way, the
president was able to please both those for and against the international control. In
this atmosphere of hostility towards the Russians, it was important to attain this
62
“Mr. Attlee’s Mission,” The New York Times, November 11, 1945.
63
“Atomic Diplomacy,” Chicago Tribune, November 17, 1945.
37
balance if any progress was to be made toward international control. The fact that
Truman did not have many supporters on this issue required a more cautious and
balanced approach. Despite the opposition he faced, the president carried the future
of the atomic weapons from the domestic to the international platform. Following
this declaration, efforts turned to fixing this as an issue in the platform of the United
Nations.
38
CHAPTER III
President Truman started the second volume of his memoirs with the
subtitle Control of the Atomic Energy. The first sentences of the president revealed
the chaos of the period following the war: “Within the first few months I discovered
that being a president is like a man riding a tiger. He has to keep on riding or be
declaration was the first step towards the international control of atomic weapons,
but there was much yet to come; the president had to “keep on riding.” The months
after the meeting of the three leaders proved to be tough for Truman in both the
domestic and international fields. From the foreign ministers’ conference in Moscow,
to dealing with the first United Nations assembly in London and its aftermath, and
64
Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (New York:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1956)1.
39
congressional opposition, and even the strengthening of his own suspicions, Truman
gave way to a positive outcome in the first Untied Nations meeting in January.
Therefore, despite the darkening domestic atmosphere and the uncertain international
mood, President Truman was able to pursue policies that made international control a
realizable goal.
By the end of November, 1945, Byrnes proposed another meeting of the Big
Three foreign ministers to be held before Christmas in Moscow. Byrnes’ view of the
Russians had changed slightly over the couple months following the London
Conference. The secretary realized that it was not realistic to ask for American
involvement in Eastern European countries, while the United States denied any
since signing peace treaties for East Europe was going to open a door for the Russian
troops to leave. Without any treaty, the Russians had legitimate grounds to keep the
troops in place, and influence the domestic politics of these countries. Furthermore,
Byrnes also altered his tactics with regard to atomic energy. In a speech he delivered
in South Carolina a couple days before his departure for London, he made remarks
supporting the control of atomic energy: “without the united effort and unremitting
co-operation of all the nations in the world, there will be no enduring and effective
protection again the atomic bomb.”66 After the Truman-Attlee-King meeting, the
Secretary of State planned to introduce the accord at the first meeting of the United
65
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 276.
66
Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 69.
40
supporters in the Congress and Byrnes' advisers suggested that the Russians should
be informed about the meeting of three leaders in November before the United
Nations meeting in January. Byrnes gave in to the pressures and decided to notify the
However, the draft omitted one of the most important conditions of the declaration.
What made this process safe for the American government was the provision that the
each new phase was to be started only under the condition that the previous one was
fulfilled. The draft proposal suggested that “successful international action with
respect to any phase of the problem is not necessarily a prerequisite for undertaking
affirmative action with respect to other phases.”68 This change was important
because it made the scientific knowledge and information exchange possible prior to
any establishment of safeguards. The reason the state department undertook this
Russians to solve the problem in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, Congress would
find this proposal hard to approve without the inclusion of the safeguard conditions,
which guaranteed American security. Before leaving for Moscow, Byrnes met with
the Senate Foreign Relations and Atomic Energy committees to brief them on his
plans for the meeting in Moscow. Despite Byrnes' briefing, the senators were angry
at the way the secretary had altered the Truman-Attlee-King declaration and they
resented that the state department did not consult them before taking any action.
67
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 277.
68
Ibid.
41
Their primary concern was that the way the declaration was amended could cause
were opposed to releasing any scientific data without establishing the proper
investigation process by the United Nations. Furthermore, when the senators learned
that Dr. James B. Conant69 was going to Moscow to accompany the secretary of
state, they became even more furious at Byrnes for trusting a policy issue to a college
professor. This strong senatorial criticism did not significantly affect Byrnes,
however, and he left for Moscow two days after the meeting. Seeing that they did not
have much impact on the secretary of state, the senators requested a meeting with the
President himself.70
The senators, including Connally and Vandenberg, met with Truman two
days after Byrnes left for Moscow, on December 14, 1945. When they
communicated their concerns about the draft, even though the president was not
pleased with the alterations, he did not take any action to stop Byrnes, even declining
a suggestion that he could contact the secretary via the radio. After the meeting,
Senator Vandenberg stated that, “we shall hold the Executive Department
responsible. It is our unanimous opinion that the Byrnes formula must be stopped.”71
Truman was left in a position where it was necessary to appeal to the senators'
opinions and also further the attempts to establish international control. At a cabinet
meeting, Truman defended Byrnes by stating that America was not that much ahead
of the game. Wallace recorded in his diary entry how Truman saw the issue:
The president said he was convinced that they [the senators] were
wrong; that the Russians had just as good scientists as we had; that the
scientific information was now available to everyone and that it was
69
James Bryant Conant was the president of Harvard University from 1933 to 1953. He also served as
the chairman of the National Defense Research committee and played a key role in the Manhattan
Project.
70
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War,278.
71
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 78-79.
42
important that we help create an atmosphere of worldwide
confidence.72
American nuclear science did not mean that he trusted the Soviet Government. He,
too, had reservations on how international control was to be achieved, but his
suspicions differed from those of the senators and the congressmen. Therefore, there
was a misperception about Truman's and Byrnes' stance towards the Russians.
Neither statesman relied on the trustworthiness of the Soviet government more than
any senator:
What the senators did not understand, in their anger and ignorance,
was that they hardly differed from Byrnes and Truman. It was not, as
Vandenberg naively assumed, that the administration was acting in
trust of the Soviet Union and the senators counseling mistrust. All
agreed on mistrust to the Soviets—but not on the tactics that mistrust
required.73
At the same time, Truman did take note of the senators' opinions, as
evidenced by the fact that, after the meeting, the President ordered the
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, who had been present as well, to cable a full
transcript of the discussions. In spite of this, however, the President did not waver in
his confidence in Byrnes. The undersecretary echoed the President's support of the
secretary of state in his memoirs: “The President had me reassure Byrnes that the
congressional flurry had not disturbed him, adding that he would be glad to consider
any proposals the Russians might have.”74 On December 17, the secretary of state
without proper safeguards and assured the President that he would undertake a more
72
Blum, The Price of Vision, 516.
73
Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of
Atomic Energy, 1942-1946,” The Journal of American History 60, No. 4. (March 1974): 1003-1044,
27.
74
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton,
1969), 135-136.
43
strict policy toward the issue compatible with the declaration of the three leaders.
When this conflict was leaked to the public, Truman stated that the secretary of state
balancing of interests, the most compelling of which were the following: First, the
not willing to alienate them for the international control of the bomb; he was well
aware that their support was indispensable to carry out any sound foreign and
domestic policy. Thus, he had to find a way to appeal to the senators to gain their
primary concern for Truman was the Soviet actions in the Middle East and in the
Balkans. By the winter of 1945, there were more than half a million Russian troops
in Bulgaria and some were moving to Iran. Truman knew that he had no recourse
when the Soviets undertook fait accompli involvements in these countries.76 And,
finally, the criticisms Truman accepted on behalf of Byrnes and the lack of
communication on the part of the secretary resulted in further problems between the
two men. All of these matters influenced the way Truman replied to Byrnes and the
Soviet Union approval for the formation of a United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission than it was to garner congressional support. The Russians did not show
much interest in the issue and accepted the American plan except for requesting that
the commission would report to the Security Council instead of the General
Assembly. The arguments on the issue of which body would be reported to lasted a
75
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 279.
76
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 62-64.
44
couple of days both because such a decision would be definitive regarding the future
of atomic weapons and because each option had certain advantages for the two
be more advantageous for the United States, since most of the countries participating
in the General Assembly were sympathetic to the American cause. On the other
hand, if the Security Council was in charge, the Soviet Union would have veto
power, which gave them the capacity to control the developments. When Byrnes
could not manage to persuade the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, he requested a
meeting with Stalin. The two times Byrnes and Stalin met resulted in an agreement,
of which the only concession from the Truman-Attlee-King declaration was that the
UN commission on atomic energy would operate under the Security Council. Other
than this problematic topic, the conferees agreed that the commission would suggest
in stages the basic scientific knowledge exchange, limit the use of weapons of mass
destruction starting with the nuclear weapons and set up strong safeguards. The
Truman-Attlee-King declaration had paved the way and the Moscow Conference
Communiqué fell in step by asserting that the international control of the atomic
weapons would be carried out in stages: “the work of the Commission should
proceed by different stages, the successful completion of each of which will develop
the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.”77
Therefore, with the recognition of the Big Three Agreement by the Soviets, the
American delegation felt assured about the peaceful future of atomic weapons.
