South Korea and Japan Since World War II
South Korea and Japan Since World War II
South Korea and Japan Since World War II
Shale Horowitz
Since the end of World War II, relations between South Korea and Japan
have gone through significant changes – from distant and hostile in the
1950s, to cooperative and increasingly close through about 2005, to the last
decade of serious deterioration. Three frameworks are used to understand
change and continuity in South Korea–Japan relations: a realist perspective
emphasizing either structural military power relations or “revealed” patterns
of military threat; an institutional perspective that emphasizes similarities or
differences in political institutions; and an ideological regime-type perspec-
tive that includes ideologies as well as institutions as influences on govern-
ment or leadership preferences. The third framework captures two types of
ideological factors that have exerted significant influences on South Korea–
Japan relations: the existence of a small range of competitive ideological
regime types or government types specifying national ideals and national
development roadmaps; and historical legacies of intense conflict, which tend
to produce ideological and diversionary frictions that cause conflict to persist
or recur. Only the last factor, the history issue, is readily subject to policy
control: the best way forward to restore cooperative and stable relations is
for South Korean and Japanese leaders to agree informally on truthful and em-
pathetic norms governing historical judgments, and for Japanese political and
opinion elites to agree informally to marginalize those that defy such norms.
Key words: South Korea, Japan, bilateral relations, alliances, regime type,
ideology, conflict history, diversionary politics.
79
80 / Pacific Focus
stronger common threats tending to yield closer relations.2 Yet, in the 1950s, when
both countries faced a serious common threat from the communist bloc, South
Korea, the more gravely threatened of the two states, refused even normal diplo-
matic and economic relations with Japan. Only from the 1960s, when the immediate
crisis of the Korean War had passed and an effective deterrence framework seemed
established, did South Korea initiate a rapprochement. More recently, around 2005,
relations began to deteriorate seriously, not after the communist threat receded, but
as a new China threat emerged.
Liberal institutionalist theories emphasize the difference between democracies
and authoritarian regimes, and to some extent, also institutional differences among
these types. More prominently, the Democratic Peace literature suggests that
democracies are unlikely to fight each other, and by extension, are more likely to
be reliable allies in the face of common threats.3 Yet South Korea–Japan relations
have been most consistently warm when the two countries were farthest from
ideals of consolidated democracy – when South Korea was governed by military
dictatorships and Japan was under one-party, if still democratic, rule. More
recently, relations between consolidated democracies, in which both countries
see regular turnover in power of democratically elected leaders and parties, have
had an adverse action–reaction dynamic, in which provocations by one side lead
to hostile reactions by the other, tending to produce a broadening and hardening
of bad feelings.
Today, while South Korea and Japan are still managing to cooperate in practical
areas, such as indirect military cooperation via the US alliance system, economic
relations, and societal ties in areas such as tourism and popular culture, there is a
danger that mutual alienation will damage the core national security interests of
both sides. Are South Korea–Japan relations doomed to revert back to the bad
old days of the 1950s? If not, what factors will tend to prevent further deteriora-
tion, or to restore the improving trend of relations evident only a decade or so ago?
To address these questions, this paper follows liberal and constructivist litera-
tures that take ideology seriously, in at least two different forms. First, institutional
regime type provides incomplete information about ideological regime type or
government type. At certain points in historical time in given regions of the world,
there are usually only a limited number of competing ideological models that offer
national ideals and related developmental roadmaps. These ideological models
provide additional information that make it easier to understand which regimes
are greater threats to one another, and which are more likely to cooperate, either
2. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kenneth
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
3. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, 80-4
(December 1986), pp. 1151–1169; Brett A. Leeds, “Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commit-
ments, and International Cooperation,” American Journal of Political Science, 43-4 (October 1999),
pp. 979–1002; Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
4. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (Garden City, NY: Anchor,
1973), pp. 90, 131; John M. Owen IV, “When Do Ideologies Produce Alliances? The Holy Roman
Empire, 1517–1555,” International Studies Quarterly, 49-1 (March 2005), pp. 73–99.
5. Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose, The Balance of Power: Stability in
International Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
recent conflict and tensions as necessary conditions to activate the potential threats
of material relative power.
