National Interest or Transnational Allia

Journal of East Asian Studies 15 (2015), 243-269
National Interest or
Transnational Alliances? Japanese Policy
on the Comfort Women Issue
Yangmo Ku
When and why does a perpetrator state take a contrite stance on its
past wrongs? More specifically, why do Japanese behaviors differ over
time in addressing apology and compensation with regard to the com-
fort women issue? In this article I address these questions by testing two
hypotheses, utilizing an instrumentalist approach and a transnational-
political activism model. The former posits a perpetrator state is more
likely to take a contrite stance on its past misdeeds when it calculates
such action is in its security and/or economic interests. The latter hy-
pothesizes that when transnational activism is powerful and a perpe-
trator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more
likely to adopt conciliatory policies toward historical issues. I find that
the transnational-political activism model possesses more explanatory
power than instrumentalism for within-case variations in Japanese be-
havior toward the comfort women issue. The two approaches are not,
however, mutually exclusive and are complementary in some regards.
The effect of transnational activism is heightened when the target state
is faced with other geopolitical incentives and/or when the target state
is led by a progressive ruling coalition and has weak conservative reac-
tion. KEYWORDS: instrumentalism, transnational-political activism model,
comfort women, apology and compensation, postwar Japanese history
policy
DURING WORLD WAR II, JAPAN FORCIBLY DRAFTED VAST NUMBERS OF

women from its colonized and occupied countries into military prostitu-
tion. These comfort women,' whose numbers are estimated at 50,000 to
200,000, were forced into sexual slavery for Japanese troops between
1932 and 1945 (Piper 2001). Comfort stations were first established in
Shanghai around 1932, yet the outbreak of the Japanese-Chinese War in
1937 prompted the Japanese military to adopt the general policy of es-
tablishing military brothels in various occupied locations (Yoshimi 2000,
43-51). Despite the lack of accurate information, unearthed documents
243
https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

244 National Interest or Transnational Alliances?
and testimony indicate 80 to 90 percent of comfort women were Koreans

in their mid-teens and early twenties. The most commonly used method
ofrecruitment was to deceive women with false promises of employment
in Japan (Soh 2008, 107). Under harsh conditions, these comfort women
suffered traumatic experiences during and after World War II.
In light of this historical background, the way Japan has addressed
its past wrongs has varied significantly over time. Up until the late 1980s,
the Japanese government denied any Japanese military involvement in
organizing the comfort women system by attributing it to private enter-
prise. In the early and mid-1990s, the Japanese government issued some-
what apologetic statements regarding the comfort women issue, and also
helped establish a nongovernmental fund, the Asian Women's Fund
(AWF). However, the establishment of the AWF was not equivalent to
full-fledged state compensation and apology (Soh 2003). The Japanese
government did not move forward with these limited but positive
changes with respect to apology and compensation in the late 1990s, and
it has in fact regressed (Saaler 2005, 52-55). For example, high-ranking
Japanese government officials made a series of provocative statements
that either denied or whitewashed the wartime atrocities perpetrated by
the Japanese against the comfort women. Additionally, Japanese Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo denied Japan's coercive recruitment of comfort
women in March 2007, although he reversed his stance on the issue a
month later.
When and why does a perpetrator state take a contrite stance on its
past wrongs? More specifically, why do Japanese behaviors differ over
time in addressing apology and compensation with regard to the com-
fort women issue? I address these questions by testing two hypotheses
using an instrumentalist approach and a transnational-political activism
model. The former posits a perpetrator state is more likely to take a con-
trite stance on its past misdeeds when it calculates such action is in its se-
curity and/or economic interests. The latter is a two-level political model.
It hypothesizes that when transnational activism is powerful and a per-
petrator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more
likely to adopt conciliatory policies toward historical issues.'
I find that the transnational-political activism model possesses more
explanatory power than instrumentalism for within-case variations in
Japan's behavior toward the comfort women issue. The two approaches
are not, however, mutually exclusive and are complementary in some re-
gards. The effect of transnational activism is heightened when the target
state is faced with other geopolitical incentives and/or when the target
state is led by a progressive ruling coalition and has weak conservative

Yangmo Ku 245
reaction. The Japanese state responded to the transnational comfort

women movement in a somewhat conciliatory manner between 1993 and
1995 when building better ties with Asia was in its security and economic
interests and a liberal, non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) coalition
briefly took power. During that time period, conservative reaction within
Japan was weak as well.
Analytical Frameworks for State History Policy

Two perspectives seem pertinent to explain a perpetrator state's history
policy. The first is an instrumentalist explanation that stresses security
and/or economic incentives to adopt a contrite stance on historical is-
sues. The second perspective is the transnational-political activism model
that emphasizes the importance of political and societal actors in exert-
ing great influence on state behavior toward historical problems.
Definition and Operationalization of Contrition

The dependent variable in this study is the variation in state behavior in
apology and compensation regarding the comfort women issue. There
are three levels of state behavior in addressing apology and compensa-
tion issues: deep contrition, shallow contrition, and no contrition. The
definition of deep (shallow) contrition is official state behavior that re-
flects a deep (shallow) sense of remorse for its past violence. But, no
contrition means showing no sense of remorse for past wrongs. There-
fore, an important criterion to classify these levels is whether a perpetra-
tor state displays a sense of remorse for its past transgressions through its
official statements and compensation measures.'
Given these definitions, I operationalize the three different levels of
contrition in a qualitative manner. When a perpetrator state reaches the
highest level, deep contrition, in the area of apology and compensation,
the state issues apologetic statements to manifestly acknowledge past
wrongs and expresses regret for them to former victims. In these state-
ments, agency is clear (i.e., X did this to Y) and apologetic words are un-
ambiguous. The state also pays direct compensation to surviving victims
for its past offenses. When a perpetrator state is in the next phase, shal-
low contrition, the state issues apologetic statements, but the contents of
these statements are ambiguous enough to raise doubts on the state's sin-
cerity. Statements express remorse but do not fully acknowledge past
wrongdoing; or, they reflect remorse yet fail to specify the agency that
committed the crimes. Although it makes apologetic statements, the state
takes no concrete actions to compensate former victims for its past vio-