Clearly, the Moscow Conference was not solely about the future of nuclear
weapons; rather, it also dealt largely with the post-war arrangements of Eastern
Europe and East Asia. Byrnes returned home with concessions from the Russians on
77
Interim Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, December 27, 1945, Yale University,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade19.htm.
45
most of these issues. While the problems in Iran and Greece were not solved, both
sides agreed to hold a peace conference including France and China. Even though the
Moscow Conference had ended with more positive results than the London
Conference, the Republicans at home were not happy with the concessions made
concerning the atomic bomb. Some members of the Truman administration, as well
as many senators and congressmen, did not see why the United States had to give up
its dominant position by being willing to allow international control of the atomic
bomb. Since most of the statesmen believed that the United States was years ahead of
the Soviet Union, even on the topic of nuclear science, the exchange of any
information from their perspective constituted sharing the “secret” of the bomb. They
feared that the scientists who went to Moscow as a part of the US delegation might
have shared vital information with the Russians. Furthermore, the events of the
previous year and the way Russia had dealt with its peripheral countries seemed to
justify their suspicions about the Stalinist government. As a result, in the days after
success and returned to America with confidence that he would gain presidential,
congressional and senatorial approval, things looked much different from the other
collaboration with the Soviets was getting stronger, the Truman administration was
relying, not on the good intentions of the Russian government, but on the assumption
that they, too, were driven by their own national security concerns, like the United
States. However, those who endorsed this national security position started to doubt
78
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 80-83.
46
the intentions of the Moscow government after seeing the situation in Iran and
Eastern Europe. Especially after the Moscow Conference and the more
compromising attitude of the Byrnes delegation, many politicians were led to believe
that the Soviets would do anything to slow down and weaken America's progress.
Thus, most people in Washington saw the Russian collaboration on atomic energy as
nothing more than a game, giving the Soviet scientists more time to catch up while
the Russians acted like they were as interested in “world peace” as the United States
was. This shift in the public view of Russian politics increased the anti-Soviet feeling
in the United States and, it can be argued, affected foreign policy in the long run.79
relatively independent position in the Roosevelt Administration during the war as the
secretary of state, he desired a similar kind of independence, which had the potential
to cause separation between him and the president; this desire may be observed in his
dealings in foreign relations, and thus in the Moscow Conference. He did not stay in
proper communication with the president while he was in Russia partly because he
thought there was a leak and was therefore reluctant to send telegrams to the White
House as they might not be secure. From December 16 to December 26, Byrnes sent
only one telegram directly to the president, which was not informative at all, as the
president himself observed: “It was more like one partner in business telling the other
that his business trip was progressing well and not to worry.”80 When Byrnes
unnerved Truman awaited the return of the secretary. Upon his arrival, the president,
79
David Halloway, The Atomic Bomb and the End of War Time Alliance, The Rise and the Fall of the
Grand Alliance, 221
80
Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope,549.
47
the secretary of state and some other officials met on the presidential yacht, the
are not consistent, one certainty is that the relationship between the president and the
secretary of state deteriorated. As mentioned above, this difficulty with the secretary
which the president had to function in the aftermath of the Moscow Conference.
documents of the Moscow Conference left by Byrnes, he concluded that all was not
as it had appeared: “it became abundantly clear to me that the successes of the
Moscow Conference were unreal.”81 Truman was especially unhappy that Byrnes
was not able to get any concessions from the Soviets concerning the international
control of the bomb and withdrawal of the Russian troops from Iran. This
dissatisfaction was the result of different objectives and expectations. For Truman,
one of the most important issues of the conference should have been the post-war
situation of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Since the secretary could not get
any concessions regarding these problems, Truman was disappointed and this failure
memoirs referring to the Moscow Conference: “I could see that the Russians had
given us no more than a general promise that they would be willing to sit down and
talk again about the control of the atomic energy.”82 On the other hand, Byrnes
looked back to other prior conferences and thought the Moscow Conference had
been just as successful, if not more so, as there had been many accomplishments in
with the conference's outcome, in a way, reflected upon his interaction with Byrnes.
81
Ibid., 50.
82
Ibid.
48
Truman called Byrnes two weeks after his return and told him that the
communication between the secretary of state and the chief executive was vital as
evidenced by the result of this Moscow Conference. In the end, due to personal,
domestic and international reasons, Truman saw the Conference not as a success on
the way to permanent peace, but as a tactical diplomatic move which did not promise
anything, either on the atomic energy or on the future of Eastern European or Middle
Eastern countries.
With regard to public opinion at this juncture, The New York Times
supported both the United Nations and international weapons control. In an editorial
published on December 2, 1945, the editors argued that world peace was only
possible with the United Nations and that this organization would be the only one
that the nation could trust for the control of the atomic weapons.83 The paper also
embraced the Moscow Conference with hope and anticipation, stating that this was a
The paper pointed out that the big powers of the world seemed more separated and
there had not been any steps taken to restore peace since the London Conference. On
the other hand, the hope of the editors was tempered as they recognized the
After the conference, The New York Times applauded the success of the meetings,
citing the establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Agency as the most
important outcome.85
The Chicago Tribune, on the other hand, saw the meeting in Moscow as a
chance for Truman and Byrnes to fix what they had done wrong in Potsdam. The
editors of the paper criticized the leaders for opening the nation's wealth to other
83
“The Big Four Dozen,” The New York Times, December 2, 1945.
84
“The Moscow Meeting,” The New York Times, December 10, 1945.
85
“A New Start for Peace,” The New York Times, December 19, 1945.
49
nations without receiving any payment. The paper believed that the only way to
direct the Truman administration's policy was to pressure it with public opinion.86
Furthermore, while Byrnes and the American delegation were in Moscow, the paper
called on the government to resume the scientific research on nuclear weapons. The
editors expressed their endorsement of nuclear armament by stating that “we might
be getting a start on how to live with and master the problems of the atomic age,
instead of sitting around wondering if we'll all be blown up some bright day.”87 The
timing of this editorial reflected how the paper saw the international control of
atomic weapons. Instead of arguing for disarmament, the paper spoke against the
By this time domestic American politics, which had been moving towards a
foreign policy after Pearl Harbor and this was one of the biggest strengths of the
country during the war. However, starting from the end of the war, the new Truman
administration did not enjoy this bipartisan calm because of the prejudices against
both a strong executive branch and a foreign policy favoring the Soviet Union. This
bipartisan unity was falling apart by the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, as
will be detailed below. The Republicans were dissatisfied with the Truman
government's foreign policy since the end of the war. Because the executive branch
had gained so much freedom and authority during the war, Congress reacted, as
might be expected, with skepticism and a desire to investigate the way the new
administration made policy. As a result, the more sensitive issues, like atomic
86
“The Idiocy of Potsdam,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 13, 1945.
87
“Get the Scientists Back to Work,” Chicago Daily Tribune, December 19, 1945.
50
energy, attracted even more attention. The Moscow Conference and Byrnes'
of 1945 when leading members accused Byrnes of forming diplomatic policy without
consulting them. This uneasiness before the London Conference was not relieved
even though Byrnes invited John Foster Dulles, who was a legal consultant to
President Wilson and helped Senator Vandenberg to draft the United Nation
Charter,88 to be a part of the London delegation. After the London Conference, the
December, 1945, the Republican members of the Congress issued a joint statement
entailing a firmer stance on the issue of fulfilling wartime promises made to smaller
nations. Governor Dwight Green of Illinois stated that “the shameful betrayal of
Poland” should not be forgotten or tolerated. On an even stronger note, after the
Vandenberg was also a strong defender of a more strict policy towards the Russians,
who looked upon the Byrnes' policy “with deep reservations [...] regarding the
December, Truman asked Vandenberg and Dulles to represent the Republican Party
88
Dulles also worked as secretary of state under President Eisenhower and was known for his strong
anti-communist stance. He was involved in the building of NATO in line with his support of massive
retaliation policy towards the Soviets. See Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles,
Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973.
89
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 291.
90
Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 237.
