Nilsson RevisitingElusiveConcept 2011
Nilsson RevisitingElusiveConcept 2011
Nilsson RevisitingElusiveConcept 2011
REFERENCES
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Uppsala University
'We would like to thank Thomas Ohlson and the Research Article Seminar at the Departm
Conflict Research, Uppsala University, for many useful suggestions. A previous version of this p
sented at the National Conference on Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala, December 16-17, 201
like to thank the participants for valuable discussions. We also wish to thank the three anonymo
their constructive comments on an earlier draft, from which the final version has greatly benefited
acknowledge financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
kens Jubileumsfond, and the SYLFF Endowment at Uppsala University. The authors have contribu
article.
Nilsson, Desirée and Söderberg Kovacs, Mimmi. (2011) Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in Peace
Processes. Intentional Studies Review, doi: 10.1111/j.l468-2486.2011.01080.x
© 2011 International Studies Association
In Stedman's (1997) original work, it was implicit that the spoiler concept was t
be limited to an analysis of the key warring actors to the armed conflict, or fac
tions within these groups. This approach to the topic has subsequently come to
dominate the field, especially in empirically oriented peace research (Zahar
2006a, 2008; Findley 2007; Greenhill and Major 2007; Nilsson 2008; Pearlman
2009). The rationale for such an approach is relatively straightforward; thes
actors have both a clear stake in the armed conflict and its outcome, and have a
least at some point been willing and able to use violence to pursue their inter-
ests, and could thus potentially do so again. Within this strand of literature, how
ever, the more precise empirical focus may vary considerably. Some focus their
attention primarily or exclusively on the activities of the nonstate armed actor
engaged in civil wars - be they called rebel groups, insurgents, or militias - or fac
tions within these groups or splinters breaking off from them. In a few cases, th
analysis is even limited to one particular such nonstate actor deemed capable of
stalling the peace process, for example, Hamas in the conflict between Israe
and Palestine (Gunning 2004). Other scholars emphasize the need for a mor
comprehensive analysis by also including so-called official spoilers on the govern
ment side - decision makers, paramilitaries, and the army - and their means an
motives for disrupting the peace process (for example, Conversi 2006; Höglund
and Zartman 2006).
Another approach to identifying the relevant actors of concern has mainl
gained ground within the field of critical studies. Authors coming from th
scholarly tradition deliberately employ a much more wide-ranging definition in
terms of which actors ought to be included in a spoiler analysis, suggesting tha
the traditional approach to the subject is too limited to capture the comple
reality of contemporary peace processes. Newman and Richmond (2006b), fo
example, suggest that in addition to the warring parties, other groups with an
are both more likely to emerge and more likely to pose a great
Stedman argues (2002:14; 2008:153).
The insights produced by the discussion on the emergenc
been critical for our understanding of how the structural cond
process shape the behavior of the key actors toward the peace
their goals, ideologies, or leadership qualities. In our opinion,
and Major (2007), key proponents of the structural argument
mate powerful internal differences between various armed gr
the range of strategic considerations that actors take into acc
relative power resources at hand and the risks and costs assoc
in that particular peace process. For example, on the basis of
cannot explain why resourceful and strong parties sometimes
to peace agreements even when they could probably gain m
the view of Greenhill and Major (2007:9, footnote 7), all p
goals in relation to their relative power position and are theref
revisionists. We take issue with this point, as we believe that g
this respect. Some parties seek limited and specific politica
primarily interested in maximizing their power. There are se
strong rebel groups that have entered into peace agreement t
all their goals, yet they have preferred an imperfect peace ove
conflict. The Farabundo Marti Liberación National (FMLN) in El Salvador is a
case in point, the ANC in South Africa another. In addition, we have witnessed a
number of governments that enter into peace agreements with significantly
weaker rebel groups or factions. For example, in 2000 the government in
Burundi signed a peace accord with the former warring factions the National
Liberation Front (Frolina), the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People
(Palipehutu) , and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD)
that excluded the two stronger rebel groups. The reason for them to do so may
be either related to some characteristic of the government, its leadership, goals,
or interests, or due to strategic incentives to opt for peace.
Hence, like some other writers in the field, we too believe that both the char-
acter of the group itself and the structural environment of the peace process are
likely to be of importance for the emergence of spoilers. A more complex model
that takes into consideration intent, capability, and opportunity, and specifies
the contextual meaning of such terms depending on both position (inside or
outside) and type (government or nonstate actor), is therefore likely to provide
for a more powerful explanation for the emergence of spoiler activities.
