In the Matter of J.

Robert Oppenheimer: A
Trial of Character.

Jason Constantine Flanagan

A thesis presented in partial fiilfilment

of the requirements of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honours in History
at The University of Queensland.

1998
1 declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submhted in any other form for
another degree or diploma at any university or other institute of tertiary education.
Information derived from the published or unpublished work of others has been
acknowledged in the text and a list of references is given.

I also declare that I am familiar with the mles of the Department and the Univershy relating
to the submission of this thesis.

'f^'^.(Signature) .. ?.^.7. (^.. 7. ^?-.. .(Date)

 CONTENTS

Acknowledgements iv

Abstract V.

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 - In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer. 7,

CHAPTER 2 - The Emergence of a Scientist. 23.

CHAPTER 3 - The Action: Science Joins the War Effort. 34.

CHAPTER 4 - The Reaction: Science and PoUtics Converge. 45.

CONCLUSION 62.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 68.
 IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge and thank my supervisor. Dr. Joseph M. Siracusa, not only for his
invaluable comments and criticisms, but for originally sparking my interest in the
Oppenheimer hearing during one of his undergraduate courses. Thanks also to Pat Warren
and Shannon Dorsey at the University of California for their aid in locating information
unavailable in Australia. I also wish to thank Marian Powers at Time (U.S. edition) for
supplying a number of articles on Oppenheimer.
Finally I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and help during the
researching and writing of this thesis.

Word Length - approximately 19,970 words.

 ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the historical controversy surrounding the official removal of
J. Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance. It argues that the majority finding of the
Atomic Energy Commission, which scholarship on the subject has generally rejected, was
essentially correct in concluding that Oppenheimer's clearance was removed due to defects
in his character The thesis begins with an analysis of the security hearing itself, revealing
how the Personnel Security Board was less concerned with Oppenheimer's loyalty and
discretion than with various facets of his character. Much of the testimony dealt with the
quality of Oppenheimer's advice, and issues such as his "wisdom," "influence,"
"arrogance," and lack of "enthusiasm". In order to explain the case against Oppenheimer,
this thesis studies the origins and nature of Oppenheimer's character. This begins with an
examination of Oppenheimer's childhood and school life, where strong ethical and moral
values were instilled in him. It goes on to look at Oppenheimer's entry into the international
world of science, and his development of a strong faith in the canons of science. It
documents how Oppenheimer, perhaps due to his brilliance, also became something of an
intellectual snob during this period, and was often verbally abusive to those less intelligent
than him. The burden of this thesis maintains that Oppenheimer represented a way of
thinking and of being that was antipathetic to those who dominated the policy-making
circles he entered after the war. Oppenheimer's unpopular ideas regarding defense policy,
weapons development, and candor in nuclear matters, combined with his arrogance and
influence, earned him powerful enemies. Such enemies were responsible for the initiation
of his security hearing and the resuhing removal of his clearance. This thesis concludes that
Oppenheimer's character, which was well suited to the world of science, was completely
unsuited to the Cold War policy-making circles he entered after World War II, and that the
removal of his security clearance arose out of this discord.
INTRODUCTION
 On 29 June 1954, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officially
withdrew J. Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance. Not only was J. Robert
Oppenheimer a renowned physicist, but he was the celebrated "father of the A-bomb", the
holder of the government's highest civilian award for national service, and the former
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Committee. As a frequent
consultant to various government agencies, Oppenheimer had been privy to the nation's
most sensitive secrets. Oppenheimer's security hearing was ostensibly primarily concerned
with the security risk inherent in his former Communist and left-wing associations. As a
result of the hearing it was determined that Oppenheimer was a loyal and unusually discreet
citizen. However, after Oppenheimer was unanimously cleared of being a security risk, in
the ordinary meaning of the term, his clearance was formally revoked by a majority
decision of both a specially convened Personnel Security Board, and the five-man Atomic
Energy Commission. The majority opinion of the AEC, authored by critic Lewis Strauss,
said that Oppenheimer's security clearance was permanently removed because of
"fundamental defects in his 'character'" ^
The transcript of the Oppenheimer hearing was immediately published and sparked
considerable debate. Almost half a century later the debate surrounding the Oppenheimer
hearing continues to attract scholarly attention. This hearing was a watershed moment for
security policy. The transcript of the hearing was the first such document released after the
1947 AEC loyalty-security program and Eisenhower's 1953 federal employees security
program. It gave the public its first chance to study security policy, and it provoked outrage.
Even a cursory reading of the transcript revealed that the Oppenheimer case never really
concerned issues of loyalty or discretion. It quickly became apparent that, among other
things, it was the acceptability of Oppenheimer's advice that had been on trial. Many
liberals were outraged because they believed Oppenheimer was put on trial for holding
opinions, or for "thought-crimes," a concern raised by Vannevar Bush during the hearing
itself^ Ever since news of the Oppenheimer hearing broke, and particularly after the

' United States Atomic Energy Commission. In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts ofPrincipal
Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners {^2&\an!gior\: United
States Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 51.
- United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript ofHearing
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954). p. 565.
 3
transcript was published, historical debate has raged as to the real causes behind the
hearing.
Much of the literature that has been published on Oppenheimer and his removal
does not deal specifically with the causes behind his security hearing. Writers such as Peter
Goodchild, James Kunetka, Peter Michelmore and Denise Royal have all written detailed
biographies.^ Scholars such as Joseph Haberer have studied the Oppenheimer hearing as far
as it sheds light on differences within the community of science and the relationship
between science and government."* The Oppenheimer hearing is also embedded in the wider
literature concerning the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War. Some scholars
have sought refuge in easy generalizations and dangerous oversimplifications, portraying
the Oppenheimer hearing as a product of McCarthy ism. ^ Though the political climate of the
times undoubtedly made Oppenheimer's removal all the more easy and may have dictated
something of the shape that it took, the Oppenheimer hearing cannot simply be written off
as a manifestation of McCarthyism. McCarthy played no direct role in Oppenheimer's
removal and it seems clear that those who did play such roles would have effected
Oppenheimer's removal even without the aid of anti-Communist sentiment.
Though there is a great deal of literature that does not address the central question
of why Oppenheimer was removed, there is also much that does. While studying the forces
behind the hearing, scholars such as Arthur Schlesinger and Diana Trilling recognized early
the importance of Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb, the personal animosities of
individuals such as Edward Teller and Lewis Strauss, and the hostility of the Strategic Air
Command.^ However, their analyses fall short in critical areas. Trilling brilliantly revealed
the true cause of the hearing when she said that Oppenheimer was reinvestigated "because
he represented a way of thinking and perhaps even of being which was antipathetic to a

^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation,

1980). James W. Kunetka Oppenheimer: The Years ofRisk (En^ewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982).
Peter Michehnore, The Swift Years: The Robert Oppenheimer Story (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company,
1969) Denise Royal, The Story ofJ Robert Oppenheimer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969).
^ Joseph Haberer. Politics and the Community of Science (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,
1969).
' The Oppenheimer hearing is featured in many books on anti-Communism, for example see David Caute,
The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon and
Schuster. 1978).
* Arthur M. Schlesinger, 'The Oppenheimer Case", The Atlantic, 194 (October 1954), pp. 29-36.
Diana Trilling. 'The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony", Partisan Review, 21 (1954), pp. 604-
635.
 4
dominant faction" then in power in policy-making circles.^ However, she does not explain
how or why he represented such a way of thinking or being, and her article, as Hans
Q

Meyerhoff has pointed out, is in parts "far fetched and wildly speculative."
Two of the best books on the subject are Thomas Wilson's The Great Weapons
Heresy and Philip M. Stem's The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial.^ Wilson stresses
Oppenheimer's policy views as a cause, while Stem argues that it was not only policy
views, but Oppenheimer's arrogant personality, which led to his removal. While Stem in
particular offers brilliant insight into the factors behind the hearing, neither he nor Wilson
take their analyses far enough, treating Oppenheimer's policy views and his numerous
personal enemies as two separate causes, rather than as two manifestations of a single
underlying cause. Wilson, like many other scholars, also goes too far in his attempt to
differentiate between the "real" as opposed to the "ostensible" factors behind the
Oppenheimer case. He argues that the real factors behind the hearing had nothing to do
with the ostensible issues of "loyahy," "associations," and "character."'^ Even a cursory
study of the testimony reveals the fact that Oppenheimer's loyalty and discretion were never
seriously in question. It is equally clear that since Oppenheimer was seen as both loyal and
discreet, the issue of "associations" became essentially meaningless. Having disposed of
the issues of "loyahy" and "associations," most scholars, like Wilson, go on to dismiss the
issue of "character" in a similar fashion. Scholars often cite Oppenheimer's long list of
distinguished character witnesses to show that his character was above reproach. Many
argue that the character issue was simply used to disguise the real issues. Philip Reiff, for
example, argues that "the open decision on his character masked the hidden decision on his
policy."'' Such an approach reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the issues.
Oppenheimer's character and policy views were not separate issues, but rather
Oppenheimer's character was the underlying source of his policy views.
It is clear that Strauss' judgement of Oppenheimer's character, which was primarily
based on the issue of veracity, does not ring tme. However, to argue that Oppenheimer was

Trilling. 'The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony", p. 615.

* Hans Meyerhoff and Diana Trilling. 'The Oppenheimer Case: An Exchange", Partisan Review, 22 (1955),
pp. 238-251.
' Thomas W. Wilson. The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifilia, 1970), p. 50.
Philip M. Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).
'° Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy, p. xxi.
" PhiUp Reiff "The Case of Dr. Oppenlieimer". The Twentieth Centurv, 156 (August-September 1954), pp.
114.
 I
removed due to his character is not to accept Strauss' portrayal of Oppenheimer's character.
As Diana Trilling said, Oppenheimer was removed "because he represented a way of
thinking and perhaps even of being which was antipathetic to a dominant faction" then in
power in policy-making circles.'^ It was Oppenheimer's character, or his "way of being,"
that lost him his security clearance. In an effort to explain the forces behind the
Oppenheimer hearing, scholars have rightly pointed to Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-
bomb, his alienation of the Strategic Air Command, and his numerous powerful personal
enemies. However, because they treat these things as separate and singular factors, and do
not show their origins or intercormected nature, their analyses fall short of offering a tme
understanding of the issues. It is only through an understanding of Oppenheimer's character
that these separate issues can be seen as part of a larger whole, and thus begin to make
sense.
The purpose of the following chapters is to take the scholarship on the Oppenheimer
hearing one step further, bringing it full circle and retuming to the majority finding of the
AEC. Chapter 1 undertakes an analysis of the transcript and the principal documents,
showing how these documents reveal Oppenheimer's character to be the central issue on
trial in early 1954. Chapter 2 looks at the origins and nature of Oppenheimer's character.
This chapter looks at the strong morals that were instilled in Oppenheimer at an early age,
the character traits he acquired while maturing within the intemational world of science,
and his development of not only an ability to charm and persuade, but also a talent for
antagonizing and alienating. Chapter 3 studies how Oppenheimer's role as director of the
A-bomb project at Los Alamos was largely motivated, on his behalf, by moral
considerations. It goes on to look at how such motivating factors, particularly the belief that
the United States was in a desperate race against Nazism, had evaporated by the end of the
project. The evaporation of such motivating factors, combined with the terrible destmction
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, left Oppenheimer with feelings of guih and a desire to ensure
that nuclear power would come to represent a great hope rather than a great peril. This
chapter also looks at examples of Oppenheimer's arrogance and sharp tongue. Chapter 4,
the final chapter, examines how Oppenheimer's character was completely unsuited to the
policy-making circles he entered after the war. Oppenheimer's moral outlook resulted in his
opposition to the H-bomb, his emphasis on tactical over strategic weapons, and his

'" Trilling, 'The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony", p. 615.

 6
criticism of Air Force doctrine, the same doctrine which would later become the basis of
official defense strategy. Oppenheimer's great belief in free and open debate, fundamental
to his outlook as a scientist, also led him to call for greater candor on the government's
behalf and a reduction in the levels of secrecy surrounding nuclear issues. Oppenheimer's
views engendered animosities among H-bomb advocates such as Lewis Strauss and Edward
Teller, and among officials of the Strategic Air Command. Not only would Oppenheimer's
views create powerful enemies, but as the Cold War set in, his views would be seen in
increasingly sinister terms, alienating even more moderate officials. Oppenheimer's
arrogance was also to play an important role in this period. His unfriendly relationship with
Lewis Strauss is studied in particular, for it is Strauss who would later conclude that
Oppenheimer should have his security clearance removed due to fundamental defects of
character.
 CHAPTER 1

IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT

OPPENHEIMER.
 8

From 12 April through 6 May 1954, a specially convened Personnel Security Board
of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) held a hearing to determine whether J. Robert
Oppenheimer was a security risk, and as such should have his security clearance removed.
For three weeks mnning Oppenheimer sat on a nondescript leather couch while his life was
laid bare in often-embarrassing detail, and his actions and motivations were dissected and
discussed. Five times Oppenheimer himself took the witness chair; his own testimony
filling about a quarter of the 993 page published transcript.^ The whole affair was supposed
to be confidential, but the New York Times ran the story on the second day of the hearing.
The charges against Oppenheimer had been presented in a 3000-word letter from
AEC General Manager, Kenneth R. Nichols.^ This letter presented some twenty-four
allegations, the first twenty-three of which concemed Oppenheimer's Communist and left-
wing connections from 1938 to 1946. The twenty-fourth and final charge concemed
Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb. Thus, ostensibly, the hearing was primarily
concemed with Oppenheimer's former Communist "associations". However, things were
not as simple as they appeared. The first twenty-three charges concemed events that had
taken place, and were known to have taken place, prior to the AEC's meticulous review of
the Oppenheimer file in 1947, and its subsequent unanimous clearance of him. Lewis
Strauss reaffirmed Oppenheimer's loyalty again in 1948."* Such simple facts alone raise
questions about the real factors behind the hearing.
In an effort to understand the case against Oppenheimer, the most informative area
of the transcript to study is the testimony of the principal witnesses for the "prosecution"
This testimony, more than anything else in the documentation, is sure to expose the real
issues involved in the Oppenheimer hearing. It is this testimony that reveals what the AEC
considered to be the primary reasons for denying Oppenheimer's security clearance. The
principal witnesses called by the AEC were Dr. Teller and Dr. Alvarez, both physicists; Dr.
Pitzer and Dr. Latimer, two chemists; Mr. Griggs, the former chief scientist to the

' United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript ofHearing
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954). Hereafter noted as
Transcript.
^ "'Dr. Oppenheimer Suspended by A.E.C. in Securitj' Review; Scientist Defends Record" New York Times,
13 April 1954, p. 1.
^ Transcript, p. 3-7.
" Barton J. Bernstein, "The Oppenheimer Loyalty-Security Case Reconsidered", Stanford Law Review, 42,
1383 (July 1990), p. 1401.
 9
Department of the Air Force; and General Wilson, a Major General in the Strategic Air
Command (SAC).^ Not one of these witnesses was qualified to testify about the first
twenty-two of the twenty-four charges against Oppenheimer. Thus the supposedly central
issue behind the hearing - Oppenheimer's pro-Communist or left-wing associations - did
not arise in the course of their testimony.
If the fact that the principal witnesses called by the AEC were not qualified to
comment on the first twenty-two charges leads one to conclude that the case was not really
about Oppenheimer's "associations", the testimony of these individuals eliminates all doubt
on the subject. None of these witnesses raised doubts about Oppenheimer's loyalty or his
discretion with classified information. In fact, they all openly affirmed Oppenheimer's
loyahy. General Wilson, when discussing why Oppenheimer should be removed, said: "I
would like to first say that I am not talking about loyalty. I want this clearly understood."*^
The other AEC witnesses also made it clear that their concems about Oppenheimer were
not due to issues of loyahy. Thus we have the principal witnesses for the "prosecution"
affirming that the accused is a loyal citizen, removing the primary reason he would be
considered a security risk. The question now arises as to just how Oppenheimer was
considered a security risk.
Before going on to discuss why Oppenheimer was considered a security risk,
another revealing fact about this group of witnesses must be mentioned. All the principal
AEC witnesses voluntarily admitted that they were incapable of objectivity towards
Oppenheimer. They had all consistently opposed Oppenheimer in behind-the-scenes
stmggles over military policy and weapons development. All these men were advocates of
a certain approach to national defense and strategy which eventually led to the doctrine of
"Massive Retaliation." Wilson stated in his testimony, "I am first of all a big-bomb
man...[and] a dedicated airman," and said that this had to be understood or his testimony
would not make sense.^ Griggs said, "the testimony that I have to give here before this
board...is testimony which will be concemed at least in part with two very controversial
issues on which I was a participant...on the opposite side of this controversy to Dr.
Oppenheimer."^ Because of this, Griggs said that he might "not be fiiUy capable of

^ Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 195.
^ Transcript, p. 684.
^ Ibid., pp. 684, 689.
^ Ibid., p. 746.
 ID
objectivity."' Teller admitted that his views on Oppenheimer were "based on feelings,
emotions, and prejudices."'° Roger Robb, who represented the AEC and played the role of
a prosecutor, was not disturbed by such open statements of bias, but in fact drew out and
discussed the areas where the witnesses had disagreed with Oppenheimer. Thus it is
obvious that the AEC considered these disagreements to be of some importance.
Upon study of the testimony of the principal AEC witnesses, it is easy to conclude
that Oppenheimer was put on trial for holding unpopular opinions. Vannevar Bush, leader
of the nation's scientific mobilization effort during World War II, who appeared as a pro-
Oppenheimer witness, made just such an observation. He said,
I feel that this board has made a mistake and that it is a serious one. I feel that the
letter of General Nichols.. is quite capable of being interpreted as placing a man
on trial because he held opinions.. and as I move about I find that discussed
today very energetically, that here is a man who is being pilloried because he had
strong opinions, and had the temerity to express them.''
Bush was closer to the mark than he knew. As will be discussed later, not only did the
board fail to object to the nature of initial H-bomb charge, they also listened to testimony
conceming issues such as the Vista report, the "second-lab" issue, the Lincoln Summer
Study, and nuclear weapons development. Such testimony did not deal with Oppenheimer's
motivations or loyalty but purely his policy views. It was the acceptability of
Oppenheimer's advice that was being debated and considered.
The testimony of General Wilson offers a good illustration of the manner in which
Oppenheimer was judged. Wilson discussed an alarming "pattem" in Oppenheimer's
activities. After stating that he was a "dedicated airman," Wilson outlined this pattern,
saying:
First was my awareness of the fact that Dr. Oppenheimer was interested in what I
call the intemationalizing of atomic energy, this at a time when the United States
had a monopoly, and in which many people, including myself, believed that the A-
bomb in the hands of the Unhed States with an Air Force capable of using it was

^ Transcript, p. 746.
^"^ Ibid., p. 121.
" Ibid., p. 565.
 11
12
probably the greatest deterrent to further Russian aggression. This was a concern.
(Emphasis added).
Wilson had already stated at this point that he did not believe that Oppenheimer's advice
was motivated by disloyahy. It is easy to understand why Wilson and the Air Force were
concemed with Oppenheimer's views, but it is far from clear how such views were relevant
to the hearing if they were not a reflection of sinister motives. Wilson went on to discuss
Oppenheimer's opposition to two Air Force backed nuclear detection devices; his
opposition to a nuclear-powered aircraft; and the fact that he approached thermonuclear
weapons with "more conservatism than the Air Force would have liked." These events
were all part of the "pattem" Wilson discussed. Such issues had nothing to do with
Oppenheimer being a security risk, and everything to do with Oppenheimer, in the eyes of
the Air Force, offering unwelcome advice and criticism.
Wilson offered further insight into the issues behind the Oppenheimer hearing when
he remarked:
The fact that he [Oppenheimer] is such a brilliant man, the fact that he has such a
command of the English language, has such national prestige, and such power of
persuasion, only made me nervous, because I feh if this was so it would not be to
the interest of the United States.. ."''*
Here Wilson seemed to be saying that Oppenheimer's very character conflicted with
national interests. However, Wilson's testimony makes it clear that he was equating
national interests with the interests of the Air Force. Wilson, as mentioned earlier, had
already admitted he was a dedicated airman and big-bomb man. What becomes clear is that
the Air Force felt threatened by Oppenheimer, not simply because of his policy views, but
because of his influential character, and feh that he should be removed. Oppenheimer was
considered a security risk, not for lack of loyalty to the United States, but lack of loyalty to
the Air Force.
If Wilson remained a somewhat reserved spokesman for the Air Force, David
Tressel Griggs, former Chief Scientist of the Air Force, was less inhibited. Griggs picked
up on some of the ideas of Wilson, particularly the idea of Oppenheimer's actions betraying
an alarming pattem of activities. Griggs said:

'" Transcript, p. 684.

