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which have economic value have not had labour expended on them,
we must look elsewhere for their common characteristic. We should
probably say that they all have in common the fact that they are
desired and that there is not an unlimited supply of them. The pure
economist finds the key to this analysis of value in the consideration
of the laws of supply and demand, which alone affect all things that
have economic value, and finds little difficulty in refuting Marx's
theory, on the basis which his investigation assumes.
A consideration of Marx's own argument forces us therefore to the
conclusion that either Marx was an incapable bungler or that he
thought the fact that some things have economic value and are yet
not the product of labour irrelevant to his argument because he was
talking of economic value in two senses, firstly in the sense of price,
and secondly in a peculiar sense of his own. This indeed is borne out
by his distinction of value and price. Croce developing this hint,
suggests that the importance of Marx's theory lies in a comparison
between a capitalist society and another abstract economic society
in which there are no commodities on which labour is not expended,
and no monopoly. We thus have two abstract societies, the capitalist
society which though abstract is very largely actualised in modern
civilisation, and another quite imaginary economic society of
unfettered competition, which is continually assumed by the classical
economist, but which, as Marx said, could only exist where there
was no private property in capital, i.e. in the collectivist state.
Now in a society of that kind in which there was no monopoly and
capital was at everyone's disposal equally, the value of commodities
would represent the value of the labour put into them, and that
value might be represented in units of socially necessary labour
time. It would still have to be admitted that an hour of one man's
labour might be of much greater value to the community than two
hours of another man, but that Marx has already allowed for. The
unit of socially necessary labour time is an abstraction, and the hour
of one man might contain two or any number of such abstract units
of labour time. What Marx has done is to take the individualist
economist at his word: he has accepted the notion of an economic
society as a number of competing individuals. Only he has insisted
that they shall start fair and therefore that they shall have nothing to
buy or sell but their labour. The discrepancy between the values
which would exist in such a society and actual prices represent the
disturbance created by the fact that actual society is not a society of
equal competitors, but one in which certain competitors start with
some kind of advantage or monopoly.
If this is really the kernel of Marx's doctrine, it bears a close
relation to a simpler and more familiar contention, that in a society
where free economic competition holds sway, each man gets what
he deserves, for his income represents the sum that society is
prepared to pay for his services, the social value of his work. In this
form the hours worked are supposed to be uniform, and the
differences in value are taken to represent different amounts of
social service. In Marx's argument the social necessity is taken as
uniform, and the difference in value taken to represent differences in
hours of work. While the main abstract contention remains the
same, most of those who argue that in a system of unfettered
economic competition most men get what they deserve, rather
readily ignore the existence of monopoly, and assume that this
argument justifies the existing distribution of wealth. The chief
purpose of Marx's argument is to emphasise the difference between
such an economic system and a capitalist society. He is here, as so
often, turning the logic of the classical economists against
themselves, and arguing that the conditions under which a purely
economic distribution of wealth could take place, could only exist in
a community where monopoly had been completely abolished and all
capital collectivised.
Croce maintains that Marx's theory of value is economic and not
moral. Yet it is hard to read Marx and certainly Marxians without
finding in them the implication that the values produced in such an
economic society would be just. If that implication be examined, we
come on an important difficulty still remaining in this theory. The
contention that in a system of unfettered economic competition,
men get the reward they deserve, assumes that it is just that if one
man has a greater power of serving society than another he should
be more highly rewarded for his work. This the individualist
argument with which we compared Marx's assumes without
question. But the Marxian theory of value is frequently interpreted to
imply that amount of work is the only claim to reward. For
differences in value it is held are created by differences in the
amount of labour. But the word amount may here be used in two
senses. When men say that the amount of work a man does should
determine a man's reward; they commonly mean that if one man
works two hours and another one, the first ought to get twice the
reward of the second. 'Amount' here means the actual time spent in
labour. But in Marx's theory of value amount means something quite
different, for an hour of one man's work may, he admits, be equal to
two of another man's. He means by amount a sum of abstract
labour time units. Marx's scientific theory of value is quite consistent
with different abilities getting different rewards, the moral contention
that men should get more reward if they work more and for no other
reason is not. The equation of work done by men of different
abilities by expressing them in abstract labour time units is essential
to Marx's theory but fatal to the moral claim sometimes founded
upon it.