How does this logic apply to South Korea–Japan relations? From the end of
World War II, and certainly with the Korean War, the Soviet Union, and after
1949 also the People’s Republic of China, posed the most significant common
threats. Both South Korea and Japan responded primarily via bilateral alliances
with the United States. Given the importance of Japanese bases to the defense of
South Korea, and to a lesser extent the value of South Korea as a barrier to attacks
on Japan, we would expect a strong tendency for the two countries to ally. This
was not counteracted by any comparable tendency of the two countries to be a
threat to one another. South Korea was too weak to be a significant threat to Japan,
and Japan was constrained by its dependence on US support and the greater threat
posed by the Soviet Union and China. The common threat remained relatively high
throughout the Cold War, despite some ups and downs due to events such as the
Sino–Soviet split or the retreat of US power and will in the late 1970s.
The next major change occurred with the reform and then collapse of the USSR.
The USSR withdrew its support for North Korea, and then itself collapsed. China
was by then a decade into regime transformation, which disengaged from the So-
viet-led international communist movement, and refocused inward on political sta-
bility and market-based economic development. As the Soviet Union retreated and
collapsed, China provided some compensating increase in aid to the North. Yet the
North faced mass starvation, and its Stalinist regime too looked to be on the brink
of collapse.
The Dengist regime in China had its own near-death experience at the same
time. While China’s strength continued to grow, its leaders remained focused on
internal stability and development. Abroad, Deng’s guideline of “concealing
strength” and “never being the highlight” meant above all avoiding conflict with
the United States and its allies, so as to be able to profit from open and stable in-
ternational trade, investment, and technology transfers.
Despite a massive military build-up and an ideological turn toward traditional
nationalism (“patriotic education”) beginning after the Tiananmen Square massa-
cre, China’s foreign policy did not change significantly until the mid-2000s, during
the middle years of the Hu Jintao period. Hu adopted a more confrontational
posture with US treaty allies, such as the Philippines and above all, Japan. China
encouraged or tolerated more frequent public demonstrations or riots against
Japan, and began regular sea and air incursions into the area around the Japan-held,
China-claimed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China claimed to oppose North Korea’s
nuclear weapons program. Yet China did not use its overwhelming economic
leverage to pressure the North to stop, and even appears to have assisted and
protected the North’s efforts. The first North Korean nuclear test occurred in
2006, and the North continues to upgrade its nuclear and missile delivery capabil-
ities, and to proliferate them to US enemies, such as Iran and Syria. Across a series
of territorial disputes stretching from the Sea of Japan through the South China Sea
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
South Korea and Japan since World War II / 83
to the Himalayan frontier with India, China’s rhetoric and actions are similar but
even more assertive under Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping.6
Realist theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations: Large
changes in the relative strength of common threats predict that South Korea–Japan
relations should improve with the outbreak of the Korean War, deteriorate with the
end of the Cold War, and improve with increasingly aggressive Chinese foreign
policies from the mid-2000s.7
Unlike realist theories, liberal and constructivist theories do not assume that
states have more or less homogeneous preferences. Differences in state preferences
become the sources of threats, activating or deactivating the potential threats
created by the various configurations of relative power. Where do these foreign
policy preferences come from? Liberal theories traditionally emphasize political
institutions, while constructivist ones usually focus on ideologies. Thus, the liberal
theory of Democratic Peace is anchored in the difference between democratic and
authoritarian political institutions. Constructivist theories often emphasize the
metaphor of socialization of individuals, in which socially created norms and rules
have the international analog of norms and regimes of international order. But in
practice, this distinction blurs. Liberals typically concede that institutions become
associated with norms and ideologies that add significant content, and coexist in
an enmeshed relationship in which causation runs in both directions.8 Construc-
tivists, for their part, acknowledge a similar interdependence of ideologies with
institutions.9
A purely institutional approach has limited explanatory power. The strongest
prediction – derived from the Democratic Peace literature – is that democracies
are unlikely to fight each other, and therefore are more likely to be allies against
common threats. Such common threats are expected to come from authoritarian
regimes – but it is not clear when authoritarian regimes are expected to threaten
each other or other democracies. Thus, a purely institutional approach defaults
back into a realist “revealed threat” approach when it comes to explaining behavior
of authoritarian regimes. For South Korea–Japan relations, it has the same
implications as “revealed threat” realism, except that the predicted direction of
change for the period of South Korea’s military dictatorship is less clear.
