Iran: Background and U.S. Policy: Updated January 26, 2024

Iran: Background and U.S.
Policy
Updated January 26, 2024
Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov
R47321
SUMMARY
R47321
Iran: Background and U.S. Policy
January 26, 2024
Congress has played a major role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, authorizing extensive U.S.
sanctions, seeking to influence diplomatic engagement with Iran, funding and authorizing support Clayton Thomas
to U.S. partners facing Iranian threats, and enacting legislation that allows Congress to review Specialist in Middle
agreements related to Iran’s nuclear program, a key concern for U.S. policymakers. The October Eastern Affairs
2023 attack on Israel led by the Palestinian group Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization
which Iran has long supported, and ongoing attacks against U.S. forces and other targets in the
region by other Iran-backed groups, have attracted significant congressional attention. U.S. and
Israeli officials have stated that they do not have evidence of the Iranian government’s direct
involvement in the October 7 attack, but that they hold Iran broadly complicit because of its support for Hamas. The Iranian
government’s human rights violations and close relationships with Russia and China also pose challenges for the United
States. Selected issues on which Congress has engaged include:
Iran’s Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups. Iran’s government seeks, among other goals, to erode U.S.
influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states by backing a range of regional armed groups,
including some U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Since the outbreak of war in Gaza, Iran-backed
groups throughout the Middle East (which sometimes refer to themselves as the “axis of resistance”) have conducted attacks
against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria and international shipping in the Red Sea, drawing retaliatory U.S. military action.
Observers debate the nature of Tehran’s relationships with and influence over these groups. While neither the United States
nor Iran appears to seek a direct military confrontation, the evolving threat perceptions, political calculations, and strategic
goals of multiple actors in a dynamic combat environment could increase the risk of such a conflict.
Prisoner Exchange and Fund Transfer. In September 2023, the United States and Iran concluded a prisoner exchange and
the United States facilitated the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian funds from South Korea to Qatar. Some in Congress have
criticized the move, and the Biden Administration has reportedly agreed to prevent Iran’s use of the funds since October
2023.
Iran’s Nuclear Program. U.S. policymakers have for decades signaled concern that Tehran might seek to develop nuclear
weapons, though Iranian leaders deny such ambitions. The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange
for relief from most U.S. and U.N. Security Council economic sanctions. In 2018, the Trump Administration ceased U.S.
participation in the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions that the Obama Administration had lifted. Since the reimposition of U.S.
sanctions, Iran has decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. Iran barred some international
inspectors and reportedly increased its nuclear activities in the context of heightened regional tensions in late 2023. Biden
Administration attempts to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) via indirect negotiations stalled in
fall 2022.
Nationwide Protests. The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested for allegedly violating
Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head covering) law and died in custody, sparked nationwide unrest. The regime cracked down
violently against protesters, killing hundreds, and restricted internet use. The protests appear to have subsided but the
grievances underlying them remain unresolved.
Sanctions. Since 1979, successive U.S. Administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to change various
aspects of Iran’s behavior, often at the direction of Congress. U.S. sanctions include measures targeting Iran’s energy sector,
its arms and weapons-related technology transfers, its financial sector, and various non-oil industries and sectors.
Iran’s Military and Foreign Policy. In addition to its support for allied groups throughout the Middle East, Iran maintains
what U.S. officials describe as “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region” and has developed a range of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These activities give Iran considerable regional influence, which the Iranian government
has sought to reinforce by taking steps to strengthen its economic and military ties with China and Russia—for example, by
exporting UAVs to bolster Russian military operations in Ukraine and selling oil to China.
The U.S. government has used various policy tools, including comprehensive sanctions, limited military action, and
diplomatic engagement with leaders in Iran and other countries to counter what the U.S. officials describe as Iranian threats
to U.S. interests. As of 2024, the Iranian government faces some challenges at home but retains considerable influence in the
Middle East region, is developing new ties to Russia and China (including via its prospective BRICS membership), and
remains able to contest U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In this context, Members of Congress may consider questions
related to U.S. and Iranian policy goals, the stability of Iran’s government, and efforts to counter Iran’s regional influence and
deter its nuclear development activities.

Contents
Overview and Issues for Congress .................................................................................................. 1
Rising Regional Tensions and Conflict: The United States, Iran, and the “Axis of
Resistance” ................................................................................................................................... 2
Background: Iran’s Foreign Policy ........................................................................................... 3
Iran, Hamas, and the October 7, 2023, Attacks on Israel .......................................................... 4
U.S. Policy amid “Axis of Resistance” Attacks ........................................................................ 5
Iraq and Syria ...................................................................................................................... 6
Yemen and the Red Sea ...................................................................................................... 7
Lebanon and Hezbollah ...................................................................................................... 8
U.S.-Iran Relations: Background, Recent Approaches, and Developments in 2023 ....................... 9
Biden Administration Policy ................................................................................................... 10
Developments in 2023 ....................................................................................................... 11
Iran’s Relations with China and Russia ............................................................................ 13
Iran’s Political System ................................................................................................................... 15
2022-2023 Political Protests ................................................................................................... 16
U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests ............................................................................... 17
Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities .................................................................................... 18
Iran’s Nuclear Program.................................................................................................................. 20
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 22
Sanctions ................................................................................................................................. 22
Oversight of Negotiations and Possible Nuclear Agreement .................................................. 23
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 24
Figures
Figure 1. Iran at a Glance ................................................................................................................ 1
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 26

Overview and Issues for Congress

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the second-largest country in the Middle East by size (after Saudi
Arabia) and population (after Egypt), has for decades played an assertive, and by many accounts
destabilizing, role in the region and beyond. Iran’s influence stems from its oil reserves (the
world’s fourth largest), its status as the world’s most populous Shia Muslim country, and its active
support for political and armed groups (including several U.S.-designated terrorist organizations)
throughout the Middle East. Attacks by those groups against Israel, U.S. forces, and other targets
in the region have increased in late 2023 and early 2024.
Figure 1. Iran at a Glance
Geography Total Area: 1,648,195 sq km (636,372 sq. miles), 2.5 times the size of Texas
People Population: 87,590,873 (17th largest in the world)
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.5%
Religion: Muslim 99.6% (90-95% Shia, 5-10% Sunni), other (Zoroastrian, Christian, and Jewish)
0.3% (2016)
Literacy: 85.5% (male 90.4%, female 80.8%) (2016)
Economy GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $19,550 (2023)
Real GDP Growth: 2.9% (2022); 3.2% (2023 forecast)
Year-on-year Inflation: 45.3% (2023 forecast)
Unemployment: 10% (2023 forecast)
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Fact information (2023 estimates unless otherwise specified) from Economist
Intelligence Unit, International Monetary Fund, and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook.
Since the Iranian Revolution that ushered in the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has presented a
major foreign policy challenge for the United States. Successive U.S. Administrations have
identified Iran and its activities as a threat to the United States and its interests. Of particular
concern are the Iranian government’s nuclear program, its military capabilities, its support for
armed factions and terrorist groups, and its partnerships with Russia and China. The U.S.
government has condemned the Iranian government’s human rights violations and detention of
U.S. citizens and others, and has wrestled with how to support protest movements in Iran. The
U.S. government has used a range of policy tools intended to reduce the threat posed by Iran,
including sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic engagement. Despite these efforts,
Congressional Research Service 1

Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities remain considerable and have arguably
increased.
Congress has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, providing for extensive U.S.
sanctions, providing aid and authorizing arms sales for partners threatened by Iran, seeking to
influence negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, and enacting legislation that allows Congress
to review related agreements. Much of that legislative energy was related to the 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which restricted Iran’s nuclear program in return for
relief from some U.S. and international sanctions; the Trump Administration ceased U.S.
participation in the agreement in 2018. In 2021-2022, as the Biden Administration engaged in
negotiations intended to reestablish mutual compliance with the JCPOA, Members expressed a
range of views, some in support of and others opposed to renewing the agreement.
The prominence of the JCPOA in U.S. policy towards Iran waned in late 2022 as negotiations
stalled amid other developments, such as nationwide unrest in Iran and Iran’s provision of
weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine. In September 2023, the United States and Iran concluded a
prisoner exchange and the United States facilitated the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian assets from
South Korea to Qatar, attracting significant congressional attention. The October 2023 attack on
Israel led by Hamas, an Iran-backed Palestinian Sunni Islamist group (and U.S. designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization, or FTO), and subsequent attacks on U.S. forces and other targets
by Iran-supported groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, have dramatically escalated tensions in the
region. Nevertheless, U.S. officials reportedly assess that the Iranian government does not seek
direct military confrontation with the United States or Israel.1 Iran may use these conflicts as an
opportunity to advance longstanding goals like leading opposition to Israel and reducing U.S.
regional influence.
Rising Regional Tensions and Conflict: The United

States, Iran, and the “Axis of Resistance”
The October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on Israel, subsequent conflict in Gaza, and ongoing
attacks by other Iran-backed groups throughout the Middle East have significant implications for
the United States. These Iran-backed groups, which sometimes refer to themselves as the “axis of
resistance,” have for decades threatened various U.S. interests but are now engaged militarily
against U.S. forces and partners simultaneously across multiple fronts to a degree not previously
seen. Observers debate the varying nature of Tehran’s relationships with and influence over these
groups. While neither the United States nor Iran appears to seek direct military engagement, the
evolving threat perceptions, political calculations, and strategic goals of multiple actors in a
dynamic combat environment could increase the risk of such a conflict.2
1 David Sanger et al., “U.S. and Iran battle through proxies, warily avoiding each other,” New York Times, January 14,
2024.
2 Katie Bo Lillis, “US intelligence currently assesses Iran and its proxies are seeking to avoid a wider war with Israel,”
CNN, November 2, 2023; Peter Baker, “As U.S. and militias engage, White House worries about a tipping point,” New
York Times, January 21, 2024.