' V6/i/., p. 685.
'V*;V/.,p.685.
 12
there was a pattem of activities, all of which involved Dr. Oppenheimer. One of
these was the Vista Project... We were told that... Oppenheimer and two other
colleagues formed an informal committee of three to work for world peace or some
such purpose, as they saw it. We were also told that in this effort they considered
that many things were more important than the development of the thermonuclear
weapon...It was further told [to] me...that in order to achieve world peace...it was
necessary.. .to give up.. .the Strategic Air Command."'^
It must be pointed out that this was a clear distortion of Oppenheimer's views. However,
Griggs did not stop here, but took this "pattem of activities" idea a step further, suggesting
some kind of conspiracy. Griggs told of seeing Dr. Zacharias write the initials Z.O.R.C. on
a blackboard in front of fifty to a hundred people at a meeting of the Scientific Advisory
Board in 1952.'^ He went on to explain that Z was for Zacharias, O for Oppenheimer, R for
Rabi, and C for Charles Lauritsen. This group supposedly supported Oppenheimer in his
advocacy of world peace and abolishment of the Strategic Air Command. Not only did
Lauritsen deny, under oath, that he ever wrote these letters on a blackboard, but not one of
the other fifty to a hundred people that were supposed to have witnessed this event was ever
produced.
In the course of Griggs' testimony, we once again see that the alarming "pattem of
activities" that was being discussed simply referred to Oppenheimer voicing ideas, or being
connected to ideas, that clashed with those held by the Air Force. Many of the issues Griggs
discussed, and was in fact encouraged to discuss by Roger Robb, had absolutely no
relevance to the charges outlined in the Nichols letter. Griggs discussed, in some detail,
Oppenheimer's role in the Vista Project and the Lincoln Summer Study, and why the Air
Force was unhappy with these projects. At one point Griggs said: "we [the Air Force] have
learned to be a little cautious about study projects which have in mind making budget
allocations or recommending budget allocations for major components of the Military
17

Establishment." Griggs was also unhappy with the fact that the Lincoln Summer Study,
ftinded primarily by the Air Force, studied submarine defense. This, once again, had
nothing to do with Oppenheimer being a security risk, and everything to do with the Air
Force being unhappy with Oppenheimer's advice.

^^ Transcript, p. 749.
'^ Ibid., p. 750.
^' Ibid
 13
Griggs readily admitted, on more than one occasion, that his ideas about
Oppenheimer were largely based on "hearsay evidence" and "impressions."' It is clear that
Griggs had a certain impression of Oppenheimer's character, and with this impression in
mind, wrongly attributed various views and incidents to Oppenheimer and his influence.
The testimony of Dr. Kenneth Pitzer, like that of many other witnesses, seems to have been
based on the very same thing. With regard to Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb,
Pitzer said:
I have no personal knowledge of Dr. Oppenheimer going to Mr. X and saying don't
work at Los Alamos, or of his making a technical recommendation obviously and
distinctly contrary to the demonstrable good of the program. On the other hand, I
have great difficuhy believing that the program would have had certain
difficulties...if he had enthusiastically urged individuals to participate in the
program, because as I said before, he was a great personal influence among
theoretical physicists."''
Oppenheimer was apparently a security risk, in Pitzer's view, because he failed to show
"enthusiasm" for the H-bomb. Such an idea would resurface in the findings of the Gray
Board majorhy.
When reading the testimony of the AEC witnesses, it becomes clear that fear of
Oppenheimer's influence was an important factor behind the hearing. Wendell Latimer,
under direction from Robb, testified at length about Oppenheimer's influence. Latimer
attributed to Oppenheimer an almost supematural ability to persuade people, tracing a
number of events back to his influence. Latimer argued that many people came back from
Los Alamos pacifists, going on to say that he judged this to be due "very largely to... this
tremendous influence he [Oppenheimer] had over those young men."^° Latimer also
attributed a number of other things to Oppenheimer and his influence, such as a desire to
disband Los Alamos, opposition to the H-bomb, and "the 4 years that we twiddled our
thumbs," in post-war atomic research.^' Latimer argued, like Wilson and Griggs, that all
these things gave "a certain pattem" to Oppenheimer's philosophy. He argued that "not
only General Groves, but the other members of the [General Advisory] committee... were

'* Transcript, p. 746.

^"^ Ibid., p. 106.
-''Ibid
-' Ibid
 14
under the influence of Dr. Oppenheimer."^^ Latimer maintained that the only reason he had
not fallen under Oppenheimer's spell himself was due to the fact he hadn't been in close
enough contact with Oppenheimer.
Like Latimer, Alvarez also discussed Oppenheimer's influence in his testimony. As
far as people being opposed to the H-bomb, Alvarez said, "every time I have found a
person who feh this way, I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer's influence on that persons mind."
However, when asked if this meant that he thought Oppenheimer was disloyal, Alvarez
responded "Absolutely not, sir."'^'' None of the principal AEC witnesses questioned
Oppenheimer's loyahy. Alvarez argues that Oppenheimer's stance on the H-bomb issue did
not reflect disloyahy, but rather "exceedingly poor judgement."^^ Thus it was argued that
Oppenheimer was a securhy risk because of his poor judgement, which was given all the
more weight due to his great influence. Latimer stated this even more clearly, saying that
all Oppenheimer's "reactions were such to give me considerable worry about his judgement
as a security risk." (Emphasis added). Once again we see Oppenheimer being condemned
as a security risk simply due to his judgement on policy issues.
The testimony of Edward Teller sheds the most light on this issue of Oppenheimer
being considered a security risk due to the quality of his judgement. At one point Gordon
Gray directly asked Teller if he felt "that it would endanger the common defense and
97

security to grant clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer?" This was thefrindamentalquestion that

formed the basis of the entire hearing, and Teller's response was enlightening. Teller
answered:
I believe...that Dr. Oppenheimer's character is such that he would not knowingly
and willingly do anything that is designed to endanger the safety of this country. To
the extent, therefore, that your question is directed toward intent, I would say I do
not see any reason to deny clearance. If it is a question of wisdom andjudgement, as
demonstrated by actions since 1945, then I would say one would be wiser not to
grant clearance. (Emphasis added).

"• Transcript, p. 663.

-^ Ibid., 802.
-'Ibid., p. 803.
-'Ibid
'-'Ibid., p. 660.
-'^ Ibid.,p. 726.
''Ibid
 15
This issue of "wisdom and judgement", in the manner which it is discussed in such
testimony, can only mean agreement with official views. Thus the principal witnesses of
the AEC suggested that Oppenheimer should be removed because he was an influential
advisor who did not agree with official views. This was an entirely new, and very
dangerous, understanding of the term "security risk", though it is not altogether surprising
given the political environment of the early stages of the Cold War.
On 29 June 1954, one day before Oppenheimer's consulting contract would have
ended, his security clearance was formally removed.^^ The decision to remove
Oppenheimer's clearance was taken by a two-to-one decision of the Personnel Security
Board (the Gray Board); by a separate finding by the General Manager of the AEC; and by
a four-to-one vote of the AEC commissioners. A study of the testimony indicates that
Oppenheimer was being removed because he was an unwelcome source of advice and
criticism. Though the testimony of the principal AEC witnesses does help to reveal the real
issues involved in the Oppenheimer hearing, the findings of the Gray Board and the Atomic
Energy Commission offer even clearer insight into the factors that led to the removal of
Oppenheimer's clearance.
The three-man Gray Board consisted of Dr. Gordon Gray, Dr. Ward Evans, and Mr.
Thomas Morgan. The Gray Board found twenty of the twenty-four allegations to be "tme"
or "substantially tme."^° It must again be noted that the first twenty-three charges could be
no "tmer" then they had been in 1947, when the AEC had cleared Oppenheimer after a
meticulous review of his file. In his dissenting opinion, Evans wrote:
Most of this derogatory information was in the hands of the Commission when Dr.
Oppenheimer was cleared in 1947. They apparently were aware of his associations
and his left-wing policies; yet they cleared him. They took a chance on him because
of his special talents and he continued to do a good job. Now when the job is done,
we are asked to investigate him for practically the same derogatory
information.... To deny him clearance now for what he was cleared for in 1947,

^^ Rachel L. HoUoway, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Politics, Rhetoric, and Self-Defense
(London: Praeger, 1993). p. 3.
^ United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts ofPrincipal
Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 3-13. Hereafter cited as Principal Documents.
 16
when we must know he is less of a security risk now than he was then, seems to be
hardly the procedure to be adopted in a free country.
This comment stmck to the heart of many of the injustices of the Oppenheimer hearing, as
well as to the factors behind it. It is clear, as Evans points out, that Oppenheimer was less
of a security risk in 1954 than he was in 1947. However this is only if one operates from a
traditional understanding of the term "security risk" As discussed earlier, the idea of
"security risk" was redefined in the course of the Oppenheimer hearing to include sources
of unwelcome advice and criticism.
The Majority Report itself dismissed the significance of the first twenty-three
charges, concluding that though "Dr. Oppenheimer was deeply involved with many people
who were active Communists,...there is no indication of disloyalty." The Board also
concluded that "Dr. Oppenheimer seems to have had a high degree of discretion reflecting
as unusual ability to keep to himself vital secrets"^^ Thus the Board concluded that
Oppenheimer was a loyal and discreet citizen who possessed an unusual ability to keep
secrets to himself This should have, in effect, done away with the hearing. As Evans said
in his dissenting opinion, "We don't have to go out of our way and invent something;.. .it is
not our function to rewrite any clearance mles;... we don't have to dig deeply to find other
ways he may be a security risk"^"* But the other two members of the board did just this.
The Majority Report of the Board clearly stated that "Dr. Oppenheimer served his
Government because it sought him," going on to say: "the Nation owes these scientists, we
believe, a great debt of gratitude for loyal and magnificent service. This is particularly tme
with respect to Dr. Oppenheimer"?^ The report then went on to say that the advice of
people such as Oppenheimer must be "uncolored and uninfluenced by considerations of an
emotional character"/'^ At this point, in perhaps the most amazing sentence in the
documentation, the Majority Report betrayed the hearing for the travesty that it was, saying
that govemment officials "must be certain that underlying any advice is a genuine
conviction that this country cannot in the interest of security have less than the strongest

^' Principal Documents, p. 22.

^-Ibid., pp. 18-19.
" Ibid., p. 20.
" Ibid., p. 22.
''Ibid., pp. 17-18.
'^ Ibid p. 18.
 17
possible offensive capabilities."^^ Thus a loyal, valuable and discreet citizen can be
considered a security risk if his opinions do not reflect official views, in this case the view
that national security can only be based on the preservation of the "strongest possible
offensive capabilities" This point was later reiterated and connected to the issue of
Oppenheimer's influence. The report said:
We are concerned.. that he [Oppenheimer] may have departed his role as scientific
advisor to exercise highly persuasive influence in matters in which his convictions
were not necessarily a reflection of technical judgement, and also not necessarily
related to the protection of the strongest offensive military interests of the country.
It seems clear, despite denials, that Oppenheimer was being put on trial because he was
seen as an influential man whose opinions conflicted with official views.
The Board did not stop here. In discussing the "controlling considerations" that led
to their conclusions, the majority said that they found Oppenheimer's conduct in the
hydrogen bomb program "sufficiently disturbing as to raise doubts as to whether his future
participation, if characterized by the same attitudes in Govemment program relating to the
national defense, would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security."
Oppenheimer was not only being condemned for his past opinions, but the board, judging
from what they knew of Oppenheimer's character, presumed to discern his future opinions
and condemn them in advance. The Report also discussed Oppenheimer's lack of
"enthusiastic support of the securhy system," mentioning how he "repeatedly exercised an
arrogance of his own judgement" when it came to the loyalty and reliability of others.'**^
Due to these considerations, as well as those mentioned above, the Board reached the
conclusion that it would not be "clearly consistent with the security interests of the United
States to reinstate Dr. Oppenheimer's clearance" "" Such were the findings of the majority
of the Gray Board. It was recommended that Oppenheimer, a loyal and unusually discreet
individual, should be denied clearance due to, among other things, his "judgement,"
"influence," "arrogance" and lack of "enthusiasm" It seems clear then, that Oppenheimer
was being removed, not because he was a security risk as we would commonly understand

' Principal Documents, p. \%.

'^ Ibid., p. 20.
'"^ Ibid..p.2\.
^Ibid. p. 20.
'' Ibid
 18
it, but because, in the past, he had caused trouble for those in power, and given his
character, was likely to do so again in the future.
Things did not stop here, next came the separate finding of AEC General Manager,
K. D. Nichols. Nichols belabored Oppenheimer's Communist connections, saying that
Oppenheimer was more than a simple "parlor pink," though he admitted that there was "no
direct evidence that Dr. Oppenheimer gave secrets to a foreign nation or that he is
disloyal".'*^ Nichols, like the majority of the Gray Board, argued that Oppenheimer
"repeatedly exercised an arrogance of his own judgement" when it came to the loyalty of
his associates, and showed disregard for "a reasonable security system".'*^ In an apparent
effort to ward off the criticism he received for including the H-bomb charge in his initial
charges against Oppenheimer, Nichols said that "technical opinions have no security
implications unless they are a reflections of sinister motives." '^ He later said that the
record cleared Oppenheimer of such motives. However, two sentences later, Nichols
seemed to retreat from this position, discussing the negative impacts of Oppenheimer's
influence. He said that had Oppenheimer "given his enthusiastic support to the [H-bomb]
program, a concerted effort would have been initiated at an earlier date, and that, whatever
the motivation, the security interests of the United States were affected."'*'
After Nichols had given his conclusions, the final resolution of the case was handed
over to five men at the AEC. These men were Lewis L. Strauss, Joseph Campbell, Thomas
Murray, Eugene Zuckert, and Henry DeWolf Smyth. The Commission voted four-to-one to
deny Oppenheimer clearance. Each one of the Commissioners wrote an opinion, with the
majority opinion, signed by Strauss, Campbell and Zuckert, being authored by Strauss.'*^
Murray concurred with the majority conclusions, but for different reasons, and Smyth
dissented. The various statements put forward by the AEC commissiontrs not only
contradicted the Gray Board, but at times contradicted each other.
Zuckert's opinion offers valuable insight into why Oppenheimer's clearance was not
simply allowed to lapse, thus avoiding an ugly hearing. He declared that such a possibility

""^ Principal Documents, p. 44.

