CS205 Handouts by CS World
CS205 Handouts by CS World
CS205 Handouts by CS World
Handouts
Prepared by
CS World
1
What is Information Security ?
(SANS)
2
What is Information Security ?
• IT Security is
information security
applied to technology
• Information security
also covers physical
security, human
resource security, legal
& compliance,
organizational, and
process related aspects
3
What is Information Security ?
• IT Security functions:
– Network security
– Systems security
– Application &
database security
– Mobile security
• InfoSec functions:
– Governance
– Policies & procedures
– Risk management
– Performance reviews
4
What is Information Security ?
5
What is Information Security ?
• Three Pillars of
Information Security:
– Confidentiality:
keeping information
secret
– Integrity: keeping
information in its
original form
– Availability: keeping
information and
information systems
available for use
6
Why Is Information Security Needed ?
REF: WIRED.COM
7
Why Is Information Security Needed ?
Contd…
• Requests sent to the
Federal Reserve Bank of
New York asking the bank
to transfer millions of the
Bangladesh Bank’s funds
to bank accounts in the
Philippines, Sri Lanka and
other parts of Asia.
• USD 81 million stolen
• Total impact could have
been USD 1 billion
REF: WIRED.COM 8
Why Is Information Security Needed ?
9
REF: TELEGRAPH
Why Is Information Security Needed ?
10
REF: GUARDIAN
Why Is Information Security Needed ?
• The Importance Of
Information
– IT is pervasive in our
society & critical to
the Ops & Mngmt of
all organizations
– IT is an enabler for
business and govt
– Personal information
is vital for individuals
to function in society
– Information holds
11
value
Why Is Information Security Needed ?
Module 4 • Personal:
– Social media
passwords and safe
usage
– Online banking and
email account
passwords
– Home PC/laptop
security
– Mobile security
13
Who Is Information Security For ?
• Organizational:
– Board and executive
leadership
(management
commitment)
– CISO (responsible to
drive security
program)
– IT staff and business
users (following
information security
policies & procedures)
14
Who Is Information Security For ?
• Govt and national:
– Law enforcement
– Legal and policy
making
– National database
– Critical infrastructure
– Regulation
– Standards and
certification
– Capacity-building and
coordination
15
Who Is Information Security For ?
• Legal
• Technical
• Organizational
• Capacity building
• Cooperation
16
Who Is Information Security For ?
17
Who Is Information Security For ?
18
Who Is Information Security For ?
20
How Is Information Security Implemented ?
REF: LINKEDIN
21
How Is Information Security Implemented ?
• Leadership
commitment:
– “Tone at the top”
– Information security
policy and objectives
– Assigning
responsibility and
authority
– Resource allocation
– Performance reviews
– Ensuring
accountability
22
How Is Information Security Implemented ?
• Information Security
Manager or CISO:
– Heads department
responsible for
implementing
information security
program
– Directs planning,
implementation,
measurement,
review, and continual
improvement of
program
23
How Is Information Security Implemented ?
• IT user:
– Understand policies
– Conduct security/risk
assessment
– Design effective
security architecture
– Develop SOPs and
checklists
– Implement controls
– Report incidents
– Conduct effective
change management
24
How Is Information Security Implemented ?
• Business user:
– Security awareness
and training
– Follow information
security policy
– Develop and
implement secure
business processes
– Role-based access
control and periodic
reviews
– Reporting incidents
25
How Is Information Security Implemented ?
• Information security
program
– Assessing security
risks and gaps
– Implementing security
controls
– Monitoring,
measurement, &
analysis
END – Management reviews
and internal audit
– Accreditation/testing
26
Who Are The Players In Information Security ?
Module 6 • Government
• Industry & sectors
• International
organizations
• Professional
associations
• Academia and research
organizations
• Vendors and suppliers
27
Who Are The Players In Information Security ?
• Government:
– Policy making
– Law enforcement
– Legal system
– National cyber
security strategy and
standards
– International
coordination
– Computer Incident
Response Team
(CIRT)
28
Who Are The Players In Information Security ?
• International
organizations:
– APCERT
(www.apcert.org)
– European Union
Agency for Network
& Information
Security - ENISA
(www.enisa.org)
30
Who Are The Players In Information Security ?
• International
organizations:
– ITU IMPACT
(http://www.impact-
alliance.org)
https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/c/c/cc91d8
3a-e8a9-40ac-8d75-0f544ba41a71.pdf
31
Who Are The Players In Information Security ?
• Professional
associations:
– ISACA (isaca.org)
– ISC2 (www.isc2.org)
– OWASP
(www.owasp.org)
– Cloud Security
Alliance
– Pakistan Cyber
Security Association
(PCSA)
http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-associations/
32
Who Are The Players In Information Security ?
33
Infosec Transformation Framework 4 Layers
34
Infosec Transformation Framework 4 Layers
4. Security
Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2.
Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
35
Infosec Transformation Framework 4 Layers
• 1: Security hardening:
– Compile IT assets
– Establish minimum
security baseline
(MSB)
– Research security
controls and
benchmarks
– Pilot (test)
– Implement controls
– Monitor and update
controls
36
Infosec Transformation Framework 4 Layers
• 2: Vulnerability
management:
– Purchase internal tool
(NESSUS, Qualys, etc)
– Conduct vulnerability
assessment
– Prioritize and
remediate
– Report
– Repeat cycle on
quarterly/monthly
basis
37
Infosec Transformation Framework 4 Layers
• 3: Security engineering:
– Assess risk profile
– Research security
solutions
– Design security
architecture
– Implement security
controls & solutions
– Test and validate
security posture
38
Infosec Transformation Framework 4 Layers
• 4: Security governance:
– Policies and
procedures
– Risk management
– Core governance
activities (change
management,
incident
management,
END
internal audit)
– Training & awareness
– Performance reviews
39
What Is Information Security Hardening ?
• IT assets (network,
Module 8
systems, application,
databases, mobile,
physical security) come
with default settings
which are not suitable
for security
• Security hardening is
the process of
configuring IT assets to
maximize security of the
IT asset and minimize
security risks
40
What Is Information Security Hardening ?
• Security in the
“trenches:”
– Security at the most
fundamental
operational layer
– Security where it
matters most
– Usually (but not
always) involves
junior staff who need
extra guidance,
training, and scrutiny
41
What Is Information Security Hardening ?
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
42
What Is Information Security Hardening ?
• Why is security
hardening at the first
step in the security
transformation model ?
– Most basic security
settings
– If not adequately
addressed here, rest
of the security
measures hardly
matter
43
What Is Information Security Hardening ?
• Short example of Cisco
router security
hardening:
– Remote access
through SSH and not
through telnet
– Turn of all unused
services
– Session timeout and
password retry
lockout
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/suppor
t/docs/ip/access-lists/13608-21.html
44
What Is Information Security Governance ?
45
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• IT Governance Institute
Definition:
– "Security governance
is the set of
responsibilities and
practices exercised
by the board and
executive
management, with
the goal of providing
strategic direction,…
46
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• IT Governance Institute
Definition (contd.):
– “…ensuring that
objectives are
achieved,
ascertaining that risks
are managed
appropriately and
verifying that the
enterprise's
resources are used
responsibly."
47
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• ISO27001:2013 – ISMS
(Information Security
Management System) is
the world’s leading and
most widely adopted
security governance
standard
48
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• ISO27001 "provides a
model for establishing,
implementing,
operating, monitoring,
reviewing, maintaining
and improving an
information security
management system.”
49
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• Ten short clauses and a
long Annex with 114
controls in 14 groups
• 27000+ certifications
globally in 2015
50
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
Module 10 • Policy:
– Formal and high level
requirement for
securing the
organization and its
IT assets (mandatory)
51
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140611162901-223517409-difference-
between-guideline-procedure-standard-and-policy
52
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
• Policy:
– Scope is across
organization so
should be brief and
focusing on desired
results
– Signed off by senior
management
53
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
• Procedure / SOP:
– More detailed
description of the
process; who does
what, when, and how
– Scope is
predominantly at a
department level
having specified
audience
– May be signed off by
departmental head
https://www.slu.edu/its/policies
54
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
• Guideline:
– General
recommendation or
statement of best
practice
– Not mandatory
– Further elaborates
the related SOP
https://www.slu.edu/its/policies
55
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
• Standard:
– Specific and
mandatory action or
rule
– Must include one or
more specifications
for an IT asset or
behavior
– Yardstick to help
achieve the policy
goals
https://www.slu.edu/its/policies
56
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
• In practice:
– Policy recommended
to be a single
document applicable
at the organizational
level (wide audience)
– Sub-policies may be
defined at a
departmental level
– Policies and standards
are mandatory
(exception approval)
57
Difference Between Policy, SOP, & Guideline
• Examples:
– Information security
policy
– System administrator
password sub-policy
– User ID & Access
Management SOP
– Vulnerability
Management
standard
– Social engineering
prevention guideline
58
What Is An Information Security Program ?
pmtips.net/blog-new/difference-projects-
programmes
59
What Is An Information Security Program ?
• Program definition:
– A program is defined
as a group of
related projects
managed in a
coordinated way to
obtain benefits not
available from
managing
the projects
individually
pmtips.net/blog-new/difference-projects-
programmes
60
What Is An Information Security Program ?
• Security program:
– Sum-total of all
activities planned and
executed by the
organization to meet
its security objectives
pmtips.net/blog-new/difference-projects-
programmes
61
What Is An Information Security Program ?
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2708617/information-security-program-management-key
62
What Is An Information Security Program ?
8. Communications 9. Incident
1. Policy
security management
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) REQUIREMENTS
2. Management
7. Operations 10. Business
commitment &
security continuity
performance review
AND CONTROLS
6. Physical &
3. Risk management 11. Compliance
environmental
63
What Is An Information Security Program ?
4 Layer Security
Transformation Model
4. Security
Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2. Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
64
What Is An Information Security Program ?
• 4-layer security
transformation model
may be implemented as
an ideal security
program
• After establishing a
basic policy, the
sequence of the
program (steps 1
through 4) is paramount
in order to achieve
constructive results
65
Role of People, Process, and Tech In InfoSec
• People, process, and
Module 12 technology are together
referred to as the
Information Security
Triad
• All three aspects help to
form a holistic view of
Information Security
• All three are important
and cannot be
overlooked in an
Information Security
program or activity
66
Role of People, Process, and Tech In InfoSec
• People:
– People must be
trained to effectively
& correctly follow
policies, information
security processes,
and implement
technology
– Social engineering
and phishing are
aspects that people
must be trained to
handle appropriately
67
Role of People, Process, and Tech In InfoSec
• Processes are
fundamental to effective
information security
– User access
management
– Backups
– Incident management
– Change management
– Vulnerability
management
– Risk management
68
Role of People, Process, and Tech In InfoSec
• Technology plays a
central role in the
Information Security
program:
– Firewalls
– Antivirus
– Email anti-spam
filtering solution
– Web filtering solution
– Data loss prevention
(DLP) solution
69
Role of People, Process, and Tech In InfoSec
https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/tech-203.pdf
70
Role Of An Information Security Manager
71
Role Of An Information Security Manager
• The Information Security
Manager develops a
policy to regulate the
Information Security
program which is signed
off by senior
management
• Assigned resources and
authority to plan, assess,
implement, monitor, test,
and accredit the
Information Security
activities
72
Role Of An Information Security Manager
http://www.shortinfosec.net/2009/11/role-of-information-security-manager.html
73
Role Of An Information Security Manager
76
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
77
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
78
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
• Awareness:
– Awareness is not
training
– Purpose of
awareness is simply
to focus attention on
security
– Change behavior or
reinforce good
security practices
REF: NIST SP800-50, PAGE 8
79
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
• Training:
– “Strives to produce
relevant and needed
security skills and
competencies”
– Seeks to teach skills
– E.g. IT Security course
for system
administrators
covering all security
aspects
REF: NIST SP800-50, PAGE 9
80
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
• Education:
– Integrates all of the
skills and
competencies into a
common body of
knowledge
– E.g. a degree
program
81
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
NIST-SP-800-50
IMPLEMENTATION STEPS
82
What Is Information Security Awareness ?
• Don’ts:
– Share your password
– Click on suspicious
email links
– Install unlicensed
software on your PC
• Do’s:
– Logout when getting
up from your system
– Report security
incidents
83
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
Module 15 • A standard or
framework is a blueprint
or roadmap for
achieving Information
Security objectives
• Examples are
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS),
PCI DSS, & COBIT
84
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
• ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
– Specifies the
requirements for
establishing,
implementing,
maintaining and
continually improving
an information
security management
system
– Ten short clauses
– Long annex
85
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
86
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
TOTAL: 113
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
87
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
• PCI DSS:
– SSC is an
independent body
that was created by
the major payment
card brands (Visa,
MasterCard,
American Express,
Discover and JCB
– 6 Broad goals and 12
requirements
REF: PCI Best Practices For Implementing Security Awareness
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/
89
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf
90
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf
91
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
• COBIT:
– ISACA framework for
IT Governance
– COBIT 5 helps
enterprises to create
optimal value from IT
by maintaining a
balance between
realising benefits and
optimising risk levels
and resource use
(ISACA)
92
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
93
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
94
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
95
Leading Security Standards & Frameworks
• A standard or
framework is a blueprint
or roadmap for
achieving Information
Security objectives
• Examples are
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS),
PCI DSS, & COBIT
96
What Is Information Security Risk ?
• A process aimed at
achieving an optimal
balance between
realizing opportunities
for gain and minimizing
vulnerabilities and loss
• Usually accomplished by
ensuring that impact of
threats exploiting
vulnerabilities is within
acceptable limits at an
acceptable cost
REF: ISACA CISM MANUAL
98
What Is Information Security Risk ?
100
What Is Information Security Risk ?
• Risk Assessment:
– Foundation for
effective risk
management
– Solid understanding
of the risk universe
– Nature and extent of
risk to IT resources
and potential impact
on organizations
activities
REF: ISACA CISM MANUAL
101
What Is Information Security Risk ?
102
What Is Information Security Risk ?
1.
Requirements
3. Remediation
6. Accredit
Plan
4. Implement
5. Test/Validate
Controls
105
Information Security Lifecycle
• Step 1: Requirements
– Established by policy,
or security program
– Could also be driven
by security
transformation
program
– Establish security
exposure, determine
risk and priority
106
Information Security Lifecycle
107
Information Security Lifecycle
• Step 3: Remediation
Plan
– Methodology &
framework
– Controls
– Resources
– Approvals and
communication
– Timeline
– Project monitoring
and review
– Develop SOP 108
Information Security Lifecycle
• Step 4: Implement
Controls
– Pilot
– Test/validate in pilot
– Change management
– Implement in
production/live
environment
– Roll-back if
unexpected response
– Maintain SOP
109
Information Security Lifecycle
• Step 5: Test/Validate
– Security team or
independent review
of correctness and
coverage of security
control
implementation
– Ensure SOP/checklist
developed and
followed
110
Information Security Lifecycle
• Step 6: Security
Accreditation
– Review process has
been followed
(change
management, SOP,
sign-offs)
– Establish monitoring
mechanism
– Awareness training
– Issue formal
accreditation
111
Information Security Lifecycle
112
Management Commitment
• ISO2700:2013 (ISMS)
Clause 5.1:
a) Policy and objectives
are established
(compatible with
strategic direction)
b) Integration of ISMS
reqmts into processes
c) Resources
d) Communicating
importance
114
Management Commitment
• ISO2700:2013 (ISMS)
Clause 5.1:
e) Intended outcomes are
achieved
f) Directing and
supporting persons
g) Promoting continual
improvement
h) Supporting other
management roles
115
Management Commitment
• In practice:
– Security policy
– Security responsibility
delegated to head
(CISO) or dept
– Security steering
committee (board
level)
– Quarterly or frequent
management reviews
of information
security program
117
Information Security Responsibility
118
Information Security Responsibility
• Security is everyone’s
responsibility:
– Management
commitment & tone
at the top
– Security awareness
campaigns/program
– A strong and
effective security
program
– Allocation of
sufficient resources
119
Information Security Responsibility
Information Security
Management Committee (ISMC)
[WEEKLY]
121
Information Security Responsibility
• Security is everyone’s
responsibility and has to
gradually take its place
in org culture
122
Cyber Security Breaches
124
Cyber Security Breaches
125
Cyber Security Breaches
126
Cyber Security Breaches
127
Cyber Security Breaches
128
Cyber Security Breaches
129
Cyber Security Breaches
130
Cyber Security Breaches
131
Cyber Security Breaches
132
Cyber Security Breaches
133
Challenges Of InfoSec Implementation
InfoSec
Audit
IT Compliance
Risk
135
Challenges Of InfoSec Implementation
• Challenges Of InfoSec:
– Silos & lack of
coherent ownership
– Lot of time & energy
wasted in traversing
dept boundaries
– Enabling
environment for
tough security work
missing
– Security hardening
glaringly absent
136
Challenges Of InfoSec Implementation
• Pakistan Industry
Security Characteristics:
– Wavering
management
commitment
– Superficial “dressing”
security
– Reactive to regulator
audit/compliance
mandate
– Industry in denial
137
Challenges Of InfoSec Implementation
InfoSec
Transformation Model 4. Security
Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2. Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
138
Challenges Of InfoSec Implementation
• Challenges Of InfoSec
139
Role Of A Regulator
• A cybersecurity
regulation comprises
directives that
safeguard information
technology and comput
er systems with the
purpose of forcing
companies and
organizations to protect
their systems and
information from cyber-
attacks (Wikipedia)
141
Role Of A Regulator
• Industry regulators
including banking
regulators have taken
notice of the risk from
cybersecurity and have
either begun or are
planning to begin to
include cybersecurity as
an aspect of regulatory
examinations
(Wikipedia)
142
Role Of A Regulator
• Role Of Regulator In
Cyber Security:
– Regulations,
guidelines, and audit
– Engagement of key
stakeholders
– Technical and
industry expertise
– Regional and
international
cooperation
143
Role Of A Regulator
144
Role Of A Regulator
• Singapore:
– Cyber Security
Agency (2015);
strategy, education,
outreach, eco-system
development
– National Cyber
Security Master Plan
2018 (created 2013)
– Cyber Security
Strategy (created
2016)
145
Role Of A Regulator
• Pakistan; Ministry of IT
(MOIT):
– National IT Policy
2016 (draft)
– Digital Pakistan
Policy 2017
146
Role Of A Regulator
147
Role Of A Regulator
• Pakistan lacks:
– National cyber
security strategy
– National cyber
security master plan
– National cyber
security agency
– National certification
& accreditation body
– National Computer
Emergency Response
Team (CERT)
148
Status Of InfoSec in Pakistan
152
Status Of InfoSec in Pakistan
• Pakistan needs:
– Necessary measures
by the Government in
line with what
Malaysia, Oman have
done for cyber
security
– Development of the
security eco-system
as an enabler in order
to drive strong
security posture
154
Solution For InfoSec Improvement (PK)
155
Solution For InfoSec Improvement (PK)
4. Security
Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2. Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
156
Solution For InfoSec Improvement (PK)
1. Security Hardening;
Security controls on IT
assets & process
2. Vulnerability
Management; patching
3. Security Engineering;
More complex security
design & solutions
4. Security Governance;
Managing the
information security
program
157
Solution For InfoSec Improvement (PK)
Module 24 • Chapter 2:
– Typical Enterprise IT
Architecture &
Security Overlay
160
Typical Enterprise IT Network
161
Typical Enterprise IT Network
162
Typical Enterprise IT Network
• Edge router
• NGN FW
• DMZ:
– Web security
GW/Proxy
– Application security
FW
– Web server
– Email antispam GW
• IPS & N-DLP
• Distribution switch
163
Typical Enterprise IT Network
166
Major Components: Enterprise IT Network
• DMZ:
– Security zone with
placement of
published web server,
web & email security
GWs, app security GW
• IPS:
– Intrusion prevention
(signature based)
– May be feature in
NGN-FW
167
Major Components: Enterprise IT Network
• Distribution switch
– Connectivity to
access switches,
external exit point
(WAN), and DC
switch
• Data center switch & FW
– Data center filtering
(malware & access-
lists)
168
Major Components: Enterprise IT Network
• Access switch
– User connectivity
– Switchport security &
access switch security
• NAC
– Network admission
control (IEEE802.1X)
• SIEM
– Logging & dashboard
for events, root cause
analysis, event
correlation 169
Major Components: Enterprise IT Network
• Vulnerability Manager
– Vulnerability scanning
and asset tracking
• System AV
– Signature based
malware prevention
• Server HIPS
– IPS features for
servers, also file
integrity checking
170
Major Components: Enterprise IT Network
• UTM
– Multi-featured NGN
FW device
• Mobile device – MDM
– Security features for
mobile devices
171
OSI Security Architecture
• Security service is a
service that ensures
adequate security of the
system or data transfer
– Authentication
– Access control
– Data confidentiality
– Data integrity
– Non-repudiation
– Availability
https://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk/~alexei/COMP522_10/COMP52
2-SecurityArchitecture_07.pdf
174
OSI Security Architecture
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/ftp/l_01ov.pdf
175
OSI Security Architecture
• Security mechanism:
– Feature designed to
detect, prevent, or
recover from a
security attack
– Cryptography
underlies many of the
mechanisms
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/ftp/l_01ov.pdf
176
OSI Security Architecture
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/ftp/l_01ov.pdf
177
OSI Security Architecture
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-11/ftp/l_01ov.pdf
178
OSI Security Architecture
179
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
180
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
Cloud
Changing
IOT Face Of Mobile
IT
Social
181
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
https://www.mcafee.com/us/re
sources/reports/rp-threats-
predictions-2016.pdf
182
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
reports/rp-threats-predictions-2016.pdf
183
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
reports/rp-threats-predictions-2016.pdf
184
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/
reports/rp-threats-predictions-2016.pdf
185
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
186
New IT Frontiers: Cloud, Mobile, Social, IOT
• Useful URLs:
– https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project
– https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Proje
ct
– https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/assets/research/security-
guidance/csaguide.v3.0.pdf
– https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/mobile/Mobile
_Guidance_v1.pdf
– https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/assets/research/mobile/
MAST_White_Paper.pdf
– https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/whitepapers/Security_Gu
idance_for_Early_Adopters_of_the_Internet_of_Things.pdf
– https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/assets/research/internet-
of-things/connected-vehicle-security.pdf
187
Virtualization Environment Security
188
Virtualization Environment Security
1. VM Sprawl
2. Sensitive data within
VM
3. Security of offline and
dormant VMs
4. Security of Pre-
configured (Golden
Image) VMs
5. Lack of visibility into
virtual networks
189
Virtualization Environment Security
192
Virtualization Environment Security
193
Virtualization Environment Security
Module 29 • Organizational
characteristics:
– Location: Karachi
– 70 total staff
– 10 IT staff
– 8 servers
– 1 main DC, no DR site
– IT service oriented
business delivered to
banks, telcos,
enterprises
195
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• Organizational culture:
– Small IT oriented
profitable business
– Mostly chaotic
culture with no
defined or
documented
processes
– Organization lacks
discipline (execution)
– Quality of resources:
average
196
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• IT setup:
– Windows 2010/2012,
Linux server OS
– ASP.net 4.x, PHP
applications (total 10)
– Windows 8/10
desktops (50+)
– 1 Cisco ASA FW in DC
– No DR site or offsite
backup
– Free AV, no AD, no
licenses 197
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• Security posture:
– Completely absent
– No hardening done
– No vulnerability
management
– No security
management or
governance
– No policy or staff
dedicated for
– No management
commitment (prior)198
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• Security requirement:
– Customers are banks
and telcos
– Desired
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
certification for
customer RFPs
199
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• Driving change ?
– Executive
management facing
security questions
from top clients
– COO approaches
security consulting
company for pen-
testing
– Consultant advises
project for security
transformation
200
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• Security transformation
project:
– Project initiation: 2
Mths
– Layer 1: security
hardening of IT assets
(6 Mths)
– Layer 2: VM (1 Mth)
– Layer 3: security
engineering (1 Mth)
– Layer 4: Governance
& ISO cert.(3 Mths)
201
Case Study – Enterprise Network (Small Org)
• Conclusion:
– Absence of a process
oriented, organized
culture makes it
difficult for security
implementation
– Adhoc culture is
difficult to transform
– Executive
management support
and commitment was
the success factor
202
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
Module 30 • Organizational
characteristics:
– Location: Lahore
– 350 total staff
(group)
– 15+ IT staff
– 25 servers
– 1 main DC, 1 DR site, 1
backup site
– IT service business in
media industry
203
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• Organizational culture:
– Medium sized,
profitable IT business
– Good internal culture
(several employees
with org since 10 yrs)
– Organization lacks
processes
– Teams have
execution discipline
– Senior resources are
experienced
204
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• IT setup:
– Windows 2010/2012,
Linux server OS
– Oracle & MS-SQL
databases
– ASP.net 4.x
applications (total 15)
– Windows 8/10
desktops (300+)
– 1 Cisco ASA FW in DC;
MicroTik routers as
edge routers
205
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• IT setup (contd):
– Asterisk voice server
for call center (10
seats, 6-8 lines)
– 1 DR site (offshore)
and 1 backup site (PK)
– Panda AV, AD,
unlicensed windows
– Mdaemon for email
server, migrating to
MS Exchange
206
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• Security posture:
– Completely absent
– No hardening done
– No vulnerability
management
– No security
management or
governance
– No policy or staff
dedicated for security
– No management
commitment (prior)207
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• Security requirement:
– Security incident;
competitive data
leakage to third-party
by internal employee
– License renewal due
by regulator;
demonstration of
security commitment
imperative
208
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• Driving change ?
– Executive
management
concerned about
information security
& security culture
– CEO approaches
security consulting
company
– Consultant advises
project for security
transformation
209
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• Security transformation
project:
– Project initiation: 15
days
– Layer 1: security
hardening of IT assets
(3 Mths)
– Layer 2: VM (1 Mth)
– Layer 3: security
engineering (4 Mths)
– Layer 4: Governance
& ISO cert.(3 Mths)
210
Case Study – Enterprise (Medium Org)
• Conclusion:
– Senior resources in
the organization
were committed
– Demonstration of
security commitment
was essential for
organizations survival
– ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
serves as credible
credential for
customers/regulator
211
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
Module 31 • Organizational
characteristics:
– Location: Karachi
– 10,000+ total staff
– 150 IT staff
– 200 servers
– 1 main DC, 1 DR site
– Energy & distribution
sector
212
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• Organizational culture:
– Large sized privatized
org
– Strong internal
culture
– Organization lacks
process culture
– Teams have high
execution discipline
– Good quality &
qualification of IT
resources
213
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• IT setup:
– Windows 2010/2012,
Linux, AIX OS
– Oracle & MS-SQL
databases
– Over 100 internal
applications
(Sharepoint, GIS,
ASP.net)
– Windows 7/8/10
desktops (5500+)
214
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• IT setup (contd):
– Asterisk voice server
for voice
communication
– 1 DR site (hosted)
– Licensed AV, AD, &
windows
– Complete SAP ERP
suite & internal
development
215
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• Security posture:
– Superficial
– No hardening done
– Weak vulnerability
management
– Poor security
management/
governance
– Security team exists
– No management
commitment (prior)
216
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• Security requirement:
– Security incident;
servers hacked
causing financial loss
217
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• Driving change ?
– Executive
management
concerned about
information security
& security culture
– Board drives IT to hire
consultant
– Consultant convinces
IT to go for security
transformation
218
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• Security transformation
project:
– Project initiation: 15
days
– Layer 1: security
hardening of IT assets
(6 Mths)
– Layer 2: VM (1 Mth)
– Layer 3: security
engineering (1 Mths)
– Layer 4: Governance
& ISO cert.(5 Mths)
219
Case Study – Enterprise (Large Org)
• Conclusion:
– Strong commitment
of the Board & IT
Director drove the
implementation of
the security
transformation
project
– ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
achieved as a security
credential
220
Structure Of An IT Team
221
Structure Of An IT Team
GENERAL STRUCTURE
CIO
Executive Asst.
GM Networks Procurement/
GM IT GM Software GM PMU/
& GM IT Services IT Security
Operations Development Business Tech Finance
Infrastructure
222
Structure Of An IT Team
JOB FUNCTIONS
CIO
Executive Asst.
GM Networks IT Procurement/
GM IT GM Software GM PMU/
& GM IT Services IT Security
Operations Development Business Tech Finance
Infrastructure
223
Structure Of An IT Team
ADDITIONAL TASKS
CIO
Executive Asst.
GM Networks IT Procurement/
GM IT GM Software GM PMU/
& GM IT Services IT Security
Operations Development Business Tech Finance
Infrastructure
224
Structure Of An IT Team
LARGE ORG
(150 IT Staff)
CIO
Executive Asst.