Further the great difficulty in allowing that it is just that men of
different abilities should have different rewards, comes from the fact
that differences of ability are of the nature of monopolies. In a pure
economic society high rewards would be given to rare ability and
although it is possible to equate work of rare ability with work of
ordinary ability by expressing both as amounts of abstract labour
time units, it surely remains true that the value is determined not by
the amount of abstract labour time congealed in it but by the law of
supply and demand. Where there are differences of ability there is
some kind of monopoly, and where there is monopoly, you cannot
eliminate the influence of the relation of supply and demand in the
determination of value. What you imagine you have eliminated by
the elimination of capital, which you can collectivise, remains
obstinately in individual differences of ability which cannot be
collectivised.
But here I have entered beyond the limits of Croce's argument.
His critical appraisement of Marx's work must be left to others to
judge who have more knowledge of Marx and of economics than I
can lay claim to. I am confident only that all students of Marx
whether they be disciples or critics, will find in these essays
illumination in a field where much bitter controversy has resulted in
little but confusion and obscurity.
A.D. Lindsay.

CHAPTER I. CONCERNING THE SCIENTIFIC FORM OF

HISTORICAL MATERIALISMToC

Historical materialism is what is called a fashionable subject. The

theory came into being fifty years ago, and for a time remained
obscure and limited; but during the last six or seven years it has
rapidly attained great fame and an extensive literature, which is daily
increasing, has grown up around it. It is not my intention to write
once again the account, already given many times, of the origin of
this doctrine; nor to restate and criticise the now well-known
passages in which Marx and Engels asserted the theory, nor the
different views of its opponents, its supporters, its exponents, and
its correctors and corruptors. My object is merely to submit to my
colleagues some few remarks concerning the doctrine, taking it in
the form in which it appears in a recent book by Professor Antonio
Labriola, of the University of Rome[1].
For many reasons, it does not come within my province to praise
Labriola's book. But I cannot help saying as a needful explanation,
that it appears to me to be the fullest and most adequate treatment
of the question. The book is free from pedantry and learned tattle,
whilst it shows in every line signs of the author's complete
knowledge of all that has been written on the subject: a book, in
short, which saves the annoyance of controversy with erroneous and
exaggerated opinions, which in it appear as superseded. It has a
grand opportunity in Italy, where the materialistic theory of history is
known almost solely in the spurious form bestowed on it by an
ingenious professor of economics, who even pretends to be its
inventor[2].

1. Scope of essay: Labriola's book implies that historical

materialism is not a philosophy of history: Distinction
between a philosophy of history and philosophising
about history: Reason why two have been confused:
Materialistic theory of history as stated by Labriola not
an attempt to establish a law of history: This
contrasted with theories of monists, and teleologists:
Engels' statement that it is a new method erroneous:
New content not new method.
Any reader of Labriola's book who tries to obtain from it a precise
concept of the new theory of history, will reach in the first instance a
conclusion which must appear to him evident and incontestable, and
which I sum up in the following statement: 'historical materialism,
so-called, is not a philosophy of history.' Labriola does not state this
denial explicitly; it may even be granted that, in words, he
sometimes says exactly the opposite.[3] But, if I am not mistaken,
the denial is contained implicitly in the restrictions which he places
on the meaning of the theory.
The philosophical reaction of realism overthrew the systems built
up by teleology and metaphysical dogmatism, which had limited the
field of the historian. The old philosophy of history was destroyed.
And, as if in contempt and depreciation, the phrase, 'to construct a
philosophy of history,' came to be used with the meaning: 'to
construct a fanciful and artificial and perhaps prejudiced history.'
It is true that of late books have begun to re-appear actually
having as their title the 'philosophy of history.' This might seem to be
a revival, but it is not. In fact their subject is a very different one.
These recent productions do not aim at supplying a new philosophy
of history, they simply offer some philosophising about history. The
distinction deserves to be explained.
The possibility of a philosophy of history presupposes the
possibility of reducing the sequence of history to general concepts.
