Evidence Proving Corruption of The Federal Judiciary by The Credit Union Cartel (The Profiteers of Tax-Exempt Banking) .

Court-Filed Evidence Proving Corruption of the Federal Judiciary
by the Credit Union Cartel (the Profiteers of Tax-Exempt Banking)
On July 11, 2022, an FRCP Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate, and for damages, sanctions and other relief,
was filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court with new evidence, proving attorneys from the Sheppard Mullin law firm for
San Diego County Credit Union (“SDCCU”) conspired with opposing attorneys, all funded and directed through
a mutual insurer owned by ~5,000 other credit unions (i.e., the credit union cartel), to perpetrate an early-to-
mid 2014 extrinsic1 fraud on the court scheme in a 2011 state trial court. The scheme involved using a court
order to conceal having a non-neutral computer forensic expert with a hidden conflict of interest for SDCCU,
first access, and tamper with, the home PC hard drive of a former employee and witness to federal crimes by,
SDCCU, their attorneys, et al. The tampering was then used as evidence of spoliation to secure terminating
sanctions against that witness to their crimes, to strip him of due process, a trial and other rights under the U.S.
Constitution, state, and federal laws, to secure and coerce other rulings and agreements respectively.
Sheppard Mullin attorneys then conspired with attorneys for opposing parties to use the corrupted state trial
court ruling to defraud the judiciary in, a state appellate court in 2018 and, a U.S. Bankruptcy Court in 2018–
2019 to strip a lawsuit away from that witness to crimes, against SDCCU’s co-conspirator North Island Financial
Credit Union (NIFCU), et al (See Section 57, p. 22) with, and after merging into, California Credit Union (CCU),
and to defraud the judiciary in a U.S. District Court (twice) and Ninth Circuit Court, on appeals for other matters
in this case (before July 11, 2022). The foregoing were federal crimes “…to influence, obstruct, or impede, the
due administration of justice…” per the second prong of 18 U.S.C. §1503; in a conspiracy against rights, 18
U.S.C. §241, and arguably chargeable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The motive for defrauding the judiciary in state and federal courts was to enforce the provision in confidential
SDCCU employee separation agreements, against a witness to crimes by SDCCU, et al, that stated:
The case was assigned to (former Chief) Bankruptcy Court Judge, Laura S. Taylor, a former attorney of 21
years with Sheppard Mullin in San Diego, whose attorneys perpetrated federal crimes against the judiciary in
state and federal courts since at least early 2014 (to conceal other crimes by, them, SDCCU, et al)! Five weeks
later, the case is assigned to current Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge Christopher B. Latham (Chief Bankruptcy
Court Judges are appointed by, and therefore have gravitas with, the local District Court, on any appeal).
1
“Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court” Kougasian v. TMSL,
Inc. 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-1141, 1164, (9th Cir. 2004). The 9th Cir Ct in Green v. Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577
F.2d 1380, 1384, (9th Cir. 1978) also defined extrinsic fraud as conduct that “…prevents a party from having an
opportunity to present his claim or defense in court . . . or deprives a party of his right to a day in court.". Extrinsic
fraud is also the only type of fraud within the 9th Circuit court system that is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, that otherwise prohibits a party from contesting state court rulings based on fraud, in federal court.
-1-
As the court transcript for the September 14, 2022 motion hearing before Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge
Latham proves, the attorney for SDCCU’s co-conspirator NIFCU/CCU, admitted on line 12–13 of 1-ER-146,
about all the opposing attorneys, funded and directed by credit unions, who conspired to conceal and defraud
the judiciary in state and federal trial and appellate courts (before July 11, 2022) about their use of, tainted
evidence and, a non-neutral computer forensic expert with a hidden conflict of interest for SDCCU, that it was
“…nothing…” because “…everybody knew…”, and “…squared it away.” with themselves to assent to it, as if
the admission absolves them all of, and preserves their spoils from, defrauding state and federal courts!
The court transcript for the September 14, 2022 motion hearing also evidences the attorney for Sheppard
Mullin engage in a deceitful scheme to falsely reframe the Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion to cite
legal authorities for defeating a Rule 60(b) motion. When the Sheppard Mullin attorney for SDCCU is pressed
about the legal authorities cited in the Rule 60(d)(3) motion that supersede those cited by the Sheppard Mullin
attorney, the attorney admits “…there is an exception…” (line 5–19 of 1-ER-144), but continues advocating
legal authorities to defeat a Rule 60(b) motion, in a scheme that Chief Judge Latham obliges (proven below)
on behalf of Judge Taylor and Sheppard Mullin, her former law firm of 21 years, by issuing an Order with legal
authorities to deny a Rule 60(d)(3) motion, as if it sought relief under Rule 60(b) (1-ER-178–185), that it did not.
After a motion for reconsideration is filed calling out Chief Judge Latham’s error in falsely reframing the Rule
60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion to cite legal authorities for defeating a Rule 60(b) motion, Chief Judge
Latham issues a second Order (with no hearing) denying it, with a blatantly false statement of material
importance proving it, when he stated the Rule 60(d)(3) “…motion to vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b)
(ECF No. 71)” (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089)! Chief Judge Latham does not cite where Rule 60(b) was cited in ECF No.
71 because it was not there, not in table of authorities or anywhere else in that motion (ECF No. 71) because
it was a blatant lie to oblige the deceitful scheme to conceal federal crimes by, Sheppard Mullin, where Judge
Taylor, previously assigned to this case, was a former attorney for 21 years, and its client, SDCCU, et al!
On appeal in U.S. District Court before Judge Todd. W. Robinson, not only did Judge Robinson disregard,
the errors and blatantly false statements of material importance by Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge Latham in his
two Orders and, the evidence and, the admissions and non-denials by attorneys for SDCCU, NIFCU/CCU, and
a Bankruptcy Trustee (with a conflict of interest she refused to recuse herself of), to defraud the judiciary in
state and federal courts over eight years, but went one step further to protect Chief Judge Latham (who was
acting on behalf of Judge Taylor and Sheppard Mullin, her former law firm of 21 years). To affirm Chief Judge
Latham’s Order, Judge Robinson issued an Order stating that evidence of the (extrinsic fraud on the court)
scheme by attorneys from Sheppard Mullin (with opposing attorneys, all funded and directed by credit union
interests), to strip a witness to crimes by SDCCU, et al, of due process, a trial and other rights, and to use the
corrupted state trial court ruling to defraud a 2018 state appellate court and three federal courts (between 2019
and July 7, 2022) benefitting Sheppard Mullin, Judge Taylor’s former law firm of 21 years and its client, SDCCU,
was evidence that “…only revealed a disqualifying conflict of interest...” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU and
Sheppard Mullin, that (shockingly) did not require disqualifying all that was secured in state and federal courts
with tainted evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic expert with “…a disqualifying conflict of interest...”!
The above case is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court as Case No. 23-55750. Complaints
for Judicial Misconduct, pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1)(A) and Rule 4(a)(6) of the Guide to Judiciary Policy, Article
II. Misconduct and Disability have been filed and are currently pending with the Judicial Council of the Ninth
Circuit, against Bankruptcy Court, Chief Judge Christopher B. Latham and Judge Laura S. Taylor, Case No.
23-90050 and 23-90051 respectively, and U.S. District Court Judge, Todd. W. Robinson, Case No. 23-90167.
-2-
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023, ID: 12802219, DktEntry: 3, Page 1 of 50
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLTON ROARK 9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750

(“Roark”), Appellant,
District Court Case No.
vs. 3:22-CV-01962-TWR-WVG
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION

(“SDCCU”), et al, Appellees,
APPELLANT’S INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF
JURISDICTION.
1. Timeliness of Appeal:
a. What is the date of the judgment or order that you want this court to
review? August 22, 2023.
b. Did you file any motion, other than for fees and costs, after the judgment
was entered? Answer yes or no: No.
• If you did, on what date did you file the motion? N/A.
• For prisoners or detainees, what date did you give the motion to
prison authorities for mailing? N/A.
• What date did the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel

(BAP) decide the motion that you filed after judgment? N/A.
c. What date did you file your notice of appeal? August 25, 2023.
• For prisoners or detainees, what date did you give your notice of
appeal to prison authorities for mailing? N/A.
Appellant prays for a full de novo standard of review. ER numbers in this brief refer to
documents in the Excerpt of Record filed in this Court as Dkt #2 on October 2, 2023.
9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 2
FACTS. Include all facts that the court needs to know to decide your case.
2. What are the facts of your case?
The District Court failed to recognize evidence proving attorneys as officers of
the court for, Roark, his co-defendant employer North Island Financial Credit Union
(“NIFCU”)1 and plaintiff SDCCU (all funded and directed by SDCCU, NIFCU and
insurer CUNA Mutual, n/k/a TruStage) conspired to perpetrate an early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in a 2011 state trial court, to conceal their use of
tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic expert, to assert
spoliation and secure terminating sanctions and a default judgment against Roark,
that counsel for NIFCU/CCU admitted in a September 14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court
hearing, all the attorneys were aware of (per the evidence cited later in this brief)!
The District Court also failed to recognize that the Bankruptcy Court not only
reframed Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate, as a Rule 60(b) motion in its first
order (1-ER-178–185) to deny it, as evidenced by its second order (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-
089) denying Roark’s motion for reconsideration (due to court error) when it falsely
stated Roark’s “…motion to vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b)…”, but not citing
where in his motion, because it’s not there (2-ER-219–390), but also cited false
evidence Roark could not contest due to terminating sanctions caused by the early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to conceal use of tainted/fabricated
1 NIFCU became a division of California Credit Union (“CCU”) in February, 2017

evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic expert who had what, the District
Court itself said, was a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015).
The scheme, based on Roark’s evidence (line 19 of 2-ER-230 to 2-ER-390, line
1–10 of 2-ER-227, line 5 of 1-ER-207 to line 2 of 1-ER-208, and line 1 of 1-ER-045
to line 13 of 1-ER-053) entailed attorneys as officers of the court for all opposing
parties conspiring to conceal from the state trial court (and every subsequent state
and federal court thereafter) their use of Jim Sevel, a non-neutral computer forensic
expert who had, what the District Court itself acknowledged was, “…a disqualifying
conflict of interest…” [Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, to first
access (and tamper with) Roark’s home PC hard drive to create evidence of
wholesale file deletion activity (line 11–18 of 1-ER-211, and middle of 3-ER-546).
However, not only did the District Court fail to recognize that the Bankruptcy
Court falsely reframed Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate as a Rule 60(b)
motion for common fraud, which it was not, to cite legal authorities and a time-bar
to deny it, when Roark’s filings and evidence prove he was seeking relief under Rule
60(d)(3) for an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, by attorneys as officers of the
court, that pursuant to the legal authorities he cited, has no time-bar, but also;
(a) failed to recognize that the state trial court had (unknowingly) relied on the use
of tainted/fabricated evidence produced by that non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015), and;

(b) failed to recognize that attorneys as officers of the court for all opposing parties
conspired to not only conceal the “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” of the
non-neutral computer forensic expert from the state trial court, but to take part
in a (early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court) scheme to only inform that
court about subsequently used neutral computer forensic experts the state trial
court only knew of and relied on (line 2–22 of 2-ER-232 and line 18 of 1-ER-
050 to line 13 of 1-ER-053, and line 11–16 of 1-ER-021). This was evidenced
by the state trial court’s own minute order that only references (the subsequently
used) "neutral" computer forensic experts (line 14 of 2-ER-255 and five places
in 2-ER-262), who the state trial court did not know were all working with, and
analyzing, Roark’s home PC hard drive (and copies thereof), after it was first
accessed and tampered with by Mr. Sevel, the non-neutral computer forensics
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…”. This was an orchestrated
scheme to propound the deceptive fallacy to the 2011 state trial court that neutral
computer forensics experts were first or only used (which was false)!
Tainted/fabricated evidence from the non-neutral computer forensic expert with
a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” for SDCCU, was then used by SDCCU to
assert wholesale spoliation by Roark to have terminating sanctions imposed on him.
Roark’s attorney, now evidenced taking part in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud
on the court scheme, repeatedly and in hindsight falsely, assured Roark the issue of
tainted/fabricated evidence from the non-neutral computer forensic expert, would be
raised, until he did not, and could not, with the state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-
026 and line 3–7 of 1-ER-028), and later the state appellate court that Roark’s new
evidence now proves was a sham appeal (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 2-ER-
227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053, line 3–7 of
1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040).
The false assurances by Roark’s counsel were extrinsic fraud out of court to facilitate
the extrinsic fraud scheme on the state trial court and, later fraud scheme on the state
appellate court, all with opposing officers of the court in conspiracy with each other.
Terminating sanctions (secured by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme by attorneys as officers of the court) stripped Roark of due process, a
trial and other rights under the U.S. Constitution, state, and federal laws necessary
to prove his innocence and to prove that other allegations from SDCCU were based
on fabricated evidence. The evidenced intent by attorneys as officers of the court for
all three opposing parties who were all funded and directed by credit union interests,
to corrupt the judicial process against Roark, was (at a minimum);
(a) to prevent Roark, a former SDCCU employee, from presenting evidence of, or
corroborating, SDCCU wrongdoing, alleged by, anonymous others and in a
lawsuit from, Scott Norris (3-ER-565–584), an executive employed by SDCCU
when wrongdoing began (and fired in May of 2013), who was, and is, the son-
in-law of Roger McTighe, a Board member at NIFCU, Roark’s co-defendant
employer, and a direct rival of SDCCU, and;
(b) to enforce the unenforceable anti-whistleblower provision against public policy
contained in confidential SDCCU employee separation agreements like Roark’s
that stated “Employee agrees that he will not engage in the following activities:
(1) Raise allegations of wrongdoing against SDCCU with any Governmental
agency; and/or (2) Incite other persons and/or entities to raise allegations of
wrongdoing against SDCCU.” [Emphasis Added] (top of 3-ER-589).
The orchestrated early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme was prior
to an orchestrated August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme by officers of the court
for the same opposing parties (previously adjudicated to not be an extrinsic fraud on
the court scheme). The August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme to corrupt the 2011
state trial court’s ability to impartially adjudicate reconsideration of its tentative for
terminating sanctions was intended to conceal the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud
on the court scheme, and conceal NIFCU’s respondeat superior liability (the state
appellate court had suspicions about even without benefit of the evidence, 2nd ¶, p.
10, Dkt #39, 9th Cir. Case No, 21-55040) for requiring and directing Roark to delete
NIFCU files on his home PC, that it believed SDCCU’s preservation order allowed
to comply with its policies (September 5, 2014 entry on p. 18, and pp. 20–28 of Dkt
#13, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040) that Roark’s NIFCU provided attorney stated were
“…proper to permanently delete.” (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line
20 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, and 3-ER-638 based
on 3-ER-623–637). Now SDCCU counsel is citing Roark’s deletion of files NIFCU
required, to excuse the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme.
The corrupted state trial court rulings were then used by officers of the court for,
a fraud on the court scheme in a 2018 state appeal court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112,
line 20 of 2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-
053, line 3–7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9th Cir. Case
No. 21-55040), to conceal the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic (and other) fraud on the
court schemes in the state trial court, and after Roark filed bankruptcy, used for an
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in a 2018–19 bankruptcy adversary trial court to
secure summary judgment after Roark filed evidence of the August 7, 2015 fraud on
the court scheme but, before he could file evidence alluded to on line 13–17 of 2-
ER-229, line 9–14 of 1-ER-043 of his answer to SDCCU’s adversary complaint (line
20–21 of 3-ER-433) of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme.
Roark did not fail to overturn the default judgment against him in Bankruptcy
Court (for the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme only) for lack of evidence,
but because he allegedly “…had waived any challenge to the bankruptcy court’s
decision regarding affirmative defenses…” (line 4–5 of 1-ER-008) even though he
did cite affirmative defenses. However, the District Court is now citing Roark’s
deletion of files on his home PC, from the August 18, 2015 state trial court ruling,
his evidence filed in the 2018–19 bankruptcy adversary trial court (concealed from
the state trial court by the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme, adjudicated in
two prior District Court cases2 and Ninth Circuit to not be an extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme) proves were required and directed by NIFCU (September 5, 2014
entry, p. 18, and pp. 20–28, Dkt #13, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040). Roark’s attorney
acknowledged the foregoing in an email to not only state NIFCU files were "...proper
to permanently delete" but that “You [Roark] had mentioned this issue in the past…”
acknowledging his prior instructions to Roark (middle of 1-ER-193 and 3-ER-638).
Summary Judgment based on corrupted state court rulings were then used by a
Bankruptcy Trustee (line 13 of 2-ER-243 to line 11 of 2-ER-244, and line 4–20 and
24 of 2-ER-229) to strip Roark of his 2018 complaint against NIFCU, et al, that
referenced the Bankruptcy Trustee’s former employee at NIFCU (Dkts #13 and #39,
9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040) who, assisted officers of the court in extrinsic (and other)
fraud on the court schemes in the 2011 state trial court action with SDCCU (line 21
of 1-ER-207 to line 2 of 1-ER-208), witnessed (1-ER-217) the gaslighting tactic by
SDCCU counsel in a deposition to conceal Mr. Sevel’s name (line 5 of 1-ER-207 to
line 2 of 1-ER-208 based on 1-ER-214–218) and was breaching Roark’s confidential
attorney-client emails for NIFCU (line 21–23 of 2-ER-225, line 5–8 of 2-ER-237
2
19-CV-00344 and 19-CV-02117
and bottom of 2-ER-389). Roark’s prior appeal in this Court involving the August
7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme only, included pleas in, motions, petitions and,
briefs for 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040, to consider supplemental evidence proving the
early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme was entering the rulings of
the Ninth Circuit, last denied on July 7, 2022 (Dkt #52, Case No. 21-55040), so his
evidence was filed with a motion in Bankruptcy Court five days later because: (1) it
could not be filed or adjudicated in any prior court due to extrinsic and other fraud
on the court schemes by officers of the court and; (2) extrinsic fraud on the court, by
officers of the court, is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and has no
time-bar per Roark’s legal authorities (2-ER-219–390 and 1-ER-030–073).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT OR THE BAP. In this

section, we ask you about what happened before you filed your notice of appeal with
this court.
3. What did you ask the district court or the BAP to do—for example, did you
ask the court to award money damages, issue an injunction, or provide some
other type of relief?
Appellant requested the District Court overturn the Bankruptcy Court’s Orders
(1-ER-178–185 and 1-ER-088–090) and grant his Rule 60(d)(3) motion (2-ER-219–
390) in full (line 12 of 2-ER-244 to line 21 of 2-ER-248), to void every agreement,
and state and federal court order Roark’s new3 evidence proves was the result of
3
Roark’s evidence filed in Bankruptcy Court was characterized as “new evidence”
only because it could not be filed or adjudicated earlier in any state or federal trial
court due to extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes by officers of the court.
terminating sanctions secured by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme by officers of the court for opposing parties, to conceal their use of
tainted/fabricated evidence, later admitted, and not denied, by at least counsel for
SDCCU and NIFCU/CCU, in a September 14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court hearing (line
18 of 1-ER-049 to line 8 of 1-ER-050, line 5–12 of 1-ER-069 and line 2–16 of 1-
ER-021). This includes the Bankruptcy Trustee settlement, the nondischargeable
default judgment against Roark, and $9,875,000 Mary Carter settlement agreement
Roark was coerced to sign with NIFCU and SDCCU (line 14 of 1-ER-102, line 5 of
1-ER-114 to line 1 of 1-ER-115, and 1-ER-151–157, also cited in Dkt #13 and #39,
9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040) and to impose sanctions, damages and grant other relief.
4. What legal claim or claims did you raise in the district court or at the BAP?
An extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in a 2011 state trial court action, in which
attorneys as officers of the court for all three opposing parties conspired, in early-to-
mid 2014, to conceal use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer
forensic expert who had, what the District Court called, a “…disqualifying conflict
of interest…” [Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, to allege
spoliation, to secure terminating sanctions against Roark to strip him of due process,
a trial and other rights under the U.S. Constitution, and state and federal laws.
The District Court failed to recognize Appellant cited as further evidence, a July,
2022 Bankruptcy Court filing by SDCCU counsel (line 11–15 of 1-ER-206, and line
8–17 of 1-ER-050, and line 20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022) and a September
14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court hearing transcript (1-ER-133–150) in which counsel for
NIFCU/CCU, SDCCU, and Bankruptcy Trustee, acknowledged, or did not deny:
(a) the explicit statement by NIFCU/CCU counsel (Mr. Sims) in the September 14,
2022 Bankruptcy Court motion hearing (per the transcript section cited below),
about all the attorneys as officers of the court for all three opposing parties in
the 2011 state trial court action who cited, or did not contest, what they all knew
was use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest….” for SDCCU (i.e., the
early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme) to secure terminating
sanctions against Roark, that “…everybody knew…”, and had “…squared it
away.” with themselves to assent to it (line 12–13 of 1-ER-146, line 2–8 of 1-
ER-050, line 7–12 of 1-ER-069, and line 10–16 of 1-ER-072, which did not
include the state trial court. The District Court failed to recognize that the state
trial court Entry of Judgment and Minute Order (2-ER-251–266) referencing
"neutral" computer forensic experts (on line 14 of 2-ER-255 and at least five
places in 2-ER-262), was a reference to subsequently used computer forensic
experts who analyzed Roark’s home PC hard drive after it was first accessed
and tampered with by Mr. Sevel, the non-neutral computer forensic expert,
which was concealed from the state trial court by officers of the court for all
three opposing parties in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme (line 20 of 2-ER-230 to line 8 of 2-ER-237, based on email evidence,
2-ER-267–376) filed with Roark’s motion to vacate (2-ER-219-390). The
District Court also failed to recognize that in the second to last paragraph from
the bottom of 2-ER-261 (state trial court minute order), it stated the parties
agreed in May of 2014 to inspect Roark's hard drive, which is false based on
Roark’s new evidence for a materially significant reason (2-ER-267–376).
The foregoing was intended to conceal that the parties actually agreed in mid-
February to inspect Roark’s hard drive (2-ER-267–269) to conceal that it was
first accessed (and tampered with) two months earlier in March of 2014, by Mr.
Sevel, the non-neutral computer forensic expert! The District Court also failed
to recognize why the bottom paragraph in 2-ER-262 (the state trial court minute
order) only has a vague reference to an earlier March 2014 image of Roark's
home PC hard drive but not by whom, to conceal the name of Mr. Sevel, the
non-neutral computer forensic expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of
interest…” for SDCCU (line 5 of 1-ER-015). The foregoing was not squared
away with Roark who was repeatedly and in hindsight falsely, assured by his
attorney that the issue of tainted/fabricated evidence from Mr. Sevel would be
raised, until he did not, and could not, with the state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-
ER-026 and line 3–7 of 1-ER-028) and a later state appellate court (line 20 of
2-ER-227 to line 10 of 2-ER-228) that Roark’s new evidence now proves was a
sham state court appeal. The foregoing was extrinsic fraud by Roark’s attorney
out of court to enable the extrinsic fraud scheme on the state trial court and later
fraud on a state appellate court with opposing counsel, and that;
(b) terminating sanctions (secured by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme) involving Roark’s home PC only, also allowed SDCCU counsel
to cite other false allegation and false evidence, terminating sanctions prevented
Roark from proving were false and fabricated. This included a USB drive used
against Roark cited in the state trial court minute order (2-ER-261–263) that
was not only tainted, and had no chain of custody because another NIFCU
affiliated party gave the USB drive to Roark (line 10–11 of 2-ER-231, line 4 of
2-ER-234, line 20 of 1-ER-051 to line 1 of 1-ER-052, line 17–18 of 1-ER-211,
line 18 of 1-ER-023 to line 8 of 1-ER-024) who was instructed by his attorney
(now evidenced taking part in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme) to first send it to him (line 3-19 of 1-ER-187 and 1-ER-190). The early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by officers of the court for
opposing parties, also prevented Roark from proving NIFCU was requiring and
instructing him to delete NIFCU files on his home PC, his NIFCU provided
attorney stated in an email were “…proper to permanently delete” [Emphasis
Added] (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187 to line