GM Networks IT Procurement/
GM IT GM Software GM PMU/
& GM IT Services IT Security
Operations Development Business Tech Finance
Infrastructure
225
Structure Of An IT Team
MEDIUM ORG
(15-20 IT Staff) Head Of IT
Head Of
Head Of Applications Head Of IT Support
IT Infrastructure
226
Structure Of An IT Team
SMALL ORG
COO
(7-8 IT Staff)
Head Of
IT Infrastructure & Head Of Applications
Support
All IT Infrastructure,
Software Acquisition
Servers, Data Center,
& Dev., Databases
IT Helpdesk & Support
227
Structure Of An IT Team
Module 33 • IT is a challenging
domain which requires
skill, experience,
structure, and spending
to run efficiently
• Business is making steep
demands on IT for agile
delivery of applications
in order to keep up with
competition
• Running IT requires a
diverse skillset
229
Objectives, Performance KPIs, Priorities Of IT
• Performance KPIs:
– Minimal network
disruption
– Timely completion of
new projects
– Quick and efficient
changes to existing
applications (change-
requests) to meet
business
requirements
231
Objectives, Performance KPIs, Priorities Of IT
• Priorities of IT:
– To meet the
performance KPIs
– To meet adhoc and
unplanned business
requirements
• General IT teams
performance in Banking:
– Extremely large
number of
applications
(hundreds) & legacy
– Heavy-weight
business teams and IT
seen as a cost-center
– Technologists
generally poor at
banking (business)
233
Objectives, Performance KPIs, Priorities Of IT
• General IT teams
performance in Telcos:
– More professional
and qualified
workforce
– Most telco have been
setup in the last 10
years so have clean
greenfield networks
(no legacy)
– Fewer applications; IT
supports business
234
Objectives, Performance KPIs, Priorities Of IT
• General IT teams
performance in
Enterprise:
– Competence and
professionalism of IT
teams matches
culture of
organization
– IT efficiency driven by
top management
commitment and
interest
235
Objectives, Performance KPIs, Priorities Of IT
• Security posture:
– Surprisingly in 95% of
all orgs in Pakistan
(all types and sizes),
security posture has
been found to be
deficient
– Lack of awareness in
the country has
contributed to this
deficient and poor
security posture
236
IT Team Interaction With Other Stakeholders
Module 34 • IT budget/projects
approved by IT Steering
Committee (annual)
• Business requirements &
new projects
• Audit & compliance
requirements
• Expansion (branches) &
maintenance
• IT support for
computing (helpdesk)
• Business continuity & DR
237
IT Team Interaction With Other Stakeholders
• IT budget/projects
approved by IT Steering
Committee (annual):
– Capex and opex
layout
– Includes new projects
& licensing /
maintenance of
operations
– New hirings
238
IT Team Interaction With Other Stakeholders
240
IT Team Interaction With Other Stakeholders
• IT support for
computing (helpdesk):
– New software and
versions rollout (e.g.
migration of AV or
email program)
– IT support for
business functions
(application not
working, speed slow,
etc)
– Software bugs
242
IT Team Interaction With Other Stakeholders
244
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 1)
WEBSITE
HACKING App FW DMZ FW
& DEFACEMENT
DATA LEAKAGE
SPAM, SPEAR-
Email Antispam
PHISHINGGW IPS
ATTACKS N-DLP
WAN/Extranet
& DR Switch
Access
Switch
SIEM
NAC DC Switch/FW
INFECTED SYSTEM NON-COMPLIANT INFECTED SERVER DATA THEFT,
SYSTEM UNAUTHORIZED
ACCESS
MALICIOUS
USER VM NMS
245
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 1)
246
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 1)
248
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 1)
249
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
250
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
251
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
252
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
253
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
254
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
255
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
256
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
257
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
258
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
259
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 2)
260
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 3)
261
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 3)
262
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 3)
1. Block unauthorized
traffic at edge (direct
public www traffic to
DMZ web server)
2. Edge malware
protection & DMZ
3. Web & email are
important vectors to
secure against malware
and attacks
4. NGN-FW (may be found
in a UTM as well)
263
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 3)
267
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 3)
268
Security Overlay Of Enterprise (Part 3)
269
High Availability (HA)
https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/
what-is-high-availability
270
High Availability (HA)
• High availability is a
strategy
• Fault tolerance refers to
a system designed in
such a way that when
one component fails, a
backup component
takes over operations
immediately to avoid
loss of service
271
High Availability (HA)
https://jazz.net/wiki/bin/view/Deployment/HighAvailability
272
High Availability (HA)
• High availability is
designed in the
following manner:
– System level (data
center or service)
– Device level (within
single device)
– Device level
(combination of
multiple redundant
devices)
– Alternate site level
273
High Availability (HA)
275
High Availability Design
ACTIVE-STANDBY SERVER CONFIGURATION
https://www.getfilecloud.com/blog/2015/12/architectural-patterns-for-high-availability/#.WVeex4SGPIU
276
High Availability Design
ACTIVE-ACTIVE SERVER CONFIGURATION
https://www.getfilecloud.com/blog/2015/12/architectural-patterns-for-high-availability/#.WVeex4SGPIU
277
High Availability Design
N+1 UPS REDUNDANT CONFIGURATION
https://www.getfilecloud.com/blog/2015/12/architectural-patterns-for-high-availability/#.WVeex4SGPIU
278
High Availability Design
ACTIVE-STANDBY SUN SERVER CLUSTER
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19693-01/819-0992/6n3cn7p3n/index.html
279
High Availability Design
NETWORK REDUNDANT CONFIGURATION
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/solutions/Enterprise/Campus/HA_campus_DG/hacampusdg.html
280
High Availability Design
DATA CENTER REDUNDANT CONFIGURATION
https://www.getfilecloud.com/blog/2015/12/architectural-patterns-for-high-availability/#.WVeex4SGPIU
281
High Availability Design
282
Site Redundancy
283
Site Redundancy
http://www.seguetech.com/three-stages-disaster-recovery-sites/
285
Site Redundancy
DR SITE
PRIMARY SITE
SECONDARY SITE
287
Site Redundancy
• RTO:
– Max amount of time,
following a disaster,
for an organization to
recover files from
backup storage and
resume normal
operations (max
amount of downtime
an organization can
handle)
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.com/definition/disaster-
recovery
288
Site Redundancy
• RPO:
– Max age of files that
an organization must
recover from
backup storage for
normal operations to
resume after a
disaster (minimum
frequency
of backups)
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.com/definition/disaster-
recovery
289
Site Redundancy
• Example:
– If an organization has
an RTO of two hours,
it cannot be down for
longer than that.
– if an organization has
an RPO of four hours,
the system must back
up at least every four
hours.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.com/definition/disaster-
recovery
290
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
291
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
DR SITE
PRIMARY SITE
SECONDARY SITE
292
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
• IT setup:
– Oracle ERP system
– Sharepoint portal for
workflow automation
– Head office in Karachi
– Primary DC in Karachi
(hosted with 3rd
party)
– DR site in Lahore
(hosted with 3rd
party)
– Secondary DC in ISB293
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
• Primary DC:
– Fully redundant (HA)
design for network,
systems, and storage
– Cisco HA (active-
standby)
– Oracle cluster
technology for
servers and DBs
(active-active)
294
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
• Secondary DC (ISB):
– All network, systems,
and storage backups
maintained here
(also mirrored in DR)
– Regional servers (AD,
file servers, etc)
– Test & staging
environment here
(segregated from
main DC)
– Office working space
295
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
• DR site
– Bare minimum HA (as
DR site) for network,
systems, and storage
– Mirror of all backups
from secondary site
maintained here
– Office working space
– Some additional
computing capacity
(minimum for
unforeseen events)
296
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
• DR site
– All critical systems
and devices
maintained in active
mode (hot) for
immediate DR
failover
– Data maintained as
per org RTO/RPO for
immediate utility
– Monthly DR
testing/drill
297
High Availability & Redundancy Case Study
• Backup strategy:
– Primary backup at
secondary DR site
– Mirror at DR site
– For critical systems:
monthly full backup,
daily incremental
backup
– For critical network
devices: weekly full
backup; backups
based on change
298
Backup Strategies
• What to backup ?
– Network
configuration files
– OS backups
– Database &
application data
– Other critical data
300
Backup Strategies
• Backup location ?
– Onsite for faster
recovery
– Offsite for DR
purposes
– Intermediate site
(secondary site) as a
middle-ground
301
Backup Strategies
• Backup frequency ?
– Depends entirely on
criticality of data,
nature of the
information being
backed up (how
frequently does info
change ?), storage
space available, and
overall backup plan
302
Backup Strategies
303
Backup Strategies
310
Security Tools Used In An Enterprise
311
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
312
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Endpoint
Protection
Jan, 2017
Gartner
Trend Micro
Sophos
Kaspersky
Symantec
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3SCOKCW&ct=170131&st=sb
313
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Secure Web
GW
June, 2017
Gartner
Symantec
Zscaler
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3SCOKCW&ct=170131&st=sb
314
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
UTM
(SMB Multi-function
FW)
June, 2017
Gartner
Fortinet
Checkpoint
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3SCOKCW&ct=170131&st=sb
315
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Enterprise
Network FWs
May 2016
Gartner
Palo Alto
Networks
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3805JH8&ct=160525&st=sb
316
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
SIEM
AUGUST 2016
GARTNER
IBM
Splunk
LogRhythm
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-2JNR3RU&ct=150720&st=sb
317
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
DLP
FEB 2017
GARTNER
-Symantec
-Digital
Guardian
-Forcepoint
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3UKD88K&ct=170301&st=sb
318
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
APPLICATION
SECURITY
TESTING
FEB 2017
GARTNER
HPE
Veracode
IBM
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3UKD88K&ct=170301&st=sb
319
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
320
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 2)
321
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 2)
NGFW
NSS Labs
2016
Hillstone
Huawei
Fortinet
https://www.fortinet.com/content/dam/fortinet/assets/analyst-reports/Brochure-NSS-Lab-Independent-Validation.pdf
322
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Enterprise
Mobility
Management
(EMM)
June 2017
VMWARE
MobileIron
IBM
Blackberry
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-42A6Q84&ct=170607&st=sb
323
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
DC Backup
& Recovery
June 2016
Commvault
IBM
EMC
Veritas
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-38JSYOW&ct=160602&st=sb
324
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Identity,
Governance
Feb 2017
Sailpoint
Oracle
CA
IBM
https://www.sailpoint.com/identity-governance-leader-gartner-magic-quadrant/
325
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Network Perf
Monitoring
& Diagnostics
Feb 2017
NetScout
Viavi
Riverbed
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3TYUQFH&ct=170221&st=sb
326
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 1)
Web App FW
July 2016
Imperva
https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-3TYUQFH&ct=170221&st=sb
327
Security Tools – Typical Enterprise (Part 2)
• Gartner
• Forrestor
• NSS labs
• ICSA Labs
END
328
What Does “Box Security” Mean ?
329
What Does “Box Security” Mean ?
• Box for :
– Email security
– Web security
– FW
– IPS
– APT attack
prevention
– DDOS prevention
– Network DLP
– Network Forensics
– Others
330
What Does “Box Security” Mean ?
• Security is a
combination of people,
process, and technology
• Industry observation:
most of the devices are
not used to full
capability or capacity
after purchase
• Case in point: SIEM
solution or DB security
solution
331
What Does “Box Security” Mean ?
333
What Does “Box Security” Mean ?
1. Security
requirement study
8. Ongoing operations,
change mngmt, audits 2. Solution research
5. Installation &
Commissioning +
Training
334
What Does “Box Security” Mean ?
4. Security
Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2.
Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
337
Best Approach: IT Enterprise Security ?
1. Security hardening:
address security
configuration of all IT
assets which security
“boxes” won’t do for
you
2. Vulnerability
management: scanning
to inspect patching of
IT assets (essential)
3. Security engineering
4. Security governance
338
Best Approach: IT Enterprise Security ?
3. Security engineering:
this is where more
serious investments
may be made once
layers 1 & 2 have been
completed
satisfactorily (or are
being addressed)
339
Best Approach: IT Enterprise Security ?
4. Security governance:
ensure the proper
utilization (as
intended), ROI, and
audits of purchased
devices & solutions
340
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
• What is disaster
recovery (DR) ?
– DR is an area of
security that allows
an organization to
maintain or quickly
resume mission-
critical (IT) functions
following a disaster
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarge
t.com/ definition/disaster-recovery
342
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
343
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
http://grcbizassurance.com/services/disaster-recovery/
345
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
346
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
• What is a DR plan ?
– A documented,
structured approach
to dealing with
unplanned incidents
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techt
arget.com/definition/disaster-
recovery-plan
347
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
• DR plan checklist:
– Scope of the activity
– Gathering relevant
network
infrastructure
documents
– Identifying the most
serious threats and
vulnerabilities, and
the most critical
assets
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.co
m/definition/disaster-recovery-plan
348
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
– Identifying current
DR strategies
– Identifying
emergency response
team
– Management review
& approval of DR plan
– Testing the plan (drill)
– Updating the plan
– Implementing a DR
plan audit
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.co
m/definition/disaster-recovery-plan
349
What Is Disaster Recovery (DR) ?
• Sample DR plan
template:
– http://www.it.miami.
edu/_assets/pdf/secur
ity/ITPol_A135-
Disaster%20Recovery
%20Plan%20Example%
202.pdf
350
What is Business Continuity (BC) ?
352
What is Business Continuity (BC) ?
• What is business
continuity management?
– …framework for
building org resilience
with an effective
response that
safeguards interests
of key stakeholders,
reputation, brand and
value-creating
activities. (Source: ISO
22301:2012)
http://www.thebci.org/index.php/resourc
es/what-is-business-continuity
353
What is Business Continuity (BC) ?
http://www.thebci.org/index.php/resources/what-is-business-continuity
354
What is Business Continuity (BC) ?
• What is a BC plan ?
– A document that
consists of critical
information an
organization needs to
continue operating
during an unplanned
event
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget
.com/definition/business-continuity-
action-plan
355
What is Business Continuity (BC) ?
• What is a BC plan ?
– The BCP should state
essential functions of
the business, identify
which systems and
processes must be
sustained, & detail
how to maintain
them. It should take
into account any
possible business
disruption
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.com/definition/busine
ss-continuity-action-plan
356
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
Module 50 • DR considerations:
– DR plan
– RTO & RPO
357
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• DR plan:
– A disaster recovery
policy statement,
plan overview and
main goals of the
plan
– Key personnel and
DR team contact
information
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarg
et.com/definition/disaster-recovery
358
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• DR plan (contd)…:
– Description of
emergency response
actions immediately
following an incident.
– A diagram of the
entire network and
recovery site.
– Directions for how to
reach the recovery
site.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarg
et.com/definition/disaster-recovery
359
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• DR plan (contd)…:
– A list of software and
systems that will be
used in the recovery.
– Sample templates for
a variety of
technology
recoveries, including
technical
documentation from
vendors.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarg
et.com/definition/disaster-recovery
360
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• DR plan (contd)…:
– Summary of
insurance coverage.
– Proposed actions for
dealing with financial
and legal issues.
– Ready-to-use forms
to help complete the
plan.
361
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
http://grcbizassurance.com/services/disaster-recovery/
362
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• RTO:
– Max amount of time,
following a disaster,
for an org to recover
files from backup
storage and resume
normal operations;
max amount of
downtime an org can
handle.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarg
et.com/definition/disaster-recovery
363
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• RTO:
– If an organization has
an RTO of two hours,
it cannot be down for
longer than that
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarg
et.com/definition/disaster-recovery
364
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• RPO:
– RPO is the max age of
files that an
organization must
recover from
backup storage for
normal operations to
resume after a
disaster; determines
the minimum
frequency of backups.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.
com/definition/disaster-recovery
365
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 1
• RPO:
– For example, if an
organization has an
RPO of four hours,
the system must back
up at least every four
hours
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.
com/definition/disaster-recovery
366
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
Module 51 • DR considerations:
– DR facility
– DR drills & testing
– DR testing checklist
– BC plan alignment
367
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
• DR facility:
– Location
– Media circuits and
backup circuits
– Power and
environment
– IT data center design
– Based on DR plan
– Operations &
maintenance
368
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
369
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
• DR testing checklist:
– Secure management
approval and funding
for the test.
– Provide detailed
information about
the test.
– Make sure the entire
test team is available
on the planned test
date.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.
com/definition/disaster-recovery
370
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
• DR testing checklist …:
– Ensure your test does
not conflict with
other scheduled tests
or activities.
– Confirm test scripts
are correct.
– Verify that the test
environment is ready.
– Schedule a dry run of
the test.
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.
com/definition/disaster-recovery
371
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
• DR testing checklist…:
– Be ready to halt the
test if needed.
– Have a scribe take
notes.
– Complete an after-
action report about
what worked and
what failed.
– Use the test results
to update DR plan
http://searchdisasterrecovery.techtarget.
com/definition/disaster-recovery
372
DR In Enterprise Architecture – Part 2
• BC plan alignment:
– DR is under IT
ownership, whereas
BC is under business
operations ownership
– DR is part of overall
BC
– Both plans must
integrate and align
seamlessly
373
Role Of An IT Asset In Enterprise Security
374
Role Of An IT Asset In Enterprise Security
1. Planning
7. Retirement
2. Procurement
& Disposal
IT ASSET LIFECYCLE
6. Support &
3. Installation
Maintain
5. Acceptance 4. Secure
375
Role Of An IT Asset In Enterprise Security
1. PLANNING 2. PROCUREMENT 3. INSTALLATION
- Requirements - RFP - Site Preparation
- Owner & Risk Owner - Vendor Selection - Delivery
- High Level Design - PO - Configuration
- Budget Approvals - Contract & SLA - Testing
- Project Planning - Kick-Off Meeting - Commissioning
4. SECURE 5. ACCEPTANCE 6. SUPPORT/MAINTAIN
- Security Controls - Test Scripts - Vendor Support
- Security Checklist - UAT - Maintenance/Repair
- Security SOP - Security Accreditation - Change Requests
- Security Testing - Commissioning Sign-off - Renewals & Upgrades
- Change Management - Regular Updates
7. RETIRE/DISPOSE - Monitoring & Audits
- Decommission
- Dispose/Salvage
- Update Inventory
376
Role Of An IT Asset In Enterprise Security
1. Planning
7. Retirement
2. Procurement
& Disposal
SECURITY DURING
ASSET LIFECYCLE
6. Support &
3. Installation
Maintain
5. Acceptance 4. Secure
377
Role Of An IT Asset In Enterprise Security
378
Role Of An IT Asset In Enterprise Security
379
How To Determine Security Posture ?
– Security hardening
done on IT assets ?
– Which standard used
for hardening ?
– Internal VM program
?
– Frequency of VM
scanning ?
– Licensed software for
OS/DB/Programs ?
381
Case Study: Typical Security Posture
– Is internal software
developed ? (Secure -
SDLC)
– What is the
mechanism to take
backups of IT assets
and to test backups ?
– What is the maturity
of access control for
users, admins
– Regular audits for
access control ?
383
Case Study: Typical Security Posture
384
Case Study: Typical Security Posture
– What is the
mechanism to
perform security
accreditation of new
applications or
systems ?
– Is security embedded
in critical business
processes ?
– Is there a business
continuity and DR
policy / mechanism ?
385
Case Study: Typical Security Posture
– Security standard or
framework followed
for governance ?
– Internal security
awareness program ?
– Maturity of change
management and
incident management
– Board Steering
Committee
(Information
Security)
386
Case Study: Typical Security Posture
• Note: the
implementers of the
security measures are
often not the ones
giving the best answers
• Auditors & compliance
team should also be
queried
• Important question:
have there been any
recent incidents ?
387
Driving Successful Security Transformation
389
Driving Successful Security Transformation
Infosec Head
Manager IT
Infra
(Win/SQL)
390
Driving Successful Security Transformation
INFORMATION
SECURITY
STAKEHOLDERS MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE
(ISMC)
IT
SECURITY STEERING
IT TEAMS
PROGRAM COMMITTE
E
BOARD/EXEC
UTIVE
391
Driving Successful Security Transformation
Security
Governance
Security
Engineering
Vulnerability
Management
Security
Hardening
392
Driving Successful Security Transformation
Board
[QTR]
InfoSec Steering
Comm.
[MONTHLY]
Information Security
Management Committee
(ISMC) [WEEKLY]
393
Driving Successful Security Transformation
1. Establish
Track
5. Continuous
2. MSB
Improvement
4. Implement
3. Pilot
Across IT
394
Driving Successful Security Transformation
Weekly ISMC
status
update
Monthly
status
update
Quarterly
IT STEERING COMM. status update
BOARD
395
Driving Successful Security Transformation
• Successful security
transformation projects
can be made successful
with correct
sponsorship, structure,
strategy, and strong
project management
396
Difference Between Patching & Hardening
Module 55 • Chapter 3
– Security
Transformation Stage
1: Security Hardening
Of IT Assets
397
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
4. Security
Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2.
Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
398
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
• Security hardening:
– IT assets such as
hardware and
software come with
default (insecure)
configurations which
become the basis for
attacks
– Typical case in point:
username and
password: “admin,
admin”
399
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
• Security hardening:
– Process of securing a
system by reducing
its surface of
vulnerability, which is
larger when a system
performs more
functions; in principle
a single-function
system is more
secure than a
multipurpose one
(Wikipedia) 400
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
• Patching: Fixing
vulnerabilities (which
may be exploited by
malware or attackers) in
software or firmware
with vendor released
patches (auto or manual
updates)
• Patches are also called
fixes
https://www.kenexis.com/patching-hardening-
cybersecurity/
401
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
• Patching considerations:
– Vendors release
patch when they
become aware of a
vulnerability
– Patches may be rolled
up into a release
– Off-the shelf
software works well
but testing reqd for
customized instances
https://www.kenexis.com/patching-hardening-
cybersecurity/
402
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
• Hardening: includes
additional steps beyond
patching to limit the
ways a hacker or
malware could gain
entry.
• Accomplished by turning
on only the ports and
services required, secure
configuration of services
& additional steps to
limit system access
https://www.kenexis.com/patching-hardening-
cybersecurity/
403
Revisit Of Security Transformation Model
406
Security Hardening Strategy
• Separate security
engineering (Step 3)
from security hardening
(step 1)
• Security engineering
requires more thorough
working so will slow
down the security
implementation
• Do the low hanging fruit
first (security hardening)
407
Security Hardening Strategy
• Minumum security
baseline (MSB) refers to
the obvious assets
which need to be
secured and the
threshold which is the
minimum expectation
from the security
program
408
Security Hardening Strategy
409
Security Hardening Strategy
TRACK 1: IT INFRASTRUCTURE
410
Security Hardening Strategy
411
Pre-requisites For Security Hardening
1. Security program
approved
– Project director
– Timeline
– General project
sequence and
strategy
– Understanding of
main players and
roles
– Understanding of
project structure
413
Pre-requisites For Security Hardening
2. Consultant on board
– Expert consultants
in security
transformation can
facilitate the project
success
– Third party &
independent
– Bring a focus on
delivering results
– Strong domain
knowledge
414
Pre-requisites For Security Hardening
3. Project kick-off
meeting held
– Project goals &
mission
– All key stakeholders
made aware of their
roles
– Responsibilities &
authority
– Success criteria &
reporting
mechanism
415
Pre-requisites For Security Hardening
416
Pre-requisites For Security Hardening
5. Appraisal linkage of
core resources
announced by CIO
– Broader team
– Announcement by
CIO
– Clarity on evaluation
mechanism
417
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
418
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
Security IT
IT Ops teams
team management
Consultant Business
419
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
• IT Operations teams:
– Study the security
controls (CIS/DISA)
– Apply the security
controls in pilot/test
environment
– Report the
completion of control
implementation to
ISMC
– Assist InfoSec team
with validation
420
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
• InfoSec team:
– Conduct validation of
security controls
implementation
– Acquire checklist of
controls from
relevant IT team
– Document the status
of controls in the
form of a checklist
– Forward validation
report to ISMC
421
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
• IT management:
– Ensure IT operations
teams receive
required guidance
and support
– Sign-off on change
management
requests
– Assist with planning
down-time and
business related
downtime
422
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
• Consultant or project
director:
– Drives the security
program
– Ensures that strategy
is aligned with project
objectives
– Ensures process and
activities are moving
at good momentum
as per timeline
423
Who Will Conduct The Security Hardening ?
• Business stakeholders:
– Provide downtime
approvals if required
– Help to engage other
vendors if applicable
424
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (1)
425
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (1)
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
426
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (1)
• Purpose:
– Many assets need to
be hardened at
various times, by
various teams, for
various requirements
and projects
– Standardize and
follow a consistent
approach
427
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (1)
• Benefits:
– Process for security
hardening
– Discipline to always
follow the same steps
– Helps avoid missing
any steps in the
process
– Gives team clarity on
what to do and what
sequence to follow
428
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (1)
HEAD OF DEPT
INFOSEC
ISMC TEAM LEAD IT OPS TEAM
TEAM
• DRIVES THE • MEMBER OF • TEAM THAT • REPORTS TO
PROGRAM ISMC WILL CISO OR
• DECISION • REPORTS TO IMPLEMENT INFOSEC
MAKING HEAD OF THE HEAD
• INCLUDES THE DEPT SECURITY • OR LED BY
ALL 3-4 CONTROLS CONSULTAN
DOMAIN T
TEAM LEADS
430
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (1)
STEP DESCRIPTION PERFORMED BY FACILITATED BY
1 IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS ISMC HEAD OF IT SECTION
(& ASSET OWNER)
2 RESEARCH APPLICABLE SECURITY INFOSEC TEAM ISMC
CONTROLS
3 CHECLIST OF APPLICABLE SECURITY INFOSEC TEAM TEAM LEAD
CONTROLS
4 DOCUMENT CONTROLS INTO SOP TEAM LEAD INFOSEC TEAM
END
432
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (2)
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
434
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (2)
• Step 2: Research on
applicable security
controls
– CIS, DISA
– Search on google
– Review
standards/framework
s (ISO27001, PCI, etc)
– Look at OWASP, CSA,
NIST, CIS Top 20
– Selection of controls
435
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (2)
• Step 3: Checklist of
applicable security
controls
– Checklist for
progress tracking
– Share with
appropriate IT team
– Forms record for
controls trail
436
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (2)
• Step 4: Document
controls into SOP
– Enter controls set
into draft SOP
– Who will do what
when, (and briefly
how)
– Get Dept Head
agreement and sign-
off on checklist and
END SOP
437
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (3)
438
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (3)
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
439
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (3)
• Step 6: Validation of
control implementation
(by InfoSec team)
– InfoSec resource with
relevant domain
knowledge
– Conduct preparation
before actual
validation (study
controls)
– Update checklist with
status column
440
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (3)
• Step 7: Change
management process
for PRODUCTION:
– ISMC receives
validation status from
InfoSec team
– Relevant dept head
takes up change
management process
and prepares for
shifting to PROD
– Rollback, impact etc
441
8 Step Methodology – Security Hardening (3)
• Step 8: Implement on
PROD & monitor:
– Monitor closely for
24-48 hours after
moving to PROD
– Rollback in case of
unforeseen
circumstances
– IT team SOP finalized
END
and now ops task
442
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
443
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
444
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
445
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
446
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
447
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
448
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
449
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
450
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
451
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
452
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
453
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
• Next
module…remaining
categories
END
454
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
455
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
456
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
457
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
458
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
459
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
460
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
461
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
462
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
463
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (2)
464
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (1)
• Next module…further
details
END
465
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
466
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
467
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
468
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
• Control content:
– Profile applicability
(ASA 8.X, ASA 9.X)
– Description
– Rationale
– Audit
– Remediation
– Default value
– References
469
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
470
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
471
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
472
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
473
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
474
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (3)
475
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
476
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
477
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
478
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
• Profile applicability:
– Level 1 domain
controller
– Level 1 member
server
– Level 2 domain
controller
– Level 2 member
server
479
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
480
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
• Control content:
– Profile applicability
(ASA 8.X, ASA 9.X)
– Description
– Rationale
– Audit
– Remediation
– Impact
– Default value
– References
482
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
483
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
485
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
486
A Look At CIS Security Benchmarks (4)
487
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
489
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
STIGs HOME
490
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
491
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
STIGs Viewer
492
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
493
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
494
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
495
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
Import STIG
496
A Look At DISA STIGs (1)
• Completely different
mechanism for DISA
STIGs
END
497
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
498
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
SEVERITY DISA CATEGORY CODE GUIDELINES
CAT 1 Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which
will directly and immediately result in loss
of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.
FILTER PANEL
500
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
CREATE CHECKLIST
501
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
CHECKLIST
502
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
• Checklist screens:
– Overall totals
– Target data
– Role
– Finding details
– Comments
503
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
• Checklist screens
(STATUS):
– Not reviewed
– Open
– Not a finding
– Not applicable
504
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
Totals
505
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
Target Data
506
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
Status
507
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
Vuln Information
508
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
END
509
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
510
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
511
A Look At DISA STIGs (2)
512
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Rule Title:
– The lockout duration
must be configured
to require an
administrator to
unlock an account
– Severity: CAT II
513
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Discussion:
– The account lockout
feature, when
enabled, prevents
brute-force password
attacks on the
system. This
parameter specifies
the period of time
that an account will
remain locked after
the specified number
514
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Discussion…:
– of failed logon
attempts. A value of
0 will require an
administrator to
unlock the account.