Now, whilst it is possible to reduce to general concepts the particular
factors of reality which appear in history and hence to construct a
philosophy of morality or of law, of science or of art, and a general
philosophy, it is not possible to work up into general concepts the
single complex whole formed by these factors, i.e. the concrete fact,
in which the historical sequence consists. To divide it into its factors
is to destroy it, to annihilate it. In its complex totality, historical
change is incapable of reduction except to one concept, that of
development: a concept empty of everything that forms the peculiar
content of history. The old philosophy of history regarded a
conceptual working out of history as possible; either because by
introducing the idea of God or of Providence, it read into the facts
the aims of a divine intelligence; or because it treated the formal
concept of development as including within itself, logically, the
contingent determinations. The case of positivism is strange in that,
being neither so boldly imaginative as to yield to the conceptions of
teleology and rational philosophy, nor so strictly realistic and
intellectually disciplined as to attack the error at its roots, it has
halted halfway, i.e. at the actual concept of development and of
evolution, and has announced the philosophy of evolution as the
true philosophy of history: development itself—as the law which
explains development! Were this tautology only in question little
harm would result; but the misfortune is that, by a too easy
confusion, the concept of evolution often emerges, in the hands of
the positivists, from the formal emptiness which belongs to it in
truth, and acquires a meaning or rather a pretended meaning, very
like the meanings of teleology and metaphysics. The almost religious
unction and reverence with which one hears the sacred mystery of
evolution spoken of gives sufficient proof of this.
From such realistic standpoints, now as always, any and every
philosophy of history has been criticised. But the very reservations
and criticisms of the old mistaken constructions demand a discussion
of concepts, that is a process of philosophising: although it may be a
philosophising which leads properly to the denial of a philosophy of
history. Disputes about method, arising out of the needs of the
historian, are added. The works published in recent years embody
different investigations of this kind, and in a plainly realistic sense,
under the title of philosophy of history. Amongst these I will mention
as an example a German pamphlet by Simmel, and, amongst
ourselves a compendious introduction by Labriola himself. There are,
undoubtedly, still philosophies of history which continue to be
produced in the old way: voices clamantium in deserto, to whom
may be granted the consolation of believing themselves the only
apostles of an unrecognised truth.
Now the materialistic theory of history, in the form in which
Labriola states it, involves an entire abandonment of all attempt to
establish a law of history, to discover a general concept under which
all the complex facts of history can be included.
I say 'in the form in which he states it,' because Labriola is aware
that several sections of the materialistic school of history tend to
approximate to these obsolete ideas.
 One of these sections, which might be called that of the monists,
or abstract materialists, is characterised by the introduction of
metaphysical materialism into the conception of history.
As the reader knows, Marx, when discussing the relation between
his opinions and Hegelianism employed a pointed phrase which has
been taken too often beside the point. He said that with Hegel
history was standing on its head and that it must be turned right
side up again in order to replace it on its feet. For Hegel the idea is
the real world, whereas for him (Marx) 'the ideal is nothing else than
the material world' reflected and translated by the human mind.
Hence the statement so often repeated, that the materialistic view of
history is the negation or antithesis of the idealistic view. It would
perhaps be convenient to study once again, accurately and critically,
these asserted relations between scientific socialism and
Hegelianism. To state the opinion which I have formed on the
matter; the link between the two views seems to me to be, in the
main, simply psychological. Hegelianism was the early inspiration of
the youthful Marx, and it is natural that everyone should link up the
new ideas with the old as a development, an amendment, an
antithesis. In fact, Hegel's Ideas—and Marx knew this perfectly well
—are not human ideas, and to turn the Hegelian philosophy of
history upside down cannot give us the statement that ideas arise as
reflections of material conditions. The inverted form would logically
be this: history is not a process of the Idea, i.e. of a rational reality,
but a system of forces: to the rational view is opposed the dynamic
view. As to the Hegelian dialectic of concepts it seems to me to bear
a purely external and approximate resemblance to the historical
notion of economic eras and of the antithetical conditions of society.