•'^ Ibid., p. 46.
•" Ibid., p. 47.
45
''Ibid
"* Charles P. Curtis, The Oppenheimer Case: The Trial of a Security System (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1955), p. 239.
 w
was "not practical," going into a rather long-winded explanation as to why this was so.
Zuckert discussed Oppenheimer's influence, saying:
His advice was sought on many matters in which science or technical aspects of
atomic energy were important as incidentals and background. With his unique
experience, his intellect, his breadth of interests and his articulateness it was almost
inevitable that he was consulted on a growing number of national security policy
matters.'*^
Thus Zuckert shows Oppenheimer's influence to be the "almost inevitable" resuk of various
aspects of Oppenheimer's character. He then stmck to the heart of the issue, saying that
ahhough the Commission had used Oppenheimer very little after 1952, Commission
clearance had, however, "been a basis for other agencies using him in coimection with
delicate problems of national security [and] it is logical to expect that would continue.""*^
Zuckert said the Commission was "clearly obligated to determine" whether Oppenheimer
could go on being used and consuhed by other agencies. Thus once again there was a
concem not only for Oppenheimer's current role, but that of his future role. As has already
been discussed, Oppenheimer was being removed primarily due to the opinions he held and
the influence he wielded. What Zuckert was saying, was that if Oppenheimer's clearance
was simply allowed to lapse, his influence would not be destroyed and his opinions would
not be silenced.
The most important report by the AEC is the majority report. The majority opinion
concluded that Oppenheimer was not "entitled to the continued confidence of the
Govemment and of this Commission because of the proof of fiindamental defects in his
'character."''° To support this conclusion, Strauss cited six examples, half of which
occurred before his 1947 clearance of Oppenheimer. After discussing his six examples,
Strauss went on to say "the catalogue does not begin and end with these six examples,"
suggesting other events had been considered in reaching this judgement.'^ At the end of the
majority statement, Strauss wrote:
It is clear that for one who has had access for so long to the most vital defense
secrets of the Govemment and who would retain such access if his clearance were

47
Principal Documents, p. 56.
''Ibid
Ibid
'^ Ibid., p. 51
'° Ibid., p. 51.
^' Ibid., p. 53.
 continued. Dr. Oppenheimer has defauhed not once but many times upon the
52

obligations that should and must be willingly bome by citizens in national service.
Strauss did not mention the fact that Oppenheimer had never, during the "long" years he
had held clearance, betrayed any of the "vital secrets" mentioned. Oppenheimer was to be
considered a security risk simply because he was of "bad character" In his dissenting
opinion, Smyth would raise questions about quality of Strauss' judgement and his role in
the origins of the hearing.
Smyth's dissenting opinion is one of the most enlightening documents of the case,
for it serves to point out many of the inconsistencies and injustices in the hearing. Smyth
said "the only question being determined by the Atomic Energy Commission is whether
there is a possibility that Dr. Oppenheimer will intentionally or unintentionally reveal
information to persons who should not have it,...this is what is meant within our security
system by the term security risk."^^ Later in his dissenting opinion he went on to clarify this
point further, saying that "if a man protects the secrets he has in his hands and his head, he
has shown essential regard for the security system."^"* It is clear that Smyth did not accept
the way the term "security risk" had been redefined to suit the needs of Oppenheimer's
enemies. Smyth went on to say:
I frankly do not understand the charge made by the majority that Dr. Oppenheimer
has shown a persistent and willful disregard for the obligations of security, and that
therefore he should be declared a security risk. No gymnastics of rationalization
allow me to accept this argument.^^
Smyth also pointed out the lack of new evidence and hinted at the forces behind the
reopening of old questions surrounding Oppenheimer's loyalty.
The past 15 years of his [Oppenheimer's] life have been investigated and
reinvestigated. For much of the last 11 years he has been under actual surveillance,
his movements watched, his conversations noted, his mail and telephone calls
checked. This professional review of his actions has been supplemented by
enthusiastic amateur help from powerful personal enemies.^^ (Emphasis added.)

'- Principal Documents, p. 54.

'^ Ibid., p. 64.
'Ubid.,p.61
''Ibid
'Ubid., p. 64.
 21
Smyth later recalled that this last comment had been provoked by reports in the
Oppenheimer file, which he said, originated from "such avid and skeptical Oppenheimer-
watchers as Lewis Strauss, William Borden, David Griggs and, to a lesser extent, Edward
Teller." Such men did not like Oppenheimer's influential views, and hoped to silence
such an influential source of unwelcome advice..
As mentioned, Smyth not only questioned Strauss' role in the origins of the
Oppenheimer hearing, but also questioned his veracity. In support of his conclusion that
Oppenheimer had fundamental defects of character, Strauss cited six examples, but said,
"the catalogue does not begin and end with these six examples. "^^ In his dissenting opinion,
Smyth, who had access to the same files as Strauss, said of these six examples: "any
implication that these are illustrations only and that further substantial evidence exists in
the investigative files to support these charges is unfounded."^^ Smyth quoted the AEC
security criteria, which said that the decision as to security clearance was "an overall
commonsense judgement," and went on to say that the application of this standard to the
Oppenheimer record, "destroys any pattem of suspicious conduct or catalog of falsehoods
and evasions, and leaves a picture of Dr. Oppenheimer as an able, imaginative human being
whh normal human weaknesses and failings."^" In his dissenting opinion Smyth was direct
in pointing out the injustice of the Oppenheimer hearing, at one point simply saying, "the
conclusion [of the majority] cannot be supported by a fair evaluation of the evidence."^^ It
seems clear that little about the Oppenheimer hearing was "fair".
After one peels away the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Oppenheimer
hearing, the tme issues involved become discemible. The ostensible concem behind the
hearing was Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb and the security risk inherent in his
former Communist "associations". However, it soon became clear that this issue of
"associations" did not carry the importance that the charges first indicated. The Gray Board
openly attested to Oppenheimer's loyahy and discretion, and none feh Oppenheimer would
betray govemment secrets. Many commentators and scholars concluded that Oppenheimer
was tried for his opinions, but the case is not that simple. Though scholarship on the subject

"^ Stem. The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 419.

"^* Principal Documents, p. 53.
'Ubid.. p. 66.
^ Ibid., p. 61.
*' Ibid., p. 64.
 22
seems to have unanimously rejected Strauss' conclusion that Oppenheimer was in fact
removed due to "fundamental defects in his character", Strauss was in a way correct. A
study of the hearing reveals that h was in fact Oppenheimer's character that cost him his
security clearance.
Throughout the hearing various aspects of Oppenheimer's character were studied
and discussed. The principal AEC witnesses, under direction from the "prosecution",
discussed Oppenheimer's opinions and influence, and the dangers these posed to the
security of the United States. The testimony is littered with issues such as Oppenheimer's
wisdom and judgement, his command of the English language and powers of persuasion,
his morality and his lack of enthusiasm. The prosecution portrayed each one of these facets
of Oppenheimer's character as constituting a security risk, and it is clear that such issues
were decisive in the final outcome. Though study of the documentation reveals that it was
indeed Oppenheimer's character that led to the removal of his security clearance, it does not
reveal how it did so. For a better understanding of how Oppenheimer's character led to the
loss of his securhy clearance, one must study the origins and nature of Oppenheimer's
character, and his changing role in the years leading to the hearing.
 23

CHAPTER 2

THE EMERGENCE OF A
SCIENTIST.
 24

J. Robert Oppenheimer was bom to Julius and Ella Oppenheimer on April 22,
1904. Julius Oppenheimer was a prosperous German-Jewish emigrant who directed a
cloth-importing company. Ella was from a prosperous American family of German descent.
When she met Julius Oppenheimer she had already begun to make a name for herself as a
painter of some distinction and an art teacher with her own studio in Manhattan.^ Julius and
Ella Oppenheimer were people of digmty. Visitors to the Oppenheimer home found the
atmosphere subdued and correct, like an elegant restaurant.^ Julius Oppenheimer was
devoted to matters of the mind and more than anything he enjoyed lively discussions on
philosophy or ethics."* Both Julius and Ella Oppenheimer were non-practicing Jews, and
did not belong to any temple. Instead they were part of the Ethical Culture Society. This
society was founded by Felix Adler, the son of a German rabbi, and promoted the idea of a
society based on ethics rather than religion. Members preached of the need for stronger
moraUty, but believed morality should not be based on religious dogma. They feh that
people could develop values that would allow them to live and die with dignity, without the
aid of religious institutions. Such ideas were ingrained in the young Oppenheimer.
From second grade through high school, Oppenheimer attended the Ethical Culture
School on Central Park West, which had grown out of the Ethical Culture Society. This
school offered a new kind of education, not only teaching "the three R's" but also courses
in areas such as craft and art, geography, history, nature study, the writing of original
composhions, and most of all ethics. "Moral law" was taught in all grades, firstly through
the study of fairytales, then later through the study of history, the Old and New Testament
and classics such as the Odyssey.^ One of Oppenheimer's cousins once said of the Ethical
Culture School: "If there ever was an outfit where ethics and honesty and morals were
stressed, that was h!"^

' Whetlier or not the "J" in Robert's name stood for Julius has never been fully resolved. Official
communications by FBI director J.Edgar Hoover as well as the 1968 book Lawrence and Oppenheimer, by
Nuel Pharr Davis, referred to him as "Julius Robert Oppenheimer." The City of New York Bureau of Records
and Statistics said the city records "contain a birth certiJBcate for a Julius R. Oppenheimer." However, Robert
himself always maintained that the " f stood "for nothing"
- Jack Rummel. Robert Oppenheimer: Dark Prince (New York: Facts on File, 1992), p. 16.
^ .Mice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner, eds., Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1980). p. 2.
' Denise Royal. The Story of J Robert Oppenheimer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 5.
' Rummel, Robert Oppenheimer: Dark Prince, p 19.
^ PhiUp M. Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 10.
 25
Ethical Culture School had a profound and lasting effect on Oppenheimer. His
approach to people and problems and the great weight he laid on moral and ethical
considerations can be traced back to the philosophy of his parents and that of the Ethical
Cuhure School. Oppenheimer later had great difficuhy in reconciling the strong moral
values this school had imbued in him whh his central role in ushering in the nuclear age. He
would view the debates that the nuclear age engendered, such as the one that surrounded
the H-bomb decision, in a moralistic manner. Oppenheimer's moralistic approach to post-
war problems became increasingly out of step whh that of the defense establishment. This
divergence of views and approaches was a primary factor in Oppenheimer's later removal.
At school, Oppenheimer excelled. However, though he was far ahead of his peers
intellectually, he was emotionally immature, never developing normal social skills. Jane
Kayser, one of his classmates, remembered the teenage Oppenheimer as someone who
"never wanted to come to the front of anything...If he did h was because he was so
extraordinarily gifted and brilliant - that just pushed him."^ This is also tme of
Oppenheimer's later life, it seems his brilliance, combined whh his strong morals, "just
pushed him." After the end of the war, when Oppenheimer entered into various advisory
roles, he recognized many of the problems that were inherent in the new nuclear age,
problems that others had not yet recognized, and feh it was his moral obligation to see that
these problems were addressed. Oppenheimer was perhaps the first to recognize the tmly
revolutionary nature of nuclear weapons and the resulting inapplicability of traditional
military and political thought. Unfortunately for Oppenheimer, many of the problems that
he was to recognize and draw attention to, ahhough real, were problems that the country
was not yet willing to face or openly discuss.
Oppenheimer, even in his childhood, suffered from bouts of depression, coupled
with a type of self-destmctive introspection. Depression would particularly trouble him
throughout his school and university life. In 1963, Oppenheimer would say:
Up to now, and even more in the days of my almost infinitely prolonged
adolescence, I hardly took an action, hardly did anything or failed to do
anything, whether h was a paper in physics, or a lecture, or how I read a
book, how I talked to a friend, how I loved, that did not arouse in me a very
great sense of revulsion and of wrong.

Smith and Weiner. Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 1.

Howard Gardner, Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 1995), p. 92.
 26
Nothing in his later life aroused a greater sense of "revulsion and wrong" than his
connection whh the A-bomb project. During his univershy years Oppenheimer would tell a
friend: "The kind of person that I admire most would be one who becomes extraordmarily
good at doing a lot of things but still maintains a tear-stained countenance."^ Oppenheimer
did become extraordinarily good at a number of things, but after the creation of the A-bomb
he feh that he had "blood on his hands."^°
Oppenheimer entered Harvard in 1922, completing the four-year course in just three
years, graduating summa cum laude. At Harvard the tartness and arrogance that were to
later become more pronounced, and which were to play an integral role in his later troubles,
began to manifest themselves. During a vish to the home of physics professor Percy
Bridgman, Oppenheimer noticed a photograph of a temple at Segesta, Sicily. Bridgman
remarked that it had been built in 700BC, to which Oppenheimer responded: "I should
judge from the caphals on the columns that it was built about fifty years earlier.""
Oppenheimer could be extremely cutting, and would cut someone mid-conversation if he
thought they were cmde or banal. "That boy will either shake up physics or the world,"
Bridgman said of Oppenheimer. In reality that "boy" was to shake up both.
After graduating from Harvard, Oppenheimer applied to the Univershy of
Cambridge, where he worked with the famous physicist. Sir Joseph J. Thomson at the
Cavendish laboratory. Oppenheimer was awkward in the laboratory, and the simple act of
soldering two wires together fiixstrated him. By Christmas of 1925, Oppenheimer had once
again sunk into the depths of depression, deciding to take a holiday to Britain and France.
He walked along the seashore and thought of suicide, later saying: "I was on the point of
bumping myself off. This was chronic."^^ One of Oppenheimer's friends, John Edsall,
recalled that it was obvious that in Oppenheimer "there was a tremendous inner turmoil, in
sphe of which...he kept on doing a tremendous amount of work, thinking, reading,
discussing things, but obviously whh a sense of great inner anxiety and alarm."'"* It seems
that throughout his life Oppenheimer would agonize over decisions and actions he had

^ Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 93.

"^ Oppenheimer, in a meeting with Dean Acheson and President Truman, very much offended Truman by
saying, in connection with his role in the production of the A-bomb, "Mr. President, I have blood on my
hands." See Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 90.
'' Readers Digest, "Behind the Scenes with a Genius", (February 1949), p. 81.
'• J. Alvin Kugelmass, J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Atomic Story (New York: Julian Messner, 1961), p. 42.
''Ibid
14
Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 92.
 77
taken, never sure if what he was doing was ethical or right. Nothing would come to torment
him more than the moral questions surrounding his role in the Manhattan Project, and his
later life would be dedicated torightingwhat he conceived of as a terrible sin.
Though Oppenheimer was having great difficulties whh laboratory work, he was
making a name for himself in theoretical physics. Oppenheimer decided to take an offer to
work in Germany. The offer came from Max Bom, director of the Institute of Theoretical
Physics at the University of Gottingen in Germany. Oppenheimer could not have picked a
more interesting time to make this transition, for early that year (1926), Erwin Schrodinger
had proposed a revolutionary new theory of the atom, called quantum mechanics.
Oppenheimer had already written two papers on various aspect of Quantum Theory, which
had been published by the Joumal of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. Because of this,
Oppenheimer's reputation preceded him to Gottingen, and he was immediately accepted
into the weekly staff and student seminars as a member of some standing, though he was
one of the youngest on the scene. ^^
The relationship between teacher and pupil was close at Cambridge, but this did not
compare to the situation at Gottingen. Quantum mechanics was a new field, where students
and professors learned from one another. The professors did not make secrets of their
mistakes and doubts, and prompted students to seek out their own explanations. '^ Gottingen
at that time was the epitome of the intemational world of science at its best. Here, tmth was
the only goal, rationality was the only method, and the process of discovery was imminent
and endless. Here h was feh that the responsibility of scientific mind was to "challenge and
test all doctrine, to expose all views, discuss all possibilhies, and reject all errors in the free
air of open debate."'^ This is the atmosphere in which Oppenheimer matured, and this was
the kind of scientific mindset instilled in Oppenheimer. Hans Bethe later said: "Vigorous
discussion as well as emphasis on fundamental problems was Oppenheimer's style...
Perhaps he wanted to perpetuate that feeling of continuous discovery which must have
pervaded Gottingen."^^ Later Oppenheimer would bring this mindset and approach to his
post-war advisory roles. When Oppenheimer entered policy-making circles, his ideas about
international openness and free debate brought him into sharp conflict with much of the

'^ Rebecca Larsoa Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988), p. 27.
'^ Royal, The Story ofJ Robert Oppenheimer, p. 38.
'^ Thomas W. Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifilin, 1970), p. 3.
'^ Hans Bethe, "Oppenheimer: 'Where He Was There Was Always Life and Excitement'" Science, 155
(March 1967), p. 1081.
 2S
defense establishment, which equated knowledge whh power and believed secrecy was
essential to nuclear supremacy.
In his student days, Oppenheimer's brilliance led many students to dislike him.
Fellow American student Ed Condon said: "the trouble is that Oppie is so quick on the
trigger intellectually that he puts the other guy at a disadvantage. And, dammit, he is always
right, or at least right enough."^^ Oppenheimer was also weahhy, arrogant and cultivated.
Condon recalled one incident that illustrated just how sheltered and elitist Oppenheimer's
early life had been. Oppenheimer had invhed Ed Condon and his wife Emilie out for a
walk, but Emilie was forced to refiise because she had to look after the couple's new baby.
"All right," Oppenheimer replied, "we'll leave you to your peasant tasks."^° As mentioned
before, such arrogance would earn Oppenheimer powerfiil enemies.
On May 11, 1927, after some difficuhies whh the Pmssian Ministry of education,
Oppenheimer was allowed to take his oral examination. After the examination the physicist
James Franck was asked how it had gone by a colleague; he replied "I got out of there just
in time. He was beginning to ask me questions."^' Oppenheimer next became a Fellow of
the National Research Council, first at Harvard, then at the California Institute of
Technology. In 1928 Oppenheimer became a Fellow of the Intemational Education Board,
visiting Leiden and Zurich. At the University of Leiden, Oppenheimer stutmed staff and
students by delivering a lecture in Dutch after having been there only six weeks. It is here
that Oppenheimer gained the affectionate nickname "Opje", which would become "Oppie"
in the Umted States. Throughout his time in Europe, h seems that Oppenheimer was
homesick and even a little chauvinistic, often infiiriating other students with superlatives
about the Unhed States. One student remarked: "According to him, even the flowers
seemed to smell better back there." Oppenheimer later wrote:
In the spring of 1929 I retumed to the United States. I was homesick for this
country, and in fact I did not leave h for nineteen years. I had leamed a great

'^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation,
1980). p. 20.
-^Ibid
"' Royal, The Story ofJ Robert Oppenheimer, p. 38.
" Hans Bethe. "J. Robert Oppenheimer 1904-1967", Biographical Memoirs ofFellows of the Royal Society,
14(l%8),p. 392.
-' CJoodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds', p. 20.
 29
deal in my student days about the new physics; I wanted to pursue this
myself, to explain h, and to foster hs cuhivation...^'^
This is exactly what Oppenheimer was to do. Over the next ten years, beginning with a
single graduate student, Oppenheimer tumed Califomia into a great center for theoretical
physics.
Oppenheimer chose concurrent appointments as an assistant professor at the
California Institute of Technology (Cal Tech) and at the University of Califomia at
Berkeley. In his early days of teaching, Oppenheimer is alleged to have "terrorized" his
students. He was a poor lecturer who raced through his notes, often spoke in abstract prose,
and vastly overestimated the abilities of his audience. After one of his early lectures a
professor congratulated Oppenheimer by saying, "Well, Robert, I didn't understand a damn
word!"^^ Eventually Oppenheimer slowed down his lectures and improved his delivery, and
soon attracted a devout following of particularly gifted students. Oppenheimer's charming
and magnetic personality was instmmental in his great success as a teacher. Glenn Seaborg
said of Oppenheimer: "his electric personality certainly contributed to our fascination and
satisfaction with his performance." Various people have tried to explain Oppenheimer's
unusual abiUty to influence people, speculating as to what unique personal quaUty he
possessed that allowed him to so easily command, persuade and influence. Philosopher
Will Dennes, who knew Oppenheimer for many years, answered this question with one
word: "Charisma."^^ Oppenheimer's unusual ability to influence people was also given
mention in his hearing and was an important factor in his removal. This ability gave him
power and influence beyond that which someone would normally command in his position.
Those that disagreed with his ideas and advice found him all the more threatening due to
his influential nature.
For all his charisma, there was also a very harsh and sometimes cmel side to
Oppenheimer's personalhy. Oppenheimer was an intellectual snob, who would often
criticize those who did not meet his high standards. One student recalls how Oppenheimer
"could be, and often was, a rough person to have in the audience when giving a lecture.

