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Nyāya Philosophy

PRAMĀNATATTVA: EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC

Jnana or Cognition: Its nature and types

● Maharsi Goutama defines cognition or Jnana as, “Buddhih

upalabdhirjnanamityanarthantaram.”(Nyaya Sutra 1-1-15) That means intellect, apprehension, and
knowledge are not different from one another. ). In Nyaya philosophy, the term “buddhi” is
synonymous with the words “jnana” or consciousness, and apprehension or Upalabdhi‟.
● “Cognition (buddhi )is consciousness (jnana) and is that Quality (guna) which is the ground (hetu) of
all linguistic usage (vyavahara=sabdaproyoga)
● According to Nyāya philosophy, Knowledge is the apprehension of an object. Knowledge is an
accidental quality of Atman.
● Naiyayikas are the supporters of realism. According to them, knower and knowable objects are
different and knowledge reveals both of them. So, Nyaya philosophy is called logical realism.

● The Nayayikas make a distinction between two kinds of cognition: 1. memory or representational
knowledge (Smṛti) and 2. apprehension or presentational knowledge (anubhāva).
● Smṛti is that kind of cognition that is born out of mental impressions alone
(Saṁskara-mātra-janya-jñanam). Smṛti is the cognition of the past object.
● Anubhava or apprehension has been defined by the Nyaya as ‘knowledge different from that’. In other
words, the knowledge that is not memory or not born of mental impressions is what can be termed as
apprehension or presentational knowledge.
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Pramā and Apramā

● Anubhava is of two types- veridical ( yatharthaanubhāva) and non-veridical (ayatharthaanubhāva)

● Yatharthaanubhāva or veridical apprehension called Pramā and Ayatharthaanubhāva or non-veridical
apprehension is called Apramā.
● Pramā or Yatharthaanubhāva / veridical apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing
attributes that it really possesses. Tadvatitatprakarakahanubhavoyatharthah. If one apprehends an
object as possessing certain attributes and if the object in reality possesses those attributes, then the
apprehension is said to be valid. If one apprehends an object as silver and the object is silver, then the
apprehension is valid or veridical / Pramā
● when one apprehends an object as possessing certain attributes while the object does not possess them,
then the apprehension is invalid or non-veridical apprehension or Apramā.
Tad-abhavavatitatprakarakahanubhah-ayatharthah. e.g., When one apprehends a thing as silver, but
it is not silver, then it is a case of wrong apprehension.
● For the Nyaya valid presentational knowledge or knowledge which is valid apprehension is Pramā. In
other words, Pramā is characterized by truth and presentativenes (anubhavatvah)
● Pramā has to be yathartha or true and this characteristic of Pramā excludes error (bhrama) and others
from being recognized as a kind of valid knowledge or Prama.
● the Nyaya says that Pramā is apprehension or presentational (anubhāva) and not representational. It is
this characteristic that excludes memory from valid knowledge. Memory can be true in the sense of
faithfully representing the event or the action in its true characteristic. Still, it is not Pramā as it arises
from a mental impression and is not due to the object presented
● Naiyayikas said that valid knowledge (prama) are of four types – pratyaksa, anumiti, upamiti and sabda
and the source of valid knowledge (pramana) are also of four types- pratyaksa, anumana, upamana and
sabda.
● Aprama includes doubt (Samsaya), error (Viparyaya), and hypothetical reasoning (Tarka).
1. Samsaya or Doubt is indefinite knowledge. It is the nature of vacillation between two
conflicting judgments. E.g., is this a post or a man?
2. Viparyaya or Error is an illusory perception. It is a definite knowledge however it is the false
knowledge of one thing (e.g. Shell) as another(e.g., silver)
3. Tarka or hypothetical reasoning is indirect proof that shows that wrong assumptions lead to
absurdity. If there is fire there is no smoke.

Pramānyavāda:

● Truth is the correspondence of knowledge with reality and error is the non-corrospondence of
knowledge with reality. Truth or falsity of knowledge consists respectively in its correspondence and
noncorrespondence to facts.
● Prama or valid knowledge corresponds to its object and Aprama or invalid knowledge does not
correspond to its object.
● Veridical Cognition or Prama or Non-veridical cognition or Aprama is NOT true or false on its own – it
depends upon another condition for its truth or Pramanya.
● Pravrittisamvada or Successful activity is the criterion of validity and pravrittivisamvada or
un-successful activity is the criterion of invalidity.
● Naiyayikas holds that the truth and falsity of knowledge, which are produced by extraneous conditions
such as positive excellence or efficiency( Guna) and positive defects (Dosa) or inefficiency in
generating condition of knowledge [parath-pramanya-apramanyar-utpattivada], are also known by
certain extraneous conditions other than the general conditions of knowledge such as the capacity to
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produce fruitful activity (Pravritti Samarthya / Saphalya) or incapacity to produce fruitful activity
(Pravritti Visamvada) [= pratah-Pramanya-apramanyar-jnaptivada]

Pramana: Nature and Its Types.