lence in order to fulfill the statements; or, instead of direct state compen-
sation, the state pays victim survivors only indirectly through a non-
governmental fund. When a perpetrator state shows no contrition, the
state issues official statements that justify, deny, or glorify its past mis-
deeds. The state does not mention past violence at all. It does not speak
of or design any compensation scheme for surviving victims either. The
state may also overlook its past (somewhat) apologetic statements and
policies, regressing to more unapologetic attitudes regarding apology and
compensation issues.
Instrumentalism
As an interest-based approach, instrumentalism means here that a perpe-
trator state's behavior is shaped by calculations of national interests." As
rational actors, perpetrator states should choose history policies that best
serve their overall security and/or economic interests (Berger 2012). For
perpetrator states, coming to terms with their past wrongs can be used as
a means of improving their diplomatic relations with former victim states,
which can help avoid diplomatic isolation and thus promote their own se-
curity. Perpetrator states also can take a more conciliatory stance on their
past misdeeds in order to strengthen their economic ties with former vic-
tim states and to gain more economic benefits by doing that. In this re-
gard, it would be important whether or not a perpetrator state has security
and/or economic incentives to seek closer ties with its neighboring coun-
tries-particularly with former victim states. Given this logic, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is inferred: a perpetrator state is more likely to take a
contrite stance on its past misdeeds when it calculates such action is in
its security and/or economic interests. The presence of both security and
economic incentives will prompt a perpetrator state to take a deeply con-
trite stance on historical issues, whereas the absence of both incentives
will lead it to the level of no contrition. The presence of either security
or economic incentives will bring about its reaching the level of shallow
contrition.
Since the early 1950s, Japan's ultimate security interest-national
survival-has been largely dependent upon the US-Japan Alliance, which
has formed the bedrock of Japan's postwar foreign policy (He 2009, 295).
The conclusion of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 ensured Japan's
internal and external security by guaranteeing the presence of US troops
in Japan (Seraphim 2006, 18-19). This alliance agreement did not re-
quire Japan's reconciliation with war-shattered Korea or Communist
China. Responding to US pressure, Japan did normalize its relationship
with South Korea in 1965. But up until the late 1980s, it was not neces-

Yangmo Ku 247
sary for Japan to accommodate South Korea, because Japan was pro-
tected by the United States.
The US-Japan Alliance significantly weakened between 1991 and
1995 due to the disappearance of the common enemy, the Soviet Union,
and intensified trade disputes between the United States and Japan. As
Victor Cha (1999) posits, the fear of US abandonment would compel
Japan to improve its relationship with South Korea. However, the period
from the mid-1990s witnessed the notable strengthening of the alliance,
which was aimed at checking and balancing North Korea's provocative
actions and the rising Chinese threat at the time. US war on terrorism
after September 11, 2001, also played a key role in invigorating the US-
Japan security alliance, as Japan became an indispensable supporter of
the US policy on terrorism.
In terms of economic interests, Japan did not have to put great value
on its Asian neighbors, especially South Korea, until the end ofthe 1960s.
As an advanced and powerful economy in the region, Japan was largely
dependent on US and European markets. In the 1970s, however, Japan
started to expand its interest in East Asia, and Japan's economic interests
in the region increased significantly in the 1980s. Not only did South
Korea and Taiwan emerge as economic competitors to Japan, but China
also began to focus on economic development after Deng Xiaoping came
to power in 1978 (Berger 2012, 165-166). Under these changed circum-
stances, Japan had to pay more attention to Asia's huge economic poten-
tial, especially as US and European markets were turning increasingly
protectionist. In this regard, an instrumentalist focus on security and eco-
nomic incentives enables the following predictions: (1) Japan will take
unapologetic attitudes toward historical issues until the late 1960s (in the
absence of both security and economic incentives); (2) Japan will take
shallowly contrite attitudes toward historical problems in the 1970s-
1980s and after the mid-1990s (in the presence of economic incentives
but no security incentives); and (3) Japan will take deeply contrite atti-
tudes toward the issues during the period between 1991 and 1995 (in the
presence of both security and economic incentives).
The Transnational-Political Activism Model

The transnational-political activism model is a newly synthesized analyt-
ical framework that can be represented by a two-by-two matrix address-
ing how political and societal actors can affect state behavior in dealing
with historical issues. According to this model, a progressive governing
coalition tends to place more value on human rights and social justice
than a conservative ruling coalition (Chang 2008; Huntington 1957; Laak

2003). Progressive ruling coalitions are more apt to voluntarily initiate

processes that address past wrongs and ignore or finesse conservative
and nationalist interest groups. They are also more likely to listen to and
seriously take into account the voices and requests of transnational ac-
tivist groups. For progressives, reckoning with historical issues is closely
connected with actions that advance their ideological values. Therefore,
whether or not a perpetrator state's ruling coalition is progressive exerts
significant influence on the state's dealings with apology/compensation
issues.
However, conservative governing coalitions, which usually put the
first priority on national pride and confidence, strive to prevent their gov-
ernment and society from taking a contrite attitude toward past wrongs.
To this end, they often create a broad political network that empowers
conservative groups and media. Conservative groups strongly oppose
transnational activism or their state's contrite attitudes by participating in
a unified network with conservative media, intellectuals, and political
figures. Jennifer Lind (2008, 181-186) supports this point indirectly by
arguing that contrition often triggers conservative backlash, because
many conservatives believe that emphasizing past violence and wrong-
doings undermines national pride and patriotism. As Richard Price (2003,
586) points out, the outcomes oftransnational activism may vary accord-
ing to the intensity of a backlash from targets of activism. Margaret Keck
and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 202) also highlight how political resistance
may interfere with the influence oftransnational actors and exert a strong
impact on issue resonance.
Along with the nature ofruling coalitions, transnational activist net-
works playa key role in altering the way a perpetrator state comes to
terms with its past actions. To address historical problems, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) seek to organize a transnational activist
network and promote issue resonance in the international community.
Progressive civil groups in a perpetrator state tend to join and/or support
the transnational activist networks that address apology and compensa-
tion issues, as their progressive ideological goals are often compatible
with ones of transnational actors. To promote the effectiveness of their
activism, furthermore, network actors frequently seek to make connec-
tions with the media, international organizations, and other (powerful)
states. Through this issue resonance, the transnational network exerts
pressure on the state to correct its behavior in a contrite manner (Keck
and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998).
For this article, I code the power of transnational activism in dichoto-
mous terms as either strong or weak. I evaluate the strength of transna-

Yangmo Ku 249
tional activist networks on the basis of two factors: (1) network density
and cohesiveness; and (2) external support from the media, international
institutions, and foreign governments. A strong transnational network
will engage in regular exchanges between NGOs in a dense, unified net-
work and enjoy a high degree of external support from the media, inter-
national organizations, and other governments. A weak transnational
network, however, does not have regular exchanges between NGOs
within a sparse network. It not only suffers a sharp division among net-
work actors in terms of movement tactics or goals but also shows a low
degree of support from the media, international organizations, and
governments.
Hence, the transnational-political activism model deduces the fol-
lowing hypothesis, which can be summarized in Figure 1. The combi-
nation of the two independent variables-the power of transnational
activism and the nature of a ruling coalition-yields four possible out-
comes for a perpetrator state's behavior in grappling with historical
problems.
First, when strong transnational activism aligns with a progressive
ruling coalition in a perpetrator state, the state will take deeply contrite
attitudes toward historical problems (quadrant I). The combination of a
sympathetic government and strong networks incentivizes NGOs to de-
velop suitable strategies through exchanges like holding conferences and
workshops. Drawing attention from the media, international organiza-
tions, and other governments, transnational networks are more likely to
achieve issue resonance in the international community. In this process,
Figure 1 Transnational-Political Activism Model for State Behavior