515
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Check Content:
– Verify the effective
setting in Local Group
Policy Editor.
Run "gpedit.msc".
516
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Check Content:
– Navigate to Local
Computer Policy ->
Computer
Configuration ->
Windows Settings ->
Security Settings ->
Account Policies ->
Account Lockout
Policy.
517
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Check Content…:
– If the "Account
lockout duration" is
not set to "0",
requiring an
administrator to
unlock the account,
this is a finding.
518
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Fix Text:
– Configure the policy
value for Computer
Configuration ->
Windows Settings ->
Security Settings ->
Account Policies ->
Account Lockout
Policy -> "Account
lockout duration" to
"0" minutes,
519
A Look At DISA STIGs (3)
• Fix Text….:
– "Account is locked
out until
administrator unlocks
it".
• CCI: NIST SP 800-53
Revision 4 :: AC-7 b
END
520
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
521
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
522
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
• General Information:
– Rule Title: The
network devices
must time out access
to the console port at
10 minutes or less of
inactivity
– STIG ID: NET1624
– Severity: CAT II
523
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
• Discussion:
– Terminating an idle
session within a short
time period reduces
the window of
opportunity for
unauthorized
personnel to take
control of a
management session
enabled on the
console or console…
524
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
• Discussion…:
– port that has been
left unattended. In
addition quickly
terminating an idle
session will also free
up resources
committed by the
managed network
device. Setting the
timeout of the
session to 10 minutes
525
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
• Discussion…:
– or less increases the
level of protection
afforded critical
network components
526
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
• Check Content:
– Review the
configuration and
verify a session using
the console port will
time out after 10 mins
or less of inactivity.
– If console access is
not configured to
timeout at 10 minutes
or less, this is a
finding.
527
A Look At DISA STIGs (4)
• Fix Text:
– Configure the
timeout for idle
console connection
to 10 minutes or less.
END
528
Comparison of CIS Vs DISA
529
Comparison of CIS Vs DISA
FEATURE CIS DISA
CONTROL GOOD EXCELLENT
COVERAGE
ORG SUITABILITY SMALL AND LARGE ORGS
MEDIUM ORGS
USER GOOD SATISFACTORY
FRIENDLINESS
UNUSABLE NO YES
TERMINOLOGY
CONTROL DETAIL GOOD SATISFACTORY
TOOLS CAT (COMMERCIAL) SCAP
(MILITARY USE)
530
Comparison of CIS Vs DISA
FEATURE CIS DISA
CONTROL LEVEL 1, LEVEL 2 CAT I - CAT III
PRIORITIZATION
TRACKING EASE CAT TOOL FREE STIG
(COMMERCIAL) VIEWER
(CHECKLIST)
FREQUENCY OF FAIR QUARTERLY
UPDATES
INDUSTRY HIGH VERY HIGH
CREDIBILITY
INDUSTRY HIGH MODERATE
ADOPTION
531
Comparison of CIS Vs DISA
532
Comparison of CIS Vs DISA
• Rule of thumb:
– Smaller orgs use CIS
– Larger orgs use DISA
– CIS is part of
Homeland Security,
DISA is part of US
Military
– DISA more frequently
updated and
END maintained with
wider coverage
533
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
534
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
535
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• General Information:
– Rule Title: Autoplay
must be disabled for
all drives
– STIG ID: WN12-CC-
000074
– Severity: CAT I
536
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• Discussion:
– Allowing Autoplay to
execute may
introduce malicious
code to a system.
Autoplay begins
reading from a drive
as soon media is
inserted into the
drive. As a result, the
setup file of
programs or ….
537
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• Discussion…:
– music on audio media
may start. By default,
Autoplay is disabled
on removable drives,
such as the floppy
disk drive (but not
the CD-ROM drive)
and on network
drives.
538
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• Discussion…:
– Enabling this policy
disables Autoplay on
all drives.…
539
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• Check Content:
– If the following
registry value does
not exist or is not
configured as
specified, this is a
finding:
– Registry Hive:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHI
NE
540
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• Check Content:
– Registry Path:
\SOFTWARE\Microsof
t\Windows\CurrentVe
rsion\policies\Explore
r\
– Value Name:
NoDriveTypeAutoRun
– Type: REG_DWORD
Value: 0x000000ff
(255)
541
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
• Fix Text:
– Configure the policy
value for Computer
Configuration ->
Administrative
Templates ->
Windows
Components ->
AutoPlay Policies ->
"Turn off AutoPlay"
to "Enabled:All
Drives".
542
Security Hardening – Windows Server 2012R2
END
544
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
545
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
546
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
547
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
549
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
550
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
551
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
552
Case Study Security Hardening – Linux
– …should only be
used if they are
performed over a
secondary encryption
channel, such as SSL,
TLS or IPSEC.
554
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
555
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
556
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• General Information:
– Rule Title: All shell
files must have mode
0755 or less
permissive
– STIG ID: GEN002220
– Severity: CAT I
557
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• Discussion:
– Shells with
world/group-write
permissions give the
ability to maliciously
modify the shell to
obtain unauthorized
access.
558
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• Check Content:
– If /etc/shells exists,
check the group
ownership of each
shell referenced.
# cat /etc/shells |
xargs -n1 ls -lL
– Otherwise, check any
shells found on the
system.
# find / -name "*sh" |
xargs -n1 ls -lL
559
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• …Check Content:
– If a shell has a mode
more permissive than
0755, this is a finding
560
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• Fix Text:
– Change the mode of
the shell
# chmod 0755
<shell>
561
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• …CCI (Control
Correlation Identifier):
– …to accomplish
assigned tasks in
accordance with
organizational
missions and business
functions
563
Security Hardening – Case Study – Solaris
• …CCI (Control
Correlation Identifier):
– …NIST SP 800-53 ::
AC-6
NIST SP 800-53A ::
AC-6.1
NIST SP 800-53
Revision 4 :: AC-6
564
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
565
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
566
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
567
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
569
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
570
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
571
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
572
Case Study Security Hardening – Apache
573
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
574
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
575
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• General Information:
– Rule Title: The Oracle
Listener must be
configured to require
administration
authentication
– STIG ID: O121-BP-
022700
– Severity: CAT I
576
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Discussion:
– Oracle listener
authentication helps
prevent unauthorized
administration of the
Oracle listener.
Unauthorized
administration of the
listener could lead to
DoS exploits;
577
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Discussion…:
– …loss of connection
audit data,
unauthorized
reconfiguration or
other unauthorized
access. This is a
Category I finding
because privileged
access to the listener
is not restricted to
authorized users.
578
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Discussion…:
– …Unauthorized
access can result in
stopping of the
listener (DoS) and
overwriting of
listener audit logs.
579
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Check Content:
– If a listener is not
running on the local
database host server,
this check is not a
finding
580
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• …Check Content:
– For Windows hosts,
view all Windows
services with
TNSListener
embedded in the
service name
– The service name
format is:
Oracle[ORACLE_HOM
E_NAME]TNSListener
581
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• …Check Content:
– View the STIGVIEWER
for Unix hosts…
582
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Fix Text:
– By default, Oracle Net
Listener permits only
local administration
for security reasons.
As a policy, the
listener can be
administered only by
the user who started
it. This is enforced
through local
operating system
authentication. 583
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Fix Text:
– For example, if user1
starts the listener,
then only user1 can
administer it. Any
other user trying to
administer the
listener gets an error.
The super user is the
only exception.
584
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Fix Text:
– Remote administ. of
the listener must not
be permitted. If
listener administ.
from a remote
system is required,
granting secure
remote access to the
Oracle DBMS server
and performing local
administration is
preferred. 585
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
586
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• …CCI (Control
Correlation Identifier):
– …NIST SP 800-53 ::
CM-6 b
NIST SP 800-53A ::
CM-6.1 (iv)
NIST SP 800-53
Revision 4 :: CM-6 b
END
587
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
588
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
589
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
590
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
591
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
592
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
593
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
594
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
596
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
598
Case Study Security Hardening – MS SQL
599
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
600
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
601
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• General Information:
– Rule Title: The Oracle
REMOTE_OS_ROLES
parameter must be
set to FALSE.
– STIG ID: O112-BP-
022000
– Severity: CAT I
602
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Discussion:
– Setting
REMOTE_OS_ROLES
to TRUE allows
operating system
groups to control
Oracle roles. The
default value of
FALSE causes roles to
be identified and
managed by the
database…
603
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Discussion…:
– …If
REMOTE_OS_ROLES
is set to TRUE, a
remote user could
impersonate another
operating system
user over a network
connection.
604
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Check Content:
– From SQL*Plus:
select value from
v$parameter where
name =
'remote_os_roles';
– If the returned value
is not FALSE or not
documented in the
System Security Plan
as required, this is a
Finding
605
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Fix Text:
– Document remote OS
roles in the System
Security Plan.
– If not required,
disable use of remote
OS roles.
– From SQL*Plus:
alter system set
remote_os_roles =
FALSE scope = spfile;
606
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
• Fix Text:
– The above SQL*Plus
command will set the
parameter to take
effect at next system
startup
607
Security Hardening – Case Study – Oracle
609
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
610
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
• 18.9.70.3 Ensure
'Automatically send
memory dumps for OS-
generated error reports'
is set to 'Disabled'
(Scored)
• Profile applicability:
– Level 1
– Level 1 + BitLocker
611
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
• 18.9.70.3 Ensure
'Automatically send
memory dumps for OS-
generated error reports'
is set to 'Disabled'
(Scored)
• Description: This policy
setting controls whether
memory dumps in
support of OS-
generated error reports
can be sent to..
612
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
• Description…:
…Microsoft
automatically. This
policy does not apply to
error reports generated
by 3rd-party products, or
additional data other
than memory dumps.
– The recommended
state for this setting
is: Disabled.
613
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
– Rationale: Memory
dumps may contain
sensitive information
and should not be
automatically sent to
anyone.
614
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
615
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
– Audit:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACH
INE\SOFTWARE\Poli
cies\Microsoft\Win
dows\Windows
Error
Reporting:AutoAppr
oveOSDumps
616
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
– Remediation: To
establish the
recommended
configuration via GP,
set the following UI
path to Disabled:
617
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
– Remediation:
Computer
Configuration\Policie
s\Administrative
Templates\Windows
Components\Windo
ws Error
Reporting\Automatic
ally send memory
dumps for OS-
generated error
reports
618
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
619
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
– Default Value:
Enabled. (Any
memory dumps
generated for error
reports by Microsoft
Windows are
automatically
uploaded, without
notification to the
user.)
620
Case Study Security Hardening – Windows 8
• References:
– CCE-33927-5
– Critical Controls:
13 Data Protection
END
621
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
Module 79 • Windows 10
• DISA, Release 9
– 28 April 2017
622
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
623
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
• General Information:
– Rule Title: The
antivirus program
must be configured
to update signature
files on a daily basis.
– STIG ID: WN10-00-
000046
– Severity: CAT I
624
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
• Discussion:
– Virus scan programs
are a primary line of
defense against the
introduction of
viruses and malicious
code that can destroy
data and even render
a computer
inoperable. Using a
virus scan program
provides the ability
to… 625
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
• Discussion…:
– …detect malicious
code before
extensive damage
occurs. Updated virus
scan data files help
protect a system, as
constantly changing
malware is identified
by the antivirus
software vendors
626
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
• Check Content:
– This requirement is
NA if McAfee
VirusScan Enterprise
(VSE) is used. It will
be addressed with
the corresponding
McAfee VSE STIG.
– Configurations will
vary depending on
the product.
627
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
• Fix Text:
– Configure the
antivirus program to
update signature files
at least daily. Ensure
the updates are
occurring on timely
basis and are not
more than a week
old.
628
Security Hardening – Case Study – Win 10
630
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
631
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
632
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
635
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
636
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
637
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
638
Case Study Security Hardening – MS Exchange
END
640
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
641
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
642
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• General Information:
– Rule Title :
Membership to the
Domain Admins
group must be
restricted to accounts
used only to manage
the Active Dir domain
and domain
controllers
643
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• General Information:
– STIG ID: AD.0002
– Severity: CAT I
644
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• Discussion:
– The Domain Admins
group is a highly
privileged group.
Personnel who are
system
administrators must
log on to Active
Directory systems
only using accounts
with the level of
authority necessary.
645
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• Discussion:
– …Only system
administrator
accounts used
exclusively to
manage an Active
Directory domain and
domain controllers
may be members of
the Domain Admins
group. A separation
of administrator…
646
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• Discussion:
– …responsibilities
helps mitigate the
risk of privilege
escalation resulting
from credential theft
attacks.
647
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• Check Content:
– Review the Domain
Admins group in
Active Directory
Users and
Computers. Each
Domain
Administrator must
have a separate
unique account
specifically for…
648
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• …Check Content:
– …managing the
Active Directory
domain and domain
controllers.
– If any account listed
in the Domain Admins
group is a member of
other administrator
groups including the
649
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• …Check Content:
– …Enterprise Admins
group, domain
member server
administrators
groups, or domain
workstation
administrators
groups, this is a
finding.
650
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• Fix Text:
– Create the necessary
documentation that
identifies the
members of the
Domain Admins
group. Ensure that
each member has a
separate unique
account that can only
be used to manage
the Active Directory...
651
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
• Fix Text:
– …domain and
domain controllers.
Remove any Domain
Admin accounts from
other administrator
groups.
652
Security Hardening – Case Study – AD
654
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
655
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
656
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– …Description: If you
enable this policy
setting, users cannot
enable or disable
add-ons through
Add-On Manager.
The only exception
occurs if an add-on
has been specifically
entered into the
'Add-On List' policy
setting in such a way
as to allow…
658
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– …Description: users
to continue to
manage the add-on.
In this case, the user
can still manage the
add-on through the
Add-On Manager. If
you disable or do not
configure this policy
setting, the
appropriate controls
in the Add-On…
659
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– …Description:
Manager will be
available to the user.
Configure this setting
in a manner that is
consistent with
security and
operational
requirements of your
organization.
660
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– Rationale: Users
often choose to
install add-ons that
are not permitted by
an organization's
security policy. Such
add-ons can pose a
significant security
and privacy risk to
your network.
661
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
662
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– Audit:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACH
INE\Software\Polici
es\Microsoft\Intern
et
Explorer\Restriction
s\NoExtensionMana
gement
663
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– Remediation: To
establish the
recommended
configuration via
Group Policy, set the
following UI path to
Not Configured.
664
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– Remediation:
Computer
Configuration\Admini
strative
Templates\Windows
Components\Internet
Explorer\Do not
allow users to enable
or disable add-ons
665
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
666
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
– Impact: …this
configuration may
affect their ability to
work.
667
Case Study Security Hardening – IE Browser
668
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
669
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
670
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• General Information:
– Rule Title : Session
only based cookies
must be disabled.
671
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• General Information:
– Vuln ID: V-44799
– STIG ID: DTBC-0045
– Severity: CAT I
672
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Discussion:
– Policy allows you to
set a list of URL
patterns that specify
sites which are
allowed to set
session only cookies.
If this policy is left not
set the global default
value will be used for
all sites…
673
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Discussion:
– …either from the
'DefaultCookiesSettin
g' policy if it is set, or
the user's personal
configuration
otherwise. If the
'RestoreOnStartup'
policy is set to restore
URLs from…
674
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Discussion:
– …previous sessions
this policy will not be
respected and
cookies will be stored
permanently for
those sites
675
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Check Content:
– Universal method:
1. In the omnibox
(address bar) type
chrome://policy
2. If the policy
'CookiesSessionOnlyF
orUrls' exists, and has
any defined values,
this is a finding…
676
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Check Content:
– …Windows method:
1. Start regedit
2. Navigate to
HKLM\Software\Polici
es\Google\Google
Chrome\Content
Settings\CookiesSessi
onOnlyForUrls
3. If this key exists
and has any defined
values, this is a
finding 677
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Fix Text:
– Windows group
policy:
1. Open the group
policy editor tool with
gpedit.msc
678
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
• Fix Text…:
– 2. Navigate to Policy
Path: Computer
Configuration\Admini
strative
Templates\Google\Go
ogle Chrome\Content
Settings
Policy Name: Allow
session only cookies
on these sites
Policy State: Disabled
Policy Value: N/A... 679
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
680
Security Hardening – Case Study - Chrome
682
Case Study Security Hardening – Firefox
683
Case Study Security Hardening – Firefox
684
Case Study Security Hardening – Firefox
686
Case Study Security Hardening – Firefox
– …Audit:
network.IDN_show_
punycode=true
688
Case Study Security Hardening – Firefox
END
690
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
691
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
692
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
• General Information:
– Rule Title : The device
must be configured
to protect the
network against
denial of service
attacks such as Ping
of Death, TCP SYN
floods, etc.
693
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
• General Information:
– Vuln ID: V-3156
– STIG ID: NET0375
– Severity: CAT II
694
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
• Discussion:
– A SYN-flood attack is
a denial-of-service
attack where the
attacker sends a huge
amount of please-
start-a-connection
packets and then
nothing else. This
causes the device
being attacked to be
overloaded with the..
695
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
• …Discussion:
– …open sessions and
eventually crash.
– A ping sweep (also
known as an ICMP
sweep) is a basic
network scanning
technique used to
determine which of a
range of IP addresses
map to live hosts
(computers)
696
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
• Check Content:
– Review the device
configurations to
determine if denial
of service attacks
guarded against.
– If the device is not
configured to
mitigate denial of
service attacks, this
is a finding.
697
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
• Fix Text:
– If the firewall support
SYN-flood or ping
sweep protection
then enable these
features. If the
firewall does not
support these
features, enable the
security features on
the router to protect
the network from
these attacks. 698
Security Hardening – Case Study - FW
END
699
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
700
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
701
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• General Information:
– Rule Title : The IAO
to that all
switchports
configured using
MAC port security
will shutdown upon
receiving a frame
with a different layer
2 source address
than what has been
configured or learned
for port security 702
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• General Information:
– Vuln ID: V-18565
– STIG ID: NET-NAC-032
– Severity: CAT III
703
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• Discussion:
– The Port Security
feature remembers
the Ethernet MAC
address connected to
the switch port and
allows only that MAC
address to
communicate on that
port…
704
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• …Discussion:
– …If any other MAC
address tries to
communicate
through the port,
port security will
disable the port.
705
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• Check Content:
– A shutdown action
puts the interface
into the error-
disabled state
immediately and
sends an SNMP trap
notification if it
receives a frame with
a different layer 2
source address that
what has been…
706
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• Check Content:
– …configured or
learned for port
security. The
following Catalyst IOS
interface command
will shutdown the
interface when such
an event occurs:
switchport port-
security violation
shutdown
707
Security Hardening – Case Study - Switch
• Fix Text:
– Configure the port to
shutdown when
insecure hosts are
connected to the wall
jack.
END
708
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
709
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
710
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
711
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
712
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
713
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
714
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
715
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
716
Case Study Security Hardening – Cisco IOS 15
END
719
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
720
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
721
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• General Information:
– Rule Title : WLAN
must use EAP-TLS
722
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• General Information:
– Vuln ID: V-3692
– STIG ID: WIR0115-01
– Severity: CAT II
723
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• Discussion:
– EAP-TLS provides
strong cryptographic
mutual
authentication and
key distribution
services not found in
other EAP methods,
and thus provides
significantly more
protection against
attacks than other…
724
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• …Discussion:
– …methods.
Additionally, EAP-TLS
supports two-factor
user authentication
on the WLAN client,
which provides
significantly more
protection than
methods that rely on
a password or
certificate alone.
725
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• …Discussion:
– …EAP-TLS also can
leverage DoD CAC in
its authentication
services, providing
additional security
and convenience.
726
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• Check Content:
– NOTE: If the
equipment is WPA2
certified, then it is
capable of supporting
this requirement.
– Review the WLAN
equipment
configuration to
check EAP-TLS is
actively used and no
other methods are
enabled. 727
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• Check Content:
– …Mark as a finding if
either EAP-TLS is not
used or if the WLAN
system allows users
to connect with other
methods.
728
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• Fix Text:
– Change the WLAN
configuration so it
supports EAP-TLS,
implementing
supporting PKI and
AAA infrastructure as
necessary.
729
Security Hardening – Case Study - WLAN
• Fix Text:
– If the WLAN
equipment is not
capable of supporting
EAP-TLS, procure new
equipment capable of
such support.
END
730
Security Hardening – Case Study – L3 Switch
731
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
732
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• General Information:
– Rule Title : The
administrator must
ensure the that all
L2TPv3 sessions are
authenticated prior
to transporting
traffic.
733
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• General Information:
– Vuln ID: V-30744
– STIG ID: NET-TUNL-
034
– Severity: CAT II
734
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• Discussion:
– L2TPv3 sessions can
be used to
transport layer-2
protocols across an
IP backbone. These
protocols were
intended for link-
local scope only and
are therefore less
defended and not
as well-known.
735
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• …Discussion:
– …As stated in DoD
IPv6 IA Guidance for
MO3 (S4-C7-1), the
L2TP tunnels can also
carry IP packets that
are very difficult to
filter because of the
additional
encapsulation.
736
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• …Discussion:
– …Hence, it is
imperative that L2TP
sessions are
authenticated prior
to transporting traffic
737
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• Check Content:
– Review the router or
multi-layer switch
configuration and
determine if L2TPv3
has been configured
to provide transport
across an IP network.
If it has been
configured, verify
that the L2TPv3
session requires
authentication. 738
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• Check Content:
– …see detailed
explanation in Check
Content…(configurat
ions)
739
Security Hardening – Case Study - L3 Switch
• Fix Text:
– Configure L2TPv3 to
use authentication
for any peering
sessions.
END
740
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
741
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
742
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
743
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
744
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
745
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Rationale:
– The DCUI allows for
low-level host
configuration such as
configuring IP
address, hostname
and root password as
well as diagnostic
capabilities such as
enabling the ESXi
shell, viewing log
files, restarting…
746
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Rationale:
– …agents, and
resetting
configurations.
Actions performed
from the DCUI are
not tracked by
vCenter Server. Even
if Lockdown Mode is
enabled, users who
are members of the
DCUI.Access list can..
747
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Rationale:
– …perform
administrative tasks
in the DCUI bypassing
RBAC and auditing
controls provided
through vCenter.
DCUI access can be
disabled. Disabling it
prevents all local
activity and thus
forces actions to be...
748
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Rationale:
– …performed in
vCenter Server where
they can be centrally
audited and
monitored.
749
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
751
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Audit: …Additionally,
the following PowerCLI
command may be used:
– # List DCUI settings
for all hosts Get-
VMHost | Get-
VMHostService |
Where { $_.key -eq
"DCUI" }
752
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Remediation: Perform
the following:
1. From the vSphere web
client select the host.
2. Select "Manage" ->
"Settings" -> "System" ->
"Security Profile".
3. Scroll down to
"Services".
4. Click "Edit...".
5. Select "Direct Console
UI".
753
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Remediation:…
6. Click "Stop".
7. Change the Startup
Policy "Start and Stop
Manually".
8. Click "OK".
754
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Impact:
– Disabling the DCUI
can create a potential
"lock out" situation
should the host
become isolated from
vCenter Server.
Recovering from a
"lock out" scenario
requires re-installing
ESXi. Consider leaving
DCUI enabled and…
755
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Impact:
– …instead enable
lockdown mode and
limit the users
allowed to access the
DCUI using the
DCUI.Access list.
756
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• Default Value:
– The prescribed state
is not the default
state.
757
Case Study Security Hardening – VMware
• References:
– http://pubs.vmware.c
om/vsphere-
55/topic/com.vmware
.vsphere.security.doc/
GUID-6779F098-48FE-
4E22-B116-
A8353D19FF56.html
END
758
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
759
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
760
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
761
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
762
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
764
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
• Rationale:
– A hardware MFA has
a smaller attack
surface than a virtual
MFA. For example, a
hardware MFA does
not suffer the attack
surface introduced by
the mobile
smartphone on which
a virtual MFA resides;
765
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
• Rationale:
– …Note: Using
hardware MFA for
many, many AWS
accounts may create
a logistical device
management issue. If
this is the case,
consider
implementing this
Level 2
recommendation…
766
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
• Rationale:
– …selectively to the
highest security AWS
accounts and the
Level 1
recommendation
applied to the
remaining accounts.
767
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
768
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
• Audit: …
2. If the output contains
one MFA with the
following Serial Number, it
means the MFA is virtual,
not hardware and the
account is not compliant
with this recommendation:
"SerialNumber":
"arn:aws:iam::<aws_accou
nt_number>:mfa/root-
account-mfa-device"
769
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
• Remediation: [8 step
process…check the
benchmark]
770
Case Study Security Hardening – Cloud AWS
• References:
– http://docs.aws.amaz
on.com/IAM/latest/Us
erGuide/id_credential
s_mfa_enable_virtual
.html
– http://docs.aws.amaz
on.com/IAM/latest/Us
erGuide/id_credential
END s_mfa_enable_physic
al.html#enable-hw-
mfa-for-root
771
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
http://www.opensamm.org/downl
oads/SAMM-1.0.pdf
772
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
773
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
774
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
• OWASP Software
Assurance Maturity
Model (SAMM)
Governance Phase:
– Strategy & Metrics
– Education &
Guidance
– Policy & Compliance
775
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
776
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
777
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
778
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
779
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
780
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
781
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
784
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM
END
785
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
http://www.opensamm.org/downl
oads/SAMM-1.0.pdf
786
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
787
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
788
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• OWASP Software
Assurance Maturity
Model (SAMM)
Construction Phase:
– Security
Requirements
– Threat Assessment
– Secure Architecture
789
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• Security
Requirements:
– Focused on
proactively specifying
the expected
behavior of software
with respect to
security
790
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• Security
Requirements:
– …Through addition
of analysis activities
at the project level,
security requirements
are initially gathered
based on the high-
level business
purpose of the
software
791
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
792
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• Threat Assessment:
– Centered on
identification and
understanding the
project-level risks
based on the
functionality of the
software being
developed and
characteristics of the
runtime environment
793
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• Threat Assessment:
– …From details about
threats and likely
attacks against each
project, the
organization as a
whole operates more
effectively through
better decisions
about prioritization
of initiatives for
security
794
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
795
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• Secure Architecture:
– Focused on proactive
steps for an
organization to
design and build
secure software by
default
796
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• Secure Architecture:
– By enhancing the
software design
process with
reusable services
and components,
the overall security
risk from software
development can be
dramatically
reduced.
797
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
798
Software Security Fundamentals-SAMM-2
• SAMM is an excellent
model for software
security and we look
at the verification and
deployment phases
as part of testing and
validation (future
module)…
END
799
SECURITY HARDENING – SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
800
SECURITY HARDENING – SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
• Typical enterprise
software:
– ERP (Oracle, SAP,
IBM, etc)
– Internally or 3rd
party developed
software in
ASP.NET, PHP,
Android/IOS, or
other platform
801
SECURITY HARDENING – SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
802
SECURITY HARDENING – SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
1. Research
Security Controls
SOFTWARE SECURITY
WORKFLOW
3. Code Review &
4. Harden Server Automated
Environment Testing
(Validation)
803
SECURITY HARDENING–SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
• Useful resources:
– www.OWASP.org
– www.cloudsecurityal
liance.org
– MS Technet
– OWASP Top 10
– OWASP Secure
Coding Practices
Quick Reference
Guide
– SAMM
804
SECURITY HARDENING–SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
17 pages document
805
SECURITY HARDENING–SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
807
SECURITY HARDENING–SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS
• Conclusion
– Software security
hardening is a
challenging activity
– Build software
security program &
integrate with QA
– Domain specific
knowledge required
– Build capabilities and
END
process following
SAMM
808
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
809
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
• .NET Framework
Guidance
• ASP.NET Web Forms
Guidance
• ASP.NET MVC
Framework Guidance
810
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
• .NET Framework
Guidance
– Data access
– Encryption
– General guidelines
811
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
812
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
814
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
815
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET SECURITY HARDENING
816
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
817
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
818
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
5. Passwords
6. Uploading files
7. Session hijacking
8. Remote file inclusion
9. PHP configuration
– Error reporting
– Exposing PHP version
– Remote files
– Open_basedir
– Session settings
819
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
820
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
9. PHP Configuration
Always keep the installed
PHP version updated. You
can use versionscan to
check for possible
vulnerabilities of your PHP
version. Update open
source libraries and
applications, and keep
your web server well
maintained.
821
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
9. PHP Configuration…
Here are some of the
important settings
from php.ini that you
should check out. You can
also use iniscan to scan
your php.ini files for best
security practices.
822
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
9. Error Reporting
In your production
environment, you must
always turn off displaying
errors to the screen. If
errors occur in your
application and they are
visible to the outside
world, an attacker could
get valuable data for
attacking your application.