Background: Iran’s Foreign Policy

Iran’s foreign policy appears to reflect overlapping and at times contradictory motivations,
including countering perceived threats from the United States and U.S. partners like Israel;3
positioning Iran as the defender of Shia Muslim communities and other groups that the Iranian
government views as oppressed, such as the Palestinians; and the pursuit of Iran’s geopolitical
interests.4 To promote its priorities, Iran has backed a number of political and armed groups in the
Middle East (see Figure 1) as part of what some experts call a “forward defense” strategy, guided
by the principle that “Iran should fight its opponents outside its borders to prevent conflict inside
Iran.”5 Backing these groups also arguably gives the Iranian government a measure of plausible
deniability as it seeks to advance its goals while avoiding direct conflict with the United States.6
Figure 1. Selected Iran-Backed Groups
Source: Created by CRS, based on U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism and other open
sources.
Experts debate the nature of Iranian support for these groups. Some contend that the groups are
“mere appendages” of Iran, following Tehran’s orders.7 Others assert that these groups have
3 Per the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment, “The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the
United States and its regional allies.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the
U.S. Intelligence Community, February 6, 2023.
4 For example, Iran has supported Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shia-inhabited Azerbaijan, possibly in part
to thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority. Borzou Daraghi, “Nagorno-Karaback: An
unexpected conflict that tests and perplexes Iran,” Atlantic Council, November 9, 2020; Vali Kaleji, “Iran increasingly
uneasy about threats to common border with Armenia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 14, 2022.
5 Amr Yossef, “Upgrading Iran’s military doctrine: An offensive ‘forward defense,’” Middle East Institute, December
10, 2019; Alex Vatanka, Whither the IRGC of the 2020s? Is Iran’s Proxy Warfare Strategy of Forward Defense
Sustainable? New America, January 15, 2021.
6 Nakissa Jahanbani et al., “How Iranian-backed militias do political signaling,” Lawfare, December 18, 2023.
7 Patrick Wintour, “As Middle East crisis grows, does Iran have control of its proxy forces?” Guardian, January 6,
2024.

“varying degrees of autonomy” and sometimes have interests, and take actions, independent of
those of the Iranian government.8
U.S. officials characterize the Iranian government’s support for these groups as a threat to U.S.
interests and forces in the region. The 2023 intelligence community threat assessment predicted
that
Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle
East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states and minimize threats
to regime security…. Iranian-supported proxies will seek to launch attacks against U.S.
forces and persons in Iraq and Syria, and perhaps in other countries and regions. 9
The Iranian government’s support for regional groups is coordinated by Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel military institution to Iran’s regular armed
forces that plays a major role in Iran’s economy and is entrusted with the primary task of
defending the Iranian government from challenges to its authority at home and abroad.10 The
IRGC component “responsible for conducting covert lethal activities outside of Iran, including
asymmetric and terrorist operations,” is the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).11 Both the IRGC
and the IRGC-QF are designated for U.S. sanctions under terrorism-related authorities, as are
many of the regional armed groups that they support.
Iran’s government has also taken direct action to advance its interests, aggressively asserting
claims to its territorial waters (including the 2016 seizure of U.S. sailors) and conducting military
strikes on anti-Iran groups (including January 2024 missile strikes in Syria and Pakistan), and
attacking shipping in the Persian Gulf.
Iran, Hamas, and the October 7, 2023, Attacks on Israel12

The Iranian government has backed Hamas for decades, going back nearly to the group’s
inception in the 1980s.13 Since Hamas took de facto control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has
engaged in several rounds of conflict with Israel, with continued reported material and financial
support from Iran. Iran has aided Hamas despite Israeli-Egyptian restrictions on the transit of
people and goods in place for Gaza since 2007; reported Iranian-supplied rockets provide Hamas
with the ability to target population centers in central Israel.14 In a September 2020 publication,
8 Sara Harmouch and Nakissa Jahanbani, “How much influence does Iran have over its proxies?” Defense One, January
23, 2024.
9 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 6, 2023.
10 National Counterterrorism Center, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,” March
2022.
11 Ibid. Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons
Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism,” 66 Federal Register 49079, as amended.
12 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12549, Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti and CRS
Report R47754, Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), coordinated by Jim
Zanotti, Jeremy M. Sharp, and Christopher M. Blanchard.
13 The Iranian government has backed terrorist groups since the early 1980s, focused initially on supporting the Shia
Islamist group Hezbollah in Lebanon and pressuring Persian Gulf monarchies to cease their support for Iraq in its war
against Iran. After the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising) broke out in 1987 (the same year Hamas was founded),
Iran began to focus more on supporting Palestinian groups. See U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism:
1986, January 1988 and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, April 1990.
14 Fabian Hinz, “Iran transfers rockets to Palestinian groups,” Wilson Center, May 19, 2021; Adnan Abu Amer,
“Report outlines how Iran smuggles arms to Hamas,” Al-Monitor, April 9, 2021.

the State Department reported that “Iran historically provided up to $100 million annually in
combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas.”15
U.S. and Israeli officials have stated publicly that despite the Iranian government’s longstanding
support for Hamas, they do not have evidence that the government of Iran played a direct role in
planning or carrying out the October 7 assault.16 Still, they have contended that “Iran is broadly
complicit in these attacks,” given that Iran has been Hamas’s “primary backer for decades,” as
Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer said on October 9.17 Media accounts, citing a variety
of unnamed U.S. and foreign officials, have varied in their assessments of Iranian involvement,
some indicating that Tehran may have been surprised by the October 7 attacks.18
For their part, Iranian officials have denied direct involvement but expressed enthusiastic support
for the assault. An October 7, 2023, post on the X account of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei stated, “God willing, the cancer of the usurper Zionist regime will be eradicated at the
hands of the Palestinian people and the Resistance forces throughout the region.”19 In an October
10, 2023, speech, Khamenei praised the Hamas attack but said that Iran was not “behind this
move.”20 According to a press report citing Iranian state media, President Ebrahim Raisi told
Russian President Vladimir Putin in an October 16 call that Palestinian groups are “free and
independent in making any decision they need, and naturally we support all the measures the
resistance takes to combat Zionist aggression.”21
U.S. Policy amid “Axis of Resistance” Attacks

The Biden Administration has sought to avoid the regionalization of the Israel-Hamas war beyond
Gaza, including the direct intervention of third parties or the spread of sustained conflict to other
countries.22 At the same time, the Administration has sought to deter and respond to potentially
escalatory attacks from Iran-backed groups in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon.
From the outset of the conflict in October 2023, U.S. officials have consistently stated that Iran
and the other nonstate actors it supports should not interfere. National Security Advisor Jake
Sullivan said on October 15, “We have means of communicating privately with Iran,” and also
that the United States had used those means to convey the message that Iran should not become
involved.23 For their part, Iranian officials have connected regional conflict to the war in Gaza;
Iran’s foreign minister said in mid-January 2024 that an end to the conflict in Gaza “will lead to
15 U.S. State Department, Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities, September 2020.
16 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Dana Bash of CNN’s State of the Union,” October 8,
2023; “No evidence yet of Iran link to Hamas attack, says Israeli military,” Guardian, October 9, 2023.
17 “U.S. to offer ‘every kind of support’ to Israel on hostages, White House advisor says,” CBS News, October 9, 2023.
18 Summer Said et al., “Iran helped plot attack on Israel over several weeks,” Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2023;
Joby Warrick et al., “Hamas received weapons and training from Iran, officials say,” Washington Post, October 9,
2023; Warren Strobel, “Iran knew Hamas was planning attacks, but not timing of scale, U.S. says,” Wall Street
Journal, October 11, 2023; Zachary Cohen et al., “Initial US intelligence suggests Iran was surprised by the Hamas
attack on Israel,” CNN, October 11, 2023; Adam Entous et al., “Early intelligence shows Hamas attack surprised
Iranian leaders, U.S. says,” New York Times, October 11, 2023.
19 Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (@khamenei_ir), X post, October 7, 2023, at https://twitter.com/
khamenei_ir/status/1710752170096701778. Khamenei days earlier said much the same thing in public remarks.
“Normalization with Israel like ‘backing the wrong horse’: Leader,” Tehran Times, October 3, 2023.
20 “Inside story: Iran’s supreme leader strongly rejects role in Hamas attack,” Amwaj.media, October 10, 2023.
21 “Putin, Raisi discuss Israel-Gaza war,” Rudaw, October 16, 2023.
22 See, for example, U.S. State Department, Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability, January 9, 2024.
23 CBS News, “Transcript: National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on ‘Face the Nation,’” October 15, 2023.

an end of military actions and crises in the region.”24 He earlier, in October 2023, stated that Iran
“cannot remain a spectator” in Israel’s war against Hamas and that if measures to end Israeli
operations in Gaza fail, “it is highly probable that many other fronts will be opened.”25
Two of those fronts appear to be Iraq and Syria, where Iran-backed Iraqi groups have
significantly escalated attacks on U.S. forces, and Yemen, where the Iran-backed Houthi
movement has targeted international shipping. U.S. forces have responded with air and missile
strikes in both theaters. Clashes between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah, perhaps Iran’s closest
and strongest regional proxy, have also increased, raising the specter of regional conflict. While
U.S. officials reportedly assess that Iranian leaders seek to avoid direct confrontation with the
United States or Israel, the growing number of regional flashpoints raises the risk of such a
conflict.26
Iraq and Syria

Iran has deeply rooted ties in neighboring Iraq, where it backs a number of powerful military and
political actors, and with Syria, where it has for decades allied with the ruling Asad regime. Since
2017, Iran-backed groups have conducted attacks against U.S. forces (which have been in Iraq
and Syria since 2014 and 2015, respectively, to support counter-Islamic State operations),
sometimes prompting U.S. retaliatory airstrikes.
Those exchanges of fire have become significantly more frequent since October 2023.27 As of late
January 2024, Iran-backed groups have reportedly attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria 140
times since October 17, 2023 (52 times in Iraq, 75 in Syria);28 media sources affiliated with the
“Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” a catch-all descriptor for Iran-backed Iraqi militia groups operating
in Iraq and Syria, have claimed many of these actual or attempted assaults.29 These attacks have
mostly used one-way attack drones and rockets, but also include at least one short-range ballistic
missile attack. Those attacks have left “nearly 70” U.S. personnel injured, with most returning to
duty “in short order,” per the Pentagon.30
In response, the U.S. military has conducted occasional airstrikes on Iran-linked targets in both
Syria and Iraq, including some facilities used by IRGC personnel. In reporting to Congress about
December 2023 strikes against facilities in Iraq used by Iran-affiliated groups, President Biden
stated those strikes, “were intended to degrade and disrupt the ongoing series of attacks against
the United States and our partners, and to deter Iran and Iran-backed militia groups from
conducting or supporting further attacks on United States personnel and facilities.”31 On January
4, a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad killed a leader of a prominent Iran-backed Iraqi militia (Harakat
al Nujaba, a U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist group), prompting Iraqi Prime Minister
24 “Iran foreign minister in Davos: Attacks on Israel will end if Gaza war stops,” Reuters, January 17, 2024.
25 Maziar Motamedi, “Iran warns Israel of regional escalation if Gaza ground offensive launched,” Al Jazeera, October
15, 2023.
26 Sanger, et al., op cit.
27 Carla Babb, “US forces attacked 151 times in Iraq, Syria during Biden presidency,” VOA, November 17, 2023.
28 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), “Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds a Press Briefing,”
January 4, 2024.
29 For a frequently updated collection of claimed attacks, see Michael Knights, Amir al-Kaabi, and Hamdi Malik,
“Tracking Anti-U.S. Strikes in Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
December 5, 2023.
30 Peter Baker, “As U.S. and militias engage, White House worries about a tipping point,” New York Times, January 21,
2024.
31 Letter from President Biden to President pro tempore Patty Murray, December 27, 2023 (EC3157, January 9, 2023).