Toward Historical Issues
Ruling Coalition in Perpetrator State
Progressive Conservative
Strong I. Deep Contrition II. Shallow Contrition

Power of
Transnational
Activism
Weak III. Shallow Contrition IV. No Contrition

while ignoring or circumventing conservative and nationalist domestic

groups, a progressive governing coalition listens to and seriously takes
into account the voices and requests of transnational networks. Through
this issue resonance, transnational networks seek to persuade and exert
strong pressure on the state to rectify its behavior. The perpetrator state
thus takes up deeply contrite attitudes toward historical issues.
Second, when there is strong transnational activism and a perpetra-
tor state is led by a conservative ruling coalition, the state will at most
show shallow contrition in addressing historical issues (quadrant II). In
this instance, transnational activist networks are able to elevate issue res-
onance with the support of the media, international organizations, and
other foreign governments. This strong transnational activism plays a
key role in pushing the state to adopt more apologetic attitudes toward
historical matters. However, conservative ruling coalitions can deflect
such pressures, in part by empowering conservative interest groups.
Strong transnational networks might force marginal concessions from
conservatives but will be less successful. As a consequence, the perpe-
trator state takes shallowly contrite or tactical measures in response to do-
mestic and international pressure.
Third, when weak transnational activism is combined with a pro-
gressive governing coalition in a perpetrator state, contrition will also
likely be shallow (quadrant III). A progressive ruling coalition listens to
and carefully takes into consideration the voices and requests oftransna-
tional networks. However, weak transnational networks are unable to en-
hance issue resonance and thus have no significant impact on state
behavior in addressing historical issues. And if conservative organiza-
tions actively work, they will face less resistance due to the weak transna-
tional activism. Given this situation, the state, though governed by a
progressive ruling coalition, is likely to only achieve shallowly contrite
measures or fail to adopt any contrite stance on historical issues due to
weak external network pressure.
Finally, when there is weak transnational activism and a perpetrator
state is governed by a conservative ruling coalition, the state is unlikely
to be contrite at all (quadrant IV). Weak transnational networks fail to
promote issue resonance enough to push a perpetrator state to behave in
a more contrite manner. Putting much value on state and national pride,
a conservative ruling coalition neglects the voices of weak transnational
activist networks and conservative groups are empowered. Under such
circumstances, the perpetrator state has no incentive to take contrite at-
titudes toward historical matters. As a result, the state issues official state-
ments denying its wartime crimes and resists compensating for past

Yangmo Ku 251
violence. Furthermore, the state may overlook its past apologetic state-
ments and policies, reverting to a more unapologetic stance on the
issues.
The subsequent sections test the two analytical frameworks against
historical facts with regard to the comfort women issue. During the first
phase, from 1945 to 1990, neither model would predict contrition, al-
though instrumentalism expects shallow contrition in the 1970s-1980s
with the rise of Japan's economic incentives. An actual outcome during
this first phase was marked by no contrition: Japan showed little care or
remorse toward the historical matter. During the second phase, from 1991
to 1995, instrumentalism predicts deep contrition as both Japan's secu-
rity and economic incentives are strong, while the transnational-political
activism model expects shallow contrition. But this period actually con-
sisted of shallow contrition: the Japanese state issued somewhat apolo-
getic statements and established a nongovernmental fund to compensate
former comfort women. During the third phase, between 1996 and the
mid-2000s, instrumentalism predicts shallow contrition with Japan's se-
curity interests significantly weakened, whereas the activism model ex-
pects no contrition. As an actual outcome, the Japanese state largely
maintained a state of shallow contrition in addressing the comfort women
issue, but showed frequent regression to no contrition.
Phase One, 1945-1990: No Contrition

The Japanese state was not contrite regarding the comfort women issue
during this lengthy period. Specifically, the Japanese government did not
issue any apologetic statements regarding this issue,' nor did it speak of
designing a compensation scheme for the surviving comfort women. This
outcome is related to not only the absence of transnational and political
actors dedicated to addressing the issue in Japan or victim states, partic-
ularly Korea, but also Japan's weak geopolitical incentives to deal with
its past transgressions.
The Transnational-Political Activism Model:

The Absence of Transnational and Political Agents
Postwar Japan was mostly governed by its conservative elites, some of
whom were involved in the expansion of imperial Japan, the war against
the United States, and wartime crimes. A former Korean foreign minis-
ter pointed out Japan's conservative leaders were reluctant to acknowl-
edge their nation's past misdeeds, as it would have posed a threat to their
political standing." It was natural for such leaders to avoid seriously pur-

suing the issue ofwho bore responsibility for the war and wartime atroc-
ities. Under the longtime conservative LDP rule, therefore, the Japanese
government had no stake in voluntarily addressing the comfort women
issue, which could have caused serious damage to its political standing
and national pride.
Additionally, the main victim state-Korea-did not initially have
the wherewithal to take the comfort women issue into account during
this period given the political and social turmoil produced by the unex-
pected division into the two Koreas after liberation and the ensuing Ko-
rean War between 1950 and 1953 (Soh 2008, 168). Korean authoritarian
leaders such as Park Jung-hee and Chun Doo-whan were engrossed in ac-
celerating economic development in order to strengthen their weak po-
liticallegitimacy, including through improving relations with Japan. For
instance, President Park did not seriously address historical issues in re-
turn for receiving economic assistance from Japan in making the Korea-
Japan Normalization Treaty in 1965. Moreover, the patriarchal social
atmosphere in Korea, which made sex victims feel ashamed while the
assailants were generally tacitly tolerated, also helped prevent former
comfort women from publicizing the issue. Hence, this period exactly
falls into quadrant IV (weak transnational activism with conservative rul-
ing coalition results in no contrition), as shown in Figure 1.
Instrumentalism: Weak Security and Economic Incentives

The Japanese state did not have strong geopolitical incentives to address
its past wrongs committed on the Asian mainland, including the comfort
women issue, during the early postwar period. In the deepening Cold
War, Japan paid much greater attention to the United States than Asia for
its security and economic imperatives. Japan's security needs were fully
satisfied by the conclusion of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951,
which guaranteed the presence of US troops in Japan and ensured its in-
ternal and external security. In this alliance agreement, Japan was not re-
quired to reconcile with war-shattered Korea and Communist China. In
the economic arena, Japan's primary trading partner was the United
States, although Japan depended on the import of strategic raw materi-
als from other parts ofAsia (Berger 2012, 189). Japan quickly became the
dominant power in the region. In this context, it had no compelling re-
alpolitik concerns at the time to deal with its past injustices in the Asian
theater of World War II.
Furthermore, the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formally
dissolved Japan's empire and restored its national sovereignty, helped
Japan avoid seriously addressing its wartime atrocities in Asia (Lee