● In Indian philosophy, valid knowledge is called prama and the source of valid knowledge is called
pramana. “Pramayah karanam pramanam.”) That means the uncommon cause or karana of valid
knowledge or prama is called pramana.
● Pramanas are four types- pratyaksa, anumana, upamana and sabda.

Pratyksa or Perception:

● Goutama defines perception as “Indriyarthasannikarsotpannam jnanam avyapadesyam avyabhicari

vyavasayatmakam pratyaksam.” (Nyaya-sutra,1.1,4)According to Goutama, Pratyksa or perception as
the non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects,
which is not associated with a name and which is well defined.
● To understand the definition, we should at first have to understand the meanings of the words
“indriya‟, “artha‟, “sannikarsa‟, “avyapadesya‟, “avyabhicari‟ and “vyavasayatmak.‟
1. Naiyayikas admits that we have six sense organs- eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin, and mind. The
first five are called external organs, while the rest is called internal organ. We perceive the
external world with the help of external organs and by the mind, we perceive our internal
states like pleasure, pain, etc.
2. The term “artha‟ means an external object. According to the Naiyayikas, every external organ
has its own object.
3. “Sannikarsa‟ means relation. The relation of the sense organ with its object is called
sannikarsa.
4. “Avyabhicari‟ means infallible. Perceptual knowledge must be infallible.
5. “Avyapadesya‟ means “asabda‟ or indefinable by words. To explain indeterminate perception,
the term “avyapadesya‟ was included in the definition of perception.
6. “Vyavasayatmaka‟ means certainty. There should be certainty in perception.
● According to the Naiyayikas, when our soul comes in contact with the mind; and the mind comes in
contact with external organs and external organs come in contact with external objects, then perceptual
knowledge arises.
● The self-manas contact and manas-sense contact are the common causes of perceptual knowledge and
sense-object contact is the uncommon cause of perceptual knowledge.
● Some neo-Naiyayikas mentioned that the definition of perception as given by Goutama suffers from the
defect of under-coverage( avyapti dosha) since perceptual knowledge is possible without the
sense-object contact. According to Nyaya philosophy, God has no sense organ though God can
perceive everything.
● Acharya Gangesa Upadhyaya in his Tattvacintamoni defines perception as -”pratyaksasya
saksatkaritvam laksanam.” . That means perception is direct knowledge.
● Visvanath said, “jnakaranam jnanam pratyaksam.”(VisvanathBhasapariccheda).i.e., Perceptual
knowledge is such a type of knowledge where no other knowledge acts as an uncommon cause.
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Types of Pryatksa/ Perception:

● According to the Naiyayikas, perception arises after the contact of the sense organ with object. This
contact may be of two types – ordinary or laukika and extraordinary or alaukika. Depending on the
relation between sense organ and object, Naiyayikas divided perception into two types – ordinary or
Laukika perception and extraordinary or Alaukika perception.
● Laukik Pratyksa emerges out of Laukik Sannikarsa.laukika sannikarşa is six fold -
1. Samyoga sannikarşa. (conjunction): In the perception of substance (dravya), the contact that
takes place between the sense-organ and the substance is known as samyoga. For example, in
the perception of a jar by visual sense-organ, the sannikarşa is samyoga, even in the perception
of ātmā by manas.
It is to be noted in this connection that in the perception of dravya by the visual or tactual
sense-organ, the relation is samyoga:
2. samyukta-samavāya sannikarşa.(conjoined inherence) : in the the perception of quality
(guņa) , action (Karma) and genus (Samanya) belonging to a substance. Like in the perception
of colour of a Ghata or Sukha, dukkha.
3. Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya sannikarşa. (conjoined inherent inherence): the perception
of jati/ samanya of Guna (Gunatva) and Karma(karmtva) . e.g., the colourhood is inherent
(samaveta) in colour, which in turn is inherent (samaveta) in a dravya, say jar; and the visual
sense-organ is conjoined with the jar. Hence the relation is called
cakşu-samyukta-samaveta-samavāya.
4. Samavāya sannikarşa. (inherence), n, in the perception of sound by the auditory
sense-organ, the relation is samavāya. For sound is a quality (guņa) of ākāśa (ether) and the
relation existing between a guņa and a guņī is that of samavāya.
5. samaveta-samavāya sannikarşa.(inherent inherence),. In the perception of soundness
(śabdatva), for instance, we have the samaveta-samavāya sannikarşa. For, soundness is present
in sound in relation of inherence, and sound is present in the ear-hole in the relation of
inherence.
6. Viśeşaņa-viśeşya-bhāva sannikarşa. (relation between qualifier and qualified)in the case of
perception of samavāya and abhāva (negation), the relation is named Viśeşaņaviśeşyabhāva.
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For example, in the perception of the absence of a jar on the floor (bhūtale ghaţābhāva) the
eyes come in contact with the floor, which is viśeşya here, and the floor is qualified by the
absence of a jar which is viśeşaņa.
● It should be noted here that the Bhāttas and the Advaitins do not admit samavāya and abhāva as
separate padārthas. According to them, abhāva is not known by perception but by a separate pramāņa,
called anupalabdhi. Some Mīmāmsakas admit vaiśişţya as a relation in the case of abhāva. But
Neo-Naiyāyikars4 like Gangeśa and Viśvanātha refute such a view.