'' United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript ofHearing
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954), p. 7. Here^er noted as
Transcript.
-' Larson, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb, p. 30.
^* Isidor Rabi, Robert Serber, Victor Weisskopf, Abraham Pais and Glenn Seaborg, Oppenheimer (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 48.
^^ Royal, The Story ofJ Robert Oppenheimer, p. 60.
 30
Frequently he'd take the speaker apart verbally."^^ Oppenheimer was not afraid to intermpt
or contradict speakers; even the great minds of physics fell prey to such attacks.
Oppenheimer is reported to have intermpted several lecturers with caustic comments such
as "Oh, come now! We all know that. Let's get on whh h," or "That is totally incorrect and
you should know better."^^ On one occasion, one of Oppenheimer's former professors, the
elderly James Franck, a warm and kindly grandfather figure, vished Berkeley to deliver a
series of lectures on which someone had bestowed the grandiose title, "The Fundamental
Meaning of Quantum Mechanics."^" As part of his vish, Franck attended a particularly
advanced lecture delivered by one of Oppenheimer's prize students. From the audience
Franck asked a question that seemed foolish to many others in the room. "Well,"
Oppenheimer said caustically from the audience, "I don't intend to deliver any lectures on
'The Fundamental Meaning of Quantum Mechanics,' but part of the meaning is that that
question is a foolish one."^^ James Franck was nehher in a position, nor of a mind, to
injure Oppenheimer. Others however, who were later humiliated by Oppenheimer's tongue,
were in such positions, and were to be instmmental in the removal of his security clearance.
On another occasion the distinguished Japanese scientist, Hideki Yukawa, came to
Berkeley and addressed Oppenheimer's group on his latest discovery, the meson. Yukawa
was only a few minutes into his talk when Oppenheimer intermpted and finished the
presentation himself ^^ Yukawa seems to have been the only one who thought this mde.
The others in the room simply assumed that Oppenheimer was better at understanding and
communicating ideas than an original researcher. It was certainly tme that Oppenheimer
greatest ability was in pointing out the mistakes of others. For this very reason, a number of
physicists from around the world had Oppenheimer check their calculations for mistakes.
Oppenheimer had a tremendous abilhy to highlight the key components of other people's
theories, and put them in such simple language that any problems became immediately
apparent. These skills later played a vhal role in Oppenheimer's successfiil directorship of
the Los Alamos laboratory. However, when Oppenheimer later pointed out the key flaws in

''ibid., p. 56.
''Ibid
30
Stem. The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 9.
'\lbid
^" Peter Michelmore. The Swift Years: The Robert Oppenheimer Story (New York: Dodd, Mead and
Company, 1969). p. 55.
 31
the defense establishment's approach to the nuclear age, particularly that of the Strategic
Air Command, he helped pave the way for his removal.
Until the mid-1930s Oppenheimer seems to have been completely caught up in
university life and the world of physics. His friends were mostly faculty members,
scientists and artists. He was, by his own admission, almost completely divorced from the
contemporary social or polhical scene.^^ "What does polhics have to do with tmth,
goodness, and beauty?" a fiiend remembers Oppenheimer saying.^"* Oppenheimer did not
read newspapers or popular magazines, had no radio or telephone, and only leamed of the
stock market crash of 1929 long after the event. Oppenheimer later said of this period: "I
was interested in man and his experience; I was deeply interested in my science; but I had
no understanding of the relations of man to his society."^^ However, 1936 was to mark the
beginning of Oppenheimer's political awakening. Wedding his early Ethical Culture
Society concerns with a growing anxiety about the turbulent world around him,
Oppenheimer unquestionably became a man of the left. The left-wing "associations" he
made in the 1930s were later resurrected and used to trigger the hearing that resulted in the
removal of his security clearance.
Two issues in particular were responsible for Oppenheimer's political and social
awakening. The first was the rise of Fascism and Nazism abroad. Oppenheimer had what he
described as a "continuing, smoldering fiiry about the treatment of the Jews in Germany."^^
Oppenheimer had relatives in Germany, whom he later helped to immigrate to America.
The Depression provided the second factor in Oppenheimer's awakening. Though
Oppenheimer was quite financially secure himself, he witnessed the effects of the
Depression on his students, who either could not get jobs at all or could only get jobs that
were completely inadequate. Oppenheimer later said of his students: "through them, I
began to understand how deeply political and economic events could affect men's lives. I
began to feel the need to participate morefiillyin the life of the communhy."^^
Oppenheimer's political and social awakening had a quality of immature
susceptibility to it. Due to his political ignorance he was particularly malleable for a man

^^ Transcript, p. 8.
^' Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 195.
^' Transcript, p. 8.
'^Ibid
37
Ibid
 32
his age, and largely allowed others to shape his political and social activism.^^ In 1936
Oppenheimer made a number of polhically active friends and soon became involved in
such groups as the Friends of Chinese People, the Westem Council Consumers' Union, the
American Commhtee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, and the Califomia Teachers
Union, local 349. What most engaged Oppenheimer's sympathies and interests was the war
in Spain. He later said that the defeat of the Loyalists caused him "great sorrow."
Oppenheimer gave large sums of money to Dr. Thomas Addis, believing that this money
went towards the fighting effort through Communist channels. It is important to point out
that Oppenheimer, though he may have had numerous connections whh Communists, was
never a member of the Communist party. Oppenheimer, h seems, feh morally obligated to
not only help the fight against fascism, but to help those less fortunate groups feeling the
effects of the Depression. Oppenheimer was not a Communist, but the Communist Party
was a vehicle through which Oppenheimer feh he could discharge his moral duty.
The fact that Oppenheimer had Communists connections did not raise any eyebrows
in the mid-1930s. In 1936, when Oppenheimer cast his first vote for President, no less than
eighty thousand Americans voted in favor of putting a Communist in the White House.'*^
American Communists were not shunned and quarantined like lepers at this time, as they
would be in later decades. The level of public acceptance was such that both the
Republicans and the Democrats, at one time or another, formed polhical alliances with the
Communist Party. For example, in California in 1939, the Democratic Congressman, Clyde
Doyle, thought nothing of sitting down with leading Califoraian Communists to plan a
campaign to elect a Democratic Govemor. A decade later, this same individual was a
member of the anti-Communist House Un-American Activities Committee.
From 1938-40 Oppenheimer moved away from the Communist Party. By 1938
Oppenheimer met three physicists that had actually lived in Russia in the thirties, Placzek,
Weisskopf, and Schein. They told Oppenheimer of the purges, the bad management and the
terror, and what they said seemed "so solid, so unfanatical, so tme, that h made a great
impression."'*' The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the behavior of the Soviets in Poland and Finland
reinforced this negative impression of the Soviet Union. Oppenheimer was also deeply

'' James W. Kunetka, Oppenheimer: The Years ofRisk (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 16.
^' Transcript, p. 9.
"" Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 17.
"" Transcript, p. 10.
 33
distressed by the fall of France. Bethe recalled how Oppenheimer spoke long and
eloquently about the terrible tragedy to Westem civilization that the fall of France
represented."*^ During the summer and fall of 1940, whh France lost and Britain under
bmtal air siege, and the Communists still anti-interventionist, Oppenheimer increasingly
fell away from his associations with the Communist Party. He fell away from the
Communists because h became clear that they were no longer the moral champions he
believed them to be.
While Oppenheimer was dabbling in politics, important events were occurring in
the world of science. In 1935, Frederic Joliot-Curie, upon receiving the Nobel Prize at
Stockholm, made a prophetic statement. "We are justified in reflecting," he said, "that
scientists who can constmct and demolish elements at will may also be capable of causing
nuclear transformations of an explosive character. ""^^ By 1939, scientists around the world
had become aware of the explosive potential of what had by that time been named "nuclear
fission." In the United States, scientists had received indications that the Germans were
taking the idea of a nuclear weapon very seriously. Fear of a Nazi A-bomb preciphated the
now famous letter written to President Roosevelt by Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein, which
in tum gave rise to the American nuclear weapons program. The American nuclear
weapons program became known as the "Manhattan Engineering District," and after a
number of fits and starts the actual design and constmction of the weapon was centralized
in the Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico.

^- Bethe, "J. Robert Oppenheimer 1904-1967", p. 397-398.

'^ Robert Jimgk, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: The Moral and Political History of the Atomic Scientists
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1958), p. 57.
 34

CHAPTER 3

THE ACTION: SCIENCE JOINS THE

WAR EFFORT.
 35

Oppenheimer was by no means an obvious choice for the poshion of director of the
Los Alamos Laboratory. Many scientists opposed the appointment because Oppenheimer
was not a Nobel Prize winner, he was not an experimental physicist, and he had almost no
administrative experience.^ However when Groves asked if they had a better man for the
job, the scientists agreed to Oppenheimer.^ Groves also met with resistance from security
officials who were unwilling to clear Oppenheimer due to his former left-wing associations.
Desphe such resistance. Groves feh Oppenheimer was the man for the job and personally
wrote a letter to the District Engineer demanding Oppenheimer be given clearance,
irrespective of any information that securhy officials had conceming him. Groves said that
Oppenheimer was "absolutely essential to the project."^
From the outset there was enormous pressure on Oppenheimer. Initially the key
problem was attracting the highest caliber scientists. What Oppenheimer was offering to
such scientists was far from enticing. Los Alamos was situated in a remote desert, where
scientists would live and work in rough, makeshift buildings."* They could not tell family or
friends where they were going or what they were doing, and because of tight security,
letters and phone calls were censored. They were seldom allowed to leave the site, and
when they did it was a long trip via primhive and winding roads to the nearest city. On top
of all this, scientists were expected to work very long hours on a project that seemed
unlikely of success. This is what Oppenheimer had to offer the scientists he was trying to
recmh, and Oppenheimer's persuasive gifts were taxed to their utmost. As he later pointed
out, "the notion of disappearing into the New Mexico desert for an indeterminate period
and under quasi military auspices disturbed a good many scientists, and the families of
many more."^
This is where Oppenheimer's charisma proved invaluable. It seems that many
agreed to Oppenheimer's request to come to Los Alamos for the simple reason that he was
to be their director. The personal magnetism that he had hitherto only exercised upon his

' Leslie R. Groves, IVow It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (London: Andre Deutsch, 1962),
p. 62.
' Joseph J. Ermenc, "The Nuclear Prometheus: An interview with Leslie R. Groves", in Joseph J. Ermenc, ed.
Atomic Bomb Scientists: Memoirs 1939-1945 (London: Medder, 1986), p. 257.
^ Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 63.
' Rebecca Larson, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988), p. 53.
' United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript ofHearing
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954), p. 13. Hereafter noted as
Transcript.
 36
students, now proved equally irresistible in wider circles. His great success in recmhing
leading scientists was later attributed to "intellectual sex appeal."^ However, many also
came because of the vision Oppenheimer painted of the Unhed States in a race against the
Germans to develop the A-bomb, a race between good and evil. Bob Wilson later recalled
Oppenheimer's attitude:
He was convinced that the war effort was a mass effort to overthrow the
Nazis and upset Fascism and he talked of a people's army and a people's
war, as though it were a big indigenous upsurge. This also made his previous
life plausible to us. The language had changed so Uttle. It's the same kind of
language, except that now h had a patriotic flavour, whereas before h had
just a radical flavour.^
This explains why Oppenheimer, an extraordinarily moral individual, oversaw the
development of the most destmctive weapon the world had ever seen. He saw the project as
a moral cmsade against evil and poured the same fervor he once poured into his political
involvements into the building of the bomb. However, in light of later events and
discoveries, Oppenheimer came to see his work at Los Alamos very differently.
Oppenheimer's intellectual abilhies were perfectly suited for his role at Los
Alamos. He was a genius at keeping in touch with the numerous technical problems facing
various groups at Los Alamos. As George Kistiakowsky, chief of the explosives division at
Los Alamos, later recalled, Oppenheimer "had an incredible ability to have all the threads
of this enormous project in his mind and to make the right technical decisions."
Oppenheimer's genius for finding other people's mistakes, and his ability to grasp other
people's ideas and then clarify them, proved invaluable to the success at Los Alamos.
Oppenheimer once joined a metallurgy session during an inconclusive argument over the
type of container to be used for melting plutonium. Though Oppenheimer was a theoretical
physicist, and this was far from familiar ground for him, he listened for a time and then
summed up the discussion so clearly, that the answer, though not provided by

^ Robert Jungk, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: The Moral and Political History of the Atomic Scientists
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1958), p. 136.
' Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds (London: British Broadcasting Corporation,
1980). p. 73.
' George B. Kistiakowsky, "Reminiscences of Wartime Los Alamos", in Lawrence Badash, Joseph O.
Hirschfelder and Herbert P. Broida, eds. Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980),
p. 60.
 37
Oppenheimer, was immediately obvious.^ There are numerous other examples of
Oppenheimer offering decisive input in various areas of the project. Even those that clashed
with Oppenheimer conceded that the laboratory's success was largely due to his leadership.
Edward Teller later said: "Los Alamos' success grew out of the brilliance, enthusiasm, and
charisma with which Oppenheimer led h."^°
There was however, vastly differing perceptions of Oppenheimer's personality.
Joseph O. Hirschfelder, a group leader at Los Alamos, later recalled: "Oppenheimer would
listen attentively, argue whh us, and sometimes dress us down whh clever and cutting
sarcasm."'^ However not everyone was so understanding and forgiving of Oppenheimer's
"cutting sarcasm." Hirschfelder went on to say: "We scientists regarded Oppenheimer as
exceedingly clever when he cut us down with his sarcasm, but the milhary guys couldn't
stand losing face and so there were a number of them... who were out to get him." Norris
Bradbury, Oppenheimer's successor at Los Alamos, recalled that Oppenheimer aimed most
of his verbal attacks at milhary officials. Colonel Kenneth Nichols, who would later
become the general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission, was in particular "the butt
1 "X

of strong language from Oppie." Oppenheimer once again earned powerful enemies with
his acerbic tongue, but this time such enemies had the power to damage, if not end, his
career. In late 1953 and early 1954, Oppenheimer's enemies would exercise this power.
The military was unhappy whh the way Oppenheimer organized Los Alamos.
Oppenheimer had organized the laboratory along democratic lines. There was a Goveming
Board that acted as a directorate for cooperative decision making, there was the Laboratory
Coordinating Council, which was concerned whh administrative and social matters, and
most importantly there was the colloquium. The colloquium was created as a fomm for the
free exchange of ideas, and was open to any individuals with a scientific degree or
equivalent experience.''^ Oppenheimer argued that there needed to be a fomm where
everyone would have a chance to make contributions and where issues could be openly and
freely debated. This reflected the ideas and mindset he had developed in his student days.

' Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1980). p. 264.
"^ Larson, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb, p. 57.
'' Joseph O. Hirschfelder, "The Scientific and Technological Miracle at Los Alamos", in Lawrence Badash,
Joseph O. Hirschfelder and Herbert P. Broida, eds. Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D.
Reidel, 1980), p. 78.
''Ibid
'^ Kunetka, Oppenheimer: The Years of Risk (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 61.
'Ubid..p.45.
 38
particularly at Gottingen. These ideas went directly against the concepts of
compartmentalization and secrecy advocated by Groves and the military. The military did
not like the prospect of such open discussion, for regular attendance of these meetings
would give any participant a complete and detailed view of the atomic bomb. The
colloquium was considered an invitation to security failures.
During Oppenheimer's later hearing. Groves discussed how the scientists resisted
compartmentalization, going on to say: "I never held this against them, because I knew that
their whole lives from the time they entered college almost had been based on
dissemination of knowledge."^^ Others whhin the military were not so understanding, yet
Oppenheimer was allowed this freedom because of the urgency of the project and the fact
that Oppenheimer himself was considered absolutely essential to hs success. However,
when Oppenheimer later brought this same scientific mindset to post-war debates
conceming nuclear weapons, and talked about the need for openness and the sharing of
nuclear secrets, he was no longer the irreplaceable leader of a top-secret project, he was
simply a noisy left-wing advisor. In the post-war years not only were Oppenheimer's views
less acceptable, but he could be more easily removed or replaced. This proved to be a lethal
combination for Oppenheimer's career in government.
Everyone at Los Alamos worked under tremendous pressure, believing they were in
a deadly race with the Germans. Elsie McMillan, who worked at Los Alamos with her
husband Edwin, recalled the atmosphere at the laboratory:
The emotional strain was apparent, the feeling that you've got to make that
bomb, you've got to get h done; others are working on it; Germans are
working on h; hurry! hurry! hurry! This is going to end the war; this is going
to save our boys lives, this is going to save Japanese boys' lives; get that
damn bomb done! We were tired, we were deathly tired."^^
The fact that the bomb was seen in such moral terms, as a way to save lives, made the work
easier. However, by the end of the war, these noble ideas, which had motivated
Oppenheimer and the other scientists to make the bomb, had all evaporated.