6. Shale Horowitz, “Why China’s Leaders Benefit from a Nuclear, Threatening North Korea:
Preempting and Diverting Opposition at Home and Abroad,” Pacific Focus, 30-1 (April 2015),
pp. 10–32.
7. For the prediction that China’s rise will improve South Korea–Japan relations, see Bhubindar
Singh, “Beyond Identity and Domestic Politics: Stability in South Korea-Japan Relations,” Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, 27-1 (Spring 2015), pp. 21–39.
8. For example, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russet, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic
Peace, 1946–1986,” American Political Science Review, 87-3 (September 1993), pp. 624–638.
9. For example, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Stephen Krasner, ed., International
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Krasner, 1983).
Korea and Japan in the same way. On the one hand, China props up the North and
thus prevents Korean unification. Yet China no longer supports Northern conquest
or subversion of the South, because China’s new regime appears to prefer the
status quo of partition. Thus China seeks to coexist with the South, and emphasizes
economic cooperation. By contrast, Japan is more unambiguously threatened by
China’s ratcheting up of hostile rhetoric and incursions around the Diaoyus/Senkakus.
Theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations of changing ideolog-
ical regime types and threats (communist regime and threat changes): Large
changes in the existence and strength of communist regime threats predict that
South Korea–Japan relations should improve with the outbreak of the Korean
War and deteriorate with the end of the Cold War.
Theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations of changing ideolog-
ical regime types and threats (South Korean and Chinese regime and threat
changes): South Korea’s military coup is expected to improve South Korea–Japan
relations; South Korea’s democratization is expected, on average, but with
direction and timing dependent on government and leadership changes, to worsen
South Korea–Japan relations. China’s regime change is not expected to have the
potential to improve South Korea–Japan relations until China showed not only
rising relative power, but also more offensive objectives, from the mid-2000s.
Even then, China’s objectives are a more unambiguous threat to Japan and a more
ideologically contestable one to South Korea.
The simplest diversionary politics literature faces limitations similar to realist
theories. Governments, upon losing popularity, are expected to resort more to
diversionary conflicts with other countries.10 One obvious question is, which other
country or countries? One cannot simply say that the biggest threat is the most likely
diversionary target. As discussed, one must explain the pattern of threat, for example,
in the manner of the ideological regime type approach above. Moreover, the biggest
threat (whether “revealed” or explained) might be a more attractive ideological
target, but it is likely to be more dangerous to provoke. This is because it is more
likely to lash out in a way that threatens the incumbent regime or government,
thereby counteracting the benefits of the internal “rally-around-the-flag” effect.
There are at least two other possible target types in diversionary politics.
Countries with which one’s own has a history of intense and recent conflict are also
promising targets, even if they are relatively low on reasonable rankings of current
threats. The more serious the historical threat, the greater the diversionary
resonance. Thus, Japan’s conquest and rule of Korea in 1905–1945 makes Japan
an attractive diversionary target in South Korean politics. On the other hand, the
destructive legacy of World War II has exerted a restraining force on Japanese
10. Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook
of War Studies (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 259–288; Ahmer Tarar,
“Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War,” International Studies Quarterly,
50-1 (March 2006), pp. 169–188.
attitudes and policies towards Korea. Thus, the ideological and political payoff of
diversionary targeting is expected to be much higher in South Korea than in Japan,
because it was Japan that threatened South Korea’s independence and national
identity, rather than the other way around. Yet the deterring effect of World War
II in Japanese politics can be expected to fade over time. This is not to say that
Japan is likely to revert to an aggressive policy. Rather, Japanese politicians and
public opinion should become less likely to suppress their own hostility or
contempt, and more likely to respond in kind to South Korean hostility.