Mohammed Shia al Sudani to announce that he would seek to end the U.S.-led coalition military
presence in Iraq. The United States has around 2,500 troops in Iraq; the government of Iraq could
invite some U.S. forces to remain in Iraq to continue training pursuant to bilateral security
negotiations.32 Changes to the U.S. military presence in Iraq could have consequences for U.S.
operations against Islamic State fighters in Syria.
Separately, in January 2024, Iran carried out missile strikes in Syria and the Kurdistan Region of
Iraq against what it claimed were sites used by the Islamic State and Israeli intelligence,
respectively.33 The Syria strikes were retaliation for the January 3, 2024, bombings in the Iranian
city of Kerman that killed nearly 100 people and were claimed by the Islamic State, which has
carried out terrorist attacks in Iran for years.34 The Iranian missile strikes in Iraq drew
condemnation from the governments of the United States, many European countries, and Iraq
itself, with the Iraqi government recalling its ambassador from Iran to protest the “attack on its
sovereignty.”35
Yemen and the Red Sea36

The Iranian government has long backed the Houthi movement in Yemen (who are Shia Muslims,
though from a different sect from that which predominates in Iran), reportedly giving the group
material support for years before the Houthis took control of Yemen’s capital and much of the
north in 2014 and 2015.37 Since then, the Houthis have battled forces of the Republic of Yemen
and the Saudi-led Arab coalition that backs it. Iran’s support to the Houthi movement in Yemen—
including supplying ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as unmanned systems—has enabled the
group to target U.S. partners, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.38
The Houthis have espoused categorically anti-Israel views for decades, and since October 2023
have claimed several missile attacks against Israel, with many having been intercepted by Israeli
or U.S. forces.39 More significantly, the Houthis have asserted they are demonstrating solidarity
with the Palestinians by attacking vessels in the Red Sea, conducting over 30 attacks on
commercial shipping lanes in the Red Sea between November 19, 2023, and January 22, 2024.
These attacks have compelled many international shipping companies to abandon that waterway
(through which approximately 10% of global trade transits) in favor of lengthier, costlier routes,
which could have an impact on the global economy.40
The United States deployed military assets to the region to respond to the Houthi attacks,
thwarting Houthi hijackings of commercial vessels and exchanging fire with Houthi forces.41 In
32 Ahmed Rasheed and Phil Stewart, “Iraq prepares to close down US-led coalition’s mission – PM,” Reuters, January
5, 2024.
33 “Iran launches missile strikes in Iraq and Syria citing security threats,” Al Jazeera, January 15, 2024.
34 Farzin Nadimi, “Terrorist bombings in Iran: Implications and potential responses,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, January 5, 2024.

35 “Iraq recalls ambassador from Tehran after Iranian missiles strike Kurdish region,” France 24, January 16, 2024.
36 For more, see CRS Insight IN12301, Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: Issues for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
37 See, for example, David Schenker, “Who’s behind the Houthis?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
February 22, 2010.

38 Seth Jones et al., “The Iranian and Houthi war against Saudi Arabia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 21, 2021; Bruce Reidel, “Yemen war spreads to the UAE,” Brookings Institution, February 10, 2022.
39 Jon Gambrell, “Yemen’s Houthi rebels claim attacks on Israel, drawing their main sponsor Iran closer to Hamas
war,” Associated Press (AP), October 31, 2023.

40 Alex Mills, “The long shadow of the Red Sea shipping disruption,” Atlantic Council, January 8, 2024.
41 “US Navy seizes attackers who held Israel-linked tanker,” BBC News, November 27, 2023.

November 2023, the Houthis reportedly shot down a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial
vehicle.42 In mid-December 2023, the United States announced the establishment of Operation
Prosperity Guardian “with the goal of ensuring freedom of navigation for all countries and
bolstering regional security and prosperity.”43 On January 11, 2024, after warnings from the
United States and other countries, the U.S. and U.K. militaries launched airstrikes on a number of
Houthi targets across Yemen; Houthi attacks (including one targeting a U.S. warship) and U.S.
airstrikes continued in subsequent days. Also on January 11, 2024, U.S. forces seized a vessel
“conducting illegal transport of advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces;” two
Navy SEALs were lost at sea in that operation and later declared deceased.44 U.S. officials have
reportedly discussed plans for a “sustained” campaign to degrade Houthi capabilities, raising
questions about U.S.-backed efforts to end the war in Yemen and meet humanitarian needs
there.45
Lebanon and Hezbollah

Hezbollah, backed by Iran since the group’s 1982 founding, is one of the post powerful non-state
armed groups in the world, arguably making it the “crown jewel” of Iranian foreign policy.46 One
former U.S. official has described Lebanese Hezbollah as “Iran’s most successful – and most
lethal – export,” and assessed that Hezbollah is “no longer merely a subsidiary or proxy of Iran
but rather an almost equal partner.”47 The group reportedly has 100,000 fighters and also holds
seats in Lebanon’s parliament, where it is a member of the caretaker government. Hezbollah
(along with Iran) has played a crucial role in supporting the Asad regime in neighboring Syria,
where it has been the target of repeated Israeli airstrikes. Hezbollah fought an inconclusive 34-
day war with Israel in 2006 that “killed some 1,100 people and displaced nearly a million.”48
Hezbollah has a longstanding, though formerly tense, relationship with Hamas.49
Since the October 2023 Hamas attacks, Hezbollah has periodically exchanged fire with Israeli
forces, prompting the evacuation of tens of thousands of residents from northern Israel and
southern Lebanon. These cross-border clashes have reportedly left over 160 Hezbollah fighters
dead and raised fears of a broader escalation in which Hezbollah’s arsenal of some 150,000
missiles and rockets could pose a grave threat to Israeli strategic sites and population centers.50
42 Eric Schmitt, “Houthi Rebels Shot Down a U.S. Drone Off Yemen’s Coast, Pentagon Says,” New York Times,
November 8, 2023.
43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on ensuring freedom of
navigation in the Red Sea,” December 18, 2023.

44 U.S. CENTCOM, “USCENTCOM seizes Iranian advanced conventional weapons bound for Houthis,” January 16,
2024; “CENTCOM status update on missing Navy SEALs,” January 21, 2024.
45 Missy Ryan et al., “As Houthis vow to fight on, U.S. prepares for sustained campaign,” Washington Post, January
20, 2024.
46 Dana Khraiche, “Iran’s ‘crown jewel’ has much to lose from a full-blown war with Israel,” Bloomberg, November
17, 2023.
47 Jeffrey Feltman and Kevin Huggard, “On Hezbollah, Lebanon, and the risk of escalation,” Brookings Institution,
November 17, 2023.

48 Robbie Gramer, “Inside Biden’s Push to Head Off an Israel-Hezbollah War,” Foreign Policy, January 11, 2024.
49 Feltman and Huggard, op. cit.
50 Yehoshua Kalisky, “Precision Missiles, UAVs, and Tens of Thousands of Fighters: Hezbollah’s Order of Battle,”
Institute for National Security Studies, October 19, 2023; “Visiting north, IDF chief says war in Lebanon becoming
much more likely,” Times of Israel, January 17, 2024.

After a January 3, 2024, Israeli strike in Beirut that killed a senior Hamas leader, Hezbollah
leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed a “response and punishment.”51
Israeli officials have threatened wider military action in Lebanon unless they determine that
Hezbollah has withdrawn sufficiently far from border areas to permit the safe return of around
80,000 evacuated Israelis to their homes in the north. However, Hezbollah has insisted that Israel
halts fighting in Gaza before this can happen.52 While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
has expressed hope for a diplomatic resolution, as sought by U.S. officials, he has said Israel is
willing to “work in other ways.”53 Israeli’s military chief of staff stated in mid-January 2024 that
the likelihood of broader escalation in the coming months “is much higher than it was in the
past.”54 One source has asserted that the major parties have compelling reasons to avoid conflict:
Israel’s probable reluctance to add a second major front, Hezbollah’s apparent concern that
destruction in Lebanon from another war with Israel could seriously damage its domestic
popularity, and Iran’s likely desire to keep Hezbollah intact as a deterrent to direct Israeli action
against Iran.55 Regardless of the parties’ intentions, accidents or miscalculations on either side
could lead to broader conflict, raising questions about if and how such conflict might involve the
United States.
U.S.-Iran Relations: Background, Recent

Approaches, and Developments in 2023
U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which
deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an authoritarian monarch who was a close U.S. ally, and
led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The United States and Iran have not had
diplomatic relations since 1980, following the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis.56
U.S.-Iran tensions continued in the following decade, punctuated by armed confrontations in the
Gulf and Iran-backed terrorist attacks (including the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy and
Marine barracks in Beirut). U.S. sanctions, first imposed in 1979, continued apace with the U.S.
government designating Iran as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism in 1984, an
embargo on U.S. trade with and investment in Iran in 1995, and the first imposition of secondary
sanctions (U.S. penalties against firms that invest in Iran’s energy sector) in 1996.
After bilateral relations briefly improved during the late 1990s, tensions rose again in the early
2000s amid reports of Iran’s armed support for Palestinian groups and the revelation of previously
undisclosed nuclear facilities in Iran.57 The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions
on Iran’s nuclear program in response to concerns that the program could enable Iranian nuclear
weapons development. The Obama Administration sought to address concerns about Iran’s
nuclear program through continued economic pressure via sanctions as well as through
51 Sarah Dadouch and Kareem Fahim, “Hezbollah leader vows ‘punishment’ after killing of Hamas official in
Lebanon,” Washington Post, January 3, 2024.
52 Raya Jalabi et al., “US pushes for Israel-Hizbollah deal as diplomacy window narrows,” Financial Times, January
17, 2024.
53 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Netanyahu's Remarks at the Start of the Government Meeting,” January 7,
2024.
54 “Visiting north, IDF chief says war in Lebanon becoming much more likely,” Times of Israel.
55 “Another war could break out on the Israel-Lebanon border,” Economist, January 4, 2024.
56 For an account of the crisis, see Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).
57 John Ghazvinian, America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present (Knopf, 2021).