13 of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, and 3-ER-638 based on 3-ER-623–637).
The District Court is citing other false allegations and fabricated evidence from
the state trial court minute order that, an August 7, 2015 fraud on the court
scheme (adjudicated to not be extrinsic fraud) and, terminating sanctions (from
the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme), prevented him from
proving were false in the state trial court and state appellate court. This is what
SDCCU counsel did (line 11–15 of 1-ER-206, line 8–17 of 1-ER-050, line 3 of
1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, and line 20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-
022) when it stated, “…regardless of whether Sevel actually tampered with
Roark’s hard drive or whether there was a conspiracy to conceal Sevel’s conflict
of interest [and use tainted/fabricated evidence from his tampering]…” (line 7–
8, p. 3, Dkt #74, Bankr S.D. CA) to refer to other false claims/evidence, and;
(c) the explicit acknowledgment by SDCCU counsel (Ms. Pruitt) in the September
14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court motion hearing, that the legal authorities asserted
by Roark to grant his Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate, based on his new evidence
and assertions, were an “…exception…” to those asserted by SDCCU counsel
to falsely reframe his motion as a Rule 60(b) motion (line 5–19 of 1-ER-144,
line 4–7 of 1-ER-126, and line 17–20 of 1-ER-055).
5. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. For prisoners, did you use up all

administrative remedies for each claim before you filed your complaint in the
district court? If you did not, please tell us why. N/A.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. In this section, we ask

you about issues related to this case before the court of appeals and any previous
cases you have had in this court.
6. What issues are you asking the court to review in this case? What do you
think the district court or the BAP did wrong?
To summarize, the District Court failed to recognize email evidence (2-ER-
267–376) Roark filed in Bankruptcy Court with his Rule 60(d)(3) motion (2-ER-
219-390) proving that attorneys as officers of the court (for all three opposing
parties) in a 2011 state trial court action, all knew they were conspiring to conceal
from that state trial court their use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral
computer forensic expert who had what the District Court itself stated was a
“…disqualifying conflict of interest…” for SDCCU (line 5 of 1-ER-015), that was
used to assert spoliation and secure terminating sanctions against Roark (i.e., the
early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme), and failed to recognize that
the Bankruptcy Court falsely reframed Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b)
motion for common fraud, which it was not, to cite legal authorities and a time-bar
that would allow denying it, when Roark’s assertions, filings and evidence proves
he sought relief under Rule 60(d)(3) and other legal authorities for an extrinsic fraud
on the court scheme, by attorneys as officers of the court, that has no time-bar.
On line 5–9 of 1-ER-014, the District Court also states Roark’s email evidence
cannot be considered new evidence for a motion seeking relief under Rule 60(b) that
Roark did not assert under Rule 60(b), because he asserted relief under Rule 60(d)(3)
and other legal authorities) because he was in possession of those emails at the time
of trial. However, the District Court fails to recognize the evidence proving that
Roark endeavored without interruption to file that evidence, but extrinsic (and other)
fraud on the court schemes by attorneys as officers of the court for opposing parties
in conspiracy with each other, in state and federal courts, prevented (and delayed) it.
The District Court’s failure to recognize the most significant aspects of Roark’s
appeal was evidenced on line 5 of 1-ER-015, when it stated Roark’s email evidence
(of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme) “…only revealed a
disqualifying conflict of interest…” [Emphasis Added]. This explains why:
(a) the District Court failed to recognize that Roark’s evidence also revealed a
scheme (i.e., conspiracy) by attorneys as officers of the court to not only conceal
from the state trial court, the “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” of the non-
neutral computer forensic expert, but that he was allowed to first access (and as
alleged by Roark, tamper with) Roark’s home PC hard drive, and why;
(b) the District Court failed to recognize that Roark’s evidence also revealed a
scheme (i.e., conspiracy) by attorneys as officers of the court to propound the
deceptive fallacy that neutral computer forensic experts were first, or, only used,
to access Roark’s home PC hard drive, (that the state trial court only knew of
and relied on) (line 2–22 of 2-ER-232 and line 18 of 1-ER-050 to line 13 of 1-
ER-053, and line 11–16 of 1-ER-021) evidenced by its own minute order that
only references (the subsequently used) "neutral" computer forensic experts
(line 14 of 2-ER-255 and in at least five places in 2-ER-262), and why;
(c) the District Court also failed to recognize that if, use of a non-neutral computer
forensic expert to first access (and as alleged by Roark to tamper with) Roark’s
home PC hard drive, constituted a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…”
[Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015), that was concealed from the state trial
court, then accordingly, why did it not constitute a disqualification of the work
product (i.e. tainted/fabricated evidence) by that non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…”, to allege spoliation, to
secure terminating sanctions against Roark, stripping him of due process, a trial
and other rights under the U.S. Constitution, state and federal laws, that left him
with a nondischargeable default judgment (that no trial court would have
imposed, had all the attendant circumstances been disclosed to it), and why;
(d) the District Court also failed to recognize that state trial court rulings based on
at least a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” have, before July 11, 2022,
entered into the prior rendered rulings of the District Court and Ninth Circuit
Court for different/previous appeal matters involving this bankruptcy case.
Even if the District Court did not believe evidence tampering occurred (line 6–
18 of 1-ER-211, line 17 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022 and middle 3-ER-546):
(a) that belief is still based on the tainted work product of a non-neutral computer
forensic expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” for SDCCU, per
the District Court, that officers of the court for opposing parties conspired to
conceal from the state trial court (and subsequent state and federal courts), and;
(b) that is not a determination for an appeal court to make, but for the (state) trial
court to make, that did not have the benefit of that evidence because of the early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, that Roark was able to finally
file evidence of, in Bankruptcy Court on, and after, July 11, 2022, and;
(c) it cannot be denied that tainted evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) was
used in, but concealed from, the state trial court, because Roark’s new evidence
(2-ER-267-376), with the state trial court minute order, proves it (line 14 of 2-
ER-255 and throughout 2-ER-262) and prevented him from proving tampering.
The District Court also failed to recognize that the Bankruptcy Court falsely
reframed Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate as a Rule 60(b) motion to assert
legal authorities and a time-bar that would allow denying it. Roark’s motion to
vacate sought relief for an early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by
attorneys as officers of the court in a 2011 state trial court under Rule 60(d)(3), which
states “This rule does not limit a court's power to: […] set aside a judgment for fraud
on the court.” because "There is no statute of limitations for fraud on the court”, In
re Roussos, 541 B.R. at 729 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) and because "a decision
produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final." 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23 (see Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. references and other authorities in Bankruptcy/District Court filings).
Rule 60(b) does not apply to extrinsic fraud on the court schemes by officers of
the court, otherwise there would be no need for Rule 60(d)(3), and because the time-
bar under Rule 60(b) would then conflict with the legal authorities that state there is
no time-bar for (extrinsic) fraud on the court (by attorneys as officers of the court).
The most obvious evidence proving the Bankruptcy Court falsely reframed
Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate as a Rule 60(b) motion, the District
Court failed to recognize even after being reminded of it (throughout 1-ER-101–
177, line 1 of 1-ER-068 to line 18 of 1-ER-072, 1-ER-030–073 and 1-ER-019–029)
was the objectively false statement in its second order (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089) denying
Roark’s motion for reconsideration (“due to clear court error”) that his “…motion to
vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b)…”, but not citing where he sought relief under
Rule 60(b), precisely because it is not there, not in the Table of Authorities or
anywhere else because it was at Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate (2-ER-219–390)!
The District Court also failed to recognize that in the September 14, 2022
Bankruptcy Court motion hearing (per the transcript section cited below), counsel
(Mr. Sims) for NIFCU/CCU explicitly admitted, about the officers of the court for
all three opposing parties in the 2011 state trial court action who conspired to take
part in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, that “…everybody
knew…” and “…squared it away.” with themselves to assent to it (line 12–13 of
1-ER-146, line 2–8 of 1-ER-050, line 7–12 of 1-ER-069, and line 10–16 of 1-ER-
072, which was not denied by counsel for SDCCU or, Bankruptcy Trustee present
in that hearing (line 18 of 1-ER-049 to line 8 of 1-ER-050, line 5–12 of 1-ER-069
and line 2–16 of 1-ER-021). However, it was not only not squared away with the
state trial court (line 11–16 of 1-ER-021), it was also not squared away with Roark
who was repeatedly and in hindsight falsely, assured by his NIFCU provided
attorney the issue of tainted/fabricated evidence from Mr. Sevel would be raised,
until he did not, and could not, with the state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-026 and
line 3–7 of 1-ER-028), and a later state appellate court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line
20 of 2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053,
line 3–7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9 th Cir. Case No.
21-55040) that Roark’s new evidence proves was a sham appeal. Roark counsel
engaged in extrinsic fraud out of court, to facilitate an extrinsic fraud scheme on the
state trial court and, later fraud on a state appellate court, all with opposing counsel.
The District Court also failed to recognize that in the September 14, 2022
Bankruptcy Court motion hearing (per the transcript section cited below), SDCCU
counsel (Ms. Pruitt) acknowledged the legal authorities asserted by Roark in his Rule
60(d)(3) motion to vacate, based on his new evidence of the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by officers of the court were an “…exception…”
to those asserted by SDCCU counsel to falsely reframe his motion as a Rule 60(b)
motion (line 5–19 of 1-ER-144, line 4–7 of 1-ER-126, line 17–20 of 1-ER-055).
The District Court also failed to recognize it is citing false allegations and false
evidence against Roark from an August 18, 2015 state trial court ruling, for NIFCU
files deleted on his home PC that his evidence suppressed from the state trial court
by the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme, but filed in the 2018–19 bankruptcy
adversary trial court, cited in a prior appeal in this Court, proves was required and
directed by NIFCU (pp. 20–28 of Dkt #13 for 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040), that
Roark’s NIFCU provided attorney stated were “…proper to permanently delete…”
[Emphasis Added] (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187
to line 13 of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, and 3-ER-638, per 3-ER-623–637).
Roark’s exculpatory evidence for the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme
failed to overturn the default judgment against him, not for lack of evidence, but
because Roark allegedly “…had waived any challenge to the bankruptcy court’s
decision regarding affirmative defenses…” (line 4–5 of 1-ER-008) even though
Roark did cite affirmative defenses. However, the District Court is still citing (1)
alleged evidence of spoliation against Roark his evidence filed in Bankruptcy Court
in 2018 exonerates him of, and (2) tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral
computer forensic expert who had what the District Court acknowledged was, a
“…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015), to deny his appeal.
The District Court (at a minimum):
(a) failed to recognize Roark’s evidence proving the early-to-mid-2014 extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme by attorneys as officers of the court, and;
(b) failed to recognize the admission by an officer of the court for NIFCU/CCU in
a September 14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court hearing, about the attorneys as officers
of the court for all opposing parties in the 2011 state trial court, who took part
in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to conceal their use
of what they knew was tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer
forensic expert who had what the District Court itself acknowledged was, a
“…disqualifying conflict of interest…” [Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-001–
015) for SDCCU, to allege spoliation, to secure terminating sanctions against
Roark, that “…everybody knew…” and “…squared it away.” with themselves
to assent to it (line 12–13 of 1-ER-146, line 2–8 of 1-ER-050, line 7–12 of 1-
ER-069, and line 10–16 of 1-ER-072, which was not denied by counsel for
SDCCU or the Bankruptcy Trustee present in that hearing (line 18 of 1-ER-049
to line 8 of 1-ER-050, line 5–12 of 1-ER-069 and line 2–16 of 1-ER-021).
However, it was not only not squared away with the state trial court, (line 11–
16 of1-ER-021) but not squared away with Roark who was repeatedly and in
hindsight falsely, assured by his NIFCU provided attorney the issue of

tainted/fabricated evidence by Mr. Sevel’s would be raised, until he did not, and
could not, with the state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-026 and line 3–7 of 1-
ER-028), and later a state appellate court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 2-
ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053, line
3–7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9 th Cir. Case No.
21-55040) that Roark’s new evidence now proves was a sham state court appeal.
The foregoing was extrinsic fraud out of court by an officer of the court, to
facilitate an extrinsic fraud scheme on the state trial court and later a fraud
scheme on a state appellate court, all with opposing officers of the court, and;
(c) failed to recognize objective evidence proving that the Bankruptcy Court falsely
reframed Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion, to deny it.
The District Court’s failure to recognize the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud
on the court scheme by officers of the court, is best proven by line 5 of its ruling (1-
ER-015) that Roark’s evidence “…only revealed a disqualifying conflict of
interest…” [Emphasis Added]. The foregoing proves why:
from the state trial court, the “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” of the non-
alleged by Roark, tamper with) Roark’s home PC hard drive, and that;
scheme (i.e., conspiracy) by officers of the court to then propound the deceptive
fallacy that neutral computer forensic experts were first, or, only used, to access
Roark’s home PC hard drive, that the state trial court only knew of and relied
on (line 2–22 of 2-ER-232 and line 18 of 1-ER-050 to line 13 of 1-ER-053, and
line 11–16 of 1-ER-021), evidenced by its own minute order that only references
(the subsequently used) "neutral" computer forensic experts (line 14 of 2-ER-
255 and in at least five places in 2-ER-262), and that;
(c) the District Court also failed to recognize that if use of a non-neutral computer
forensic expert to first access (and as alleged by Roark tamper with) Roark’s
[Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015), that was concealed from the state trial
court, then accordingly, why did it not constitute a disqualification of the work
product (i.e., tainted/fabricated evidence) by that non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…”, to allege spoliation, to
secure terminating sanctions against Roark, stripping him of due process, a trial
and other rights under the U.S. Constitution, state and federal laws (no trial court
would have imposed had all the attendant circumstances been disclosed), and;
at least a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” have, prior to July 11, 2022,

Based on the evidence, assertions and legal authorities cited by Appellant in his
Bankruptcy Court filings, reasserted and cited on appeal in District Court, Appellant
cites the following oversights, errors, and omissions by the District Court per the
line and page number in its Order and Judgment (1-ER-001–018).
District Court Order and Judgment
Line 11–14 of 1-ER-002: To be clear, Roark was not “…let go” alone, but with
other employees, subject to confidential separation agreements that conditioned
receipt of severance pay to an unenforceable anti-whistleblower provision (top of 3-
ER-589), SDCCU enforced against Roark, by having officers of the court perpetrate
extrinsic (and other) fraud on the court schemes in state and federal trial courts.
Line 15 of 1-ER-002 to line 8 of 1-ER-003: These are not facts! Roark was
never proven to be disseminating defamatory statements (or misappropriating
anything from SDCCU). Evidence proving otherwise was provided to Roark’s
attorneys, but never cited in the 2011 state trial court. The District Court is citing
false allegations and evidence against Roark as facts from the state trial court; (1)
that Roark’s evidence later filed in Bankruptcy Court exonerates him of, or (2) that
are based on the tainted/fabricated evidence findings of a non-neutral computer
forensic expert who the District Court admitted had “…a disqualifying conflict of
interest…” [Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, whose tampering
of Roark’s home PC hard drive, led to terminating sanctions (for alleged spoliation)
against Roark, that prevented from proving all allegations against him were false,
based on fabricated evidence, or NIFCU’s respondeat superior obligation.
Line 9–16 of 1-ER-003: The District Court failed to recognize Roark’s co-
defendant employer NIFCU, believed SDCCU’s preservation order allowed it to
require him to delete NIFCU files on his home PC, to comply with its policies, as
proven by the exculpatory evidence that Roark filed in Bankruptcy Court in 2018,
concealed from the state trial court by the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme
previously evidenced in this Court (September 5, 2014 entry on p. 18, and pp. 20–
28, Dkt #13, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040). This is why Roark’s NIFCU provided
attorney said NIFCU files on his home PC were “…proper to permanently delete”
[Emphasis Added] (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187
to line 13 of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, 3-ER-638 based on 3-ER-623–637),
Line 17–21 of 1-ER-003: The District Court also failed to recognize when
CUNA Mutual suggested Mr. Sevel, it was in an email without the customary cc: to
Roark on February 13th 2014, to Roark’s attorney only (top of 2-ER-268) stating, “I
would recommend that we reach out to Jim Sevel first. I have used him in the past
on cases and have had good results” [Emphasis Added], proving after all conflict
checks CUNA Mutual was in a position to have foreknowledge that Mr. Sevel had,
what the District Court itself stated was a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…”
[Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015).
Line 22–28 of 1-ER-003: The District Court also failed to recognize after all
conflict checks, Mr. Sevel was only terminated almost two months after his conflict
of interest was disclosed that CUNA Mutual was in a position to have foreknowledge
of, and one month after he was allowed to first access and tamper with Roark’s home
PC hard drive. This was evidenced by the wholesale file deletion activity on Roark’s
home PC he could not explain (line 11–18 of 1-ER-211, and middle of 3-ER-546),
far in excess of the deleted work files NIFCU required, and instructed, him to delete
(September 5, 2014 entry on p. 18, and pp. 20–28, Dkt #13, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-
55040) that Roark’s NIFCU provided attorney stated were “…proper to permanently
delete” (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187 to line 13
of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, and 3-ER-638 based on 3-ER-623–637) that the
August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme concealed from the state trial court.
Line 1 of 1-ER-004 to line 18 of of 1-ER-005: The District Court also failed
to recognize the alleged discovery it repeatedly cites, was all based on subsequently
used computer forensic experts who were all working with Roark’s home PC hard
drive (and copies thereof) after it was first accessed and tampered with by Mr. Sevel,
the non-neutral computer forensic expert, which led to terminating sanctions that
prevented Roark from contesting the use of any fraudulent evidence used against
him. This includes the USB drive cited in the state trial court minute order (2-ER-
261–263) that was given to Roark by someone else affiliated with NIFCU, and had
no chain of custody because it was tainted (line 10–11 of 2-ER-231, line 4 of 2-ER-
234, line 20 of 1-ER-051 to line 1 of 1-ER-052, line 17–18 of 1-ER-211, line 18 of
1-ER-023 to line 8 of 1-ER-024) that Roark’s attorney Steven Yee (line 12–19 of 1-
ER-187, and 1-ER-190) now evidenced taking part in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme with attorneys as officers of the court for NIFCU and
SDCCU, instructed Roark to first send to him. Roark’s attorney (Mr. Yee) was
evidenced in prior appeals also taking part in the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court
scheme in the state trial court to conceal NIFCU’s respondeat superior liability in
order to transfer it to Roark (and fraud on the court in the 2018 state appellate court
to conceal all of the foregoing). The August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme was
also intended to conceal that Roark’s NIFCU provided attorneys at (at least) the Yee
law firm, knew NIFCU required and instructed him to permanently delete NIFCU
files on his home PC (pp. 20–28 of Dkt #13 for 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040) because
they were informing him that those files were “…proper to permanently delete…”
(line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-
188, middle of 1-ER-193 and 3-ER-638 per 3-ER-623–637). The aforementioned is
just one of many examples of false and fabricated evidence that terminating
sanctions (secured by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme
involving Roark’s home PC only, allowed SDCCU counsel to cite uncontested. That
is why SDCCU counsel dismissed its role in the conspiracy to take part in the early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in the 2011 state trial court action
to state, “…regardless of whether Sevel actually tampered with Roark’s hard drive
or whether there was a conspiracy to conceal Sevel’s conflict of interest [and use
tainted/fabricated evidence from his tampering] …” (line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 in
Bankruptcy Court) to then cite other false allegations and manufactured evidence
(line 11–15 of 1-ER-206, line 8–17 of 1-ER-050, line 3 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-
ER-188, and line 20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022) SDCCU counsel knew
(unlawfully secured) terminating sanctions involving only Roark’s home PC,
prevented Roark from proving were also false and manufactured.
The District Court is again failing to recognize that Roark’s evidence filed in
Bankruptcy Court in 2018 (suppressed from the state trial court by the August 7,
2015 fraud on the court scheme) proves his deletion of NIFCU files on his home PC
was approved by NIFCU and Roark’s attorney provided by NIFCU. However, the
District Court is citing those deleted NIFCU files as alleged evidence of spoliation
by Roark to undermine his claim and evidence for the manufactured wholesale file
deletion activity on his home PC hard drive after it was first accessed and tampered
with by a non-neutral computer forensic expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of
interest…” [Emphasis Added] per the District Court (line 5 of 1-ER-015).