823
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
https://docs.php.earth/security/intro/#php-configuration
824
CASE STUDY – PHP SECURITY HARDENING
END
825
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
826
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
827
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
• Your approach to
securing your web
application should be to
start at the top threat A1
below and work down,
this will ensure that any
time spent on security
will be spent most
effectively and cover the
top threats first and
lesser threats
afterwards.
829
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
830
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
833
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
834
CASE STUDY – ASP.NET MVC SECURITY HARDENING
END
836
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
837
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
STIGVIEWER WINDOW
838
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• General Information:
– Rule Title : For
environments
requiring an Internet-
facing capability, the
SharePoint
application server
upon which Central
Administration is
installed, must not be
installed in the DMZ.
839
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• General Information:
– Vuln ID: V-59995
– STIG ID: SP13-00-
000155
– Severity: CAT II
840
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• Discussion:
– Information flow
control regulates
where information is
allowed to travel
within an information
system and between
information systems
(as opposed to who is
allowed to access the
information) and
without explicit…
841
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• …Discussion:
– …regard to
subsequent accesses
to the information.
– SharePoint installed
Central Administrator
is a powerful
management tool
used to administer
the farm. This server
should be installed on
a trusted network…
842
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• …Discussion:
– …segment. This
server should also be
used to run services
rather than user-
oriented web
applications.
843
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• Check Content:
– For environments
requiring an Internet-
facing capability,
ensure the
SharePoint Central
Administration
application server is
not in the DMZ.
– Inspect the logical
location of the server
farm web front end…
844
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• Check Content:
– …servers.
– Verify the Central
Administration site is
not installed on a
server located in a
DMZ or other publicly
accessible segment
of the network.
– If Central
Administrator is…
845
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• Check Content:
– installed on a publicly
facing SharePoint
server, this is a
finding.
846
Security Hardening – Case Study-SharePoint
• Fix Text:
– For environments
requiring an Internet-
facing capability,
remove the
SharePoint Central
Administration
application server
upon which Central
END
Administration is
installed from the
DMZ.
847
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
848
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
https://wiki.sei.cmu.edu/confluence/display/seccode/SE
I+CERT+Coding+Standards
849
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
850
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Avoid casting
away const qualification
because doing so makes
it possible to modify
const-qualified objects
without issuing
diagnostics.
851
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
852
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
853
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
854
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
855
CASE STUDY – C APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
END
856
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
857
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
858
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
859
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
861
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
862
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• The C++
Standard, [thread.mutex
.class], paragraph 5
[ISO/IEC 14882-2014],
states the following:
• The behavior of a
program is undefined if
it destroys
a mutex object owned
by any thread or a
thread terminates while
owning a mutex object.
863
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
864
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Non-Compliant Code
Example:
• This noncompliant code
example creates several
threads that each invoke
the do_work() function,
passing a unique number
as an ID.
• Unfortunately, this code
contains a race
condition, allowing the
mutex to be destroyed
865
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
866
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
867
CASE STUDY – C++ APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Compliant Code
Example:
• This compliant solution
eliminates the race
condition by extending
the lifetime of the
mutex.
END
868
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
869
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
870
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
871
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Rule 7
• ERR02-J. Prevent
exceptions while
logging data
• Exceptions that are
thrown while logging is
in progress can prevent
successful logging
unless special care is
taken. Failure to account
for exceptions during
the logging process can
872
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• …cause security
vulnerabilities, such as
allowing an attacker to
conceal critical security
exceptions by
preventing them from
being logged. Hence,
programs must ensure
that data logging
continues to operate
correctly even when
exceptions are thrown
873
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
874
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
875
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Non-compliant Code
Example:
• This noncompliant code
example writes a critical
security exception to
the standard error
stream:
876
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• …insufficient for
recording certain
security-critical
exceptions or errors
without leaking sensitive
information. If an I/O
error were to occur
while writing the
security exception,
the catch block would
throw
an IOException and the
878
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• …critical security
exception would be lost.
Finally, an attacker may
disguise the exception
so that it occurs with
several other innocuous
exceptions.
879
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
880
CASE STUDY – JAVA APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Compliant Solution:
• This compliant solution
uses java.util.logging.Lo
gger, the default logging
API provided by JDK 1.4
and later. Use of other
compliant logging
mechanisms, such as
log4j, is also permitted.
• Typically, only one
logger is required for
END the entire program.
881
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
882
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
883
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
884
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
• Rule 1
• IDS30-PL. Exclude user
input from format
strings
885
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
888
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
889
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
890
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
END
891
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
892
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
893
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
894
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
895
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
• Rationale:
– If you lose your
Android device, you
could use Android
Device Manager to
find your device and
also ring, lock, or
erase your device
data remotely.
896
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
897
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
• Audit: …
5. Tap Device
administrators.
6. Verify that Android
Device Manager is
enabled.
898
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
899
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
• Remediation: …
5. Tap Device
administrators.
6. Tap Android Device
Manager.
7. Tap Activate this device
administrator.
900
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
• Impact:
– Google may track
your device location
anytime.
901
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
• Default Value:
– By default, Android
Device Manager is
not enabled.
902
Case Study Security Hardening – Android
• References:
– https://support.googl
e.com/pixelphone/an
swer/3265955
END
903
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
904
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
905
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
906
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
907
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• Rationale:
– It is appropriate for
an institution to have
remote locating and
erasure capability
with their devices.
Forcing cellular data
to remain active is a
means of supporting
this goal.
908
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• Audit:
– From the
Configuration Profile:
1. Open Apple Configurator
2. Open the Configuration
Profile
3. In the left windowpane,
click on the Restrictions
tab.
4. In the right windowpane,
verify that under the tab…
909
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• Audit: …
– …Functionality, that
the checkbox for
Allow modifying
cellular data app
settings is unchecked.
910
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• Audit: …
…Or, from the device:
1. Tap Settings.
2. Tap General.
3. Tap Profile.
4. Tap <_Profile Name_>.
5. Tap Restrictions.
6. Confirm Changing app
cellular data usage not
allowed is displayed.
911
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• Remediation:
1. Open Apple
Configurator.
2. Open the Configuration
Profile.
3. In the left windowpane,
click on the Restrictions
tab;
912
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• Remediation…:
4. In the right
windowpane, under the
tab Functionality, uncheck
the checkbox for Allow
modifying cellular data
app settings.
5. Deploy the
Configuration Profile.
913
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• CIS Controls:
– 5.1 Minimize And
Sparingly Use
Administrative
Privileges Minimize
administrative
privileges and only
use administrative
accounts when they
are required;
914
Case Study Security Hardening – Apple IOS 10
• CIS Controls:
– … Implement
focused auditing on
the use of
administrative
privileged functions
and monitor for
anomalous behavior
END
915
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING
916
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
917
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING
918
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING
919
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING
924
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING
END
926
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
Week 07 • http://www.ipcomms.ne
Module 106 t/asteriskblog/1-11-steps-
to-secure-your-asterisk-
pbx
927
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
928
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
7. Limit registration by
extensions to your local
subnet.
• Restrict the IP addresses
your extensions can
register onto the local
subnet. Asterisk PBXs
can use the ACL
(permit/deny) in
SIP.conf to block IP
addresses. This can fend
off brute force
registration attempts. 929
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
930
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
932
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
• …“scanning” of port
5060 and 5061 and can
disable the attempting
endpoint for a specific
time when it detects a
violation.
933
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
934
CASE STUDY – ASTERISK VOIP SECURITY HARDENING (2)
END
935
Version Control For IT Assets
936
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– http://its.unl.edu/best
practices/version-
management
937
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 1. Organized,
coordinated
management of
changes to software
assets by one or
many individuals,
some of whom may
be geographically
dispersed
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
938
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 2. Organized,
coordinated
management of
changes to software
assets for emergency
hot-fixes, routine
maintenance,
upgrades…
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
939
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 2. …& new features
with potentially
overlapping dev
timeframes (e.g.,
work on new features
occurs
simultaneously with
work on routine
maintenance and/or
hot-fixes)
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractices/version
-management
940
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 3. An auditable
change history (e.g.,
what changed, when,
and by whom)
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
941
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 4. A reliable master
copy of what assets
are currently in
production
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
942
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 5. A reliable master
copy of assets from
which to build and/or
configure the
production
environment
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
943
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 6. Reliable copies of
previous production
versions of assets
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
944
Version Control For IT Assets
• Benefits of version
control
– 7. Ability to see the
specific differences
between distinct
versions of a given
asset
http://its.unl.edu/bestpractice
s/version-management
945
Version Control For IT Assets
• Security controls:
– Access control
measures
– Privileged
management
– Backups
END
946
Version Control Best Practices
947
Version Control Best Practices
8. Make extensive, –
detailed notes in the
check-in comments
about why the changes
were made.
9. Developers must
commit their own
changes (only).
https://intland.com/blog/sdlc/source-
control-management-best-practices/
950
Version Control Best Practices
953
SECURITY HARDENING - SECURE SOFTWARE IMAGES
954
SECURITY HARDENING - SECURE SOFTWARE IMAGES
956
SECURITY HARDENING - SECURE SOFTWARE IMAGES
957
SECURITY HARDENING - SECURE SOFTWARE IMAGES
958
SECURITY HARDENING - SECURE SOFTWARE IMAGES
END
960
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
961
CASE STUDY – PERL APPLICATIONS SECURITY HARDENING
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
962
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
963
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
964
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
965
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
966
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
967
SECURITY HARDENING – MANUAL & AUTOMATED WORK
968
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
969
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
970
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
971
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
973
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
HELP OPTIONS
974
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
RESOURCES
976
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
977
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
978
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
• Qualys is an excellent
tool with detailed online
help, training, and
resources to aid the new
user
END
979
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING II
980
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING II
982
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
985
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
986
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
3. CONFIGURE AUTHENTICATION
987
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
988
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
3. CONFIGURE AUTHENTICATION
989
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
3. CONFIGURE AUTHENTICATION
990
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
3. CONFIGURE AUTHENTICATION
COMPLIANCE LIBRARY: CIS RED HAT ENT. LINUX 7
991
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
POLICY EDITOR
992
QUALYS DEMO – SECURITY HARDENING
POLICY EDITOR
END
994
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
995
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
1. Harden IT Asset
5. Pursue Controls
2. Periodic
That May Require
Validation
Additional Working
3. Seek Updates
4. Implement
On Hardening
Additional Controls
Benchmarks
996
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
1: Harden IT Asset
Pursue the 8 step
hardening methodology
997
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
998
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
2: Periodic Validation
Check periodically (every
quarter) for changes to the
established standard or
baseline
999
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
3: Seek Updated On
Hardening Benchmarks
• Benchmarks are
periodically updated
• Subscribe to feeds from
CIS, DISA, NIST NCP
(National Checklist
Program) Repository
1000
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
4: Implement Additional
Controls
• Update the security
controls by studying the
changes
1001
SECURITY HARDENING – LIFECYCLE
1003
Hardening When CIS/DISA STIG Not Available
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
1004
Hardening When CIS/DISA STIG Not Available
• Step 2: Research:
– Look up google
– Look for case studies
and whitepapers
1005
Hardening When CIS/DISA STIG Not Available
• Other considerations:
– Implement on test
setup
– Test the controls
– Security testing tools
– Perform third-party
security testing
(penetration testing)
– Vendor best-practices
for application
security hardening
1006
Hardening When CIS/DISA STIG Not Available
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
1007
Hardening When CIS/DISA STIG Not Available
END
1008
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
1009
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
1010
Security Hardening For Outsourced IT Assets
• IT Outsourcing
• Mechanism to harden
outsourced IT assets
• Important
considerations
1011
Security Hardening For Outsourced IT Assets
• IT Outsourcing
examples:
– Call centers
– Hosted servers
– Software
development
– Workstation helpdesk
functions
– Network services
– Any other
arrangement
1012
Security Hardening For Outsourced IT Assets
• Mechanism:
– Information Security
Policy
– Vendor contract
(right-to-audit clause)
– Set up security
project with security
project manager
– Periodic reviews
– Penalties for non-
compliance
1013
Security Hardening For Outsourced IT Assets
• Important
considerations:
– Enter security
requirements into
RFP
– Part of vendor
evaluation
– Proceed with
contract including
InfoSec clauses
– Awareness training
1014
Security Hardening For Outsourced IT Assets
• Security evaluations:
– Include outsourced
scope in periodic
internal audit
– Ask for third-party
security review
– Vulnerability
assessment and
penetration test (if
END applicable)
– Spot security checks
1015
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
Module 116
1016
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
1018
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
POLICIES DASHBOARD
1019
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
DISA STIG
1020
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
VENDOR POLICIES
1022
QUALYS POLICY LIBRARIES
END
1023
What is Vulnerability Management ?
• What is a vulnerability ?
– …or in anything that
leaves information
security exposed to a
threat.
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/13
484/vulnerability
1025
What is Vulnerability Management ?
• What is vulnerability
management ?
– Vulnerability
management is the
"cyclical practice of
identifying,
classifying,
remediating, and
mitigating vulnerabiliti
es"
Foreman, P: Vulnerability Management,
page 1.
1028
What is Vulnerability Management ?
• What is vulnerability
assessment (VA) ?
– A process that
defines, identifies,
and classifies the
security holes
(vulnerabilities) in a
computer, network,
or communications
infrastructure.
http://searchmidmarketsecurity.techtarget
.com/definition/vulnerability-analysis
1029
What is Vulnerability Management ?
END
1030
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
1031
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
1. Analyze Assets
– Examine assets to
scan
– Gather details on IP
subnet
– Look at potential
issues with network
traffic
– Inform asset owners
and relevant
department heads
1032
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
2. Prepare Scanner
– Set scanner
parameters
– Select type of scan
– Look at credentials-
based scan
– Explore and research
plug-ins
– Do a test run
– Coordinate with asset
owner
1033
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
3. Run Vulnerability
Scanner
– Run the automated
scan
– Monitor network
performance
degradation issues
– Generate report
1034
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
4. Assess Results:
– Evaluate results
– Prioritize according
to the risk level
– Collate results for
asset owners
– Communicate the
results and
remediation timelines
1035
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
5. Patch Systems:
– Research
vulnerabilities
– Evaluate fixes and
remediation method
– Test the patches and
fixes
– Apply patches/fixes
– Monitor results
1036
What Are The Steps In VM Lifecycle ?
6. Verify (Re-scan)
– Re-scan to confirm
that the vulnerability
scanner gives a
positive report
– Collate results of
vulnerability scan
– Report findings
END
1037
Why Is Software Insecure ?
1039
Why Is Software Insecure ?
• Extensibility: “Second,
an extensible system is
one that supports
updates and extensions
and thereby allows
functionality to evolve
incrementally.
• Web browsers, for
example, support plug-
ins that enable users to
install extensions for
new document types.
1040
Why Is Software Insecure ?
• Extensibility:
…Extensibility is
attractive for purposes
of increasing
functionality, but also
makes it difficult to keep
the constantly-adapting
system free of software
vulnerabilities.”
https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-
cybersecurity-why-software-so-insecure
1041
Why Is Software Insecure ?
• Complexity: Software
systems are growing
exponentially in size and
complexity, which
makes vulnerabilities
unavoidable.
https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-
cybersecurity-why-software-so-insecure
1042
Why Is Software Insecure ?
• Carnegie Mellon
University's CyLab
Sustainable Computing
Consortium estimates
that commercial
software contains 20 to
30 bugs for every 1,000
lines of code…
https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/us-
cybersecurity-why-software-so-insecure
1043
Why Is Software Insecure ?
• —and Windows XP
contains at least 40
million lines of code
• That’s 1 million bugs in
Windows XP !
https://newrepublic.com/article/1151
45/us-cybersecurity-why-software-so-
insecure
1044
Why Is Software Insecure ?
• Monoculture: Dan
Greer: “The security
situation is
deteriorating, and that
deterioration
compounds when nearly
all computers in the
hands of end users rely
on a single operating
system subject to the
same vulnerabilities the
END
world over.”
https://newrepublic.com/article/115145/u
s-cybersecurity-why-software-so-insecure
1045
Why Is A VM Program Required ?
• What is patch
management ?
– Patch management is
an area of systems
management that
involves acquiring,
testing, and installing
multiple patches
(code changes) to an
administered
computer system.
http://searchenterprisedesktop.techtarget.
com/definition/patch-management
1047
Why Is A VM Program Required ?
• Patch management
tasks :
– Maintaining current
knowledge of
available patches,
deciding what
patches are
appropriate for
particular systems,
ensuring that patches
are installed…
http://searchenterprisedesktop.techtarget.
com/definition/patch-management
1048
Why Is A VM Program Required ?
• Patch management
tasks:
– properly, testing
systems after
installation, and
documenting all
associated
procedures, such as
specific configs
required.
http://searchenterprisedesktop.techtarget.com/
definition/patch-management
1049
Why Is A VM Program Required ?
1052
Why Is A VM Program Required ?
A VM program addresses
timely management of
patching to ensure that
vulnerabilities are not
present for hackers to
exploit…
END
1053
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
• What is CVE ?
– …across separate
vulnerability
capabilities (tools,
repositories, and
services) with this
"common
enumeration."
https://cve.mitre.org/about/faqs.html#c
ve_identifier_descriptions_created
1055
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
1056
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
What is NVD ?
• The NVD is the CVE
dictionary augmented
with additional analysis,
a database, and a fine-
grained search engine.
The NVD is a superset of
CVE. The NVD is
synchronized with CVE
such that any updates to
CVE appear immediately
on the NVD.
https://nvd.nist.gov/general/faq
1057
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
1058
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
https://nvd.nist.gov/general/faq
1059
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
SNAPSHOT OF CVE-2017-10788
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10788#vulnDescriptionTitle
1061
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10788#vulnDescriptionTitle
1062
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10788#vulnDescriptionTitle
1063
What Is CVE & Vulnerability Database ?
END
1064
What Is An Exploit ?
1065
What Is An Exploit ?
• Remote exploit:
– A remote exploit
works over a network
and exploits the
security vulnerability
without any prior
access to the
vulnerable system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploit_
(computer_security)
1066
What Is An Exploit ?
• Local exploit:
– A local exploit
requires prior access
to the vulnerable
system and usually
increases the
privileges of the
person running the
exploit past those
granted by the
system administrator.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploit_
(computer_security)
1067
What Is An Exploit ?
• Exploit database:
– The Exploit Database
is a CVE compliant
archive of public
exploits and
corresponding
vulnerable software,
developed for use by
penetration testers
and vulnerability
researchers. Our aim
is to serve the most
https://www.exploit-db.com/about/
1068
What Is An Exploit ?
• Exploit database:
– …comprehensive
collection of exploits
gathered through
direct submissions,
mailing lists, as well
as other public
sources, and present
them in a freely-
available and easy-to-
navigate database.
https://www.exploit-db.com/about/
1069
What Is An Exploit ?
• Exploit database:
– The Exploit Database
is a repository
for exploits and proof-
of-concepts rather
than advisories,
making it a valuable
resource for those
who need actionable
data right away.
https://www.exploit-db.com/about/
1070
What Is An Exploit ?
1071
What Is An Exploit ?
1072
What Is An Exploit ?
• Zero-day exploit:
– A zero day
vulnerability refers to
a hole in software
that is unknown to
the vendor. This
security hole is then
exploited by hackers
before the vendor
becomes aware and
hurries to fix
1073
What Is An Exploit ?
• Zero-day exploit:
– it-this exploit is called
a zero day attack.
http://www.pctools.com/security-
news/zero-day-vulnerability/
END
1074
Effective Vulnerability Management: Stage 2
1075
Effective Vulnerability Management: Stage 2
4 – LAYER SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION 4. Security
MODEL Governance
3. Security
Engineering
2. Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
1076
Effective Vulnerability Management: Stage 2
• Stage 1: Security
hardening
– Taking stock of your
assets
– Prioritizing the assets
– Establishing an MSB
– Implement security
controls with
CIS/DISA/Other
benchmarks
– Basic/broader
security hardening
1077
Effective Vulnerability Management: Stage 2
• Stage 1 (Hardening) is
equivalent to tightening
all the screws on
machinery and will
reduce impact of an
attack (like a shield)
• Stage 2 (Patching) will
seal all the entry points
for an attacker to gain
access or to penetrate a
system
1079
Effective Vulnerability Management: Stage 2
END
1080
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
1081
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
• Sequence of events:
– The attackers were
able to gain access to
one of Home Depot’s
vendor environments
by using a third-party
vendor’s logon
credentials
1082
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
• Sequence of events:
– Then they exploited a
zero-day vulnerability
in Windows, which
allowed them to
pivot from the
vendor-specific
environment to the
Home Depot
corporate
environment.
1083
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
• Sequence of events:
– Once they were in the
Home Depot
network, they were
able install memory
scraping malware on
over 7,500 self-
checkout POS
terminals (Smith,
2014).
1084
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
• Sequence of events:
– This malware was
able to grab 56
million credit and
debit cards. The
malware was also
able to capture 53
million email
addresses (Winter,
2014).
1085
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
• Sequence of events:
– The stolen payment
cards were used to
put up for sale and
bought by carders.
The stolen email
addresses were
helpful in putting
together large
phishing campaigns.
https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/breaches/case-study-home-
depot-data-breach-36367
1086
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/breaches/case-study-home-
depot-data-breach-36367
1087
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/breaches/case-study-home-
depot-data-breach-36367
1088
Security Breach Case Study 1: Home Dept 2014
END
1089
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
1090
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Sequence of events:
– Data breach began
on Feb. 18, 2014,
when a user within
one of Anthem's
subsidiaries opened a
phishing email
containing malicious
content
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-
in-depth-analysis-anthem-breach-a-9627
1091
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Sequence of events:
– Opening the email
launched the
download of
malicious files to the
user's computer and
allowed hackers to
gain remote access to
that computer and
dozens of other
systems within the…
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-
in-depth-analysis-anthem-breach-a-9627
1092
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Sequence of events:
– Anthem enterprise,
including Anthem's
data warehouse
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-
in-depth-analysis-anthem-breach-a-9627
1093
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Sequence of events:
– Starting with the
initial remote access,
the attacker was able
to move laterally
across Anthem
systems and escalate
privileges, gaining
increasingly greater
ability to access
information and
make changes in the
environment 1094
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Sequence of events:
– The attacker utilized
at least 50 accounts
and compromised at
least 90 systems
within the Anthem
enterprise
environment
including, eventually,
the company's
enterprise data
warehouse -
1095
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Sequence of events:
– a system that stores a
large amount of
consumer personally
identifiable
information
– Queries to that data
warehouse resulted
in access to an
exfiltration of
approximately 78.8 m
unique user records
1096
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Vulnerabilities:
– Exploitable
vulnerabilities were
found in anthem
network
– User security
awareness training
conducted to prevent
phishing and social
engineering
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-
in-depth-analysis-anthem-breach-a-9627
1097
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Remediation measures:
– Implemented two-
factor authentication
on all remote access
tools, deployed a
privileged account
management solution
and added enhanced
logging resources to
its security event and
incident management
solutions
1098
Security Breach Case Study 2: Anthem
• Remediation measures:
– Further, the company
conducted a
complete reset of
passwords for all
privileged users,
suspended all remote
END access pending
implementation of
two-factor
authentication and
created new Network
Admin IDs 1099
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc750077.aspx
1100
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
1101
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
1103
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
1105
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
1106
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
1107
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
1108
Best Practices For Applying Security Patches
3. Apply updates on a
need-only basis
4. Testing
5. Plan to uninstall
6. Working backup and
production downtime
7. Always have roll-back
plan
8. Don’t get more than 2
service packs behind
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc750077.aspx
1109
Who Conducts Vulnerability Management
1110
Who Conducts Vulnerability Management
1112
Who Conducts Vulnerability Management
1113
Who Conducts Vulnerability Management
1114
Who Conducts Vulnerability Management
1115
Who Conducts Vulnerability Management
END
1117
Nessus Features
1118
Nessus Features
• Nessus (Reports):
– Customize reports to
sort by vulnerability
or host
– Create an executive
summary or compare
scan results
– Targeted email
notifications of scan
results
1119
Nessus Features
1120
Nessus Features
1122
Nessus Features
1123
Nessus Features
1124
Nessus Features
1125
Nessus Features
• Nessus is a cost-
effective scanner that
gets most of the job
done for vulnerability
scanning
• It has CIS and DISA
compliance templates
• Has some flaws and
bugs but overall useful
tool
1126
Qualys Features
1127
Qualys Features
• Qualys:
– Cloud-based service
– On-premise device
– Complete suite
– Scalable and
immediate
deployment
1128
Qualys Features
• Qualys:
– Asset discovery; find
and organize hosts
– Prioritize & manage
remediation tickets
– Continuous
monitoring service
– Policy compliance
scanning
– Qualys Secure Seal
for websites
1129
Qualys Features
1130
Qualys Features
1131
Qualys Features
1132
Qualys Features
1133
Qualys Features
1134
Qualys Features
• Qualys:
– Website scanning
– compliance
– Annual subscription
service model
1135
Qualys Features
• Qualys is a convenient
and scalable VM tool
that comes with several
modules
• Subscription-based
pricing model which can
be expensive
• Several advantages due
to cloud-based service
1136
Nessus Demo - 1
1137
Nessus Demo - 1
LOGIN SCREEN
1138
Nessus Demo - 1
DASHBOARD
1139
Nessus Demo - 1
NEW SCAN
1140
Nessus Demo - 1
1141
Nessus Demo - 1
1142
Nessus Demo - 1
1143
Nessus Demo - 1
NEW SCAN…
1144
Nessus Demo - 1
1145
Nessus Demo - 1
CREDENTIAL SCAN
1146
Nessus Demo - 1
COMPLIANCE SCAN
1147
Nessus Demo - 1
WINDOWS COMPLIANCE MENU (CIS)
1148
Nessus Demo - 1
WINDOWS COMPLIANCE MENU (CIS)…
1149
Nessus Demo - 1
1150
Nessus Demo - 2
1151
Nessus Demo - 2
1152
Nessus Demo - 2
1153
Nessus Demo - 2
SCAN…IN PROGRESS
1154
Nessus Demo - 2
1155
Nessus Demo - 2
1156
Nessus Demo - 2
1157
Nessus Demo - 2
1158
Nessus Demo - 2
1159
Nessus Demo - 2
1160
Nessus Demo - 2
1161
Nessus Demo - 2
SCANS DASHBOARD
1162
Nessus Demo - 2
1163
Nessus Demo - 2
1164
Nessus Demo - 2
1165
Nessus Demo - 2
1166
Nessus Demo - 3
1167
Nessus Demo - 3
1168
Nessus Demo - 3
1169
Nessus Demo - 3
SCAN DASHBOARD
1170
Nessus Demo - 3
1171
Nessus Demo - 3
1172
Nessus Demo - 3
1173
Qualys Demo - 1
1174
Qualys Demo - 1
1175
Qualys Demo - 1
1176
Qualys Demo - 1
1177
Qualys Demo - 1
PROTOCOL DETAILS
1178
Qualys Demo - 1
QUALYS FREESCAN
1179
Qualys Demo - 1
QUALYS FREESCAN
1180
Qualys Demo - 1
1181
Qualys Demo - 1
THREAT REPORT
1182
Qualys Demo - 1
THREAT REPORT
1183
Qualys Demo - 1
• Qualys is a powerful
cloud-based
vulnerability
management tool
• Several online free tools
• Advanced web
application security
testing
END
1184
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
1185
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
QUALYS
14 APPLICATIONS
1186
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
1187
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
SCAN INITIATED
1189
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
1190
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
1191
QUALYS DEMO - PART 2
1193
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
1194
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
RULESET BUILDER
1195
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
RULESETS INTERFACE
1197
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
1198
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
PROFILE CREATION
1199
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
CHOOSE RULESET
1200
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
NOTIFICATIONS
1201
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
1202
QUALYS DEMO - PART 3
• Qualys Continuous
Monitoring is very useful
for watching critical
changes that may
impact security
END
1203
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-
1068
1204
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
• QualysGuard scanning
methodology mainly
focuses on the different
steps that an attacker
might follow in order to
perform an attack.
• It tries to use exactly the
same discovery and
information gathering
techniques that will be
used by an attacker.
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-
1068
1205
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1206
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
2. Firewall detection
The second test is to check
if the host is behind any
firewalling/filtering device.
This test enables the
scanner to gather more
information about the
network infrastructure and
will help during the scan of
TCP and UDP ports.
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1208
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1209
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
4. OS Detection
Once the TCP port
scanning has been
performed, the scanner
tries to identify the
operating system running
on the host.
This detection is based on
sending specific TCP
packets to open and
closed ports.
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1210
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1211
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
6. Vulnerability
assessment based on the
services detected
Once the scanner has
identified the specific
services running on each
open TCP and UDP port, it
performs the actual
vulnerability assessment.
The scanner first tries to
check the version of the
service in order to detect...
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1212
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
6. Vulnerability
assessment based on the
services detected
…only vulnerabilities
applicable to this specific
service version. Every
vulnerability detection is
non-intrusive, meaning
that the scanner never
exploits a vulnerability if it
could negatively affect the
host in any way.
https://community.qualys.com/docs/DOC-1068
1213
How Do VM Scanners Work ?