Yangmo Ku 253
2007). Immediately after World War II, the United States planned to im-
plement a strict reparation policy toward Japan.' This harsh reparation
plan, however, was rolled back significantly for three reasons. First, as
the Cold War intensified, the US government came to recognize Japan's
elevated strategic value in preventing the spread of communism in East
Asia. Second, the United States desired to reduce its huge occupational
expenses and became concerned that Japan's excessive reparations
scheme could further aggravate the US financial condition. Indeed, dur-
ing the occupation (1945-1952), the US government had to provide
Japan with more than $2 billion in economic aid. Third, the United States
reflected fruitfully on the lessons learned following the excessive repa-
rations regime applied to Germany following World War I, and how it
contributed to the emergence of the Nazi regime and the subsequent out-
break of World War II.
With these relaxed conditions, the major Western powers-includ-
ing the United Kingdom and Australia-renounced their reparation
claims following the US example. China and Korea, the nations most se-
verely damaged by Japan's aggressive war and colonial rule, were ex-
cluded from the forty-nine official signatories of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty. Only Indonesia and a few other Southeast Asian countries re-
quested and received reparations for war damages (Seraphim 2006, 320).
In a series of bilateral negotiations with those countries, Japanese nego-
tiators "were able to hammer out ambiguously worded agreements in
which they offered economic development assistance that could be inter-
preted as reparations, without officially having to acknowledge them as
such" (Berger 2007, 190). In this process, consequently, Japan was able
to avoid directly addressing its past atrocities in Asia, including the com-
fort women issue.
Phase Two, 1991-1995: Shallow Contrition

Japan began to change its original position and shifted its stance on the
comfort women issue from no contrition to shallow contrition during this
second phase. During his state visit to South Korea in January 1992,
Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi made a formal public apology for
Japan's past wrongs. In a speech to South Korea's National Assembly,
Miyazawa said, "Recently, the issue of comfort women in the service of
the Imperial Japanese Army has come into light. I cannot help feeling
acutely distressed over this, and I express my sincerest apology.'" In the
first official investigative report of July 1992, moreover, the Japanese
government admitted to the military's involvement in the comfort women

issue, although it did not acknowledge its forceful recruitment of com-

fort women." In August 1993, the Japanese government issued a second
official report (the so-called Kono Statement) that partially admitted its
involvement in the forceful recruitment of comfort women. 10
This report, however, failed to acknowledge that the Japanese gov-
ernment and military were the main actors in establishing and managing
the comfort women system." Meanwhile, Prime Minister Murayama, a
socialist, made a series of apologetic statements regarding the comfort
women issue during this second phase. He commented in July 1995 that
"the problem of the wartime comfort women is one such scar, which,
with the involvement of the Japanese military forces of the time, seri-
ously stained the honor and dignity of many women. This is entirely in-
excusable. I offer my profound apology to all those who, as wartime
comfort women, suffered emotional and physical wounds that can never
be closed.'?" Despite these statements, the Japanese government still re-
fused individual compensation for the surviving victims on the ground
that "Japan had earlier provided reparations to, or reached agreements
with, the governments concerned" (Hayashi 2001,574). Instead of pro-
viding direct state compensation, the government helped establish a non-
governmental fund, the AWF, in July 1995. 13
Therefore, compared with the first phase, Japan's behavior toward
the comfort women issue moved significantly toward a more contrite
stance during this second period between 1991 and 1995, although it did
not achieve deep contrition. This shift in behavior could be related to
both powerful transnational activism led by societal groups in South
Korea/Japan and the brief rule of a progressive coalition government.
This second phase also witnessed a rise in Japan's geopolitical incen-
tives to address its past misdeeds following the end of the Cold War.
However, instrumentalism cannot fully explain why Japan did not go
further toward a deep contrition, given strong realpolitik concerns.
Instrumentalism: Strong Security and Economic Incentives

As noted, the Japanese state made progress regarding apology and com-
pensation linked to the comfort women issue, although it stopped short
of accepting full culpability and providing direct state compensation.
This progress can to some extent be explained by the strong geopolitical
incentives that had developed and made Japan more likely to address its
past wrongs. As a professor at Tokyo University notes, Japan was no
longer able to overlook its Asian neighbors in pursuing its own security,
economic, and political interests following the end of the Cold War in
1989. 14 From a strategic standpoint, the significant weakening of the US-

Yangmo Ku 255
Japan Alliance in the early 1990s, which had been the bedrock of Japan's
postwar foreign policy, can be construed as a clear motive for Japan's
seeking closer ties with other Asian countries (Mochizuki 2007, 4). The
1990-1991 Gulf War first caused a rupture in the US-Japan Alliance. As
the United States led efforts against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, Washington
demanded a military contribution from Japan commensurate with their
alliance partnership. Despite this request, Japan provided a large sum of
financial support ($13 billion) rather than dispatching its Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) and cited the Peace Constitution that prevented the move-
ment of troops overseas. Despite the hefty financial contribution, Japan
received little gratitude and recognition from the United States or Kuwait
following the Gulf War (Park 2004, 177).
The US-Japan Alliance faced other challenges in the early 1990s.
Given the disappearance of a common adversary, the Bush administra-
tion began to place increased weight on economic issues while it deem-
phasized Japan's strategic importance (Park 2007, 187-188). At the end
of Bush's presidency, the US Department of Defense issued a strategic
report that took into account the reduction of the US military presence in
Asia. President Clinton, who was inaugurated in 1993, also focused on
economic diplomacy and strove to rectify the trade imbalance between
the United States and Japan. Thus the US trade representative and the
National Economic Council officials were much more influential than
the security experts who had enjoyed greater influence when maintain-
ing a containment policy had been a critical driver to US-Japan relations.
Moreover, Japanese concerns were further aroused when the United
States labeled China a strategic partner. To Japan, this action signaled a
significant devaluation of the US-Japan Alliance. With the emergence of
Asia's huge economic potential, Japan also faced another economic chal-
lenge: "the rise of economic regionalism, such as the formation of a uni-
fied European market and the North American Free Trade Agreement,
which could hamper Japan's access to lucrative markets in the advanced
industrial world" (Mochizuki 2007, 4). Japan thus needed to better inte-
grate itself with Asia by mending bridges that had remained in disrepair
long after the conclusion of World War II-era hostilities. Facing these
new concerns and challenges, Japanese leaders recognized the US-Japan
Alliance was no longer sufficient and that Japan needed to take proactive
steps to nurture a favorable environment in Asia to protect its long-term
security and economic interests. 15
Accordingly, instrumentalism can provide a plausible explanation
of the positive changes in Japan's dealings with the comfort women issue
during this second phase. Instrumentalism is not sufficient, however, to

account for why Japan did not go further toward a deep contrition, given
the geostrategic gains. Rather the answers are to be found in the interac-
tion of transnational networks and domestic politics. As described above,
Japan refused to accept full state responsibility for the issue as evidenced
by its establishment of a nongovernmental fund. A reason for the Japan-
ese government's wan response was that despite strong networks, the
rule of a progressive non-LDP coalition was short. And, even during that
period, the still-influential conservative LDP prevented a progressive
Prime Minister Murayama from adopting deeply contrite measures to-
ward the historical matter.
Strong Transnational Comfort Women Movement