Another diversionary target type has been allies – particularly more powerful
allies. Any relations of dependence with a senior alliance partner are fraught with
tensions and disagreements. In the context of the Cold War and post–Cold War
periods, left governments are more prone to take advantage of such tensions for
ideological reasons. Right governments tended to take harder lines against commu-
nist threats, and to justify market-friendly policies partially as means of building
and maintaining greater strength against these threats. By contrast, left govern-
ments are more likely to be critical of America, the symbolic “homeland of
capitalism,” both to help legitimize their internal interventionist agenda, and to
counteract the right’s tendency to legitimize its market-friendly agenda by focus-
ing on the communist threat. While both the South Korean and the Japanese left
would be expected to make the United States a diversionary target, Japan’s relative
power and historical role also make it an attractive South Korean diversionary
target on these grounds. For the same reasons, the United States and Japan become
more attractive diversionary targets when they are led by center-right or farther
right governments.11
Theoretical implications for South Korea–Japan relations of historical legacies
of conflict and ideological and diversionary politics: After World War II, South
Korea should be more likely to make Japan an ideological and diversionary target
than the reverse. Under democracy, the expectation is strengthened as South
Korean governments are farther to the left, and as Japanese governments are
farther to the right. Over time, potential for ideological and diversionary targeting
is likely to become more symmetrical, as the ideological impact of historical events
recedes.
Another notable influence is economic interdependence, which increases the
cost of frictions, and thus creates an incentive to avoid conflict and maintain more
cooperative relations. Given that existing economic benefits have a more potent
influence than potential ones, economic interdependence is expected to have an
increasingly favorable impact on bilateral relations as it increases. Japanese and
South Korean economic interdependence rose sharply from the 1960s, but then
11. In contrast to much of the diversionary politics literature, it is assumed here that diversionary
politics serves ideological as well as political purposes. Successful diversionary politics not only
increases popularity, but also increases the rulers’ ability to achieve their ideological objectives.
plateaued and declined somewhat in relative importance with the rising importance
of the China market from the 1990s.12
Bilateral relations went through three main phases. From 1948 to 1960, South
Korean president Rhee Syngman adopted a broadly hardline policy toward Japan.
Rhee annexed the contested Dokdo/Takeshima Islands in 1952, and declared an
expansive maritime demarcation line – which South Korea called the “Peace
Line,” but which came to be known internationally as the “Rhee Line” – that far
exceeded international norms for maritime territory. The Rhee Line encompassed,
among other areas, the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, along with the surrounding 8
nautical miles of sea. South Korea then regularly used live fire and boat seizures
to drive Japanese fishing vessels from the disputed area around the islands.13 Rhee
also refused to establish formal diplomatic relations and severely restricted trade.
Japan did not accept the South Korean claim to the islands and insisted on its
own sovereignty. Japan pursued various diplomatic tracks to assert its claim,
alongside repeated public statements. Nevertheless, Japanese leaders’ rhetoric
about the islands was more restrained. The most confrontational Japanese state-
ments were made about colonial and World War II history in Korea. Against a
background of carefully measured, more correct statements of empathetic regret,
contradictory sentiments occasionally appeared. Most notably, early post-Ko-
rean-War efforts to normalize relations were damaged when Japan’s negotiator,
Kubota Kanichiro, suggested that South Korea should compensate Japan for colo-
nial-era infrastructure investment and economic development in Korea. To take an-
other example, Ikeda Hayato, Japan’s Prime Minister from 1960 to 1964, denied
“wrongdoings committed by Japan since the annexation of Korea.”14
The second and longest phase in bilateral relations was one of diplomatic rap-
prochement and increasing economic cooperation.15 Efforts to improve relations
began under the short-lived Second Republic in 1960–1961, but did not make sig-
nificant progress until after the 1961 military coup. The new South Korean military
regime, led by Park Chung-hee, sought to restore good relations with Japan as part
12. Byung-chul Koh, op. cit., pp. 276–277; Hidehiko Mukoyama, “Japan-South Korea Relations
Grow Stronger in a Globalized Environment,” Pacific Business and Industries, 12-43 (2012), pp.
2–22.
13. From 1951 to 1965, South Korea captured 326 Japanese fishing boats and arrested over 3,000 fish-
ermen. Northeast Asian History Foundation, Dokdo in the East Sea (Seoul: Northeast Asian History
Foundation), at <http://contents.nahf.or.kr/english/item/level.do?levelId=eddok_003e_0030_0030>
(searched date: 5 September 2015). According to Japan’s Shimane Prefecture, 44 fishermen were
killed in the enforcement actions.