Whatever may be the value of this suggestion, which I express with
hesitation, recognising the difficulty of the problems connected with
the interpretation and origin of history;—this much is evident, that
metaphysical materialism, at which Marx and Engels, starting from
the extreme Hegelian left, easily arrived, supplied the name and
some of the components of their view of history. But both the name
and these components are really extraneous to the true character of
their conception. This can be neither materialistic nor spiritualistic,
nor dualistic nor monadistic: within its limited field the elements of
things are not presented in such a way as to admit of a philosophical
discussion whether they are reducible one to another, and are united
in one ultimate source. What we have before us are concrete
objects, the earth, natural production, animals; we have before us
man, in whom the so-called psychical processes appear as
differentiated from the so-called physiological processes. To talk in
this case of monism and materialism is to talk nonsense. Some
socialist writers have expressed surprise because Lange, in his
classic History of Materialism, does not discuss historical materialism.
It is needless to remark that Lange was familiar with Marxian
socialism. He was, however, too cautious to confuse the
metaphysical materialism with which he was concerned, with
historical materialism which has no essential connection with it, and
is merely a way of speaking.
But the metaphysical materialism of the authors of the new
historical doctrine, and the name given to the latter, have been not a
little misleading. I will refer as an example to a recent and bad little
book, which seems to me symptomatic, by a sufficiently accredited
socialist writer, Plechanow.[4] The author, designing to study
historical materialism, thinks it needful to go back to Holbach and
Helvetius. And he waxes indignant at metaphysical dualism and
pluralism, declaring that 'the most important philosophical systems
were always monistic, that is they interpreted matter and spirit as
merely two classes of phenomena having a single and indivisible
cause.' And in reference to those who maintain the distinction
between the factors in history, he exclaims: 'We see here the old
story, always recurring, of the struggle between eclecticism and
monism, the story of the dividing walls; here nature, there spirit,
etc.' Many will be amazed at this unexpected leap from the
materialistic study of history into the arms of monism, in which they
were unaware that they ought to have such confidence.
Labriola is most careful to avoid this confusion: 'Society is a
datum,' he says, 'history is nothing more than the history of society.'
And he controverts with equal energy and success the naturalists,
who wish to reduce the history of man to the history of nature, and
the verbalists, who claim to deduce from the name materialism the
real nature of the new view of history. But it must appear, even to
him, that the name might have been more happily chosen, and that
the confusion lies, so to speak, inherent in it. It is true that old
words can be bent to new meanings, but within limits and after due
consideration.
In regard to the tendency to reconstruct a materialistic philosophy
of history, substituting an omnipresent Matter for an omnipresent
Idea, it suffices to re-assert the impossibility of any such
construction, which must become merely superfluous and
tautologous unless it abandoned itself to dogmatism. But there is
another error, which is remarked among the followers of the
materialistic school of history, and which is connected with the
former, viz., to anticipate harm not only in the interpretation of
history but also in the guidance of practical activities. I refer to the
teleological tendencies (abstract teleology), which also Labriola
opposes with a cutting attack. The very idea of progress, which has
seemed to many the only law of history worth saving out of the
many devised by philosophical and non-philosophical thinkers, is by
him deprived of the dignity of a law, and reduced to a sufficiently
narrow significance. The idea of it, says Labriola, is 'not only
empirical, but always incidental and hence limited': progress 'does
not influence the sequence of human affairs like destiny or fate, nor
like the command of a law.' History teaches us that man is capable
of progress; and we can look at all the different series of events
from this point of view: that is all. No less incidental and empirical is
the idea of historical necessity, which must be freed from all
remnants of rationalism and of transcendentalism, so that we see in
it the mere recognition of the very small share left in the sequence
of events, to individuals and personal free will.