The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery
by Japan (hereafter the Korean Council) played a key role in launching
and strengthening a transnational movement aimed at redressing the com-
fort women issue. Thanks to the Korean Council's efforts, a Korean vic-
tim-Hak-sun Kim-first delivered public testimony on her ordeal in
August 1991.16 Kim's testimony, reported by news media, attracted much
attention from the Japanese public, notably promoting the cooperation of
many Japanese groups with the Korean Council. Among these groups
were the Association of Japanese Women, the Young Women's Christian
Association, the National Council of Churches in Japan, and the Asian
Women Association (Chung 2001, 167-168). In December 1991, Kim
and two other victims also filed a class-action lawsuit against the Japan-
ese government, requesting 20 million yen each. Furthermore, the un-
covering of official documents in Japan strengthened the transnational
comfort women movement. The national daily Asahi Shimbun reported
this discovery of the official documents on January 11, 1992, notably in-
creasing public interest in the comfort women issue (Seaton 2006). These
documents proved the Japanese government had been involved in estab-
lishing and managing the military comfort women system.
The Korean Council strove to publicize the comfort women issue
internationally by appealing to the UN Human Rights Commission in
March 1992 (Soh 2003). To build solidarity, furthermore, the Korean
Council paid great attention to networking with women's organizations
in other Asian countries whose women had suffered. The first Asian
Women's Solidarity Forum was held in Seoul in August 1992 under the
auspices of the Korean Council. Victims and support groups from Asian
nations, including the Asian Center for Women's Human Rights in the
Philippines and the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation, attended the re-
gional conference that formalized a transnational network dedicated to

Yangmo Ku 257
the comfort women issue (Yoon 2007, 29). In the wake of this forum,
there was an upsurge of cooperation among groups in the countries of
victims and groups in Japan.
These newly networked groups actively sought to raise the comfort
women issue in international conferences sponsored by the UN. During
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, the Asian
Women's Forum was launched and adopted a resolution demanding the
UN investigate the Japanese army's sexual slavery system.'? Represen-
tatives from the Asian groups frequently participated in preliminary
meetings for the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing and
worked as lobbyists publicizing the seriousness of suffering inflicted on
former comfort women. 18 As a result of their efforts, the Vienna Confer-
ence clearly included "sexual slavery" as a violation of women's human
rights under armed conflict in the Vienna Declaration. In its code of con-
duct, the Beijing Conference stipulated that as sexual slavery was a war
crime, perpetrator states should investigate allegations, punish the per-
sons in charge, and compensate surviving victims. Consequently, this
mobilized transnational activism significantly increased issue resonance
in the international community, thus pushing the Japanese government to
move toward a more contrite stance on the comfort women issue.
In contrast to this strong transnational activism, Japan's conserva-
tive groups were caught off guard and unprepared for mounting a de-
fense during this second phase. As Sarah Soh (2008, 66) notes,
"Conservatives regarded the comfort women redress activism through a
small number ofNGOs as noise that over time would fade away." Japan-
ese nationalists just expressed their negative opinions of the transnational
comfort women movement and the somewhat apologetic stance of the
Japanese government regarding the issue. In an editorial, the Sankei
Shimbun lamented that Japan had to take the blame in the sense that
countries like Britain also employed foreign prostitutes throughout its
empire (Seaton 2006, 110). Japanese conservative figures usually as-
serted that the military comfort women issue was not only a necessary
evil at the time but also an effective system aimed at protecting women
in Japan's occupied territories (Chung 2001,175).
The Brief Rule of a Progressive Ruling Coalition

The second phase witnessed the emergence of a progressive non-LDP
coalition and the first socialist prime minister since 1948, offering a win-
dow of opportunity to come to terms with Japan's past." In contrast to
the long-ruling conservative LDP, they strove to address Japan's injus-
tices committed in Asia during World War II, thus being more responsive

to the requests of transnational activist groups. Upon taking office in Au-

gust 1993, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro made an unprecedented
remark that characterized Japan's past actions in Asia as an "aggressive
war" and "wrong war." In another speech, he also named Japan's pres-
ence in Korea as "colonial rule" rather than using the conventional eu-
phemism of "annexation" (Nozaki 2005, 292). As noted before, Prime
Minister Murayama sincerely expressed a sense of contrition for Japan's
past violence to its Asian neighbors.
Despite these positive changes, however, the Japanese state failed
to move toward the level of deep contrition due to strong opposition from
conservative politicians (Lind 2008, 75-77). Reacting to Hosokawa's re-
marks, a group of conservative LDP politicians organized the Commit-
tee for the Examination of History, which campaigned to foster views of
history that recognized World War II as justifiable and denied the exis-
tence of the military comfort women (Nozaki 2005, 293). Prime Minis-
ter Murayama sought to adopt an "antiwar resolution" or an "apology
resolution" marking the fiftieth anniversary of Japan's surrender. This
endeavor was also confronted with opposition from conservative politi-
cians in Japan. To prevent passage of the Diet resolution, in December
1994 about half ofLDP members established a conservative organization
known as The Diet Members League for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
End of World War II (McCormack 2000, 56). Given this opposition
from the LDP-the dominant coalition partner-Murayama had no
choice but to accept a compromised statement, which was an ambigu-
ous statement that satisfied no one, in order to avoid the risk of ending
up with no resolution at all (Saaler 2005, 72-73). And under this strong
conservative influence, the Japanese government only helped establish
a nongovernmental fund, the AWF, instead of providing direct state
compensation for former comfort women. Therefore, the second phase
falls broadly into quadrant II as shown in Figure 1. Although the issue
did see a strong transnational network and progressive government, the
progressive government did not last long and was constrained by on-
going LDP opposition.
Phase Three, 1996-mid-2000s:

Shallow Contrition and No Contrition
Between 1996 and the mid-2000s, the Japanese state maintained its shal-
low contrition regarding the comfort women issue, though the period
was also marked by frequent regression to unapologetic attitudes. Dur-
ing this third phase, the Japanese government generally reaffirmed Prime