It is worth noting that the District Court omits mentioning the conspiracy by
attorneys as officers of the court for all opposing parties, to only inform the state
trial court about subsequently used neutral computer forensic experts that the state
trial court only knew of and relied on (line 2–22 of 2-ER-232 and line 18 of 1-ER-
050 to line 13 of 1-ER-053, and line 11–16 of 1-ER-021) as evidenced by the state
trial court’s own minute order that only references (the subsequently used) "neutral"
computer forensic experts (line 14 of 2-ER-255 and in at least five places in 2-ER-
262), but concealing from the court they were all used to analyze Roark’s home PC
hard drive (and copies thereof), after it was first accessed and tampered with, by the
non-neutral computer forensic expert the District Court said had a “…disqualifying
conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, to propound the deceptive
fallacy, that only neutral computer forensics experts were first, or only, used.
Even if the District Court did not believe evidence tampering occurred (line 6–
18 of 1-ER-211, line 17 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022 and middle 3-ER-546):
(a) that belief is still based on the tainted work product of a non-neutral computer
forensic expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” for SDCCU, per
the District Court, that officers of the court for opposing parties conspired to
conceal from the state trial court (and subsequent state and federal courts), and;
(b) that is not a determination for an appeal court to make, but for the (state) trial
court to make, that did not have the benefit of that evidence because of the early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, that Roark was able to finally
file evidence of, in Bankruptcy Court on, and after, July 11, 2022, and;
(c) it cannot be denied that tainted evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) was
used in, but concealed from, the state trial court, because Roark’s new evidence
(2-ER-267-376) with the state trial court minute order, proves it (line 14 of 2-
ER-255 and throughout 2-ER-262) and prevented him from proving tampering.
The District Court also failed to recognize that if the “…disqualifying conflict
of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) Mr. Sevel had for SDCCU to first access (and
tamper with) Roark’s home PC hard drive, was so problematic that it required his
immediate termination and return of fees paid him (2-ER-288–307) then:
(1) why did the District Court believe it was acceptable for attorneys as officers of
the court for opposing parties to conspire to conceal this material fact from the
state trial court to strip Roark of due process, a trial and other rights, and;
(2) why did the District Court believe it was acceptable to use the findings/analysis
of subsequent computer forensic experts who are now all evidenced working
with tainted/fabricated evidence on Roark’s home PC hard drive and copies
thereof, after it was first accessed, and tampered with, by Mr. Sevel, to affirm
terminating (i.e., death penalty) sanctions, for alleged spoliation, and;
(3) why did the District Court believe it was acceptable for attorneys as officers of
the court for all opposing parties to then take part in the voluminously evidenced
conspiracy to conceal all of the foregoing, to propound the deceptive fallacy to
the 2011 state trial court (and use corrupted rulings based thereon in subsequent
state and federal courts), that only neutral computer forensic experts were used
to access Roark’s home PC hard drive, which was false?!
The District Court also failed to recognize that setting aside for the moment
the tampering that occurred (line 6–18 of 1-ER-211 and line 17 of 1-ER-021 to line
7 of 1-ER-022, and middle of 3-ER-546), the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on
the court scheme, by attorneys as officers of the court (for opposing parties no less),
to deceive the 2011 state trial court into believing neutral computer forensic experts
were first, or only, used to access Roark’s home PC hard drive, to assert spoliation,
to secure terminating sanctions against Roark, to strip him of due process, a trial and
other rights under the U.S. Constitution and state and federal laws was still a federal
crime (line 12 of 1-ER-099 to line 3 of 1-ER-100, and line 5–16 of 1-ER-072). It
was a conspiracy against rights (18 U.S.C. §241) by attorneys as officers of the court
“…to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice…” (second
prong of 18 U.S.C. §1503) using an early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme to conceal use of tainted/fabricated evidence, a conspiracy confirmed by an
officer of the court for NIFCU/CCU, and not denied by other opposing counsel in a
Bankruptcy Court motion hearing on September 14, 2022 (line 18 of 1-ER-049 to

line 8 of 1-ER-050, line 5–12 of 1-ER-069 and line 2–16 of 1-ER-021).
Line 19 of 1-ER-005 to line 8 of 1-ER-006: The District Court cites the state
trial court granting SDCCU its motion for terminating sanctions on August 18, 2015
following a hearing, but does not mention the fraud on the court scheme on August
7, 2015 for that hearing; that was;
(a) before Appellant filed evidence in Bankruptcy Court in 2018 for the August 7,
2015 fraud on the court scheme by attorneys as officers of the court, that despite
subsequently being adjudicated to not be an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme,
did prove fraud on the court to conceal NIFCU’s respondeat superior liability,
that had the state trial court known, would have instead imposed terminating
sanctions on NIFCU alone, and;
(b) before Appellant filed evidence in Bankruptcy Court on, and after, July 11, 2022
for the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by attorneys as
officers of the court for all opposing parties, in the 2011 state trial court action
involving their use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer
forensic expert who had a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” [Emphasis
Added] for SDCCU, per the District Court itself (line 5 of 1-ER-015).
Line 9 of 1-ER-006 to line 4 of 1-ER-007: The District Court cites a 2018 state
appeal court ruling, but failed to recognize evidence filed by Roark in Bankruptcy
Court in not just 2018, but filed again in 2022, cited in this Appeal with additional
evidence offered to, but declined by, the Bankruptcy Court (line 10–19 of 2-ER-228
and line 16 of 1-ER-114 to line 2 of 1-ER-115) proving that in view of Roark’s new
evidence for the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, the 2018
state court appeal was (as Roark has always alleged) a fraud on the court scheme and
sham appeal by officers of the court for, Roark and, SDCCU (line 19–21 of 1-ER-
112, line 20 of 2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-
ER-053, line 3–7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9 th Cir.
Case No. 21-55040). to conceal their use of tainted/fabricated evidence in the early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, and to conceal their August 7, 2015
fraud on the court scheme, all by officers of the court for all opposing parties. The
sham 2018 state court appeal was also discussed in great detail with cited evidence
in Roark prior appeal in this Court (bottom of page 8 to the top of page 11, and
elsewhere, in Dkt #39 for 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040).
Line 5–15 of 1-ER-007: To clarify, Roark did not fail to prosecute his adversary
complaint against SDCCU. The Bankruptcy Court in late 2018 requested that Roark
abandon his adversary complaint, to instead respond to SDCCU’s (stated intention
to file its own) adversary complaint, for the economy of the court (which Roark
agreed to do) and stated Roark would have the opportunity to present all of his
evidence in SDCCU’s adversary trial court action. This included the early-to-mid
2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme Roark alluded to in his answer to SDCCU’s
adversary complaint (line 13–17 of 2-ER-229, line 9–14 of 1-ER-043 and line 20–
21 of 3-ER-433) before allowing SDCCU to cite the corrupted state court rulings it
produced to secure summary judgment preventing it. This allowed a Bankruptcy
Trustee to strip Roark of his 2018 complaint through counsel, against NIFCU, et al,
that cited NIFCU’s role authorizing its attorneys as officers of the court to participate
in extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes in the state trial court (line 10–12
of 2-ER-243, line 4–20 of 2-ER-229, line 21 of 1-ER-199 to line 1 of 1-ER-200, and
line 17 of 1-ER-201 to line 12 of 1-ER-203).
Line 16 of 1-ER-007 to line 13 of 1-ER-008: The District Court is conflating or
confusing matters. The extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine the
District Court states (line 16–26 of 1-ER-007) the Bankruptcy Court asserted did not
apply in early 2019, was only in regard to evidence filed for the August 7, 2015
fraud on the court scheme (Roark at that time asserted was also an extrinsic fraud
on the court scheme, before summary judgment prevented him from filing evidence
of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme). The Bankruptcy
Court in 2018–19 did not have benefit of any evidence for the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in the 2011 state trial court action because
counsel for SDCCU used the corrupted rulings it produced to secure summary
judgment against Roark to prevent it. The appeals the District Court refers to (line
27 of 1-ER-007 to line 13 of 1-ER-008) exclusively concerned the August 7, 2015

fraud on the court scheme only that the District Court is conflating, or confusing,
with the current claim of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme.
Line 14–21 of 1-ER-008: The District Court’s emphasis on Roark filing his Rule
60(d)(3) motion and evidence for the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme by officers of the court almost two years after SDCCU’s adversary case was
closed, ignores line 3–5 of 1-ER-062, and is based on the Bankruptcy Court falsely
reframing his Rule 60(d)(3) motion (1-ER-101–177, line 1 of 1-ER-068 to line 18
of 1-ER-072, 1-ER-030–073, and 1-ER-019–029) as a Rule 60(b) motion. This was
to assert legal authorities and a time-bar that allow denying a Rule 60(b) motion,
while disregarding evidence of extrinsic fraud on the court by officers of the court
that pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) and other legal authorities, is not time-barred.
The most obvious evidence proving the Bankruptcy Court falsely reframed
Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion, as a Rule 60(b) motion, the District Court failed
to recognize even after being reminded of it, was the objectively false statement in
its second order (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089) denying Roark’s motion for reconsideration
(“due to clear court error”), that his “…motion to vacate sought relief under Rule
60(b)…”, but not citing where in Roark’s motion to vacate he sought relief under
Rule 60(b) precisely because it is not there, not in the Table of Authorities or
anywhere else because it was a Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate (2-ER-219–390)!
The District Court also failed to recognize, that Roark only filed his evidence
in Bankruptcy Court on, and after, July 11, 2022; almost two years after SDCCU’s
adversary case was closed (to also ignore line 3–5 of 1-ER-062), because:
(a) his last attempt to have evidence of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme considered as (supplemental) evidence by the Ninth Circuit (as
part of an appeal involving the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme) was
denied only five days earlier on July 7, 2022 (Dkt #52 Case No. 21-55040) after
four years of uninterrupted efforts by Roark to have that evidence considered
earlier in federal courts, and;
(b) his (new) evidence for the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme
had never been filed or adjudicated in any court due to extrinsic and other fraud
on the court schemes in state and federal courts by attorneys as officers of the
court, and because pursuant to the legal authorities cited by Roark, there is no
time-bar for (extrinsic) fraud on the court (by attorneys as officers of the court).
Line 22–28 of 1-ER-008: The statement, “…Roark [only] purported to introduce
new evidence of extrinsic fraud on the court in the nature of emails showing a
“conspir[acy]” [Emphasis Added] proves the District Court failed to recognize:
(a) Roark’s evidence proving the conspiracy to perpetrate (extrinsic) fraud on the
court (line 19 of 2-ER-230 to 2-ER-390, line 1–10 of 2-ER-227, line 5 of 1-ER-
207 to line 2 of 1-ER-208, and line 1 of 1-ER-045 to line 13 of 1-ER-053), and;
(b) the admission from NIFCU/CCU counsel (Mr. Sims), in a September 14, 2022
Bankruptcy Court motion hearing (per the transcript section cited below), in
which he stated about all the attorneys as officers of the court for opposing
parties in the 2011 state trial court action who agreed (i.e., conspired) to conceal
from that trial court their use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral
computer forensic expert, to allege spoliation, to secure terminating sanctions
against Roark, that “…everybody knew…” and had “…squared it away.” with
themselves to assent to it (line 12–13 of 1-ER-146, line 2–8 of 1-ER-050, line
7–12 of 1-ER-069, and line 10–16 of 1-ER-072), which was not denied by
counsel for SDCCU or the Bankruptcy Trustee, in that hearing. However, not
only was the foregoing not squared away with the state trial court whose minute
order proves its (false) reliance that only neutral computer forensic experts were
used (line 14 of 2-ER-255 and in at least five places in 2-ER-262), it was not
squared away with Roark who was repeatedly and in hindsight falsely, assured
by his NIFCU provided attorney the issue of tainted/fabricated evidence from
Mr. Sevel would be raised, until he did not, and could not, with the state trial
court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-026 and line 3–7 of 1-ER-028), and later state appeals
court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line
17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053, line 3–7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9,
and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040). that Roark’s new
evidence now proves was a sham appeal. Roark’s attorney (falsely) stating he
would raise the issue of tainted/fabricated evidence in the state trial court, and
later in a state appellate court, and not doing so, to cause terminating sanctions
to be imposed and affirmed, respectively, was extrinsic fraud out of court by an
officer of the court to facilitate an extrinsic fraud scheme on the state trial court
and, later fraud on a state appellate court, all with opposing counsel, and;
(c) belied by the District Court, who acknowledged that the non-neutral computer
forensic expert had “…a disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-
015) whose work product officers of the court conspired to conceal their use of.
Line 1–5 of 1-ER-009: The District Court cites Dkt #74 in Bankruptcy Court for
SDCCU, but again failed to recognize in Dkt #74 that SDCCU counsel dismissed
its role in the conspiracy to take part in the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme in the 2011 state trial court action, to state, “…regardless of whether
Sevel actually tampered with Roark’s hard drive or whether there was a conspiracy
to conceal Sevel’s conflict of interest [and use tainted/fabricated evidence from his
tampering] …” (line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 in Bankruptcy Court) to then cite other false
allegations and manufactured evidence (line 11–15 of 1-ER-206, line 8–17 of 1-ER-
050, line 3 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, and line 20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of
1-ER-022) SDCCU counsel knew terminating sanctions secured by the early-to-mid
2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme (involving only Roark’s home PC) also
prevented Roark from proving were false and manufactured. This included a USB
drive that was tainted and given to Roark by another party at NIFCU (line 10–11 of
2-ER-231, line 4 of 2-ER-234, line 20 of 1-ER-051 to line 1 of 1-ER-052, line 17–
18 of 1-ER-211, line 18 of 1-ER-023 to line 8 of 1-ER-024), that Roark was
instructed by email to first send to his attorney Steven Yee (line 3–19 of 1-ER-187,
and 1-ER-190), who Roark’s new evidence proves took part in the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme with attorneys as officers of the court for NIFCU
and SDCCU. Roark’s attorney (Mr. Yee) was evidenced in prior appeals also taking
part in the August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme in the state trial court to conceal
NIFCU’s respondeat superior liability and transfer it to Roark, and fraud on the court
in the 2018 state appellate court to conceal all of the foregoing. The August 7, 2015
fraud on the court scheme was also intended to conceal that Roark’s NIFCU
provided counsel at the Yee law firm, knew NIFCU required and instructed him to
permanently delete NIFCU files on his home PC (pp. 20–28 of Dkt #13 for 9th Cir.
Case No. 21-55040) and stated they were “…proper to permanently delete…” (line
7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188,
middle of 1-ER-193, 3-ER-638 based on 3-ER-623–637).
Line 6–11 of 1-ER-009: The District Court’s only mention of the September
14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court hearing or its transcript (1-ER-133–150), that omits the
two most important admissions about the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on
the court scheme, by officers of the court for opposing parties, NIFCU/CCU
and SDCCU, that the District Court failed to recognize, as follows:
(a) that NIFCU/CCU counsel (Mr. Sims), explicitly admitted about all the officers
of the court for all three opposing parties who conspired to conceal from the
2011 state trial court (i.e., the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme) their use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer
forensic expert who had what the District Court called, “…a disqualifying
conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) that “…everybody knew…” and
“…squared it away.” with themselves to assent to it (line 12–13 of 1-ER-146,
line 2–8 of 1-ER-050, line 7–12 of 1-ER-069, and line 10–16 of 1-ER-072)
which was not denied by counsel for SDCCU or Bankruptcy Trustee present in
that hearing (line 18 of 1-ER-049 to line 8 of 1-ER-050, line 5–12 of 1-ER-069
and line 2–16 of 1-ER-021). However, it was not only not squared away with
the state trial court, (line 14 of 2-ER-255 and in at least five places in 2-ER-
262), it was also not squared away with Roark who was repeatedly and in
hindsight falsely, assured by his attorney (provided through NIFCU) that the
issue of tainted/fabricated evidence from Mr. Sevel would be raised, until he did
not, and could not, with the state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-026 and line 3–
7 of 1-ER-028), and a later state appellate court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line
20 of 2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-
053, line 3–7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9 th Cir.
Case No. 21-55040), that Roark’s new evidence now proves was a sham appeal.
Roark’s attorney stating he would raise the issue of tainted/fabricated evidence
in the state trial court, and later in a state appellate court, and not doing so, to
cause terminating sanctions to be imposed and affirmed, respectively, on Roark,
was extrinsic fraud out of court to facilitate an extrinsic fraud scheme on the
state trial court, and later a fraud scheme on the state appellate court, and;
(b) that SDCCU counsel (Ms. Pruitt), explicitly acknowledged the legal authorities
asserted by Roark to grant his Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate, based on his new
evidence and assertions were an “…exception…” to those asserted by SDCCU
counsel to falsely reframe his motion as a Rule 60(b) motion, (line 5–19 of 1-
ER-144, line 4–7 of 1-ER-126, line 17–20 of 1-ER-055).
Line 12–28 of 1-ER-009: The District Court is citing legal authorities applicable
to a Rule 60(b) motion, because it failed to recognize the Bankruptcy Court and
counsel for SDCCU, falsely reframed Roark’s motion to vacate, as a Rule (60)(b)
motion, to deny it (throughout 1-ER-101–177, line 1 of 1-ER-068 to line 18 of 1-
ER-072 and elsewhere in 1-ER-030–072 and throughout 1-ER-019–028). The most
obvious evidence proving the Bankruptcy Court falsely reframed Roark’s Rule
60(d)(3) motion to vacate, as a Rule 60(b) motion was the objectively false
statement in its second order (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089) denying Roark’s motion for
reconsideration (“due to clear court error”), that his “…motion to vacate sought
relief under Rule 60(b)…”, but not citing where in his motion to vacate he sought
relief under Rule 60(b), because it is not there, not in the Table of Authorities or
anywhere else because it was a Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate (2-ER-219–390)!
Line 1–23 of 1-ER-010: The District Court failed to recognize per lines 18–
20, that Roark did call out “clear error” by the Bankruptcy Court (throughout 1-ER-
101–177, line 1 of 1-ER-068 to line 18 of 1-ER-072 and elsewhere in 1-ER-030–
072 and throughout 1-ER-019–028). That “clear error” was the Bankruptcy Court
falsely reframing Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate as a Rule 60(b) motion, a
“clear error” evidenced by the Bankruptcy Court’s false statement in its second order
(3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089) denying Roark’s motion for reconsideration (“due to clear court
error”) when is falsely stated Roark’s “…motion to vacate sought relief under Rule
60(b)…”. Despite being reminded, the District Court still failed to recognize that the
Bankruptcy Court did not cite where in Roark’s motion to vacate he sought relief
under Rule 60(b), precisely because it is not there, not in the Table of Authorities or
anywhere else in that Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate (2-ER-219–390)!
Line 25 of 1-ER-012 to line 8 of 1-ER-13: Roark’s motion asserted Rule
60(d)(3), which states “This rule does not limit a court's power to: […] set aside a
judgment for fraud on the court.”, because "There is no statute of limitations for
fraud on the court”, In re Roussos, 541 B.R. at 729 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015), and
because "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at
all, and never becomes final.", 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23.
Line 9–12 of 1-ER-013 and line 1–9 of 1-ER-014: The District Roark failed
to recognize, Roark stated he did raise the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme issue with his attorney during the 2011 state trial court action, who
repeatedly and in hindsight falsely, assured Roark the issue of tainted/fabricated
evidence from the non-neutral computer forensic expert, would be raised, until he
did not, and could not, with that state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-026 and line 3–
7 of 1-ER-028), and later a state appellate court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of
2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053, line 3–
7 of 1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040)
that Roark’s new evidence now proves was a sham appeal. In Bankruptcy Court in
2018, Roark was advised by Judge Adler he would have an opportunity to present
all his evidence in the adversary trial, before SDCCU counsel presented corrupted
state court rulings to secure summary judgment against Roark, to prevent it.
On line 5–9, p. 14, the District Court states Roark’s new (email) evidence cannot
be considered new because he was copied on those emails and waited too long, but
fails to recognize that Roark endeavored without interruption to file that evidence,
but was prevented by extrinsic (and other) fraud on the court schemes by officers of
the court for all opposing parties in state and federal courts, to prevent and delay it,
and that (extrinsic) fraud on the court by officers of the court is not time-barred.
Line 23–28 of 1-ER-013 and line 23–28 of 1-ER-014: The District Court
appears to be conflating prior appeals by Roark, involving only the August 7, 2015
fraud on the court scheme, by officers of the court, with his current claim of the
early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme that summary judgment from
corrupted state court rulings prevented Roark from previously filing evidence of, in
the 2018–19 bankruptcy adversary trial court, despite indicating in his answer to
SDCCU’s adversary complaint there was an issue regarding a non-neutral computer
forensic expert (line 20–21 of 3-ER-433). The District Court claims Roark is
attempting to relitigate state and federal court orders and judgments, but fails to
recognize that relitigating to prove an (early-to-mid 2014) extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme, by attorneys as officers of the court, in the 2011 state trial court, in
which the corrupted rulings entered into the rendered rulings of subsequent state and
federal court is exactly what the exception to Rooker-Feldman was intended for!
Line 22–25 of 1-ER-013: The District Court is conflating or confusing matters
again. Judge Adler’s rulings only concerned the August 7, 2015 fraud on the
court scheme, that Roark at that time asserted was also an extrinsic fraud on the
court scheme. Judge Adler prevented Roark from filing evidence of early-to-mid
2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme despite stating in his answer to SDCCU’s
adversary complaint there was an issue regarding a non-neutral computer forensic
expert (line 20–21 of 3-ER-433) and telling him he could present all of his evidence
at trial, before granting SDCCU summary judgment to prevent it.
Line 23–26 and 28 of 1-ER-014: This only concerned the August 7, 2015 fraud
on the court scheme by officers of the court that Appellant at that time asserted was
also an extrinsic fraud on the court. Roark could not appeal the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, because before he could file his evidence for it,
SDCCU counsel used the corrupted state court rulings to secure summary judgment
preventing it. The foregoing is why Roark’s prior appeals based only on the August
7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme by attorneys officers of the court included requests
to supplement his record on appeal with evidence of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme which were all denied, and last denied by the Ninth Circuit
on July 7, 2022, as Dkt #52, Case No. 21-55040.
Line 10 of 1-ER-014 to line 9 of 1-ER-015: The District Court chose to falsely
reframe Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion (like the Bankruptcy
Court) to disregard evidence of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) and other legal authorities cited by Roark. The
clearest proof the District Court failed to recognize the foregoing (line 4–6 of 1-
ER-068) even after being reminded, was its failure to recognize the objectively false
statement (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089) by the Bankruptcy Court in its second order denying
Roark’s motion for reconsideration (“due to clear court error”) that his “…motion to
vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b)…”, but not citing where in Roark’s motion to
vacate, precisely because it is not there, not in the Table of Authorities or anywhere
else because it was a Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate (2-ER-219–390)!
The District Court’s failure to recognize Roark’s evidence of the early-to-mid
2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by officers of the court, is best proven on
line 5 of 1-ER-015 of its ruling, that his evidence “…only revealed a disqualifying
conflict of interest…” [Emphasis Added]. The foregoing proves why:
from the state trial court the “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” of the non-
alleged by Roark, tamper with) Roark’s home PC hard drive, and that;
scheme (i.e., conspiracy) by officers of the court to then propound the deceptive
fallacy that neutral computer forensic experts were first, or, only used, to access
Roark’s home PC hard drive (that the state trial court only knew of, and relied
on (line 2–22 of 2-ER-232 and line 18 of 1-ER-050 to line 13 of 1-ER-053, and
line 11–16 of 1-ER-021) evidenced by its own minute order that only references
(the subsequently used) "neutral" computer forensic experts (line 14 of 2-ER-
255 and in at least five places in 2-ER-262), and that;
(c) the District Court also failed to recognize that if, use of a non-neutral computer
forensic expert to first access (and as alleged by Roark to tamper with) Roark’s
[Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015) concealed from the state trial court, then
accordingly, why did it not constitute a disqualification of the work product (i.e.
tainted/fabricated evidence) by that non-neutral computer forensic expert with
a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” to allege spoliation, to secure
terminating sanctions against Roark, to strip him of due process, a trial and other
rights under the U.S. Constitution, state and federal laws, that left him with a
nondischargeable default judgment, (that no trial court would have imposed,
had all the attendant circumstances been disclosed to it) and;
at least a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” have, prior to July 11, 2022,
Line 10 of 1-ER-015 to line 2 of 1-ER-016: The District Court cites Roark’s
admission to permanently deleting files on his home PC without more importantly,
citing the evidence suppressed from the state trial court by the August 7, 2015 fraud
on the court scheme that Roark later filed in Bankruptcy Court in 2018 (now cited
three times in District Court and in his last appeal in this Court (September 5, 2014
entry on p. 18, and pp. 20–28, Dkt #13, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040) proving NIFCU
required and directed Roark to delete NIFCU work files on his home PC that Roark’s
attorney provided by NIFCU stated in an email, were “…proper to permanently
delete.” [Emphasis Added] (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-
ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, and 3-ER-638 based on 3-ER-
623–637). The District Court not only failed to recognize that terminating sanctions
(secured against Roark by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme
involving only his home PC), prohibited him from contesting all the other false and
fabricated evidence used against him, but is now citing those other false allegations
and manufactured evidence from the state trial court ruling Roark’s exculpatory
evidence filed in Bankruptcy Court in 2018 exonerates him of.
Line 3 of 1-ER-016 to line 23 of 1-ER-017: Roark reasserts the legal authorities
and arguments asserted in 2-ER-219–390 and in 1-ER-030–073.
Line 1–3 of 1-ER-017: The District Court erroneously stated Appellant asserted
fraud on the court was an exception to the Rooker Feldman doctrine, with a reference
to where Appellant actually stated “…extrinsic fraud on the court scheme…”
[Emphasis Added] (line 20 of 1-ER-063 to line 2 of 1-ER-064) was an exception to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This is just another example of the District Court
reframing Roark’s motion for extrinsic fraud on the court, by officers of the court,
as just fraud, to support falsely reframing his Rule 60(d)(3) motion as Rule 60(b).
Line 24 of 1-ER-017 to line 12 of 1-ER-018: All of this has been addressed