14. Dal-joong Chang, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of South Korea-Japan Relations: A
More Strained Relationship?” Korea and World Affairs, 16-3 (Fall 1992), p. 507.
15. Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1985).
of its efforts to build South Korea’s economic and military strength. The result was
the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations and five related agreements, in which the two
countries established formal diplomatic relations and normalized economic
relations. Japan agreed to pay one-time compensation – $300 m in grants and
$500 m in loans – for colonial-era and wartime damages inflicted on Korea. The
Dokdo/Takeshima dispute was frozen or set aside, with each side maintaining its
claim. A compromise was reached on area fisheries, in which both sides accepted
a “Joint Regulation Zone” beyond a 12-mile territorial zone. There was explosive
growth of bilateral trade, which rose about 10-fold over the first post-normalization
decade. By 1973, Japan accounted for 60% of accumulated foreign direct invest-
ment in Korea.16
Various flare-ups in Japan–South Korea relations occurred over time. These
included Korean intelligence’s 1973 kidnapping of Korean dissident Kim Dae-jung
in Tokyo; a Japan-based, North Korean-guided attempt to assassinate Park
Chung-hee (which killed Park’s wife); Japanese history textbook disputes in 1982
and 2001; visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine; and most importantly,
a series of statements by Japanese politicians that minimized or denied various
aspects of historical Japanese aggression and brutality.
But relations generally remained positive and friendly through the end of Kim
Dae-jung’s term as South Korea’s president (1998–2003). The dominant note in
Japanese official statements about history was correctly contrite and conciliatory.
During a 1983 visit to South Korea, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro affirmed
Japan’s “need for a penitent attitude toward the unfortunate past.” Similar but
stronger statements were made by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992 and
Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in 1993. The 1995 Murayama Statement went
farthest, stating that,
[Japan ], through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the
people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake
be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and
express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.17
Apart from the history issue, the other traditionally fraught issue was the territo-
rial dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima and the surrounding seas. This issue too
created problems, but was handled effectively. In 1974, Japan and South Korea
agreed on continental shelf boundaries, and 5 years later, began jointly exploring
for oil and natural gas. In 1996, pursuant to ratifying the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Japan and South Korea declared conflicting exclusive
economic zones. As usual, grassroots sentiments and protests were much stronger
in South Korea. South Korean President Kim Young-sam and Japanese Prime
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro agreed to reduce tensions and resume negotiations,
which proved to be long and difficult. In 1997, Japan began seizing Korean fishing
boats that violated its newly expanded maritime territory. In 1998, President Kim
Dae-jung and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo agreed to revise the 1965 fisheries
agreement to take account of the new UNCLOS guidelines. The two countries’
territorial seas were expanded, but the compromise on the jointly administered
fisheries zone that surrounded Dokdo/Takeshima was left intact.
The third phase, in which relations deteriorated sharply, dates from the adminis-
tration of South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) through the
present, corresponding roughly to the tenures of Japanese Prime Ministers
Koizumi Junichiro (2001–2006) and Abe Shinzo (2006–2007, 2012–present). In
2004, Japan’s Shimane Prefecture assembly declared an annual Takeshima Day.
President Roh called this “an act of justifying the history of invasion.” From
2005, instead of following the longstanding precedent of trying to contain the
fallout of the various disputes, Roh adopted the opposite approach of escalating
his rhetorical responses. Following one of Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni,
Roh declared that, “We dare to wage a diplomatic war with Japan.” Meeting with
the press after a June 2005 summit meeting, Roh publicly attacked Koizumi’s
history-related policies, while Koizumi emphasized areas of cooperation.18
In 2006, the situation worsened over ongoing disagreements about exclusive
economic zones, most controversially in the seas around Dokdo/Takeshima. South
Korea planned to submit Korean names for undersea features to an international
maritime body, and Prime Minister Koizumi responded by ordering Japanese
maritime research in the area. Roh then ordered South Korean naval vessels into
the area around Dokdo/Takeshima and authorized them to use force to keep
Japanese vessels out. Emergency negotiations then agreed to shelve both the
place-naming and the maritime research.19 On 28 April 2006, Roh fired a
dramatic rhetorical broadside against Japan:
Dokdo is our land. It is not merely a piece of our land but one that carries historic significance as a
clear testament to our 40 years of affliction…. As long as Japan continues to glorify its past
wrongs and claim rights based on such history, friendly relations between Korea and Japan
cannot stand. So long as Japan clings to these issues, we will be unable to trust any of its
rhetorical commitment to the future of Korea-Japan relations and peace in East Asia…. The
nature of this matter is such that no compromise or surrender is possible, whatever the costs