• Limitations:
– Vulnerability scanners
work in the same
manner as antivirus
programs do by using
databases that store
descriptions of
different types of
vulnerabilities
– False positive or false
negative rate
http://www.spamlaws.com/how-
vulnerability-scanning-works.html
1214
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
1215
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
DASHBOARD
1216
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
1217
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
ASSET DETAILS
1218
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
CRAWL SCOPE
1219
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
SCAN SETTINGS
1220
QUALYS WEB APPLICATION SCANNING
MALWARE MONITORING
1221
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
1222
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
1224
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
1227
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
iDefense Intelligence
1228
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
SEARCH KNOWLEDGEBASE
1229
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
1230
QUALYS ADDITIONAL FEATURES
END
1231
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
1232
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
DASHBOARD VIEW
1233
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
SCANS DASHBOARD
1234
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
ASSETS DASHBOARD
1235
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
OS BY VULNERABILITY SCORE
1236
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
1237
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
1238
Open Source Vulnerability Scanners
OPENVAS ARCHITECTURE
• OpenVAS is a simple,
free (opensource) VA
scanner
• It has source code
documentation, virtual
images for download,
and mailing lists on its
website
END
1240
Suggested Frequency For VM Scanning
1241
Suggested Frequency For VM Scanning
• At the start:
– Organizations
scanning once a year
or not at all
– Vulnerabilities
identified by internal
scanning or external
VA report
– Not remediated
– Lack of discipline and
management support
1242
Suggested Frequency For VM Scanning
• As organizations get
more mature in scanning
discipline:
– Quarterly scan
– Quarterly
remediation by IT
teams
– Quarterly report to IT
Steering Committee
1243
Suggested Frequency For VM Scanning
• Mature organizations:
– Monthly scan
– Monthly remediation
– Quarterly or bi-annual
external VA/PT
– Monthly reports to IT
Steering Committee
1244
Suggested Frequency For VM Scanning
• Most mature
organizations:
– Fortnightly scan
– Fortnightly
remediation
– Monthly reporting
1245
VM Challenges & Pitfalls
1246
VM Challenges & Pitfalls
• Internal expertise on VM
tool
– Not too much
expertise required
– Create testbed
– Monitor traffic
pattern
– Train staff if possible
– Patch small portions
of the network first
1247
VM Challenges & Pitfalls
• Patching causing
application failure:
– In test environment
create work around
or compensating
controls
– Test the
compensating
controls
– Document the
compensating
controls
1249
VM Challenges & Pitfalls
• Not enough
management support:
– Share reports with
management
highlighting recent
incidents
– Share industry-
specific or
geographically
relevant breach
reports
– Create awareness
1250
IT Asset Management Challenges
1251
IT Asset Management Challenges
• Challenges:
– Asset discovery &
tracking
– Antivirus status
– Windows & OS
updates
– Patch management
– Change management
1252
IT Asset Management Challenges
1253
IT Asset Management Challenges
• Antivirus status:
– Working and updated
antivirus critical to a
security managed
network
– Geographically
dispersed network
– Some stations not
responding or
updating
1254
IT Asset Management Challenges
• Patch management:
– Scanning for
vulnerabilities
– Passing on reports to
IT teams
– Tracking the
remediation
– Re-scanning for
verification
– Reporting to
management
1256
IT Asset Management Challenges
• Change management:
– Change management
inherent to all change
processes
– Change management
requires reviews and
approvals
– Configuration
management
END
database or
repository
1257
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
1258
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
1259
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
1260
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
1262
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
1263
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
1264
ASSET MANAGEMENT THROUGH QUALYS
END
1265
ASSET MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS
1267
ASSET MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS
• Unified endpoint
management (UEM)
tools combine the
management of multiple
endpoint types in a
single console. UEM
tools perform the
following functions:
GARTNER UEM 2018
REPORT
1269
ASSET MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS
https://www.ibm.com/security/endpoint-security/bigfix
1272
ASSET MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS
MICROSOFT SOFTWARE
RESTRICTION POLICIES
(SRP) FOR WHITELISTING
• Software Restriction
Policies (SRP) is Group
Policy-based feature
that identifies software
programs running on
computers in a domain,
and controls the ability
of those programs to
run.
1273
ASSET MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS
• …Software restriction
policies are part of the
Microsoft security and
management strategy to
assist enterprises in
increasing the reliability,
integrity, and
manageability of their
computers.
1274
ASSET MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONS
1277
WHAT IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION 4. Security
Governance
MODEL
3. Security
Engineering
2.
Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
1278
WHAT IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
1281
WHAT IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
• Why at Layer 3 of
Security Transformation
Model ?
– Low hanging fruit
first
– Teams tend to get
bogged down with
advanced security
tasks
– These take time,
END
effort, and often
budget approval
1283
WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
SECURITY ENGINEERING
STRUCTURE
OPERATION
ARCHITECTURE
1285
WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
• Examples:
– FW first and then IPS
– Edge FW, data center
FW
– Malware protection
at the network edge
– VPN termination on
remote access VPN
device
– VPN tunnels for
extranet connectivity
1286
WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
1287
WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
1288
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
1289
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
Program
Manager
1290
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
ACTIVITY TEAM
1291
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IS SECURITY ENGINEERING ?
• As Security Engineering
involves in-depth
knowledge of IT &
Security, the necessary
resources, knowledge,
skills, and people need
to be pooled to achieve
the objectives
effectively
END
1292
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
Module 148
1293
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1294
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1295
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
https://www.cisecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Poster_Winter2016_CSCs.pdf
1296
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
• CSC 1: Inventory of
Authorized and
Unauthorized Devices
• CSC 2: Inventory of
Authorized and
Unauthorized Software
• CSC 3: Secure
Configurations for
Hardware and Software
on Mobile Devices,
Laptops, Workstations,
and Servers
1297
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
• CSC 4: Continuous
Vulnerability
Assessment and
Remediation
• CSC 5: Controlled Use
of Administrative
Privileges
• CSC 6: Maintenance,
Monitoring, and
Analysis of Audit Logs
1298
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
• CSC 8: Malware
Defenses
• CSC 9: Limitation and
Control of Network
Ports, Protocols, and
Services
• CSC 10: Data Recovery
Capability
1299
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
1300
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
1301
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
1302
CIS 20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
END
1303
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1304
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1305
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1307
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1309
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
• …network equipment
(routers, switches,
firewalls, etc.),
printers, storage area
networks, Voice Over-
IP telephones, multi-
homed addresses,
virtual addresses, etc.
1310
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1311
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1312
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
1313
CSC1: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Devices
END
1314
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1315
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1316
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1317
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1318
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1319
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1320
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1321
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1322
CSC2: Inventory Of Authorized & Unauthorized Software
1323
CSC3-I: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
Module 151
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1324
CSC3-I: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1326
CSC3-I: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1329
CSC3-I: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
• 3.3…: Alternatively,
these master images
can be stored in offline
machines, air-gapped
from the production
network, with images
copied via secure media
to move them between
the image storage
servers and the
production network.
1330
CSC3-I: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1331
CSC3-I: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1332
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
Module 152
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1333
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1334
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1336
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1337
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1338
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1339
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
1340
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
• 3.6…: Whenever
possible use tools
compliant with the
Security Content
Automation Protocol
(SCAP) in order to
streamline reporting
and integration.
1341
CSC3-II: Secure Configurations For HW & SW
END
1343
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
Module 153
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1344
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1345
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1346
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1347
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
• Vulnerabilities and
Exposures entries) and
configuration-based
vulnerabilities (as
enumerated by the
Common Configuration
Enumeration Project).
1348
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1349
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
• 4.2…: Second,
personnel should be
able to correlate attack
detection events with
prior vulnerability
scanning results to
determine whether the
given exploit was used
against a target known
to be vulnerable.
1350
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
• 4.3: Perform
vulnerability scanning in
authenticated mode
either with agents
running locally on each
end system to analyze
the security
configuration or with
remote scanners that
are given administrative
rights on the system
being tested.
1351
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1352
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1353
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
• 4.4: Subscribe to
vulnerability intelligence
services in order to stay
aware of emerging
exposures, and use the
information gained from
this subscription to
update the
organization’s
vulnerability scanning
activities on at least a
monthly basis.
1354
CSC4-I: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
• 4.4…: Alternatively,
ensure that the
vulnerability scanning
tools you use are
regularly updated with
all relevant important
security vulnerabilities.
END
1355
CSC4-II: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
Module 154
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1356
CSC4-II: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1357
CSC4-II: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
1359
CSC4-II: Continuous Vuln. Assessment & Remediation
Module 155
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1363
CSC5-I: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
• 5.1: Minimize
administrative
privileges and only use
administrative
accounts when they
are required.
Implement focused
auditing on the use of
administrative
privileged functions
and monitor for
anomalous behavior.
1364
CSC5-I: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
1365
CSC5-I: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
1367
CSC5-I: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
END
1368
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
Module 156
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1369
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
1370
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
• 5.6…: Multi-factor
authentication can
include a variety of
techniques, to include
the use of smart cards,
certificates, One Time
Password (OTP) tokens,
biometrics, or other
similar authentication
methods.
1371
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
1372
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
• 5.8: Administrators
should be required to
access a system using a
fully logged and non-
administrative account.
1373
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
• 5.9: Administrators
shall use a dedicated
machine for all
administrative tasks or
tasks requiring
elevated access.
1375
CSC5-II: Controlled Use Of Administrative Privileges
1376
Information Security Transformation
Module 157
• CSC6-1: Maintenance,
Monitoring, Analysis of
Audit Logs
1377
CSC6-1: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1378
CSC6-1: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1379
CSC6-1: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1380
CSC6-1: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1382
Information Security Transformation
Week 10
Module 158 • CSC6-II: Maintenance,
Monitoring, Analysis of
Audit Logs
1383
CSC6-II: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1384
CSC6-II: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1385
CSC6-II: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1386
CSC6-II: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1387
CSC6-II: Maintenance, Monitoring, Analysis of Audit Logs
1388
Information Security Transformation
Module 159
• CSC7-1: EMAIL AND
WEB BROWSER
PROTECTION
1389
CSC7-1: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1390
CSC7-1: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1391
CSC7-1: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
• 7.2: Disable
Unnecessary or
Unauthorized Browser
or Email Client Plugins
• Uninstall or disable any
unauthorized browser
or email client plugins
or add-on applications.
1392
CSC7-1: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1393
CSC7-1: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1394
CSC7-1: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1395
Information Security Transformation
Module 160
• CSC7-II: EMAIL AND
WEB BROWSER
PROTECTION
1396
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1397
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1398
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1399
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1400
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
• 7.8: Implement
DMARC and Enable
Receiver-side
Verification
• …starting by
implementing the
sender policy
Framework(SPF) and
the Domain keys
Identified Mail(DKIM)
standards.
1401
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
• 7.9: Block
Unnecessary File
Types
• Block all email
attachments entering
the organization’s
email gateway if the
files types are
unnecessary for the
organization’s
business.
1402
CSC7-II: EMAIL AND WEB BROWSER PROTECTION
1403
Information Security Transformation
Module 161
• CSC8-I: MALWARE
DEFENSES
1404
CSC8-I: Malware Defenses
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1405
CSC8-I: Malware Defenses
1406
CSC8-I: Malware Defenses
1407
CSC8-I: Malware Defenses
1408
CSC8-I: Malware Defenses
1409
CSC8-I: Malware Defenses
1411
Information Security Transformation
Module 162
• CSC8-II: MALWARE
DEFENSES
1412
CSC8-II: Malware Defenses
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1413
CSC8-II: Malware Defenses
1415
CSC8-II: Malware Defenses
• 8.8: Enable
Command-line Audit
Logging
• Enable Command-line
audit logging for
command shells, such
as Microsoft
PowerShell and Bash.
1416
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
1417
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1418
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1419
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
1420
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
1421
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
1422
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
1423
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
9.5: Implement
Application Firewalls
• Place application
firewalls in front of any
critical servers to verify
and validate the traffic
going to the server. Any
unauthorized traffic
should be blocked and
logged.
1424
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
• …listening on each
discovered port. This list
of services and their
versions are compared
against an inventory of
services required by the
organization for each
server and workstation
in an asset management
system.
1426
CIS CONTROL 9: LIMITATION & CONTROL OF NETWORK
1427
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
1428
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1429
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1430
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
1431
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
1432
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
1433
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
1435
CIS CONTROL 10: DATA RECOVERY CAPABILITIES
1438
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1439
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1440
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
1441
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
1442
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
1443
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
END
1445
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES-II
1446
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1447
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1448
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
1449
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
1450
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
1451
CIS CONTROL 11: SECURE CONFIG FOR NETWORK DEVICES
END
1453
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
1454
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1455
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1456
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
1457
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
12.3: Deny
Communications with
Known Malicious IP
Addresses
• Deny communications
with known malicious or
unused Internet IP
addresses and limit
access only to trusted
and necessary IP
address ranges at
each…
1459
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
12.3: Deny
Communications with
Known Malicious IP
Addresses
• …of the organization's
network boundaries.
1460
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
1461
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - I
END
1462
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
1463
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1464
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1465
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
1466
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
1467
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
1468
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - II
END
1469
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
1470
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1471
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1472
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
1473
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
1474
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
1475
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
1476
CIS CONTROL 12: BOUNDARY DEFENSE - III
END
1478
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
1479
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1480
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1481
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
1482
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
1483
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
1484
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-I
END
1486
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-II
1487
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1488
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1489
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-II
1490
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-II
1491
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-II
END
1492
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-III
1493
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1494
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1495
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-III
1496
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-III
1497
CIS CONTROL 13: DATA PROTECTION-III
END
1498
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
1499
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1500
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1501
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
1502
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
1503
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
1504
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
1505
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
1506
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-I
END
1508
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
1509
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1510
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1511
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
1512
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
1513
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
1514
CIS CONTROL 14: CONTROLLED ACCESS-NEED TO KNOW-II
1517
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1518
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1519
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-I
1520
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-I
1521
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-I
1522
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-II
1523
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1524
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1525
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-II
1526
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-II
END
1528
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-III
1529
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1530
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1531
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-III
1532
CIS CONTROL 15: WIRELESS ACCESS CONTROL-III
1534
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
Module 178
1535
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1536
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1537
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
1538
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
1539
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
1540
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-I
END
1541
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
1542
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1543
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1544
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
1545
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
16.6: Maintain an
Inventory of Accounts
• Maintain an inventory of
all accounts organized
by authentication
system.
1546
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
1548
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-II
1549
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
1550
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1551
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1552
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
1553
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
1554
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
1555
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
1556
CIS CONTROL 16: ACCOUNT MONITORING & CONTROL-III
END
1557
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
1558
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1559
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1560
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
1561
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
1562
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
1564
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-I
1566
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1567
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1568
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
1569
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
1570
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
1571
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
1572
CIS CONTROL 17: SECURITY AWARENESS & TRAINING-II
END
1573
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
1574
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1575
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1576
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
1577
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
END
1580
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
1581
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1582
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1583
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-II
1584
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-II
1585
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-II
1586
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-II
1588
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1589
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-III
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1590
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-III
1591
CIS CONTROL 18: APPLICATION SOFTWARE SECURITY-III
1595
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-I
1596
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1597
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1598
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-I
1599
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-I
19.3: Designate
Management Personnel to
Support Incident Handling
• Designate management
personnel, as well as
backups, who will
support the incident
handling process by
acting in key decision-
making roles.
1601
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-I
1603
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
1604
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1605
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1606
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
1608
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
1609
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
1611
CIS CONTROL 19: INCIDENT RESPONSE & MANAGEMENT-II
1613
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1614
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1615
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
20.1: Establish a
Penetration Testing
Program
• Establish a program for
penetration tests that
includes a full scope of
blended attacks, such as
wireless, client-based,
and web application
attacks.
1616
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
1617
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
1618
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
1619
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-I
1620
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-II
1621
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1622
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-II
https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/
1623
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-II
1625
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-II
1628
CIS CONTROL 20: PEN TESTS & RED TEAM EXERCISES-II
END
1630
What Is IT Governance ?
1631
What Is IT Governance ?
• What is IT Governance ?
– Simply put, it’s
putting structure
around how
organizations align IT
strategy with
business strategy,
ensuring that
companies stay on
track to achieve their
strategies and goals,
http://www.cio.com/article/2438931/governance/it
-governance-definition-and-solutions.html
1632
What Is IT Governance ?
• What is IT Governance ?
– …and implementing
good ways to
measure IT’s
performance.
– It makes sure that all
stakeholders’
interests are taken
into account and that
processes provide
measurable results.
http://www.cio.com/article/2438931/governance/it
-governance-definition-and-solutions.html
1633
What Is IT Governance ?
• What is IT Governance ?
– An IT governance
framework should
answer key questions
such as how the IT
dept is functioning
overall, what key
metrics management
needs and what
return IT is giving
back to the business
from investments
http://www.cio.com/article/2438931/governance/it
-governance-definition-and-solutions.html
1634
What Is IT Governance ?
• Frameworks which
cover IT Governance:
– ISO27001: 2013
(Information Security
Management System
- ISMS)
– ITIL (IT Infrastructure
Library)
– COBIT (Control
Objectives for
Information &
Related Technology)
https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/it_governance
1635
What Is IT Governance ?
IT Governance
Resource
Management
1636
What Is IT Governance ?
• What is COBIT ?
– Simply stated, COBIT
5 helps enterprises to
create optimal value
from IT by
maintaining a balance
between realising
benefits and
optimising risk levels
and resource use.
END
1637
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• What is Information
Security governance ?
– ensuring that
objectives are
achieved, ascertaining
that risks are
managed
appropriately and
verifying that the
enterprise's resources
are used responsibly."
IT Governance Institute (ITGI), Guidance
For Boards of Directors & Executive
Management, 2nd Edition
1639
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• Information Security
governance is the
mechanism how the
information security
function is managed by
the organization
1640
What Is Information Security Governance ?
IT Governance
IT Service
Information Business Management
IT Project
Security Continuity & &
Management
Governance DR Performance
Management
1641
What Is Information Security Governance ?
1642
What Is Information Security Governance ?
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
1643
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• Clauses 4 to 10 of
ISO27001:2013
– 4: Organization &
context, scope
– 5: Leadership &
commitment, policy,
organizational roles &
responsibilities
– 6: Planning; Infosec
objectives and
planning to achieve
them
1644
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• Clauses 4 to 10 of
ISO27001:2013
– 7: Support; resources,
competence,
awareness
– 8: Operations; risk
assessment and risk
management
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
1645
What Is Information Security Governance ?
• Clauses 4 to 10 of
ISO27001:2013
– 9: Performance
evaluation;
monitoring,
measurement &
analysis; internal
audit
– 10: Non-conformities
& corrective actions,
continual
END
improvement
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
1646
Why Is InfoSec Governance At Stage 4 ?
1647
Why Is InfoSec Governance At Stage 4 ?
INFORMATION
SECURITY 4. Security
TRANSFORMATION Governance
MODEL
3. Security
Engineering
2. Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
1648
Why Is InfoSec Governance At Stage 4 ?
• Why is security
governance at stage 4?
– First build a building
and then manage it
– First 2 stages build up
the essential
foundation
– 3rd stage implements
advanced security
measures
– Then (4th stage) it is
time to manage ….
1649
Why Is InfoSec Governance At Stage 4 ?
• Limited organizational
bandwidth ?
– Governance is a
broad function
– May get lost in
governance if
implement at the
wrong time
– Spend limited
resources where they
count most (in
security hardening)
1650
Why Is InfoSec Governance At Stage 4 ?
• Pakistan’s InfoSec
paradigm –
– Governance overkill
– Reactive
– Superficial
– Complete absence of
underlying security
controls
– …that is why security
transformation is
required
1651
Why Is InfoSec Governance At Stage 4 ?
• Organizational security
maturity…when does
governance make sense
?
• Governance is important
but only after security
hardening & controls
(stage 1, 2, and 3) are in
place…
END
1653
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
1654
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
INFORMATION
4. Security
SECURITY Governance
TRANSFORMATION
MODEL
3. Security
Engineering
2. Vulnerability
Management
1. Security
Hardening
1655
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
• Implications of
implementing Stage 4
before first 3 stages:
– Expending project
energy, resources,
and time in
governance whereas
they should have
been spent on
building fundamental
security foundation
(which later requires
management) 1656
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
• Implications of
implementing Stage 4
before first 3 stages:
– Getting caught up in
intangible
“governance” activity
– Getting caught up in
policy & management
without essential and
fundamental
underlying security
controls
1657
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
• Implications of
implementing Stage 4
before first 3 stages:
– Setting unrealistic
expectations
– Note that
governance consists
of documentation
and process which
tends to bog down
and dis-interest tech
resources
1658
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
• Why ?
– We know what works
and is implementable
in terms of security
controls
– Controls are
implemented
incrementally
(practical)
– Minimal policy in
place at initial stages
as a starting point
1660
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
• However:
– Certain projects may
have governance
stipulations by the
regulator/customers
– Deadline to achieve
certain governance or
security milestones
– In such cases tailor
security
transformation
project
1661
Can InfoSec Governance Be Before Stage 4 ?
1663
Pakistan’s InfoSecurity Posture & Challenges
InfoSec
Audit
IT Complian
ce
Risk
1664
Pakistan’s InfoSecurity Posture & Challenges
IT CHALLENGES SUMMARY
1665
Pakistan’s InfoSecurity Posture & Challenges
1666
Pakistan’s InfoSecurity Posture & Challenges
1667
Pakistan’s InfoSecurity Posture & Challenges
Security
Harden ? Manage
Security ?
1668
Pakistan’s InfoSecurity Posture & Challenges
1669
InfoSec Governance Building Blocks
1670
InfoSec Governance Building Blocks
Respon-
Policy
sibility
Resource Periodic
& Priority Review
1671
InfoSec Governance Building Blocks
CHANGE
SOPs
MANAGEMENT
INTERM-
EDIATE
AWARENESS MONITORING
1672
InfoSec Governance Building Blocks
INTERNAL AUDIT
1673
InfoSec Governance Building Blocks
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT CYCLE
CONTINUAL
IMPROVEMENT
CORRECTIVE
ASSESSMENT
ACTION
1674
InfoSec Governance Building Blocks
• Governance
implementation should
be broken up into
phases
– Essential (initial)
activities first
– Gradually progress
with activities that
match organizational
readiness & maturity
END
1675
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
1676
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
1677
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
1678
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
• Based on experience
with real Information
Security Transformation
projects in the Pakistan
industry, we have set a
more practical structure
as shown in the
following slides
• Well-suited to drive the
Security Transformation
project successfully
1679
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
InfoSec Steering
Comm. IT MANAGEMENT
& CISO
[MONTHLY]
Information Security
CISO
Management Committee
(ISMC) [WEEKLY]
TEAMS
IT / InfoSec Teams [DAILY]
1680
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
[MONTHLY]
Information Security
STRATEGY &
Management Committee PLANNING
(ISMC) [WEEKLY]
1681
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
InfoSec Steering
Comm. REVIEW, MONITOR,
PROPOSE
[MONTHLY]
Information Security
PLAN, BUILD,
Management Committee RUN
(ISMC) [WEEKLY]
1682
Whose Responsibility Is InfoSec Governance ?
1684
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
Respon-
Policy
sibility
Resource Periodic
& Priority Review
1685
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
1686
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
CHANGE
SOPs
MANAGEMENT
INTERM-
EDIATE
AWARENESS MONITORING
1687
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
INTERMEDIATE GOVERNANCE BUILDING BLOCKS
ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE DETAIL
CHANGE IT MANAGEMENT ESTABLISHING AND ENFORCING
MANAGEMENT A CHANGE MANAGEMENT
PROCESS
SOPs IT MANAGEMENT DEVELOPING STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES BASED
ON ACTUAL PRACTICE
AWARENESS CISO/ CONDUCTING SECURITY
SECURITY TEAMS AWARENESS TRAINING
INTERNAL AUDIT
1689
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
1690
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT CYCLE
CONTINUAL
IMPROVEMENT
CORRECTIVE
ASSESSMENT
ACTION
1691
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT CYCLE
ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE DETAIL
CONTINUAL BOARD/ CONTINUAL STEPS FOR THE
IMPROVEMENT EXECUTIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF INFOSEC
PROGRAM
CORRECTIVE IT MANAGEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR NON-
ACTIONS / INFOSEC CONFORMITIES AND GAPS
THIRD-PARTY BOARD/INFOSEC CONDUCT THIRD-PARTY
ASSESSMENTS ASSESSMENTS SUCH AS VA/PT,
GAP ANALYSIS
1692
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
• Information Security
governance can quickly
become a challenge as
governance is
considered an intangible
– How do you achieve
governance ?
– When do you know
you have achieved it ?
– How you drive
process and
documentation in IT ?
1693
How Is InfoSec Governance Implemented ?
1695
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
Leadership
Culture Strategy
InfoSec
Governance
Project
Structure
Mngmt
Reporting
1696
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Leadership:
– Executive
management role
– Tone at the top
– Drive pressing
priority
– Approves budgets
and resources
– Periodic review of
progress
1697
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Strategy:
– How the objectives
will be practically
achieved while
achieving the
technical,
governance, and
performance goals
– How the organization
will gear up and focus
for the security
transformation
1698
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Structure:
– What hierarchies,
team structures,
reporting lines, and
resources will come
together
– How will different
teams work together
to achieve the
common goals ?
1699
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Reporting:
– What will be
reported?
– What will be the
frequency of reports?
– Who will perform
review and
assurance?
– Who will monitor and
track progress?
1700
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Project Management:
– How will an
exceptional
execution discipline
be built ?
– How will milestones
and performance be
tracked ?
– How will project
management best-
practices be utilized?
1701
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Culture:
– How will an open,
cooperative,
authentic, and
committed culture be
built ?
– How will contention
and conflict be
eliminated ?
– How will a
performance driven
culture be promoted?
1702
How To Build Effective InfoSec Governance ?