51
at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, which was to gather the
following month. The Michigan senator reserved the right to resign if he disagreed
Vandenberg wrote Dulles that he might return earlier than expected “if at London I
Vandenberg read the transcript of the Moscow conference, he was on the verge of
resigning:
the undersecretary of state arranged a meeting between the senator and the president.
Truman and Acheson persuaded Vandenberg that the Moscow Conference was
strongly tied to the Truman-Attlee-King accord and that inspection and security were
the priorities with regard to the international control of atomic weapons. After his
meeting with the president on December 28, 1945, the senator not only agreed to go
to London, but even thought that the circumstances demanded he be present at such a
vital meeting. Because the bare text of the Moscow Conference did not include
Truman's qualifications on the issue, Vandenberg believed that this agreement could
not be the foundation of the proposal that would be presented to the General
Assembly.
91
Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg 237.
92
Ibid., 230-232.
52
In London, Vandenberg and Dulles pressured Byrnes on pursuing a more
assertive policy with the Russians. Vandenberg was fearful that Byrnes “might be
tempted to yield on vital issues for harmony's sake.”93 Eleanor Roosevelt, who was
American officials: “Secretary Byrnes is afraid of his own delegation.”94 Thus, the
time, in contrast to the previous conferences, Byrnes had to bring dissenting voices
with him and thereby could not help but grasp the strength of his opposition.
When Byrnes returned from London, he did not have much hope in the
future bipartisanship of American foreign policy and stated to his friends that:
“Vandenberg's –and for that matter Dulles's-- activities from now on could be viewed
unfounded. The statements of Vandenberg and Dulles upon their return from London
pointed to a firmer foreign policy which required a change in direction from those
currently employed:
It is our right and it is our duty to speak in these councils just as firmly
and just as earnestly for ideals of justice and the fundamentals of
freedom as it is for others in the UNO to assert their viewpoints. I
hope to see the Government of the United States more firmly assert its
moral leadership in these respects.96
criticism by the GOP became so strong by February, 1946, that Senator Vandenberg
93
Ibid., 237.
94
Eleanor Roosevelt quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 292.
95
Byrnes quoted in Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 292.
96
Arthur Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 231.
53
connection with events in our own United States. What is Russia up to
now? 97
In the same speech, the Michigan senator praised many statesmen, including
some French and English diplomats, but avoided making any positive remarks about
Truman's foreign policy or Secretary of State Byrnes. When he finished his speech,
the Senate and the galleries gave their approval by applauding him standing and
forming long lines to shake his hand, serving as an indicator for the Truman
Moscow and London, they would not find congressional support behind them.98
Concerning the United Nations meeting in London, The New York Times
strongly urged full support of the delegation in an editorial of the beginning of the
year: “The alternative is unthinkable: for the almost certain result of a competitive
meeting in London, the paper informed the American public about the content of the
Commission. However, the editorial of January 25, 1946, was more skeptical than
the previous ones. The editors had many reservations concerning the efficiency and
the future of the United Nations. Time would reveal the limits of the organization
and, by the spring of 1946, even the most heated advocates of the international
After the United Nations meeting, the secretary of state was determined to
present a policy for the international control of atomic energy. Byrnes appointed a
Bush, and Wall Street Attorney and former Assistant Secretary of War John
97
Ibid.
98
Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War, 296
99
“The Bomb at London,” The New York Times, January 9, 1946.
54
McCloy100 as the members. Except for Groves, all of the members of the committee
were closely associated with Stimson and, thus, they were more prone than Byrnes to
support a generous policy towards the Soviet Union. However, Bush and his
associate Conant had earned Byrnes' respect and trust after making an agreement
Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone and Harry Winne, vice president in
charge of engineering for General Electric and a former participant in the Manhattan
Project.101 Similar to the previous Interim Committee, these groups also consisted of
elite members of scientific, corporate, legal and governmental societies and therefore
were not under direct political pressures. They were also acknowledged as
the authority from 1941 to 1946. When asked by Undersecretary Acheson to be the
chair of the consultant team, Lilienthal described their job by saying, “our work is to
develop a position, based on facts not known by our political officers, that will
'work,' and have a good chance of being accepted, especially by Russia.”103 The
Following the discussions in the Acheson committee, the report took its final form
100
John McCloy was a lawyer and the assistant secretary of war during World War II. He was
known for his opposition to the bombings in Japan. Later, he served as presidential advisor to
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan.
101
Harry S Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 7.
102
Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International
Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946,” 28.
103
Ibid., 29.
55
with slight changes made by the committee. The report prepared by the consultants
suggested a program that minimized inspections and did not rely on sanction for its
vitality, but instead offered to focus on raw materials, such as uranium and thorium.
The plan suggested that the ownership of these raw materials should be given to an
lead to international control of atomic energy, keeping in mind that without these
specific materials the enrichment and building if the bomb would be impossible.
With this plan, instead of trying to carry out the negative task of preventing violation,
the ADA had the positive task of promoting and guiding the peaceful development of
atomic energy. Therefore, the ADA was not solely a peacekeeping force relying on
the local governments who already possessed the bomb. Instead, by giving the raw
by making the materials available for other nations to develop their nuclear bombs in
the event of a seizure of a country, which could cause a nuclear war. This way, the
weaker countries would also own nuclear weapons, which would function as
Although there was less emphasis on inspections, the plan still called for
free access to nuclear plants to detect possible deviations from the established codes.
As a member of the Acheson Committee, Bush feared that the loss of American
monopoly would leave the Soviets as the sole military super power in the world.
Because of his influence, this plan was also to be carried out in stages, the first being
the survey of the raw material and the last being the surrender of the nuclear
monopoly. The only risk involved for the United Sates was the exchange of
theoretical knowledge, which was still a gray area since there was not a consensus as
to if this was sharing the “secret” of the bombs or not. This information exchange
56
might make it slightly easier for the Soviets to develop their nuclear bombs, but it
was a slight risk that did not jeopardize American security to a significantly greater
degree. Furthermore, the plan gave America the opportunity to retain its nuclear
arsenal until the finalization of the last stage, preventing any premature disarmament
which could imperil American security. Another positive loophole was that the
report stayed silent on whether the United States could still produce nuclear bombs
while the plan was in effect, thus providing the Americans with the ability to stay
ahead of the nuclear armament if the plan failed, and thereby saving its advantageous
position.104
as its authors had believed. The previous dealings of these men were much more
open to a flexible plan concerning the future of the bomb. However, this plan was
a Russian spy ring, which was trying to attain atomic secrets in both Canada and in
the United States, was just exposed in Canada, justifying and reinforcing the
suspicions of many. The plan had to address the suspicions of those who were
against any collaboration with the Soviet Union concerning atomic energy. Although
the plan foresaw a crucial information exchange before adequate safeguards were
included, this exchange still involved little risk for the United States. On the other
hand, there were several risks involved for the Soviets putting them in a
disadvantageous position. First of all, the plan required the penetration of Russian
secrecy, on which Soviet security depended. Moreover, the plan guaranteed the
American nuclear monopoly until Russia would have developed the bomb by its own
means anyway. But because the ADA would possess the right to control all plants
104
Ibid., 30-31.
57
and materials, the Soviets would not have any chance to break the American
monopoly while the United States was able maintain a nuclear arsenal. If the United
States chose to abolish the plan right before the final stage was completed, the Soviet
Union would have been left even further behind the United States, prolonging the
American monopoly.105
these men had been strong supporters of international control, of which the Soviet
Union would be the most important party. Undoubtedly, they were supporting
who were against any form of appeasement with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
Acheson and his group were still operating in a hostile and suspicious atmosphere,
which, in some respects, forced them to be more cautious. One cannot assume that
these men were free from any kind of anti-Russian sentiments or did not have any
compared to most of their counterparts, they were willing to leave a door open for
During the discussions, the Committee members tried to create the safest
and the most secure plan for the United States without paying much attention to how
the Kremlin would react to this plan. However, they did not find it appropriate to
include any wording expressing distrust during the implementations of the stages and
so they assumed “the good faith of Russia.” Since they were primarily concerned
which was hard for the Soviet Union to accept. In any case, considering the current
105
Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security,”30.