● Laukika perception may be of two types- external perception and internal perception. External
Perception Again five – visual, Tactual, auditory, olfactory, and gustatory. Internal Perception is the
perception of internal objects like Sukha, dukkha etc,.

● Alaukika-pratyakṣa is that in which sense-organ does not come in contact with the object directly,
but through an unusual medium.
● Alaukika-pratyakṣa (extra-ordinary perception) has three types—
1. Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarşa., When we perceive an individual (e.g., a cow), we also
perceive the thesāmānya /jati ( cowness) inherent in it, and through the perception of that
sāmānya/ jati (cowness) we perceive in an extra-ordinary manner all the instances of that
individual ( all cows) – past, present and future. This is called sāmānya-lakşaņā sannikarşa.
2. Jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarşa.:Sometimes we perceive an object by a sense organ which is not
actually the object of that organ. For example,the visual perception of the fragrance of
sandalwood is not received ordinarily. The smell is usually received through olfactory
sensation. But in the visual perception of the fragrance of sandal (Surabhi candanam), the
previous memory of the fragrance acts as a sannikarşa
3. Yogaja sannikarşa.: The yogins, by virtue of their penance, are capable of perceiving subtle
objects like atoms and distant or remote objects as well which are not ordinarily perceivable.
This type of perception is called yogaja pratyakşa.

Stages of Pratyksa:
● The Naiyyayika maintains two modes or stages in perception. The first is called nirvikalpa
(indeterminate), when one just perceives an object without being able to know its features, and the
second savikalpa (determinate), when one is able to clearly know an object.
● All laukika and alaukika pratyakshas are savikalpa, but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage
when it is indeterminate. So the existence of the Nirvikalpa pratyksa is known through anumana or
inference.
● Nirvikalpa or indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities (Guna), actions(karma), and
universals(jati/samanya) as separate and indistinct, without any association with any names( =
avyapdeshya), whereas determinate perception apprehends them all together with a name(
Vyapyadeshya).
● There is yet another stage called Pratyabhijñā, when one is able to re-recognise something on the basis
of memory.

Anumana or Inference

● There are two parts to the word anumāna. ‘Anu’ means after and ‘mana’ means knowledge.
Hence, the literal meaning of anumana is that it is a knowledge (mana) which originates after
(anu) other knowledge
● After looking at smoke coming out from a hill we may come to know that there is fire. This
cognition results thus: we see smoke coming out from the hill; we remember: “Where there is
smoke there is fire‟ and we are assured that the smoke which we see comes under the rule.
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After this, we infer that there is fire. The way of such valid knowledge is called anumana and
such valid knowledge is called anumiti.
● anumana (inference) is the instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (anumiti).
“Anumiti-karanam-anumanam.”

Process Of Anumana:
The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to
particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:
1. This hill has fire (pratijna),
2. Because it has smoke (hetu),
3. Whatever has smoke has fire e.g. an oven (udaharana),
4. This hill as smoke which is invariably associated with fire (upanaya),
5. Therefore this hill has fire (nigamana).