Stedman (1997:11-12) originally suggested that the locus of the spoiler prob-
lem may be either with the leadership of the group or among a group of hard-
liners within the party who do not have the support of its leaders or even the
majority of the group's followers. This argument implies that parties in civil war
peace processes are not homogenous actors, but consist of a merger of differ-
ent individuals, factions, and groups with different interests and goals, and that
the internal political dynamics of these parties is likely to have an impact on
the group's decision to either spoil or remain committed to a particular peace
agreement.
Most subsequent writers within the mainstream literature on spoilers have,
however, primarily concerned themselves with the relationship between the dif-
ferent parties to the peace process for the purpose of explaining spoiler behav-
ior, although some do also refer to the importance of intraparty dynamics (for
example, Zahar 2006a, b, 2008; Findley 2007; Greenhill and Major 2007).
Perhaps a contributing reason for the relatively limited attention paid to the
Spoiler Management
The fundamental purpose of Stedman's (1997) study
spoiler management strategies that international pe
use of in order to prevent spoilers from undermini
ments. The success of such strategies, however, is con
nostic of the spoiler in question, Stedman argued, u
prior understanding of different spoiler types. Only in
we can arrive at a set of appropriate strategies for mix
with different third-party measures. While Stedman's
ated a rich literature on how to define spoilers and wh
cussion of management strategies has received much l
ensuing debate. Yet indirectly, by proposing other app
of both identifying and explaining spoiler emergence,
also arrived at rather different recommendations for
address spoiler problems in contemporary peace pr
debate has generated a discussion on the usefulness of
types versus seeking to change the decision-making
potential spoiler by attempting to manipulate the stra
peace process.
those as the key individuals and parties who have already used
means that risk undermining the peace efforts. Thus, in our vie
cally observable actions of the relevant parties that should det
they are to be considered manifest spoilers or not, not their pr
motivations alone. This does not by any means suggest that th
to do in reality, when faced with a multitude of different sig
and opinions. This is just to suggest that there are analytical b
by clearly distinguishing between the notion of potential and
an issue that appears to have caused some unnecessary polemic
Second, and related to this issue, we think that one of the k
spoiler concept is the acknowledgment that both violent and no
by the parties can have a potentially destructive effect on the
process. Although it makes sense that previous research has fo
on incidents of violence given the obvious and immediate thre
tutes to a fragile peace agreement, it is also important to exam
spoiler actions, as both types of behavior may serve to underm
the peace, albeit in diverse ways and through different causal
this review of the research field on spoilers has clearly showe
learn more about various kinds of non-violent spoiler behav
shapes and forms that such activities may take, not least by ins
peace process.
Third, we suggest the need to distinguish between actions and outcomes in ou
research, that is, whether we attempt to explain spoiler behavior or its many
and diverse effects on peace processes or other conceivable outcomes. Wh
some studies primarily focus on explaining the emergence of spoilers and why
some parties resort to violence to undermine the peace efforts, violent spoilin
behavior should not be equated with failed peace processes. The many cau
pathways, and the various causal mechanisms that link them together, ought
be made much more transparent in our analyses. Along the lines of some prev
ous authors on the topic, we also want to bring attention to the fact that the
exist many empirically relevant outcomes besides the dichotomy of successful
versus failed peace processes. For example, actors sometimes strive to obta
other goals than to wreck the entire peace agreement, such as their inclus
into the peace process and the possibility to share the prospects of peace divi-
dends. Future research should preferably analyze how spoiling affects a much
wider range of conceivable outcomes within the framework of an ongoi
peace process.
Finally, we think it is useful to distinguish between the prevention of spo
and the management of spoilers. This review of the debate has shown that p
ous spoiler literature has not always made a clear enough distinction bet
third-party strategies aiming to prevent potential spoilers from emerging
the management of manifest spoilers that already has engaged in spoiling be
ior. Not only has this generated unnecessary polemic in the ensuing debate
believe it may also have contributed to the lack of balance in the litera
where much more attention has been paid to the issue of spoiler prevention
the expense of spoiler management. While Stedman's (1997) article prim
focused on the latter, subsequent literature has mostly been preoccupied w
suggesting various ways third-party actors may prevent parties from actin
spoilers in the first place. While both tasks are clearly relevant and importan
call attention to the need for more research on third-party strategies for m
ing different kinds of spoilers who use various tactics for different purpose
particular, one key task for future research should be the development of
strategies for spoiler management beyond the resort to force and other vi
tactics.
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