58
domestic atmosphere, a proposal that would gain Russian approval would have not
[B]y the spring of 1946, greater boldness might have been political
suicide. Indeed, the authors might have been condemned as foolish
visionaries. There were not many in America then who would have
welcomed a bolder report.106
the public sphere were becoming increasingly anti-Soviet, a trend which must have
been noted by the Acheson group as well. One such indication of these changing
attitudes was the February 1946 telegram from George F. Kennan to the Secretary of
State. The United States Chargé D'affaires in Moscow sent a 5300-word telegram
explaining how Stalin saw the world and the politics. According to Kennan, Stalin
needed a hostile world to legitimize his own authority in the country and, therefore,
misgivings about the Soviet Union. One of the most important of these was
Churchill's “Iron Curtain” speech. In this speech Churchill demonized the Soviet
Union to the extent that it made it impossible to deal with the Russians in a realist
political way. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used the term “Iron
106
Bernstein, Barton J. “The Quest for Security,” 31.
107
David Mayers,“Soviet War Aims and the Grand Alliance: George Kennan’s Views, 1944-
1946” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 21, No.1. (Jan., 1986): 57-79.
108
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.
59
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an “iron curtain”
has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals
of the ancient states of central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin,
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these
famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call
the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only
to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing
measure of control from Moscow.109
Soviet Union. He made the same remarks in the House of Commons and in New
York. It should be stated that Churchill had great influence on the American people,
even after Roosevelt's death. His words had an astounding effect on the Americans
and many in the world. Churchill did not call solely for a political alliance but a
The winds in America and in the West were thus blowing in an anti-Soviet
this trend when they did not withdraw their troops from Iran by the March 2, 1946
deadline, a date confirmed by the Kremlin.112 Therefore, the year of 1946 inherited
and reinforced the uncertainty of the year 1945 regarding the future of atomic
weapons.
The president was not immune to this change either. It cannot be assumed
that President Truman trusted the Soviets more than the congressmen or the senators.
109
Winston S. Churchill, “Iron Curtain” Speech, March 5, 1946:
http://www.seattleu.edu/artsci/history/us1945/docs/icsp.htm/
110
Henry B. Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 170-171.
111
Winston S. Churchill, “Iron Curtain”
112
Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 98-99.
60
As a matter of fact, the new year ushered in more distrust and doubt for Truman as
the first quarter of 1946 was marked with a decline in the hopes of international
control of the atomic bomb. Although the president did not give up the attempts to
solve this problem and to be the architect of the Cold War of coming years, the seed
of doubt kept growing. Despite these reservations, Truman continued his plan of
international control of atomic energy. Therefore, though it was clear that Soviet-
communism took a firm hold on American foreign policy. Reaching its climax in
June 1946, the cooling of relations that had started earlier in the year came to a
61
CHAPTER IV
move to different directions. The Soviet Union wanted to secure its western border
Furthermore, in March, the British troops withdrew from Iran, as mentioned in the
last chapter, but the Soviet troops remained as Stalin attempted to establish a pro-
Soviet regime in Iran. After United States pressure, however, the Russian troops
were withdrawn in May. Another episode which revealed Stalinist foreign policy
priorities was the Russian support of the Greek civil war, which broke out in 1942
but took a different shape with the involvement of the Greek Communist Party.
62
Therefore, atomic diplomacy was to be formed in an international atmosphere with
In the midst of the growing suspicion and opposition, Truman did not
forsake the prospect of the international control of atomic weapons. The ever-
growing mistrust clearly affected the way he perceived the foreign policy and the
place of the Soviet Union in the world; however, he also knew that he had to work
with this same Russian government in order to make the control of nuclear weapons
viable. Thus he did not abandon the idea of international control in the midst of the
unstable and unpredictable international politics. The time came for the Truman
administration to appoint somebody to present the American plan for the United
Nations Atomic Energy Committee meeting in June 1946. This man had to be
somebody who would be approved of by Congress and by the people, and yet, who
would also be supportive of the administration’s position on the issue. Indeed this
appointment led to the creation of the Baruch Plan, which was ultimately rejected by
the Soviet government putting an end to the hope of the international control of
atomic weapons.
ambassador to the United Nations Atomic Energy Committee. This was an important
strategic move for Truman because, as the Republican opposition was getting
stronger in both houses, he had to bring someone onto the scene who would ease the
tensions with his personal connections and political past. In his memoirs, Truman
mentions his correspondence with Byrnes about the future of atomic diplomacy if
such tensions could not be tempered. He feared that Congress could pass a law about
113
Roy Douglas, From War to Cold War (London: The MacMillan Press, 1981), 130-134
63
atomic energy that would undercut the effort on the international control thereby
good choice for the Truman administration mainly because the popular support for
Truman’s presidency was decreasing and the Secretary of State was seen as being
circumstances as he “had the esteem of the Congress, the confidence of the nation,
and the respect and the friendship of Byrnes.”116 Truman expressed his reasons for
The press also endorsed the appointment of Baruch as The Chicago Tribune
stated “we can all sleep better at night knowing ... clear-eyed Bernie Baruch is on
guard.”118 On the other hand, there were reasons that Baruch seemed, to some, less
than ideal. Baruch was a native conservative and was not the best choice for a
position as idealistic and visionary as the international control of the atomic energy
required. The advisers he chose seemed like poor choices for the Acheson-Lilienthal
Plan. Furthermore, the fact that General Groves was chosen as one of the key
consultants for the Baruch team created suspicions about Baruch's commitment to
114
Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 269.
115
Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 8.
116
Bernstein, “The Quest for Security,” 31.
117
Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 8-9
118
Chicago Tribune is cited in Herken, 159.
64
international control. Acheson expressed his concerns regarding this appointment in
his diary,
When I read this news last night, I was quite sick. ... We need a man
who is young, vigorous, not vain, and who the Russians would feel
isn't out simply to put them in a hole, not really caring about
international cooperation. Baruch has none of these qualifications.119
Thus Acheson was anxious about Baruch’s role, not only because of
Baruch’s age and political past, but also because he doubted Baruch's sincerity. It is
ironic that what bothered Acheson about Baruch was actually what made Baruch the
best option for that specific task at that specific time. Acheson’s enumeration of his
he was chosen as the face of the international control of the atomic weapons. He was
not someone unheard of; he was a man who had proved himself in different areas of
American life and gained the respect of many, though Acheson did not approve of
Three weeks after his appointment, the Truman administration and Baruch
sent the president a letter putting himself in the position of a policy maker: “I have
no doubt that the public feels that I am going to have an important relation to the
119
Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years, 30.
120
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 154.
65
determination of our atomic energy policy.”121 Truman was unsettled by this self-
attested position: “Baruch is the only man to my knowledge who has built a
reputation on a self assumed unofficial status as “adviser”. I had asked him to help
me what his job should be.”122 However, as mentioned before, Baruch was needed in
the government as a public figure both to appeal the politicians and the dissidents of
the international control. Consequently, when in the same letter Baruch threatened to
resign upon learning about a leak of the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, Truman and
Baruch was annoyed with this leak mainly because he had objections to the
report and this leak might have tied his hands if it was perceived as the official
policy. Baruch stated his concerns about the plan as follows: “Even the superficial
and incomplete examination of the subject that I have been able to make in the last
few days convinces me that this report is likely to be the subject of considerable and
only a “messenger boy” for this plan. He wanted an assurance from the
administration guaranteeing that he was not bound by the plan. When Baruch asked
the president who would be responsible for drafting the plan that was going to be
presented to the UN, the president answered, “Hell, you are!”124 Not satisfied with
Truman's response, Baruch approached Byrnes in April for a more official response.
Byrnes told him that the President and the Secretary of State would still be
responsible for the foreign policy making, but they would seek the advice of Baruch
on the international control of the atomic bomb. Accordingly, even the first few
121
Bernard Baruch quoted in Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 9-10.
122
Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 12.
123
Bernard Baruch quoted in Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope, 10.
124
Truman quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 160.
66
weeks of working with this elderly statesman had been a trial for Truman and
Byrnes. However, both believed that they needed him to ease the growing opposition
and both trusted that he was the suitable man for the task and were thereby willing to
After his confirmation by the Senate, a process which took only two days
and further emphasized the support he enjoyed in the Republican Senate, Baruch was
free to put a team together, mainly from old business associates. Banker John M.
Hancock had worked with Baruch during World War II on industrial mobilization.