and sacrifices may be.20
18. Byung-chul Koh, op. cit., pp. 467–468, 473–475; Kentaro Nakajima, op. cit., pp. 23, 26.
19. Michael Weinstein, “South Korea-Japan Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute: Toward Confrontation,”
Japan Focus (10 May 2006).
20. “Special Message by President Roh Moo-hyun on Korea-Japan Relations,” Presidential Archives
(28 April 2006), at <http://16cwd.pa.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/archive_view.php?meta_id=hot_dip_
etc&id=6acd4bd3647383f285862e6> (searched date: 28 August 2015).
President Roh here implicitly argues for setting aside the compromising
approach in place since the early 1960s. Normal relations are called into question
for as long as Japan claims the Dokdo/Takeshima islands; and for as long as Ja-
pan’s standard apologies for its colonial-era and World War II–era crimes are qual-
ified by behavior such as official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, approval of
inappropriate textbooks, and inadequate acknowledgement of historical incidents,
such as those involving South Korean “comfort women.” Roh followed up by
suspending high-level talks with Japan.
Prime Minister Abe followed Roh with his own significant contribution to dete-
riorating relations. Most importantly, Abe made a number of statements minimiz-
ing Japan’s colonial- and World War II–era crimes, which went well beyond the
boundaries observed by his more nationalistic predecessors, such as Nakasone
and Koizumi. In 2007, Abe denied Japanese wrongdoing toward “comfort
women.”21 During his second, longer term in office, in 2013, he qualified the
Murayama Statement by arguing that there is no agreed international legal defini-
tion of aggression.22 Such statements heightened international and domestic
opposition to Abe’s efforts to revise Japan’s defense policy to allow broader
regional defense cooperation with allies, in which Japan could defend allies as well
as its own territory.
Although Abe was more confrontational and less conciliatory than Koizumi,
Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye showed greater restraint than Roh. Neverthe-
less, both adopted elements of Roh’s more confrontational approach. In 2012, Lee
made the first ever visit to the disputed islands by a South Korean Prime Minister,
and stated that Japan’s Emperor should not visit South Korea before making an
explicit apology. Both Lee and Park made public criticisms of Japan a more
regular and prominent part of public diplomacy, and both refused to return to
regular summit meetings with Abe. Both gave special prominence to the comfort
women issue, arguing that Japan must properly acknowledge the historical events.
On the other hand, Lee and Park sometimes resisted China’s diplomatic efforts to
take a stronger joint stance against Japan.23
In recent years, these disputes have qualitatively worsened public attitudes.
While South Koreans have long been relatively hostile toward Japan, their negative
opinion has worsened. Japanese public opinion, which has been more favorable or
indifferent toward South Korea, has reached new lows more similar to South
21. “Japanese PM Denies Wartime ‘Comfort Women’ Were Forced,” Telegraph (3 March 2007), at
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1544471/Japanese-PM-denies-wartime-comfort-women-
were-forced.html> (searched date: 24 August 2015).
22. “Abe Stands Firm on Definition of ‘Aggression’ amid International Outcry,” Asahi Shimbun
(13 May 2013), at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201305100092> (searched
date: 1 September 2015).
23. David Kang and Bang Jiun, “Japan-Korea Relations: Sisyphus,” Comparative Connections, 14-1
(April 2012), pp. 129–138; Narushige Michishita, “Changing Security Relationship between Japan
and South Korea: Frictions and Hopes,” Asia-Pacific Review, 21-2 (July 2014), pp. 19–32.