It must be admitted that a little of the blame for the teleological
and fatalistic misunderstandings fall on Marx himself. Marx, as he
once had to explain, liked to 'coquette' with the Hegelian
terminology: a dangerous weapon, with which it would have been
better not to trifle. Hence it is now thought necessary to give to
several of his statements a somewhat broad interpretation in
agreement with the general trend of his theories.[5] Another excuse
lies in the impetuous confidence which, as in the case of any
practical work, accompanies the practical activities of socialism, and
engenders beliefs and expectations which do not always agree with
prudent critical and scientific thought. It is strange to see how the
positivists, newly converted to socialism, exceed all the others (see
the effect of a good school!) in their teleological beliefs, and their
facile predeterminations. They swallow again what is worst in
Hegelianism, which they once so violently opposed without
recognising it. Labriola has finely said that the very forecasts of
socialism are merely morphological in nature; and, in fact, neither
Marx nor Engels would ever have asserted in the abstract that
communism must come about by an unavoidable necessity, in the
manner in which they foresaw it. If history is always accidental, why
in this western Europe of ours, might not a new barbarism arise
owing to the effect of incalculable circumstances? Why should not
the coming of communism be either rendered superfluous or
hastened by some of those technical discoveries, which, as Marx
himself has proved, have hitherto produced the greatest revolutions
in the course of history?
I think then that better homage would be rendered to the
materialistic view of history, not by calling it the final and definite
philosophy of history but rather by declaring that properly speaking
it is not a philosophy of history. This intrinsic nature which is evident
to those who understand it properly, explains the difficulty which
exists in finding for it a satisfactory theoretical statement; and why
to Labriola it appears to be only in its beginnings and yet to need
much development. It explains too why Engels said (and Labriola
accepts the remark), that it is nothing more than a new method;
which means a denial that it is a new theory. But is it indeed a new
method? I must acknowledge that this name method does not seem
to me altogether accurate. When the philosophical idealists tried to
arrive at the facts of history by inference, this was truly a new
method; and there may still exist some fossil of those blessed times,
who makes such attempts at history. But the historians of the
materialistic school employ the same intellectual weapons and follow
the same paths as, let us say, the philological historians. They only
introduce into their work some new data, some new experiences.
The content is different, not the nature of the method.

II

2. Historical materialism a mass of new data of which

historian becomes conscious: Does not state that
history is nothing more than economic history, nor
does it provide a theory of history: Is simply
investigation of influence economic needs have
exercised in history: This view does not detract from
its importance.
I have now reached the point which for me is fundamental.
Historical materialism is not and cannot be a new philosophy of
history or a new method; but it is properly this; a mass of new data,
of new experiences, of which the historian becomes conscious.
It is hardly necessary to mention the overthrow a short time ago
of the naïve opinion of the ordinary man regarding the objectivity of
history; almost as though events spoke, and the historian was there
to hear and to record their statements. Anyone who sets out to write
history has before him documents and narratives, i.e. small
fragments and traces of what has actually happened. In order to
attempt to reconstruct the complete process, he must fall back on a
series of assumptions, which are in fact the ideas and information
which he possesses concerning the affairs of nature, of man, of
society. The pieces needed to complete the whole, of which he has
only the fragments before him, he must find within himself. His
worth and skill as a historian is shown by the accuracy of his
adaptation. Whence it clearly follows that the enrichment of these
views and experiences is essential to progress in historical narration.
What are these points of view and experiences which are offered
by the materialistic theory of history?
That section of Labriola's book which discusses this appears to me
excellent and sufficient. Labriola points out how historical narration
in the course of its development, might have arrived at the theory of
historical factors; i.e., the notion that the sequence of history is the
result of a number of forces, known as physical conditions, social
organisations, political institutions, personal influences. Historical
materialism goes beyond, to investigate the interaction of these
factors; or rather it studies them all together as parts of a single
process. According to this theory—as is now well known, and as
Marx expressed it in a classical passage—the foundations of history
are the methods of production, i.e. the economic conditions which
give rise to class distinctions, to the constitution of rank and of law,
and to those beliefs which make up social and moral customs and
sentiments, the reflection whereof is found in art, science and
religion.