• Building effective
information security
governance or an
effective information
security transformation
project are based on
good management,
execution and project
management skills
END
1703
InfoSec Dept Structure (Large-Sized Org)
1704
InfoSec Dept Structure (Large-Sized Org)
CISO
Program
Manager
Security
Security Security Security
Frameworks &
Engineering Operations Governance
Standards
1705
InfoSec Dept Structure (Large-Sized Org)
CISO
Program
Manager
Security
Security Security Security
Frameworks &
Engineering Operations Governance
Standards
1706
InfoSec Dept Structure (Large-Sized Org)
CISO
Program
Manager
Security
Security Security Security
Frameworks &
Engineering Operations Governance
Standards
POLICIES,
NETWORK, RUNNING
SOPS, ISO27001,
SYSTEMS, VARIOUS
COMPLIANCE, COBIT,
APPLICATION, SECURITY OPS
AUDITS, CMMI
DB TOOLS, SOC
TRAINING
1707
InfoSec Dept Structure (Large-Sized Org)
TOTAL:
1 CISO
30
Program
1 Manager
Security
Security Security Security
Frameworks &
Engineering Operations Governance
Standards
6 15 4 3
1708
InfoSec Dept Structure (Large-Sized Org)
1709
InfoSec Dept Structure (Mid-Sized Org)
1710
InfoSec Dept Structure (Mid-Sized Org)
CISO
1711
InfoSec Dept Structure (Mid-Sized Org)
CISO
Policies, Procedures,
AV, SOC, Security
Domain Knowledge Training,
Tools, VM
Frameworks
1712
InfoSec Dept Structure (Mid-Sized Org)
CISO
TOTAL:
1 CISO 12
1714
InfoSec Dept Structure (Mid-Sized Org)
• A mid-sized organization
can have an Infosec
team ranging between
10-15 staff
• 10% of IT (100 to 150 IT
staff)
END
1715
InfoSec Dept Structure (Small Org)
1716
InfoSec Dept Structure (Small Org)
CISO
Security Security
Operations Governance
1717
InfoSec Dept Structure (Small Org)
CISO
Security
Security Technology
Governance
1718
InfoSec Dept Structure (Small Org)
CISO
Security Security
Technology Governance
RUNNING POLICIES/SOPS,
VARIOUS COMPLIANCE,
SECURITY OPS AUDITS,
TOOLS, TECH TRAINING
1719
InfoSec Dept Structure (Small Org)
TOTAL:
1 CISO 6
Security Security
Technology Governance
3 2
1720
InfoSec Dept Structure (Small Org)
• A small-sized
organization can have
an Infosec team ranging
between 2-4 staff
• 10% of IT (15 to 50 IT
staff)
END
1721
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
1722
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
Technology
Domain
Knowledge
Governance
Domain
CISO Leadership
& Strategy
Knowledge Skills
People Skills
1723
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
1724
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
• Technology Domain
Knowledge
– CISOs or security
heads usually have 5-
10 years experience in
IT followed by 3-5
years in Information
Security
– CISOs are typically
strong in 2-3 domain
areas such as…
1727
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
• Technology Domain
Knowledge
– …networking +
infrastructure OR
software + databases
OR software QA &
process engineering
– A good CISO is able to
build a good team to
cover all major
domain areas and all
functional reqmts
1728
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
• Technology Domain
Knowledge
– Having a solid
technical base, good
CISOs are able to
easily build a security
competence layer on
top of it
1729
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
• Governance domain
knowledge:
– Working with
regulators &
compliance
– Policies & SOPs
– Frameworks &
standards
– A passion for training
& awareness
1730
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
• Governance domain
knowledge:
– A process oriented
mindset to
successfully build a
strong InfoSec
program
– Ability to balance
people, process, and
technology
1731
Role Of CISO In Driving Infosec Program
• Placement
– Within IT
– Within risk
– Reporting to board
committee
1733
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
1734
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
Poor
executive
commitment
Poor
Poor
structure &
execution
strategy
Failed
Project
1735
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
• Executive management
– Allocates budget and
approves resources
– Sets organizational
priority & “tone at
the top”
– Even if you start a
program without
executive
management
support, it may not
last long
1736
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
• Executive management:
– Periodic reviews by
executive
management drive
the execution in the
IT organization
– Organizational
priorities may change
quickly if executive
management does
not sustain its
commitment
1737
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
1739
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
• Execution:
– All information
security projects boil
down to strong
execution & project
management once
leadership
commitment and
strategy/structure
issues are addressed
1740
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
• Execution:
– Allocating tasks to
run different phases
in parallel &
sequentially
– Prioritizing tasks
– Tracking progress
– Reporting
dashboards
– Team/Steering
Committee/Board
presentations
1741
Key Inhibitors For Security Program Failure
• Failure of the
Information Security
program will be
imminent if any one of
these three elements
(leadership,
strategy/structure,
execution) is not
adequately addressed
END
1742
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
1743
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
Limited
budget
Adhoc Untrained
culture staff
Smaller
Orgs
1744
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
• Limited budget:
– Limited priority with
limited resources
– Break up project into
phases matching
resource allocation &
organizational
bandwidth available
– Limit scope to 1
location,
department, team, or
even to 1 application
1745
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
• Limited budget:
– Consider hiring one
competent security
or IT member in the
team
– Provide management
support and periodic
review
– 12 to 15 months for
security
transformation
1746
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
• Untrained staff:
– Consider hiring a
consultant
– Train, incentivize,
and motivate team
– Give time to the team
to adopt the security
culture & processes
– Periodic
management reviews
& corrective actions
1747
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
• Adhoc culture:
– Smaller & newer
organizations may
have a chaotic and
adhoc culture
– Lack of process
approach
– Resources not
disciplined for
consistent delivery
1748
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
• Adhoc culture:
– Rapidly changing
focus and attention
span
– May be resolved with
a good project leader
or competent
consultant
– Training & setting
organizational vision
1749
InfoSec Strategy For Smaller Organizations
1750
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
1751
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
Defective &
Process
voluminous
culture absent
documents
1753
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
1756
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
1758
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
1760
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
1761
Common Challenges: Security Documentation
https://frsecure.com/blog/dif
ferentiating-between-
policies-standards-
procedures-and-guidelines/
1763
Security Documentation: Policies
https://frsecure.com/blog/differentiating-between-policies-standards-
procedures-and-guidelines/
1764
Security Documentation: Policies
• Policies
Policies are formal
statements produced
and supported by senior
management. They can
be organization-wide,
issue-specific or system
specific. Your
organization’s policies
should reflect your
objectives for your
information security
program. 1765
Security Documentation: Policies
• Policies
Your policies should be
like a building
foundation; built to
last and resistant to
change or erosion.
1766
Security Documentation: Policies
• Policies
1. Driven by business
objectives and convey
the amount of risk
senior management is
willing to accept.
1767
Security Documentation: Policies
• Policies
2. Easily accessible and
understood by the
intended reader
1768
Security Documentation: Policies
• Policies
3. Created with the intent
to be in place for
several years and
regularly reviewed with
approved changes made
as needed.
1769
Security Documentation: Policies
TITLE
DOC #
VERSION #
CLASSIFICATION
DATE
1770
Security Documentation: Policies
HEADER
REVISION HISTORY
REVIEW HISTORY
APPROVED BY
1771
Security Documentation: Policies
1772
Security Documentation: Policies
INTRODUCTION
SCOPE
POLICY DESCRIPTION
1773
Security Documentation: Policies
POLICY COMMUNICATION
REVIEW
ENFORCEMENT
1774
Security Documentation: Policies
1775
Security Documentation: Policies
• Policies
• Standards
• Procedures
• Guidelines
https://frsecure.com/blog
/differentiating-between-
policies-standards-
procedures-and-
guidelines/
END
1776
Security Documentation: Standards
https://frsecure.com/blog
/differentiating-between-
policies-standards-
procedures-and-
guidelines/
1777
Security Documentation: Standards
https://frsecure.com/blog/differentiating-between-policies-standards-procedures-and-guidelines/
1778
Security Documentation: Standards
• Standards
Standards are mandatory
actions or rules that give
formal policies support
and direction. One of the
more difficult parts of
writing standards for an
information security
program is getting a
company-wide consensus
on what standards need
to be in place.
1779
Security Documentation: Standards
• Standards
This can be a time-
consuming process but
is vital to the success of
your information
security program.
1780
Security Documentation: Standards
• Standards
1. Used to indicate
expected user
behavior. For example,
a consistent company
email signature.
1781
Security Documentation: Standards
• Standards
2. Might specify what
hardware and software
solutions are available
and supported.
1782
Security Documentation: Standards
• Standards
3. Compulsory and must
be enforced to be
effective. (This also
applies to policies!)
END
1783
Security Documentation: Procedures
https://frsecure.com/blog/d
ifferentiating-between-
policies-standards-
procedures-and-guidelines/
1784
Security Documentation: Procedures
https://frsecure.com/blog/differentiating-between-policies-standards-
procedures-and-guidelines/
1785
Security Documentation: Procedures
• Procedures
Procedures are detailed
step by step
instructions to achieve
a given goal or
mandate. They are
typically intended for
internal departments
and should adhere to
strict change control
processes.
1786
Security Documentation: Procedures
• Procedures
Procedures can be
developed as you go. If
this is the route your
organization chooses to
take it’s necessary to
have comprehensive and
consistent
documentation of the
procedures that you are
developing.
1787
Security Documentation: Procedures
• Procedures
1. Often act as the
“cookbook” for staff
to consult to
accomplish a
repeatable process.
1788
Security Documentation: Procedures
• Procedures
2. Detailed enough and
yet not too difficult
that only a small
group (or a single
person) will
understand.
1789
Security Documentation: Procedures
• Procedures
3. Installing operating
systems, performing
a system backup,
granting access rights
to a system and
setting up new user
accounts are all
example of
procedures.
1790
Security Documentation: Procedures
TITLE
DOC #
VERSION
CLASSIFICATION
DATE
1791
Security Documentation: Procedures
HEADER
REVISION HISTORY
REVIEW HISTORY
APPROVED BY
1792
Security Documentation: Procedures
HEADER
TOC
1793
Security Documentation: Procedures
HEADER
PURPOSE
SCOPE
REF POLICY
1794
Security Documentation: Procedures
HEADER
PROCEDURE
DETAIL
…ACCESS
CONTROL
1795
Security Documentation: Procedures
• Policies
• Standards
• Procedures
• Guidelines
https://frsecure.com/blog
/differentiating-between-
policies-standards-
procedures-and-
END guidelines/
1796
Security Documentation: Guidelines
https://frsecure.com/blog
/differentiating-between-
policies-standards-
procedures-and-
guidelines/
1797
Security Documentation: Guidelines
https://frsecure.com/blog/differentiating-between-policies-standards-procedures-and-guidelines/
1798
Security Documentation: Guidelines
• Guidelines
Guidelines are
recommendations to users
when specific standards do
not apply. Guidelines are
designed to streamline
certain processes
according to what the best
practices are.
1799
Security Documentation: Guidelines
• Guidelines
Guidelines, by nature,
should be open to
interpretation and do not
need to be followed to the
letter.
1800
Security Documentation: Guidelines
• Guidelines
1. Are more general vs.
specific rules.
2. Provide flexibility for
unforeseen
circumstances.
3. Should NOT be
confused with formal
policy statements.
END
1801
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
http://www.infosectoday.c
om/Articles/Security_Policy
_Excellence.htm
1802
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
1804
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Policy Pitfalls
1. Poorly worded policies
2. Badly structured
policies
3. Out-of-date policies
4. Inadequately
communicated policies
5. Unenforced policies
6. Lack of management
scrutiny
1805
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
1. Create & Review
Documents must be
written using language
that is appropriate for the
target audience and should
spell out the consequences
of non-compliance.
Smaller, more manageable
documents are easier for
an organization to review
and update, while also…
1806
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
1. Create & Review
…being more palatable for
the intended recipients.
1807
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
2. Distribute
Organizations need to
effectively distribute
policies, both new and
updated, in a timely and
efficient manner. These
need to be consistently
enforced across an
organization.
1808
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
3. Achieve Consent
A process needs to be
implemented that
monitors users' response
to policies. Policy
distribution should be
prioritised, ensuring that
higher risk policies are
signed off earlier by users
than other lower risk
documents.
1809
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
3. Achieve Consent
For example, an
organization may want to
ensure that a user signs up
to their Information
Governance policy on the
first day that they start
employment, whilst having
up to two weeks to sign up
to the Travel & Expense
Policy.
1810
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
3. Achieve Consent
Systems need to in place
to grant a user two weeks
to process a particular
document, after which the
system should
automatically force the
user to process it.
1811
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
4. Understanding
To monitor and measure
staff comprehension and
effectiveness of policies
and associated
documentation,
organizations should test
all, or perhaps a subset of,
users.
1812
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
4. Understanding
Any areas that show
weaknesses can be
identified and corrected
accordingly. Additional
training or guidance may
be necessary or, if it's the
policy that is causing
confusion, it can be
reworded or simplified.
1813
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
5. Auditability
The full revision history of
all documents needs to be
maintained as well as who
has read what, when & if
possible, how long it took;
who declined a policy and
why. This record should be
stored for future reference
& may be stored in
conjunction with test
results. 1814
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
6. Reporting
To affect change and
improve compliance it
helps if key performance
indicators relating to policy
uptake are clearly visible
across all levels of an
enterprise.
1815
How To Develop Effective Security Policies
Six Steps:
6. Reporting
Dashboard visibility of
policy uptake compliance
by geographical or
functional business units
helps to consolidate
information and highlights
exceptions.
END
1816
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1818
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
TOTAL: 113
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1819
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
• Merits of ISO27001:2013
(ISMS):
– Exceptional
framework with
comprehensive
coverage of
mandatory
requirements
(clauses 4-10) and
discretionary controls
(annex)
1820
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
• Merits of ISO27001:2013
(ISMS):
– Highly beneficial as a
framework for
security program
– Covers all domain
areas
– Provides a structure
and organized
sequence for security
controls
1821
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
• Merits of ISO27001:2013
(ISMS):
– Complements
security
transformation
model as serves as a
reference and
guideline for activities
and controls
1822
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
• De-merits of
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS):
– Very broad
– Generic framework –
leaves it to
organization how to
implement the
measures and
controls
– Not suited for orgs
that are new to
security program
1823
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
1824
ISMS:Leading InfoSec Governance Framework
1825
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
1826
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1827
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 4: Context:
– Understanding org
and its context;
internal and external
issues relevant to its
purpose and that
affect its ability to
achieve intended
outcomes of ISMS
1828
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 4: Context:
– Needs and
expectations of
interested parties
(e.g. legal and
regulatory reqmts
and contractual
obligations)
– Scope (boundaries);
interfaces and
dependencies
1829
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 5: Leadership &
Commitment
– Policy & objectives
are established and
are compatible with
strategic direction of
org
– Integrating ISMS into
org processes
– Resources for ISMS
available
1830
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 5: Leadership &
Commitment
– Communicating
importance
– Ensuring ISMS
achieves intended
outcomes
– Directing &
supporting persons
– Promoting continual
improvement
1831
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 5: Leadership &
Commitment
– Assign and
communicate roles,
responsibilities &
authorities
1832
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 6: Planning
– Address org risks &
opportunities &
prevent or reduce
undesired effects
– Ensure risk
assessment is
conducted
– Identify, analyze,
evaluate risks
– Ensure risk treatment
is effective
1833
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 6: Planning
– Address org risks &
opportunities &
prevent or reduce
undesired effects
– Ensure risk
assessment is
conducted
– Identify, analyze,
evaluate risks
– Ensure risk treatment
is effective
1834
Clauses 4-6 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 6: Planning
– Ensure information
security objectives
are measurable,
communicated
– For objectives
determine what will
be done, what
resources reqd, who
will be responsible,
when completed,
how to evaluate
results 1835
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
1836
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1837
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 7: Support
– Org shall provide the
resources necessary
for the
establishment,
implementation,
maintenance and
continual
improvement of the
ISMS
– Ensure competence
of staff for the ISMS
1838
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 7: Support
– Awareness related to
the policy and ISMS
will be ensured
among staff
– Communication
mechanisms related
to ISMS internal and
external to the org
1839
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 7: Support
– Documentation with
appropriate
identification,
description, format,
review & approval
mechanism
– Documentation
change control,
protection,
distribution,
retention, & disposal
1840
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 8: Operations
– Plan, implement, and
control processes
– Control planned
changes
– Outsourced
processes controlled
– Risk assessment and
risk treatment &
retain documented
information
1841
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 9: Performance
Evaluation
– Monitoring,
measurement,
analysis, and
evaluation
– What needs to be
monitored, methods,
who will monitor,
when to monitor,
who shall analyze and
evaluate results ?
1842
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 9: Performance
Evaluation
– Internal audit
implemented at
planned intervals
– Define audit criteria
and scope for each
audit
– Reporting of auditing
results
– Retain auditing docs
1843
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 9: Performance
Evaluation
– Internal audit
implemented at
planned intervals
– Define audit criteria
and scope for each
audit
– Reporting of auditing
results
– Retain auditing docs
1844
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 9: Management Review
– Planned intervals
– Status of actions
– Changes in external
and internal
environment
– Review non-
conformities and
corrective actions,
monitoring &
measurement results,
audit reports, other
1845
Clauses 7-10 Of ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
• 10: Improvement
– Non-conformities and
corrective actions
– Continual
improvement
END
1846
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
1847
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
TOTAL: 114
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1848
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
A.5 INFORMATION SECURITY POLICIES
A.5.1 MANAGEMENT DIRECTION FOR INFORMATION SECURITY
Objective: To provide management direction and support for information
security in accordance with business requirements and relevant laws and
regulations.
Control:
POLICIES FOR A set of policies for information security shall
A.5.1.1 INFORMATION be defined, approved by management,
SECURITY published and communicated to employees
and relevant external parties.
REVIEW OF Control:
THE POLICIES The policies for information security shall be
A.5.1.2 FOR reviewed at planned intervals or if significant
INFORMATION changes occur to ensure their continuing
SECURITY suitability, adequacy and effectiveness.
1849
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
A.6 ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY
A.6.1 INTERNAL ORGANIZATION
1850
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
1851
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
CONTACT Control:
A.6.1.3 WITH Appropriate contacts with relevant
AUTHORITIES authorities shall be maintained
Control:
CONTACT
Appropriate contacts with special
WITH SPECIAL
A.6.1.4 interest groups or other specialist
INTEREST
security forums and professional
GROUPS
associations shall be maintained.
1852
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 1
END
1854
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1855
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20Security%
20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1856
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1857
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1860
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1861
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1862
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1863
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
1864
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 2
END
1865
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1866
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1867
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1868
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1869
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1870
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1871
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1872
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1873
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1874
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1875
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
1876
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 3
END
1877
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1878
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1879
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1880
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1881
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1883
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1884
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1885
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1886
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1887
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1888
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
1889
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 4
• Lets look at
cryptography, and
physical &
environmental security
in the next module…
END
1890
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
1891
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1892
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
A.10 CRYPTOGRAPHY
A.10.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONTROLS
POLICY ON THE USE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC
A.10.1.1
CONTROLS
A.10.1.2 KEY MANAGEMENT
1893
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
A.10 CRYPTOGRAPHY
1894
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
1896
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
1897
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
1898
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
1900
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
1901
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 5
END
1902
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
1903
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1904
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
1905
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
1906
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
1907
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
1908
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
1909
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 6
END
1910
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1911
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1912
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1913
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1914
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1915
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1916
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1917
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1918
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1919
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1921
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1922
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
1923
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 7
• Lets look at
communications
security in the next
module…
END
1924
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1925
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1926
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1927
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1928
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1929
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1930
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1931
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1932
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
1933
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 8
END
1934
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1935
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1936
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1937
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1938
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1939
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1941
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1942
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1943
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1944
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1945
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
1946
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 9
END
1947
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
1948
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1949
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
1950
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
1951
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
1953
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
1954
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
1955
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 10
END
1956
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1957
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1958
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1959
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1960
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1961
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1962
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1963
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
1964
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 11
END
1965
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
1966
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1967
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
1968
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
1969
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
1970
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
1971
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
1972
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 12
END
1973
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
1974
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
ISO27001:2013 DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
TOTAL: 114
https://chapters.theiia.org/bermuda/Events/ChapterDocuments/Information%20
Security%20Management%20System%20%28ISMS%29%20Overview.pdf
1975
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
A.18 COMPLIANCE
A.18.1 COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL & CONTRACTUAL
REQUIREMENTS
IDENTIFICATION OF APPLICABLE
A.18.1.1
LEGISLATION & CONTRACTUAL REQMTS
A.18.1.2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A.18.1.3 PROTECTION OF RECORDS
PRIVACY & PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY
A.18.1.4
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION
REGULATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC
A.18.1.4
CONTROLS
1976
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
A.18 COMPLIANCE
A.18 COMPLIANCE
1978
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
A.18 COMPLIANCE
A.18.2 INFORMATION SECURITY REVIEWS
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF INFORMATION
A.18.2.1
SECURITY
COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY POLICY &
A.18.2.2
STANDARDS
A.18.2.3 TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE REVIEW
1979
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
A.18 COMPLIANCE
A.18.2.1 INDEPENDENT Control:
REVIEW OF The organization’s approach
to managing information
INFORMATION
security & its implementation
SECURITY (i.e. control objectives,
controls, policies, processes &
procedures for info security)
shall be reviewed
independently at planned
intervals or when significant
changes occur.
1980
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
A.18 COMPLIANCE
A.18.2.2 COMPLIANCE Control:
WITH Managers shall regularly review
the compliance of information
SECURITY
processing and procedures
POLICY & within their area of
STANDARDS responsibility with the
appropriate security policies,
standards and any other
security requirements.
1981
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
A.18 COMPLIANCE
A.18.2.3 TECHNICAL Control:
COMPLIANCE Information systems shall be
regularly reviewed for
REVIEW
compliance with the
organization’s information
security policies and standards.
1982
ISO27001:2013 Controls Appendix; Part 13
END
1983
How to Use ISO27002:2013
1984
How to Use ISO27002:2013
1986
How to Use ISO27002:2013
STRUCTURE OF ISO27002:2013
http://www.iso27001security.com/html/27002.html
1987
How to Use ISO27002:2013
1988
How to Use ISO27002:2013
ISO27001:2013
Control:
REVIEW OF The policies for information
THE POLICIES security shall be reviewed at
A.5.1.2 FOR planned intervals or if significant
INFORMATION changes occur to ensure their
SECURITY continuing suitability, adequacy
and effectiveness.
1989
How to Use ISO27002:2013
ISO27002:2013
TITLE
1990
How to Use ISO27002:2013
ISO27002:2013 CONTROL
1991
How to Use ISO27002:2013
ISO27002:2013
ISO27002:2013
27002: Implementation Guidance:
Each policy should have an owner who
has approved mngmt responsibility for
REVIEW OF the development, review and
THE evaluation of the policies. The review
A.5.1.2 POLICIES should include assessing opportunities
FOR for improvement of the org’s policies
INFOSEC and approach to managing Infosec in
response to changes to the org
environment, business circumstances,
legal conditions or tech environment.
1993
How to Use ISO27002:2013
• Practically:
– ISO27001:2013
controls are brief and
generic
– 27002 clarifies
further what is being
referred to, gives
further context &
very useful
implementation
END guidance
1994
PCI DSS V3
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/P
CI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf
1997
PCI DSS V3
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Refere
nce%20Guide.pdf
1998
PCI DSS V3
REQUIREMENT
1999
PCI DSS V3
TESTING PROCEDURES
2000
PCI DSS V3
GUIDANCE
2001
PCI DSS V3
2003
PCI DSS V3
END
2004
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
2005
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
SN CONTROL
Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
1
Devices
Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized
2
Software
Secure Configurations for Hardware and
3
Software
Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and
4
Remediation
5 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
2006
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
SN CONTROL
Maintenance, Monitoring, and
6
Analysis of Audit Logs
7 Email and Web Browser Protections
8 Malware Defenses
Limitation and Control of Network
9
Ports
10 Data Recovery Capability
2007
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
SN CONTROL
Secure Configurations for Network
11
Devices
12 Boundary Defense
13 Data Protection
Controlled Access Based on the Need
14
to Know
15 Wireless Access Control
2008
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
SN CONTROL
16 Account Monitoring and Control
Security Skills Assessment and
17
Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps
18 Application Software Security
19 Incident Response and Management
Penetration Tests and Red Team
20
Exercises
2009
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
27002
How to do
27001 it ? CIS CC
What to do Tech
? guidance
BEST
CONTROL
GUIDANCE
2016
SANS/CIS CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
END
2017
NIST FRAMEWORK
2018
NIST FRAMEWORK
2019
NIST FRAMEWORK
2020
NIST FRAMEWORK
• SP 800, Computer
Security (December 1990-
present):
NIST's primary mode of
publishing
computer/cyber/informa
tion security guidelines,
recommendations and
reference materials
(SP 800s are also
searchable in the NIST
Library Catalog);
2021
NIST FRAMEWORK
2022
NIST FRAMEWORK
2023
NIST FRAMEWORK
AUGUST 2014
32 PAGES DOC
2024
NIST FRAMEWORK
2025
COBIT
IT Governance
Resource
Management
2027
COBIT
2028
COBIT
2029
COBIT
2030
COBIT
• Governance ensures
that enterprise
objectives are achieved
by evaluating
stakeholder needs,
conditions & options;
setting direction
through prioritisation &
decision making;
2031
COBIT
• …& monitoring
performance,
compliance and
progress against agreed
direction and objectives
(EDM)
2032
COBIT
• Management plans,
builds, runs and
monitors activities in
alignment with the
direction set by the
governance body to
achieve the enterprise
objectives (PBRM)
2033
COBIT
2034
COBIT
• COBIT 5 is a detailed
framework for IT
governance developed
by ISACA which has
principles, enablers, and
processes
• These tools assist
implementers and
customer organizations
to successfully deploy
the framework
END
• Certifiable framework
2035
CMMI
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability_Maturity_Model_Integration
2037
CMMI
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/assets/cmmi-
overview071.pdf
2044
CMMI
END
2045
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
2046
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
2047
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
Framework
5 components
2048
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
8 PRINCIPLES
2049
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
RISK
MANAGEMENT
PROCESS
2050
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
ISO31000 objectives:
• ISO 31000 states that
the guidelines should be
used by people who
create and protect value
in organisations by
managing risks, making
decisions, setting and
achieving objectives and
improving performance.
https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:
iso:31000:ed-2:v1:en
2051
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
ISO31000 purpose:
• ISO 31000 states that
the purpose of risk
management is the
creation and protection
of value.
END 2052
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
2053
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
2054
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – AN INTRO
8 PRINCIPLES
2055
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES:
1. Framework and
processes should be
customized and
proportionate.
2. Appropriate and timely
involvement of
stakeholders is
necessary.
3. Structured and
comprehensive
approach is required.
2056
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES:
4. Risk management is an
integral part of all
organizational activities.
5. Risk management
anticipates, detects,
acknowledges and
responds to changes.
6. Risk management
explicitly considers any
limitations of available
information.
2057
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLES:
7. Human and cultural
factors influence all
aspects of risk
management.
8. Risk management is
continually improved
through learning and
experience.
2058
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
2059
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
2060
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
2062
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – 8 PRINCIPLES
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
END
2063
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
2064
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
2065
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
Framework
5 components
2066
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
2067
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
2068
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
2069
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
• The remaining
components of the
framework are design,
implementation,
evaluation and
improvement. This
approach is often
represented in
management literature
as plan-do-check-act.
2070
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
2071
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
RISK
MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
• ARCHITECTURE
• STRATEGY
• PROTOCOLS
2072
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – FRAMEWORK
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
END 2073
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
2074
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
2075
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
RISK
MANAGEMENT
PROCESS
2076
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
2077
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
2078
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
2079
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
2080
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
2081
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – PROCESS
END
2082
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
https://www.theirm.org/m
edia/3513119/IRM-Report-
ISO-31000-2018-v3.pdf
2083
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
2084
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
Successful implementation
of a risk management
initiative is an ongoing
process that involves
working through 10
activities below on a
continuous basis. These
activities relate to:
(1) Plan;
(2) Implement;
(3) Measure; and
(4) Learn.
2085
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
Plan:
1. Identify intended
benefits of the RM
initiative and gain board
support
2. Plan the scope of the RM
initiative and develop
common language of risk
3. Establish the RM
strategy, framework and
the roles and
responsibilities
2086
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
Implement:
4. Adopt suitable risk
assessment tools and an
agreed risk classification
system
5. Establish risk
benchmarks (risk criteria)
& undertake risk
assessments
6. Determine risk appetite
and risk tolerance levels
and evaluate the existing
controls 2087
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
Measure:
7. Evaluate effectiveness of
existing controls and
introduce improvements
8. Embed risk-aware
culture and align RM with
other activities in the
organization
2088
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
Learn
9. Monitor and review risk
performance indicators to
measure RM contribution
10. Report risk
performance in line with
obligations and monitor
improvement
2089
ISO31000:2018 – RISK MANAGEMENT – HOW TO IMPLEMENT
END
2090
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
2091
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
Objective:
• “To ensure a consistent
and effective approach
to the management of
information security
incidents, including
communication on
security events and
weaknesses.”
ISO27001:2013 (16.1)
2092
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
https://www.owasp.org/im
ages/9/92/Top10Considerat
ionsForIncidentResponse.p
df
2093
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
https://www.owasp.org/images/9/92/Top10ConsiderationsForIncidentResponse.pdf
2094
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
2095
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
2096
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
2097
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
3. Create Documented IR
Plan
An organization should
have a well-documented IR
plan that would guide the
IR Team during an incident.
A comprehensive plan at
minimum , should cover
Roles & Responsibilities,
Investigation, Triage and
Mitigation, Recovery, and
Documentation process.
2098
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
2100
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-I
https://www.owasp.org/im
ages/9/92/Top10Considerat
ionsForIncidentResponse.p
df
2102
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-II
7. Recovery
Once a thorough
investigation has been
carried out, recovery is a
significant step for
restoring services or
materials that might have
been affected during an
incident. This could be the
task of the technical team
(transition from active
incident to standard
monitoring) 2104
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-II
8. Documentation &
Reporting
A comprehensive incident
report is required in
keeping with best
practices and with the
Incident Response plan.
The type of reports that
might be required might
vary but should help in
managing and reviewing
incidents satisfactorily.
2105
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-II
9. Process Review
Make intelligent decisions
about important factors:
• Should I increase or
decrease the number of
Incident Handlers?
• What risks did we
identify during the
incident that needs to
be followed up for
action and monitored
closely ?
2106
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT-II
http://www.bmc.com/guid
es/itil-change-
management.html
2108
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
2109
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
2110
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
2111
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
2112
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
Types Of Changes
Standard changes are
changes to a service or to
the IT infrastructure where
the implementation
process and the risks are
known upfront.
• These changes are
managed according to
policies that are the IT
organization already has
in place.
2113
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
2114
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
Normal Changes
• Those that must go
through the change
process before being
approved and
implemented. If they are
determined to be high-
risk, a change advisory
board must decide
whether they will be
implemented.
2115
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-I
Emergency Changes
• Arise when an
unexpected error or
threat occurs, such as
when a flaw in the
infrastructure related to
services needs to be
addressed immediately.
A security threat is
another example of an
emergency situation
END that requires changes to
be made immediately. 2116
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
http://www.bmc.com/guid
es/itil-change-
management.html
2117
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
2118
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
Mission
The mission of the IT
change management
process is to implement
changes in the most
efficient manner, while
minimizing the negative
impact on customers when
changes are implemented.
KPIs for tracking success of
the IT change
management process are:
2119
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
2120
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
2121
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
2122
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
Scope
The scope of the IT change
management process is
limited to change
implementations that will
cause:
i. A service to become
unavailable or
degraded during
service hours
2123
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
Scope
ii. The functionality of a
service to become
different
iii. The CMDB to require an
update
Other IT changes don’t
usually require formal
change management.