'^ Transcript, p. 165. See also Stanley Goldberg, "Groves and the Scientists: CompartmentaUzation and the
Building of the Bomb", Physics Today. 48, 8 (August 1995), pp. 38-43.
'^ Elsie McMillan, "Outside the Inner Fence", in Lawrence Badash, Joseph O. Hirschfelder and Herbert P.
Broida, eds. Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980), p. 43.
 39
The first motivating factor to disappear was the threat of a German A-bomb.
Following the surrender of Germany in May 1945, and the success of the Alsos mission to
discover the level of German nuclear research, h became clear that German nuclear science
was in a rather phifiil state.'^ Much has been wrhten about the impact of such news on
nuclear scientists in America. It seems that this news led many scientists to raise questions
about their work on the A-bomb. They were no longer in a desperate race against evil, but
were simply working to add yet another, and even more deadly, weapon to the United
States arsenal. However, news of the German surrender did not have the impact it might
have, particularly whh regard to Oppenheimer. The German surrender coincided with the
dress rehearsal for the Trinity test, which involved the detonation of a hundred tons of
TNT.'^ At this time the scientists were working under tremendous pressure as they
stmggled to meet the test date. This tension found expression in black humor, such as this
poem that circulated in the tense weeks before Trinity:
From this cmde lab that spawned a dud
Their necks to Tmman's axe uncurled.
Lo, the embattled savants stood
And fired a flop heard around the world.''
Oppenheimer was racked with doubts, not about the morality of the bomb, that would come
later, but about whether the thing would actually work.
By the time the bomb was tested at Alamogordo, Los Alamos was three deep in
experts, and many worried that Oppenheimer was going to have a breakdown. Groves even
told Kenneth T. Bainbridge, who was in charge of the test, to keep Oppenheimer away from
the tower and the bomb before the final test. Bainbridge refused to do this, believing that
since the bomb was Oppenheimer's "baby," he should be allowed to follow its development
to the very end. By this time Oppenheimer had lost several pounds off his already thin
frame, chain smoked, and constantly coughed. He increasingly verbally attacked staff for
incompetence. After one of the preliminary tests failed, Oppenheimer accused
Kistiakowsky of failing the entire project. Kistiakowsky in tum bet Oppenheimer an entire

" Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 153-178. See also Jacqueline Bird, The Third Reich and the Bomb: An
Historiographical Examination. BA hons thesis. University of Queensland, 1997.
'^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds', p. 137.
'Ubid.,p. 149.
'° Kermeth T. Bainbridge, "All in Our Time: A Foul and Awesome display". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
31,5(May 1975),p. 43.
 40
month's salary against ten dollars that the final test would work.^* By this time, not only
did the scientists fear failure, some were beginning to fear success and the age that success
would usher in. Though Oppenheimer and Niels Bohr did discuss the dangers of nuclear
weapons, Oppenheimer's focus was primarily on the test. At 5:10 a.m., on Monday
morning, 16 July 1945, when Sam Ellison broadcast over the loudspeaker system at Trinity,
"Zero minus twenty minutes," Oppenheimer tumed to the officer next to him and said:
"Lord, these affairs are hard on the heart."^^
At precisely 5:29:45 a.m. the months and years of intense effort culminated in the
kindling of mankind's first nuclear fire, the dawn of the atomic age. A pinprick of brilliant
light punctured the darkness, and for a fraction of a second that light was greater than any
ever before produced on earth, and could have been seen from another planet.^^
Oppenheimer in that blinding instant thought of fragments from the Bhagavad Gita:
If the radiance of a thousand suns
Were to burst at once into the sky
That would be like the splendor of Mighty One...
And then, an instant later, as the bright light dimmed and the mushroom cloud formed:
I am become Death
The shatterer of worlds.^"*
The power that was released that day in the desert would later tear at Oppenheimer's
conscience, and be, in some sense, the shatterer of his world. However, at the time, the test
simply brought Oppenheimer a great sense of relief The tremendous sound of the
explosion came a couple of minutes later. New York Times reporter William Laurence
calling h "the first cry of a new-bora world."^^ Kistiakowsky ran up to Oppenheimer and
slapped him on the back, saying, "Oppie, you owe me ten bucks."^^ Still shaken by the
spectacular nature of the test, Oppenheimer opened his wallet and replied seriously, "It's
empty, you'll have to wait," and the two men embraced. Kenneth Bainbridge shook

"' George B. Kistiakowsky, "Reminiscences of Wartime Los Alamos", in Lawrence Badash, Joseph O.
Hirschfelder and Herbert P. Broida, eds. Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980),
p. 60.
" Lansing Lament, Day of Trinity (New York: Atheneum, 1%5) p. 226.
''Ibid., p. 235.
"Ibid
" William L. Laurence, "Drama of the Atomic Bomb Found Climax in July 16 Test", New York Times, 26
September 1945, p. 16.
"* George B. Kistiakowsky, "Reminiscences of Wartime Los Alamos", in Lawrence Badash, Joseph O.
Hirschfelder and Herbert P. Broida, eds, Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-1945 (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980),
p. 60.
 41
Oppenheimer's hand and said "Oppie, now we're all sons of bhches." Oppenheimer
would tell his younger daughter in 1966 that this was the most appropriate thing anyone
had said after the test.
The successful test filled Oppenheimer whh new confidence. He surprised everyone
with a complete reversal of mood, retuming to his jaunty and energetic self. A little later
when Rabi saw Oppenheimer for the first time since the test, his confident "high-noon
stmt" gave Rabi gooseflesh.^^ "I'll never forget his walk," said Rabi, "I'll never forget the
way he stepped out of the car."^' Whhin seventy-two hours, Washington began to heap
praise on Oppenheimer and his staff Oppenheimer later said: "At the time, h was hard for
us in Los Alamos not to share that satisfaction, and hard for me not to accept the conclusion
that I had managed the enterprise well and played a key part in hs success."^^After the test
there was tremendous excitement at Los Alamos, and staff partied well into the night.
However, in the following few days the Los Alamos community experienced "a kind of
cathartic shock."^* All those issues that the scientists had largely refused to face during the
project now began to loom large. Many scientists now talked of little else but the role of the
A-bomb in the post-war world. However, once again, Oppenheimer was too busy to
contemplate such things. For him there was still the important task of preparing the bomb
for use in Japan.
Months earlier. Secretary of War Stimson and General Groves had briefed
President Tmman on the atomic bomb project, and Tmman had approved the idea of an
"Interim Committee" to formulate long-range plans for the use and control of nuclear
power. The committee received advice from a scientific panel made up of Oppenheimer,
Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton, and Emest Lawrence. On May 31, the Interim Committee
and the scientific panel had an all-day meeting to discuss how nuclear weapons should be
controlled after the war, and the more immediate question of whether the A-bomb should
be dropped on Japan.^^ During this meeting Oppenheimer argued that Russia had always

^^Kenneth T. Bainbridge, "All in Our Time: A Foul and Awesome display", p. 46.
^ Gregg Herken, "Mad About the Bomb: The Inventors of Nuclear Weapons Gather for the Fortieth Reimion
of GuiU and Pride", Harper's, 267 (December 1983), p. 49.
'^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds', p. 162.
^° Transcript, p. 14.
^' Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-47 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 77.
" "The Interim Committee minutes of May 31, 1945", reproduced in Phihp Cantelon, Richard Hewlett and
Robert WilUams, eds. The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policiesfrom the Discovery of
Fission to the Present (Philadelphia: University of Peimsylvania Press, 1991), p. 39-43.
 42
been friendly to science, and should not be prejudged, suggesting that the Unhed States
broach the subject of intemational collaboration and cooperation whh them. Several people
agreed with Oppenheimer until Secretary of State James Byrnes joined the meeting late.
Byrnes argued that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in
nuclear research and weapons production in order to ensure that the United States stayed
ahead of Russia. It was this approach, rather than Oppenheimer's, that the United States
was to follow in the post-war years. Oppenheimer's ideas about intemational collaboration
and the sharing of nuclear secrets would increasingly fall out of favor as the Cold War set
in. His persistence in voicing such heretical ideas would be a key factor in his later
removal.
It is important to note however, that h was not Oppenheimer who advised that the
bomb be used in some kind of demonstration. It was Emest Lawrence, who ironically was
later to become one of the most zealous advocates of the vastly more destmctive H-bomb,
that wanted to give the Japanese a demonstration of the A-bomb's power. Oppenheimer, on
the contrary, seemed to feel that "an enormous nuclear firecracker detonated at a great
height doing little damage" would not have convinced the Japanese to end the war.^'*
However, though the scientific panel later said that they saw "no direct alternative to
military use," they admitted that they had "no claim to special competence in solving the
political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic
power."^^ The committee eventually reached the generally agreed conclusion that the bomb
should be used on Japan without prior warning and that the target should be a vital war
plant surrounded by a civilian population.^^
Oppenheimer's attitude about the limited competence of scientists in political,
social and military problems was the subject of an important conversation a month later
between Oppenheimer and Edward Teller. This conversation rankled Teller for years to
come and might well have been one of the factors behind his damning testimony at
Oppenheimer's hearing. The conversation concerned a pethion that Szilard had asked
Teller to support, which urged the Unhed States not to use the A-bomb whhout first

'' Ibid., p. 42.

'' Richard Rhodes. The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 647.
'' "Science Panel Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, Jime 16,1945", reproduced
in Cantelon. Hewlett and Williams, eds.. The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies
from the Discovery of Fission to the Present, p. 47-48..
'Ubid..p.43.
 43
waming the enemy. Teller was in absolute agreement with the petition and was prepared to
circulate h at Los Alamos, but felt h was his duty to first discuss h with Oppenheimer.^^
Oppenheimer told Teller "that he thought it improper for a scientist to use his prestige as a
platform for polhical pronouncements."^^ At the time Teller feh relieved, and decided to
not circulate the pethion. However, when Oppenheimer later became involved in political
circles and vehemently opposed Teller's "baby," the hydrogen bomb. Teller was infuriated
and felt betrayed. However, it seems that at the time Oppenheimer meant what he said to
Teller. This was before Oppenheimer, or anyone for that matter, fully understood the
terrible destmction and loss of life that would result in the use of nuclear weapons. This
was before Oppenheimer came to believe that scientists had committed a terrible sin in
creating the A-bomb, and before Oppenheimer tried to make up for this sin by entering
political circles in an attempt to tum nuclear power into a force for peace.
Shortly after 8:00 a.m. on the moming of August 6, 1945, the bomb was detonated
over Hiroshima and the world was introduced to the power of the atom. The bomb created
the nightmarish scene that author John Hersey would later describe in Hiroshima^^
Estimates are still in dispute, but upward of 140,000 people died on the day of the attack
and the weeks immediately following h. Groves called Oppenheimer on August 6 at 2:00
p.m. to pass on the news and congratulate Oppenheimer and his people. "Everybody is
feeling reasonably good about h," Oppenheimer replied."^" The physicist Otto Frisch
remembers hearing people mnning and yelling about Hiroshima. "I still remember the
feeling of unease, indeed nausea... h seemed rather ghoulish to celebrate the sudden death of
a hundred thousand people, even if they were 'enemies,'" recalls Frisch."*^ It seems that
Frisch was one of the first to feel the sense of horror and guilt that would come to infect a
majorhy of the scientists that had worked on the bomb project.
On the day of Hiroshima, Oppenheimer entered a giant meeting of clapping
scientists assembled at the Los Alamos audhorium. The time for more somber assessment
and reflection was not yet here, and Oppenheimer was caught up in the feeling of success.
He proudly strode down the aisle and as he mounted the podium he clasped his hands over
his head in a victory gesture. He informed his colleagues that an atomic bomb had been

^' Edward Teller, The Legacy ofHiroshima (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 13.
''Ibid
'"^ John Hersey, Hiroshima (New York: Bantam Books, 1979).
^° Rhodes. The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 734.
'^ Otto Frisch, What Little I Remember (Camhiidge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 176.
 44
successfully detonated over Hiroshima. Initially Oppenheimer had estimated that around
twenty thousand Japanese would die in such an attack, but it soon became clear that deaths
would far exceed that number. As after the Trinity test, a party was organized at one of the
men's dormhories. However most people did not come and many of those who did, beat a
hasty retreat. Those that did attend, quietly talked and sipped drinks as feelings about the
day's events tumed sour. In one comer Oppenheimer showed a colleague a telex that had
arrived from Washington with details of the damage at Hiroshima. Both became upset by
the news and went home. When returning home Oppenheimer spotted a sober and usually
cool-headed group leader vomhing in the bushes, and thought to himself "The reaction has
begun."^'

42
Smith and Weiner, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 292.
 45

CHAPTER 4

THE REACTION: SCIENCE AND

POLITICS CONVERGE.
 46

When victory over Japan was announced, Los Alamos celebrated whh as much
verve as it could muster. Now that their secret was out, the staff at Los Alamos were
praised as heroes. Congratulatory letters and telegrams began to flood in from all over the
country, and many scientists received medals or letters of merit. But VJ day also brought
increased reflection about the use of the A-bomb. Laura Fermi, wife of Enrico Fermi,
recalled:
When among the praising voices some arose that deprecated the bomb, and words
like 'barbarism,' 'horror,' 'the crime of Hiroshima,' 'the mass murder,' were heard
from several directions, the wives sobered. They wondered, they probed their
consciences, but found no answers to their doubts.^
The scientists themselves were filled with even greater doubts about the A-bomb, none
more so than Oppenheimer himself On 26 August 1945, in a letter to his old friend Herbert
Smith, Oppenheimer said of the A-bomb project: "You will believe that this undertaking
has not been without its misgivings; they are heavy on us today, when the future, which has
so many elements of high promise, is yet only a stone's throw from despair."^
Oppenheimer arranged to leave his poshion at Los Alamos and retum to academic
life immediately after a ceremony on 16 October, where Groves presented the laboratory
with a Certificate of Appreciation on behalf of the Army. But Oppenheimer's retum to
teaching was no more than a gesture, for he felt a moral obligation to help address the
problems of the nuclear age. In the course of his later security hearing, Oppenheimer said:
"I felt, perhaps quite strongly, that having played an active part in promoting a revolution in
warfare, I needed to be as responsible as I could with regard to what came of this
revolution."^ Oppenheimer was no longer some obscure scientist; the spectacular success of
the A-bomb had tumed him into a well-known and respected public figure. This public
notoriety, combined whh his already high standing among scientists, gave Oppenheimer a
good deal of personal and political influence.

' Laura Fermi. Atoms in the Family: My Life with Enrico Fermi, Designer of the First Atomic Pile (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 257.
" Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner, eds, Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1980), p. 297.
' United States Atomic Energy Commission. In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript ofHearing
before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United States Printing Office, 1954), p. 959. Hereafter noted
as Transcript.
 47
Oppenheimer was soon called to Washington to help develop a plan for postwar
control of the atom, becoming one of the primary authors of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.
This report was a radical polhical response to a radical breakthrough in science. It proposed
the creation of a supranational Atomic Development Authority, which would take control
of all the earth's uranium and thorium deposhs, and own and operate all faciUties
concemed whh the development or use of atomic energy."^ Bernard Bamch was appointed
to present the plan to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Oppenheimer did
not believe Bamch was up to the job, later saying of his appointment: "That was the day I
gave up hope."^ The Soviet Union rejected what had by this time became known as the
Bamch Plan, primarily due to concems about veto powers and the inspection system.
On one occasion, during his work on the intemational control plan, Oppenheimer
met with President Tmman. During this meeting Oppenheimer suddenly revealed the guilt
he felt over his role in the A-bomb project, blurting out: "Mr. President, I have blood on my
hands''^ This greatly offended Tmman. "Don't you bring that fellow around again,"
Tmman later told Acheson, going on to say: "After all, all he did was make the bomb. I'm
the guy who fired h off"^ In a lecture in 1947 Oppenheimer said: "In some sort of cmde
sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists
have known sin; and this is a knowledge which they cannot lose." After Hiroshima it
seems that Oppenheimer feh it was his task to help ensure that nuclear technology
represented a "great hope" rather than a "great peril" ^ The Bamch Plan was part of
Oppenheimer's effort to do just this. It represented a bold break with tradhional ideas about
security, and reflected Oppenheimer's idealistic hopes for the post-war world. However,
Soviet rejection of this plan meant that pre-nuclear political and military tradition survived
the advent of the nuclear age. Security through the intemational development of atomic
energy was rejected in favor of the more traditional concept of security through military
superiority.'° On the day Gromyko rejected the Bamch Plan, Oppenheimer told David

' Larrv Gerber. "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold Waf'. Diplomatic History, 6,1 (Winter 1982),
p. 71.
^ Quoted in Rebecca Larson, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988), p. 124.
^ PhiUp M. Stem. The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 90.
Ibid
' J. Robert Oppenheimer. "Physics in the Contemporary World". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4,3 (March
1948), p. 66. Also reprinted in J. Robert Oppenheimer, The Open Mind (Hew York: Simon and Schuster,
1955).
' Smith and Weiner. Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections, p. 319.
'" Thomas W. Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifilin, 1970), p. 50.
 48
Lilienthal: "I am ready to go anywhere and do anything, but I am bankmpt of further
ideas.""
Oppenheimer soon had a place to go and things to do. In the autumn of 1946, the
Atomic Energy Act was passed.'^ This act transferted the nuclear program from military
hands to the civilian hands of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). David
Lilienthal, former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was appointed chairman of
the AEC. Oppenheimer was named a member of the nine-person General Advisory
Committee (GAC), created to advise the new Commission on scientific and technical
matters. This committee included scientists such as Isidor Rabi, Enrico Fermi, James
Conant, and Lee Dubridge, men who had played important roles in the nuclear revolution.
Oppenheimer arrived late to the first meeting of the GAC only to find that his fellow
1%

members had elected him chairman. Since nuclear energy was a new field, Lilienthal and
the AEC leaned heavily on Oppenheimer and the GAC. This made Oppenheimer the most
influential scientific advisor at least until 1950, perhaps beyond.^'*
In early September 1949, the crew of a special Air Force plane on patrol over the
Bering Sea picked up traces of radioactive materials in the atmosphere. Oppenheimer, who
was called in to help analyze the samples, had no doubt that the Soviet Union had tested a
nuclear weapon and that the American monopoly was now a piece of history. ^^ This news
immediately sparked fierce debate about how the Unhed States should respond. The AEC
began planning increased efforts in all nuclear weapon projects, from the proposed use of
small thermonuclear reactions to boost fission weapons, to the improvement of fission
weapons along more conventional lines. ^^ Some believed there was only one suhable
response to the Soviet A-bomb, and that was the immediate development of a
thermonuclear weapon. Among those pushing for the H-bomb, were scientists such as
" David E. LiUenthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal. Vol. II., The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950
(New York: Harper and Row. 1964), p. 69.
'- Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World, 1939/1946, Vol. I of A History of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Penns.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), p.
530.
'^ Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation,
1980). p. 184.
''' Joseph Haberer, Politics and the Community of Science (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,
1969). p. 229-230.
'^ On 29 August 1949, on the steppes of Kazakhstan, the Soviets had successfiilly tested their own atomic
bomb. See David HoUoway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 213.
'* Herbert York, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and
Company), p. 42.
 49
Edward Teller, Luis Alvarez and Wendell Latimer; a majority of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, particularly its chairman Senator Brian McMahon, and his staff chief
William L. Borden; Lewis Strauss, a member of the AEC; and milhary figures such as
General Kenneth D. Nichols. These early H-bomb advocates would later play important
roles in the removal of Oppenheimer's security clearance.
After a brief period of confusion, the debate following the Soviet test came to
revolve around one question; Was a high priority program for the development of a
thermonuclear weapon the appropriate response to a Soviet fission weapon?^^ The AEC
called a special meeting of the General Advisory Committee to not only address this
question, but to also discuss and recommend upon any other means of ensuring the defense
and security of the Unhed States. ^^ The GAC's report consisted of three separate sections
plus two addenda. Part I of the report recommended, among other things, "an
intensification of efforts to make atomic weapons available for tactical purposes."'^ Some
have argued that after Hiroshima, Oppenheimer came to oppose all nuclear weapons, but
this was not the case. In the absence of any international arms-limitation agreements,
Oppenheimer and the GAC recognized the need for nuclear weapons, and they promoted
efforts to increase the variety and numbers of such weapons. It is tme that Oppenheimer
liked to see nuclear weapons only in defensive terms, but he certainly did not categorically
oppose them. Oppenheimer and the GAC only opposed one kind of nuclear weapon, and
that was the H-bomb.
Part ni of the report addressed the most important question, the question of whether
or not the H-bomb should be developed. The report concluded that "h would be wrong at
the present moment to commh ourselves to an all-out effort towards its development."^°
The GAC report also called for enough information on the H-bomb to be declassified so
that a public statement of policy could be made. Because the destmctive power of a
thermonuclear weapon is potentially limhless, the majority addendum, signed by
Oppenheimer, concluded that such a weapon "might become a weapon of genocide," and
thus represented an intolerable threat to the human race.^' The majority addendum also

' York. The Advisors, p. 45.

'* Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, y^/ow/c Shield, 1947-1952, Vol. II of A History of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1990), p. 380.
'^ York. The Advisors, p. 152. - The GAC report is reprinted in full in Appencix, pp. 150-159.
"^ Ibid., p. 156.
=' Ibid p. 157.
 50
stated: "We believe a super bomb should never be produced. Mankind would be better off
not to have a demonstration of the feasibility of such a weapon until the present climate of
world opinion changes."^^ Thus the GAC report called for greater openness on the
govemment's behalf, called for the development of tactical nuclear weapons, and opposed
the H-bomb. Such issues would be picked up again and again by Oppenheimer in later
years, and would be important factors leading to his later hearing.
An A-bomb with a yield of approximately fifteen kilotons had killed almost
150,000 people at Hiroshima, leaving Oppenheimer whh "blood on his hands" By the time
of the Soviet test, the Unhed States had developed weapons with yields of over a hundred
kilotons. The yield of the H-bomb, if h could be built, would be measured in megatons. The
H-bomb would be far too powerfiil for use against a military target; it would be too big for
anything but the utter obliteration of urban life. Oppenheimer and the GAC believed such a
weapon was simply too murderous. It is of great importance that Oppenheimer opposed the
H-bomb due to moral considerations. Had he opposed h solely due to technical
considerations, h would have been acceptable for him to revise his opinions in the face of
later technical advancements. The fact that he opposed the H-bomb for moral reasons not
only angered H-bomb advocates who did not believe thermonuclear weapons were different
to fission weapons in terms of morality, but it also permanently established him, in the
minds of many, as an opponent of a thermonuclear weapon. Even after the decision to go
ahead whh the H-bomb, and his support of the later H-bomb design, Oppenheimer was
forever seen as a moral cmsader against the H-bomb.
Just as Oppenheimer had come to be known as the "father of the A-bomb" for his
directorship of the Los Alamos laboratory, he, as the chairman of the GAC, also came to
symbolize opposhion to the H-bomb. By this time Oppenheimer was already well-known
for his influence, and the advocates of the H-bomb generally believed that the GAC was
under Oppenheimer's spell. They believed the GAC opposed the H-bomb simply because
Oppenheimer opposed the H-bomb, and every time a scientist declined to work on the H-
bomb project, had second thoughts, or lost enthusiasm for the project, Oppenheimer's
influence was believed to be involved. Such concems were openly raised in the Nichols
letter of charges against Oppenheimer.^^

fibid.
-' Transcript, p. 6.
 51
Oppenheimer's opposhion to the H-bomb not only eamed him powerful enemies
among Air Force leaders and other H-bomb advocates, but in subsequent years,
Oppenheimer's poshion was seen in increasingly sinister terms. An article published soon
after the hearing said:
The plain fact was that on a question of overriding importance Dr. Oppenheimer
was wrong, tragically and frightfully wrong. Repeatedly the point was made in Dr.
Oppenheimer's behalf that it is not criminal to be wrong. That is undebatable. It's
not criminal to be wrong about the weapons of the atomic age, only fatal. ^'*
The article went on to say that if the United States had followed Oppenheimer's advice, and
not buih the H-bomb, h would have quhe possibly been guihy of "murdering freedom". In
light of later developments, particularly the Soviet detonation of a thermonuclear device in
1953, Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb came to be seen as having seriously
endangered United States security. Events such as the Berlin Blockade, the "loss" of China,
and the North Korean invasion of South Korea, made the Soviet Union seem increasingly
malevolent and untmstworthy. Such developments, combined whh Soviet advancements in
nuclear science, resulted in American officials becoming increasingly concemed with the
safeguarding of America's nuclear supremacy. In such a frigid Cold War atmosphere,
Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-bomb appeared to many as both dangerous and foolish.
Oppenheimer's opposhion to the H-bomb would be part of the alarming "pattem of
activities" discussed by AEC witnesses such as Wilson and Griggs. This opposition would
also be used as an example of the poor "judgement" discussed by witnesses such as Teller
and Alvarez. Thus Oppenheimer's moral opposhion to the H-bomb led to his later removal
in two general ways. Firstly, because of this opposition, his name became permanently
associated whh policies that were seen in increasingly unfavorable terms as the Cold War
set in. Secondly, it eamed him personal enemies among H-bomb advocates. These enemies,
particularly after the successful development of the H-bomb and its incorporation into
American defense strategy, held increasingly powerful positions. Strauss eventually came
to hold Oppenheimer's future in his hands.

" James Sheply and Clay Blair. The Hydrogen Bomb, quoted in "Hydrogen Bomb: How the U.S. Almost Lost
It". U.S. News and World Report, 24 September 1954. p. 107. See also Joseph M. Siracusa, Into the Dark
House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins of the Cold War (Claremont Calif.: Regina Bo
1998), p. 57.
 52
Shortly after the presidential decision to proceed with the development of the H-
bomb in January 1950, Oppenheimer appeared on a radio program and discussed the
dangers of secrecy. This was another area of great concem to him. He said:
The decision to seek or not to seek intemational control of atomic energy, the
decision to try to make or not to make the hydrogen bomb, these are complex
technical things, but they touch the very base of our morality. It is a grave danger
for us that these decisions are taken on the basis of facts held secret.
Such a statement expresses a recurring theme in Oppenheimer's lectures and writings.
Oppenheimer grew increasingly concerned about issues of secrecy, continually calling for
greater opeimess and candor of behalf of the govemment. In scientific circles, where
Oppenheimer's character was moulded, h was the dissemination and sharing of information
that was all important. However, in the political climate of the early Cold War, when Soviet
agents like Klaus Fuchs were being uncovered, such views met with increasing concem and
suspicion from govemment officials. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were arrested as Soviet
spies during the summer of 1950. On 19 June 1953, the Rosenbergs were executed in the
electric chair at Sing Sing prison. During the sentencing of the Rosenbergs, Judge Irving
Kaufman said that their crimes had been "worse than murder," for in giving the Soviets the
secret of the bomb they were largely responsible for the aggression in Korea.^^ In such an
atmosphere, it is difficuh to see how Oppenheimer's calls for greater opermess and candor
could have met with anything but suspicion and animosity.
In early 1948 the Navy sought Oppenheimer's views on how the United States
should prepare for future wars. "Whatever our hopes for the future, we must surely be
prepared, both in planning and in the development of weapons... for more than one kind of
conflict," Oppenheimer replied. ^^ Oppenheimer found the kind of thinking that would
eventually lead to the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" to be both dangerous and morally
repugnant, and was one of the first to recognize the dangers inherent in a complete reliance
on weapons of mass destmction. Oppenheimer called for the development of tactical
nuclear weapons in the 1949 GAC report, and in a 1951 article he raised this issue again,
while also attacking the entire concept of strategic bombing. Oppenheimer did not condemn

" Transcript, p. 962.

'^ Peter Buckingham, America Sees Red: Anti-Communism in America. 1870s to 1980s (Claremont Calif.:
Regina Books, 1988), p. 79.
^' Transcript, p. 46.
 53
strategic bombing himself, but rather quoted Admiral Ofstie, who said that many senior
officers in the Navy feh that "strategic air warfare, as practiced in the past and proposed for
the future, is militarily unsound and of limhed effect, and is morally wrong, and is
decidedly harmful to the stability of a postwar world. "^^
In this same year, 1951, Oppenheimer fiirther developed his ideas about tactical
nuclear weapons during his participation in Project Vista. Oppenheimer was widely
recognized as the author of the controversial fifth chapter of the report, which discussed
ways in which nuclear weapons could be used in ground operations. The report
recommended that the stockpile of fissionable material be divided into thirds, with the
Strategic Air Command (SAC) getting a third, one third being assigned to the tactical
defense of Europe, and one third going into reserve. ^^ However, it was the Report's attitude
toward the use of the SAC and strategic weapons that most worried Air Force officials. In
his testimony, Griggs said that the Vista Report recommended, in the event of war, that the
President should announce that the United States would withhold the SAC from attacking
chies or urban areas except in response to a similar attack by the Soviets.^" Later evidence
indicates that the Vista Report never contained such a recommendation, but even ignoring
this issue, the Vista Report eamed Oppenheimer powerful enemies.
It is important to note that in this period, the concepts of Giulio Douhet still
dominated Air Force doctrine.^^ According to this doctrine, the secret to military success
lay in the swift penetration, deep behind enemy lines, of an aerial bombing force, which
would destroy the enemy's ability, and will, to wage war. Due to a belief in such a doctrine,
the Air Force gave overwhelming priority to its offensive wing, believing the best defense
was a strong offense. The end of the Second World War and the onset of the nuclear age
reinforced the significance of strategic ah- power. Victory in Japan was attributed,
somewhat misleadingly, almost entirely to the use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Victory in Japan came to symbolize the triumph of strategic air power.^^
Thus Air Force doctrine gained widespread acceptance; strategic bombing was given pride
of place in post-war security policy, and the Air Force alone was given the privilege of

^ J. Robert OppenheimCT, "Comments on the Nfilitary Value of the Atom", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
7,2 (February 1951), p. 44.
^'Major, The Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 159.
^° Transcript, p. 759.
'^ Bernard Brodie, "Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine", World Politics, 7,3 (April 1955), p. 350.
" John Major, The Oppenheimer Hearing (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), p. 149.
 S4
deploying the few nuclear weapons possessed by the United States at this time.
Representative Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee,
dismissed the importance of the Army and Navy, and said: "The only way to avoid war is
to have available at any instant the means of striking swiftly.... And the atomic bomb,
serviced by land-based bombers, is the only weapon which can ensure that protection."
Such views gave the SAC a good deal of influence and privilege.
Oppenheimer's views on tactical weapons, as reflected in lectures and articles, as
well as in his recommendations in the Vista Report, posed a threat to the Air Force's
privileged poshion among the military services. Waher G. Whitman said in the course of
his testimony before the Gray Board: "The Strategic Air Command had thought of the
atomic weapon as solely restricted to hs own use. I think that there was some definite
resentment at the implication that this was not just the Strategic Air Command's
weapon."^"* There was more than a little "resentment" towards Oppenheimer; some feh that
he was out to destroy the SAC, and thus American securhy. It seemed, to the authors of The
Hydrogen Bomb, "as if some US scientists, unable to stop Teller and his hydrogen bomb,
had seized on the invitations to study the Air Force as an opportunity to make political war
on the SAC." ^^ Oppenheimer's role in the Vista Project and the later Lincoln Summer
Study (which argued for a system of continental air defense) was seen as part of a sinister
"pattem of activhies" designed to curb, if not eliminate ahogether, strategic air power.
Oppenheimer's "pattem of activities" was one thing when it simply opposed and
offended the Strategic Air Command, but whh the coming of Eisenhower's "New Look"
and the adoption of Massive Retaliation, such activhies took on a whole new meaning. As
General Maxwell Taylor pointed out, "the New Look was little more than the old air power
dogma set forth in Madison Avenue trappings and now formally buttressed upon Massive
Retaliation as the central strategic concept." With the adoption of Massive Retaliation,
Air Force doctrine became the central strategic doctrine of Unhed States defense policy. As
Thomas Wilson has pointed out, "when contending doctrine becomes accepted dogma,
dissent is tumed into heresy."^^

" Quoted in Walter Millis, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 240.
'' Transcript, p. 498.
" Quoted in Major, The Oppenheimer Hearing, p. 163.
'^ Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960), p. 17. Also quoted in
Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy, p. 145.
^' Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy, p. 146.
 55
In the late afternoon of 17 Febmary 1953, in an off-the-record lecture delivered to a
weekly meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, Oppenheimer presented his major
criticisms of prevailing national security policy.^^ Most of what he discussed seems obvious
today, but at the time h was shocking in hs vision and crhicisms. The off-the-record mle is
taken quhe seriously by the Council on Foreign Relations, and thus the text of
Oppenheimer's original speech is not available. However, Foreign Affairs did later publish
a more circumspect version of this lecture.^^ By this time Oppenheimer had become almost
obsessed with the need for greater candor and openness on behalf of the govemment.
Because the govemment would not inform the public, Oppenheimer chose to do so himself,
in a very limited fashion, without violating security. Of the arms race Oppenheimer said: "I
must tell about it without communicating anything. I must reveal its nature without
revealing anything; and this I propose to do."'*^ Oppenheimer went on to discuss the
changing face of nuclear weapons, repeatedly calling for the government to inform the
public on such issues, saying, "we should all know - not precisely, but quantitatively and,
above all, authoritatively - where we stand in these matters.""^^ Such ideas flew dkectly in
the face of fiercely held tenets about nuclear secrecy. To add insult to injury, Oppenheimer
illustrated the dangers of secrecy by quoting a high officer of the Air Defense Conmiand as
saying: "it was our policy to attempt to protect our striking force, but that it was not really
our policy to attempt to protect this country, for that is so big a job that it would interfere
with our retaliatory capabilities."'*^ Such a statement reflected official poUcy views, yet
Oppenheimer labeled such a view foolish and dismissed it as the product of excessive
secrecy and a lack of information.
Oppenheimer went on to discuss the futilhy of the arms race. He said that the Soviet
Union was approximately four years behind the United States in the field of nuclear
weapons. This, he pointed out, "sounds comfortably reassuring...as though the job of
keeping ahead were being satisfactorily accomplished."'*^ However, he went on to say that
this four-year gap would soon be meaningless.

" Ibid., p. 153.

'^ J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy", Foreign Affairs, 31,4 (July 1953), pp.
525-535.
"^ Ibid., p. 526.
'•' Ibid., p. 527.
''''Ibid., p. 531.
''Ibid
 56
The very least we can say is that, looking ten years ahead, h is likely to be small
comfort that the Soviet Union is four years behind us, and small comfort that they
are only about half as big. The very least we can conclude is that our twenty-
thousandth bomb, useful as it may be in filling the vast munitions pipelines of a
great war, will not in any deep strategic sense offset their two-thousandth.'*^
Oppenheimer anticipated a time when both superpowers would be able to completely
destroy the other, but not without risking their own destmction, like "two scorpions in a
bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at risk of hs own life."'*^
Oppenheimer went on to offer three reforms, which he believed were "so obvious,
so important, [and] so sure to be salutary."'*^ The first was "candor on the part of the
officials of the United States Govemment to the officials, the representatives, [and] the
people of their country."'*^ The second reform concemed the need for candor in American
deaUngs with its allies, and the third called for increased efforts at continental defense.
Oppenheimer admitted that such suggestions had been discussed in the past, but pointed out
that they had yet to be acted upon. The entire tone of the article implied that the time for
debate was over, and that these suggestions, already largely associated with Oppenheimer
himself, were essential to ensure the continued security of the United States, if not the
world.
Oppenheimer's lecture, and the subsequent Foreign Affairs article, predicted the
death of a historical doctrine that still taught people that national security lay in the
attairmient of military superiority over one's enemies. He thus undermined the basis for
official strategy up to that point, and yet offered no solution. The few suggestions he did
make were simply the reiteration of ideas that he had been promoting for several years,
ideas that the govemment found quite objectionable. Oppenheimer did not simply discuss
the dangers of secrecy, but clearly attacked govemment policies, almost threatening to
inform the public himself if the govemment would not do so. At this time Massive
Retaliation was the official strategic doctrine of the Administration, yet Oppenheimer
labeled such an approach "folly." At a time when the govemment was primarily concemed
whh its offensive capabilhies and the protection of its nuclear secrets, Oppenheimer was