diplomatic engagement.58 That engagement culminated in the 2015 multilateral nuclear

agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) that placed limits on Iran’s nuclear
activities in exchange for relief from most economic sanctions.
President Trump announced on May 8, 2018, that the United States would cease participating in
the JCPOA, reinstating all sanctions that the United States had waived or terminated in meeting
its JCPOA obligations. In articulating a new Iran strategy in May 2018, then-Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo said that due to “unprecedented financial pressure” through reimposed U.S.
sanctions, U.S. military deterrence, and U.S. advocacy, “we hope, and indeed we expect, that the
Iranian regime will come to its senses.”59 He also laid out 12 demands for any future agreement
with Iran, including the withdrawal of Iranian support for armed groups throughout the region.
Iran’s leaders rejected U.S. demands and insisted the United States return to compliance with the
JCPOA before engaging on a new or revised accord.
The Trump Administration policy of applying “maximum pressure” on Iran after late 2018 took
two main forms: additional sanctions and limited military action. From mid-2019 on, Iran
escalated its regional military activities, at times coming into direct military conflict with the
United States. Several Iranian attacks against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and a September
2019 drone attack against Saudi Arabian oil production facilities further increased tensions. Those
tensions peaked with the Trump Administration’s January 3, 2020, killing of IRGC-Qods Force
commander Qasem Soleimani in Baghdad, and Iran’s retaliatory ballistic missile strikes against
U.S. forces in Iraq and subsequent attacks by Iran-backed forces in Iraq against U.S. targets.60
Iran also began exceeding JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear activities in 2019, according to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).61
Biden Administration Policy

As a presidential candidate in 2020, Joe Biden described the Trump Administration’s Iran policy
as a “dangerous failure” that had isolated the United States from its international partners,
allowed Iran to increase its stockpiles of enriched uranium, and raised tensions throughout the
region.62 The Biden Administration initiated indirect talks with Iran and after months of halting
negotiations, reports in August 2022 indicated that all sides were close to achieving agreement
before stalling over Iran’s reported revival of some demands that the other parties had considered
closed issues.63 The Iranian government’s violent crackdown against nationwide unrest the
following month (see Protests below) further diminished the prospects of a new agreement.64
In its October 2022 National Security Strategy, the Administration laid out its policy toward Iran,
stating the United States would “pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran can never acquire a nuclear
weapon, while remaining postured and prepared to use other means should diplomacy fail,” and
that “we will respond when our people and interests are attacked.”65 The Strategy also states, “we
58
White House, “Statement by the President on Iran,” July 14, 2015.
59 “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,” Heritage Foundation, May 21, 2018.
60 For more, see CRS Report R46148, U.S. Killing of Qasem Soleimani: Frequently Asked Questions.
61 See, for example, IAEA Board of Governors, Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of
United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), November 11, 2019.
62 Joe Biden, “There’s a smarter way to be tough on Iran,” CNN, September 13, 2020.
63 Ishaan Tharoor, “Is the Iran deal worth salvaging?” Washington Post, August 26, 2022; “Iran nuclear talks in
‘stalemate,’ says EU foreign policy chief,” Arab News, September 15, 2022.
64 Nahal Toosi, “‘Everyone thinks we have magic powers’: Biden seeks a balance on Iran,” Politico, October 25, 2022.
65 White House, National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022.

will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied
them by the regime in Tehran.”
Developments in 2023
In 2023, friction between the United States and Iran persisted, with Iranian or Iran-backed attacks
against commercial shipping in the Gulf, and the continued application of U.S. sanctions,
including the interdiction of a tanker transporting Iranian oil. At the same time, the Biden
Administration reportedly engaged directly with Iranian diplomats in an attempt to decrease
tensions. In September 2023, the United States and Iran conducted mutual prisoner releases and
the United States facilitated the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian funds from South Korea to
Qatar.66
Attacks on Gulf Shipping. The United States seeks to safeguard freedom of navigation in the
Persian Gulf, which has long been a flashpoint for U.S.-Iran tensions.67 U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command’s Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, said in a July 2023 statement that “Iran has harassed,
attacked or seized nearly 20 internationally flagged merchant vessels” since 2021.68 This includes
the Iranian seizure of two tankers in April-May 2023 and the attempted seizure of two more in
July 2023.69 Iran’s April-May seizures came weeks after the United States confiscated the Suez
Rajan, a Marshall Islands-flagged tanker suspected of carrying Iranian crude oil to China in
violation of U.S. sanctions.70 The Justice Department hailed the confiscation and sale of the oil as
“the first-ever criminal resolution involving a company that violated sanctions” related to trade in
Iranian oil.71 In January 2024, the Iranian navy announced that it had seized the Suez Rajan
(renamed the St Nikolas) in the Gulf of Oman, drawing U.S. condemnation.72
Sanctions.73 The Biden Administration has not issued any new sanctions authorities but has
continued to designate for sanctions Iranian and third-country-based entities pursuant to existing
U.S. laws and executive orders. Entities designated in 2023 include individuals and companies
involved in Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and ballistic missile programs; individuals
involved in the production, sale, and shipment of Iranian oil to Asia; individuals involved in the
crackdown on protesters and in other human rights abuses; senior IRGC officials involved in the
wrongful detention of U.S. nationals in Iran; and individuals and companies facilitating the
Iranian regime’s internet censorship.74
66 “U.S. reaches deal with Iran to free Americans for jailed Iranians and funds,” op. cit.
67 See White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States strengthens cooperation with Middle East partners to address 21 st
century challenges,” July 16, 2022.
68 U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, “U.S. prevents Iran from seizing two merchant tankers in Gulf of Oman,” July
5, 2023.
69 Iranian forces seized the Marshall Islands-flagged Advantage Sweet and the Panama-flagged Niovi in April-May
2023, and attempted to seize the Marshall Islands-flagged TRF Moss and the Bahamas-flagged Richmond Voyager on
July 5, 2023. “U.S. prevents Iran from seizing two merchant tankers in Gulf of Oman,” op. cit. Both tankers, and their
crews, appear to remain in Iran.
70 Nahmeh Bozorgmehr et al., “US seizure of oil vessel triggered Iran tanker capture,” Financial Times, April 28, 2023.
71 U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department announces first criminal resolution involving the illicit sale and
transport of Iranian oil in violation of U.S. sanctions,” September 8, 2023.

72 “Iran seizes oil tanker involved in U.S.-Iran dispute in Gulf of Oman,” Reuters, January 15, 2024.
73 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12452, U.S. Sanctions on Iran, by Clayton Thomas.
74 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control press releases “Treasury sanctions
international procurement network supporting Iran’s missile and military programs,” June 6, 2023; “Treasury sanctions
companies involved in production, sale, and shipment of Iranian petrochemicals and petroleum,” February 9, 2023;
(continued...)

Prisoner Exchange and Transfer of Iranian Assets. In September 2023, Iran released five
detained U.S. nationals who had been held in Iran on what the State Department called “baseless
charges.”75 In exchange, the Biden Administration granted clemency to five imprisoned Iranian
nationals who had been charged with or convicted of violating U.S. sanctions and failing to
register as a foreign agent.76 In a statement welcoming the return of U.S. detainees, President
Biden thanked the leaders of Qatar and Oman for their role in facilitating the agreement and
announced new sanctions on Iranian entities responsible for the wrongful detentions.77 President
Biden also stated
The U.S. State Department has a longstanding travel warning that states: “Do not travel to
Iran due to the risk of kidnapping and the arbitrary arrest and detention of U.S. citizens.”
All Americans should heed those words and have no expectation that their release can be
secured if they do not.
In connection with the exchange, the United States also facilitated the transfer of $6 billion of
Iranian funds from South Korea (where they had been held as payment for pre-2019 exports of
Iranian oil to South Korea) to Qatar.78 In a September 17, 2023, press briefing, one unnamed U.S.
official stated that the funds in Qatar would be “available only for transactions for humanitarian
goods [namely, food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural products] with vetted third-
party, non-Iranian vendors,” as part of what the Administration has termed “the humanitarian
channel in Qatar” or HC.79 In explaining why the Administration had facilitated the transfer of
funds, an unnamed senior U.S. official said that while similar humanitarian transactions were
permitted with respect to the South Korea-based funds, “the situation in Korea was unique
because of difficulties to convert the Korean currency,” which “made it difficult to actually do
humanitarian transactions.”80 According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Qatari banks
operating the humanitarian channel “have committed to stringent due diligence measures,” and
the United States “will closely monitor the HC and will take appropriate action should Iran
attempt to use these funds for purposes other than permitted humanitarian transactions.”81
Observers and some Members of Congress responded in varying ways to the exchange and
transfer of funds. Some characterized the transfer of Iran’s South Korea-based funds to Qatar as a
“ransom” that incentivizes hostage-taking.82 Some of these critics argued that even if the regime
is not able to use the unfrozen funds for malign activities, the regime’s access to additional funds
“Treasury sanctions senior Iranian officials overseeing violent protest suppression and censorship,” April 24, 2023;
“Treasury sanctions officials of Iranian intelligence agency responsible for detention of U.S. nationals in Iran,” April
27, 2023; “Treasury sanctions Iranian company aiding in internet censorship,” June 2, 2023.
75 U.S. Department of State, “Sixth anniversary of Iran’s wrongful detention of Baquer Namazi,” February 22, 2022.
76 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Iran reveals names of 5 citizens sought in US prisoner deal,” Al-Monitor, September 11, 2023;
Ellen Knickmeyer et al., “Americans released by Iran arrive home, tearfully embrace their loved ones and declare:
‘Freedom!’” Associated Press, September 19, 2023.
77 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the return of American detainees from Iran,” September 18,
2023. The sanctions designations were made pursuant to E.O. 14078, which implements the Robert Levinson Hostage
Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act (Title III, Subtitle A of P.L. 116-260).
78 The Administration issued a waiver permitting banks in several European countries to engage in the transfer of the
Iranian funds from South Korea to Qatar. Lee, “The US moves to advance a prisoner swap deal,” op. cit.
79 White House, “Background press call by senior Administration officials on the return of American detainees from
Iran,” September 17, 2023.

80 Ibid.
81 Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Frequently Asked Question 1134: What is the humanitarian channel in Qatar,”
September 18, 2023.