Herbert Bayard Swope was Baruch's assistant during World War I on the War
Industries Board. Ferdinand Eberstadt was an investment banker and a former aide to
the Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal. Fred Searls, Jr., who was considered Baruch's
mentioned earlier, these choices created dismay among the supporters of the
and because of the qualifications of the members. Bush referred to the appointees as
refused this offer by claiming to have too much work in Washington. But in fact, he
confirmation of his policies. Further, the Acheson and Lilienthal group was uncertain
to what extent Baruch was going to alter their plan and therefore opted for remaining
outside the Baruch team in order that they might be able to raise their concerns
instead of getting their voices drowned out on the committee. In the end, after
125
Ibid.
67
Baruch's appointment, the people who had been a part of the policy-making process
since the fall of 1945 remained distant, creating an important shift in the approach
taken to international control. The new team also brought a new direction to the
policy.
Although years later Baruch accused the scientists of running off and not
being willing to serve, at the time he was clearly not enthusiastic about cooperating
concluded that I would drop the scientists because as I told them, I knew all I wanted
to know. It went boom and it killed millions of people and I thought it was an ethical
and political problem and I would proceed on that theory.”126 Baruch did admit to
wanting Oppenheimer to join his team, but the way he approached the scientist did
not make it possible for Oppenheimer to work under him. The scientist described to
Lilienthal the course of the meeting by quoting Baruch's words, “Don't let these
associates of mine worry you, Hancock is pretty “Right,” but (with a wink) I'll watch
him. Searls is smart as a whip, but he sees Reds under every bed.”127 But what
bothered Oppenheimer the most was that Baruch wanted to prepare the American
people for a refusal from the Russians. For the scientist, the tone of his speech did
not give any hope to the international control of the atomic bomb. As a result,
Oppenheimer refused Baruch's offer diplomatically and chose to stay out of the
also the scientists, who had been in the center of the atomic energy development
process since the beginning of the Manhattan Project, refused to work under Baruch.
126
Truman quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 161.
127
Baruch quoted in Lieberman, The Scorpion and The Tarantula, 273.
128
After Oppenheimer's refusal, the FBI started tapping his phone. The FBI director, Herbert
Hoover, sent the President a transcript of a conversation Oppenheimer had with a fellow scientist
about other possible ways to pressure the American government for the international control.
Oppenheimer thought that it might be possible to create a joint effort with the European scientists,
mainly those in Poland, France, England and Holland.
68
It was not surprising that the Baruch delegation was unsympathetic to the
Baruch was not willing to accept any advice on the issue. He expressed his
disinterest by turning off his hearing aid when reporters asked him what he thought
about the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Furthermore, although Baruch and his staff
received many letters supporting the report, few, if any, were answered. On the other
hand, the letters that criticized the Undersecretary's plan were received with
meeting in mid-June. Although no one knew how much he was going to alter the
plan, by alienating the scientists and the drafters of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report,
concerning the way Baruch would deal with the report. The first confirmation of
these suspicions came when Baruch admitted to Byrnes that the Acheson-Lilienthal
Report required extensive amendments. Throughout the month of May, the Baruch
delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal group held a series of meetings. During these
discussions the latter group learned the extent of Baruch's new plan. Lilienthal
expressed his disapproval stating that, “the gravest danger is that they will put
forward proposals in a spirit that will ensure their refusal.”130 However, these
129
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 162-163
130
Lilienthal quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 163.
131
Acheson , Present at the Creation, 156.
69
Because the meeting between these two committees had not ended in
agreement, the Baruch delegation continued down their own path. In the beginning
of May, Baruch and Hancock met secretly and decided that they would develop a
new plan to present at the UN meeting, replacing the Acheson-Lilienthal report. The
two men also decided that they would not make any concessions on their own plan,
so as to portray a strong front both in the eyes of the public and the international
community.132
The draft of the new plan was presented to the Acheson group in mid-May.
The Baruch Plan included four fundamental alterations from the Acheson-Lilienthal
report. The first change was that the new plan called for a total disarmament instead
of a nuclear disarmament, which would cause uncertainty for the future of the plan.
As Lilienthal expressed, “this would hopelessly confuse and mix issues, and obscure
the hope of working out something on the atom bomb.”133 Such a change would
remove the focus from the atomic bomb and focus instead on the much larger,
complex and problematical issue of general disarmament. Secondly, the new plan put
more emphasis on the punishment that would be imposed in case of a violation of the
conditions. Baruch and his aides were not the first who thought about
early stage, the previous group decided that such an action would be fatal for the
Atomic Development Authority. The new plan suggested that private industry would
be responsible for the mining and refining of fissionable materials which could lead
132
Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 280-281.
133
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 42-43.
70
to the creation of a private, not government-run, atomic energy industry. Such a
potential was desired neither by the American government nor by the international
under the Congress. Hancock was one of the strongest supporters of the change,
which he saw as a way to hinder the international socialized state. But the most
controversial of the alterations was the last one, which suggested the abolishment of
the veto power in the United Nations Security Council. Baruch argued that the veto
power would enable Russia to abandon the Atomic Development Authority and
withdraw from the plan.134 Baruch had concluded that the Soviet Union was going to
As expected, the Acheson and Lilienthal group opposed any changes in the
previous plan. Acheson objected to the new draft, arguing that the focus on the
punishment and the removal of the veto power did not contribute to the security of
134
Security Council veto was an American proposal for the UN charter, and was reluctantly
accepted by the Soviet Union. After the war, Byrnes convinced the Soviets to abolish the veto power
in Moscow. However, it was re-established in London when Senator Vandenberg strongly supported
it.
135
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 164.
136
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 155.
71
The Undersecretary of State reasoned that if a state decided to violate the
agreement, this would lead to the collapse of the United Nations and the withdrawal
of that individual state from the international organization. Therefore, the plan was
paving the way for failure and did not provide incentive for other nations to stay
committed. Lilienthal opposed the motivations of Baruch and his aides even more
than the changes they made. He believed that Searls provided insight as to what his
Searls said that in this we would find out what is going on in Russia.
And if the Russians refused to accept this proposal, then we would
know that they would not go along on any international scheme, and
[...] he didn't finish the statement, but his eyes indicated what he
thought should then be recommended, and it was anything but
pleasant.137
What Searls had in mind was not an international control but an atomic
league of nations when he suggested in the same meeting that, “each nation be
permitted a stockpile of bombs, as a deterrent against atomic warfare; and that the
completely different than what Stimson and Truman had in mind at the end of 1945.
They, too, were not willing to sacrifice American national security for the sake of
nuclear disarmament, but after seeing what the bomb was capable of, for them the
international control of the atomic weapons far surpassed a nuclear arms race, which
Baruch, for his part, was not willing to alter the new plan either. Baruch
may have suspected that, by advocating the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan without being
willing to make any concessions, the Board of Consultants were seeking to advance
the previous report by withholding their approval from the Baruch Plan. With his
team having a completely different mindset about nuclear weapons, Baruch naturally
137
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 49-50.
138
Searls quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 165.
72
was suspicious of the way the Board reacted to the new draft. The criticisms were
coming from a group which was not willing to work under him, a disconnection
made Baruch and his aides hold their ground even more strongly.
The reaction of the military should also be taken into account at this point.
After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, other than General Leslie Groves, top ranking
soldiers of the time did not show any willingness to be involved in the future of the
atomic bomb. After numerous discussions about whether the civilian authorities or
the soldiers should be in charge of the nuclear weapons, Truman supported the
civilian administration, and thus it may be that the soldiers were wary of being
Baruch, on the other hand, desired the advice of the chiefs of staff and, in
April, approached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking their opinion about the
international control of the atomic weapons. The chiefs did not respond to Baruch
with an opinion on the issue. Thereupon, Searls went to communicate with the
members of Military Staff Committee, which was the military wing of the US
representation in the UN. At this meeting, Searls learned that the members of the
committee never discussed the future of the bomb. The approach of Baruch and
Searls was also quite surprising to the military as they seemed to be seeking
affirmation of, rather than advice about, the new plan. However, although the
military men, such as Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, Carl Spaatz and William
Leahy, did not give an official respond to Baruch, they expressed their view on the
issue through personal correspondence. They argued that “the atomic monopoly put
America in a preeminent bargaining position with regard to the Soviet Union, and
73
that much advantage should be exploited in the UN.”139 They saw the bomb as a tool
monopoly of the bomb, even though it is transitory, may well prove to be a factor in
our efforts to achieve first a stabilized condition and eventually a lasting peace.”140
Thus, although Baruch did not receive any official military endorsement for
his plan in these personal conversations, he perceived that the military was not
monopoly. The military had been opposed to any form of nuclear disarmament since
the efforts on the issue commenced. They retained their anti-communist and anti-
Russian stance, which overruled any form of cooperation during this period.