''Ibid., p. 52^.
"Ibid, p. 529.
'^ Ibid., p. 530.
"Ibid
 57
publicly calling for an increased emphasis on defense and greater candor and openness on
behalf of the government. After having made powerful enemies in the Air Force and among
H-bomb proponents, Oppenheimer now alienated even more moderate officials.
Three months after Oppenheimer's lecture to the Council on Foreign Relations, he
was under direct public attack on the pages of Fortune magazine, in an unsigned article
enthled: "The Hidden Stmggle for the H-bomb: The story of Dr. Oppenheimer's persistent
campaign to reverse U.S. milhary strategy."'** It tumed out that an Air Force reserve officer,
who had close associations with many other high-ranking officers in the service, had
written the article.'*^ The article opened by stating that "a Ufe and death stmggle over
national milhary policy has developed between an influential group of American scientists
and the military."^" The heroes of this article were Teller, Strauss, and the SAC. The
detection of the Soviet A-bomb test was attributed to Strauss' "sixth sense," and the
decision to pursue the H-bomb was laid down to Strauss' urging. The successful test of a
thermonuclear weapon was attributed solely to Teller's genius, even though more recently
declassified documentation reveals that Teller was in fact responsible for most of the delays
in the H-bomb program. ^^
The villains of the Fortune article were Oppenheimer and his followers, a group
calling themselves ZORC. Oppenheimer and his "disciples" were portrayed as a group
persistently trying to undermine the SAC, not only through then- opposhion to the H-bomb,
but through their participation in projects such as Vista and the Lincoln Summer Study. The
article stated that "Oppenheimer had transformed Vista into an exercise for rewriting U.S.
strategy - an exercise introduced by a veiled suggestion that Air Force doctrine was based
on the slaughter of civilians." The article went on to discuss how there formed around
Oppenheimer a group called ZORC - Z for Zacharias; O for Oppenheimer; R for Rabi; and
C for Charles Lauritsen. This group was accused of trying to prove the feasibility of a "jet-

'' Fortune, "The Hidden Struggle for the H-bomb: The story of Dr. Oppenheimer's persistent campaign to
reverse U.S. military strategy", 47, 5 (May 1953), pp. 109-110; 230.
"' Larson, Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb, p. 146.
'^ Ibid., p. 109.
^' WiUiam J. Broad, "Rewriting the History of the H-bomb", Science, 155 (19 November 1989), pp. 769-772.
- This article smdies a recently declassified history of the H-bomb written in 1954 by Hans Bethe. This
history shows that it was technical errors by Teller, rather than political opposition by Oppenheimer, that
hindered work on the H-bomb.
" Fortune, "The Hidden Struggle for the H-bomb", p. 110.
 58
propelled, electronically hedged Maginot Line", in order to "undercut the 'deterrent-
retaliatory' argument"."
The Fortune article clearly anticipated the testimony of such anti-Oppenheimer
whnesses as Mr. Griggs, the former chief scientist to the Department of the Air Force, and
Greneral Wilson, a Major General in the Strategic Air Command. This article was the first
known mention of the ZORC group that would feature in Griggs' testimony. Like the
testimony of Griggs and Wilson, this article clearly shows that the SAC saw Oppenheimer
as a dangerous threat to Air Force doctrine, and thus to then- privileged poshion among the
services. The Fortune article, again like later testimony, portrayed Oppenheimer as putting
the SAC, and thus national security, at risk due to moral concerns. When discussing the
idea of national defense, the Fortune article said: "the essence of the ZORC idea is that the
fortress concept offers a more moral solution to the dilemma of cold-war strategy than does
SAC."^'* The Fortune article concluded by saying that Oppenheimer and ZORC had failed
to rewrite American strategy, and that the SAC had retained "its mighty mission."^^
However, the article also correctly stated that the issues Oppenheimer raised, continued "to
haunt national milhary policy."^^ Oppenheimer's later security hearing was partly an effort
by the SAC to exorcise such issues once and for all.
As Joseph and Stewart Alsop said, "the record of the Gray Board hearings reeks like
a compost heap with emotions engendered by old policy disputes."^^ Oppenheimer had
eamed a host of powerful enemies through his heretical views on defense and security
policy. However, this was not the only way that Oppenheimer's character led to his
removal. As already discussed, during his Los Alamos days Oppenheimer's arrogance and
sharp tongue made an enemy out of Kenneth Nichols, who was the General Manager of the
AEC during Oppenheimer's hearing. Even more hnportant was Oppenheimer's relationship
with Lewis Strauss, the author of the majority decision of the AEC. It was Strauss who was
primarily responsible for the conclusion that Oppenheimer's clearance should be removed
due to "fundamental defects in his 'character.'"^^ Strauss, perhaps more than any other

"^ Ibid., p. 230. The term "jet-propelled, electronically hedged Maginot Line" simply referred to the system of
continental air defense proposed by the Lincoln Summer Study.
''Ibid
"Ibid
"Ibid
''^ Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "We Accuse", Harper's Magazine, 209 (October 1954), p. 37.
" United States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer: Texts ofPrincipal
Documents and Letters ofPersonnel Security Board, General Manager, Commissioners {Waslangion: United
States Govemment Printing Office, 1954), p. 51.
 59
single individual, was responsible for Oppenheimer's removal, and thus warrants special
attention.
Strauss was an arrogant self-made millionaire who was never in doubt as to the
correctness of his views. Though he had only a high school education, he stmggled to
understand physics and was both proud and anxious of his intellectual abilities.'^ He
prided himself on being treated as an intellectual equal by physicists. Thus h seems almost
inevhable that Strauss would have a bad relationship whh Oppenheimer, an intellectual
snob who had no time for those who pretended to know more than they actually did, and
who was all too willing to point out the intellectual shortcomings of others. The
crystallizing incident in the trouble between Oppenheimer and Strauss was a disagreement
over the export of radioactive isotopes to American allies. In a hearing before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Strauss argued against the export of radioactive isotopes on
the grounds that they could be used to make nuclear weapons. When Oppenheimer took the
whness chah- to give his opinion, he said:
No one can force me to say you cannot use these isotopes for atomic energy. You
can use a shovel for atomic energy. In fact you do. You can use a bottle of beer for
atomic energy. In fact you do. But to get some perspective, the fact is that during
the war and after the war these materials have played no significant part and in my
knowledge no part at all.^°
With the mention of a bottle of beer, a ripple of laughter ran through the hearing room.
Philip Stem, who was present at the hearing, said that even to the uniformed observer, h
was clear Oppenheimer was making a fool of someone.^^ At this point someone posed the
question: "Is it tme. Doctor, that the over-all national defense of a country rests on more
than secret military development alone?" Oppenheimer replied, "Of course it does...My
own rating of the importance of isotopes in this broad sense is that they are far less
important than electronic devices, but far more important than, let us say, vitamins."^^ Once
again, to Strauss' humiliation, laughter filled the room.

'^ Barton J. Bernstein, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer'', Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences,
12, 1 (1982), p. 205.
*° Goodchild, J. Robert Oppenheimer: 'Shatterer of Worlds' (London: British Broadcasting Corporation,
1980), p. 195.
^' Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 129.
^'Ibid, p. 129-30.
 60
After the hearing Oppenheimer asked AEC General Counsel Joseph Volpe, who had
been seated next to him, how he thought he had done. Volpe, who had seen rage and
humiliation clearly drawn on Strauss' face, replied, ''Too well, Robert. Much too well."
Lilienthal later wrote in his journals:
My heart sank when I heard the offhand way Oppenheimer dismissed Strauss'
objections - which is what they deserved, as to their lack or merit - but I knew the
kind of man we were dealing whh... .1 had feared, from that time on, that this would
be a thing for which Oppenheimer might have to pay in Strauss' enmity.^'*
Once again, Oppenheimer's arrogance and sharp tongue had earned him a powerful enemy.
Lilienthal was right to think that Oppenheimer might have to pay for the way he treated
Strauss, for as soon as Strauss was in a poshion to end Oppenheimer's career as a
govemment advisor, he moved to do exactly that.
Strauss became Chairman of the AEC on 3 July 1953, and whhin just four days he
had ordered the removal of all classified documents in Oppenheimer's possession, in
preparation for a security review.^^ Strauss promised J. Edgar Hoover, who believed that
Oppenheimer had "moral and character deficiencies," that he would purge Oppenheimer.^^
It seems clear that Strauss was planning to remove Oppenheimer quietly, just as he had
purged other opponents, but William L. Borden closed such an avenue. Borden, former
chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, had long been suspicious of
Oppenheimer. He had served in Air Force bomber crews during the war, and had written a
book extolling strategic bombing. Borden explained in 1954, that his doubts about
Oppenheimer had grown between 1950 and 1953 as he had watched Oppenheimer take
policy poshions that seemed anthhetical to America's interests.^^ In Borden's view,
Oppenheimer fanatically opposed "anything that might give us some good out of the atom,"
most importantly the H-bomb. On Saturday, 7 November 1953, Borden sent a registered

^'Ibid., p. 130.
^ David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. III.. Venturesome Years. 1950-1955 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 522.
^' New York Times, 14 April 1954, p. 18.
^ Harold P. Green, "The Oppenheimer Case: A Study in the Abuse of Law", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
33, 7 (September 1977), p. 16. - Green was the man primarily responsible for drafting AEC General
Manager, K. D. Nichols' letter of charges against Oppenheimer. In February 1954, for reasons of personal
conscience he asked to be reUeved of any further responsibilities in the case. He was alarmed at Nichols'
personal enthusiasm for the Oppenheimer case. After reading the Commission's final decision he submitted
his resignation.
^^ Bernstein, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer", p. 199.
^ William L. Borden quoted in Bernstein, "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer", p. 199.
 61
letter to J. Edgar Hoover, stating that more probably than not Oppenheimer was an agent of
the Soviet Union. In this letter Borden drew attention to Oppenheimer's radical background
and opposhion to the H-bomb.
Though few took such allegations seriously, this letter proved to be the trigger that
led directly to Oppenheimer's security hearing. When h became clear that a hearing was
inevitable, Strauss hired the aggressive Roger Robb to represent the Commission. Robb
was an attomey with extensive prosecutorial experience, having tried twenty-three murder
cases, obtaining an unusually high number of convictions.^^ The presence of a prosecutor at
a security hearings was unheard of, as such hearings were supposed to be inquiries rather
than trials. Strauss also personally intervened to ensure that Luis Alvarez, an anti-
Oppenheimer witness, would testify. AEC General Manager, K. D. Nichols, another enemy
of Oppenheimer's, also took a personal interest in Oppenheimer's prosecution. Nichols
discussed Oppenheimer's bad attitude and arrogance whh Harold Green, the primary author
of the letter of charges against Oppenheimer, and encouraged him to approach his drafting
of the charges whh greater enthusiasm. ^° The animosity of Nichols and Strauss, combined
with Borden's resurrection of Oppenheimer's left-wing past, opened the way for
Oppenheimer's adversaries to effect his complete removalfi^ompolicy-making ckcles.

^' Stem. The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, p. 239.

™ Ibid., p. 226.
 62

CONCLUSION
 63

The Oppenheimer hearing has attracted much scholarly attention. It represented an

important watershed in American security policy, in the relationship between science and
govemment, and in the development of American defense strategy. However, the
Oppenheimer case has also attracted attention for an altogether more human reason. It has
attracted attention because, as Rachel HoUoway has pointed-out, stories of challenged
character have always intrigued the American people.^ Whether it was Richard Nixon's
emotional defense of Checkers and Pat's cloth coat, or Jimmy Swaggert's pleas for
forgiveness of sin, Americans have been drawn to trials of character. And this is exactly
what the Oppenheimer hearing was, a trial of character.
An analysis of the transcript promptly reveals that the Oppenheimer hearing was no
ordinary security hearing. Though a good deal of the testimony dealt with Oppenheimer's
former left-wing "associations," the principal witnesses for the prosecution frankly
admitted that they did not question Oppenheimer's loyalty. Oppenheimer's discretion with
classified material was also not in question, and thus the issue of "associations" became
irrelevant. Whom Oppenheimer associated with was unimportant if there was no risk of
him revealing government secrets to such associates. Yet Oppenheimer was declared a
"security risk," even though the traditional grounds for such a conclusion were dismissed.
He was declared a security risk because of, among other things, the quality of his advice,
his lack of "enthusiasm" for the H-bomb, his arrogance, his great influence, and his poor
"wisdom and judgement" General Wilson of the Strategic Air Command, went so far as to
argue that even Oppenheimer's command of the English language represented a threat to
the national interest.^ When all the issues are taken together h is clear that it was
Oppenheimer's character that was on trial in early 1954.
Scholars in an effort to explain the forces behind Oppenheimer's hearing have
pointed to things such as Oppenheimer's opposhion to the H-bomb, his alienation of the
Strategic Air Command, and his numerous and powerful enemies. However, such factors,
when treated separately do not make sense, for they are simply manifestations of a deeper
cause. To understand why Oppenheimer took the views that he did, and how he alienated
the SAC and people such as Strauss, one must understand Oppenheimer's unique character.

' Rachel L. HoUoway, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Politics, Rhetoric, and Self-Defense (London:
Praeger, 1993), p. 6.
' Transcript, p. 685.
 64
Oppenheimer's character was forged in a world far removed from polhics, and h was his
character, unsuited to the policy-making environment he entered after the war, which cost
him his security clearance.
Oppenheimer's parents were members of the Ethical Culture Society, and
Oppenheimer attended the Society's school. Thus "moral law" and ethics played a large
part in Oppenheimer's childhood, and he developed a moralistic outlook. After
Oppenheimer left school he entered the intemational world of science, where tmth was the
only goal and rationality the only method. Here h was feh that the responsibility of
scientific mind was to "challenge and test all doctrine, to expose all views, discuss all
possibilhies, and reject all errors in the free air of open debate."^ Such values became
fundamental parts of Oppenheimer's character, and throughout his life his approach to
problems would reflect these values. Perhaps arising from his brilliance, Oppenheimer also
developed an abilhy both to charm and persuade, as well as to alienate and offend. To those
whom Oppenheimer considered his intellectual equal, or even superior, Oppenheimer was a
remarkably charming individual, who always seemed to know just what to say. To those
Oppenheimer considered banal or foolish, he was often verbally abusive and ridiculing.
It was Oppenheimer's strong moral and scientific values that led to his participation
in the A-bomb project. Oppenheimer believed that the United States was in a desperate race
with the Nazis to produce a nuclear weapon. The A-bomb also came to be seen as
something that would end the war quickly and save both American and enemy lives.
However, by the end of the war, such motivating factors had evaporated. Whh the invasion
of Germany and the success of the Alsos mission, h became clear that the Germans had not
been close to producing a weapon. The reports that came infi^omHiroshima showed that
the A-bomb had caused greater death and destmction than the scientists had believed it
would. In retrospect, Oppenheimer saw himself not as having saved the free world from a
Nazi bomb, but as having simply added a new and immensely more destmctive weapon to
the American arsenal. Oppenheimer came to feel that the physicists had committed a
terrible sin by creating the A-bomb, the power of which was bmtally demonstrated in
Japan, and felt that as director of Los Alamos he in particular had blood on his hands.
When Oppenheimer entered post-war policy-making circles he not only brought his
great knowledge and understanding of nuclear weapons, but he brought his strong moral

Thomas W. Wilson, The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 3.
 65
and scientific values, and his feelings of guilt. Oppenheimer was determined to tum nuclear
power, the most destmctive force the world had ever seen, into a positive force for peace.
The Bamch Plan represented Oppenheimer's idealistic hopes for a fiiture where security
would be based on intemational controls and cooperation. The SAC in particular was
alarmed by this idea of giving up the American monopoly and "intemationalizing" nuclear
power. When the Bamch plan was rejected by the Soviets, security through intemational
cooperation was rejected and the traditional conception of security through military
superiorly prevailed. In the absence of intemational controls, Oppenheimer recognized the
need for nuclear weapons, but he called for tactical nuclear weapons that would retum
warfare to the battlefield, weapons that could be used for something short of total war. He
saw the development of an even more powerfiil thermonuclear weapon, which was far too
powerful for use against purely milhary targets, as morally repugnant.
Combined whh Oppenheimer's moral outlook was his scientific mindset. As already
mentioned, Oppenheimer believed that h was the scientist's responsibility to challenge and
test all doctrine, to expose all views, discuss all possibilities, and reject all errors in an
atmosphere of open debate. Oppenheimer openly criticized and challenged official doctrine,
and continually called for greater openness and candor from the govemment. He criticized
the ideas behind the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, holding such ideas up as an example
of the foolishness that arose out of excessive secrecy. Oppenheimer believed that excessive
secrecy stifled the democratic process and slowed scientific development. He wanted the
govemment to release more information to the public so that the people might have a say in
the issues of the nuclear age. Oppenheimer also caUed for the sharing of nuclear secrets
with American allies.
Unfortunately for Oppenheimer, his views and character, suited as they were to the
world of science, did not suit his new environment. Policy-making circles were dominated
by views almost completely antithetical to those held by Oppenheimer. Generally speaking,
individuals in these circles did not like free and open debate, but were primarily concemed
whh the keeping of secrets. They did not want to share their secrets with allies, but only
wanted to ensure American nuclear supremacy. Such individuals didn't see criticism as a
way to spark valuable debate, but rather saw h as a threat to their polhical poshions, and
thus as something to be silenced. Policy-making circles were also generally made up of
men who were nationalistic in view. They were primarily concerned whh American lives,
not the lives of an enemy, and thus saw the use of the A-bomb in Japan, not as a great
 66
tragedy, but as a great victory. A majority in policy-making ch-cles came to support the
development of the H-bomb, believing h was the only way to insure American supremacy.
The H-bomb was clearly more powerful than the A-bomb, and most policy-makers
believed there was no difference between the two in terms of morality, and even if there
was, moral issues were not their primary concern.
Oppenheimer's unpopular views eamed him powerful enemies, particularly among
H-bomb advocates and the SAC. It must be remembered that Oppenheimer was the most
powerful scientific advisor at least until 1950, and his views carried a good deal of
influence. H-bomb advocates feh that Oppenheimer's opposhion to then- weapon
significantly slowed its development, and thus endangered American security. These
feelings would become more acute in light of later Cold War developments and the Soviet
detonation of a thermonuclear device in 1953. To those scientists responsible for the
development of the H-bomb, particularly Edward Teller, Oppenheimer's opposition
threatened to min their careers, and thus represented something very personal. The
Strategic Air Command was not only offended by Oppenheimer's opposition to the H-
bomb, but felt threatened by his position on other issues as well. Oppenheimer's opposition
to strategic bombing, his promotion of tactical over strategic nuclear weapons, and his
suggestion of a three way division of fissionable material, threatened to undermine the
SAC's privileged position at the center of Unhed States defense strategy.
H-bomb advocates like Kenneth Nichols and Lewis Strauss played central roles
both in the initiation of Oppenheimer's security hearing, and in the final decision to
permanently remove his clearance. Other H-bomb advocates and Air Force officials played
important roles in the hearing as witnesses for the prosecution, recommending against the
reinstatement of Oppenheimer's clearance. Most of these people had not only disagreed
with Oppenheimer over policy issues, but had also been on the receiving end of
Oppenheimer's acerbic tongue. Nichols had been the butt of strong language from
Oppenheimer during work at Los Alamos, and Oppenheimer had humiliated Strauss in
front of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Oppenheimer could afford to be arrogant
when he was simply a scientist and a teacher, for the enemies he created at that time would
not come to hold his future in their hands. He could also afford to voice unpopular views,
challenge prevailing ideas, and call for the open discussion of all issues when he was a
scientist. Debate and disagreement are essential parts of the process of discovery. However,
such character traits, when brought into policy-making circles, eventually cost him his
 67
career. Oppenheimer's character, well suited to scientific and academic ch-cles, was
completely unsuited to Cold War polhical or policy-making circles, and h is this simple
fact that lay behind the Oppenheimer hearing.
 68

BIBLIOGRAPHY
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

Smyth, H. D., Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the
Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States
Government, 1940-1945 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1976).