above in this brief.
7. Did you present all issues listed in Question 6 to the district court or the BAP?
Answer yes or no: Yes
8. What law supports these issues on appeal? (You may refer to cases and
statutes, but you are not required to do so.)
They are cited in Appellant’s table of authorities (2-ER-222–2-ER-224) for, and
in, his Bankruptcy Court motion to vacate (line 9 of 2-ER-237 to line 12 of 2-ER-
243) and, in the table of authorities (1-ER-035 to 1-ER-036) for, and in, his District
Court opening brief in (1-ER-030–073), with only a few cited in this brief.
9. Other Pending Cases. Do you have any other cases pending in the court of
appeals? If so, give the name and docket number of each case. None
Previous Cases. Have you filed any previous cases that the court of appeals
has decided? If so, give the name and docket number of each case.
Carlton Roark, Appellant vs. Leslie T. Gladstone, Trustee, San Diego County
Credit Union, and North Island Financial Credit Union, a division of California
Credit Union, et al, Appellees, Ninth Circuit Court Case No. 21-55040.
Carlton Roark /s/ Carlton Roark

Name Signature
11251 Rancho Carmel Dr., #503203

San Diego, CA 92150 October 2, 2023
Address Date
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

CARLTON ROARK 9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750

(“Roark”), Appellant,
District Court Case No.
vs. 3:22-CV-01962-TWR-WVG
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION

(“SDCCU”), et al, Appellees,
APPELLANT’S INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF
References to ER numbers refer to court-filed documents in Appellant’s
Excerpt of Record, Dkt #2, and AOB refers to Appellant’s Opening Brief, Dkt #3.
INTRODUCTION
Everything, SDCCU counsel from Sheppard Mullin continues to rely on, and
has relied on, in state and federal courts over the last eight years, has always been
based on the same false allegations and fabricated evidence, that death-penalty,
terminating sanctions secured by their early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme in a 2011 state trial court, has allowed them to make uncontested. That early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme (2-ER-219–390, 1-ER-204–218, 1-
ER-186–195, 1-ER-101–177, 1-ER-030–073 and AOB) was by attorneys as officers
of the court for SDCCU, who conspired with attorneys as officers of the court (for
Roark and his co-defendant employer NIFCU1), all funded and controlled by credit
1
NIFCU became a division of California Credit Union (“CCU”) in February, 2017
unions or their insurer, CUNA Mutual, to conceal from the 2011 state trial court,
their use of a non-neutral computer forensics expert (Jim Sevel) who concealed his
conflict of interest for SDCCU to first access and tamper with Roark’s home PC
hard drive to create evidence of date manipulated wholesale file deletion activity.
The attorneys as officers of the court for all three opposing parties then conspired to
only inform the 2011 state trial court of computer experts who were subsequently
used, to conceal that they were all analyzing Roark’s home PC hard drive (and copies
thereof) after it was first accessed and tampered with, by the non-neutral computer
expert who concealed his conflict of interest for SDCCU. The foregoing attorneys
as officers of the court for all three opposing parties, then conspired to propound,
and not contest, the deceptive fallacy that only neutral computer forensic experts
were used (which was false) as evidenced by the use of the word “neutral” to
describe the computer experts used in the 2011 state trial court minute order (in at
least five places in 2-ER-262). The tampering was then used to assert spoliation to
secure terminating sanctions against Roark, to strip him, as a witness to federal
crimes by SDCCU and others, of due process, a trial and other rights under the
Constitution, state, and federal laws, so Sheppard Mullin attorneys as officers of the
court for SDCCU could make other false allegations and cite other fabricated
evidence of spoliation and more, that terminating sanctions secured by their early-
to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme allowed them to make uncontested!
The foregoing is why SDCCU counsel responded to Roark’s July 11, 2022 Rule
60(d)(3) motion to vacate, to state “…regardless of whether Sevel actually tampered
with Roark’s hard drive or whether there was a conspiracy to conceal Sevel’s conflict
of interest [to cite other fabricated evidence of spoliation that unlawfully secured
terminating sanctions allows uncontested] …” (line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 in Bankruptcy
Court) to do just that (in AOB, top half of p. 14, top half of p. 29 and bottom half
of p. 39 to bottom of p. 40). Note: line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 is shown in error as pdf p.
9, Dkt #74 on line 11–15 of 1-ER-206, and line 3 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-
188, and line 20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022. See also line 8–17 of 1-ER-050.
Attorneys as officers of the court for all opposing parties funded and controlled
by credit union interests, then conspired to use the corrupted 2011 state trial court
ruling to also perpetrate, fraud on the court in a 2018 state appeals court, extrinsic
fraud on the court in a 2018–2019 bankruptcy adversary trial court to also strip Roark
of his pending lawsuit through counsel against NIFCU/CCU, et al, SDCCU’s co-
conspirator and, fraud on the court in District Court (twice) and Ninth Circuit Court
from 2019 to July 7, 2022 for appeals on other matters in this case. Sheppard Mullin
counsel for SDCCU now asserts Roark’s uninterrupted efforts over the last eight
years to present evidence and claims for the foregoing (that SDCCU counsel fought
to suppress over the last eight years, and have no time-bar) took too long.
Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU asserts there was no early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to conceal (before July 11, 2022) from state and
federal courts, their use of a non-neutral computer expert, or his tampering (two
separate, but applicable, legal issues) despite, evidence and, admissions and non-
denials, by co-conspiring attorneys as officers of the court for three opposing parties
in at least the September 14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court motion hearing (as discussed
with cited evidence throughout AOB and in prior federal court filings on, and after,
July 11, 2022) proves, SDCCU’s Sheppard Mullin counsel has relied on terminating
sanctions secured by tainted evidence and defrauding state and federal courts into
believing only neutral computer experts were used to access Roark’s home PC hard
drive, per the state trial court minute order’s use of the word “neutral” (2-ER-262),
to make other false allegations and cite other fabricated evidence of spoliation (and
more) uncontested! Per the legal authorities cited in Roark’s motion to vacate and
for damages, sanctions, and other relief (2-ER-237–243) and, in his District Court
opening brief (1-ER-030–073), there are no exceptions or time-bars for extrinsic
fraud on the court schemes by officers of the court (in state and federal trial courts).
Per the abuse of discretion / judicial misconduct section later in this brief, when
Roark filed his motion to vacate and for damages, sanctions and other relief, on July
11, 2022 in Bankruptcy Court, proving federal crimes by SDCCU’s attorneys as
officers of the court from Sheppard Mullin (who Roark witnessed conceal SDCCU
wrongdoing while working at SDCCU per bottom half of 1-ER-042), his case was
assigned to a former Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge and former attorney of 21-years
with the local Sheppard Mullin law office. Five weeks later, the case is reassigned
to the current Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge, who as evidence cited in AOB and
District Court (1-ER-030–073) proves, disregarded the evidence (line 20 of 2-ER-
230 to line 8 of 2-ER-237, line 1 of 1-ER-045 to line 13 of 1-ER-053, and throughout
AOB), declined to consider additional evidence (line 10–19 of 2-ER-228 and line 16
of 1-ER-114 to line 1 of 1-ER-115) and in the September 14, 2022 motion hearing,
disregarded the statement by the attorney as an officer of the court for co-conspirator
NIFCU/CCU about all the attorneys as officers of the court for all three opposing
parties who participated in extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes in state
and federal courts over the last eight years, to conceal their use of tainted evidence
from a non-neutral computer forensic expert with a concealed conflict of interest for
SDCCU, that it was “…nothing…” because “…everybody knew…”, and had
“…squared it away.” with themselves to assent to it (in AOB, middle of p. 11, top
of p. 20, bottom half of p. 22, top half of p. 38, and top half of p.41, and line 12–13
of 1-ER-146). The foregoing was not denied by opposing attorneys as officers of the
court as if admitting, or not denying, it, absolves them of federal crimes. However,
it was not squared away with Roark whose attorney repeatedly, but with hindsight
falsely, assured him the issue of tainted evidence would be raised, until he did not,
and could not, with the state trial court or state appellate court, an extrinsic fraud
scheme outside of court by Roark’s attorney as an officer of the court (line 20 of 2-
ER-227 to line 10 of 2-ER-228). In that September 14, 2022 motion hearing,
Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU also engaged in a deceitful scheme to reframe
Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion, but when pressed, admitted
the legal authorities asserted by Roark to grant his Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate,
based on his new evidence were an “…exception…” to (and supersede) those
asserted by Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU (to falsely reframe his motion as
a Rule 60(b) motion), an “…exception…” not denied by opposing counsel for,
NIFCU/CCU and Bankruptcy Trustee in that hearing (line 5–19 of 1-ER-144, line
17–20 of 1-ER-055, bottom half of 1-ER-056, bottom half of 1-ER-068, line 4–7 of
1-ER-126, in AOB, bottom of p. 14, bottom of p. 20 to top of p. 21, middle of p. 42).
Despite the foregoing, the Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge (on behalf of the former
Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge assigned to this case, who was a former attorney of
21-years with the local Sheppard Mullin law office) obliges the deceitful scheme by
Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU to falsely reframe Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3)
motion to vacate as a Rule 60(b) motion, to cite legal authorities in his first order for
defeating a Rule 60(b) motion (1-ER-178–185). When Roark calls attention to the
Bankruptcy Court’s error in a motion for reconsideration (1-ER-101–177), the
Bankruptcy Court issues a second order to deny it based on the blatantly false
statement that Roark’s “…motion to vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b) (ECF
No. 71).” (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089, as discussed in this brief, AOB, and in 1-ER-030–073
and 1-ER-019–029). The Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge did not cite where in the
Table of Authorities or anywhere else in Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate
(ECF No. 71 or 2-ER-219–390) he sought relief under Rule 60(b), precisely because
it, was not there and, was a blatant lie, for reasons already mentioned!
On appeal, the District Court (that appoints Chief Bankruptcy Court Judges, who
therefore have gravitas with the District Court) shockingly stated Roark’s evidence
proving attorneys as officers of the court defrauded state and federal courts over
eight years about their use of, tainted evidence and, a non-neutral computer forensic
expert with a conflict of interest for SDCCU (attempting to conceal criminal acts) to
secure, terminating sanctions against Roark, a nondischargeable default judgment
against Roark, a $9,875,000 Mary Carter settlement agreement with Roark and,
summary judgment against Roark in Bankruptcy Court to strip him of his complaint
against SDCCU’s co-conspirator NIFCU, et al, was evidence that “…only revealed
a disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, that did not
justify disqualifying all that was secured by extrinsic fraud on the court schemes!
Sheppard Mullin officers of the court for SDCCU, conspired with attorneys as
officers of the court for opposing parties, all funded and controlled by credit unions
“…to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice…” (2nd prong
of 18 U.S.C. §1503), in a conspiracy against the rights (18 U.S.C. §241) of a witness
to crimes by credit unions, et al, for the same reason SDCCU terminated employees
with knowledge of its wrongdoing (bottom half of 1-ER-042) using confidential
separation agreements that conditioned receipt of severance pay, to not raising any
allegations of its wrongdoing with any governmental agency (see top of 3-ER-589
and for context, in AOB, see item (a) at the bottom of p. 5 to the top of p. 6, and item
(b) at the top of p. 6), which was a disguised payoff to not report its wrongdoing:
SDCCU’s 2011 state trial court action, based on false allegations and fabricated
evidence, was in reality a veiled effort (using attorneys as officers of the court for
opposing parties, all funded and directed by credit union interests), to enforce an
anti-whistleblower provision in confidential SDCCU separation agreements against
Roark, a witness to federal crimes by initially just SDCCU, and later NIFCU/CCU,
its insurer CUNA Mutual, and many others, constituting a criminal conspiracy.
Moreover, Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU only acknowledged conspiring
with officers of the court for opposing parties in extrinsic (and other) fraud on the
court schemes in state and federal courts, including this Court, over eight years, after
Roark filed evidence in Bankruptcy Court (on and after July 11, 2022) proving it!
Extrinsic fraud on the court and evidence tampering (two separate issues)
The 2011 state trial court, and every court thereafter (per 2-ER-219–390, 1-ER-
030–073 and AOB), was deceived to rely on tainted evidence from Roark’s home
PC hard drive to impose (and affirm) terminating sanctions on him, to strip him of
due process, a trial and other rights under the Constitution, state and federal laws,
and based on the lie that only neutral computer forensic experts were used, per the
state trial court minute order’s use of the word “neutral” (2-ER-262), that also
involved acts of extrinsic fraud out of court (in AOB, bottom of p. 4 to top of p. 5
and throughout AOB), comprising three elements of the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme, are exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the
Ninth Circuit. Terminating sanctions secured by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic
fraud on the court scheme by attorneys as officers of the court, were then used to
secure, a nondischargeable default judgment against Roark, a $9,875,000 Mary
Carter settlement agreement with, Roark, and in Bankruptcy Court used to secure
summary judgment against Roark so a bankruptcy Trustee could strip him of his
2018 lawsuit through counsel against SDCCU’s co-conspirators, NIFCU, et al.
However, tainted evidence (from tampering of Roark’s home PC hard drive) was
also proven by the (date manipulated) wholesale file deletion activity on it he could
not explain (in AOB, top half of p. 27) that was used against him. To conceal the
tampering, Roark’s NIFCU provided attorney, now evidenced taking part in the
early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme (and August 7, 2015 fraud on
the court scheme) in the 2011 state trial court, and fraud on the court scheme in a
2018 state appellate court (bottom of p. 8 to top of p. 11 of Dkt #39 of 9th Cir. Case
No. 21-55040) characterized date manipulated file deletion activity (i.e., tampering)
on Roark’s home PC hard drive, in the 2018 sham state court appeal as discarded
program files (line 11–18 of 1-ER-211, middle of 3-ER-546, 3-ER-512–562, and
throughout AOB), and files evidence proves NIFCU and the attorney they provided
Roark stated SDCCU’s preservation order allowed him to permanently delete.
Roark also emphasized (bottom ¶, 1-ER-110) in his Bankruptcy Court motion for
reconsideration due to its “Clear Court Error” (1-ER-101–177), why the integrity of
digital evidence in particular must be preserved, and never used in court if access to
it is first given to a non-neutral computer expert with a concealed conflict of interest
for the opposing party. The sole purpose for requiring that only neutral computer
experts have access to digital evidence, with a chain of custody to prove it, is to
preserve the integrity of that evidence, and prevent having to later disqualify use of
that evidence because it was tainted and tampered with. Roark’s evidence proves
attorneys as officers of the court for opposing parties not only had prior knowledge
of Mr. Sevel’s conflict of interest for SDCCU, but knew he would be unaccompanied
to first access (and use the tools needed to tamper with) his home PC hard drive. The
only reason attorneys as officers of the court for all opposing parties in the 2011 state
trial court action conspired to conceal the foregoing was to ensure that Roark, as a
witness to crimes by credit unions, et al, remain stripped of due process and a trial.
The District Court egregiously abused its discretion to accept the self-serving
claims of attorneys as officers of the court from Sheppard Mullin (on behalf of, and
against a witness to crimes by, SDCCU), that evidence from Roark’s home PC hard
drive was not tainted or tampered with despite (1) evidence to the contrary and, (2)
evidence of extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes in state and federal courts
over eight years by officers of the court from Sheppard Mullin, et al, to conceal it!
Not only did the District Court disregard the foregoing, but stated evidence of an
early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by Sheppard Mullin attorneys
as officers of the court to conceal their use of tainted evidence and a non-neutral
computer forensics expert with a concealed conflict of interest for SDCCU, to
secure, terminating sanctions against, and other agreements with, Roark (a witness
to financial institution and other crimes by SDCCU, its Sheppard Mullin counsel and
others), was (incredulously) proof of no tampering or use of tainted evidence, and
evidence that “…only revealed a disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-
ER-015) that did not require disqualifying everything they both secured or enabled!
There were no other acts of spoliation by Roark
There was no other spoliation by Roark. Roark cited evidence filed in Bankruptcy
Court, for his prior appeal in this Court (and cited in AOB) proving his co-defendant
employer NIFCU, and the attorneys they provided him, required, and authorized him
to delete NIFCU files on his home PC because they believed SDCCU’s preservation
order (last ¶ of 3-ER-613) allowed it (in AOB, middle of p. 26 and 3-ER-519). A
tainted USB drive (in AOB, pp. 13–14, p. 28, pp. 39–40, 1-ER-051–052 and bottom
of 1-ER-070) was also used against Roark that SDCCU counsel knew included no
chain of custody or proof of origination because it was given to Roark by a NIFCU
affiliated party, before Roark was instructed to send it to his attorneys (top of 1-ER-
190) who took part in extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes in state trial
and appellate courts. SDCCU counsel was able to cite other fabricated evidence of
spoliation, and more, because they knew unlawfully secured terminating sanctions
allowed them to cite, other false allegations and, fabricated evidence, uncontested.
For example, after being hired by NIFCU on October 4, 2012 (bottom of 3-ER-
522) approximately six weeks after being terminated with others from SDCCU in
August, 2012 (3-ER-586–592), Roark was authorized on December 27, 2012 (before
SDCCU’s July 3, 2013 lawsuit) to access NIFCU’s network remotely to download
NIFCU files onto his home PC hard drive (3-ER-594 and 3-ER-596–609) that he
was required to delete to comply with NIFCU’s policies for the “…destruction of
media…” (bottom of 3-ER-620 and near top of 3-ER-615, and in AOB, pp. 8, 21,
27, 28, 40 and 48–49, and in Dkt #13 for 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040, pp. 14, 15, 17,
18, 22 and 25) which was reinforced by Ms. Brill, NIFCU’s legal liaison, mentioned
32 times in Dkt #13 for 9th Cir, Case No, 21-55040, who was, (out of court), assisting
attorneys as officers of the court in extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes.
Then on August 16, 2013, twelve weeks after a NIFCU Board member’s son-in-
law was fired from SDCCU for alleging SDCCU wrongdoing (in AOB, item (a),
bottom of p. 5 to top of p. 6) and just after SDCCU’s complaint and preservation
order was served on NIFCU and Roark, NIFCU’s legal liaison (Ms. Brill, fiancé to
a NIFCU Board member (mentioned eight times in Dkt #13 for 9th Cir. Case No. 21-
55040) and after prior reminders, again reminds Roark of NIFCU’s “…destruction
of media…” policies (in AOB, bottom half of p. 6 to top of p. 7, top of p. 8, middle
of p. 21 and 27, bottom half of p. 28, bottom of p. 40, and top of p. 49, and bottom
of 1-ER-051, 1-ER-111–112) in an email copied to senior management, framed as a
warning to not be “…sharing information from and about NICU’s business client
files to anyone outside a Regulator’s request” [Emphasis Added] (top of 3-ER-563,
and August 16, 2013 entry on p. 15, of Dkt #13, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040).
Then on September 5, 2014, six months after Roark’s home PC hard drive was
first accessed by a non-neutral computer expert with a concealed conflict of interest
for SDCCU unaccompanied (to use tools needed to tamper with it), and one year
before tampering (and an August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme) would be used
to allege spoliation to secure terminating sanctions, Roark’s NIFCU provided
attorney stated in an email NIFCU files on his home PC hard drive were “…proper
to permanently delete…” and that “You had mentioned this issue in the past…” to
acknowledge his foreknowledge of, and prior instructions to Roark on, this matter
(middle of 1-ER-193 and top of 3-ER-638 based in part on 3-ER-623–637, and line
14 of 1-ER-050, line 19 of 1-ER-051, line 3 of 1-ER-071, line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line
15 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, and throughout AOB.
Roark previously asserted in three prior cases before two federal appellate courts
including this Court (pp. 20–28 of Dkt #13 of 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040), that the
August 7, 2015 fraud on the court scheme to deny to, and conceal from, the 2011
state trial court, that NIFCU and the attorney they provided to Roark, required, and
advised him NIFCU files on his home PC were “…proper to permanently delete…”,
was an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to corrupt the court’s ability to impartially
adjudicate reconsideration of its tentative for terminating sanctions that it did not
know at that time was caused by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme by the same attorneys as officers of the court. However, this Court ruled the
August 7, 2015 fraud on the court, was not an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme.
To redirect this Court’s attention away from evidence proving, SDCCU counsel’s
use of tainted/fabricated evidence to secure terminating sanctions against Roark and,
the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to conceal it involving
Roark’s home PC hard drive, SDCCU counsel is now citing deleted NIFCU files on
his home PC hard drive that terminating sanctions (from their early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme) prevented him from proving was required,
directed, and authorized, by his co-defendant employer NIFCU and the attorney they
provided for him. Terminating sanctions (from the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud
on the court scheme also prevented Roark from proving why the USB drive used
against him included no chain of custody or proof of where it originated (in AOB,
item (b), pp. 13–14 and top half of p. 28, line 19 of 1-ER-051 to line 1 of 1-ER-052,
line 10 of 2-ER-231 and line 4 of 2-ER-234). That is because it was given to him by
another NIFCU affiliated party, that Roark was instructed to then send to his attorney
(top of 1-ER-190) that Roark’s evidence proves took part in extrinsic and other fraud
on the court schemes in the 2011 state trial court, and fraud on the court in the 2018
state appellate court, all with attorneys as officers of the court for opposing parties.
SDCCU counsel is relying on the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court
scheme it took part in with opposing officers of the court, to secure terminating
sanctions against Roark involving his home PC hard drive, that stripped him of due
process and other rights under the Constitution, state, and federal laws, to cite other
false allegations of fabricated spoliation (and more) uncontested. This is precisely
why Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU responded to Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3)
motion to state, “…regardless of whether Sevel actually tampered with Roark’s hard
drive or whether there was a conspiracy to conceal Sevel’s conflict of interest [to
cite other fabricated evidence of spoliation that unlawfully secured terminating