Instead, they can be
tracked as standard IT
activities.
2124
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
IT Change Management
Procedures
2125
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
b. Change planning:
Change coordinators and
specialists employ this
process to prepare the
implementation plans for
changes.
c. Change approval: The
change manager and
approvers (e.g., customer
representatives and
service owners) follow this
procedure to approve
planned changes. 2126
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-II
d. Change
implementation:
Specialists use this process
to implement
infrastructure changes.
e. change closure:
Specialists follow this
procedure when they
perform production tests
after changes have been
implemented, and change
coordinators employ it to
END close out changes. 2127
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
http://www.bmc.com/guid
es/itil-change-
management.html
2128
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
2129
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
The change
initiator recognizes and
identifies the need for
change.
• The initiator should be
someone who works
directly with support
services tools.
2130
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• Members of your team
who provide support
services to customers
may be best suited for
this position due to their
frequent interaction
with the system.
2131
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
The change
coordinator assesses
requests for change that
originate from incident
management, problem
management, release
management, or continuity
management.
2132
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• The change coordinator
registers changes as
needed to handle
requests for change or
receives change
requests from other
change initiators;
determines the risk and
impact for requested
changes;
2133
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• prepares
implementation plans by
creating tasks; and
monitors the progress
of changes.
2134
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
The change manager is
generally needed in mid-
sized and larger
organizations. If your IT
department is part of a
larger company, you will
need to pick one or
multiple persons to
perform the role of change
manager.
2135
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• These individuals are
responsible for
managing change
procedures, receiving
and prioritizing change
requests, evaluating the
risk level associated with
requests, and keeping
thorough records of the
outcome of each
change. 2136
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
The change advisory
board is responsible for
authorizing changes and
further evaluating requests
when the change manager
determines that there is a
high risk associated with
these requests.
2137
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• The board takes into
account the impact that
a requested change may
have on all affected
parties.
• When these high-risk
changes are brought to
the attention of the
change advisory board,
the board will …
2138
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• …schedule a meeting
with a detailed agenda
to determine how to
proceed.
2139
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
The approver decides
whether to approve or
reject changes.
2140
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
The change
implementation
team consists of the
specialists on your team
who are responsible for
actually making changes.
2141
CHANGE MANAGEMENT-III
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ROLES
• You will likely be part of
this team and
employees directly
under you may also be
assigned to implement
changes.
• As an IT manager, you
will often be responsible
for overseeing changes.
END
2142
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 1
2143
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 1
• CYBER SECURITY
CHALLENGES:
1. Reactive
2. Superficial
3. Contention
4. Box-Approach
5. Governance-
Overkill
• Effective project
management makes or
breaks any project
• Project management is
the sum-total of
managing, organizing,
and prioritizing all
resources, and tasks in
order to achieve a
successful outcome
within the stipulated
timeframe
2145
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 1
• Successful Security
Transformation
Implementation is
heavily dependent upon
the project being in the
hands of an experienced
project manager:
– Has authority
– Has domain
knowledge
– Has ability to suggest
solutions
2146
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 1
• In a nut-shell, effective
project management for
Security Transformation
is about understanding
the landscape,
understanding what is
required to solve the
problem, and being fully
committed to ensure
that the successful
outcome is achieved
within time
2147
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 1
• Common Challenges
During Projects:
– Discipline during the
one year duration
– Prior shortage of
resources
– New initiatives
(diversions)
– Constant slippage of
tasks
– Lack of commitment
by team members 2148
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 1
2150
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 2
2151
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 2
InfoSec Steering
Comm.
[MONTHLY]
Information Security
Management Committee (ISMC)
[WEEKLY]
2152
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 2
INFOSEC HEAD
INFOSEC
TEAM Infosec INFOSEC
STRUCTURE Head INFOSEC
Manager Networks
Systems Consultant
Manager
Manager
Apps/DB
2153
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 2
PROJECT 1. Establish
SEQUENCE Track
5. Continuous
2. MSB
Improvement
4. Implement
3. Pilot
Across IT
2154
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 2
TRACK 1: IT INFRASTRUCTURE
2155
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 2
• An effective project
manager has a thorough
understanding of what
needs to be achieved,
and is able to
orchestrate resources,
teams, hierarchy, and
reporting in order to
achieve a successful
project outcome
END
2156
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
2157
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
• Reporting is a critical
component of effective
project management
and has the following
objectives:
2158
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
• Reporting Objectives:
1. Creating visibility
2. Keeping resources
engaged for their
inputs and involvement
3. Keeping management
informed of successes
& challenges
4. Creating credibility
5. Ensuring team
members are on their
toes 2159
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
TRANSFORMATION ISMC
PROJECT
MAIN ENTITIES
DELTA TECH
IT STEERING
IT TEAMS CONSULTANT
COMMITTEE
TEAM
BOARD/
EXECUTIVE
2160
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
REPORTING ISMC
MECHANISM
Weekly
status
update
IT STEERING Monthly
COMM. status
update
Quarterly
status update
BOARD
2161
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
2162
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
• Dashboard Objectives:
1. Provide simple & single
view of all project
tracks, and where the
project stands
2. Highlight problem
areas for management
intervention and
support
3. Monthly Steering
Committee & Quarterly
Board reports
2163
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
Forum Frequency Report Format Objectives
IDENTIFY TASKS,
PDF MINS OF
ISMC WEEKLY RESPONSIBILITY,
MEETING
TIMELINE
INFORM
RELEVANT HEADS
STEERING PPT
MONTHLY OF PROGRESS,
COMMITTEE PRESENTATION
IDENTIFY
CHALLENGES
CRITICAL LOOK AT
PROGRESS
ACHIEVED,
BOARD QUARTER PPT
IDENTIFY
MEETING LY PRESENTATION
CHALLENGES &
SOLUTIONS, SEEK
ASSISTANCE
2164
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 3
• By creating an accurate,
honest, and disciplined
reporting mechanism,
the project manager
ensures that all project
stakeholders are
informed, involved and
helping where necessary
for project success
END
2165
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 4
2166
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 4
• The Security
Transformation requires
significant effort over a
one year period
• All resources have to be
tightly focused on the
successful outcome
• Without leadership, the
transformation cannot
take place
2167
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 4
• Leadership:
1. Authenticity
2. Openness and
transparency
3. Respect for all
individuals and teams
4. Creating motivation
5. Integrity
6. Boldness to take a
stand
2168
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 4
2169
PROJECT MANAGEMENT FOR INFOSEC: PART 4
• Security Transformation
Leadership is about
creating trust, and a
team environment to
facilitate efforts
resulting in positive
outcome
• Security Transformation
Leadership is about
working with people, at
all levels to create a
END credible and successful
project 2170
Capacity Management – Part 1
2171
Capacity Management – Part 1
• What is capacity
management ?
– Aims to ensure that
the capacity of IT
services and the IT
infrastructure is
able to deliver the
agreed service level
targets in a cost
effective and timely
manner.
https://wiki.en.it-
processmaps.com/index.php/Capacity_
Management
2172
Capacity Management – Part 1
• What is capacity
management ?
– The Capacity
Management
process considers
all resources
required to deliver
the IT service, and
plans for short,
medium and long
term business
requirements.
https://wiki.en.it-
processmaps.com/index.php/Capacity_Man
agement
2173
Capacity Management – Part 1
https://advisera.com/20000acade
my/knowledgebase/three-faces-
capacity-management/
2174
Capacity Management – Part 1
• Business capacity
management:
– Translates business
plans and needs into
requirements for IT
services and
architecture
https://advisera.com/20000acade
my/knowledgebase/three-faces-
capacity-management/
2175
Capacity Management – Part 1
• Business capacity
management:
– As customers’
business changes,
so are service
requirements
changing. Change in
service
requirements
usually has an
impact on demand
for capacity.
https://advisera.com/20000academy/kno
wledgebase/three-faces-capacity-
management/
2176
Capacity Management – Part 1
• Service capacity
management:
– Service capacity
mngmt focuses on
management,
control and
prediction of end-to-
end performance of
live IT services usage
and workloads.
https://advisera.com/20000acade
my/knowledgebase/three-faces-
capacity-management/
2177
Capacity Management – Part 1
• Service capacity
management:
– It’s about measuring
performance and
comparing it to
reqmts that are set
in Service Level
Agreements (SLAs)
or Service Level
Requirements
(SLRs).
https://advisera.com/20000academy/kno
wledgebase/three-faces-capacity-
management/
2178
Capacity Management – Part 1
• Component capacity
management:
– Focuses on mngmt,
control, performance
prediction, utilization
& capacity of
technology
components (e.g. a
hard disc, processor,
etc.).
https://advisera.com/20000acade
my/knowledgebase/three-faces-
capacity-management/
2179
Capacity Management – Part 1
END
2180
Capacity Management – Part 2
2181
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– Capacity
requirements should
be identified, taking
into account the
business criticality of
the concerned
system
2182
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– System tuning and
monitoring should be
applied to ensure
and, where
necessary, improve
the availability and
efficiency of systems.
2183
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– Detective controls
should be put in
place to indicate
problems in due
time.
2184
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– Projections of
future capacity
reqmts should take
account of new
business and system
reqmts and current
& projected trends
in the organization’s
info processing
capabilities
2185
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– Particular attention
needs to be paid to
any resources with
long procurement
lead times or high
costs; therefore
managers should
monitor the
utilization of key
system resources.
2186
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– Providing sufficient
capacity can be
achieved by
increasing capacity
or by reducing
demand.
2187
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– Examples of
managing capacity
demand include:
a) deletion of obsolete
data (disk space);
b) decommissioning of
applications, systems,
databases or
environments;
c) optimising batch
processes & schedules;
2188
Capacity Management – Part 2
• ISO27002 guidance:
– A documented
capacity
management plan
should be
considered for
mission critical
systems
– Also consider
human resources &
offices/facilities
2189
Capacity Management – Part 2
https://securityintelligence.
com/take-a-load-off-
delegate-cyber-risk-
management-using-the-
three-lines-of-defense-
model/
2191
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
https://info.knowledgeleader.com/what-is-internal-audits-role-in-cyber-security
2192
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
2195
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
2. Risk Management
• The second line of
defense is composed of
risk managers looking at
aggregate risks at an
enterprise level. It is
often simply termed risk
management but can
also include compliance,
legal, quality control and
financial control.
2196
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
2. Risk Management
• The second line looks at
cybersecurity control
frameworks, defines
KRIs and metrics,
creates risk
assessments, and tests
and reviews
conformance by
tracking the actions of
the first line of defense
and analyzing the…
2197
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
2. Risk Management
• …impact of those
actions to determine
their effectiveness in
mitigating cyber risks. In
other words, this
function monitors how
management is doing in
its handling of cyber
risks by determining the
extent that risks are
actively monitored and
appropriately managed. 2198
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
2. Risk Management
• It is often performed
under an umbrella of
senior management and
some board directors or
a board-level
committee, such as the
audit committee or a
risk committee. And,
importantly, this second
line can challenge the
first line.
2199
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-I
https://securityintelligence.
com/take-a-load-off-
delegate-cyber-risk-
management-using-the-
three-lines-of-defense-
model/
2201
RISK MANAGEMENT & INTERNAL AUDIT-II
https://info.knowledgeleader.com/what-is-internal-audits-role-in-cyber-security
2202
INTERNAL AUDIT
3. Internal Audit
• The third line of defense
is internal audit. It may
also include input from
external auditors and/or
regulators. This
function, sometimes
termed independent
assurance, evaluates the
overall process of cyber
risk governance for the
entire organization.
2203
INTERNAL AUDIT
3. Internal Audit
• It ensures that the
organization’s internal
control framework is
adequate for dealing
with the risks the
organization faces.
2204
INTERNAL AUDIT
3. Internal Audit
• As with the second line
of defense, the third line
can push back on the
assertions of the
previous lines regarding
the adequacy of the
controls in place. This
function usually reports
directly to the board or
the audit committee.
2205
INTERNAL AUDIT
2206
INTERNAL AUDIT
END
2207
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
https://www.isms.online/is
o-27001/how-to-conduct-
your-iso-27001-
management-review/
2208
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
Purpose
• The purpose of the
Management Review is
to ensure the ISMS and
its objectives continue
to remain suitable,
adequate and effective
given the organisation’s
purpose, issues and
risks.
2209
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
Results
• The results of the
management review will
enable senior
management to make
well informed, strategic
decisions that will have a
material effect on
information security and
the way the
organisation manages it.
2210
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
2211
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
2213
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
2215
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
END
2216
Human Resource Security
2217
Human Resource Security
• Prior to employment
(ISO27001):
– Screening
– Terms & conditions
of employment
2218
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(Screening):
– availability of
satisfactory
character
references, e.g. one
business and one
personal;
– a verification (for
completeness and
accuracy) of the
applicant’s CV;
2219
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(Screening):
– confirmation of
claimed academic
and professional
qualifications;
– independent
identity verification
(passport or similar
document);
2220
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(Screening):
– more detailed
verification, such as
credit review or
review of criminal
records
2221
Human Resource Security
• During employment
(ISO27001):
– Management
responsibilities
– Awareness,
education, and
training
– Disciplinary process
2222
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(Disciplinary Process):
– The disciplinary
process should not
be commenced
without prior
verification that an
infosec breach has
occurred
2223
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(Disciplinary Process):
– The formal
disciplinary process
should ensure
correct and fair
treatment for
employees who are
suspected of
committing
breaches of info
security
2224
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(Disciplinary Process):
– The formal
disciplinary process
should provide for a
graduated response
that takes into
consideration
factors such as the
nature and gravity
of the breach and its
impact on business;
2225
Human Resource Security
• Termination or change
of employment
(ISO27001):
– Infosec
responsibilities &
duties are defined,
communicated to
employee or
contractor &
enforced
2226
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(termination/change):
– The communication
of termination
responsibilities
should include on-
going infosec reqmts
& legal
responsibilities &,
where appropriate,
responsibilities…
2227
Human Resource Security
• ISO27002 guidance
(termination/change):
– …contained within
any confidentiality
agreement & the
terms & conditions of
employment
continuing for a
defined period after
the end of the
employee’s or
contractor’s
employment 2228
Human Resource Security
END
2229
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Module 253
SBP TECHNOLOGY
GOVERNANCE AND RISK
MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
2230
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
2231
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
OBJECTIVES
• The framework aims to
provide enabling
regulatory environment
for managing risks
associated with the
acquisition,
development,
deployment and use of
technology and shall
serve as SBP's baseline
requirements for all
FI(s). 2232
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
OBJECTIVES
• The FI(s) shall upgrade
their systems, controls
and procedures to
ensure compliance with
this framework latest by
June 30, 2018.
2233
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
OBJECTIVES
• The FI(s) shall assess and
conduct a gap analysis
between their current
status & this framework
and draw a time-bound
action plan to address
the gaps and comply
with the guidelines in
this framework
2234
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
OVERVIEW
• The instructions are
focused on enhancing
the proactive and
reactive environments
in FI(s) to various facets
and dimensions of
technology including
information security,
technology operations,
audit, business
continuity, …
2235
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
OVERVIEW
• …project/performance
management and
related domains (pg 5)
• FI(s) shall adopt an
integrated risk
management approach
to identify, measure,
monitor and control
technology risks (page
5)
2236
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
OVERVIEW
• The Framework consists
of 6 domains and 35 sub-
domains
• Overall the Framework
is a combination of
COBIT, ITIL, and
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
2237
SBP CIRC. # 5, TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Implementation
Mechanism
a. Gap analysis
b. Documentation
c. Implementation
END
2238
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
2239
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
V. MONITORED V. MONITORED
IV. PROTECTED IV. PROTECTED
III. HARDENED III. HARDENED
I. FOUNDATION I. FOUNDATION
2240
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
Industry Security
Challenges:
• Grass-roots security
controls have not been
implemented
• Haphazard, reactive
security approach
• Not following any
structured security
architecture or
framework
2241
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
2242
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
2243
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
2248
CYBER SECURITY MATURITY MATRIX - OVERVIEW
2250
CSMM - LAYER 1 - FOUNDATION
VI. SECURED
Security Orchestration, Automation, & Incident Response
Threat Protection
VI. SECURED
Threat Simulation
Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation
V. MONITORED
Critical Data Encryption
V. MONITORED
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solution
SIEM Solution For Security Events Detection
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) Certification
IV. PROTECTED
External/Internal Penetration Test (Critical Assets)
Software Source Code Review For Critical Applications IV. PROTECTED
CIS 20 Critical Security Controls
Software Security Hardening Program
III. HARDENED
NGN FW At Data Center Entry Point With Filtering
CIS Security Benchmarks Hardening Of All IT Assets
III. HARDENED
Min Monthly Credential Based VM Cycle
Network Segmentation With VLANs By Dept/Service, & DMZ
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Edge NGN FW With Web, Email, Anti-malware Filtering
Min Quarterly Credential Based VM Cycle
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Licensed Or Open Source VM Tool
Edge FW With Filtering
I. FOUNDATION
Active Directory (WS/S)
Licensed Enterprise AV (WS/S) I. FOUNDATION
Licensed Windows OS (WS/S) Or Open Source
2251
CSMM - LAYER 1 - FOUNDATION
2252
CSMM - LAYER 1 - FOUNDATION
2255
CSMM - LAYER 1 - FOUNDATION
2257
CSMM - Layer 2 - Fundamentals
VI. SECURED
Security Orchestration, Automation, & Incident Response
Threat Protection
VI. SECURED
Threat Simulation
Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation
V. MONITORED
Critical Data Encryption
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solution V. MONITORED
SIEM Solution For Security Events Detection
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) Certification
IV. PROTECTED
External/Internal Penetration Test (Critical Assets)
Software Source Code Review For Critical Applications IV. PROTECTED
CIS 20 Critical Security Controls
Software Security Hardening Program
III. HARDENED
NGN FW At Data Center Entry Point With Filtering
CIS Security Benchmarks Hardening Of All IT Assets
III. HARDENED
Min Monthly Credential Based VM Cycle
Network Segmentation With VLANs By Dept/Service, & DMZ
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Edge NGN FW With Web, Email, Anti-malware Filtering
Min Quarterly Credential Based VM Cycle
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Licensed Or Open Source VM Tool
Edge FW With Filtering
I. FOUNDATION
Active Directory (WS/S)
Licensed Enterprise AV (WS/S)
I. FOUNDATION
Licensed Windows OS (WS/S) Or Open Source
2258
CSMM - LAYER 2 - FUNDAMENTALS
2259
CSMM - LAYER 2 - FUNDAMENTALS
2260
CSMM - LAYER 2 - FUNDAMENTALS
2261
CSMM - LAYER 2 - FUNDAMENTALS
2.4. Network
Segmentation With VLANs
by Dept./Service & DMZ
• Network segmentation
helps create separate
broadcast domains
• Separate policies and
filtering possible for
each separate VLAN
• Helps manage traffic
• Segregates traffic into
END traffic-types
2263
CSMM - LAYER 3: HARDENED
2264
CSMM - LAYER 3: HARDENED
VI. SECURED
Security Orchestration, Automation, & Incident Response
Threat Protection
VI. SECURED
Threat Simulation
Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation
V. MONITORED
Critical Data Encryption
V. MONITORED
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solution
SIEM Solution For Security Events Detection
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) Certification
IV. PROTECTED
External/Internal Penetration Test (Critical Assets)
Software Source Code Review For Critical Applications IV. PROTECTED
CIS 20 Critical Security Controls
Software Security Hardening Program
III. HARDENED
NGN FW At Data Center Entry Point With Filtering
CIS Security Benchmarks Hardening Of All IT Assets
III. HARDENED
Min Monthly Credential Based VM Cycle
Network Segmentation With VLANs By Dept/Service, & DMZ
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Edge NGN FW With Web, Email, Anti-malware Filtering
Min Quarterly Credential Based VM Cycle
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Licensed Or Open Source VM Tool
Edge FW With Filtering
I. FOUNDATION
Active Directory (WS/S)
Licensed Enterprise AV (WS/S) I. FOUNDATION
Licensed Windows OS (WS/S) Or Open Source
2265
CSMM - LAYER 3: HARDENED
2266
CSMM - LAYER 3: HARDENED
2267
CSMM - LAYER 3: HARDENED
3.3: NGN FW At
Datacenter Entry Point
With Filtering
• Filtering and malware
protection at
datacenter entry point
often ignored
• All traffic including
internal user traffic
entering or exiting
data center needs to
be filtered
2269
CSMM - LAYER 3: HARDENED
2271
CSMM - LAYER 4: PROTECTED
VI. SECURED
Security Orchestration, Automation, & Incident Response
Threat Protection
VI. SECURED
Threat Simulation
Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation
V. MONITORED
Critical Data Encryption
V. MONITORED
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solution
SIEM Solution For Security Events Detection
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) Certification
IV. PROTECTED
External/Internal Penetration Test (Critical Assets)
Software Source Code Review For Critical Applications IV. PROTECTED
CIS 20 Critical Security Controls
Software Security Hardening Program
III. HARDENED
NGN FW At Data Center Entry Point With Filtering
CIS Security Benchmarks Hardening Of All IT Assets
III. HARDENED
Min Monthly Credential Based VM Cycle
Network Segmentation With VLANs By Dept/Service, & DMZ
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Edge NGN FW With Web, Email, Anti-malware Filtering
Min Quarterly Credential Based VM Cycle
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Licensed Or Open Source VM Tool
Edge FW With Filtering
I. FOUNDATION
Active Directory (WS/S)
Licensed Enterprise AV (WS/S) I. FOUNDATION
Licensed Windows OS (WS/S) Or Open Source
2272
CSMM - LAYER 4: PROTECTED
2273
CSMM - LAYER 4: PROTECTED
4.3: External/Internal
Penetration Test (Critical
Assets):
• Penetration test most
beneficial after the
internal VM program is
functional, and security
hardening has been
performed
• Third-party review of
vulnerabilities and
hacker-view of assets
2276
CSMM - LAYER 4: PROTECTED
2278
CSMM - LAYER 5: MONITORED
VI. SECURED
Security Orchestration, Automation, & Incident Response
Threat Protection
VI. SECURED
Threat Simulation
Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation
V. MONITORED
Critical Data Encryption
V. MONITORED
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solution
SIEM Solution For Security Events Detection
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) Certification
IV. PROTECTED
External/Internal Penetration Test (Critical Assets)
Software Source Code Review For Critical Applications IV. PROTECTED
CIS 20 Critical Security Controls
Software Security Hardening Program
III. HARDENED
NGN FW At Data Center Entry Point With Filtering
CIS Security Benchmarks Hardening Of All IT Assets
III. HARDENED
Min Monthly Credential Based VM Cycle
Network Segmentation With VLANs By Dept/Service, & DMZ
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Edge NGN FW With Web, Email, Anti-malware Filtering
Min Quarterly Credential Based VM Cycle
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Licensed Or Open Source VM Tool
Edge FW With Filtering
I. FOUNDATION
Active Directory (WS/S)
Licensed Enterprise AV (WS/S) I. FOUNDATION
Licensed Windows OS (WS/S) Or Open Source
2279
CSMM - LAYER 5: MONITORED
2280
CSMM - LAYER 5: MONITORED
2282
CSMM - LAYER 5: MONITORED
5.4: SECURITY
OPERATIONS CENTER
(SOC) IMPLEMENTATION
• After implementation
of the first four layers,
its time to consolidate
security operations
• People, process, and
technology/tools
• Similar to a NOC but for
security purposes
END • SIEM is starting point
2284
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
2285
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
VI. SECURED
Security Orchestration, Automation, & Incident Response
Threat Protection
VI. SECURED
Threat Simulation
Security Operations Center (SOC) Implementation
V. MONITORED
Critical Data Encryption
V. MONITORED
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Solution
SIEM Solution For Security Events Detection
ISO27001:2013 (ISMS) Certification
IV. PROTECTED
External/Internal Penetration Test (Critical Assets)
Software Source Code Review For Critical Applications IV. PROTECTED
CIS 20 Critical Security Controls
Software Security Hardening Program
III. HARDENED
NGN FW At Data Center Entry Point With Filtering
CIS Security Benchmarks Hardening Of All IT Assets
III. HARDENED
Min Monthly Credential Based VM Cycle
Network Segmentation With VLANs By Dept/Service, & DMZ
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Edge NGN FW With Web, Email, Anti-malware Filtering
Min Quarterly Credential Based VM Cycle
II. FUNDAMENTALS
Licensed Or Open Source VM Tool
Edge FW With Filtering
I. FOUNDATION
Active Directory (WS/S)
Licensed Enterprise AV (WS/S) I. FOUNDATION
Licensed Windows OS (WS/S) Or Open Source
2286
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
2287
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
2288
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
2289
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
6.3: SECURITY
ORCHESTRATION,
AUTOMATION, AND
INCIDENT RESPONSE
• Solution such as
Cybersponse
(www.cybersponse.co
m)
2291
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
6.3: SECURITY
ORCHESTRATION,
AUTOMATION, AND
INCIDENT RESPONSE
• From triaging and
investigating alerts to
collaboration and
remediation between
team members,
CyberSponse takes
your security operation
team to the next level.
2292
CSMM - LAYER 6: SECURED
2294
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
2295
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
• Validation during
security hardening:
– Purpose here is to
only validate or
confirm that the
intended controls
have been correctly
and completely
applied in the pilot
setup
2296
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
• Validation during
security hardening:
– Nothing mentioned
for production
environment
– Nothing mentioned
for BUSINESS
LAUNCH (GO-LIVE)
2297
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
2298
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
1. Requirements
3. Remediation
6. Accredit
Plan
4. Implement
5. Test/Validate
Controls
2299
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
• In the Information
Security Lifecycle chart,
we have already gone
into production
“environment” with
Stage 4
• However, formal
approval for BUSINESS
LAUNCH (GO-LIVE) has
not yet been issued
• Security accreditation
has not taken place
2300
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
1. Requirements
3. Remediation
6. Accredit
Plan
4. Implement
5. Test/Validate
Controls
2301
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
• In the Information
Security Lifecycle chart
Stage 5 & 6:
• …Refer to activities
carried out in
PRODUCTION
“environment”
• …But before Business
launch (GO-LIVE) has
taken place
2302
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
1. Requirements
***FORMAL BUSINESS
LAUNCH OR GO-LIVE
3. Remediation
6. Accredit
Plan
4. Implement
5. Test/Validate
Controls
2303
InfoSecurity Lifecycle – Security Validation
2306
What is Security Validation ?
2307
What is Security Validation ?
2308
What is Security Validation ?
2309
What is Security Validation ?
• Why do we need to
validate security
controls ?
1. To check the
completeness of
the controls
2. To check the
correctness of the
controls
3. As an overall
assurance
2310
What is Security Validation ?
1. To check the
completeness of the
controls:
– Usually 100’s of
controls need to be
implemented
– There may be
genuine omissions
by technical team
members
– There may have
been errors made
2311
What is Security Validation ?
2312
What is Security Validation ?
3. As an overall assurance:
– IT team may not
have sufficient
resources to ensure
100% completeness
and correctness
– Implementation by
IT and validation by
Information Security
team forms a
healthy team
relationship
2313
What is Security Validation ?
3. As an overall assurance:
– This is also referred
to as maker-checker
principal
– Some of the
controls may have
been designated as
“not-applicable” or
“not possible” and
the reasons and
justification needs
to be reviewed
2314
What is Security Validation ?
3. As an overall assurance:
– Significant
resources are
allocated to the
security
transformational
program; even one
control missed may
affect the security
posture
– Uncovered at the
time of hack/attack
2315
What is Security Validation ?
3. As an overall assurance:
– Ability, integrity
and diligence of
team members are
key factors
http://whatis.techtarget.com/d
efinition/four-eyes-principle
– Healthy technical
debate and cross-
checks have a
positive outcome
on the program
2316
What is Security Validation ?
• The Information
Security team or the
ISMC is tasked with the
overall responsibility
of the success of the
program
• Any lapses discovered
later fall squarely
under the
responsibility of
InfoSec/ISMC
2317
What is Security Validation ?
• Security validation
becomes an essential
activity and needs to
be established in an
environment of
healthy & professional
commitment to ensure
the 100% complete and
correct
implementation &
upkeep of the controls
END…
2318
How is Security Validation Performed ?
2319
How is Security Validation Performed ?
• Security validation is
the same irrespective if
performed specific to
8-Step Security
Hardening (Model) or
to the Information
Security Lifecycle
2320
How is Security Validation Performed ?
2. Research on 5. Implement
8. Implement on
applicable controls on test
PROD & monitor
security controls setup
3. Checklist of
4. Document
applicable
controls into SOP
controls
2321
How is Security Validation Performed ?