Unhed States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer:
Texts of Principal Documents and Letters of Personnel Security Board, General
Manager, Commissioners (Washington: United States Govemment Printing
Office, 1954).

Unhed States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter ofJ. Robert Oppenheimer:
Transcript of Hearing Before Personnel Security Board (Washington: United
States Govemment Printing Office, 1954).

WORKS BY OPPENHEIMER

Oppenheimer, J. R., "The Atom Bomb As a Great Force for Peace", New York Times
Magazine, 9 June 1946, pp. 7, 59-60.

, "Intemational Control of Atomic Energy", Foreign Affairs, 26, 2

(January 1948), pp. 239-252.

, "Physics in the Contemporary World", Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, 4, 3 (March 1948), pp. 65-68, 85-86.

, "A Letter to Senator McMahon", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5,

6 (June-July 1949), pp. 163, 178.

_, "Comments on the Military Value of the Atom", Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, 7, 2 (Febmary 1951), pp. 43-45.

_, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy" Foreign Affairs, 31, 4 (July

1953), pp. 525-535.

^ Science and the Common Understanding (London: Oxford

University Press, 1954).

^ The Open Mind Q<iQv/ York: Simon and Schuster, 1955).

, "Prospects in the Arts and Sciences", Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, 11,2 (Febmary 1955), pp. 42-44, 52.
 69
_, "On Science and Culture", Encounter, 19, 4 (October 1962), pp. 3-11.

J "A Talk in Chicago", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 19, 8

(October 1963), pp. 4-6.

_j The Flying Trapeze: Three Crises for Physicists (London: Oxford

University Press, 1964).

^ "Crossing", Hound and Horn, vol. 1. (New York: Kraus Reprint,

1966), p. 335.

^ Uncommon Sense (Boston: Birkhauser, 1984).

Smith, A.K. and Weiner, C, eds, Robert Oppenheimer, Letters and Recollections
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

NEWSPAPERS

New York Times, 1945-1955.

MEMOIRS

Acheson, D., Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1970).

Eisenhower, D. D., Mandate for Change, 1953-1956: The White House Years (London:
Heinemann, 1963).

Ermenc, J.J., ed.. Atomic Bomb Scientists: Memoirs, 1939-1945 (London: Meckler,
1986).

Fermi, L., Atoms in the Family: My Life with Enrico Fermi, Designer of the First Atomic
Pile (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955).

Frisch, O., What Little I Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Groves, L. R., Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (London: Andre
Deutsch, 1962).

Hughes, E. J., The Ordeal ofPower: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years
(London: Macmillan, 1963).

Kennan, G. F., Memoirs 1950-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

Lilienthal, D. E., The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. I, The TVA Years 1939-1945
(New York: Harper and Row, 1964).
 70

, The Journals of David E Lilienthal, Vol.11, The Atomic Energy Years

1945-1950 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. Ill, Venturesome Years 1950-

1955 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

Sudoplatov, P. and Sudoplatov A., Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness
- A Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995).

Teller, E., with Brown, A., The Legacy of Hiroshima (London: Macmillan, 1962).

Tmman, H. S., The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-
1953 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955).

DOCUMENTARY HISTORIES

Cantelon, P L., Hewlett, R G., and Williams, R. C , eds. The American Atom: A
Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the
Present (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).

Siracusa, J. M., ed. The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the
Cold War, 1941-1947 (Sydney: Hoh, Rinehart and Winston, 1976).

BOOKS

Ambrose, S.E., Eisenhower, vol. 2., The President (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1983).

Badash, L., Hirschfelder, J. O., and Broida, HP., Reminiscences of Los Alamos, 1943-
1945 (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980).

Blumberg, S. A. and Owens, G., Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward
Teller (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1976).

Bobbitt, P., Freedman, L. and Treverton, G.F., US. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (London:
Macmillan 1989).

Bmner, J., Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (London: Harvard University Press, 1986).

Buckingham, P. H., America Sees Red: Anti-Communism in America, 1870s to 1980s

(Claremont, Calif: Regina Books, 1988).

Caute, D., The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).
 71
Chevalier, H., Oppenheimer: The Story of a Friendship (New York: Braziller, 1965).

Clark, R. W., The Birth of the Bomb: The Untold Story ofBritain's Part in the Weapon
that Changed the World (Londion. Hoenix House, 1961).

Cohen, B. L., Nuclear Science and Society (New York: Anchor Press, 1974).

Curtis, C.P., The Oppenheimer Case: The Trial of a Security System (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1955).

Davis, N.P., Lawrence and Oppenheimer (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).

Freedman, L., The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St Martins Press, 1989).

Gardner, H., Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

Gilpin, R., American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962).

Goldschmidt, B., The Atomic Adventure: Its Political and Economic Aspects (New York:
Macmillan, 1964).

Goodchild, P., J. Robert Oppenheimer: Shatterer of Worlds (London: British

Broadcasting Corporation, 1980).

Gowing, M., Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945 (New York: St Martin's Press,
1964).

Haberer, J., Politics and the Community of Science (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold,
1969).

Halberstam, D., The Powers That Be (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).

Hamby, A. L., Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1973).

Hersey, J., Hiroshima (New York: Bantam Books, 1979).

Hershberg, J. G., James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear
Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).

Hewlett, R. G. and Anderson O. E., The New World, 1939/1946, Vol. I of ^ History of
the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Penn:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962).

Hewlett, R. G. and Duncan, F., Atomic Shield, 1947-1952, Vol. II of ^4 History of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of Califomia
Press, 1990).
 72
HoUoway, D., Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-1956
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

HoUoway, R., In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Politics Rhetoric, andSelf-

Defense (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993).

Irving, D., The German Atomic Bomb: The History of Nuclear Research in Nazi Germany
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967).

Jungk, R., Brighter than a Thousand Suns: The Moral and Political History of the Atomic
Scientists (London. Victor Gollancz, 1958).

Kaplan, F., The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

Kugelmass, J. A., 7. Robert Oppenheimer and the Atomic Story (New York: J. Messner,
1961).

Kunetka, J. W., Oppenheimer, The Years of Risk (Englewood Chffs NJ: Prentice Hall,
1982).

Lamont, L., Day of Trinity (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

Lapp, R. E., The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965).

Larson, R., Oppenheimer and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Franklin Watts, 1988).

Major, J., The Oppenheimer Hearing (biQ-w York: Stein and Day, 1971).

Michelmore, P., The Swift Years; The Robert Oppenheimer Story (New York: Dodd,
Mead, 1969).

Miller, M., Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley
Publishing Corporation, 1974).

Millis, W., with Mansfield, H. C. and Stein H., Arms and the State: Civil-Military
Elements in National Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958).

Morland, H , The Secret that Exploded (HeyN York. Random House, 1981).

Pringle, P ad Spigelman, J., The Nuclear Barons (London: Michael Joseph, 1982).

Rabi, I.I., Serber, R., Weisskopf, V.F., Pais, A. and Seaborg, G.T., Oppenheimer (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969).

Rhodes, R., The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
 73
Rouze, M., Robert Oppenheimer: The Man and his Theories (London: Souvenir Press,
1964).

Royal, D., The Story of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: St Martins Press, 1969).

Rummel, J., Robert Oppenheimer: Dark Prince (New York: Facts on File, 1992).

Siracusa, J. M., Into the Dark House: American Diplomacy and the Ideological Origins
of the Cold War (Claremont, Calif: Regina Books, 1998).

Smith, A.K., A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists Movement in America: 1945-47
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

Stem, P.M., The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial (New York: Harper and Row,
1969).

Strout, C , Conscience, Science, and Security: The Case ofDrJ. Robert Oppenheimer
(Chicago: RandMcnally, 1963).

Tarr, D.W., American Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

Walker, M., German National Socialism and the Questfor Nuclear Power 1939-1949
(Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Weart, S.R., Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge: Harvard Univershy Press,
1988).

Weigley, R.F., The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973).

Wilson, T.W., The Great Weapons Heresy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970).

York, H.F., The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1989).

ARTICLES

Alsop, J. and Alsop, S., "We Accuse", Harper's Magazine, 209 (October 1954), pp. 25-
45.

Aron, R., "Realism and Common Sense in Security Policy", Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 11, 4 (April 1955), pp. 110-112.

Bacher, R. F., "The Hydrogen Bomb", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6, 5 (May 1950),
pp. 133-138.

, "Robert Oppenheimer (1904-1967)", Proceedings of the American

Philosophical Society, 116 (1972), pp. 279-293.
 74

Bainbridge, K. T., "All in Our Time: A Foul and Awesome Display", Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 31, 5 (May 1975), pp. 40-46.

Bamett, L., "J. Robert Oppenheimer", Life, 10 October 1949, pp. 121-125, 131-138.

Bemstein, B. J., "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer", Historical Studies in the
Physical Sciences, 12, 1 (1982), pp. 195-252.

, "Crossing the Rubicon: A Missed Opportunity to Stop the H-bomb",

Intemational Security, 14,2 (Fall 1989), pp. 132-160.

, "The Oppenheimer Loyalty-Security Case Reconsidered", Stanford Law

Review, 42 (July 1990), pp. 1383-1484.

Bemstein, J., "Personal History: The Life It Brings - V\ The New Yorker, 26 January
1987, pp. 35-68.

, "Personal History: The Life It Brings - H", The New Yorker, 2 Febmary
1987, pp. 39-69.

Bethe, H. A., "Oppenheimer: 'Where He Was There Was Always Life and Excitement'",
Science, 155 (March 3, 1967), pp. 1080-1085.

, "J. Robert Oppenheimer: 1904-1967" Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of

the Royal Society, 14 (1968), pp. 391-411.

Block, P., "The Fetish of Atomic Secrecy", Harper's Magazine, 207 (August
1953), pp. 31-37.

Bontecou, E., "Due Process in Security Dismissals", The Annals of the American
Academy of Science, 300 (1955), pp. 102-109.

Breindel, E., "The Oppenheimer File" National Review 46, 10 (1994), pp. 36-40.

Broad, W J., "Rewriting the History of the H-bomb", Science, 218 (November 1982), pp.
769-772.

Brodie, B., "Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?", Foreign Affairs, 32, 2 (1953-54),
pp. 217-229.

, "Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine", World Politics, 7, 3 (April

1955), pp. 349-370.

Brown, R. S., "The Operation of Personnel Security Programs", The Annals of the
American Academy of Science, 300 (1955), pp. 94-101.

Cushman, R. E., "Freedom Versus Security," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5, 3

(March 1949), pp. 69-72.
 75

DuBridge, L. A., "Policy and the Scientists", Foreign Affairs, 41, 3 (1962-1963), pp. 571-
589.

Dyson, F., Pais, A., Stromgren, B., and Ning Yang, C , "To J. Robert Oppenheimer on
His Sixtieth Birthday", Reviews of Modem Physics, 36, 2 (April 1964), pp. 507-
508.

Erwin, R., "Oppenheimer Investigated" The Wilson Quarterly 18,4 (1994), pp. 34-46.

Fortune, "The Scientists", 38, 3 (October 1948), pp. 106-112, 166-176.

, "The Hidden Stmggle for the H-bomb: The Story of Dr. Oppenheimer's
Persistent Campaign to Reverse U.S. Military Strategy, 47, 5 (May 1953), pp.
109-111.

, "The Atom and the Balance of Power: Dr Oppenheimer Ponders Over 'Two
Scorpions in a Bottle'", 48, 2 (August 1953), pp. 97, 202.

Gerber, L. G., "The Bamch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War", Diplomatic History,
6, 1 (Winter 1982), pp. 69-95.

Goldberg, S., "Groves, Szilard, and Oppenheimer", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 48,
10 (December 1992), p. 37.

, "Groves and the Scientists: Compartmentalization and the Building of the Bomb",
Physics Today, 48, 8 (August 1995), p. 38-43.

Goodwin, I., "Pseudo-History Redux: FBI Clears Atomic Bomb Physicists of Spying",
Physics Today, 48, 6 (June 1995), p. 44.

(jrreen, H P . , "The Unsystematic Security System", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11,
4 (April 1955), pp. 118-122, 164.

, "The Oppenheimer Case: A Study in the Abuse of Law", Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, 33, 7 (September 1977), pp. 12-16, 56-61.

Herken, G., "Mad About the Bomb: The Inventors of Nuclear Weapons Gather for the
Fortieth Reunion of Guih and Pride", Harper's Magazine, 267 (December 1983),
pp. 49-55.

Kennan, G. F., "The Illusion of Security", The Atlantic Monthly, 194, 2 (August 1954),
pp. 31-34.

Leskov, S., "An Unreliable Whness," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 50, 4 (July/August
1994), pp. 33-36.

Lilienthal, D. E., "Science and the Spirit of Man", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5, 4
(April 1949), pp. 98-100.
 76

Manely, J. H., "The Los Alamos Laboratory", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5, 4
(April 1949), pp. 101-105.

McMillan, P J., "Flimsy Memories", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 50, 4 (July/August
1994), pp. 30-33.

Meyerhoff, H. and Trilling, D., "The Oppenheimer Case: An Exchange", Partisan

Review, 22 (1955), pp. 238-251.

Murphy, C. J. V., "The U.S. as a Bombing Target", Fortune 48,5 (1953), pp. 118-121;
219-228.

New Republic, The Case of Robert Oppenheimer", 26 April 1954, pp. 8-14.

Newsweek, "The Atom: Man in the Middle", 5 April 1954, p. 20.

, "The Oppenheimer Case", 19 April 1954, p. 28.

, The Oppenheimer Paradox: Sense and Senselessness", 26 April 1954, pp. 28-
29.

, "H-Mystery Man: He Hurried the H-bomb", 2 August 1954, pp. 23-26.

Polanyi, M., "Scientific Convictions and the Free Society", Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, 6, 2 (Febmary 1950), pp. 38-42.

Potts, R. D., "National Policy and Air Defense", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9, 7
(September 1953), pp. 253-255.

Readers Digest, "Behind the Scenes with a Genius", (Febmary 1949), pp. 80-84.

Rhodes, R., "I Am Become Death: The Agony of J. Robert Oppenheimer", American
Heritage, 28, 6 (October 1977), pp. 72-83.

Rieff, P., "The Case of Dr. Oppenheimer", The Twentieth Century, 156, (August-
September 1954), pp. 113-232.

Schilling, W., "The H-bomb Decision: How to Decide Whhout Actually Choosing",
Political Science Quarterly, 76 (1961), pp. 24-46.

Schlesinger, A.M., "The Oppenheimer Case" The Atlantic 194 (October 1954), pp. 24-46.

Seitz, F., "Offensive or Defensive Weapons?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9, 9

(November 1953), pp. 325-327, 336.

Sherwin, M. J., "Atomic Pile", The Nation, 258, 20 (1994), pp. 688-689.
 77

Shils, E., "Security and Science Sacrificed to Loyalty", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
11, 4 (April 1955), pp. 106-109, 130.

Smith, A. K., "Los Alamos: Focus of an Age", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 26, 6
(June 1970), pp. 15-20.

Strout, C , "The Oppenheimer Case: Melodrama, Tragedy, and Irony", The Virginia
Quarterly Review, 40, 1 (Winter 1964), pp. 268-280.

, "Telling the Oppenheimer Story: From the AEC to the BBC", The Yale

Review, 73, 1 (October 1983), pp. 122-130.

Teller, E., "The Work of Many People", Science, 121 (25 Febmary 1955), pp. 267-275.

, Letter on H-bomb History to Science, 218 (24 December 1982), p. 1270.

Time, "The Etemal Apprentice", 8 November 1948, pp. 70-81.

, "J. Robert Oppenheimer: His Life and Times", 26 April 1954, p. 19-21.

, "The Oppenheimer Story", 26 April 1954, p. 69.

, "Did Oppenheimer Really Help Moscow?", 142, 21 (May 1994), pp. 63-65.
Trilling, D., "The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony" Partisan Review, 21
(1954), pp. 604-635.

Unna, W., "Dissension in the AEC", The Atlantic Monthly, 199 (May 1957), pp. 36-41.

Urey, H. C , "Should America Build the H-bomb?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6, 3
(March 1950), pp. 72-73.

U.S. News and World Report, "Can the H-bomb Be Stopped: Fantastic Weapons of
Defense Are on the Way", 16 April 1954, pp. 17-19.

, "Fight that Held Up the H-bomb: The Real Story Behind

the Delay", 16 April 1954, pp. 35-39.

, "No Revolt Among Scientists: Thousand Are Hard at Work

on Atomic Jobs", 30 April 1954, pp. 30-32.

, "How the U.S. Almost Lost the Atom Race: Heels Dragged
After 1945 -RussiaPushed Ahead", 25 June 1954, pp. 24-27.

, "Hydrogen Bomb: How the U.S. Almost Lost It", 24

September 1954, pp. 58-72; 88-107.
 78
, "New Debate on the Oppenheimer Case", 24 December
1954, pp. 86-103.

Whhe, L. D., "The Loyahy Program of the Unhed States Govemment", Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 8, 12 (December 1951), pp. 363-366, 382.

THESES

Bird, J., The Third Reich and the Bomb: An Historiographical Examination. BA hons
thesis, Univershy of Queensland, 1997.

Lee, S., American Nuclear Policy and Lewis L. Strauss, 1946-1954. BA hons thesis.
University of Queensland, 1995.