To understand this point of view accurately is not easy, and it is
misunderstood by all those who, rather than take it in the concrete,
state it absolutely after the manner of an absolute philosophical
truth. The theory cannot be maintained in the abstract without
destroying it, i.e. without turning it into the theory of the factors,
which is according to my view, the final word in abstract analysis.[6]
Some have supposed that historical materialism asserts that history
is nothing more than economic history, and all the rest is simply a
mask, an appearance without reality. And then they labour to
discover the true god of history, whether it be the productive tool or
the earth, using arguments which call to mind the proverbial
discussion about the egg and the hen. Friedrich Engels was attacked
by someone who applied to him to ask how the influence of such
and such other historical factors ought to be understood in reference
to the economic factor. In the numerous letters which he wrote in
reply, and which now, since his death, are coming out in the reviews,
he let it be understood that, when together with Marx, upon the
prompting of the facts, he conceived this new view of history, he had
not meant to state an exact theory. In one of these letters he
apologises for whatever exaggeration he and Marx may have put
into the controversial statements of their ideas, and begs that
attention may be paid to the practical applications made of them
rather than to the theoretical expressions employed. It would be a
fine thing, he exclaims, if a formula could be given for the
interpretation of all the facts of history! By applying this formula, it
would be as easy to understand any period of history as to solve a
simple equation.[7]
Labriola grants that the supposed reduction of history to the
economic factor is a ridiculous notion, which may have occurred to
one of the too hasty defenders of the theory, or to one of its no less
hasty opponents.[8] He acknowledges the complexity of history, how
the products of the first degree first establish themselves, and then
isolate themselves and become independent; the ideals which
harden into traditions, the persistent survivals, the elasticity of the
psychical mechanism which makes the individual irreducible to a
type of his class or social position, the unconsciousness and
ignorance of their own situations often observed in men, the
stupidity and unintelligibility of the beliefs and superstitions arising
out of unusual accidents and complexities. And since man lives a
natural as well as a social existence, he admits the influence of race,
of temperament and of the promptings of nature. And, finally, he
does not overlook the influence of the individual, i.e. of the work of
those who are called great men, who if they are not the creators,
are certainly collaborators of history.
With all these concessions he realises, if I am not mistaken, that it
is useless to look for a theory, in any strict sense of the word, in
historical materialism; and even that it is not what can properly be
called a theory at all. He confirms us in this view by his fine account
of its origin, under the stimulus of the French Revolution, that great
school of sociology—as he calls it. The materialistic view of history
arose out of the need to account for a definite social phenomenon,
not from an abstract inquiry into the factors of historical life. It was
created in the minds of politicians and revolutionists, not of cold and
calculating savants of the library.
At this stage someone will say:—But if the theory, in the strict
sense, is not true, wherein then lies the discovery? In what does the
novelty consist? To speak in this way is to betray a belief that
intellectual progress consists solely in the perfecting of the forms
and abstract categories of thought.
Have approximate observations no value in addition to theories?
The knowledge of what has usually happened, everything in short
that is called experience of life, and which can be expressed in
general but not in strictly accurate terms? Granting this limitation
and understanding always an almost and an about, there are
discoveries to be made which are fruitful in the interpretation of life
and of history. Such are the assertions of the dependence of all parts
of life upon each other, and of their origin in the economic subsoil,
so that it can be said that there is but one single history; the
discovery of the true nature of the State (as it appears in the
empirical world), regarded as an institution for the defence of the
ruling class; the proved dependence of ideals upon class interests;
the coincidence of the great epochs of history with the great
economic eras; and the many other observations by which the
school of historical materialism is enriched. Always with the aforesaid
limitations, it may be said with Engels: 'that men make their history
themselves, but within a given limited range, on a basis of conditions
actually pre-existent, amongst which the economic conditions,
although they may be influenced by the others, the political and
ideal, are yet, in the final analysis, decisive, and form the red thread
which runs through the whole of history and guides us to an
understanding thereof.