82 See, for example, Senator Ted Cruz, “Sen. Cruz blasts Biden-Iran nuclear side deal on hostages,” September 11,
2023.

for humanitarian purposes will free up other resources for those destabilizing activities.83
Supporters of the arrangement lauded the Administration for securing the release of U.S. citizens
held abroad (a stated Administration priority) and argued that supporting the conditional release
of Iranian funds for humanitarian purposes may deprive the regime of an excuse for domestic
economic problems.84
The October 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel appears to have changed U.S. policy with respect to
the funds. According to press reports and Members of Congress, Deputy Treasury Secretary
Wally Adeyemo told legislators in October 2023 that in the wake of Hamas’s assault on Israel,
U.S. and Qatari officials had agreed to prevent the use of the funds to finance the purchase of
humanitarian goods for export to Iran for an unspecified period of time.85 In November 2023, the
House passed legislation (H.R. 5961) that would, among other provisions, direct the President to
impose sanctions on any foreign financial institution that engages in transactions with the $6
billion in Iranian funds. In testimony the following month, a State Department official said of the
funds, “Not a penny of this money has been spent and these funds will not go anywhere anytime
soon.”86
Iran’s Relations with China and Russia

Iran has acted to maintain and expand economic and military ties with Beijing and Moscow,
reflecting what analysts describe as a “look East” strategy favored by hardline leaders, including
President Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei.87 In 2024, Iran is slated to formally join the
BRICS group of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), along with
Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.88 The economic and
political impacts of Iran’s BRICS membership are likely to be minimal, at least in the short term,
but Iranian leaders characterize joining the group as a “strategic victory” that will buttress the
Iranian government’s efforts to resist U.S.-led attempts to isolate and pressure it (including
sanctions).89
For the past several decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has taken steps to
deepen its financial presence in numerous sectors of the Iranian economy, as well as to expand
military cooperation. China is Iran’s largest trade partner and the largest importer of Iran’s crude
oil and condensates, despite U.S. sanctions; Chinese imports of Iranian oil grew to nearly a
million barrels per day in 2023.90 Over the years, the PRC has become a source of capital for Iran,
83 See, for example, Chairman Michael McCaul, “McCaul statement on release of Americans held hostage in Iran,”
September 18, 2023.
84 See, for example, Senator Ben Cardin, “Cardin statement on the release of Americans from Iran,” September 18,
2023; Ryan Costello, “The latest Iran deal is a win-win,” Defense One, August 10, 2023.
85 Jeff Stein and Jacob Bogage, “U.S., Qatar agree to stop Iran from tapping $6 billion fund after Hamas attack,”
Washington Post, October 12, 2023.

86 House Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations holds hearing on Iran’s financial support of
terrorism, CQ Congressional Transcripts, December 13, 2023.

87 Javad Heiran-Nia, “How Iran’s interpretation of the world order affects its foreign policy,” Atlantic Council, May 11,
2022; Pierre Pahlavi, “The origins and foundations of Iran’s “Look East” policy,” Australian Institute of International
Affairs, October 4, 2022.
88 Farnaz Fassihi et al., “What to know about the 6 nations joining BRICS,” New York Times, August 23, 2023.
89 “Deep dive: Iran hails invite to join BRICS, but few expect major dividends,” Amwaj.media, August 25, 2023;
Farnaz Fassihi, “With BRICS invite, Iran shrugs off outcast status in the West,” New York Times, August 25, 2023.
90 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran,” November 17, 2022; “China
is buying the most Iranian crude oil in a decade, Kpler says,” August 15, 2023; Muyu Xu, “China’s ‘teapot’ refiners
mop up swelling Iranian crude, defying U.S. curbs,” Reuters, September 14, 2023.

in line with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a series of energy and
transportation corridors extending throughout Eurasia. On March 27, 2021, Iran and the PRC
signed a 25-year China-Iran Comprehensive Cooperation Plan “to tap the potential for
cooperation in areas such as economy and culture and map out prospects for cooperation in the
long run.”91 Before doing so was banned by the U.N. Security Council, the PRC openly supplied
Iran with advanced conventional arms, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol boats that the
IRGC Navy operates in the Persian Gulf; anti-ship missiles; ballistic missile guidance systems;
and other technology related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).92 U.S.
officials also report that PRC-based entities have supplied Iran-backed armed groups with UAV
technology.93 The United States has imposed sanctions on a number of PRC-based entities for
allegedly supplying Iran’s missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons programs.
March 2023 China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement

In March 2023, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China announced that Iran and Saudi Arabia would reestablish diplomatic
relations (suspended since 2016), reopen embassies in each other’s capitals, and reinitiate exchanges pursuant to
bilateral accords signed during a previous period of Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (in 1998 and 2001).94 In the
China-brokered agreement, Iran and Saudi Arabia affirmed their respect for “non-interference in internal affairs of
states.” One media source indicates that specific elements include a Saudi pledge to “tone down critical coverage
of Iran” by a Saudi-linked media outlet and an Iranian pledge to halt arms shipments to the Houthis in Yemen.95
The Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers exchanged visits in June and August 2023, and both countries have
reopened their embassies.
The Biden Administration indicated that it conditionally welcomed the agreement, while highlighting uncertainty
over “whether the Iranians are going to honor their side of the deal” given the legacy of Iran’s support to the
Houthis in Yemen.96 CENTCOM Commander General Kurilla cautioned, “They have had diplomatic relations in
the past while they were still shooting at each other in the past.”97 Some Administration officials have
characterized the agreement as “a good thing” that advances the U.S. goal of “de-escalation in the Middle East,”
while downplaying the significance of the deal and of China’s role in brokering it.98 Observers have expressed a
range of views. Some view the PRC initiative as a sea change in regional diplomacy and as an indication of China’s
increased influence, while others see it as a modest win for China.99 The implications of the deal for U.S. policy
also elicited a range of views. Some experts perceive the deal as a major blow to U.S. credibility, while others
91 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Wang Yi Holds Talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif,” March 28, 2021.
92 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,
2019.
93 Testimony of Department of State Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia and Counterterrorism,
China’s Role in the Middle East, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., August 4, 2022.
94 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (@KSAmofaEN), “Joint Trilateral Statement by the
Kingdom of #Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of #Iran, and the People’s Republic of #China,” X post, March 10,
2023, https://twitter.com/KSAmofaEN/status/1634180277764276227. For more on past agreements, see Faris Almaari,
“Clarifying the status of previous Iran-Saudi agreements,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 16, 2023.
95 Summer Said et al., “China plans new Middle East summit as diplomatic role takes shape,” Wall Street Journal,
March 12, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Iran agrees to stop arming Houthis in Yemen as part of pact with Saudi
Arabia,” Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2023.
96 Patsy Widakuswara, “White House welcomes Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran deal,” VOA, March 10, 2023.
97 “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Authorization Request for Central
Command and Africa Command,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 16, 2023.

98 Nahal Toosi and Phelim Kine, “U.S. officials project calm as China stuns world with Iran-Saudi deal,” Politico,
March 13, 2023.

99 “Experts react: Iran and Saudi Arabia just agreed to restore relations, with help from China. Here’s what that means
for the Middle East and the world,” Atlantic Council, March 10, 2023.

argue that, despite China’s foray into Middle Eastern diplomacy, the United States remains the essential partner to
Gulf Arab states.100
President Raisi and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman reportedly spoke for the first time days after the
October 7, 2023, Hamas assault on Israel, and Raisi conducted his first visit to Saudi Arabia in November 2023. In
December 2023, Saudi and Iranian diplomats traveled to Beijing to reaffirm their commitment to the March 2023
agreement as part of the first meeting of the Saudi-Chinese-Iranian Tripartite Committee.101 At that meeting, the
three countries reportedly called for the “immediate cessation of military operations in Gaza.”102
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Russia and Iran—both under extensive
U.S. sanctions—have deepened their relationship. Since August 2022, Iran has transferred armed
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) to Russia, which has used them against a range of
targets in Ukraine. These transfers (and potential transfers of ballistic missiles) have implications
for the trajectory of the conflict in Ukraine as well as for U.S. efforts to support Ukraine’s defense
against Russia's invasion. In late 2022, Administration officials warned that the relationship
between Iran and Russia was advancing beyond the sale of drones; a National Security Council
spokesperson stated, “Russia is offering Iran an unprecedented level of military and technical
support that is transforming their relationship to a full-fledged defense partnership.”103 According
to media reports, Iran and Russia have constructed and are operating a factory in Russia to
produce thousands of Iranian-designed drones for Russia’s war in Ukraine.104
Iran’s Political System

Iran’s Islamic Republic was established in 1979, ending the autocratic monarchy of the Shah, and
is a hybrid political system that defies simple characterization. Iran has a parliament, regular
elections, and some other features of representative democracy. In practice, though, the
government is authoritarian, ranking 154th out of 167 countries in the Economist Intelligence
Unit’s 2022 Democracy Index.105 Shia Islam is the state religion and the basis for all legislation
and jurisprudence, and political contestation is tightly controlled, with ultimate decisionmaking
power in the hands of the Supreme Leader. That title has been held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
since 1989, when he succeeded the Islamic Republic’s founding leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. In September 2022, Khamenei appeared to suffer a brief bout of significant illness;
prospects for leadership succession are unclear.
Iran’s top directly elected position is the presidency, which, like the directly elected unicameral
parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly, also known as the Majles) and every other organ
of Iran’s government, is subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Incumbent president Ebrahim Raisi,
a hardliner close to Khamenei, won the June 2021 election to succeed the moderate Hassan
100 Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, “How China’s Saudi-Iran deal can serve U.S. interests,” Foreign Policy, March
14, 2023; Adam Gallagher et al., “What you need to know about China’s Saudi-Iran deal,” United States Institute of
Peace, March 16, 2023.
101 “Iran, Saudi Arabia reaffirm commitment to Beijing Agreement,” Middle East Monitor, December 17, 2023.
102 Ibid.
103 “Russia and Iran Military Ties Deepening Into Partnership, Biden Administration Warns,” Wall Street Journal,
December 9, 2022.
104 “Moscow, Tehran Advance Plans for Iranian-Designed Drone Facility in Russia,” Wall Street Journal, February 5,
2023; Dalton Bennett and Mary Ilyushina, “Inside the Russian effort to build 6,000 attack drones with Iran’s help,”
Washington Post, August 17, 2023.
105 Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2022: Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine, February
2023.