● In Nyāya terminology for this example, the hill would be called as paksha (minor term), the fire is
called as sādhya (major term), the smoke is called as hetu (the reason) , and the relationship between
the smoke and the fire is called as vyapti.
● the pratijna, is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is hetu or reason which states
the reason for the establishment of the proposition. The third is udaharana which the universal
concomitance together with example . the fourth is upanaya or application of the universal
concomitance to the present case. The fifth is nigamana or conclusion drawn from the preceding
propositions. These five members of Indian syllogism are called Avayavas.
Karana of Anumana : 1. Prachina Nyaya — linga paramarsha is the Karana of Anumana
2. Navya Nyaya — Vyapti Jñana is the Karana and Linga Paramarsha is the Vyapara of Anumana
● Paramarsha = Paksadharmata +Vyapti jñana (Vyapti-visistha-paksadharmata jñanam)
● paksadharmata = presence of Hetu in the Paksa
● Vyapti = Invariable Universal unconditional concomitantence between Sadhya and Hetu
Types of Vyapti : Vyapti is of two kinds-- Anavya Vyapti and Vyatireka Vyapti.
1. In Anvaya Vyapti the concomitance of two things is established. E.g., ‘where there is fire, there is
smoke’ is an example of Anavaya Vyapti.
2. . In the Vyatireka Vyapti is shown in the absence. e.g., where there is no fire, there is
smoke’, exemplifies Vyatireka Vyapti. The relationship of universal accompaniment-gradual or
concurrent-exists in Vyapti.
Characteristics of Sad-hetu or Proper Reason:
● There are five characteristics of a middle term-
1 paksadharmata :it must be present in the minor term ; e.g., smoke must be
present in the hill.
2 .sapaksasattva : It must be present in all positive instances in which the major terms is present;
e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists.
3. vipaksasattva:It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major terms is absent;
e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist..
4. abadhita-Visayatva: must be non-incompatible with the minor term;
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e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire .

5. Asat-pratipaksatva : It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a
contradictory conclusion;
e.g., ‘the fact of being caused’ should not be used to prove ‘eternality of sound.
Hetvabhāsa :
● It means that the middle term/ Hetu/Reason appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason.
● The word Hetvabhāsa has two meanings — 1. Fallacy of the Hetu/Reason and 2.Fallacious
Hetu/Reason .
● According to the Nyaya Philosophy, Hetvabhāsas are of Five Types—
1. Asiddha: It is the unproved hetu that results in this fallacy.
a. Ashrayasiddha: If Paksha [minor term] itself is unreal, then there cannot be locus of the hetu. e.g. The
sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus like any other lotus.
b. Svarupasiddha: Hetu cannot exist in paksa at all. E.g. Sound is a quality, because it is visible.
c. Vyapyatvasiddha: Conditional hetu. `Wherever there is fire, there is smoke'. The presence of smoke is
due to wet fuel.
2. Savyabhichara: This is the fallacy of irregular hetu.
a. Sadharana: The hetu is too wide. It is present in both sapaksa and vipaksa. `The hill has fire because it
is knowable'.
b. Asadharana: The hetu is too narrow. It is only present in the Paksha, it is not present in the Sapaksa
and in the Vipaksha. `Sound is eternal because it is audible'.
c. Anupasamhari: Here the hetu is non-exclusive. The hetu is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by way of
sapaksha or vipaksha. e.g. 'All things are non-ternal, because they are knowable'.
3. Satpratipaksa: Here the hetu is contradicted by another hetu. If both have equal force, then nothing
follows. 'Sound is eternal, because it is audible', and 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced'. Here 'audible'
is counterbalanced by 'produced' and both are of equal force.
4. Badhita: When another proof (as by perception) definitely contradicts and disproves the middle term
(hetu). 'Fire is cold because it is a substance'.
5. Viruddha: Instead of proving something it is proving the opposite. 'Sound is eternal because it is
produced'.

Classification of Anuman:
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Purvavat, Shesavat and Samanyatodrishta Anumana

● Gautama divides anumāna into three kinds— Purvavat, Shesavat and Samanyatodrishta.
● Both pruvavat and sesavat inferences display casual univormity between the middle (hetu)
and major terms (Sadhya), while samanyatodrsta inferences exhibit non-casual uniformity of
the middle (hetu)and major terms(sadhya).
1. Pūrvavat: A pūrvavat inference is the inference of the effect from the cause. A cause is
perceived, and from this the unperceived effect is inferred. We see dense clouds and infer the
future rain.
2. Śeşavat: A Śeşavat inference is the inference of a cause from an effect. The effect is
perceived, and from this perception the unperceived cause is inferred. When we see a river in
flood and infer that there was rain., we have a case of Śeşavat inference.
3. Sāmānyatodrsta: That inference which provides knowledge of any imperceptible or
unperceived object is called Sāmānyatodrsta, such as the inference of motion in the sub by
observing it in the East in the morning and in the West in the eveinging. This inference is not
based upon the relation of casulity, but it is based on the fact that there is motion in the sun. It
is inferred from the change of position because when other objects change their position,
motion is always apparent. Hence Sāmānyatodrsta resembles comparison to some extent.

Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumana:

● Inference may be of two types– Svarthanumana and Pararthanumana. Svarthanumana is

inference for one‟s own need and pararthanumana is inference for others.
● In Svarthanumana we do not require formal statements of the members of inference. It is a
psychological process. And the Pararthanumana, which is a syllogism, has to be presented in
language and has to be done to convince others by using five-membered syllogism/
Pañcāvayava-nyaya-vakya.
● The first one can be said to be a way of knowing and the second one a way of proving.

Kevalanvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayavyatireki Anumana:

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● Another classification of inference gives us the kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and

anvayavyatireki inference. It is based on the nature of vyapti.
1. Kevalānvayi: This applies to the case where the means and the object are always found
going together, meaning thereby that case in which the vyāpti is established by an agreement
in present between the middle and the major term, and in which there is no exception. Here
no instances of Vetireki Vyapti can be found
For example. : All knowable objects are nameable;
The pot is a knowable object;
Therefore the pot is nameable.
2. Kevalavyatrieki: An inference is kevalavyatireki when it is based on a middle term which is
only negatively related to the major term. It is based on the invariable concomitance between
the middle term, which is established by the method of agreement in absence (vyatri-reka),
since there can be no positive instance of agreement in presence between the terms
For example, No non-soul substance has life;
All beings possessing animal functions have life.
therefore,All beings possessing animal function have soul.
3. Anvayavyatireki: An inference is anvayavyatireki when it based on a middle term which is
both positively and negatively related to the major term. The universal relation (vyāpti) in this
inference is established by the method of agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in
absence (vyatireka). For example:

1 All Smoky objects are fiery;

The hill is smoky;
Therefore,The hill is fiery.

2 No non-fiery objects are smoky;

The hill is smoky;
Therefore,The hill is fiery.

Upamāna or Analogy:

● Upamana is the Third pramana Accepted by Nyaya Philosopher.Upamana

can be stated as the source of knowledge of the relation between a name
(Samjña)and the nameable object (Samjñī)or between a word and its
denotation.
● That means, After looking the similarity between a name and a thing so
named or between a word and its denotation we may achieve some
knowledge. This is upamiti and Upamana is the instrument (karana)/source of
upamiti.
● For example, assume a situation where a man has not seen a gavaya or a
wild cow and doesn't know what it is. A forester told him that a wild cow is an
animal like a country cow but she is more furious and has big horn in her
forehead. In a later period he comes across a wild cow in a forest and
recognizes it as the wild cow by comparing the descriptions made by the
forester. This knowledge is possible due to the upamana or comparison.
Thus, upamana is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the
object it denotes by that name.
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Sabda or Testimony :

● Naiyayikas have accepted sabda as another source of knowledge. Sabda

means words of trust worthy person. Gautama defines sabda as “ Aptapodesa
Sabda ” . And Annambhatta as “Aptavakyam sabdah.
● Apastu yathartha vaktah.” (Annambhatta). A trustworthy person is one who
always speaks the truth. A trustworthy person is such type of person who is
free from illusion, carelessness, defects of sense organs, desire of cheating
others.
● However, in later nyaya the Vakya which is Āpta or authoritative is considered
as Sabda pramana.
● We can distinguish between Sābdabodhā and S ābdapramā .Sābdabodha
means any kind of cognation derived from words and sentences. Sabda as a
pramāna is defined as the source of valid verbal cognation, but not of mere
verbal cognation.

Nature of Verbal Knowledge:

● The instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is cognition itself of words. Its
operation is the knowledge (i.e., recollection) of the meanings of words.
Knowledge of the denotative function associative causes verbal knowledge.
● The actual instrumental cause of verbal knowledge is not words which are
actually being known, but cognition of words. The difference between these
two positions is that, in the first case, words are actually uttered and, in the
second case, there is no need of actually uttered words; as for example, when
a person who keeps silent writes down words, we come to have the
knowledge of words by seeing the script.
● The knowledge of the meaning of words (padāthdhīriti): The operation is the
recollection of the meaning of a word which (recollection) is produced by the
word. Even the recollection of the meanings of words should be produced by
words with the help of their significatory functions (vrtti).
● Vritti or Significatory function is only a relation which is either denotative
function (śakti) or implication (lakṣaṇa). It is here alone that the knowledge of
the denotative function is useful. If one does not have the knowledge of the
denotative function earlier, even though he has the knowledge of words, there
would not arise the recollection of meaning as related with the word (Laksana)
● Nature of Denotative Function (Sakti): Prachina nyaya or The traditional
school believes that denotative function is the relation of the meaning of a
word with that word, and that is in the form of the will of God (Isvareccha
Saktih)The modern Naiyāyikas hold that the will of God is not the denotative
function but merely will and, therefore, they say that terms (coined by the
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Navya Nyāya) have indeed denotative function. Adhunika Samketa or Will of