Yangmo Ku 259
Minister Murayama's apologetic statement of 1995. In October 1998, for

instance, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo expressed his deep remorse and
heartfelt apology, stating that Japan caused tremendous damage and suf-
fering to Korean people during a certain period in the past." Prime Min-
ister Koizumi Junichiro also issued apologetic statements in an official
letter sent to the former comfort women in 2001. 21 The Japanese state
also carried out its nongovernmental compensation project through the
Asian Women's Fund during this period. Despite the pressure from
transnational actors, however, the Japanese government declined to di-
rectly pay individual compensation.
Frequent regression to unrepentant attitudes also marked this period.
First, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro was reportedly reluctant to send
apologetic letters to former comfort women in 1996 (Onuma 2007,
75-76). Second, high-ranking Japanese government officials countered
the previous apologetic statements by making a series of blunders that at-
tempted to justify or gloss over Japan's past wrongs. For example, LDP
politician Okuno Seisuke commented twice in June and July 1996 that
"comfort women voluntarily participated in commercial transactions and
they were managed by businesses" (Yang 2008, 79). Third, the Japanese
government also exerted pressure on the Japan Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, NHK) not to air documentaries showing its
involvement in the wartime sex slave system (Morris-Suzuki 2005, 5). A
Japanese journalist points out the NHK aired many TV programs deal-
ing with Japan's wartime responsibilities in the 1970s and 1980s. NHK
television producers, however, could not easily make such programs
under pressure from the conservative LDP-Ied governing coalition from
the late 1990s. 22 Finally, in March 2007 Prime Minister Abe Shinzo
stated, "there was no evidence to support the initially accepted notion
that coercion was used by the Japanese military or government in recruit-
ing wartime comfort women" (Yang 2008,74-75).
A cause of Japan's retrogressive stance on the comfort women issue
lay in the rise of the strong conservative, nationalist forces and the con-
servative LDP-Ied coalition government.
Japanese conservative groups produced a strong backlash and damp-
ened the transnational comfort women movement significantly. A newly
emerged, conservative LDP-Ied coalition had no incentives to take con-
trite attitudes toward historical issues. The ruling coalition thus neglected
the voices of transnational activist networks and reverted to a more un-
apologetic stance on apology and compensation. This third phase was
also marked by strong economic incentives but weakened security in-
centives to grapple with past wrongs in the Asian mainland.

Instrumentalism: Strong Economic Interests but

Weakened Security Interests
This third phase saw that Japan's economic incentives to address past
wrongs continued, but its security incentives decreased, especially after
Prime Minister Koizumi took power in 2001. Due to burgeoning Japan-
ese interests in Asian markets, Japanese business leaders strongly urged
the Japanese government to tackle unresolved issues regarding the past
(Berger 2012, 177-178). However, the notable strengthening of the US-
Japan Alliance since the mid-1990s had largely satisfied Japan's height-
ened security concerns, thus weakening Japan's need to improve its ties
with Asia.
Japan benefited from a significant strengthening in the US-Japan Al-
liance during this third phase. The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis was
a major catalyst for this development, as North Korea's nuclear adven-
turism prompted the United States and Japan to seriously reevaluate their
existing bilateral security alliance (Soeya 2006, 127-129). Japanese au-
thorities perceived Japan had no constitutional measure allowing the
Self-Defense Forces to provide US troops with the rear support that
would be necessary in any number of potential regional contingencies.
US authorities also recognized Japan's strategic importance in order to
better cope with contingent situations on the Korean peninsula that would
cause the sacrifice of numerous US soldiers. The United States desired
to strengthen the alliance with Japan and reconfirmed its security com-
mitment in Asia. As a subsequent measure, the two countries announced
a new US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, which re-
defined the bilateral alliance as a regional alliance for maintaining secu-
rity and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region." A series of subsequent
incidents, including the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the 1998 launch of
a North Korean Taepodong missile over Japan, reinforced the US-Japan
security alliance during this period, further weakening Japan's motives
for seeking closer ties with Asian countries (Park 2007, 191).
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States served
as another catalyst to reinforce the US-Japan Alliance (Park 2007, 193).
Following this incident, the United States focused on a security strategy
to fight against terrorism and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. To this end, the United States needed strong support
from one of its main alliance partners-Japan. By the same token, rec-
ognizing the US position, the Japanese government paid greater attention
to establishing stronger cooperative ties with the United States. In re-
sponse to the US war against Iraq in March 2003, the Koizumi adminis-
tration immediately declared its support for the war and promised to

Yangmo Ku 261
dispatch the SDF to Iraq. In contrast to the prior phase, therefore, it was
not necessary-for security reasons at least-for Japan to actively ad-
dress its past wrongs with other Asian nations, as the notably strength-
ened US-Japan Alliance settled the security concerns that Japan had held
in the early 1990s.
Relatively Weakened Transnational Activism

With the above security reasons, the transnational-political activism
model can well explain the frequent regression during this third phase.
Japanese conservative groups produced a strong backlash and dampened
the transnational comfort women movement significantly. A newly
emerged, conservative LDP-Ied coalition had no incentives to take con-
trite attitudes toward historical issues. The ruling coalition thus neglected
the voices of transnational activist networks and reverted to a more un-
apologetic stance on apology and compensation with regard to the com-
fort women issue.
During this third phase, the transnational comfort women movement
was challenged by a sharp division among its component groups. The
split among the communities of victim survivors and their supporters be-
came distinct following the creation of the Asian Women's Fund in July
1995. According to a Japanese civic activist, "The AWF was a major
cause of the division within the progressive camp in Japan. The establish-
ment of the non-governmental fund was not an appropriate action be-
cause it was not direct state compensation for the suffering of former
comfort women. "24 Many activist groups that had persistently requested
state compensation were vehemently opposed to the establishment of the
AWF because they regarded it as an attempt by the Japanese government
to avoid its legal responsibilities. A variety of Japanese groups also
formed a unified organization called the Executive Committee for De-
structing AWF, campaigning against the AWF through street rallies of
protest, a signature-collecting movement, and international conferences.
Nevertheless, many of Japan's prominent activists and organizations sup-
ported the formation and activities of the AWF (Chung 2001, 179-181).
The primary reason for these groups' support was "to take some concrete
action for elderly survivors before they died without receiving any to-
kens of atonement, let alone legal compensation" (Soh 2003, 224).
The fissures among these groups began to wane in 1998 when the
Korean government paid an equivalent amount of atonement money
(about $26,000), suggested by the AWF, to each survivor (Soh 2003,
228-230). Such payment was conducted under the condition that the re-
cipients would not accept AWF money. Given this circumstance, the in-

fluence of groups that had supported the AWF was weakened in Japan
and abroad. The anti-AWF groups continued to lobby the Japanese Diet
for reparation laws (Mitsui 2007, 46). A variety of legal groups and the
Campaign for Completing Postwar Compensation prepared reparation
bills for the Japanese Diet. After organizing a citizen convention, more-
over, a number of groups such as the Violence Against Women in War
Network, Japan (VAWW-NET Japan) sought to constitute a fact-finding
bill to demand the Japanese Diet's research regarding Japan's compre-
hensive war responsibility, including the comfort women issue. These
legal approaches were not successful, but transnational groups, including
the Postwar Compensation Network, continuously lobbied Japanese
politicians, particularly Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Diet members,
to enact reparation laws."
Mobilized Conservative Reaction with