STEP DESCRIPTION PERFORMED BY FACILITATED BY
1 IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS ISMC HEAD OF IT
(& ASSET OWNER) SECTION
2 RESEARCH APPLICABLE SECURITY INFOSEC TEAM ISMC
CONTROLS
3 CHECLIST OF APPLICABLE INFOSEC TEAM TEAM LEAD
SECURITY CONTROLS
4 DOCUMENT CONTROLS INTO TEAM LEAD INFOSEC TEAM
SOP
5 IMPLEMENT CONTROLS ON TEST IT OPERATIONS TEAM LEAD
SETUP TEAM
6 VALIDATION OF CONTROL INFOSEC TEAM IT OPERATIONS
IMPLEMENTATION TEAM
7 CHANGE MANAGEMENT TEAM LEAD ISMC
PROCESS FOR PRODUCTION
8 PRODUCTION & MONITOR IT OPERATIONS TEAM LEAD
TEAM
2322
How is Security Validation Performed ?
SECURITY VALIDATION SEQUENCE
1. Decide
Scope
5. Confirm 2. Study
Validation Controls
4. Remove 3. Conduct
Errors Review
2323
How is Security Validation Performed ?
1. Decide Scope
– Acquire checklist of
applied controls from
IT team
– Decide stakeholders
who will conduct
review (IT & InfoSec)
– Schedule the review
and send formal
email to IT (plus
calendar invite)
2324
How is Security Validation Performed ?
2. Study Controls
– Information Security
team to acquire
original controls
from CIS/DISA/other
– Study & understand
the controls
– Mark the checklist &
ensure correctness
– Prepare docs &
notes for actual
review
2325
How is Security Validation Performed ?
3. Conduct Review
– One person to
conduct review &
one to take notes
– Walkthrough of
each control
– Random sampling
of controls (20-30%)
– Agree on any action
items for
shortcomings with
timeline
2326
How is Security Validation Performed ?
4. Remove Errors:
– IT team to remove
any shortcomings
or omissions in
control
implementation
– IT team reports
back to InfoSec
team when all
shortcomings fixed
2328
How is Security Validation Performed ?
5. Confirm Validation
– InfoSec team
schedules another
session with IT
team to confirm
that all
shortcomings have
been removed
– InfoSec team adds
a confirmation
column &
comments column
to checklist 2329
How is Security Validation Performed ?
5. Confirm Validation
– Status of validation
communicated to
relevant IT teams &
stakeholders
– Records updated to
register the
validation activity
– Project
management stats
updated accordingly
END (% complete)
2330
What Is Security Testing ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_testing
2331
What Is Security Testing ?
• Types of security
testing:
– Vulnerability
assessment (VA)
– Penetration testing
(PT)
– Other security tests
through various
automated tools
– Code review
(initiated in test
environment)
2333
What Is Security Testing ?
1. Vulnerability
assessment:
– VA scanners have
various tests built-in
such as for malware,
vulnerabilities, web
application flaws
(e.g. OWASP top
ten)
– Compliance scanning
against CIS/DISA
benchmarks
2334
What Is Security Testing ?
2. Penetration Testing:
– Penetration testing
(also called pen
testing) is the
practice of testing a
computer system,
network or Web
application to find
vulnerabilities that
an attacker could
exploit.
http://searchsoftwarequality.
techtarget.com/definition/pe
netration-testing
What Is Security Testing ?
2. Penetration Testing:
– Usually outsourced
to a third-party
depending on
nature and criticality
of the application or
service being
launched
– Highly specialized
skill not commonly
found in-house
2336
What Is Security Testing ?
2. Penetration Testing:
– Pen tests can be
automated with
software
applications or they
can be performed
manually. Either
way, the process
includes gathering
information about…
http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarg
et.com/definition/penetration-testing
2337
What Is Security Testing ?
2. Penetration Testing:
– …the target before
the test
(reconnaissance),
identifying possible
entry points,
attempting to break
in (either virtually or
for real) and
reporting back the
findings
http://searchsoftwarequality.tec
htarget.com/definition/penetrat
ion-testing
2338
What Is Security Testing ?
2339
What Is Security Testing ?
2342
What Is Security Testing ?
4. Code review:
– Code review
examines flaws and
vulnerabilities in
programming
source code
– A complete cycle,
initiated early and in
pilot testing phase
– May be conducted
for production
applications as well
2343
What Is Security Testing ?
4. Code review:
– Requires a mature
internal process,
experience and
capability
– May be integrated
with software QA
testing
END
2344
What Is Security Accreditation ?
2345
What Is Security Accreditation ?
2346
What Is Security Accreditation ?
1. Requirements
***FORMAL BUSINESS
LAUNCH OR GO-LIVE
3. Remediation
6. Accredit
Plan
4. Implement
5. Test/Validate
Controls
2347
What Is Security Accreditation ?
• Whenever a new,
significant portal,
application, or service
is launched,
management requires
Information Security
team to certify after
carrying out the
required security
validation & security
testing that the…
2348
What Is Security Accreditation ?
1. Organize
6. Issue 2. Prepare
Accredit. Checklist
5. Team 3. Confirm
Meeting Tests
4. Complete
Doc &
Processes
2350
What Is Security Accreditation ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
1. Organize
– Collect all security
requirements,
related security
policy & SOPs,
hardening checklists,
validation status
reports, test reports,
completion status
reports
2351
What Is Security Accreditation ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
1. …Organize
– Information Security
team ensures that the
full context of the
security risks/impact
are understood
– Subsequent security
hardening & testing
has been fully
covered
2352
What Is Security Accreditation ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
2. Prepare Checklist &
Share With Stakeholders
– Checklist should
cover all activities &
their status for
completion of
accreditation
– Share with
stakeholders for
END feedback
2353
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
2354
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
2355
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
SECURITY ACCREDITATION SEQUENCE
1. Organize
6. Issue 2. Prepare
Accredit. Checklist
5. Team 3. Confirm
Meeting Tests
4. Complete Doc
& Processes
2356
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
3. Confirm Tests
– Core activity:
confirm that all test
reports are
satisfactory
– All tests and follow-
up remediation
measures have been
completed
2357
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
4. Documentation &
Processes (Complete)
– Reconfirm correct
versions
– Re-check checklists,
SOPs
– Backups & DR
– All change control
measures & sign-
offs
2358
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
4. Documentation &
Processes (Complete)
– Re-check all
management
approvals
– Re-check UATs,
customer sign-offs
– Check application
performance issues
2359
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
5. Team Meeting
– Call team meeting
and report status
of all activities
– List any snags &
decide completion
dates
– Seek stakeholder
sign-off on
accreditation form
2360
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
5. Team Meeting
– Clarify & recap
security
requirements &
SOPs
– Clarify what actions
will invalidate the
security
accreditation
2361
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
6. Issue Accreditation
– Once all details
completed on
accreditation sign-
off form issue
accreditation
– Business has GO-
LIVE permission
using tested
versions
2362
What Is Security Accreditation – Part 2 ?
Security Accreditation
Sequence
6. Issue Accreditation
– Enter activities for
accredited IT assets
into IT audit
program
– Update Operations
teams, incident
management, and
risk management
END register
2363
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2364
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
1. Requirements
4. Implement
5. Test/Validate
Controls
2365
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
• Software Assurance
Maturity Model
(SAMM) developed by
OWASP
– A guide to building
security into
software
development
– 96 page PDF
http://www.opensamm.org/downl
oads/SAMM-1.0.pdf
2366
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2367
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
http://www.opensamm.org/downl
oads/SAMM-1.0.pdf (PAGE 3)
2368
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
• The Software
Assurance Maturity
Model (SAMM) is an
open framework to
help organizations
formulate and
implement a strategy
for software security
that is tailored to the
specific risks facing the
organization.
http://www.opensamm.org/downl
oads/SAMM-1.0.pdf (PAGE 3)
2369
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2370
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2371
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2372
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2373
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
2374
Embedding InfoSec Lifecycle Into SDLC
http://www.opensamm.org/downl
END oads/SAMM-1.0.pdf
2375
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
2376
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
2377
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• OWASP Software
Assurance Maturity
Model (SAMM)
Verification Phase:
– Design Review
– Code Review
– Security Testing
2378
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• Design Review:
– Focused on
assessment of
software design
and architecture for
security-related
problems
– Detect architecture-
level issues early in
software…
2379
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• Design Review:
– …development and
thereby avoid
potentially large
costs from
refactoring later due
to security concerns
2380
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
2381
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• Code Review:
– Focused on
inspection of
software at the
source code level
in order to find
security
vulnerabilities.
– Code-level
vulnerabilities are
generally simple to
understand…
2382
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• Code Review:
– …conceptually, but
even informed
developers can
easily make
mistakes that leave
software open to
potential
compromise.
2383
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
2384
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• Security Testing:
– Focused on
inspection of
software in the
runtime
environment in
order to find
security problems.
– These testing
activities bolster the
assurance case for
software by…
2385
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
• Security Testing:
– …checking it in the
same context in
which it is expected
to run, thus making
visible operational
misconfigurations
or errors in business
logic that are
difficult to
otherwise find.
2386
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
2387
Software Security Testing & Validation–1
2388
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
2389
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
2390
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• OWASP Software
Assurance Maturity
Model (SAMM)
Deployment Phase:
– Environment
Hardening
– Vulnerability
Management
– Operational
Enablement
2391
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• Environment
Hardening:
– Focused on building
assurance for the
runtime environment
that hosts the
organization’s
software.
– Since secure
operation of an
application can be...
2392
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• Environment
Hardening:
– …deteriorated by
problems in external
components,
hardening this
underlying
infrastructure
directly improves the
overall security
posture of the
software
2393
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
2394
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• Vulnerability
Management:
– Focused on the
processes within an
organization with
respect to handling
vulnerability reports
and operational
incidents.
– By having these
processes in place,
an organization’s
2395
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• Vulnerability
Management:
– …projects will have
consistent
expectations and
increased efficiency
for handling these
events, rather than
chaotic and
uninformed
responses.
2396
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
2397
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• Operational
Enablement:
– Focused on
gathering security
critical information
from the project
teams building
software and
communicating it to
the users and
operators of the
software.
2398
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• Operational
Enablement:
– Without this
information, even
the most securely
designed software
carries undue risks
since important
security
characteristics and
choices will not be
known at a
deployment site. 2399
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
2400
Software Security Testing & Validation–2
• SAMM is an excellent
model for software
(security) assurance
• OWASP also has a
multitude of additional
materials, guidance,
and tools for software
END and seb application
security
2401
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
https://project-
management.com/top-5-project-
management-phases/
2402
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
Initiate
Project sponsorship, requirement gathering &
analysis, develop project charter
SECURITY TASKS:
2403
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
Plan
Build project plan and identify resources &
schedule for the project
SECURITY TASKS:
2404
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
Executing
Execute the project, project performance review &
corrections
SECURITY TASKS:
2405
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
Controlling
Project controlling, monitoring & corrections
SECURITY TASKS:
2406
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
Closing
Launch product or solution, relieve resources
SECURITY TASKS:
-Security accreditation
-Identify operational measures
-SOPs, incident management, internal audit,
monitoring
2407
Embedding InfoSec Into Project Management
• Senior management
needs to ensure that
security is integrated
with IT project plans
• Sufficient security
resources should be
made available to
manage the security
aspects of projects
END
2408
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
2409
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
• When is an internal
security assessment
required ?
– Launch of a new IT
project or service
– When an incident
has occurred
– On change of
leadership
– Regulatory or
compliance reqmts
2410
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
• Sequence of security
assessment:
1. Management approval
or communication
2. Assign resources
3. Build plan, scope and
objectives
4. Conduct assessment
5. Report findings &
remediation measures
2411
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
1. Management approval
or communication:
– Authority of the
assessment
– Cooperation from
stakeholders
– Determine &
communicate
timeline
– Determine
appropriate report
format
2412
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
2. Assign resources:
– Assign information
security resources
with relevant
experience
– Identify respective
resources for IT asset
to be assessed
– Hold initial meeting
with respective
stakeholder POC
2413
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
4. Conduct assessment:
– Conduct the
necessary activities
such as system
walkthrough,
vulnerability
assessment, security
testing, evaluation
of security controls,
review of process
and documentation,
etc
2415
How To Conduct Internal Security Assessment
• A few pointers:
– Security should not
be reactive
– Security
transformation
project should
address security
loopholes
– Align the security
assessment with
benchmarks
END established already
2417
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Vulnerability
Module 272 assessment
• Penetration test
• Audits
• Whitebox/greybox/
blackbox assessments
• Risk assessment
• Threat assessment
• Bug bounty
• Red team
https://danielmiessler.com/study/sec
urity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2418
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Vulnerability
assessment:
– Technical
assessment to yield
as many
vulnerabilities as
possible in an
environment along
with severity and
remediation priority
information
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2419
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Vulnerability
assessment:
– Best when security
maturity is low to
medium, need a
prioritized list of
everything that’s
wrong, goal is to fix
as many things as
possible as
efficiently as
possible
2420
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Penetration test:
– A Penetration Test
is a technical
assessment
designed to achieve
a specific goal, e.g.,
to steal customer
data, to gain
domain
administrator, or to
modify sensitive
salary information
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2421
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Penetration test:
– Penetration Tests
are for testing
security that is
assumed to be
strong
– No point in wasting
the effort if
hardening and
vulnerability
assessment have
not been done
2422
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• VA & PT difference:
– Vulnerability
assessments look
for security
problems when you
know/assume they
exist, and
penetration testing
validates a
configuration when
you believe it to be
secure
2423
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Audit:
– An audit can be
technical and/or
documentation-
based, and focuses
on how an existing
configuration
compares to a
desired standard
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secu
rity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2424
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Audit:
– Orgs use audits to
demonstrate
compliance
– Importantly,
compliance should
not be used to
demonstrate
security
– Compliant orgs
more likely to be
secure
2425
Different Types Of Security Assessments
• Audit:
– Secure orgs are
significantly more
likely to be
compliant (if
checked), but
compliant orgs
should lay no claims
to being secure just
because they are in
accordance with
standard X or Y.
2426
Different Types Of Security Assessments
2429
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
https://danielmiessler.com/study/security-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2430
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
https://danielmiessler.com/study/security-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2431
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
• Risk assessment:
– Should involve
determining what
the current level of
acceptable risk is,
measuring the
current risk level,
and then
determining what
can be done to bring
these two in …
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2432
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
• Risk assessment:
– …line where there
are mismatches.
Risk Assessments
commonly involve
the rating of risks in
two dimensions:
probability, and
impact.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2433
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
• Risk assessment:
– Umbrella term for
determining what
you have of value,
how it can be
attacked, what you
would lose if those
attacks were
successful, and what
should be done to
address the issues.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2434
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
• Threat assessment:
– The driver for the
assessment is to
determine how
many resources—if
any—should be
spent on addressing
the issue in
question.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2435
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
• Threat assessment:
– A threat assessment
is best used in
situations where
someone has made
a claim around
performing an
attack in the future,
or such a potential is
uncovered
somehow.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/sec
urity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2436
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 2
• Threat assessment:
– Lets look at red
team exercises and
bug bounty
programs in the
next module
END
2437
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 3
• Vulnerability
Module 274 assessment
• Penetration test
• Audits
• Whitebox/greybox/
blackbox assessments
• Risk assessment
• Threat assessment
• Bug bounty
• Red team
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2438
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 3
• Bug bounty:
– A Bug Bounty is a
type of technical
security assessment
that leverages
crowdsourcing to
find vulnerabilities in
a system. The
central concept is
simple: security
testers, regardless
of quality, have their
https://danielmiessler.com/study/security-
assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2439
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 3
• Bug bounty:
– …own set of
strengths,
weaknesses,
experiences, biases, &
preferences, & these
combine to yield
different findings for
the same system
when tested by
different people.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2440
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 3
• Bug bounty:
– Best used when you
have done multiple
Vulnerability
Assessments
already and have
already found the
easy stuff. Bug
Bounties excel at
finding issues not
found using other
methods.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/secur
ity-assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2441
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 3
2444
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 3
END https://danielmiessler.com/study/security-
assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2445
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
https://danielmiessler.com/study/security-
assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2446
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
2447
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2448
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
TYPE SUMMARY
White Measure of how much information is
Box, being provided to a security testing
Grey Box, organization during an assessment.
Black Box These can be internal, external,
Assess- application-based, network-based,
ments with or without exploitation, etc
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2449
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2450
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2451
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
TYPE SUMMARY
Crowdsourcing for the discovery
of vulnerabilities in a system.
Utilizes large collection of
Bug Bounties
independent researchers who all
bring their own perspectives to
the testing
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2452
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
TYPE SUMMARY
Continuously and effectively emulate
an organization’s real-world attackers
for the purpose of improving its
defensive capabilities. Red Teams
Red Team operate continuously, with near-full-
Assessment scope and very limited restrictions,
and constantly evolve their
approaches to match and/or exceed
the capabilities of the organization’s
actual attackers.
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
https://danielmiessler.com/study/securityassessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2453
Types Of Security Assessments-Part 4
• Vulnerability
assessment
• Penetration test
• Audits
• Whitebox/greybox/
blackbox assessments
• Risk assessment
• Threat assessment
• Bug bounty
• Red team
END
https://danielmiessler.com/study/security-
assessment-types/#gs.NdADAuQ
2454
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
2455
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
1. SYSTEM PORT
SCANNING
- Port scanning is one of
the most important
phases of a vulnerability
assessment exercise prior
to a penetration test.
- This will be the first tool
used by an attacker once
he has identified the IP
address to be targeted.
2456
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
1. SYSTEM PORT
SCANNING…
- The key part here is to
use a multiple of port-
scanning tools in order to
ensure the least false
positives and the
maximum information
that can be gathered.
2457
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
2. IDENTIFICATION OF
SYSTEM SERVICES
- Once the open ports
have been enumerated, it
is important to determine
the services that are
keeping those ports open.
- This is typically done by
analyzing the banners
thrown back when a
default connection is
made to the open port.
2458
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
2. IDENTIFICATION OF
SYSTEM SERVICES…
- The latest nmap version
allows this to be done
using the –sV switch.
2459
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
3. IDENTIFICATION &
VERIFICATION OF SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES
- During vulnerability
identification, an
assessor will perform
several activities to
detect exploitable weak
points.
2460
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
3. IDENTIFICATION &
VERIFICATION OF SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES
These activities include:
- Identify vulnerable
services using service
banners.
- Perform vulnerability
scan to search for
known vulnerabilities.
Information regarding
known vulnerabilities…
2461
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
3. IDENTIFICATION &
VERIFICATION OF SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES
• Information regarding
known vulnerabilities
can be obtained from
the vendors’ security
announcements, or
from public databases
such as SecurityFocus,
CVE or CERT advisories.
2462
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
3. IDENTIFICATION &
VERIFICATION OF SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES
- Perform false positive and
false negative verification
(e.g. by correlating
vulnerabilities with each
other and with previously
acquired information).
2463
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
3. IDENTIFICATION &
VERIFICATION OF SYSTEM
VULNERABILITIES
- Enumerate discovered
vulnerabilities.
- Estimate probable impact
(classify vulnerabilities
found).
- Identify attack paths and
scenarios for exploitation.
2464
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
4. PENETRATION TESTING
(SYSTEM EXPLOITATION)
-Following the approvals of
individual attacks by
Customer, the assessor
tries to gain unauthorized
access by circumventing
the security measures in
place and tries to reach as
wide a level of access as
possible. This process will
have the following steps:
2465
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
4. PENETRATION TESTING
(SYSTEM EXPLOITATION)
- Find proof of concept
code/tool
- Find proof of concept
code available in your own
repository or from publicly
available sources to test
for vulnerabilities. If the
code is from your own
trusted repository and…
2466
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
4. PENETRATION TESTING
(SYSTEM EXPLOITATION)
…thoroughly tested, you
can use it, otherwise test it
in an isolated environment.
- Develop tools/scripts
- Under some
circumstances it will be
necessary (and cost
effective) for assessors to
create their own tools and
scripts.
2467
STAGES OF 3RD PARTY PENETRATION TEST
4. PENETRATION TESTING
(SYSTEM EXPLOITATION)
- …Test proof of concept
code/tool in an isolated
environment
- The proof of concept
code/tool is used against
the target to gain as many
points of unauthorized
access as possible.
- Document findings
END
2468
Security Transformation: Failure ?
• Guaranteed failure:
1. Cosmetic
commitment
2. Not willing to invest
in resources
3. Deficient program
structure
4. Lack of effective
project
management
2470
Security Transformation: Failure ?
1. Cosmetic Commitment:
– Lack of awareness &
understanding
– Short-term vision
– Lack of priority
– Poorly managed
organization
2471
Security Transformation: Failure ?
3. Deficient Program
Structure:
– Ineffective
Information Security
Management
Committee (ISMC)
– Not taking along
other stakeholders
– Inexperienced IT or
security leadership
– IT team not
incentivized
2473
Security Transformation: Failure ?
4. Lack Of Effective
Project Management:
– Any project will fail
without effective
project
management
– Effective planning,
execution,
monitoring, and
reporting
– Experience &
domain knowledge
2474
Security Transformation: Failure ?
• Conclusion:
– The Information
Security
Transformation
requires a
tremendous amount
of hard work
– Not possible without
commitment, right
strategy, correct
structure, and
END effective execution
2475
Benefits Of The Security Transformation
2476
Benefits Of The Security Transformation
2477
Benefits Of The Security Transformation
2478
Benefits Of The Security Transformation
• Impact of attacks:
– Loss of market
goodwill
– Loss of customer
confidence
– Regulatory fines,
legal consequences
2479
Benefits Of The Security Transformation
• Conclusion:
– An effective
Information Security
Program (achieved
through an
Information Security
Transformation) is
essential wherever an
IT setup exists
– Not a luxury but an
imperative
END
2482
Security Transformation Timeline
2483
Security Transformation Timeline
2484
Security Transformation Timeline
• Month 1: Planning
– Understand
organization &
security issues
– Develop ISMC
– Identify stakeholders
for InfoSec Steering
Committee
– Identify assets for
various phases
– Project kickoff and
awareness trainings2485
Security Transformation Timeline
2487
Security Transformation Timeline
2490
Security Transformation Timeline
END
2491
Security Transformation Responsibility
2492
Security Transformation Responsibility
• Management role:
– Commitment
– Sets the tone at the
top
– Allocates resources
– Assigns responsibility
& roles
– Conducts periodic
performance review
2493
Security Transformation Responsibility
• Information Security
Team:
– Builds an effective
strategy & structure
for the program
– Identifies key players
to enroll in ISMC
– Ensures effective
execution & project
management
– Conducts transparent
reporting
2494
Security Transformation Responsibility
• IT Team:
– Mobilizes the
resources for
implementation of
the security program
– Ensures quality and
process during the
security
transformation
program
– Resolves roadblocks
in implementation
2495
Security Transformation Responsibility
• Conclusion:
– An effective
Information Security
Transformation can
only be orchestrated
through effective
team work
– All parts of the
END organization have to
play their due role to
make the program a
success
2496
Actions To Raise Management Support
2497
Actions To Raise Management Support
a. Understand the
organizational business
requirements and
potential impact
b. Understand regulations
& sector best-practices
c. Evaluate the security
posture
d. Assess the extent of
work and resources
required
e. Present your report
2498
Actions To Raise Management Support
a. Understand the
organizational business
requirements & potential
impact:
– Type of
business/industry
– Business
requirements
– Confidentiality,
integrity, availability
– What can go wrong
and impact ?
2499
Actions To Raise Management Support
b. Understand regulations
and sector best-practices
– Financial industry
(SBP)
– Telecoms & IT
industry
(PTA/MOITT)
– Oil & Gas (OGRA)
– Look at standards &
best-practices
(quality & security)
2500
Actions To Raise Management Support
Conclusion:
• Many of the problems
associated with weak
security posture are
actually due to poor
awareness
• Put yourself in the shoes
of your audience and
explain the need for a
security program from
their perspective
END • Keep it high level
2504
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
2505
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
SN QUESTION PTS
1 DESIGNATED HEAD OF INFORMATION 30
SECURITY ?
2 INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY 20
(AVAILABLE ON PORTAL) ?
3 INTERNAL VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT 50
PROGRAM (INTERNAL TOOL WITH MIN
QTR SCANS) ?
4 EXTERNAL PENETRATION TEST 50
CONDUCTED MIN ONCE PER YEAR ?
5 IT ASSETS HARDENED WITH CIS/DISA OR 100
OTHER INDUSTRY BEST-PRACTICE ?
2506
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
SN QUESTION PTS
6 ESTABLISHED INTERNAL PROCESSES FOR 25
CHANGE MANAGEMENT, INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT, CAPACITY PLANNING ?
7 IS INFOSEC TEAM SIZE MIN 15% OF IT TEAM 25
?
8 DO YOU HAVE OPERATIONAL DR SITE ? 50
9 ALL SYSTEMS HAVE LICENSED OS ? 50
10 IS ACTIVE DIRECTORY AND LICENSED AV 50
RUNNING ON ALL WORKSTATIONS ?
2507
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
SN QUESTION PTS
11 DOES NETWORK PERFORM FILTERING FOR 20
WEB, AND ANTI-SPAM AT EDGE ?
12 FILTER TRAFFIC AT DATA CENTER SWITCH 20
BASED ON ACCESS LIST ?
13 EDGE FIREWALL AND DMZ PRESENT ? 20
14 REGULAR BACKUPS OFFSITE AND 20
PERFORM DR DRILL ON 2X YEAR BASIS ?
15 DOES MANAGEMENT REVIEW INFOSEC ON 20
A QUARTERLY BASIS ?
TOTAL 500
2508
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
RECCOMENDED
SCORE RANGE POSTURE
ACTIONS
INFORMATION
SECURITY
LESS THAN 20% SEVERE RISK
TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAM
INFORMATION
SECURITY
20% TO 35% HIGH RISK
TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAM
INFORMATION
SECURITY
35% TO 50% MEDIUM RISK
TRANSFORMATION
PROGRAM
2509
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
RECCOMENDED
SCORE RANGE POSTURE
ACTIONS
FURTHER
THIRD-PARTY
50% TO 70% IMPROVEMENTS
SECURITY REVIEW
REQUIRED
THIRD-PARTY
70% TO 85% SATISFACTORY
SECURITY REVIEW
GO FOR
HIGHER THAN 85% VERY GOOD ! ISO@7001:2013
CERTIFICATION !
2510
Key Questions To Assess Security Posture
• By evaluating the
security posture and
comparing with a few
other organizations
(through a limited
survey), the security
posture can be
portrayed in a
quantitative manner
• The questions can be
refined and customized
for your organization
END
2511
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
2512
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
• Authenticity
• Candidness
• Fairness & fair play
• Team environment
• Recognizing talent and
hard work
• Celebrating success !
2513
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
• Authenticity
– IT is complex
– No one person
“knows-it-all”
– Communicate that
each individual has
limitations
– Admit mistakes and
failures
– Give credit where it is
due
2514
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
• Candidness:
– Call a spade a spade
– Honesty and straight-
talk
– Hear feedback and
give respect to views
of everyone
2515
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
2516
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
• Team Environment:
– Discourage solo-flight
and promote team
consensus, team
reviews, and team
achievements
– Single out and coach
individuals playing
turf tactics
2517
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
2518
Key Leadership Qualities Of InfoSec Head
• Celebrate Success !
– Hold team
celebrations
– Recognize quiet
workers and
background workers
as well
– Promote team
END achievements
2519
COURSE WRAP UP
2520
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 1: INTRO TO
INFORMATION SECURITY
• Some basic terms and
introduction to
concepts
• Status of Information
Security in Pakistan
2521
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 2: TYPICAL
ENTERPRISE IT
ARCHITECTURE AND
SECURITY OVERLAY
• What does IT
enterprise topology
look like ?
• Security tools overlay
• Structure of It teams
and security roles in an
enterprise
2522
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 3: SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION STAGE
1: SECURITY HARDENING
• Description of security
hardening
• Security hardening
case studies for a
variety of IT assets
through CIS
benchmarks and DISA
STIGs
2523
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 4: SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION STAGE
2: VULNERABILITY
MANAGEMENT
• VM description and
introduction
• VM demos (Qualys) &
Other tools
• VM program best-
practices
2524
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 5: SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION STAGE
3: SECURITY ENGINEERING
• Description of Security
Engineering
• CIS 20 Critical Controls
2525
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 6: SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION STAGE
4: SECURITY
GOVERNANCE
• Security governance
introduction
• Different governance
frameworks
• ISO27001:2013 (ISMS)
appendix controls
• Cyber Security Maturity
Matrix (CSMM)
2526
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 7: SECURITY
TESTING & VALIDATION
• Security assessments
and validation
description
• Security accreditation
• Software security
testing & validation
• Stages of a third-party
penetration test
2527
COURSE WRAP UP
CHAPTER 8: SUCCESSFUL
SECURITY
TRANSFORMATION
• Security
Transformation key
success factors
• Security
Transformation
timeline
• Security
Transformation
benefits
2528
COURSE WRAP UP
BECOME A SECURITY
TRASFORMATION
CHAMPION !
Nahil.mahmood@gmail.co
m
nahil@deltatechglobal.net
Nahil Mahmood
2529