Although they chose to remain silent because of their reluctance to oppose the
executive branch, this silence did not mean approval. Therefore, when Baruch sought
their concurrence for his plan, the chiefs of staff did not accommodate him, not
wishing to endorse any policy other than the one approved by the president.
Nevertheless Baruch considered his plan closer to the military line than the Acheson-
Lilienthal report; he failed to see that the chiefs were not going to affirm an
unofficial draft favoring nuclear disarmament. When the official report finally came
in late July, Baruch then understood that the military would only support his plan
when it was in line with Acheson-Lilienthal report. It should be noted that the
military wing waited to get reassurance from the President that their views on the
future of the weapons did not conflict with the civilian plan. Hence, the Joint Chiefs
simply aligned themselves with the commander in chief, regardless of the military
139
Herken, The Winning Weapon, 166-167.
140
Spaatz quoted in Herken, The Winning Weapon, 166.
74
When Baruch did not receive the support he expected from the Joint Chiefs
indicated previously, Groves had started to work with the Baruch committee as a
bridge between the Baruch delegation and the Military Staff Committee. Even
though Acheson warned Hancock that Groves might not be expressing the opinions
of the military staff, but rather his own, Groves held sway over many appointments
within the delegation. For instance, he brought Richard Tolman, who was a physicist
in the Manhattan Project, to the United Nations meeting, an appointment not favored
by the scientists. Furthermore, Baruch entrusted Major General Thomas Farrell, who
was Groves' deputy in the Manhattan Project, with the responsibility of estimating
when the Russians would build the atomic bomb. His infamous estimation was
twenty years, which was also Groves' estimation. Edgar Sengier, who was a wartime
ally of Groves, became the raw materials expert in the delegation, fervently opposing
claimed that the organization would “upset wages, dissatisfy people and have
involved.”141 In this manner, Baruch was able to include some unofficial military
influence into his team and his plan, adding to his base of allies and strengthening his
plan’s position.142
With all the influence he had in the Baruch delegation, Groves also made
sure that the word “prompt” was replaced by the word “immediate” in case of
violations of the plan, thus making it highly probable that violators would be
punished with nuclear attack. Acheson and his advisers were strongly against this
wording because of its hostile tone: “After careful analysis we had concluded that
141
Sengier quoted in Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 276.
142
Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 277-280.
75
provision for whether “swift and sure,” or “condign” punishment for violation of the
treaty were almost certain to wreck any possibility of Russian acceptance of one.”143
Unperturbed by such concerns, Baruch and his aides started to finalize the plan by
the end of May, leaving intact two of its most important aspects, severe punishments
for the violators and the abolition of the veto power. With Groves help, by the
beginning of June, Baruch was certain that he had sufficient support to put these two
strong provisions in his plan and present it at the United Nations meeting.
The reception of the Baruch Plan in America also revealed the power and
popularity of Bernard Baruch himself. Baruch had been chosen by the Truman
businessman and a statesman. An editorial in The New York Times on June 15, 1946
indicated how the editors of the paper supported the Baruch delegation:
The fact that the editors of this paper, who were behind the international
control of atomic weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, saw the Baruch Plan as
Baruch’s favorable reputation and his effective rhetoric. Thus, one should not take
the support of The New York Times as a shift in their stance towards the issue, but as
an indicator of the success of Baruch within the country, as implied in the passage
below:
143
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 155
144
“Mr. Baruch Reports,” The New York Times, June 15, 1946.
76
economic or political system of any nation. But he demonstrated that
there must be a world government over split atoms.145
At the same time, another editorial exposed how much the distrust of the
Russians had increased. When the Russian delegation was not willing to surrender
the veto power and requested early compromises from the United States, the paper
replied:
The view of the paper reflected how many people in America did not
perceive the shortcomings of the plan. Mr. Baruch had a strong support and even the
ardent defenders of the international control seemed unable to identify the potential
The first two weeks of June involved vigorous as Baruch sought to finalize
his plan while others sought to influence or oppose the method by which this
finalization was being achieved. When Acheson, Byrnes and Truman wanted to
amend his plan, Baruch was able to rebuff them. When the State Department
suggested that Baruch should have a final meeting with the members of the Board of
Consultants to get scientific and technical advice, Baruch turned down the
suggestion, complaining that the scientists were “inelastic.”147 The final efforts
coming from the state department and presidency resulted in another resignation
threat from Baruch: “I have lost my confidence in my being able to work this out
with the President and you [Byrnes] satisfactorily.”148 His threat reached its target
and Byrnes and Truman backed away from requesting any alterations of the Baruch
145
“The Atom Knows No Nations,” The New York Times, June 16, 1946.
146
“The Atomic Debate,” The New York Times, June 27, 1946.
147
Herken, The Winning Weapon,169.
148
Baruch quoted in Truman, Memoirs by Harry S Truman: Years of Trial and Hope.
77
Plan as, at this point, neither was in a place to accept Baruch's resignation. After
support, it would be too risky to get rid of Baruch now. Not only would they lose the
support Baruch brought with him, but they also would risk creating an unstable
Lilienthal explained this compromise: “As much as Truman disliked Baruch, he had
to have someone Congress would trust and who could deflect criticism of the
administration's atomic energy policy.”149 So, Baruch was triumphant. The sole
alteration he accepted in his plan was that the word “prompt” was reinserted in the
When the time approached for the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission meeting, there were many reservations concerning the Baruch Plan.
Lilienthal recorded in his diary the day he went to Washington to read Baruch's
speech:
When we went over B[aruch]'s draft of the speech (B. wasn't there), it
consisted of much mediocre oratory, an adoption of our plan in a
rather confused and badly organized form of statement, some absurd
stuff about sanctions and penalties. On raw materials they said “tight
control” was the key to the plan, and then gibbered about “dominion,”
and would not consider ownership of mines, even balked at ownership
of primary plants!150
The month of June and the time for the United Nations meeting arrived with
the prospect of the Baruch Plan. Much had changed since the fall of 1945, when
Stimson called for international control of atomic weapons. Doubtlessly, the Baruch
Plan was far removed from what Stimson had had in mind. In fact, the drafter of
149
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 174.
150
Ibid., 58-59.
78
In the end, Baruch received a promise from President Truman that he would
support Baruch and his delegation on the issue of abolition of the veto power and the
punishments. Furthermore, Truman assured him that the former relationship with
Britain and Canada on the atomic energy would be carried to the United Nations.
Baruch was able to go to the meeting with the support of the state department and the
presidency in his pocket, leaving the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan behind. This approval
of the Baruch Plan was a turning point in the international control of nuclear
weapons. The ideal of nuclear disarmament was drowned in the midst of Soviet
Two possible explanations may account for the actions of the Baruch team
and clarify their real intentions. First, it may have been that Baruch and his aides
sincerely believed in the control of atomic weapons. Nevertheless, they failed to see
that international control was not possible without Soviet support. On the other hand,
it may have been that they supported American nuclear monopoly and wanted to use
the atomic weapon as a diplomatic tool against the Russians. However, Stimson,
support amidst their concerns about Soviet actions and intentions in the world and
about American national security. This recognition prescribed the softer undertone in
government. The distinct difference in the tones of the two plans explains why the
“We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead,” declared
Bernard Baruch at the beginning of his speech before the UN General Assembly. He
79
punishment” as comprising the very heart of the American position. The punishment
was one of the most important changes from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, since a
country would be, Baruch explained, “ready to relinquish any winning weapons [...]
it must have more than words to reassure it.”151 Baruch further clarified that none of
the countries would possess a veto power over any provisions of the plan. In
addition, he outlined that one of the first steps of the plan would be an inspection
conditions in particular would make the plan unacceptable for many nations, not only
the Soviets. First of all, a preliminary raw-materials survey gave absolute authority to
The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and
maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of
uranium and thorium, and to bring them under its dominion. [...] The
Authority should exercise complete managerial control of the
production of fissionable materials in dangerous quantities and must
own and control the product of these plants.152
and the veto power, which made unilateral decisions possible. Baruch made it clear
that the issue of punishment lay at the heart of his plan. However, his strong stance
on the issue of veto power and the violations turned the issue into one which was
bound to fail instead of developing trust and relying on the commitments of other
nations. An excerpt of Baruch’s speech identifies this emphasis on the veto power
issue:
151
The Baruch Plan, Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946
, University of Maryland, http://honors.umd.edu/HONR269J//archive/BaruchPlan.html.