From this point of view too, I entirely agree with Labriola in
regarding as somewhat strange the inquiries made concerning the
supposed forerunners and remote authors of historical materialism,
and as quite mistaken the inferences that these inquiries will detract
from the importance and originality of the theory. The Italian
professor of economics to whom I referred at the beginning, when
convicted of a plagiarism, thought to defend himself by saying that,
at bottom, Marx's idea was not peculiar to Marx; hence, at worst, he
had robbed a thief. He gave a list of forerunners, reaching back as
far as Aristotle. Just lately, another Italian professor reproved a
colleague with much less justice for having forgotten that the
economic interpretation had been explained by Lorenzo Stein before
Marx, I could multiply such examples. All this reminds me of one of
Jean Paul Richter's sayings: that we hoard our thoughts as a miser
does his money; and only slowly do we exchange the money for
possessions, and thoughts for experiences and feelings. Mental
observations attain real importance through the realisation in
thought and an insight into the fulness of their possibilities. This
realisation and insight have been granted to the modern socialist
movement and to its intellectual leaders Marx and Engels. We may
read even in Thomas More that the State is a conspiracy of the rich
who make plots for their own convenience: quaedam conspiratio
divitum, de suis commodis reipublicae nomine tituloque tractantium,
and call their intrigues laws: machinamenta jam leges fiunt.[9] And,
leaving Sir Thomas More—who, after all, it will be said, was a
communist—who does not know by heart Marzoni's lines: Un' odiosa
Forza il mondo possiede e fa nomarsi Dritto....[10] But the materialist
and socialist interpretation of the State is not therefore any the less
new. The common proverb, indeed, tells us that interest is the most
powerful motive for human actions and conceals itself under the
most varied forms; but it is none the less true that the student of
history who has previously examined the teachings of socialist
criticism, is like a short-sighted man who has provided himself with a
good pair of spectacles: he sees quite differently and many
mysterious shadows reveal their exact shape.
In regard to historical narrative then, the materialistic view of
history resolves itself into a warning to keep its observations in mind
as a new aid to the understanding of history. Few problems are
harder than that which the historian has to solve. In one particular it
resembles the problem of the statesman, and consists in
understanding the conditions of a given nation at a given time in
respect to their causes and functioning; but with this difference: the
historian confines himself to exposition, the statesman proceeds
further to modification; the former pays no penalty for
misunderstanding, whereas the latter is subjected to the severe
correction of facts. Confronted by such a problem, the majority of
historians—I refer in particular to the conditions of the study in Italy
—proceed at a disadvantage, almost like the savants of the old
school who constructed philology and researched into etymology.
Aids to a closer and deeper understanding, have come at length
from different sides, and frequently. But the one which is now
offered by the materialistic view of history is great, and suited to the
importance of the modern socialist movement. It is true that the
historian must render exact and definite in each particular instance,
that co-ordination and subordination of factors which is indicated by
historical materialism, in general, for the greater number of cases,
and approximately; herein lies his task and his difficulties, which may
sometimes be insurmountable. But now the road has been pointed
out, along which the solution must be sought, of some of the
greatest problems of history apart from those which have been
already elucidated.
I will say nothing of the recent attempts at an historical
application of the materialistic conception, because it is not a subject
to hurry over in passing, and I intend to deal with it on another
occasion. I will content myself with echoing Labriola, who gives a
warning against a mistake, common to many of these attempts. This
consists in retranslating, as he says, into economic phraseology, the
old historical perspective which of late has so often been translated
into Darwinian phraseology. Certainly it would not be worth while to
create a new movement in historical studies in order to attain such a
result.
 III

3. Questions as to relation between historical materialism

and socialism: Only possible connection lies in special
historical application: Bearing of historical materialism
upon intellectual and moral truth: Throws light on
influence of material conditions on their development,
but does not demonstrate their relativity: Absolute
morality a necessary postulate of socialism.
Two things seem to me to deserve some further explanation. What
is the relation between historical materialism and socialism? Labriola,
if I am not mistaken, is inclined to connect closely and almost to
identify the two things. The whole of socialism lies in the
materialistic interpretation of history, which is the truth itself of
socialism; to accept one and reject the other is to understand
neither. I consider this statement to be somewhat exaggerated, or,
at least, to need explanation. If historical materialism is stripped of
every survival of finality and of the benignities of providence, it can
afford no apology for either socialism or any other practical guidance
for life. On the other hand, in its special historical application, in the
assertion which can be made by its means, its real and close
connection with socialism is to be found. This assertion is as follows:
—Society is now so constituted that socialism is the only possible
solution which it contains within itself. An assertion and forecast of
this kind moreover will need to be filled out before it can be a basis
for practical action. It must be completed by motives of interest, or
by ethical and sentimental motives, moral judgments and the
enthusiasms of faith. The assertion in itself is cold and powerless. It
will be insufficient to move the cynic, the sceptic, the pessimist. But
it will suffice to put on their guard all those classes of society who
see their ruin in the sequence of history and to pledge them to a
long struggle, although the final outcome may be useless. Amongst
these classes is the proletariat, which indeed aims at the extinction
of its class. Moral conviction and the force of sentiment must be
added to give positive guidance and to supply an imperative ideal for
those who neither feel the blind impulse of class interest, nor allow
themselves to be swept along by the whirling current of the times.