sanctions allowed uncontested] …” (line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 in Bankruptcy Court) to
do just that (in AOB, top half of p. 14, top half of p. 29 and bottom half of p. 39 to
bottom of p. 40). Note: line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 is shown in error as pdf p. 9, Dkt #74
on line 11–15 of 1-ER-206, and line 3 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, and line
20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022. Also see line 8–17 of 1-ER-050.
Roark did not admit to spoliation
As previously asserted and proven (in 1-ER-030–073, AOB and prior federal
court filings since 2018), Roark did not admit to destroying evidence, only files on
his home PC his co-defendant employer, NIFCU required (per its policies), directed,
and authorized because it believed SDCCU’s preservation order (per evidence cited
in AOB and prior federal court filings) allowed it. When attorneys as officers of the
court conspired to deny and conceal the foregoing from the 2011 state trial court in
an August 7, 2015 hearing, it was to corrupt that court’s ability to adjudicate
reconsideration of a tentative for terminating sanctions it did not know was secured
by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme. Roark asserted in his
last appeal before this Court (Case. No. 21-55040) that the August 7, 2015 fraud on
the court scheme was an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme, more so because the
attorneys NIFCU provided Roark, stated repeatedly (as did NIFCU, his co-defendant
employer), and by email, that NIFCU files were “…proper to permanently delete…”
(1-ER-193 and 3-ER-638) as part of their extrinsic fraud scheme outside of court!
There is no time-bar for extrinsic fraud on the court by officers of the court
Per the legal authorities cited in Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate and for
damages, sanctions, and other relief (2-ER-219–390) and District Court appeal (1-
ER-030–073), there is no time-bar for extrinsic fraud on the court schemes by
attorneys as officers of the court in both state and federal courts, and there are no
exceptions in which those extrinsic fraud on the court schemes permit making other
false allegations of spoliation and more uncontested! The lower federal courts (after
July 11, 2022) abused their discretion to disregard, as Roark previously asserted and
evidenced (in AOB, 1-ER-101–177 and 1-ER-030–073) that SDCCU counsel’s
time-bar argument is suited to a Rule 60(b) motion for fraud, in which exceptions to
the one-year time-bar still apply (per line 12 of 1-ER-125 to line 8 of 1-ER-128), if
Roark had filed a Rule 60(b) motion that he did not. A time-bar is not applicable to
a Rule 60(d)(3) motion for extrinsic fraud on the court schemes by attorneys as
officers of the court in both a 2011 state trial court and 2018–2019 bankruptcy
adversary trial court. The foregoing is precisely why SDCCU counsel reframed
Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate and for sanctions, damages, and other relief,
as a Rule 60(b) motion, the Bankruptcy Court accommodated (in AOB, bottom half
of p. 36 and elsewhere in AOB, and line 17 of 1-ER-019 to line 7 of 1-ER-020).
Roark filed his motion to vacate and for sanctions, damages, and other relief pursuant
to Rule 60(d)(3) because pursuant to the legal authorities cited in his motion, and
District Court appeal (1-ER-030–073), extrinsic fraud on the court by officers of the
court is not time-barred. This renders how long evidence was in Roark’s possession
irrelevant, more so because attorneys as officers of the court used the corrupted state
court rulings for extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes in three federal courts
before July of 2022 to prevent Roark from presenting his evidence earlier (line 3–6
of 2-ER-247, line 6 of 1-ER-021, line 5 of 1-ER-023, line 8–12 of 2-ER-230, in
AOB, footnote 3, p. 9, top ¶ on p. 16, item (a), p. 37, and bottom ¶ of p. 44).
To facilitate the deceitful effort by SDCCU counsel as an officer of the court in
Bankruptcy Court to reframe Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion
that it was not, to cite non-applicable legal authorities and a time-bar, SDCCU
counsel cited Roark’s use of the phrase “New Evidence” in his motion. However,
Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion defined new evidence as “…not seen by any state or
federal court…” (line 1 of 2-ER-220) and that “…has not been filed in any state or
federal court…” (line 21–22 of 2-ER-230) to differentiate his Rule 60(d)(3) motion
from newly discovered evidence associated with a Rule 60(b) motion, his motion for
reconsideration also more clearly defined (footnote 2, line 19–21 of 1-ER-108). In
District Court, Roark again defined his evidence as new evidence “…because it was
not previously adjudicated in any trial court due to extrinsic fraud on the court
schemes, by officers of the court…” (line 11–13 of 1-ER-053) meaning both the
2011 state trial court, and the 2018–2019 bankruptcy adversary trial court.
Despite the deceitful effort by the attorney as an officer of the court for SDCCU
(Ms. Pruitt, from Sheppard Mullin) to reframe Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a
Rule 60(b) motion, Ms. Pruitt, when pressed, explicitly admitted in the September
14, 2022 Bankruptcy Court motion hearing that the legal authorities asserted by
Roark to grant his Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate, based on his “new evidence” and
assertions were an “…exception…” to those asserted by SDCCU counsel (to falsely
reframe his motion as a Rule 60(b) motion), and not denied by opposing counsel for
NIFCU/CCU and the Bankruptcy Trustee in that hearing (line 5–19 of 1-ER-144,
line 17–20 of 1-ER-055, middle of 1-ER-056, bottom half of 1-ER-068, line 4–7 of
1-ER-126, in AOB, bottom of p. 14, bottom of p. 20 to top of p. 21, middle of p. 42).
Roark being copied on the email evidence is irrelevant
This red herring argument ignores the “out of court” extrinsic fraud by attorneys
for Roark and others. As also discussed throughout AOB, Roark was repeatedly and
in hindsight falsely, assured by his NIFCU provided attorney that the issue of tainted
evidence from the non-neutral computer forensic expert would be raised, until he did
not, and could not, with the state trial court (line 5–20 of 1-ER-026 and line 3–7 of
1-ER-028), and later state appeals court (line 19–21 of 1-ER-112, line 20 of 2-ER-
227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053, line 3–7 of
1-ER-028, and top ¶, p. 9, and item 6, p. 21 Dkt #39, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040).
Furthermore, possessing emails proving attorneys as officers of the court took

part in an early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme in a 2011 state trial
court, and used the corrupted state trial court rulings to defraud subsequent state and
federal courts, does not create a legal exception permitting the foregoing.
It also implies (outlandishly) that Roark went along with the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to have “death penalty” terminating sanctions
imposed on himself, so he would be stripped of due process, a trial and other rights
under the Constitution, state and federal laws, so he could be coerced into signing a
$9,875,000 Mary Carter settlement (that involved CUNA Mutual and NIFCU’s
excess coverage insurer, Great American Insurance Company) with NIFCU and
SDCCU for the (fabricated) claim of misappropriation (line 14 of 1-ER-102, line 5
of 1-ER-114 to line 1 of 1-ER-115, and 1-ER-151–157, and cited in Dkt #13 and
#39, 9th Cir. Case No. 21-55040) to also have a nondischargeable default judgment
now over $1,000,000 with accruing interest (bottom of 2-ER-258), imposed on
himself. The Mary Carter settlement excluded the (fabricated) defamation claim
Roark was also innocent of, despite “…the Great American attorney trying to argue
the defamation cause of action was covered…” (top of 3-ER-669), to facilitate the
insurance fraud scheme CUNA Mutual, NIFCU and SDCCU perpetrated against
Roark, discussed in Roark’s last appeal in this Court (Dkt #13 and Dkt #39, 9th Cir.
Case No. 21-55040). Terminating sanctions secured by the early-to-mid 2014
extrinsic fraud on the court scheme by attorneys as officers of the court, allowed
NIFCU, CUNA Mutual and SDCCU to demand that Great American Insurance
Company not indemnify Roark (for NIFCU’s respondeat superior liability) under
NIFCU’s blanket policy with CUNA Mutual covering NIFCU and Roark, so the
remaining coverage amount (insufficient for the Mary Carter settlement) could be
misappropriated to NIFCU only, with the excess coverage carrier making up the
difference. This is why the $9,875,000 Mary Carter settlement agreement Roark was
coerced and deceived into signing (1-ER-151–157), also included a “policy release”
for Great American Insurance Company, the excess coverage insurer, for its role in
the insurance fraud scheme to have Roark waive rights to employer indemnification
under CA Labor Code § 2802, that are unwaivable per CA Labor Code § 2804.
Abuse of Discretion / Judicial Misconduct by Bankruptcy and District Courts
When Roark filed his Rule 60(d)(3) motion to vacate, and for damages, sanctions
and other relief in Bankruptcy Court on July 11, 2022 with evidence (2-ER-219–
390), and additional evidence thereafter (1-ER-204–218, 1-ER-186–195, and 1-ER-
101–177) proving attorneys as officers of the court from the local Sheppard Mullin
law firm had conspired with attorneys as officers of the court for opposing parties,
to take part in extrinsic and other fraud on the court schemes against the judiciary in
state and federal courts, including this Court, over the last eight years prior to July
11, 2022, (federal crimes per line 12 of 1-ER-099 to line 3 of 1-ER-100, and line 5–
16 of 1-ER-072, in AOB, bottom half of p. 32), he discovered his case was assigned
to Bankruptcy Court Judge Laura S. Taylor, who was a former attorney of 21 years
with the local Sheppard Mullin law office (line 17 of 1-ER-019 to line 1 of 1-ER-
020) whose attorneys Roark also witnessed assisting SDCCU conceal wrongdoing
in 2010 (bottom half of 1-ER-042). This is why SDCCU terminated employees with
any knowledge of its wrongdoing using confidential separation agreements that
conditioned receipt of severance pay to not raising any allegations of its wrongdoing
with any governmental agency (see top of 3-ER-589 and for context, in AOB, see
item (a) at the bottom of p. 5 to top of p. 6, and item (b) at the top of p. 6), which
was a disguised payoff to not report its wrongdoing to government agencies.
Five weeks after filing his Rule 60(d)(3) motion, the court delays Roark’s motion
hearing to September 14, 2022, and presumably because of Judge Taylor’s conflict
of interest, reassigns his case to Judge Christopher B. Latham, the Chief Bankruptcy
Court Judge (who is appointed by, and has gravitas with, the local District Court, on
appeal to act on behalf of former Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge, Taylor), which may
explain (per AOB) why the District Court abused its discretion to:
(a) disregard why the Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge obliged the deceitful effort,
by the attorney for SDCCU from the Sheppard Mullin law firm (Judge Taylor’s
former law firm locally of 21 years) in the September 14, 2022 motion hearing,
to falsely reframe Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion to assert
a time-bar and other legal authorities for defeating a Rule 60(b) motion (1-ER-
178–185), not applicable to a Rule 60(d)(3) motion. The foregoing was proven
after Roark called attention to the Bankruptcy Court’s clear error in a motion
for reconsideration (1-ER-101–177) that was declined in an order based the
blatantly false statement that Roark’s “…motion to vacate sought relief under
Rule 60(b) (ECF No. 71).” (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089, as discussed in this brief, AOB,
and in 1-ER-030–073 and 1-ER-019–029). The Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge
did not cite where in Roark’s motion to vacate (ECF No. 71) he sought relief
under Rule 60(b), precisely because it, is not there and, was a lie, and to;
(b) disregard why the Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge also disregarded the criminal
conspiracy by attorneys as officers of the court from Sheppard Mullin, et al,
even after it was explicitly admitted in the September 14, 2022 Bankruptcy
Court motion hearing by the attorney as an officer of the court for SDCCU’s co-
conspirator NIFCU/CCU, who stated about all of the co-conspiring attorneys as
officers of the court for all three opposing parties who participated in extrinsic
and other fraud on the court schemes against the judiciary in state and federal
courts over eight years, that it was “…nothing…” because “…everybody
knew…”, and “…squared it away.” with themselves to assent to it (in AOB,
middle of p. 11, top of p. 20, bottom half of p. 22, top half of p. 38, and top half
of p. 41, and 1-ER-050, 1-ER-069, 1-ER-072, and 1-ER-113–114, per line 12–
13 of 1-ER-146). However, it was not squared away with Roark whose attorney
repeatedly, but with hindsight falsely, assured him the issue of tainted evidence
would be raised, until he did not, and could not, with the state trial court or state
appellate court, an extrinsic fraud scheme outside of court by Roark’s attorney
as an officer of the court (line 20 of 2-ER-227 to line 10 of 2-ER-228), and to;
(c) disregard why the Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge also disregarded the explicit
admission by the attorney as an officer of the court for SDCCU from Sheppard
Mullin (Judge Taylor’s former law firm of 21 years) in the September 14, 2022
motion hearing, that the legal authorities cited in Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion
to vacate, for his evidence, were an “…exception…” to (and supersede) those
asserted by Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU to falsely reframe his motion
(line 5–19 of 1-ER-144, and in AOB, pp. 14, 21 and 42), and to;
(d) disregard that when the Bankruptcy Court Chief Judge denied Roark’s motion
for reconsideration (due to its “Clear Court Error”), it was based on the false
statement in its order (3rd ¶ of 1-ER-089), to oblige the deceitful effort by
Sheppard Mullin counsel as an officer of the court (for Judge Taylor’s former
law firm of 21 years) to falsely reframe his Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b)
motion, that Roark’s “…motion to vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b) (ECF
No. 71).”! The Bankruptcy Court Chief Judge did not state where Rule 60(b) is
cited in ECF No. 71 (2-ER-219–390) precisely because it, is not there and,
was a lie (in AOB, bottom half of p. 19 and p. 36, p. 43 and bottom of p. 46 to
top of p. 47, and 1-ER-068–069), to oblige the deceitful effort by counsel for
SDCCU from Sheppard Mullin (the former law firm for 21 years of former
Chief Judge Taylor who was first assigned to this case), to falsely reframe
Roark’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion as a Rule 60(b) motion (on any appeal), and to;
(e) disregard why the Chief Bankruptcy Court Judge also disregarded that Sheppard
Mullin counsel for SDCCU was relying on terminating sanctions secured by
their early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the court scheme to cite other false
allegations and fabricated evidence of spoliation (and more) uncontested! The
foregoing was proven when Sheppard Mullin counsel for SDCCU stated that,
“…regardless of whether Sevel actually tampered with Roark’s hard drive or
whether there was a conspiracy to conceal Sevel’s conflict of interest [to cite
other fabricated evidence of spoliation that unlawfully secured terminating
sanctions allowed uncontested] …” (line 7–8, p. 3, Dkt #74 in Bankruptcy
Court, adversary Case No. 18-90158-CL7, and in AOB top half of p. 14, , top
half of p. 29 and bottom half of p. 39 to bottom of p. 40), to do just that!
Carlton Roark /s/ Carlton Roark

Name Signature
11251 Rancho Carmel Dr., #503203
San Diego, CA 92150 December 10, 2023
Address Date
Case No. 23-55750
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

CARLTON ROARK,
Appellant,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ET AL
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court, Southern District of California,
Case No. 22-CV-01962, Hon. Todd W. Robinson
After an Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court,

Southern District of California,
for Adversary Case No. 18-90158-CL7, Hon. Christopher B. Latham,
for Bankruptcy Case No.: 18-04093-LT7
APPELLANT’S EXCERPT OF RECORD
CARLTON ROARK, APPELLANT, PRO SE

11251 RANCHO CARMEL DRIVE, #503203
SAN DIEGO, CA 92150
PHONE: (818) 227-4825
EMAIL: 818CAPITALADVISOR@GMAIL.COM
1
ROARK V. SDCCU, ET AL
APPEAL NO. 23-55750
APPELLANT’S EXCERPT OF RECORD ON APPEAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS
VOLUME 1 of 3
DOCKET
DATE DESCRIPTION PAGES
NO.
ROARK V. SDCCU, ET AL
U.S. DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. 22-CV-01962-TWR-WVG
U.S. District Court Order and 1-ER-

8/22/2023 15
Judgment 001 – 018
4/3/2023 14 Appellant Reply Brief 1-ER-
019 – 029
2/8/2023 10 Appellant Opening Brief 1-ER-
030 – 073
Supplement to Debtor Designation of 1-ER-
12/23/2022 7
Record on Appeal 074 – 077
12/19/2022 5 Appellant’s Statement of Issues and 1-ER-
Designation of Record on Appeal 078 – 087
2
DOCKET
NO.
SDCCU V. ROARK
BANKRUPTCY COURT ADVERSARY CASE NO. 18-90158-CL
12/9/2022 98 Bankruptcy Court Order on Debtor 1-ER-

Motion for Reconsideration Dkt #92 088 – 090
11/07/2022 96 Debtor Joint Reply to Responses from 1-ER-
NIFCU/CCU, SDCCU and the
Bankruptcy Trustee to Dkt #92 091 – 100
10/21/2022 92 Debtor Motion for Reconsideration