152
Ibid.
80
only by concurrence of each of the five great powers - the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, China, France, and
the United States.
I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto
power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto
to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or
use atomic energy for destructive purposes. 153
and the world would gain. This understanding led to a defensive and exclusive
outcome rather than an open and inclusive one which required that the international
control of the atomic weapons happen under American conditions or not at all.
delegation could not have been expected given the atomic-spy hysteria, the
Republican opposition and the dealings of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and in the
Middle East, all of which justified considerable cynicism. The nation and its leaders
had been moving towards a more pessimistic outlook since the beginning of the year.
One could argue that this tendency toward negativity and distrust affected the
drafters of the Baruch Plan. It could also be maintained, however, that this pessimism
was precisely the atmosphere Baruch and his aides needed to make their plan viable.
In either case, it was the Baruch plan that was presented to the United Nations
Atomic Energy Committee, not the Acheson-Lilienthal report. That was the changing
of the tide.
revealed the way he perceived the bomb. For Baruch, America had a better
bargaining position because of the atomic monopoly, making him and the American
153
Ibid.
154
Ibid.
81
delegation less eager to pursue the Russians for the international control of the bomb.
Instead, with or without the Soviet approval, America would leave the meeting as the
single owner of “the winning weapon.” Even if the Soviets accepted the Baruch Plan
they still had to yield to the provisions of the plan, which included a complete
investigation of the uranium and thorium reserves in Soviet Russia. Even after the
investigation of the Soviet reserves, the agency was to possess the sole authority over
although Baruch claimed that America was ready to make any concessions to
achieve disarmament, in the provisions he offered there was nothing that would
Soviet side, nuclear attack was possible. The issue of punishment gave America
much more room to maneuver as the sole owner of nuclear weapons. Thus, the plan,
though it was born of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, took the shape of an ultimatum
by the time it reached the United Nations meeting. Lilienthal recorded his first
I [...] pointed out that the raw material ambiguity and its importance;
said as to “sanctions” that this talk of “condign punishment” set
another and a discredited tone –the outlaw of the weapon business –
and was contradictory to the spirit of our Report, but perhaps wasn't
fatal.155
There were several reasons why the Baruch Plan failed. As mentioned
before, the Acheson and Lilienthal group had good reasons for insisting upon the
punishment and the veto provisions. Even though Baruch and his aides kept the some
aspects of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, these two provisions made America look
arrogant and uncompromising. Furthermore, Baruch did not mention any timetables
155
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, 72.
82
or any deadlines, which made the plan look like an ambiguous set of ideas rather
not have proved any more successful had it been given a chance as it, too, had
significant weaknesses. This first plan was idealistic and visionary, while the latter
Baruch plan was realistic and politically applicable. It is true that the board of
there were other aspects of the issue. For instance, assuming that the Atomic
Development Agency would function the way the Acheson group had outlined was
to deny the political atmosphere of the time. It was still too early for the United
completely free from national interests. At that time, right after the war, the Soviets
energy into the hands of an international organization might have been crippling for
the Soviets, whether the plan was altered by Baruch or not. For these reasons, the
cause of the deadlock of the international control cannot be laid solely on the Baruch
Plan. Despite the fact that the alterations, the wording and the provisions most likely
made it much easier for the Soviets to oppose the plan, the political and economic
atmosphere of the post-war era was not a promising one in which to bring about
nuclear disarmament.
On June 14, 1946, Baruch ended his speech with a paraphrase from
Abraham Lincoln: “We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last, best hope of earth.
The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just - a way which, if followed, the world will
forever applaud.”156 However, despite the rhetoric, the Russian delegation did not see
156
The Baruch Plan
83
the American plan as a means of salvation. In a week, the Soviet delegate Andrei
prohibiting the possession, production, and use of nuclear weapons. Gromyko stated
that world peace was impossible “if the discovery of atomic energy is not placed in
“forbidding the production and use of atomic weapons based upon the use of atomic
energy for mass destruction.”157 Nevertheless, the Soviets were not willing to achieve
this end under the American conditions. The Russians also rejected negotiations
concerning the abolishment of the veto power. Eventually Gromyko added that the
Baruch Plan was not acceptable “either as a whole or in their separate parts.” The
next six months witnessed a debate on the international control of the atomic energy
with neither side willing make any compromises on their plan. There the matter died.
United Nations Atomic Energy Committee was definitely a vital decision for the
international control of the atomic bomb. As discussed in the previous chapters, the
year following the end of World War II was dominated by several struggles for the
starting with Truman and Byrnes, to seek a means to make the international control
more appealing to the Congress and to the public. Keeping these internal dynamics in
mind, one can conclude that Baruch’s appointment was not a bad political move.
Although Baruch proved to be a hard man to work with, the president still believed
that he was the right choice. Nonetheless, what made Baruch the best choice for the
task was also what made him a man of strong will and determination. With the years
of experience in politics and business, Baruch did not find it hard to raise the support
157
Gromyko quoted in Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula, 309.
84
he needed for his plan. By ignoring the criticism and advice of the men who were
involved in the process since the creation of the idea of international control, Baruch
gave a new direction to the course. At the United Nations meeting, he presented a
plan that brought the issue to a dead end by the conclusion of the year.
However, the Baruch Plan was not the only reason that the attempts for the
international control of the atomic weapons failed. The global atmosphere of the time
and the Soviet post-war economic and political struggles, doubtlessly, played an
important role in this failure. Moreover, Stalin was aware of the implications of the
atomic bomb and how much Hiroshima had changed the balance favoring the United
States. As a result the Soviet premier initiated the project to build the Soviet atomic
bomb, as he was aware of the power the bomb gave to the American government.158
For that reason, it is important to differentiate the impact of Baruch in the domestic
politics and in foreign policy. It is true that Baruch’s appointment alienated many
who had the ideal of preventing a nuclear arms race in the coming years. This shift
had more effect on domestic politics than a foreign policy. By threatening the
President with resignation more than once, he was able to alter the Acheson-
Lilienthal report and still be supported by the executive branch. Since the Truman
administration could not afford creating an atmosphere of crisis at such a critical time
and lose the support Baruch brought with him, they complied with the Baruch plan.
It should also be reiterated that the thought process of the Baruch team was not clear.
It is true that the Baruch Plan was not technically against the idea of nuclear
disarmament; however, Baruch and his aides could not perceive the importance of
Soviet participation and their disadvantageous position even if they believed in the
international control. Another possibility was that they wanted to retain America's
158
Gaddis, We Now Know, 97-99
85
superior position and thus secure America’s position as the leader in the international
politics. Either way, they created a plan, which was foolproof for the Americans, and
The president was not driven solely by the changes in American domestic
politics. Yet, at the same time, the man who had come a long way to make
international control possible was not immune to the developments in the world and
in the American society. Certainly, the growing opposition and the increasing Soviet
involvement in the Middle East and the Eastern Europe affected the way Truman
domestic politics of the first half of 1946 obliged the president to include a public
figure who was not stained with the ongoing criticism of the administration. After the
appointment, although he had several objections to Baruch, Truman did not think
that the plan would be fatally injurious to the goal his administration had pursued
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The atomic bomb started a new era. There were those who saw this era as
the age of American power, since it was the only country that possessed nuclear
technology. On the other hand, there were those who foresaw the danger lying ahead:
a world wide nuclear arms race. Secretary of War Henry Stimson concluded that
prolonging the American nuclear monopoly would become a catalyst for the arms
race, rather than becoming a deterrent. He believed that the United States should take
the first step towards the international control of atomic weapons. Stimson proposed
that the United States, Great Britain and Canada approach the Soviet Union to halt
Robert Oppenheimer argued that the atomic weapons fell under the responsibility of
the world community and only one government. Furthermore, nuclear scientist Niels
Bohr defended free access to scientific information and international control. Leo
Szilard agreed with Bohr, arguing that preventing an arms race through international
collaboration was possible. Albert Einstein concurred with his colleagues declaring
that international control was the only escape from a global destructive war.