Human also can be Sakti according to Navya nyaya.
● Sakti-grahopaya or means of knowing Denotative Function (Sakti)
Knowledge of denotative function (śakti) is attained through 6 ways —
1. grammar,
2. comparison,
3. dictionary,
4. the testimony of apt person,
5. action brought about by usage,
6. the rest of the sentence,
7. explanation and
8. proximity of a well-known word.
Lakṣaṇa or Implication: Implication is the relation with that meaning which is
denoted by the denotative function, because of the incompatibility of the intention of
the speaker. For instance:When the sentence 'there is a village on the Ganges' is
uttered, the incompatibility of syntactic connection of village with the river 'Ganges'
leads the listener, by implication, knows that the speaker is referring to the banks of
the Ganges.

Types of Laksana : .
Annambhatta and Visvanathan maintain the threefold nature of lakşaņā or
implication.
1. Jahallakşaņā is that where the primary meaning is wholly abandoned and a
new one is substituted, for example, the statement, maňcāh krośantīti, or ‘The
cots cry out’.
2. Ajahallakşaņā is that where a word conveys something more, while retaining
the sense of the primary meaning, as is found in the statement Chatriņo
gacchanti, ‘The umbrella-holders are going’.
3. Jahadajahallakşaņā is that where only a part of the statement is abandoned,
as is found in the Vedic dictum tat tvam asi, that is Thou art That.

However, in Many palaces in Navya nyaya it has been seen that tendency to
consider the Lakṣna or the Implication is of two kinds: those by which words discard
their denoted meanings (jahatsvārthā) and those by which words do not discard their
denoted meaning (ajahatsvārtha).

Division of Words :Word which has denotative function is in some place derivative,
in some place conventional, in some place derivatively conventional and in some
place derivate and conventional.
1. Yogika or Derivative: Where only the meanings of the parts of the word is
grasped. Ex.: pācaka (cook).
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2. Rudha or Conventional: Where the meaning is grasped by the denotative

function of the word as whole, not taking into account the denotative functions
of the parts of the word. Ex.: Cow (goh)
3. Yoga-Rudha or Derivatively conventional: Where in the meaning conveyed
by the denotative functions of the parts of the word, there is also the
denotative function of the word as a whole. Ex., pankaja (lotus): part of the
word conveys the meaning of that which has origin from mud and the whole of
the word conveys the denotative meaning of lotus as lotus.
4. Yogic-Ruda or Derivative and conventional: Where the derivative
meanings and the conventional meanings are obtained independently of each
other. Ex., udbhid: the meaning conveyed by means of denotative functions of
parts of the word is that which shoots up: tree, shrub etc.; the meaning
conveyed by means of denotative functions of the whole word is a particular
kind of sacrifice.

Conditions of Verbal Cognition: a sentence in order to be

intelligible must conform to certain conditions. These conditions are four –
1. Ākāmkşā is the eagerness that is observed in one to know the remaining part
of the sentence when one part of the sentence is known. kāmkşā consists in
the inability of a word to convey complete meaning of the sentence in the
absence of some other word (yena padena vinā
yatpadasyānvayānanubhāvakatvam tenapadena tasyākānkşā). When one
simply says ghaţah, it arouses the curiosity to know further details like: what
about the jar. This is satisfied only when we supply words bring, etc. This
alone completes the sentence. This desire to know is ākāmkşā.

2. Sannidhi is also known as Āsatti The point is that a sentence becomes

authoritative only when the words are uttered in quick succession. If the gap
between the utterances of words is too long, then it cannot be considered as a
sentence.
3. yogyatā is the connection of a meaning of a word with that of another
(ekapadārthe’parapadārthasambandho yogyatā). In the absence of this
apprehension there would be no apprehension of a sentence. A sentence is
said to possess yogyatā or compatibility with another when the intended
sense of the sentence conveyed by the two words is not inconsistent in any
way. The sentence anginā siňcati that is, sprinkle with fire, lacks compatibility
on account of the inconsistency found in the sentence. The action of
sprinkling with fire is consistent with the notion of fire, and the construction of
a syntactic meaning from such a sentence as this, which lacks compatibility, is
impossible
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4. Tātparya :The desire of the speaker (vakturicchā) is tātparya.15 In other

words, when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey
something, it is called tātparya (tatpratītīcchayā uccaritatvam).