Due to Court Error 1-ER-
with Exhibits T (9-14-2022 Bankruptcy 101 – 177
Court Motion Hearing), U and V
10/12/2022 89 Bankruptcy Court Order on Debtor 1-ER-
Motion Dkt #71 178 – 185
07/29/2022 78 Brief in Support of Supplemental
1-ER-
Evidence to Debtor Motion Dkt #71
186 – 195
with Exhibits R and S
Debtor Reply to Bankruptcy Trustee 1-ER-
07/28/2022 76
Response to Dkt #71 196 – 203
07/28/2022 75 Debtor Reply to SDCCU Response to 1-ER-
Dkt #71 with Exhibit Q 204 – 218
3
VOLUME 2 of 3
DOCKET
NO.
SDCCU V. ROARK
(continued)
07/11/2022 71 Debtor Motion, to Vacate the 2011

State Trial Court Default Judgment
Based on New Evidence Proving it was
2-ER-
Secured by an Extrinsic Fraud Scheme
on the Court and, for Damages 219 – 390
Sanctions, and Other Relief
with Exhibits A through P
3/14/2019 61 Transcript of Hearing on 1/31/2019 2-ER-
391 – 409
3/14/2019 60 Transcript of Hearing on 12/13/2018 2-ER-
410 – 424
VOLUME 3 of 3
DOCKET
NO.
SDCCU V. ROARK
(continued)
Debtor Answer with Exhibits, to 3-ER-

10/23/2018 5
SDCCU Adversary Complaint 425 – 706
4
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
Document DktEntry: 2,
15 Filed 08/22/23 Page 5 of 710
PageID.173 Page 1 of 18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 In re Case No.: 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
Bankruptcy Case No.: 18-4093-LT7
12
CARLTON ROARK, Adversary Case No.: 18-90158-CL
13
Debtor. ORDER AND JUDGMENT
14
AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY
15 COURT
16 CARLTON ROARK,
(ECF Nos. 1, 10, 13, 14)
17 Appellant,
18
v.
19
20 SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT
UNION,
21
22 Appellee.
23
24 Presently before the Court is Debtor-Defendant and Appellant Carlton Roark’s
25 Notice of Appeal from two of the Honorable Christopher B. Latham’s orders: (1) Judge
26 Latham’s October 12, 2022 Order on Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Judgment (the “First
27 Underlying Order”); and (2) Judge Latham’s December 9, 2022 Order Denying
28 Defendant’s Motion for Further Reconsideration (the “Second Underlying Order”). (See
1
1- ER-001 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
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Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
15 Filed 08/22/23 Page 6 of 710
1 generally ECF No. 1 (“NOA”).) The Court is in receipt of Roark’s Opening Brief (“AOB,”
2 ECF No. 10), the Responsive Brief (“RB,” ECF No. 13) filed by Appellee San Diego
3 County Credit Union (“SDCCU”), and Roark’s Reply Brief (“ARB,” ECF No. 14).
4 The Court previously determined that this appeal was suitable for determination on
5 the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (See ECF No. 9.)
6 Having carefully considered the Parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, the
7 Court AFFIRMS the rulings of the bankruptcy court.
8 BACKGROUND
9 I. The San Diego County Credit Union Litigation
10 A. Underlying Facts
11 SDCCU employed Roark as a loan officer from 2003 to mid-August 2012, at which
12 time Roark was let go. See SDCCU v. Roark, No. D065117, 2015 WL 1311511, at *1
13 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2015) (the “Anti-SLAPP Appeal”). Roark then found a position
14 with North Island Financial Credit Union (“NIFCU”). See id.
15 Meanwhile, beginning in late December 2011, an anonymous individual later
16 identified as Roark began disseminating defamatory statements regarding SDCCU through
17 blogs, customer review sites, and email. (See Judgment Against Defendant Carlton Roark
18 and in Favor of Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union at 6, Halleck v. Doe, No. 37-
19 2011-00100322-CU-DF-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 16, 2016) (the “Default
20 Judgment”).1) The defamatory statements accused SDCCU of mortgage fraud, ATM theft,
21 racial discrimination, and financing gay pornography, among other things. (See id.)
22 Teresa Halleck, SDCCU’s then-CEO, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of
23 California, County of San Diego, against doe defendants for defamation, Halleck v. Doe,
24
25
1
The Default Judgment is attached as Exhibit A to Roark’s Motion to Vacate the 2011 State Trial
26 Court Default Judgment Based on New Evidence Proving It Was Secured by Extrinsic Fraud Scheme on
the Court and for Damages, Sanctions, and Other Relief (“Mot. to Vacate”), which was filed at ECF No.
27 71 in SDCCU’s underlying adversary proceeding. To avoid ambiguity, pin citations to the exhibits
28 appended to Roark’s Motion to Vacate refer to the Exhibit letter and page numbers provided by Roark at
the bottom of each page.
2
1- ER-002 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
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Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
15 Filed 08/22/23 Page 7 of 710
1 No. 37-2011-00100322-CU-DF-CTL (Cal. Super. filed Nov. 1, 2011) (the “State Court
2 Action”). (See AOB at 1; RB at 10.) In 2013, after discovering that Roark was behind the
3 defamatory statements, Halleck amended the complaint to substitute SDCCU as the
4 plaintiff and name Roark and NIFCU as defendants. (See AOB at 1–2; RB at 10.) SDCCU
5 asserted claims for defamation per se, defamation per quod, breach of employment
6 agreement, breach of separation agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair
7 competition against Roark. See SDCCU v. Roark, No. D071960, 2018 WL 1663204, at *1
8 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2018) (the “Default Judgment Appeal”).
9 B. Discovery
10 1. The Preservation Order and Imaging of Roark’s Hard Drive
11 On July 3, 2013, San Diego Superior Court Judge Joel Pressman issued an evidence
12 preservation order (the “Preservation Order”), ordering Appellant to “protect and preserve
13 all potentially relevant evidence in th[e SDCCU] action, including but not limited to
14 electronic information stored on his personal and/or work computers, laptops, PDAs, smart
15 phones, tablets and/or other electronic devices.” (Default Judgment at 11 (emphasis in
16 original).) Appellant admitted to receiving a copy of the Preservation Order. (See id.)
17 In February 2014, NIFCU’s insurer, CUNA Mutual, suggested Jim Sevel as Roark’s
18 forensic expert. (See Mot. to Vacate Ex. B at 2.) On March 4, 2014, Roark’s counsel
19 arranged for Sevel to image Roark’s hard drive on the afternoon of March 7, 2014 (the
20 “March Image”). (See Mot. to Vacate Ex. C at 2; Ex. D at 1–2.) On March 8, 2014, Sevel
21 confirmed he had successfully imaged Roark’s computer. (See Mot. to Vacate Ex. E at 2.)
22 On April 8, 2014, however, Roark’s counsel sent a letter confirming Sevel’s
23 immediate termination in light of a previously undisclosed conflict of interest. (See Mot.
24 to Vacate Ex. G at 3.) Specifically, CUNA Mutual and/or Roark’s counsel discovered that
25 Sevel or his employer, San Diego Computer Forensics, LLC, had previously performed
26 computer forensics services for SDCCU through an intermediary in the same action. (See
27 id.) Roark received a copy of the letter by email. (See id. at 1.) Roark’s counsel therefore
28 engaged Daniel Libby of Digital Forensics Inc. (See Mot. to Vacate Ex. I at 13.)
3
1- ER-003 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
15 Filed 08/22/23 Page 8 of 710
1 In May 2014, Roark and SDDCU stipulated to a protocol for inspecting Roark’s hard
2 drive (the “Stipulated Protocol”). (See Default Judgment at 11.) Pursuant to the Stipulated
3 Protocol, Roark’s forensic expert (presumably Libby), while being monitored by SDCCU’s
4 forensic expert, would extract a forensically sound copy of the hard drive of Roark’s
5 personal computer. (See id.) To identify relevant information, Roark’s expert, monitored
6 by SDCCU’s expert, would run searches on the replicated hard drive of 87 stipulated key
7 words. (See id. at 11–12.)
8 Beginning May 8, 2014, Roark’s counsel arranged for Libby to re-image Roark’s
9 hard drive on the morning of May 12, 2014 (the “May Image”). (See Mot. to Vacate Ex. I
10 at 15–20.)
11 2. Forensic Analysis of Roark’s Hard Drive
12 On June 11, 2014, while running the keyword search on the May Image, Roark’s
13 expert found evidence that Roark had used a wiping device to delete files unilaterally prior
14 to production of his hard drive in violation of the Preservation Order and Stipulated
15 Protocol. (See Default Judgment at 11–12.) This led to two developments: First, in July
16 2014, Roark’s counsel privately hired James Vaughn of iDiscovery Solutions to compare
17 the then-unproduced March and produced May Images of Roark’s hard drive. (See Mot.
18 to Vacate Ex. J at 4.) Second, Judge Pressman held a discovery conference on July 22,
19 2014, at which time the court instructed the parties to agree to a neutral forensic expert to
20 examine the May Image. (See Default Judgment at 12.) The parties chose Bruce Pixley.
21 (See id.)
22 In his report dated August 29, 2014, Pixley concluded that “it was clear that someone
23 intentionally used software to wipe data” in May 2014. (See id.) Pixley found that over
24 210,000 files had been permanently destroyed, many of them only hours prior to Roark’s
25 production of his hard drive. (See id.) Indeed, just hours before the hard drive had been
26 produced, somebody had downloaded data to USB devices and then used software known
27 as “USBOblivion” to delete evidence of the USB download. (See id.) Although it is not
28 ///
4
1- ER-004 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
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Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
15 Filed 08/22/23 Page 9 of 710
1 clear precisely what data had been deleted, some of the files appeared to relate to Roark’s
2 internet activity and certain NIFCU loan files. (See id.)
3 Pixley requested production of the USBs used for the download from Roark’s hard
4 drive. (See id.) In response, Roark produced a single USB on September 4, 2014, (see
5 id.), despite reporting to his attorney that he had “found” it on August 19, 2014. (See
6 SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 78 (“Supp. Exs.”) Ex. R at 2.) In a supplemental
7 report dated September 14, 2014, Pixley concluded that wiping software had also been
8 used to wipe data from the USB, including on September 3, 2013, the day before the USB
9 had been produced. (See Default Judgment at 12.)
10 Although Pixley was able to recover approximately 33,000 destroyed files, there was
11 additional data that he could not recover. (See id.) Roark did not dispute that he had
12 deleted the 33,000 files that Pixley recovered, contending only that he had not deleted any
13 “relevant” files. (See id.)
14 In January 2015, Roark produced the March Image for the first time. (See id.) Pixley
15 again found evidence that wiping software had been used and that data had been deleted in
16 the days before the hard drive had been imaged. (See id.) Based on a comparison of the
17 March and May Images of Roark’s hard drive, Pixley concluded that Roark had deleted
18 data responsive to 50 of the 87 stipulated search terms. (See id. at 13.)
19 C. Sanctions and Default
20 In light of Roark’s apparent spoliation, SDCCU requested terminating sanctions.
21 (See id. at 11.) Following oral argument and supplemental briefing, Judge Pressman
22 granted SDCCU’s motion on August 18, 2015. (See id.) He consequently struck Roark’s
23 answer and entered default against him. (See id. at 13.)
24 On December 16, 2016, Judge Pressman held a hearing on SDCCU’s application for
25 default judgment. (See id. at 6.) Judge Pressman concluded that SDCCU’s operative third
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
5
1- ER-005 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
Document 15 Filed DktEntry:
08/22/23 2,PageID.178
Page 10 of 710
Page 6 of 18
1 amended complaint and evidence supported its claims for defamation against Roark.2 (See
2 id.) Judge Pressman therefore awarded SDCCU compensatory damages in the amount of
3 $442,500 for reputational harm, $318,641 in wage expenses, and $134,260 for the services
4 of outside vendors and consultants, totaling $802,901. (See id. at 6–7.) Judge Pressman
5 additionally awarded SDCCU $1,000 in punitive damages, $13,415.71 in expert fees, and
6 $40,396.50 in attorneys’ fees. (See id. at 8.) Accordingly, on December 16, 2016, Judge
7 Pressman entered judgment in favor of SDCCU and against Roark in the amount of
8 $857,713.21. (See id. at 8–9.)
9 D. Appeal
10 Roark appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed both the issuance of
11 terminating sanctions and the entry of the Default Judgment. See generally SDCCU, 2018
12 WL 1663204. With regard to the terminating sanctions, the Court of Appeal noted that,
13 “[c]entral to SDCCU’s ability to prove its case was its need to examine Roark’s computer
14 files[,]” but “[b]y deleting those files in violation of the court’s protective order and the
15 parties’ protocol for handling his hard drive, Roark diminished SDCCU’s ability to pursue
16 its case as it was impossible to ascertain what data Roark had deleted.” See id. at *5. The
17 court also “infer[red] Roark [had] acted willfully in destroying the files and taking actions
18 to cover up his deletions[,]” including “us[ing] a software program designed to delete the
19 files. . . [and] delet[ing] files from both a hard drive and a USB drive hours before they
20 were to be examined by experts under the protective order.” See id. Further, “some of the
21 recovered files included matters responsive to the parties’ list of keywords to be searched.”
22 See id. The court therefore “conclude[d] this [wa]s one of the unusual cases requiring
23 terminating sanctions as a first measure” because “[n]o lesser remedy would have sufficed
24 to protect SDCCU’s interests in the face of Roark’s willful efforts to sabotage SDCCU’s
25 ///
26
27 2
The Anti-SLAPP Appeal, which concluded that “SDCCU [had] made a prima facie showing the
28 defamatory statements are false for purposes of the defamation causes of action,” SDCCU, 2015 WL
1311511, at *11, bolstered Judge Pressman’s conclusion. (See Default Judgment at 6.)
6
1- ER-006 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
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Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
08/22/23 2,PageID.179
Page 11 of 710
Page 7 of 18
1 case against him.” See id. at *7. The court also rejected Roark’s arguments that the amount
2 of the Default Judgment was excessive. See id. at *7–8.
3 The California Supreme Court denied Roark’s petition for review on June 7, 2018.
4 (See RB at 14 (citing Cal. Supreme Ct. No. S248735).)
5 II. The Bankruptcy and Adversary Proceedings
6 On July 9, 2018, Roark filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, In re Roark,
7 No. 18-bk-4093-LT7 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. filed July 9, 2018) (the “Bankruptcy Proceeding”).
8 Roark and SDCCU each filed an adversary proceeding against the other in the bankruptcy
9 court concerning the dischargeability of the Default Judgment, Roark v. SDCCU, No. 18-
10 ap-90109-LA (Bankr. S.D. Cal. filed Aug. 2, 2018) (the “Roark Adversary Proceeding”),
11 and SDCCU v. Roark, No. 18-ap-90158-LA (Bankr. S.D. Cal. filed Sept. 27, 2018) (the
12 “SDCCU Adversary Proceeding”). The Honorable Louise DeCarl Adler dismissed the
13 Roark Adversary proceeding for failure to prosecute on September 12, 2019. (See
14 generally Order Dismissing Adversary Proceeding Without Prejudice for Want of
15 Prosecution, Roark Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 36.)
16 As for the SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, Judge Adler granted summary judgment
17 in SDCCU’s favor on February 25, 2019. (See generally Order on Motion for Summary
18 Judgment on Claim for Determination of Non-Dischargeability of Debt Pursuant to 11
19 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 50.) Judge Adler specifically
20 found that the Default Judgment was entitled to collateral estoppel and that Roark’s
21 affirmative defenses were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See id. at 2.) Judge
22 Adler also concluded that “th[e] extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman
23 [doctrine] does not apply, and does not preclude summary judgment in favor of SDCCU[,]”
24 because “[t]here is no evidence of any extrinsic fraud on the Court that led to the
25 terminating sanctions, which would need to be shown for the extrinsic fraud exception to
26 apply.” (See id. at 3.)
27 Appellant appealed to this Court, Roark v. SDCCU (In re Roark), No. 19-CV-344
28 AJB (MSB) (S.D. Cal. filed Feb. 20, 2019) (the “Prior Bankruptcy Appeal”). On
7
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1 August 15, 2019, the Honorable Anthony J. Battaglia affirmed Judge Adler’s
2 determination that the Default Judgment was nondischargeable. (See generally Order
3 Affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s Ruling and Dismissing Debtor’s Appeal, Prior Bankr.
4 Appeal, ECF No. 14.) Judge Battaglia concluded that Roark had waived any challenge to
5 the bankruptcy court’s decision regarding his affirmative defenses, (see id. at 3–4), and that
6 “the state court’s findings [of willfulness and maliciousness] were entitled to collateral
7 estoppel effect and the bankruptcy court was correct in granting summary judgment to
8 SDCCU on these grounds.” (See id. at 4–6.) Finally, Judge Battaglia determined that
9 Roark had failed to introduce sufficient evidence that NIFCU had committed any external
10 fraud on the court such that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not apply. (See id. at 6–
11 8.)
12 Roark did not appeal Judge Battaglia’s Order. (See generally Prior Bankr. Appeal,
13 Docket.)
14 III. The Underlying Motions
15 A. Motion to Vacate
16 On July 11, 2022, nearly two years after Judge Battaglia’s affirmance and the closing
17 of the SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, (see SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF Nos. 68,
18 69, respectively), Roark filed the underlying Motion to Vacate. (See SDCCU Adversary
19 Proceeding, ECF No. 71.) In light of Judge Adler’s retirement, the SDCCU Adversary
20 Proceeding was reassigned to the Honorable Laura S. Taylor. (See Notice of Change in
21 Assigned Judge and Number, SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 70.)
22 In his Motion to Vacate, Roark purported to introduce new evidence of extrinsic
23 fraud on the court in the nature of emails showing a “conspir[acy]” by NIFCU, SDCCU,
24 and CUNA Mutual “to have Roark’s home PC hard drive first accessed (and tampered
25 with) by a non-neutral computer forensic expert[, i.e., Sevel] who concealed his conflict
26 of interest for SDCCU.” (See Mot. to Vacate at 1–2 (emphasis in original).) Further,
27 “those same officers of the court then conspired to perpetrate an unconscionable scheme to
28 conceal their use of a non-neutral computer expert[, i.e., Sevel] from the court.” (See id.
8
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1 at 2 (emphasis in original).) SDCCU opposed the Motion to Vacate, (see SDCCU

2 Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 74), and Roark filed a reply in support of his Motion to
3 Vacate. (See SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 75.) Roark filed his Supplemental
4 Exhibits on July 29, 2022. (See Brief in Support of Supplemental Evidence to Debtor’s
5 Motion, Dkt #71, and Reply, Dkt #75, SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 78.)
6 The case was then reassigned to Judge Latham, (see Order Referring Adversary
7 Proceeding for All Further Proceedings to Judge Christopher B. Latham, SDCCU
8 Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 80), who held a hearing on September 14, 2022. (See
9 Minute Order, SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 86.) Judge Latham’s “two main
10 concerns” were res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See Transcript at
11 4:13–5:2, SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 87.)
12 On October 12, 2022, Judge Latham denied Roark’s Motion to Vacate, (see
13 generally Order on Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Judgment, SDCCU Adversary
14 Proceeding, ECF No. 89 (the “First Underlying Order”)), concluding that, “[e]ven if
15 [Roark]’s allegations held merit (and they do not), at least four legal grounds prevent the
16 court from ruling in his favor.” (See id. at 5.) First, Judge Latham concluded that Roark’s
17 motion was not timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. (See First Underlying
18 Order at 5–6.) Further, even if his motion had been timely, Roark failed to establish that
19 he was entitled to relief because his purportedly new evidence consisted of emails that he
20 had been copied on in 2014, meaning he could reasonably have introduced his evidence
21 earlier. (See id. at 6 n.2.) Second, Judge Latham found that the Default Judgment was
22 claim preclusive because Roark could have—but failed to—raise his extrinsic fraud claims
23 before Judge Pressman. (See id. at 6.) Third, Judge Latham determined that, under the
24 law-of-the-case doctrine, he could not revisit Roark’s allegations of extrinsic fraud on the
25 court, (see id. at 6–7), and that no exceptions to the doctrine applied. (See id. at 7 n.3.)
26 Finally, Judge Latham decided that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Roark’s motion
27 and that res judicata and the law of the case prevented Roark from arguing that any fraud
28 occurred such that the exception should apply. (See id. at 7.)
9
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1 B. Motion for Reconsideration