87
Not everybody was as enthusiastic about the international control. The
military figures of the time, like General Leslie Groves, for example, were hesitant to
support any form of information exchange. On the political side, Secretary of State
Byrnes believed that the atomic bomb would make the diplomacy with the Russians
easier while Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, objected to this proposal because of his
deep mistrust of the Russians. Amidst the ongoing discussions, President Truman
believed that international control of atomic weapons was so vital that, before
decision on this issue revealed that he was not an ardent supporter of nuclear arms
race as his policies in the latter years suggested. His support of international control
showed that Truman was willing to give up the American nuclear monopoly to
prevent global proliferation. The fact that Truman made this decision in the midst of
congressional and public opposition further proves his earnestness on the issue.
discontent about information exchange; they believed that the Soviets were not close
to building their own atomic bomb, and that an information exchange would only
help them to construct the bomb faster, thus shortening the life of the American
Connally and Vandenberg. The President stated that America was not that far ahead
of the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear science. Therefore, the risk of hastening the
Soviet bomb construction was small enough to take in order to achieve international
control. The fact that Truman was willing to take this risk did not mean that he
trusted the Russians any more than any senator. In fact, his distrust grew increasingly
88
when he witnessed the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. These
two issues, namely losing the support of the Senate and the course of Russian foreign
although the front against the international control was gaining power, Truman still
formed a committee to frame the American proposal in the upcoming United Nations
politicians and scientists who were strong supporters of international control, drafted
the Acheson-Lilienthal Report as the basis of the American position. In the wake of
this report, however, Truman was pushed into a corner politically by Republican
opposition and emerging bipartisan politics. Furthermore, the issues of Iran, Greece
and the Eastern European countries, along with Kennan's long telegram and
Churchill's “Iron Curtain” speech led Truman to change the way he saw the Russians
Truman and Byrnes had to carefully choose the man who would present the
American proposal in the United Nations meeting. When Byrnes suggested Baruch,
Truman thought this elderly statesman was the best choice for the task. Baruch was
experienced in politics and business and had been an adviser to several presidents.
He was able to attract both public and congressional support. However, Baruch and
his aides had a different mindset about the international control of the atomic bomb.
Thus, when this new team started to draft the American proposal, they moved away
from the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Even though the Board of Consultants expressed
89
their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the new plan, it was the Baruch Plan that
was presented in June to the UN. Truman and Byrnes also had several objections to
the way Baruch was drafting the plan; however, both because the fear of losing the
support Baruch brought with his appointment and the fear of shifting the focus from
the issue at hand, Truman went ahead with the Baruch Plan.
period of time in twentieth century history. Because it was Truman who made the
decision to drop the bombs and because he was the first president of the period of
nuclear arms race, he has been depicted as a president who was blinded by an anti-
Soviet mindset. Doubtlessly, Truman was cautious in the way he dealt with the
Russians, was the case with the previous presidents as well. Nonetheless, looking
back to this period through the lenses of the Cold War, one might perceive Truman
simply as an insincere politician. On the contrary, the foreign and domestic policy
Truman pursued during this ten-month period reveals that he was not inherently a
Cold Warrior, endorsing nuclear armament and promoting anti-Soviet policies at any
cost. He sought a way to control further bomb construction in the world including,
the United States, because he had witnessed its deadly power, power which could be
used for or against America. Thus, although the dream of international control of the
atomic weapons was not realized in 1946, or in the following years, Truman stayed
committed to this ideal despite strong doubts, considerable domestic opposition, and
After the collapse of the talks concerning the international control of atomic
weapons, Truman presented what has come to be referred to as the Truman Doctrine.
The doctrine was designed to contain communism, to prevent its spread and limit its
sphere of influence. Truman was able to gain the support of the Republican Congress
90
when he proclaimed the doctrine on March 12, 1947, and thus opening the way to aid
Greece and Turkey, helping to prevent these countries from becoming a part of the
Soviet sphere. The Truman Doctrine was followed by the Marshall Plan, which was
People's Republic of China and the rise of McCarthyism. Furthermore, the United
States involvement in Korea and Vietnam took place for the first time during this
period. Thus, a wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was followed by anti-
On the issue of nuclear weapons, those who predicted that it would take
twenty years for the Soviets to develop nuclear weapons were wrong. The first
Soviet atomic test took place in August of 1949 and the Russians detonated their first
hydrogen bomb in August of 1953. The decade of the 1950s witnessed nuclear
proliferation both in the Untied States and in the Soviet Union. By the 1960s, some
steps were taken towards limiting the nuclear proliferation. In 1957, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United
safeguards against the misuse of nuclear plants. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in
1962, bringing the United States, the Soviet Union and Cuba on the verge of a
nuclear war. The crisis showed the fragility of the balance regarding nuclear
weaponry in the international sphere. A year later, in 1963, the Partial Test Ban
Treaty banned all nuclear testing expect for underground testing to prevent nuclear
states to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty had three fundamental
91
technology. In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which banned all nuclear
explosions in all environments, was signed by many nations, including the United
In addition to these multinational treaties, the United States and the Soviet
Union underwent several bilateral arms control attempts. The Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) were comprised of two rounds of bilateral talks between
the Soviet Union and the United States. The negotiations started in 1969 and resulted
in the SALT I Treaty, which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers
at the existing level for both countries and put restrictions on the construction of
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The talks for SALT II took place between
1972 and 1979 as a continuation of SALT I. Another treaty was signed in 1979
Reduction Treaty) was also another bilateral attempt between the two superpowers
signed in 1991. Currently, there are five nuclear powers under the NPT: the USA, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France and China. However, India,
Pakistan and North Korea are also known to possess nuclear weapons while Israel,
Iran and Saudi Arabia are suspected of possessing nuclear arsenals as well.
In the year 2007, the topic of nuclear energy and weapons is still a
weapons failed in 1946, despite many efforts to quell the rise, the number of nuclear
powers and nuclear weapons increased. Under the shadow of this proliferation, Kofi
Annan delivered his last speech as the United Nations Secretary General on
159
This treaty was not ratified by the Congress.
92
meaningful location, especially in light of nuclear disarmament. When Annan spoke
security indicates how important it is to study this period. The ideal of Truman,
Acheson, Oppenheimer and others has not been realized. The waters, lands and the
international control, millions of people lived in fear of nuclear attack and mutually
war. Scientists predicted doomsday and a nuclear winter. The political and daily
discourse was filled with acronyms such as MIRVs, ICBMs, SLBMs. Although the
nuclear bombs had only been detonated over one country, they cast their shadow
over the whole world for more than half a century, a shadow which lingers even
today.
Indeed, this issue continues to demand attention today in the area of nuclear
non-proliferation. One of the biggest issues in the United Nations is nuclear research
for military purposes. Iran, who was a party to the NPT, is the current country on the
agenda, having passed up North Korea, because they have developed a uranium
enrichment program, claiming to be for peaceful purposes. Even though the United
Nations passed a resolution dictating that Iran halt the enrichment program, it has not
lives, because its leader, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, was suspected of building
160
Full Text: Kofi Annan's Final Speech, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6170089.stm.
93
weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it was this fear of nuclear weapons which
verbalized: “If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly
enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon
in less than a year.”161 The present day struggles concerning the nuclear weapons
make the history of this issue more valuable, not only for scholarship but also for the
recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize for “their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from
being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes is used in the safest possible way."162 The road to permanent peace in the
world must go through nuclear disarmament. History has proved that the policy of
deterrence only led to more fear and more nuclear bombs. Even though, in the past
nuclear war did not occur, the future still holds the possibility, and it may be that it is
stronger than ever before. That is the reason that ElBaradei's words are to be taken
Everybody has to chip in, I think, and see how we can have a
functioning system of collective security where we do not continue to
face the threat of countries trying to acquire weapons of mass
destruction or particularly nuclear weapons. Right now what we have is
countries [having nuclear weapons] because of historical incidents.
They developed them in the ‘50s and ‘60s or [...] that again, that was
not meant to be the norm in the future. It was suppose to be a temporary
situation. We need to bite the bullet and see how we can move beyond
nuclear weapons deterrence, and I think that we have not done that
yet.163
No, we have not done that yet; neither in 1946 nor in 2007.
161
President Bush Outlines the Iraqi Threat, The White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html
162
Nobel Peace Prize Awarded to IAEA and Directory General, IAEA,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2005/nobelprize2005.html
163
ElBaradei, Arms Control Today, Transcript's of the Director General's Interview on Curbing
Nuclear Proliferation, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Transcripts/2003/act112003.html.
94
95
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