an LOP-Led Coalition
Beginning in 1996, Japanese conservatives/nationalists launched a sys-
tematic counterattack against the transnational comfort women move-
ment and the Japanese government's softening stance on the issue. In
right-leaning magazines, nationalists published a number of articles ar-
guing Japan's imperial war was not wrong in the context ofworld history
at the time (Chung 2001, 140-147). They even asserted the comfort
women system had been a good institution that prevented local women
from being raped. At the center of these systematic nationalistic cam-
paigns was the Research Association of Liberal Historical Perspectives
founded by Tokyo University professor Fujioka Nobukazu in February
1995. The Research Association emerged primarily in response to the
official history textbooks released in 1994 that included the descriptions
of Japan's past wrongs, including comfort women, Unit 731, and the
Nanjing Massacre (Kim 2008, 103). The Research Association aimed to
remove all mentions of comfort women from the textbooks in order to re-
cover Japan's damaged national pride. It attacked the textbooks' content,
claiming that "comfort women were protected and well treated, not ex-
ploited by the Japanese military and government authorities" (Hayashi
2001, 576).
In support of this movement, the Sankei Shimbun published a series
of articles titled "What the School Textbooks Do Not Teach," written by
Research Association authors. Additionally, in its daily editorials the
Sankei launched a campaign to eliminate comfort women-related content
from history textbooks (Chung 2001, 143). The nationalist backlash in
Japan reached its pinnacle in January 1997 when nationalist LDP mem-
bers and conservative academics such as Fujioka founded the Japanese

Yangmo Ku 263
Society for Composing New History Textbooks (hereafter Tsukurukai).

With strong political support from a newly emerged LDP-Ied coalition,
the Tsukurukai engaged in active public outreach programs, publishing
many books and holding symposia/conferences, in order to promote con-
servative perspectives that emphasized Japan's positive historical views
and national pride (Saaler 2005, 80-81). The Tsukurukai boasted a sig-
nificant membership (peaking at 10,000 in 1999) and received strong
support from a wide array of prominent figures in Japanese society, in-
cluding scholars, columnists, art historians, businessmen, and politicians.
The Tsukurukai was also able to obtain a wider societal influence be-
cause of strong support from Japan's nationalist media, including the Fuji
Television Network and the Sankei Shimbun. This strong conservative
reaction significantly weakened the effect of the transnational comfort
women movement. Therefore, this third phase exactly falls into quad-
rant IV (weak transnational activism + conservative ruling coalition =
regression to no contrition), as illustrated in Figure 1.
Conclusion
To examine the variations in Japan's choice ofhistory policy, I have tested
two competing approaches-instrumentalism and the transnational-
political activism model-against the comfort women issue. The former
posits that when geopolitical incentives are strong, a perpetrator state is
more likely to take contrite attitudes toward historical issues. The latter hy-
pothesizes that when the power of transnational activism is strong and a
perpetrator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more
likely to adopt contrite policies toward historical issues. Table 1 illustrates
the results of theory tests regarding Japan's dealings with the comfort
women issue.
Table 1 Summary of Theory Tests: Japan Comfort Women
Predictions
Intrumentalism T-P Activism Model Outcomes
1950s-1960s No contrition No contrition No contrition

1970s-1980s Shallow contrition No contrition No contrition
1991-1995 Deep contrition Shallow contrition Shallow contrition
1996-mid-2000s Shallow contrition No contrition Shallow contrition
and no contrition

As can be seen, the theories sometimes predict the same outcome.

But when they don't, this study finds the transnational-political activism
model is more accurate than instrumentalism in explaining within-case
variations in Japan's behavior toward apology and compensation with
regard to the comfort women issue. In addition, the activism model can
adequately explain the causal mechanisms at work: the dynamics of spe-
cific agents-i.e., transnational networks, conservative groups, and rul-
ing coalitions-in affecting state behavior toward historical issues.
However, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and are comple-
mentary in some respects. Empirical evidence suggests the effect of
transnational activism becomes stronger when the target state has geopo-
litical incentives and/or when the target state is ruled by a progressive rul-
ing coalition. For example, the Japanese state responded to the
transnational comfort women movement in a somewhat contrite manner
between 1992 and 1995 when improving its relationships with Asian
neighbors was in its security and economic interests and a liberal, non-
LDP coalition briefly took power.
This study also finds transnational civil society groups can playa
pivotal role in pushing perpetrator states to adopt more apologetic atti-
tudes toward their past injustices. Japan has not taken proactive steps to
pay compensation for its past wrongs before victims or organizations
representing the victims seriously raised the issues. The Korean Council
took the lead in organizing a transnational network focusing on comfort
women, elevating the resonance of the issue in the international commu-
nity and exerting significant pressure on the Japanese government to re-
spond to this unresolved historical matter. However, the conservative
LDP-Ied coalition often deflected such transnational pressure, although
the previous short-lived progressive ruling coalition tried to accommo-
date the voices of transnational networks. Moreover, conservative organ-
izations in Japan, such as the Tsukurukai, significantly dampened the
effect of the transnational comfort women movement with the support of
conservative media and leaders.
This study indicates that it would be hard for the Japanese state to
take a more contrite stance on apology/compensation issues if Japanese
society continues to move in a conservative direction. Although the DPJ
was relatively more progressive than the LDP, the former was still com-
prised of many conservative Diet members. For instance, DPJ prime min-
ster Noda (September 2011-December 2012) was more conservative
than many LDP politicians in dealing with historical issues. He said,
"there are no documents or testimonies on the Japanese side that con-
firm the comfort women were coerced. "26 Thus despite the rule of a more
progressive party, the 2009-2012 period in Japan did not witness any

Yangmo Ku 265
significant changes in the Japanese stance on historical issues, including

the comfort women issue. During this period, the transnational comfort
women movement was continually dampened by powerful conservative
reaction in Japanese society, although the transnational networks stayed
intact.
Furthermore, while taking an unapologetic stance on the issue of for-
mer comfort women, the currently conservative Abe administration re-
viewed the process of formulating the Kono Statement in June 2014 and
announced that the statement was made by a political compromise be-
tween the two governments." This act significantly tarnished the mean-
ing of the Kono Statement, which in 1993 acknowledged Japan's
involvement in the forced mobilization of comfort women for the first
time. In response, the transnational network, led by the Korean Council,
and even the South Korean government harshly criticized such provoca-
tive action by the Abe government. However, such external pressure has
not worked well. Given the particularly nationalist government on the
issue, therefore, conservative forces were empowered and liberal ones
weakened, reducing the ability of even strong transnational networks to
operate.
Yangmo Ku is assistant professor of political science and director of the Interna-

tional Studies Program at Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont. His research
focuses on the politics of memory and reconciliation in East Asia and Europe, East
Asian security, economic reform in communist states, and US foreign policy mak-
ing. His work has appeared in Pacific Focus, Asian Perspective, YaleJournal ofIn-
ternational Affairs, and Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society as
well as an edited volume, Routledge Handbook ofMemory and Reconciliation in
East Asia (forthcoming). He previously taught in the School of International Serv-
ice at American University and received his PhD in political science from George
Washington University.
Notes
This research was supported by the Korea Foundation and Norwich University.
1. The term comfort women is a euphemism for women drafted for military
sexual slavery by Japan during the Asia Pacific War. I use the term in this arti-
cle, because scholars have commonly used it in their works.
2. In this article, transnational activism is defined as "voluntary collective
action across state borders that self-organized advocacy groups undertake in pur-
suit of what they deem to be the wider public interest" (Price 2003). A ruling
coalition is equal to ruling parties (or a ruling party) that constitute(s) and lead(s)
a national government.
3. The concept of contrition in this article is narrower than one adopted in
previous studies, as the scope of this research is limited to apology/compensation
issues. To measure degrees of contrition reflected in official historical narratives