Rouhani, who won elections in 2013 and 2017.106 Rouhani oversaw Iran’s negotiations with the
United States and its entry into the JCPOA. The 2018 U.S. exit from the JCPOA and reimposition
of sanctions, as well as the January 2020 U.S. killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC)-Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani, appeared to shift public support away from
moderates like Rouhani.107 Hardliners prevailed in the February 2020 Majles elections.
The June 2021 presidential election appears to have cemented this shift toward a more hardline
approach to the United States. Rouhani was term-limited and ineligible to run; the government
also banned several moderate candidates from running. These circumstances might have
contributed to this election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history; slightly
less than half (49%) of eligible Iranians voted. Raisi, who reportedly played a role in a judicial
decision to approve the execution of thousands of political prisoners in 1988, had lost the 2017
presidential election to Rouhani. In 2019 Khamenei appointed Raisi to head Iran’s judiciary.
Raisi’s presidential victory may boost his chances of succeeding Khamenei as Supreme Leader.108
Elections for the Majles and the Assembly of Experts, a body whose constitutional
responsibilities include selecting the Supreme Leader, are scheduled for March 2024.
Mass demonstrations shook Iran in 2009 and 2010, when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators
took to the streets of Iran’s urban centers to protest alleged fraud in the 2009 presidential election.
Iran has experienced unrest intermittently since then, including in December 2017, summer 2018,
and late 2019, based most frequently on economic conditions but also reflecting other opposition
to Iran’s leadership. The government has often used violence to disperse protests, in which
hundreds have been killed by security forces. U.S. and U.N. assessments have long cited Iran’s
government for a wide range of human rights abuses in addition to its repression of political
dissent and use of force against protesters, including severe violations of religious freedom and
women’s rights, human trafficking, and corporal punishment.
2022-2023 Political Protests

The September 2022 death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by Iran’s Morality
Police for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (head covering) law and died after
reportedly having been beaten in custody, sparked nationwide unrest in late 2022. In protests
throughout the country, demonstrators voiced a broad range of grievances, with some calling for
an end to the Islamic Republic and chanting “death to the dictator.” Women played a prominent
role in the protests.109 In response to the protests, the Iranian government deployed security forces
who reportedly killed hundreds of protesters and arrested thousands. Iranian officials, who
blamed the United States and other foreign countries for fomenting what they called “riots,” also
shut down internet access.
Throughout fall 2022, observers debated whether the protests, information about which remains
opaque and highly contested, represented the “turning point” that some activists claimed: one
106 In Iran’s political system, hardliners, who support the Islamic Republic and generally oppose accommodation with
the West, are also known as conservatives or “principlists”; “reformists” generally support greater political openness
and engagement with the West. “Moderates” exist between these groups, but are increasingly identified with the
reformists. Benoit Faucon and David Cloud, “Confronting Iran protests, regime uses brute force but secretly appeals to
moderates,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2022.
107 Garrett Nada, “Iran’s Parliamentary Polls: Hardliners on the Rise, Reformists Ruled Out,” United States Institute of
Peace, February 12, 2021. In Iran’s political system, hardliners are also known as “principlists,” moderates as
“reformists.”
108 Parisa Hafezi, “Winner of Iran presidency is hardline judge who is under U.S. sanctions,” Reuters, June 20, 2021.
109 Suzanne Kianpour, “The women of Iran are not backing down,” Politico, January 22, 2023.

observer compared 2022 unrest to the circumstances that preceded the 1979 Islamic Revolution,
while another discounted the revolutionary potential of the protests.110 The demonstrations of
2022 were smaller and more geographically dispersed than those of 2009, and reportedly included
protestors from a diverse range of social groups. In December 2022, as the protests appeared to
wane, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated, “this is not something that we see
right now as being … an imminent threat to the regime.”111
As of January 2024, the protest movement has receded but the fundamental grievances that
motivated the outbreak of unrest in September 2022 (and in previous years) remain unresolved,
so further rounds of popular protests are possible. The protest movement apparently lacks an
organized structure, a visible leader, and a shared alternative vision for Iran’s future, and therefore
may have limited capacity to pose an existential risk to the Islamic Republic. Many Iranian
women (particularly in urban areas) have reportedly stopped wearing mandatory head coverings,
prompting Iran’s parliament to pass legislation to impose heavier punishments on women who
flout the mandate.112
U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests

New sanctions designations. Since September 2022, the Biden Administration has announced
sanctions designations targeting Iran’s Morality Police and dozens of other government entities
and officials for their role in the crackdown.
General license and Internet service. In September 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control issued Iran General License D-2, designed to counter what
officials described as Tehran’s move to “cut off access to the Internet for most of its 80 million
citizens to prevent the world from watching its violent crackdown on peaceful protestors.”113
Treasury officials stated that the new license expands access to cloud-based services, Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs), and anti-surveillance tools critical to secure communication. In March
2023, a State Department spokesperson said “several U.S. companies have in turn taken
advantage of the expanded authorization that we’ve provided.”114
Action at international bodies. In late November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Council
authorized an independent fact-finding mission (FFM) to investigate allegations of human rights
abuses committed by the Iranian government.115 The FFM is expected to present a comprehensive
report on its findings at the March 2024 meeting of the Human Rights Council. The United States
also led a successful effort to remove Iran from the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women in
December 2022.
Congressional Action. In the 118th Congress, some Members have introduced several resolutions
and bills related to the protests. In January 2023, the House voted 420-1 to agree to H.Con.Res. 7,
which condemns Amini’s death and the violent suppression of protests and “encourages continued
110 Ray Takeyh, “A second Iranian revolution?” Commentary, November 2022; Sajjed Safael, “Iran’s protests are
nowhere near revolutionary,” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2023.
111 “DNI Avril Haines: Protests in Iran not an ‘imminent threat to the regime’” MSNBC, December 5, 2022.
112 Nasser Karimi and Jon Gambrell, “A year ago, an Iranian woman’s death sparked hijab protests. Now businesses are
a new battleground,” Associated Press, August 10, 2023; “Iran’s politicians to debate hijab laws in secret,” BBC,
August 13, 2023.
113 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “U.S. Treasury issues Iran General License D-2 to increase support for internet
freedom,” September 23, 2022.

114 U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, March 1, 2023.
115 Office of the High Commissioner, “Human Rights Council establishes fact-finding mission to investigate alleged
human rights violations in Iran related to the protests that began on 16 September 2022,” November 24, 2022.

efforts” by the Biden Administration to respond to the protests via sanctions and the expansion of
unrestricted internet access in Iran. In September 2023, the House voted 410-3 to pass the Mahsa
Amini Human rights and Security Accountability Act (MAHSA Act, H.R. 589), which would
direct the Administration to review whether specified Iranian entities meet the criteria for
designation under certain existing sanctions authorities.
Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities

Given the adversarial nature of U.S.-Iran relations and the centrality of various military-related
entities in Iranian domestic and foreign policy, Iran’s military has been a subject of sustained
engagement by Congress and other U.S. policymakers. In 2023 testimony, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Erik Kurilla said, “The advancement of Iranian
military capabilities over the past 40 years is unparalleled in the region.”116 The elements of Iran’s
military that arguably threaten U.S. interests most directly are Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and the country’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, or drone) programs.
Iran’s traditional military force, the Artesh, is a legacy of Iran’s Shah-era military force. The
Artesh exists alongside the IRGC, which Khomeini established in 1979 as a force loyal to the new
regime. Rivalries between the two parallel forces (each have their own land, air, and naval force
components) stem from their “uneven access to resources, varying levels of influence with the
regime, and inherent overlap in missions and responsibilities.”117 While both serve to defend Iran
against external threats, the government deploys the Artesh primarily along Iran’s borders to
counter any invading force, while the IRGC has a more ideological character and the more
expansive mission of combating internal threats and expanding Iran’s influence abroad.
Ballistic Missiles
According to the U.S. intelligence community, Iran has “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles
in the region” and, as of 2022, had steadily improved the range and accuracy of its more than
3,000 ballistic missiles over “the last five to seven years.”118 Per CENTCOM Commander
Kurilla, Iran has aggressively developed its missile capabilities to achieve “an asymmetric
advantage against regional militaries.”119 Iran has used its ballistic missiles to target U.S. regional
assets directly, including a January 2020 attack (shortly following the U.S. killing of IRGC-QF
Commander Soleimani) against Iraqi sites where U.S. military forces were stationed, and attacks
against Iraq’s Kurdistan region in March and September 2022.120
Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles were assessed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
in 2019 to have a maximum range of around 2,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders, reportedly
capable of reaching targets as far as Israel or southeastern Europe.121 U.S. officials and others
116 General Michael Kurilla, “Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of
U.S. Central Command,” March 13, 2023.
117 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance,
2019.
118 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 8, 2023; Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358.

119 Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 13, 2023.
120 “Who would live and who would die: The inside story of the Iranian attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, August
8, 2021; “Iran attacks Iraq’s Erbil with missiles in warning to U.S., allies,” Reuters, March 13, 2022; White House,
“Statement by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Iran’s Missile and Drone Attacks in Northern Iraq,”
September 28, 2022.
121 Iran Military Power, op. cit. 43.

have expressed concern that Iran’s government could use its nascent space program to develop
longer-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).122 According to a
congressionally mandated report issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in
June 2023, Iran’s work on space launch vehicles (SLVs) “shortens the timeline to an ICBM if it
decided to develop one because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies.”123 The Biden
Administration has designated for sanctions several Iranian and Chinese entities for their
involvement in the Iranian government’s ballistic missile activities.124 The House voted 403-8 in
September 2023 to pass the Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports Act (Fight
CRIME Act, H.R. 3152), which would further authorize sanctions on individuals determined to
be engaged in Iran’s missile programs.
Iran’s Missile Program and U.N. Sanctions “Snapback”125

In July 2015, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 (UNSCR 2231), which, in addition to endorsing
full implementation of the JCPOA, also contained provisions related to Iran’s arms and missile development
activities. Specifically, Annex B of the Resolution provides for a ban on the transfer of conventional arms to or
from Iran (the conventional weapons ban expired in October 2020), and restricts exports of missile-related items
until October 2023. UNSCR 2231 also includes provisions that effectively allow any “JCPOA participant state” to
force the reimposition of UN sanctions, including the arms transfer and ballistic missile bans as well as a ban on
purchasing Iranian oil, in a process known as “snapback.” In August 2020, the Trump Administration invoked the
snapback provision in an attempt to extend the conventional arms embargo, but most other members of the
Security Council (including JCPOA participants France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China) asserted that the
United States, having ceased implementing its JCPOA commitments in 2018, was not a participant and therefore
did not have the standing to trigger the snapback of sanctions, and the conventional arms ban expired in October
2020.126 The Biden Administration has reversed the Trump Administration’s position on the snapback provision.
On October 18, 2023, U.N. sanctions related to Iran’s missile-related activities also expired, though the United
States and many European countries have retained their own sanctions on those activities. On the day the ban
expired, the Treasury Department announced sanctions on twenty individuals and entities (including some in
China) for their support for Iran’s missile and UAV programs. Some argue that the expiration of U.N. sanctions
will strengthen both Iran and its ties with other U.S. adversaries like Russia.127 Others contend the impact of the
expiration is likely to be minimal, given existing U.S. and other bilateral sanctions.128
UAVs
According to CENTCOM, Iran has also developed “the largest and most capable Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle force in the region,” with which it has attacked numerous foreign targets.129 While
Iranian drones are not as technologically complex or advanced as the U.S. UAVs on which the
Iranian versions are often modeled, they are a cost-effective way of projecting power, especially
122 Annual Threat Assessment, op. cit.; Farzin Nadimi, “Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is still growing in size, reach, and
accuracy,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 13, 2021.
123 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of
2022, June 2023.