● The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significance of intention

(tātparya) first in the context of enquiring the seed of implicative meaning
(lakşaņā). To Annambhatta and Viswanatha the non-realisability of the
intention of the speaker (tātparyānupapatti) is the seed of lakşaņā i.e.,
the implicative meaning.
● It is admitted that the non-realisability of the intention of the speaker, but not
of relation (anvaya) is the root of lakşaņā

Types of Sabda-pramāna :

● Sabda-pramāna or Testimony is of two kinds – Vaidika and laukika.

● The vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the vedas are spoken
by God, And
● Laukika Sabda or secular testimony, bring only the words of trustworthy
persons who always speak the truth and valid;others are not.

God

● In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theology, God is considered to a kind of Ātman . However,

God is the supreme soul/ Paramātma, One,perfect, omniscient, omnipresent
and eternal being as opposed to jīvātma who has limited knowledge and
potency, Many in number and imperfect being.
● On the account of Vaisesika, the Veda is authoritative because it is the word
of God.
● He is guided by the law of karma representing the unseen power of merits
and demerits. He creates motion that the living beings may be rewarded and
punishable according to their past deeds.
● Creation and destruction of the universe takes place in agreement with the
wishes of God. The creation does not start until God sets the atoms in motion.
Thus, though Paramānus are the Upādāna kārana or material cause of
this universe, the God is the nimmira kārana or efficient cause of the
world.

Arguments in favour of the existence of God

Udayanacharya in his Nyayakusumanjali gave the following nine arguments to prove

the existence of creative God and also tried to refute the existing objections and
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questions by atheistic systems of charvaka, mimamsa, buddhists, jains and

samkhya.

● Kāryāt ("from effect"): The world is an effect, all effects have efficient cause,
hence the world must have an efficient cause. That efficient cause is God.
● Āyojanāt (lit., from combination): Atoms are inactive. To form a substance,
they must combine. To combine, they must move. Nothing moves without
intelligence and source of motion. Since we perceive substance, some
intelligent source must have moved the inactive atoms. That intelligent source
is God.
● Dhŗtyādéḥ (, from support): Something sustains this world. Something
destroys this world. Unintelligent Adrsta (unseen principles of nature) cannot
do this. We must infer that something intelligent is behind. That is God.
● Padāt (, from word): Each word has meaning and represents an object. This
representational power of words has a cause. That cause is God.
● Pratyayataḥ (lit, from faith): Vedas are infallible. Human beings are fallible.
Infallible Vedas cannot have been authored by fallible human beings.
Someone authored the infallible Vedas. That author is God.
● Shrutéḥ (from scriptures): The infallible Vedas testify to the existence of God.
Thus God exists.
● Vākyāt (from precepts): Vedas deal with moral laws, the rights and the
wrongs. These are divine. Divine injunctions and prohibitions can only come
from a divine creator of laws. That divine creator is God.
● Samkhyāviśeşāt (from the specialty of numbers): By rules of perception, only
number "one" can ever be directly perceived. All other numbers other than
one, are inferences and concepts created by consciousness. When man is
born, his mind is incapable of inferences and concepts. He develops
consciousness as he develops. The consciousness development is
self-evident and proven because of man's ability with perfect numerical
conception. This ability to conceive numerically perfect concepts must depend
on something. That something is divine consciousness. So God must exist.
● Adŗşţāt (from the unforeseen): Everybody reaps the fruits of his own actions.
Merits and demerits accrue from his own actions. An Unseen Power keeps a
balance sheet of the merit and demerit. But since this Unseen Power is
Unintelligent, it needs intelligent guidance to work. That intelligent guide is
God.

Pramana Samplava and Pramana Vyavastha :

● The idea behind these Pramāna Vyavastha and Pramāna Samplabhava is
that whether a specific Prameya is grasped by a specific pramāna or bunch of
Pramāna .
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● The. Pramāna-vādi / Nyāya-vādi /. Sautrantika- yogācāra Buddhist/

Dignaga- Dharmakīrti tradition of Buddhist epistemology holds that a specific
prameya is only grasped through a specific pramana .
according to them, this world is consist of only two prameyas — Svalakṣana
and Samanya-lakṣana which are only grasped by two specific pramāna —
Pratykṣa and Anumāna . That's way it is called Pramāna Vyavastha.
● Svalakṣana is primarily grasped by Pratyksa and Sāmānya Lakṣana is
grasped by Anumāna.
● Whereas The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are the supporter of
Pramāna-Samplabhava-vāda according to which a specific prameya can be
grasped by many pramānas . E.g. the existence of fire can be grasped
through either Pratyakṣa or Anumāna or Sabda Pramāna .
A glimpse of the major points of Buddhist Epistemology:
● The founder of Nyayavadi or Sautrantika-Vijñanavada epistemology is
Acharya Dignāga ( also known as Diṅnāga).
● Flowing the footsteps of Diṅnāga, Dhamakīrti, Śantarakṣita, KamalŚila and
other, flousrished this system of epistemology.
● Major works of this tradition:

● Diṅnāga/Dignāga — Pramāna-Samuccaya
● Dharmakīrti — Pramāna-Vārttika, Praṃāna-Viniścaya, Nyayabindu,
Hetubinfu, VādaNyāya and Santantarasiddhi
● Prajñakara Gupta worte commentary or Bhāṣya on Pramāna-Vārttika
● Dharmottora wrote commentary, called Nyāyaabindu-tīka on
Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti and Vīnitdeva also wrote an commentary
on it.
● Śanta-rakṣita — Tattva-Saṃgraha and Kamalśila wrote Pañjika tīka on
Tattva-Saṃgraha.

● Buddhism accept that knowledge serves the purpose of empirical life and
hence it is necessary to discuss the meaning and significance of the word
‘pramāna’ and the source of empirical knowledge.
● The Buddhist philosophers differ among themselves with regard to the
meaning of the word ‘pramāna’. According to Nyāya and Others Realist
schools Praṃā is something different from the Pramāna. Pramana is the
instrument of veridical cognition/Pramā. Pramā is cognition whereas pramāna
is something different from that consciousness.
● But according to Nyayavadi Buddhism pramana and Pramana-phala or prama
is both consciousness in nature.
● the formal similarity obtaining between cognition and its object (
Arthasārūpya) is to be regarded as pramāna and knowledge of that object (
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Arthasambitti) is the pramana-phala or prama , which is self-reflexive ( Sva

Samvritti) in nature.
● Dharmakirti defines pramana as Samgyak-jñana or right knowledge.Right
cognition is successful cognition — avisaṁvādi Jñana ..Cognition, which
leads us astray or which deceives us is wrong cognition or error. Thus, there
is a connection between the logic of our knowledge and its practical efficiency.
Right knowledge is efficacious knowledge.
● So the validity of a cognition or Pramanya is parataḥ. = Prataḥ prāmānyavādi ,
however invalidity Aprāmanaya can be known directly= Svataḥ
-Aprāmānyavādi.
● The Buddhist epistemology divides knowledge into direct and indirect.
Dinnāga calls these sources of knowledge conventionally as perception and
inference respectively. These are the only two sources of knowledge accepted
by the Buddhists.
● The Buddhists do not give verbal testimony as the status of pramāna.
● Dignaga defines pratyksa as " pratyksam kalpanapodam
nam-jatyadi-samyuktam" , which means, pratyksa or perception is free from
mental construction which is name, genus etc.
● Dhamakirti defines pratyksa ad " pratyaksam kalponapodam abhrantam" that
is, pratyksa is free from mental construction and it it abhranta or
nonerronomous.
● Kalpna or the mental construction is of five types — nama , jati , dravya, guna
and karma.
● According to Dharmakirti there is few instances of erroneous cognition that is
not due to kalpana. So to differentiate yathartha pratyksa from bhranta
pratyksa he added the qualification ' abhranta'.
● This definition, we can notice, makes no mention of sense-object contact as
we saw in Nyaya philosophy.— rather in Buddist philosophy pratyksa is
Sakshat jñana or direct jñāna.
● Perception is four types — indriya pratyksa , manasa pratyksa or mental
cognition, Svasamvedna or self-consciousness and Yogaja or mystic
cognition.

● The cognition of a non perceived object through a perceived object is called

inference. It is an indirect cognition, cognition of an object through its “mark”.
The inferential judgement is possible only because the ‘mark’ that you see is
related to the object wonder by a necessary relation or vyāpti or Abinavaba
sambandha.
● According to them Vyapti or abinvaba sambandha is known through two ways
— relationship of identity ( tādātmya) and causal factors ( tadutpatti ) .
● Every inference has three terms— the logical subject(paksa) the logical
predicate ( sadhya) and the mark (hetu) which unites them.
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● Inferential reasoning that is used for the knowledge of others, is called a

syllogism (pararthanumana) when it is for oneself, it is called svarthanumana
(Inference for oneself), which can be worded as ‘there is a fire on the hill
because there is smoke just as in the kitchen. The syllogism reads as:
wherever there is smoke, there must be fire as in the kitchen.
There is such a smoke on the hill.
Therefore there must be fire on the hill.
● Dinnāga says that these three propositions are enough in a syllogism and he
criticises Nyāya for their five membered syllogism.
● According to Buddhist , sad-hetu or a proper reason has three characteristics
—
1. Pakse sattvam
2. Sapakshe sattvam
3. Vipakshe Astitvam.
A fallacy will occur when any one of these rules are violated.