Korean attitudes toward Japan. For the first time, Japanese in large numbers have
become seriously aggrieved over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.24
In this third, more confrontational period, we see a return to rhetoric, and in the
case of Dokdo/Takeshima, also actions or policies more like that of the first period
than the second. Roh’s statements and policies went far beyond any previous
Korean leader other than Rhee Syngman, tearing open old wounds. Abe did not
follow previous Japanese prime ministers in trying to minimize confrontation
and contain disputes. Although Roh’s successors were more restrained, they
responded to Abe with their own critical statements rather than actively seeking
to repair relations. Among all of its significant bilateral trading partners, South
Korea failed to negotiate a free-trade agreement with Japan alone – largely because
of overwhelmingly negative South Korean public sentiment.
We begin with Syngman Rhee’s initial Japan policy, which maintained cold and
even hostile relations with Japan while struggling to consolidate and secure a
South Korean polity against the North Korean and internal communist threat. This
policy’s initial high level of hostility to Japan is not as easily explained by realist
theories, given the far greater communist threat, and Japan’s occupation by Rhee’s
US ally. It can be argued that, in the late 1940s, there was still great uncertainty
about Japan’s political future, such that a future Japanese threat could not easily
be dismissed.25 The strength of ideological and diversionary politics rooted in
the recent experience of Japanese rule also played an important role. Thus, Rhee’s
long political career was above all one of anti-Japanese activism for Korean
independence. Such an ideological orientation could not easily be abandoned over-
night. Moreover, to do so would have exposed Rhee to the charge of being soft on
Japan, which would strengthen the communist and non-communist opposition.
It is more difficult to explain Rhee’s continued hostility to Japan after the
Korean War – and even while the South’s existence hung by a thread during
the War itself. Thus, Rhee annexed the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands and imposed
the Rhee Line in 1952. Even as Japan emerged from occupation as an inward-
looking democracy, with heightened autonomy and a continuing role as a vital
base area for the South’s defense, Rhee maintained his anti-Japanese policy to
the end of his rule in 1960. Rhee’s stubbornness is difficult to explain without
24. Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, The 3rd Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll
(2015): Analysis Report on Comparative Data (Seoul and Tokyo: Genron NPO and East Asia
Institute, 2015); Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East
Asian Security and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
25. One might also argue that Japan could not be a threat while under US occupation. Yet US
occupation would predictably not last for more than a few years. After that, an independent Japan
would have to be dealt with.
26. According to John Kie-chiang Oh, Korean Politics: The Quest for Democratization and
Economic Development (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 61, the later, 1965 normal-
ization of relations with Japan “would have been unimaginable under Rhee, who hated the Japanese
passionately.”
27. See the discussion in Van Jackson, “Getting Past the Past: Korea’s Transcendence of the anti-Japan
Policy Frontier,” Asian Security, 7-3 (2011), pp. 238–259.
memory is still so great, that even South Korean leaders prone ideologically to
pragmatic cooperation are constrained by public opinion.
We now turn back to the Japanese side of the relationship since the end of the
Cold War. Here again we see that Japan is less concerned with Korea relations than
is South Korea with Japan relations. While bilateral economic relations continued
to blossom, South Korea became less important to Japan’s defense. Ideologically,
Korea was only one aspect of Japan’s colonial- and World War II–era history.
Periodically, Japanese politicians would bridle at an unambiguously negative
assessment, making statements that excused or rationalized Japanese policies, or
indirectly indicating such sentiments via visits to the Yasukuni Shrine or support
for revisionist textbooks. Such statements and actions were more likely to come
from center-right politicians. However, whenever relations with Korea began to
deteriorate significantly, leaders such as Hashimoto and Koizumi always made
conciliatory statements and diplomatic efforts. This pattern seemed to end with
Abe. He went farther in his revisionist statements than earlier Japanese Prime
Ministers, and for many years did little to repair damage and arrest negative trends
in bilateral relations and public sentiment.28
How can we account for these political dynamics on the Japanese side? Broadly,
the timing and content of Japanese diplomatic and policy changes are consistent
with a response to the rising China threat in the mid-2000s.29 However, revision-
ist sentiments recur regularly in the post–World War II period, long preceding the
mid-2000s. Moreover, historical revisionism is not only unnecessary to a more
forceful Japanese response to the China threat, but positively damaging. Historical
revisionism poisons relations with South Korea, and even injects difficulties into
the more vital relations with the United States. It also strengthens the hand of
the Japanese left in the internal political battle over whether Japan should weaken
its postwar norms and constraints against normalizing its diplomatic and defense
policies.