124 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Key Actors in Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” March 30,
2022; “Treasury sanctions international procurement network supporting Iran’s missile and military programs,” June 6,
2023.
125 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11583, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.N. Sanctions Reimposition, by Paul K. Kerr.
126 “UNSC dismisses US demand to impose ‘snapback’ sanctions on Iran,” Al Jazeera, August 25, 2020. For more, see
CRS In Focus IF11429, U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback.
127 Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Expiration of UN ban on Iran’s missile development will strengthen U.S.
adversaries,” October 16, 2023.

128 Vali Kaleji, “Expiration of UN missile sanctions has limited effect on Iran’s arms trade,” Jamestown Foundation,
November 30, 2023.

129 Statement for the Record, op. cit.

given Iran’s underdeveloped air force. Traditional air defense systems have difficulty intercepting
UAVs, in part because such systems were designed to detect manned aircraft with larger radar
and/or heat signatures.130 Iran’s drone operations include attacks in September 2019 against Saudi
oil production facilities in Abqaiq, a complex assault that featured 18 drones and several land-
attack cruise missiles; in July 2021 against an oil tanker off the coast of Oman; and in October
2021 against a U.S. military base in At Tanf, Syria. The Biden Administration has designated for
sanctions numerous individuals and entities that have supported Iran’s UAV programs,131 and in
the 117th Congress the House passed, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported, a bill
(H.R. 6089) that would have required the President to impose sanctions on persons that engage in
activities related to Iranian UAVs.132 In August 2022, Iran began transferring armed drones to
Russia, which has used them against Ukrainian forces and civilian infrastructure.133
Iran’s Nuclear Program134

U.S. policymakers have signaled concern for decades that Tehran might attempt to develop
nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently
the main source of concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Gas centrifuges can produce
both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-
grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in
nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders claim that the country’s LEU production is only for Tehran’s
current and future civil nuclear reactors.
U.S. policy has focused on using various means of coercive diplomacy to pressure Iran to agree to
limits on its nuclear program. The Obama Administration pursued a “dual track” strategy of
stronger economic pressure through increased sanctions coupled with offers of sanctions relief if
Iran accepted constraints on the nuclear program. Many observers assess that U.S. and
multilateral sanctions contributed to Iran’s 2013 decision to enter into negotiations that concluded
in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).135
2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

The JCPOA imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from most U.S.
and U.N. Security Council economic sanctions. The agreement restricted Iran’s enrichment and
heavy water reactor programs and provided for enhanced IAEA monitoring to detect Iranian
efforts to produce nuclear weapons using either declared or covert facilities. The nuclear-related
provisions of the agreement, according to U.S. officials, extended the nuclear breakout time—the
130 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iran deploys drones to target internal threats, protect external interests,” RFE/RL, January 18,
2022.
131 See, for example, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury sanctions network and individuals in connection with
Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle program,” October 29, 2021; “Treasury sanctions multinational network supporting
Iran’s UAV and military aircraft production,” September 19, 2023.
132 The bill would amend Section 107 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA.
P.L. 115-44) to include unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

133 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Iran sends first shipment of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine,” Washington
Post, August 29, 2022; Yaroslav Trofimov and Dion Nissenbaum, “Russia’s use of Iranian kamikaze drones creates
new dangers for Ukrainian troops,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2022.
134 Material in this section is drawn from CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit, which contains
additional information on Iran’s nuclear program and the JCPOA.

135 Uri Berliner, “Crippled by sanctions, Iran’s economy key in nuclear deal,” NPR, November 25, 2013; Amir Toumaj,
“Iran’s economy of resistance: implications for future sanctions,” AEI, November 17, 2014; “Inside the Iran nuclear
deal,” Harvard Gazette, October 6, 2015.

amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear
weapon—to a minimum of one year, for a duration of at least 10 years.136 In addition to the
restrictions on activities related to fissile material production, the JCPOA indefinitely prohibited
Iranian “activities which could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive
device,” including research and diagnostic activities. The IAEA continues to monitor Iranian
compliance with the JCPOA provisions but since 2019 has reported diminishing Iranian
cooperation with JCPOA-mandated monitoring.137
Sanctions relief.138 In accordance with the JCPOA, the United States waived its secondary
sanctions—restrictions on any third country engaging in some types of trade with Iran, primarily
in the energy sector—in 2016. The secondary sanctions eased during JCPOA implementation
included (1) sanctions that limited Iran’s exportation of oil and foreign sales to Iran of gasoline
and energy sector equipment, and that limited foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2)
financial sector sanctions, including trading in Iran’s currency, the rial; and (3) sanctions on Iran’s
auto sector. The European Union (EU) lifted its ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; and
Iranian banks were readmitted to the SWIFT financial messaging services system.139 The U.N.
Security Council revoked its resolutions that required member states to impose restrictions. The
JCPOA did not require the lifting of U.S. sanctions on direct U.S.-Iran trade or sanctions levied
for Iran’s support for regional armed factions and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses, or its
efforts to acquire missile and advanced conventional weapons technology. The United States
reimposed sanctions waived pursuant to JCPOA implementation in 2018 (see below).
Post-2019 nuclear developments.140 The IAEA has reported that some of Iran’s nuclear
activities, including Iran’s LEU stockpile and number of enrichment locations, exceed JCPOA-
mandated limits, and that the agency is unable to fully perform JCPOA verification and
monitoring activities. In March 2023, after the detection of uranium particles enriched to 83.7%
at Iran’s Fordow enrichment site sparked U.S. and international concern,141 IAEA Director
General Rafael Grossi stated that the agency and Iran “have initiated technical discussions to fully
clarify this issue.”142 In June 2023, Grossi reported that “some progress has been made, but not as
much as I had hoped,” though the agency reportedly had no further questions regarding the highly
enriched uranium particles.143 In response, the U.S. Representative to the IAEA “underscored that
Iran’s production of uranium enriched up to 60% has no credible peaceful purpose,” and called on
136 “Background Conference Call by Senior Administration Officials on Iran,” July 14, 2015. U.S. Secretary of Energy
Ernest Moniz described this timeline as “very, very conservative” in an April 2015 interview (Michael Crowley,
“Ernest Moniz: Iran Deal Closes Enrichment Loophole,” Politico, April 7, 2015). See also CRS In Focus IF12106, Iran
and Nuclear Weapons Production, by Paul K. Kerr.
137 CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K.
Kerr.
138 For additional details on sanctions waived under the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.
139 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), based in Belgium, provides a
financial messaging service to facilitate cross-border transactions, including payments involving multiple currencies.
International energy-sector trade heavily depends on SWIFT services.
140 For more, see CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations,
by Paul K. Kerr.
141 Karen DeYoung and Joby Warrick, “Iran nuclear advance challenges U.S. as time to make potential bomb
shortens,” Washington Post, March 2, 2023.

142 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, March 6, 2023.
143 IAEA Director General’s introductory statement to the Board of Governors, IAEA, June 5, 2023; Stephanie
Liechtenstein, “International Atomic Energy Agency reports seen by AP say Iran resolves 2 inquiries by inspectors,”
Associated Press, May 31, 2023.

Iran to “cease its nuclear provocations.”144 In June 2023, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence reported that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-
development activities that would be necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”145
Iran’s September 2023 de-designation of several IAEA inspectors, effectively barring them from
taking part in the monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program, drew condemnation from the IAEA
Director General, who called the move “disproportionate and unprecedented” and “another step
in the wrong direction” that “constitutes an unnecessary blow to an already strained relationship
between the IAEA and Iran.”146 Iran reportedly continued to advance its nuclear activities in late
2023, increasing its “production of highly enriched uranium” in November 2023, “reversing a
previous output reduction from mid-2023.”147
Issues for Congress

Sanctions148
Since 1979, U.S. administrations have imposed economic sanctions in an effort to change Iran’s
behavior, often at the direction of Congress.149 U.S. sanctions on Iran are multifaceted and
complex, a result of over four decades of legislative, administrative, and law enforcement actions
by successive presidential administrations and Congresses.
U.S. sanctions on Iran were first imposed during the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1981, when
President Jimmy Carter issued executive orders blocking nearly all Iranian assets held in the
United States. In 1984, Secretary of State George Shultz designated the government of Iran a
state sponsor of acts of international terrorism (SSOT) following the October 1983 bombing of
the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon by elements that later established Lebanese Hezbollah.
Iran’s status as an SSOT triggers several sanctions including restrictions on licenses for U.S. dual-
use exports; a ban on U.S. foreign assistance, arms sales, and support in the international financial
institutions; and the withholding of U.S. foreign assistance to countries that assist or sell arms to
the designee.150
Later in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, other U.S. sanctions sought to limit Iran’s
conventional arsenal and its ability to project power throughout the Middle East. In the 2000s, as
Iran’s nuclear program progressed, U.S. sanctions focused largely on trying to pressure Iran to
limit its nuclear activities. Most of the U.S. sanctions enacted after 2010 were secondary
sanctions on foreign firms that conduct transactions with major sectors of the Iranian economy,
including banking, energy, and shipping. Successive Administrations issued Executive Orders
under which they designated specific individuals and entities to implement and supplement the
144 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, U.S. Statement as
Delivered by Ambassador Laura S.H. Holgate, June 6, 2023.
145 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of
2022, June 2023.

146 IAEA, “IAEA Director General’s statement on verification in Iran,” September 16, 2023.
147 Francois Murphy, “Iran undoes slowdown in enrichment of uranium to near weapons-grade – IAEA,” Reuters,
December 26, 2023.

148 For more, see CRS In Focus IF12452, U.S. Sanctions on Iran, by Clayton Thomas.
149 For details on the legislative bases for sanctions imposed on Iran, see CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic
Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack.