(or policies ofremembrance), Thomas Berger (2012) and Jennifer Lind (2008) in-
corporated three more indicators-legal trials, commemoration, and history edu-
cation-in addition to the official statements and compensation measures.
4. Both realism and neoliberalism can fall into the category of instrumen-
talism in that those theories endorse the following assumption: as key actors in
world politics, states rationally act in accordance with self-interest under the an-
archic international system (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998).
5. It was necessary for Japan to soothe Koreans' strong anti-Japanese sen-
timent that had consistently prevented the making of the Korea-Japan Normal-
ization Treaty. To this end, Japanese foreign minister Shiina issued a somewhat
apologetic statement about Japan's colonial rule over Korea when he visited
Seoul in January 1965. However, he did not mention any ofJapan's past wrongs
such as the comfort women issue (Lee 1996, 26-63).
6. Personal interview, Seoul, October 7, 2008.
7. This planned policy intended (1) to transfer to the Allies capital facilities
that could make Japan remilitarized; (2) to collect the reparations in kind to the
extent that they did not obstruct the subsistence level of the Japanese people or
the maintenance of the Allied occupation; and (3) to transfer Japan's overseas
property to the Allies (Lee 2007).
8. Seoul Shinmun, January 18, 1992.
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1992), "Statement by ChiefCabi-
net Secretary Koichi Kato on the Issue of the So-Called 'Wartime Comfort
Women' from the Korean Peninsula." www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/state
9207.html (accessed January 5, 2009).
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1993), "Statement by the Chief
Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the Result of the Study on the Issue of 'Com-
fort Women. '" www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (accessed
January 5,2009).
11. Personal interview, Tokyo, October 25, 2008. A Japanese civil activist
states, "The report was not fully apologetic because it did not clearly present
who had established the system."
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1995), "Statement by Prime Min-
ister Tomiichi Murayama on the Occasion of the Establishment of the 'Asian
Women's Fund. '" www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9507.html (ac-
cessed January 5, 2009).
13. To implement this atonement project, the AWF contained the following
three major elements: (1) to provide "atonement money" (2 million yen per per-
son) donated by the Japanese people to former comfort women; (2) to send a
letter from the Japanese prime minister to surviving victims; and (3) to disburse
"about 830 million yen from government funds over a five-year period for vic-
tims' medical care and welfare" (AWF 2007, 125).
14. Personal interview, Tokyo, October 16, 2008.
15. For instance, "Powerful factional leaders such as Ozawa Ichiro recog-
nized that Japan needed to address the history question more clearly and directly
than it had been willing to do in the past if it were to become more engaged in
world affairs" (Berger 2007, 195).

Yangmo Ku 267
16. Hankyoreh, August 15, 1991.

17. Hankyoreh, June 20,1993.
18. Chosun Daily, August 24, 1995.
19. The LDP sustained its parliamentary dominance for thirty-eight years
until 1993. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) participated in a briefnon-LDP rule
from 1993 to 1994 and later formed a coalition government with the LDP under
JSP prime minister Murayama Tomiichi between 1994 and 1996.
20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1998), "Japan-Republic of Korea
Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership Towards the
Twenty-first Century." www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea!joint981 O.html
(accessed January 15, 2009).
21. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2001), "Letter from Prime Minis-
ter Junichiro Koizumi to the Former Comfort Women." www.mofa.go.jp/pol-
icy/women/fund/pmletter.html (accessed January 15,2009).
23. Daily Yomiuri, April 18, 1996; Daily Yomiuri, September 23, 1997. They
also established the New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in Sep-
tember 1997 that stipulated concrete cooperation measures between US forces
and the SDF.
25. Personal interviews, Tokyo, October 27,31,2008.
26. Available at http://ajw.asahi.comJarticle/asia!korean-'peninsula!AJ2012
08290036 (accessed May 3, 2014).
27. Available at www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/06/25/editorials/stop
-undermining-kono-statement/#.VL69NUtGjl0 (accessed January 20,2015).
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Journal of East Asian Studies 15 (2015), 243-269

DURING WORLD WAR II, JAPAN FORCIBLY DRAFTED VAST NUMBERS OF

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

and testimony indicate 80 to 90 percent of comfort women were Koreans

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

reaction. The Japanese state responded to the transnational comfort

Analytical Frameworks for State History Policy

Definition and Operationalization of Contrition

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Transnational-Political Activism Model

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

2003). Progressive ruling coalitions are more apt to voluntarily initiate

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 1 Transnational-Political Activism Model for State Behavior

Ruling Coalition in Perpetrator State

Strong I. Deep Contrition II. Shallow Contrition

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

while ignoring or circumventing conservative and nationalist domestic

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Phase One, 1945-1990: No Contrition

The Transnational-Political Activism Model:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Instrumentalism: Weak Security and Economic Incentives

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Phase Two, 1991-1995: Shallow Contrition

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

issue, although it did not acknowledge its forceful recruitment of com-

Instrumentalism: Strong Security and Economic Incentives

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Strong Transnational Comfort Women Movement

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Brief Rule of a Progressive Ruling Coalition

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

to the requests of transnational activist groups. Upon taking office in Au-

Phase Three, 1996-mid-2000s:

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Minister Murayama's apologetic statement of 1995. In October 1998, for

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Instrumentalism: Strong Economic Interests but

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Relatively Weakened Transnational Activism

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Mobilized Conservative Reaction with

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

Society for Composing New History Textbooks (hereafter Tsukurukai).

Table 1 Summary of Theory Tests: Japan Comfort Women

Intrumentalism T-P Activism Model Outcomes

1950s-1960s No contrition No contrition No contrition

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

As can be seen, the theories sometimes predict the same outcome.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

significant changes in the Japanese stance on historical issues, including

Yangmo Ku is assistant professor of political science and director of the Interna-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/S159824080000936X Published online by Cambridge University Press

16. Hankyoreh, August 15, 1991.

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