The final point which I think demands explanation, although in
this case also the difference between myself and Labriola does not
appear to be serious, is this: to what conclusions does historical
materialism lead in regard to the ideal values of man, in regard that
is to intellectual truth and to what is called moral truth?
The history of the origin of intellectual truth is undoubtedly made
clearer by historical materialism, which aims at showing the
influence of actual material conditions upon the opening out, and
the very development of the human intellect. Thus the history of
opinions, like that of science, needs to be for the most part re-
written from this point of view. But those who, on account of such
considerations concerning historical origins, return in triumph to the
old relativity and scepticism, are confusing two quite distinct classes
of problem. Geometry owes its origin no doubt to given conditions
which are worth determining; but it does not follow that geometrical
truth is something merely historical and relative. The warning seems
superfluous, but even here misunderstandings are frequent and
remarkable. Have I not read in some socialist author that Marx's
discoveries themselves are of merely historical importance and must
necessarily be disowned. I do not know what meaning this can have
unless it has the very trivial one of a recognition of the limitation of
all human work, or unless it resolves itself into the no less idle
remark that Marx's thought is the offspring of his age. This onesided
history is still more dangerous in reference to moral truth. The
science of morality is evidently now in a transformation stage. The
ethical imperative, whose classics are Kant's Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, and Herbart's Allgemeine praktische Philosophie, appears
no longer adequate. In addition to it an historical and a formal
science of morality are making their appearance, which regard
morality as a fact, and study its universal nature apart from all
preoccupations as to creeds and rules. This tendency shows itself
not only in socialistic circles, but also elsewhere, and it will be
sufficient for me to refer to Simmel's clever writings. Labriola is thus
justified in his defence of new methods of regarding morality. 'Ethics,
—he says,—for us resolves itself into an historical study of the
subjective and objective conditions according to which morality
develops or finds hindrances to its development.' But he adds
cautiously, 'in this way alone, i.e., within these limits, is there value
in the statement that morality corresponds to the social situation,
i.e., in the final analysis to the economic conditions,' The question of
the intrinsic and absolute worth of the moral ideal, of its reducibility
or irreducibility to intellectual truth, remains untouched.
It would perhaps have been well if Labriola had dwelt a little more
on this point. A strong tendency is found in socialistic literature
towards a moral relativity, not indeed historical, but substantial,
which regards morality as a vain imagination. This tendency is
chiefly due to the necessity in which Marx and Engels found
themselves, in face of the various types of Utopians, of asserting
that the so-called social question is not a moral question,—i.e. as
this must be interpreted, it cannot be solved by sermons and so-
called moral methods—and to their bitter criticism of class ideals and
hypocrisies.[11] This result was helped on, as it seems to me, by the
Hegelian source of the views of Marx and Engels; it being obvious
that in the Hegelian philosophy ethics loses the rigidity given to it by
Kant and preserved by Herbart. And lastly the name materialism is
perhaps not without influence here, since it brings to mind at once
well-understood interests and the calculating comparison of
pleasures. It is, however, evident that idealism or absolute morality
is a necessary postulate of socialism. Is not the interest which
prompts the formation of a concept of surplus-value a moral interest,
or social if it is preferred? Can surplus value be spoken of in pure
economics? Does not the labourer sell his labour-power for exactly
what it is worth, given his position in existing society? And, without
the moral postulate, how could we ever explain Marx's political
activity, and that note of violent indignation and bitter satire which is
felt in every page of Das Kapital? But enough of this, for I find
myself making quite elementary statements such as can only be
overlooked owing to ambiguous or exaggerated phraseology.