Diversionary motives alone are also an inadequate explanation. Japan’s eco-
nomic stagnation and the LDP’s attendant loss of political hegemony go back to
the 1990s. Yet a succession of LDP leaders avoided the sort of strongly revisionist
statements made by Abe. It is true that Abe, as his popularity has declined, has had
greater need for diversionary political benefits. But this explains neither the timing
nor the direction of his statements. Abe’s statements and associations with histor-
ical revisionism predate his first term as prime minister. They are not easily
explained apart from his personal ideology and the weakening constraints imposed
28. In 2015, Abe and Park agreed that Japan is responsible for procuring Korean comfort women for
its soldiers while ruling over Korea, and that the Japanese government will pay $8.3 m in compensa-
tion to a foundation set up by the South Korean government. It is too early to say whether this thaw in
relations will continue.
29. Yoshinori Kaseda, “Japan’s Security Policy towards East Asia,” Perceptions, 17-4 (January
2012), pp. 27–48.
by memories of World War II. Just as democratization made it possible but not
inevitable that a leader like Roh Moo-hyun would arise to cater to latent anti-Japanese
memories and sentiments, the passage of time made it politically easier for one like
Abe, capitalizing on the desire of many that Japan become a “normal” country, to
indulge his own ideological belief that Japan’s colonial- and World War II–era history
had significant mitigating circumstances and redeeming features.
feasibly do to improve relations. The best that could be hoped for was silence or a
more restrained response to provocations. Because of the greater resonance of his-
torical conflicts for Korean identity, restraint in the face of provocation is predict-
ably more difficult for Korean leaders – both for ideological and diversionary
reasons.
What role has been played by economic interdependence? The Rhee case shows
the weakness of potential economic interdependence. How strongly do existing
high levels of interdependence favorably affect relations? While high levels of in-
terdependence make strongly adverse policy changes less likely, they were not
much of a barrier to the policies of either Roh Moo-hyun or Abe. Moreover,
leaders find it easy to separate economic and security policies. Thus, Roh sup-
ported a free-trade agreement with the United States while pursuing an anti-Amer-
ican ideological agenda. Similarly, Abe has tried to protect economic relations
with China as he responds to a rising China threat on the geopolitical side. Finally,
high interdependence is no guarantee of continued movement toward openness, as
indicated by the stalled efforts to create a South Korea–Japan free-trade agreement.
If such a free-trade agreement happens, it will probably be through an indirect mul-
tilateral framework, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Poor relations with Japan endanger both South Korea’s national defense against
the North and the prospects for Korean unification. Assuming that these goals are
important enough to counteract historically grounded anti-Japanese ideological
tendencies and diversionary political incentives, what are the main elements of
an effective engagement strategy toward Japan? Most importantly, such a strategy
must be premised upon a Japanese national identity and policy objectives that will
command consensus support in Japan. This means that South Korea must accept
Japan as a “normal” country, both in terms of national security and symbolic or
ideological status. As memories of World War II fade, Japan will not accept per-
manent constraints on military capabilities and strategies viewed as necessary for
its defense. This now includes defense of the Diaoyus/Senkakus as well as the
Ryukyus and the Home Islands. And it includes cooperation with countries such
as the United States, the Philippines, Australia, and India, to protect vital sea-lanes
and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and elsewhere. More broadly,
Japan cannot be kept on probationary status forever. Japan has not committed ag-
gression or war crimes for 70 years, and aspires to international recognition com-
mensurate with its economic and geopolitical importance. Japanese will not view
South Korea as friendly and worthy of support if South Koreans seem bent on
keeping Japan as a permanent scapegoat. Prime Minister Abe has effectively
deflected attention from his reprehensible and counter-productive historical revi-
sionism by emphasizing that, just like any other country, Japan has a right to
self-defense, and a right to be judged by its current and recent behavior. Denying
these rights only plays into the hands of Abe and other revisionists.
This does not mean that South Korea should ignore Japanese historical revision-
ism – and in any case, it is not politically feasible to do so in the South. On the
© 2016 Center for International Studies, Inha University
98 / Pacific Focus
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