150 CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—Legislative Parameters: In Brief, by
Dianne E. Rennack.

provisions of these laws. The United States has also, pursuant to various authorities, imposed
sanctions on scores of entities held responsible for human rights violations.
Impact of sanctions. U.S. sanctions imposed during 2011-2015, and since 2018, have taken a
substantial toll on Iran’s economy. According to one assessment, economic outcomes in Iran “are
determined primarily by the multiple negative consequences of sanctions.”151 Some analysts,
while agreeing that sanctions have an impact, also have argued that Iran suffers from “decades of
failed economic policies.”152 A U.N. official, in a May 2022 visit to Iran, said that economic
sanctions had increased inflation and poverty, exacerbating overall humanitarian conditions.153
Sanctions appear to have had a mixed impact on the range of Iranian behaviors their imposition
has been intended to curb. As mentioned above, some experts attribute Iran’s decision to enter
into multilateral negotiations and agree to limits on its nuclear program under the JCPOA at least
in part to sanctions pressure. Other aspects of Iranian policy seen as threatening to U.S. interests,
including its regional influence and military capabilities, appear to remain considerable and have
arguably increased in the last decade.154
Since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018 and resulting economic pressure, Iran has
decreased its compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA and conducted
provocations in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq. Those nuclear advances and regional provocations
continued as Iran and the United States engaged with other JCPOA signatories in indirect
negotiations around reviving the JCPOA. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions after 2018 may also
have contributed to Iran’s growing closeness to China (with which Iran signed a March 2021
agreement to deepen economic and security ties) 155 and Russia.156 President Raisi has also said
that Iran’s prospective BRICS membership “will definitely play [a] part in fighting the US
sanctions.”157
As part of its oversight responsibilities and to better inform legislative action, Congress has
directed successive Administrations to provide reports on a wide array of Iran-related topics,
including U.S. sanctions. In recent legislation, they include reports on the “status of United States
bilateral sanctions on Iran” (§7041(b)(2)(B) of FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L.
117-328) and the impact of sanctions on various Iranian entities and Iran-backed groups (§1227
of the FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 117-81). Congress has also held
numerous hearings focused primarily or in part on U.S. sanctions on Iran.
Oversight of Negotiations and Possible Nuclear Agreement

Congress has sought to influence the outcome and implementation of international negotiations
over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2015, Congress enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
151 Country Forecast: Iran, Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2023.

152 Anthony Cordesman, “The Crisis in Iran: What Now?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 11,
2018.
153 Golnaz Esfandiari, “Visit to Iran by controversial UN rapporteur provokes concerns,” RFE/RL, May 13, 2022; Amir
Vahdat, “UN envoy: US sanctions on Iran worsen humanitarian situation,” ABC News, May 18, 2022.
154 See, for example, “New report reveals extent of Iran’s growing Middle East influence,” Al Jazeera, November 7,
2019; Ariane Tabatabai et al., “Iran’s Military Interventions: Patterns, Drivers, and Signposts,” RAND Corporation,
2021; David Gardner, “Curbing Iran’s regional ambitions remains a distant hope for the west,” Financial Times, June
10, 2021; Philip Loft, “Iran’s influence in the Middle East,” House of Commons Library (UK Parliament), March 23,
2022.
155 “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” New York Times, March 27, 2021.
156 “Russia’s Lavrov in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Deal, Cooperation,” Reuters, June 22, 2022.
157 “Iran’s membership in BRICS, SCO to help overcome negative sanctions impact – Raisi,” TASS, August 29, 2023.

(INARA, P.L. 114-17), which mandates congressional review of related agreements and provides
for consideration of legislation to potentially block their implementation.158
Among other provisions, INARA directs the President to submit to Congress within five calendar
days of reaching “an agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran” that agreement
and a certification that it meets certain conditions, such as that the agreement ensures that Iran
will not be permitted to use its nuclear program for military purposes. It also provides Congress
with a 30-day period following transmittal to review the agreement, during which the President
may not waive or otherwise limit sanctions; if Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval during
that period, the executive branch may not take any “action involving any measure of statutory
sanctions relief.”
Indirect negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program (see above) may have implications for INARA-
mandated congressional review provisions. The Biden Administration would likely be required to
report any JCPOA amendments to Congress, triggering the congressional review process
described above.159 Biden Administration officials have stated publicly that they are “committed
to ensuring the requirements of INARA are fully satisfied” without engaging on the question of
whether they would submit a hypothetical agreement for congressional review.160 These officials
have also emphasized since September 2022 that U.S. policy has not been focused on reviving the
JCPOA, given objectionable Iranian behaviors in other areas; Secretary Blinken said in July 2023
that “We’re now in a place where we’re not talking about a nuclear agreement.”161
The September 2023 prisoner exchange/fund transfer agreement focused some additional
congressional attention on INARA. In August 2023, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman
Michael McCaul and other representatives wrote to President Biden to express “significant
concern” about the prospective agreement and to underscore the Administration’s obligations
under INARA.162
Outlook
While the challenges posed by the Iranian government’s nuclear program, its human rights
abuses, and its growing ties with China and Russia remain, the regional turmoil unleashed by the
October 2023 Hamas-led assault on Israel is the foremost issue affecting U.S. policy toward Iran
in early 2024. Iran-backed groups across the Middle East have clashed with U.S. and U.S. partner
forces across the region. U.S. retaliatory strikes have at times targeted Iranian personnel but have
not extended to Iranian territory, which could trigger the direct military confrontation both sides
say they seek to avoid.
These dynamics pose a complex challenge for U.S. policymakers and Congress, which has long
played an active role in shaping and overseeing U.S. policy toward Iran. The Biden
Administration appears to remain focused on preventing the regionalization of the conflict while
stating that the United States will respond when its interests are threatened (pointing to military
158 For a legislative history of INARA, and the several votes taken in Congress that demonstrated opposition to the
JCPOA but failed to block its implementation, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020:
Selected Case Studies, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
159 CRS Report R46663, Possible U.S. Return to Iran Nuclear Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions.
160 State Department Press Briefing, March 16, 2022.
161 “US envoy reiterates nuclear talks with Iran not a priority,” Iran International, December 4, 2022; U.S. Department
of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Fareed Zakaria of GPS,” CNN, July 23, 2023.
162 Letter available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/8.21.23-Scalise-Stefanik-McCaul-
letter-to-President-Biden-re.-Iran-Deal50-1.pdf.

action in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen). Some Members of Congress have called for more U.S. military
action, including direct attacks against Iran.163 Others have expressed concern over the
constitutionality and escalatory potential of U.S. strikes on Iran-backed groups like the
Houthis.164 Successive appropriations acts since FY2020 have included provisions stating that
they may not be construed as authorizing the use of force against Iran.165
More broadly, to counter Iran’s strategic clout, the United States has sought to marshal regional
opposition to Iran and isolate Iran on the world stage. Despite some successes on both fronts, Iran
remains diplomatically engaged with many of its neighbors, including some U.S. partners, and
the lack of U.S. relations with Tehran precludes direct U.S. involvement in those diplomatic
engagements.
Beyond the limitations of existing U.S. policy tools, a number of other factors may influence
congressional views of, and action toward, U.S. policies regarding Iran, including
• A lack of detailed, current information about dynamics within Iran due to Iranian
government-imposed media restrictions, the absence of U.S.-Iran diplomatic
relations, and other factors. Additionally, no Members of Congress or
congressional staff appear to have visited Iran since 1979.166
• The historical legacy of animosity between the United States and Iran,
particularly the U.S. embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1981 and subsequent Iranian
government support for terrorism and attacks on U.S. military personnel in the
Middle East.
• The large, diverse, and politically active Iranian diaspora community.
In seeking to understand Iran and to shape U.S. policy, potential questions that Members of
Congress may consider include
• What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Iran? What U.S. policy
approaches have been most and least successful in moving toward those goals?
• What are Iran’s regional aims, and what do they need to achieve them? What
additional assets/capabilities do U.S. partners need to counter Iran? What are the
implications of diplomatic engagement and economic ties between Iran and U.S.
regional partners for U.S. interests?
• How secure is the position of Supreme Leader Khamenei? Who might succeed
him? What other factions or power centers exist within the Iranian political
system and how might they influence leadership succession and future regime
policy?
• To what extent did protests in fall 2022 and early 2023 represent a threat to
regime stability? What, if anything, can the United States do to promote
democracy without endangering its supporters in Iran?
• Why has Iran provided Russia with weaponry for use in Ukraine and how has
their partnership impacted Iran and its other bilateral relationships? What drives
163 See, for example, Barak Ravid, “GOP contenders cast Biden as too weak on Iran,” Axios, November 8, 2023; “US
senator calls for bombing IRGC positions inside Iran,” Iran International, December 28, 2023.
164 See, for example, Chad de Guzman, “How Congress is reacting to Biden’s military attack on the Houthis in
Yemen,” Time, January 12, 2024.

165 Section 8133 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328).
166 Some Members of Congress have visited other countries without a U.S. embassy such as Syria (in 2017), Cuba (in
2009), and North Korea (in 2003).

• the deepening Iran-Russia relationship and should the United States and its
partners seek to impede it?
• Why has Iran increased its nuclear activities and what is the ultimate purpose of
the program? What additional steps would Iran need to obtain a nuclear weapon
and how can the United States and partners prevent that? What might be the
implications of Iran’s obtaining a nuclear weapon for Iran’s broader foreign
policy, regional stability, and other U.S. interests?
• What was the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s regional
activities, domestic politics in Iran, and U.S.-Iran relations overall? What was the
impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA?
• What are the arguments for and against attempting to rejoin the JCPOA? Given
changes on both sides since 2015, is reviving the accord feasible? What
alternative arrangements, if any, might meet the U.S. goal of securing limits on
Iran’s nuclear activities?
• What are the implications for the United States of Iran’s prospective membership
in the BRICS group?
• What are the dynamics between Iran and the various terrorist groups that it
supports? To what extent, if any, does it exercise command and control?
Author Information
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Insert Acknowledgments Here
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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Iran: Background and U.S.

Updated January 26, 2024

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Congressional Research Service

Overview and Issues for Congress

Figure 1. Iran at a Glance

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Rising Regional Tensions and Conflict: The United

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Background: Iran’s Foreign Policy

Figure 1. Selected Iran-Backed Groups

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Iran, Hamas, and the October 7, 2023, Attacks on Israel12

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U.S. Policy amid “Axis of Resistance” Attacks

21 “Putin, Raisi discuss Israel-Gaza war,” Rudaw, October 16, 2023.

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Iraq and Syria

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Yemen and the Red Sea36

East Policy, January 5, 2024.

February 22, 2010.

war,” Associated Press (AP), October 31, 2023.

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Lebanon and Hezbollah

navigation in the Red Sea,” December 18, 2023.

November 17, 2023.

49 Feltman and Huggard, op. cit.

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U.S.-Iran Relations: Background, Recent

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diplomatic engagement.58 That engagement culminated in the 2015 multilateral nuclear

Biden Administration Policy

65 White House, National Security Strategy, October 12, 2022.

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transport of Iranian oil in violation of U.S. sanctions,” September 8, 2023.

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Iran,” September 17, 2023.

September 18, 2023.

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Iran’s Relations with China and Russia

Washington Post, October 12, 2023.

terrorism, CQ Congressional Transcripts, December 13, 2023.

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March 2023 China-Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement

Command and Africa Command,” CQ Congressional Transcripts, March 16, 2023.

March 13, 2023.

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Iran’s Political System

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2022-2023 Political Protests

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U.S. Policy Responses to the Protests

freedom,” September 23, 2022.

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Iran’s Military: Structure and Capabilities

Hearing, March 15, 2022, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6484358.