2 On October 21, 2022, Roark moved for reconsideration of Judge Latham’s First
3 Underlying Order on the basis of “clear court error.” (See generally SDCCU Adversary
4 Proceeding, ECF No. 92 (“Mot. for Reconsideration”) (emphasis omitted).) Generally,
5 Roark contended that Judge Latham erred in two respects: First, Judge Latham conflated
6 Roark’s new extrinsic fraud on the court argument regarding Sevel’s conflict of interest
7 with Roark’s previously rejected arguments concerning NIFCU’s misrepresentations to
8 Judge Pressman regarding Roark’s work-from-home privileges and home computer. (See
9 id. at 1–18.) Second, Judge Latham wrongly concluded that Roark’s Motion to Vacate had
10 not been timely. (See id. at 18–21.) SDCCU filed an opposition on November 4, 2022,
11 (see SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 95), and Roark filed a reply on November
12 7, 2022. (See SDCCU Adversary Proceeding ECF No. 96.)
13 After taking the Motion for Reconsideration under submission without oral
14 argument, (see Termination of Hearing, SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 97),
15 Judge Latham issued an order denying Roark’s Motion for Reconsideration on
16 December 9, 2022. (See Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Further Reconsideration,
17 SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 98 (the “Second Underlying Order”).)
18 Specifically, Judge Latham concluded that Roark “ha[d] not pointed to any new evidence,
19 clear error, or intervening change in law” that would warrant reconsideration of the First
20 Underlying Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (See Second Underlying
21 Order at 2 (citing Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)).) In any event,
22 “[Roark]’s admissions of evidence spoliation provided [the Superior Court] independent
23 grounds to enter default.” (See id.)
24 JURISDICTION
25 Roark timely filed the instant appeal of the Underlying Orders on December 12,
26 2022, (see generally ECF No. 1), pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
27 8002(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
28 ///
10
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1 ISSUES ON APPEAL
2 Appellant designates the following issues on appeal:
3 1. Does a scheme (proven by authenticated emails) by attorneys as
officers of the court for all opposing parties in conspiracy with each other, in
4
a state trial court action, to propound the deceptive fallacy that neutral
5 computer forensics experts were used, in order to conceal from the court they
were all used to analyze a home computer and hard drive (and copies thereof),
6
after it was first accessed (and tampered with) by a non-neutral computer
7 forensic expert with an undisclosed conflict of interest for the opposing party,
to assert spoliation and secure terminating sanctions to strip one of due process
8
and a trial, qualify as an extrinsic fraud on the court scheme (which caused
9 a corrupted state trial court default judgment imposed on the aggrieved party),
and;
10
11 2. Does the use, by attorneys as officers of the court, of that
corrupted state trial court default judgement in Bankruptcy Court adversary
12 proceeding to secure summary judgment against that aggrieved party to
13 prevent them from presenting evidence in an adversary trial (proving it was
the result of terminating sanctions secured by extrinsic fraud on the court
14 scheme in the state trial court), qualify as an extrinsic fraud on the court
15 scheme in Bankruptcy Court and, preclude that aggrieved party from later
filing his evidence as new evidence in Bankruptcy Court after his appeals on
16 other matters that include requests to supplement[] the record were all denied,
17 when pursuant to legal authorities[:]
18 a. The new evidence and current claim for extrinsic fraud on the
19 court schemes by officers of the court in a state and federal court, is not time-
barred, and;
20
21 b. The new evidence and current claim for extrinsic fraud on the
court schemes by officers of the court in a state and federal court, was not,
22 and could not be, previously filed or adjudicated in any court due to extrinsic
23 and other fraud on the court schemes in state and federal courts by attorneys
as officers of the court, and;
24
c. The new evidence and current claim for extrinsic fraud on the
25
court schemes by attorneys as officers of the court in a state and federal court,
26 is not barred by FRCP Rule 60, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Res Judicata,
Judicial Notice and the Law of the Case Doctrine?
27
28 (See ECF No. 5 at 5–6 (emphasis in original).)
11
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1 STANDARD OF REVIEW
2 A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of
3 discretion. Alexander v. Bleau (In re Negrete), 183 B.R. 195, 197 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)
4 (citing S.G. Wilson Co. v. Cleanmaster Indus., Inc. (In re Cleanmaster Indus., Inc.), 106
5 B.R. 628, 630 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989); Martinelli v. Valley Bank of Nev. (In re Martinelli),
6 96 B.R. 1011, 1012 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)), aff’d, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1996). Under
7 this standard, the reviewing court “first ‘determine[s] de novo whether the [bankruptcy]
8 court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested.’” Clinton v. Deutsche
9 Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. (In re Clinton), 449 B.R. 79, 82 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (second alteration
10 in original) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009)). “If
11 the bankruptcy court identified the correct legal rule, [the reviewing court] then
12 determine[s] under the clearly erroneous standard whether its factual findings and its
13 application of the facts to the relevant law were: ‘(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or
14 (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’” Id.
15 (quoting Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262).
16 ANALYSIS
17 Roark challenges both Judge Latham’s First Underlying Order, which denied
18 Roark’s Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment, and Judge Latham’s Second Underlying
19 Order, which denied Roark’s Motion for Reconsideration of the First Underlying Order.
20 (See generally AOB.) The Court addresses each in turn.
21 I. The First Underlying Order Denying Roark’s Motion to Vacate
22 Roark advances several purported errors in the First Underlying Order. (See
23 generally AOB at 12–25.)
24 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60
25 Roark first contends that Judge Latham erroneously concluded that Roark’s Motion
26 to Vacate was untimely under Rule 60, (see AOB at 14–21), which is made applicable to
27 bankruptcy proceedings through Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. Rule 60(b)
28 provides for reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown: (1) mistake,
12
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1 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that by due
2 diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision; (3) fraud by the
3 adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; and (6) any
4 other reason justifying relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also School Dist. No. 1J v.
5 ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A motion predicated on reasons (1), (2),
6 or (3) must be brought “no more than a year after entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
7 Rule 60, however, “does not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside a judgment for fraud on
8 the court.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3).
9 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Judge Latham did address the merits of Plaintiff’s
10 Motion to Vacate under Rule 60(d)(3):
11 Even if Rule 60(c) did not bar any Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) motion, [Roark] still
would not be entitled to relief. As in his Ninth Circuit appeal,3 [Roark] has
12
13
3
Roark’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit was from another appeal from the Bankruptcy Litigation. As
14 the undersigned explained in addressing Plaintiff’s initial underlying appeal to this Court, see In re Roark,
No. 19-CV-2117 TWR (WVG), 2020 WL 7869485, at *1–3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-
15 55040, 2022 WL 885155 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2022), NIFCU terminated Roark after Judge Pressman had
16 issued terminating sanctions. Roark therefore sued NIFCU for discrimination, harassment, retaliation,
wrongful termination, among other things, and for failure to compensate Roark for the costs of the State
17 Court Action and denial of coverage for the Default Judgment pursuant to its management insurance
policy, Roark v. NIFCU, No. 37-2018-00016182-CU-WT-CTL (Cal. Super. filed Apr. 2, 2018) (the
18 “NIFCU Litigation”).
19 Because the NIFCU Litigation was an asset of Roark’s estate, the Trustee investigated and
20 eventually settled Roark’s claims against NIFCU for $152,000. Judge Adler approved the settlement on
February 25, 2019, over Roark’s strenuous objection. In light of the settlement, the Superior Court
21 dismissed with prejudice the NIFCU Litigation. Roark did not appeal Judge Adler’s approval of the
settlement.
22
As the Bankruptcy Proceeding was winding down, Roark moved to invalidate the Trustee’s
23 settlement on the grounds that the Default Judgment had been procured through fraud on the court. Judge
24 Adler denied his request, finding that Roark’s evidence of fraud “was previously filed and necessarily
known to him before the hearing on the settlement motion.”
25
Roark appealed to this Court, also seeking to supplement the record with further evidence of
26 purported fraud. The Court affirmed Judge Adler’s order, also denying Roark’s request to supplement the
record for the following reasons:
27
28 To the extent Appellant seeks to relitigate his contention of fraud before the Superior Court,
Judge Battaglia concluded in the prior appeal that Appellant had failed to introduce
13
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1 “failed to establish any basis for relief” and is trying to raise argument and
present evidence when he could have reasonably done so earlier. [In re]
2
Roark, [No. 21-55040,] 2022 WL 885155, at *1 [(9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2022)]
3 (citing Kona Enters.[, Inc. v. Est. of Bishop], 229 F.3d [877,] 890 [(9th Cir.
2000)]). Specifically, [Roark] fails to show “newly discovered evidence that,
4
with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for
5 a new trial under Rule 59(b).” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2). For supposed new
evidence, he mainly offers emails between attorneys and the computer experts
6
during the State Court Action – emails he was copied on and received (ECF
7 Nos. 71 & 78). Thus[,] it cannot be newly discovered because “it was in the
moving party’s possession at the time of trial.” Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota
8
Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir. 1987).
9
10 (1st Underlying Order at 6 n.2.) Judge Latham did not clearly err in concluding that
11 Roark’s purportedly “new” evidence did not constitute an acceptable basis for
12 reconsideration, even under Rule 60(d)(3).
13 Even if the Court were to examine Roark’s “new” evidence, Roark fails to carry his
14 “high burden in seeking to prove fraud on the court, which must involve an unconscionable
15 plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” See
16 Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 Indeed, fraud on the court must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See
18 United States v. Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 443 (9th Cir. 2011). “In determining
19 whether fraud constitutes fraud on the court, the relevant inquiry is not whether fraudulent
20 conduct ‘prejudiced the opposing party,’ but whether it ‘harm[ed]’ the integrity of the
21
22
evidence of extrinsic fraud to Judge Adler. . . . Appellant failed to appeal Judge Battaglia’s
23 Order, rendering it final. Because Appellant cannot now challenge that ruling, the evidence
24 Appellant seeks to introduce is not material to the instant appeal. To the extent Appellant
contends that Judge Adler violated bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy laws by approving the
25 Trustee’s settlement with NIFCU, further evidence of SDCCU’s alleged fraud before the
Superior Court is not material to those arguments.
26
See id. at *5.
27
28 Finally, Roark appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which again affirmed, finding that “Roark had failed
to establish any basis for relief.” See In re Roark, 2022 WL 885155, at *1.
14
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1 judicial process.” Id. at 444 (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Robertson, 882
2 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1989)).
3 Roark contends that emails between his counsel and opposing counsel during the
4 Superior Court Action suffice to establish fraud on the court because his initial forensic
5 computer expert, Sevel, only revealed a disqualifying conflict of interest after obtaining
6 the March Image of Roark’s personal hard drive. (See AOB at 4–12.) They do not—all
7 that the emails reveal is that Sevel had a conflict of interest that he had failed to disclose
8 before imaging Roark’s personal hard drive. In short, Roark’s purportedly “new” evidence
9 does not support Roark’s speculation that Sevel had “tampered” with his hard drive.
10 Even if Sevel had “tampered” with Roark’s hard drive—again, a showing that Roark
11 fails to make—Judge Latham was correct that Judge Pressman had an independent basis to
12 enter the Default Judgment unrelated to the supposed “fraud.” (See 2d Underlying Order
13 at 2.) Indeed, through examining the March Image, Pixley determined that somebody had
14 deleted files from Roark’s hard drive in the days immediately preceding Sevel’s access to
15 Roark’s hard drive. (See Default Judgment at 12.) Similarly, an inspection of the May
16 Image revealed that “many” of the hundreds of thousands of destroyed files had been
17 deleted long after Sevel’s access had ended and only hours before Roark provided the hard
18 drive to his second expert, Libby, for imaging. (See id.) One of the USBs used before the
19 May Image was found in Roark’s possession and had also been wiped. (See id.) Further,
20 as Judge Pressman noted, “Roark d[id] not dispute he had deleted . . . 33,000 files, including
21 11,486 emails[,] prior to producing” his hard drive for Libby to image. (See id.) Indeed,
22 although Roark now attempts to dispute his prior admission, (see ARB at 6 (“Roark did
23 not admit to deleting evidence related to the 2011 state trial court action . . . .”)), Roark
24 explicitly admitted in his September 2, 2014 deposition that he had “used wiping software
25 to permanently delete data on [his] hard drive prior to [its] production” to Libby in May
26 2014. (See SDCCU Adversary Proceeding, ECF No. 74-4 at 203:12–14.)
27 Given these facts, Roark’s purportedly “new” evidence does not establish by a
28 preponderance of the evidence that the integrity of the Default Judgment was undermined
15
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1 in any way. See Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 443–44. The Court therefore concludes that Judge
2 Latham did not clearly err in denying Roark’s Motion to Vacate under Rule 60(d)(3). 4
3 B. Additional Arguments
4 Roark also contends that Judge Latham erred in denying his Motion to Vacate on
5 several other grounds, including res judicata, the law-of-the-case doctrine, and the Rooker-
6 Feldman doctrine. (See AOB at 22–25.)
7 First, Roark contends that there can be no res judicata here because the Default
8 Judgment was procured through fraud of collusion. (See id. at 22.) Assuming that
9 California does recognize such an exception, see Lee v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.
10 2:15-cv-04061-CAS(GJSx), 2015 WL 5554006, at *5 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2015) (“[I]t
11 is not clear that either the Ninth Circuit or California state courts have recognized a fraud
12 exception to res judicata.” (citing Bailey v. United States, 42 F. App’x 79, 80 (9th Cir.
13 2002))), for the reasons discussed above, see supra pages 12–16, Judge Latham properly
14 concluded that Roark had failed to establish fraud or collusion and therefore did not clearly
15 err in concluding that the Default Judgment constituted res judicata, as did Roark’s
16 subsequent appeals to the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court and
17 various additional orders and appeals from subsequent proceedings before Judge Adler,
18 Judge Battaglia, and others, including the Ninth Circuit. (See 1st Underlying Order at 6.)
19 Second, Roark argues that “[n]ew evidence is an exception to the law of the case
20 doctrine.” (See AOB at 22.) Be that as it may, Judge Latham properly concluded that
21 Roark had failed to introduce “new” evidence such that departure from the—by now well-
22 settled—law of the case was permitted. (See 1st Underlying Order at 6 n.2.)
23 ///
24
25
4
To be clear, although not at issue in the instant appeal, Judge Latham also did not err in denying
26 Roark’s Motion to Vacate under Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) and Rule 60(c) given that all of the decisions Roark
challenged—Judge Pressman’s December 16, 2016 Default Judgment, Judge Adler’s February 26, 2019
27 summary adjudication of non-dischargeability, and Judge Adler’s February 25, 2019 approval of the
28 Trustee’s settlement of Roark’s employment-related claims—occurred more than a year before Roark
filed his Motion to Vacate on July 12, 2022. (See 1st Underlying Order at 5–6.)
16
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1 Third, Roark asserts that fraud on the court is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman
2 doctrine. (See AOB a 22–23.) Again, however, Judge Latham properly concluded that
3 Roark had failed to make the requisite showing. (See 1st Underlying Order at 7.)
4 Fourth, Roark appears to challenge Judge Latham’s decision to take judicial notice
5 of certain records from the Superior Court Action. (See AOB at 23.) Judge Latham,
6 however, properly took judicial “notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and
7 without the federal judicial system, [given] those proceedings ha[d] a direct relation to
8 matters at issue.” See Whiting v. City of Cathedral City, No. CV1300250BROCWX, 2014
9 WL 12852451, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014) (quoting United States ex rel. Robinson
10 Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)).
11 Finally, Roark appeals to the “strong judicial preference for deciding cases on their
12 merits.” (See AOB at 23–25.) This is true, but the California Court of Appeal agreed with
13 Judge Pressman that the Superior Court Action was “one of the unusual cases requiring
14 terminating sanctions as a first measure.” See SDCCU, 2018 WL 1663204, at *7. As the
15 California Court of Appeal explained, “[b]y deleting . . . files in violation of the court’s
16 protective order and the parties’ protocol for handling his hard drive, Roark diminished
17 SDCCU’s ability to pursue its case as it was impossible to ascertain what data Roark had
18 deleted.” See id. at *5. Accordingly, “Roark cannot be heard to complain that ‘the court
19 deprived him’ of a chance to raise certain defenses at a trial because his own willful actions
20 brought about that result, and the court was not obligated to protected him from those
21 consequences even at SDCCU’s expense.” See id. at *7.
22 For all these reasons, the Court concludes that Judge Latham did not abuse his
23 discretion in denying Roark’s Motion to Vacate.
24 II. The Second Underlying Order Denying Roark’s Motion for Reconsideration
25 Roark also contends that Judge Latham erred in denying his Motion for
26 Reconsideration of the First Underlying Order. (See AOB at 26–27.) Because Roark filed
27 his Motion for Reconsideration on October 21, 2022, less than fourteen days after Judge
28 Latham issued the First Underlying Order on October 12, 2022, Judge Latham treated it
17
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1 “as a motion to alter or amend judgment under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 59(e).”
2 (2d Underlying Order at 2 (quoting In re Lee, Nos. CC-15-1240 & CC-15-1272, 2016 WL
3 1450210, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016)).) As Judge Latham correctly explained,
4 “Rule 59(e) – made applicable [to the SDCCU Adversary Proceeding] through Bankruptcy
5 Rule 9023 – permits the court to reconsider and amend a previous order if: ‘(1) the district
6 court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear
7 error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an intervening
8 change in controlling law.’” (See id. (quoting Ybarra, 656 F.3d at 998).)
9 Judge Latham did not clearly err in finding that Roark “ha[d] not pointed to any new
10 evidence, clear error, or intervening change in law” in his Motion for Reconsideration.
11 (See id. at 2 (citing Ybarra, 656 F.3d at 998).) The Court therefore concludes that Judge
12 Latham did abuse his discretion in denying Roark’s Motion for Reconsideration.
13 CONCLUSION
14 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES Roark’s appeal and AFFIRMS
15 the rulings of the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court SHALL
16 CLOSE the file.
17 IT IS SO ORDERED.
18 Dated: August 22, 2023
19 _____________________________
Honorable Todd W. Robinson
20
United States District Judge
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
18
1- ER-018 22-CV-1962 TWR (WVG)
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.162
Page 23 of 710
Page 1 of 11
1- ER-019
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.163
Page 24 of 710
Page 2 of 11
1- ER-020
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.164
Page 25 of 710
Page 3 of 11
1- ER-021
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.165
Page 26 of 710
Page 4 of 11
1- ER-022
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.166
Page 27 of 710
Page 5 of 11
1- ER-023
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.167
Page 28 of 710
Page 6 of 11
1- ER-024
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.168
Page 29 of 710
Page 7 of 11
1- ER-025
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.169
Page 30 of 710
Page 8 of 11
1- ER-026
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
04/03/23 2,PageID.170
Page 31 of 710
Page 9 of 11
1- ER-027
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
14 Filed 04/03/23 Page 32 of 710
1- ER-028
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
14 Filed 04/03/23 Page 33 of 710
1- ER-029
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
Document 10 FiledDktEntry:
02/08/23 2,PageID.78
Page 34 of 710
Page 1 of 44
1- ER-030
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.79
Page 35 of 710
Page 2 of 44
1- ER-031
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.80
Page 36 of 710
Page 3 of 44
1- ER-032
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.81
Page 37 of 710
Page 4 of 44
1- ER-033
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.82
Page 38 of 710
Page 5 of 44
1- ER-034
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.83
Page 39 of 710
Page 6 of 44
1- ER-035
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.84
Page 40 of 710
Page 7 of 44
1- ER-036
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.85
Page 41 of 710
Page 8 of 44
1- ER-037
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.86
Page 42 of 710
Page 9 of 44
1- ER-038
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.87
Page 43 of Page
710 10 of 44
1- ER-039
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.88
Page 44 of Page
710 11 of 44
1- ER-040
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.89
Page 45 of Page
710 12 of 44
1- ER-041
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.90
Page 46 of Page
710 13 of 44
1- ER-042
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.91
Page 47 of Page
710 14 of 44
1- ER-043
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.92
Page 48 of Page
710 15 of 44
1- ER-044
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.93
Page 49 of Page
710 16 of 44
1- ER-045
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.94
Page 50 of Page
710 17 of 44
1- ER-046
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.95
Page 51 of Page
710 18 of 44
1- ER-047
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.96
Page 52 of Page
710 19 of 44
1- ER-048
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.97
Page 53 of Page
710 20 of 44
1- ER-049
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.98
Page 54 of Page
710 21 of 44
1- ER-050
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
02/08/23 2,PageID.99
Page 55 of Page
710 22 of 44
1- ER-051
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 56 of 710
1- ER-052
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 57 of 710
1- ER-053
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 58 of 710
1- ER-054
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 59 of 710
1- ER-055
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 60 of 710
1- ER-056
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 61 of 710
1- ER-057
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 62 of 710
1- ER-058
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 63 of 710
1- ER-059
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 64 of 710
1- ER-060
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 65 of 710
1- ER-061
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 66 of 710
1- ER-062
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 67 of 710
1- ER-063
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 68 of 710
1- ER-064
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 69 of 710
1- ER-065
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 70 of 710
1- ER-066
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 71 of 710
1- ER-067
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 72 of 710
1- ER-068
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 73 of 710
1- ER-069
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 74 of 710
1- ER-070
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 75 of 710
1- ER-071
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 76 of 710
1- ER-072
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
10 Filed 02/08/23 Page 77 of 710
1- ER-073
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/23/22 2,PageID.70
Page 78 of 710
Page 1 of 4
1- ER-074
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/23/22 2,PageID.71
Page 79 of 710
Page 2 of 4
1- ER-075
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/23/22 2,PageID.72
Page 80 of 710
Page 3 of 4
1- ER-076
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/23/22 2,PageID.73
Page 81 of 710
Page 4 of 4
1- ER-077
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.45
Page 82 of Page
710 1 of 10
1- ER-078
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.46
Page 83 of Page
710 2 of 10
1- ER-079
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.47
Page 84 of Page
710 3 of 10
1- ER-080
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.48
Page 85 of Page
710 4 of 10
1- ER-081
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.49
Page 86 of Page
710 5 of 10
1- ER-082
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.50
Page 87 of Page
710 6 of 10
1- ER-083
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.51
Page 88 of Page
710 7 of 10
1- ER-084
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.52
Page 89 of Page
710 8 of 10
1- ER-085
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
12/19/22 2,PageID.53
Page 90 of Page
710 9 of 10
1- ER-086
Case: 23-55750, 10/02/2023,
Case 3:22-cv-01962-TWR-WVG ID: 12802062,
5 Filed 12/19/22 Page 91 ofPage
PageID.54 710 10 of 10
1- ER-087
Case 18-90158-CL Filed
Case: 23-55750, 12/09/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 12/09/22
12802062, 14:14:47
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 9298 Pg. 1 of 3
of 710
December 9, 2022
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
325 West “F” Street, San Diego, California 92101-6991
In re:
CARLTON ROARK, BANKRUPTCY NO. 18-04093-LT7
Debtor.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ADVERSARY NO. 18-90158-CL

Plaintiff.
v.
CARLTON ROARK, Name of Judge: Christopher B. Latham
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as set forth on the continuation page(s) attached, numbered two (2)
through three (3).
DATED: December 9, 2022
1- ER-088
Case: 23-55750, 12/09/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 12/09/22
12802062, 14:14:47
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 9398 Pg. 2 of 3
of 710
Page 2 | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION
DEBTOR: CARLTON ROARK Bankruptcy No. 18-04093-LT7

SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CARLTON ROARK Adversary No. 18-90158-CL
The court has considered Defendant Carlton Roark’s most recent motion for reconsideration (ECF
No. 92), the Chapter 7 Trustee’s opposition (ECF No. 93), North Island Federal Credit Union
(“NIFCU”)’s opposition (ECF No. 94), Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union’s opposition
(ECF No. 95), Defendant’s reply (ECF No. 96), and its own docket. For the following reasons,
the court will deny the motion.
On July 12, 2022, Defendant moved to: (1) vacate a San Diego Superior Court judgment; (2) set
aside the court’s finding of nondischargeability based on that; (3) set aside its approval of the
Trustee’s settlement in his main bankruptcy case; and (4) award him $19,750,000 in compensatory
damages (ECF No. 71). The Trustee, Plaintiff, and NIFCU opposed (ECF Nos. 73, 74, & 77).
After carefully considering the parties’ papers and oral arguments at the September 14, 2022
hearing, the court denied the motion (ECF No. 89). Defendant now moves to reconsider that order
(ECF No. 92). The Trustee, Plaintiff, and NIFCU again oppose (ECF Nos. 93, 94, & 95). The
court then determined the matter suitable for disposition on the papers under Local Civil Rule
7.1(d)(1) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-4 (ECF No. 97).
Defendant’s earlier motion to vacate sought relief under Rule 60(b) (ECF No. 71). Because he
filed his current reconsideration motion within 14 days of the order denying that it “is treated as a
motion to alter or amend judgment under Civil Rule 59(e).” In re Lee, BAP Nos. CC-15-1240 &
CC-15-1272, 2016 WL1450210, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. April 11, 2016). Rule 59(e) – made
applicable here through Bankruptcy Rule 9023 – permits the court to reconsider and amend a
previous order if: “(1) the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district
court committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is
an intervening change in controlling law.” Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)
(internal citation marks omitted) (quoting Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
While two different procedural standards govern Defendant’s motions, there is no substantive
difference between them. Both allege the same fraudulent conspiracy (see ECF Nos. 71 & 92).
So Defendant essentially is moving the court to reconsider its order denying reconsideration. This
is without merit. Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests
of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). And it is unwarranted here.1
The court helpfully directs Defendant to its previous order on his motion to vacate (ECF No. 89).
For similar reasons articulated there, it will deny this reconsideration motion. In short, Defendant
has shown no entitlement to Rule 59 relief. Despite his philippics to the contrary, he has not
pointed to any new evidence, clear error, or intervening change in law. See Ybarra, 656 F.3d at
998. Federal courts have ruled that there was no fraud on the Superior Court – and that Defendant’s
admissions of evidence spoliation provided it independent grounds to enter default. See id. And
1
While serial reconsideration motions are assuredly not in the interests of finality and judicial economy,
Defendant remains free to exercise any appellate rights he may have.
1- ER-089
Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham December 9, 2022
Case: 23-55750, 12/09/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 12/09/22
12802062, 14:14:47
DktEntry: Doc
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Page 3 | ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR FURTHER RECONSIDERATION

since there was no fraud on the Superior Court, there can be no subsequent conspiracies to hide
that nonexistent fraud from other courts. All prior judgments, decisions, and orders in the earlier
state and federal cases stand. Rules 59 and 60, res judicata, the law of the case, and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine all bar reconsideration of those. Defendant’s motion is accordingly denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1- ER-090
Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham December 9, 2022
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc95
2, Page 96of 710
Pg. 1 of 10
1- ER-091
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc96
2, Page 96of 710
Pg. 2 of 10
1- ER-092
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc97
2, Page 96of 710
Pg. 3 of 10
1- ER-093
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc98
2, Page 96of 710
Pg. 4 of 10
1- ER-094
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc99
2, Page 96of 710
Pg. 5 of 10
1- ER-095
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 96of 710
100 Pg. 6 of 10
1- ER-096
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 96of 710
101 Pg. 7 of 10
1- ER-097
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 96of 710
102 Pg. 8 of 10
1- ER-098
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 96of 710
103 Pg. 9 of 10
1- ER-099
Case: 23-55750, 11/07/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 11/07/22
12802062, 11:31:33
DktEntry: Doc104
2, Page 96 of Pg.
71010 of 10
1- ER-100
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
105 Pg. 1 of 32
1- ER-101
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
106 Pg. 2 of 32
1- ER-102
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
107 Pg. 3 of 32
1- ER-103
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
108 Pg. 4 of 32
1- ER-104
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
109 Pg. 5 of 32
1- ER-105
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
110 Pg. 6 of 32
1- ER-106
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
111 Pg. 7 of 32
1- ER-107
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
112 Pg. 8 of 32
1- ER-108
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92of 710
113 Pg. 9 of 32
1- ER-109
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc114
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71010 of 32
1- ER-110
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc115
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71011 of 32
1- ER-111
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc116
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71012 of 32
1- ER-112
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc117
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71013 of 32
1- ER-113
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc118
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71014 of 32
1- ER-114
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc119
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71015 of 32
1- ER-115
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc120
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71016 of 32
1- ER-116
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc121
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71017 of 32
1- ER-117
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc122
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71018 of 32
1- ER-118
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc123
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71019 of 32
1- ER-119
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc124
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71020 of 32
1- ER-120
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc125
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71021 of 32
1- ER-121
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc126
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71022 of 32
1- ER-122
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc127
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71023 of 32
1- ER-123
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc128
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71024 of 32
1- ER-124
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc129
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71025 of 32
1- ER-125
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc130
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71026 of 32
1- ER-126
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc131
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71027 of 32
1- ER-127
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10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc132
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71028 of 32
1- ER-128
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc133
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71029 of 32
1- ER-129
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc134
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71030 of 32
1- ER-130
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
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DktEntry: Doc135
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71031 of 32
1- ER-131
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc136
2, Page 92 of Pg.
71032 of 32
1- ER-132
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc137
2, Page 92-1of 710
Pg. 1 of 45
1- ER-133
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc138
2, Page 92-1of 710
Pg. 2 of 45
1- ER-134
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc139
2, Page 92-1of 710
Pg. 3 of 45
1- ER-135
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc140
2, Page 92-1of 710
Pg. 4 of 45
1- ER-136
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
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Pg. 5 of 45
1- ER-137
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
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Pg. 6 of 45
1- ER-138
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
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Pg. 7 of 45
1- ER-139
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc144
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Pg. 8 of 45
1- ER-140
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc145
2, Page 92-1of 710
Pg. 9 of 45
1- ER-141
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92-1
146 Pg. 10 of
of 710
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1- ER-142
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147 Pg. 11 of
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1- ER-143
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10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
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2, Page 92-1
148 Pg. 12 of
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1- ER-144
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10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
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DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92-1
149 Pg. 13 of
of 710
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1- ER-145
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2, Page 92-1
150 Pg. 14 of
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1- ER-146
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2, Page 92-1
151 Pg. 15 of
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1- ER-147
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2, Page 92-1
152 Pg. 16 of
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1- ER-148
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
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12802062, 09:44:24
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92-1
153 Pg. 17 of
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1- ER-149
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
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2, Page 92-1
154 Pg. 18 of
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1- ER-150
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2, Page 92-1
155 Pg. 19 of
of 710
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1- ER-151
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
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DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 92-1
156 Pg. 20 of
of 710
45
1- ER-152
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10/02/2023, Entered 10/21/22
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DktEntry: Doc
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157 Pg. 21 of
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1- ER-153
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158 Pg. 22 of
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1- ER-154
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2, Page 92-1
159 Pg. 23 of
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1- ER-155
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
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2, Page 92-1
160 Pg. 24 of
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1- ER-156
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2, Page 92-1
161 Pg. 25 of
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1- ER-157
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
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162 Pg. 26 of
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1- ER-158
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163 Pg. 27 of
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1- ER-159
Case: 23-55750, 10/21/22 ID:
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1- ER-160
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1- ER-161
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October 12, 2022

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
325 West “F” Street, San Diego, California 92101-6991
In re:
CARLTON ROARK, BANKRUPTCY NO. 18-04093-LT7
Debtor.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, ADVERSARY NO. 18-90158-CL

Plaintiff.
v. Date of Hearing: 09/14/2022
CARLTON ROARK, Time of Hearing: 10:00 a.m.
Defendant. Name of Judge: Christopher B. Latham
ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as set forth on the continuation page(s) attached, numbered two (2)
through eight (8).
DATED: October 12, 2022
1- ER-178
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Page 2 | ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT

The court has considered Defendant Carlton Roark’s motion to vacate judgment (ECF No. 71), the
Chapter 7 Trustee’s opposition (ECF No. 73), Plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union’s
opposition (ECF No. 74), North Island Federal Credit Union’s (“NIFCU”) response (ECF No. 77);
Defendant’s replies (ECF Nos. 75, 76, & 78), the parties’ arguments at the September 14, 2022
hearing, and its docket. For the following reasons, the court will deny the motion.
Background
History Pre-Bankruptcy
In 2011 Defendant anonymously began posting defamatory comments about Plaintiff on the
Internet (ECF No. 74). Plaintiff sued a John Doe defendant in San Diego Superior Court,
eventually joining Defendant and his then-employer NIFCU. See Case No. 37-2011-00100322-
CU-DF-CTL (the “State Court Action”). Defendant and NIFCU’s attorneys hired a computer
forensics expert, Mr. James Sevel, to examine and image Defendant’s hard drive (ECF No. 71).
After doing so, Mr. Sevel and Defendant’s counsel realized he had a conflict of interest with
Plaintiff from a different case. Id. So Defendant’s counsel fired him and retained a new, neutral
expert to re-examine the computer (ECF No. 74).
This new expert discovered that Defendant had deleted tens of thousands of potentially relevant
files and emails from the computer (ECF No. 74). Defendant admitted to deleting some 33,000
files before Mr. Sevel examined his computer. Id. He claimed that Mr. Sevel – while colluding
with Plaintiff, his co-defendants, and his own counsel – deleted another 10,000 files to frame him
for spoliation (ECF No. 71). The second expert contradicted this, stating that all deletion happened
before and after Mr. Sevel had the computer, not while he did (ECF No. 74). Based on this and
Defendant’s own admissions, the state court found that he violated its protective order, issued
terminating sanctions, and struck his answer. See Case No. 37-2011-00100322-CU-DF-CTL. On
December 16, 2016, it entered a default judgment against him. Id. Defendant appealed. But the
Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review (ECF No. 73). See
San Diego County Credit Union v. Roark, 2018 WL1663204 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2018); Case
No. S248735.
Defendant’s Bankruptcy
Defendant then filed for Chapter 7 relief. See Case No. 18-04093-LT7. He listed one disputed
liability (the default judgment) and one asset (an employment claim against his now former
employer NIFCU) (ECF No. 74). He brought an adversary proceeding against Plaintiff for abuse
of process, which the court dismissed. See AP No. 18-90109-LA. Plaintiff then filed its own
adversary proceeding seeking to hold its default judgment nondischargeable (ECF No. 1). The
court found for Plaintiff on summary judgment (ECF No. 50). Defendant appealed, and the
District Court affirmed (ECF No. 68). See also Case No. 3:19-cv-0344-AJB-MSB.
1- ER-179
Signed by Judge Christopher B. Latham October 12, 2022
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Meanwhile, in the main bankruptcy case the Trustee settled Defendant’s employment claim and
brought $152,000 into the estate (ECF No. 73). Defendant balked at the settlement and asserted
that the Trustee was now involved in the conspiracy against him. Id. This stemmed from one
Ms. Angela Brill – who worked for NIFCU during the State Court Action – working for the Trustee
from 2005 to 2006 (ECF No. 71). So he appealed this as well (ECF No. 73). Both the District
Court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Case Nos. 19-cv-2117-TWR-WVG; Roark v. Gladstone
(In re Roark), 2022 WL885155 (9th Cir. March 25, 2022).
Plaintiff now moves to: (1) vacate the State Court Action’s judgment; (2) set aside the court’s
finding of nondischargeability based on that; (3) set aside its approval of the Trustee’s settlement
in his main bankruptcy case; and (4) award him $19,750,000 in compensatory damages. Id. The
Trustee, Plaintiff, and NIFCU oppose (ECF Nos. 73, 74, & 77).1
Legal Standards
Rule 60
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not recognize a motion for reconsideration.” In re
Captain Blythers, Inc., 311 B.R. 530, 539 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004), aff’d, 182 F. App’x 708, 709
(9th Cir. 2006). There are instead “two types of motions to obtain post-judgment relief: a motion
to alter or amend judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e), and a motion for relief from judgment, FED. R.
CIV. P. 60.” In re Walker, 332 B.R. 820, 826 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005).
“When a party files a motion for reconsideration within 14 days after the entry of judgment, the
motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Civil Rule 59(e).” In re Lee, BAP
Nos. CC-15-1240 & CC-15-1272, 2016 WL1450210, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2016) (citing
Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001)).
See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9023. “Otherwise, it is treated as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment or order.” Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc., 248 F.3d at 899.
Relief from an order under Rule 60(b), incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 9024, is available “only
upon a showing of: (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence;
(3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ which would justify relief.” In re Safarian, BAP No. CC-09-1335, 2010
WL6259763, *5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 13, 2010) (quoting Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437,
1442 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and

conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted).
1
NIFCU opposes only to state that it has never been a party to this adversary proceeding (ECF No. 77).
The court sees this and notes that Defendant need not have named NIFCU in his motion (see ECF No. 71).
1- ER-180
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Res Judicata
Res judicata – or claim preclusion – “provides that ‘a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” United States v. Schimmels
(In re Schimmels), 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153 (1979)). “Res judicata applies when there is: (1) an identity of claims; (2) a final
judgment on the merits; and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Ruiz v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1, 824 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2016). Further, res judicata “prevents parties from
raising issues that could have been raised and decided in a prior action – even if they were not
actually litigated.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 140 S.Ct. 1589,
1594 (2020) (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979)). And “[d]efault judgments are
considered ‘final judgments on the merits’ and are thus effective for the purposes of claim
preclusion.” In re Garcia, 313 B.R. 307, 311 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (citing Howard v. Lewis, 905
F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1990)).
The Law of the Case Doctrine
Under the law of the case doctrine, “a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that
has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” Thomas v.
Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993), see also U.S. v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.
1997). The doctrine is not a limitation on a tribunal’s power, but rather a guide to discretion.
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). It “is a judicial invention designed to aid in the
efficient operation of court affairs.” Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703,
715 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Lockert v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 867 F.2d 513, 518 (9th Cir.
1989)). And the doctrine “states that the decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be
followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case.” Alaimalo v. U.S., 645 F.3d 1042, 1049
(9th Cir. 2011).
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, established by two Supreme Court decisions handed down sixty
years apart, provides that a federal district court lacks the jurisdiction to hear a collateral attack on
a state court judgment or to review final determinations of state court decisions.” In re Audre, Inc.,
216 B.R. 19, 26 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (first citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); and then citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, (1983)).
Federal courts are barred from deciding “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
If a federal bankruptcy court were to intervene in a state court judgment, it could only do so if the
state proceedings were void ab initio. In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. at 29. That said, the “doctrine
applies even when a state court judgment may be in error.” In re Roussos, 251 B.R. 86, 95 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. at 29); see also In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916,
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924 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (“[A] final order that is not appealed cannot be collaterally attacked in
a later proceeding even if the order was entered in error.”).
“The collateral attack doctrine precludes litigants from collaterally attacking the judgments of
other courts.” Rein v. Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2001). See Celotex Corp.
v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (“We have made clear that [i]t is for the court of first instance
to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by
orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decisions are to be
respected.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). For the court to apply the
doctrine, “the relevant claims must have been directly ruled on in the prior proceeding.” In re RCS
Capital Dev., LLC, BAP No. AZ-12-1626, 2013 WL 3619172, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 16,
2013) (citing Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 332 F.3d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Legal Analysis and Discussion
Judicial Notice
In its opposition, Plaintiff asks the court to judicially notice: (1) its third amended complaint from
the State Court Action; (2) that court’s preservation order; (3) its terminating sanctions order;
(4) its judgment; and (5) two stipulated protocols for the inspection of Defendant’s hard drive
(ECF No. 74). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the court may take judicial notice of “matters
of public record.” Id. at 688-89. Those include other court proceedings. See U.S. ex rel. Robinson
Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); Grant v. Aurora
Loan Services, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2010). All of Plaintiff’s documents
qualify as such and are appropriate for judicial notice. The court will accordingly grant Plaintiff’s
request.
Defendant’s Motion
Defendant seeks to vacate or set aside: (1) the State Court Action’s default judgment; (2) the
bankruptcy court’s nondischargeability finding at summary judgment; and (3) its approval of the
Trustee’s settlement. (ECF No. 71). He bases his request on purported new evidence proving the
alleged conspiracy against him, extrinsic fraud, and fraud on the court. Id. The motion is not well
taken and must be denied. Even if Defendant’s allegations held merit (and they do not), at least
four legal grounds prevent the court from ruling in his favor.
Rule 60(b)
One, Rule 60 – made applicable here by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024 – itself bars
aspects of Defendant’s requested relief. True, Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) allow for relief from
judgments based on new evidence or extrinsic fraud, respectively. But motions predicated on
either must be brought “no more than a year after the entry of judgment.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c).
The court approved the Trustee’s settlement on February 25, 2019 (Bankr. ECF No. 88) and
entered its summary judgment order a day later (ECF No. 50). And the state court entered default
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judgment on December 16, 2016. See Case No. 37-2011-00100322-CU-DF-CTL. Yet Defendant
filed his motion on July 12, 2022 (ECF No. 71). All three decisions were final well over a year
before then. Thus Rule 60(c) bars the motion insofar as it seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3).2
Reconsideration for fraud on the court is not time-barred under the rule. See FED. R. CIV. P.
60(d)(3) (“This rule does not limit a court’s power to . . . set aside judgment for fraud on the
court.”). But the remaining grounds prohibit it as well.
Res Judicata
Two, res judicata precludes the court from reconsidering any further claims based on a final
judgment. Three elements must exist: “(1) an identity of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits;
and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Snohomish Cnty., 824 F.3d at 1164. This doctrine
applies to the myriad final judgments that have been entered against Defendant. The State Court
Action is claim preclusive against Defendant. There is an identity of claims – the underlying
dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant (ECF Nos. 71 & 74). This includes any fraud allegations
Defendant could have but failed to raise there. Lucky Brand Dungarees, 140 S.Ct. at 1594. The
State Court Action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; namely, the December 16, 2016
default judgment upheld on appeal. See Garcia, 313 B.R. at 311. And there is an identity of
parties – both Plaintiff and Defendant litigated there.
Likewise, both the bankruptcy court’s settlement and nondischargeability rulings have preclusive
effect. Claim identity exists, specifically Defendant’s allegations of a conspiracy against him and
fraud on the court. These were raised – or could have been – during those disputes or their appeals
(see ECF No. 50 & Bankr. ECF No. 73). Both are final judgments on the merits. Quality of
Judgments Entitled to Res Judicata, 18A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. (WRIGHT & MILLER) § 4427
(3d ed.) The orders affirming them on appeal are as well (ECF No. 68; Bankr. ECF Nos. 177 &
193). Again, there is an identity of parties, whether between Plaintiff and Defendant or him and
the Trustee (ECF No. 50 & Bankr. ECF No. 73). Thus all those orders and judgments retain their
effects against Defendant and bind the court. Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 881.
The Law of the Case Doctrine
Three, the law of the case doctrine generally precludes a court from reconsidering an issue it (or a
higher court in the same case) has already decided. U.S. v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.
2
Even if Rule 60(c) did not bar any Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) motion, Defendant still would not be entitled to
relief. As in his Ninth Circuit appeal, Defendant has “failed to establish any basis for relief” and is trying
to raise argument and present evidence when he could have reasonably done so earlier. Roark, 2022 WL
885155, at *1 (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890). Specifically, Defendant fails to show “newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b).” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2). For supposed new evidence, he mainly offers emails
between attorneys and the computer experts during the State Court Action – emails he was copied on and
received (ECF Nos. 71 & 78). Thus it cannot be newly discovered because “it was in the moving party’s
possession at the time of trial.” Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208, 212
(9th Cir. 1987).
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1997). The issue must have been “decided either expressly or by necessary implication in [the]
previous disposition.” Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). This court previously
found that “[t]here is no evidence of any extrinsic fraud on the [c]ourt that led to the terminating
sanctions” (ECF No. 50). Because of this, no exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine existed,
and the State Court Action’s default judgment has collateral estoppel effect. Id. The district court
affirmed that decision and held that Defendant offered insufficient evidence to prove his
“conclusory inferences” of fraud (ECF No. 68). The issue of whether there was any fraud on the
court was expressly decided by this court and the district court. See Thomas, 983 F.2d at 154.
Under law of the case, the court cannot now revisit it. Similarly, this court approved the Trustee’s
settlement (Bankr. ECF No. 73). And both the district court and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that,
dismissing Defendant’s allegations of fraud and conspiracy (Bankr. ECF Nos. 176 & 193). The
law of this case bars reconsidering those issues as well.3
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
And four, even if Rule 60(b), res judicata, and law of the case all weighed in Defendant’s favor,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar his motion to vacate the State Court Action’s default
judgment. This provides that federal trial courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral attacks on
state court judgments. In re Audre, Inc., 216 B.R. 19, 26 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). The court is
consequently precluded from entertaining Defendant’s arguments. After presenting his case to the
San Diego Superior Court, the Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court, he asks this
court to vacate a default judgment entered years ago. He is a “state-court loser[] complaining of
injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[] rendered” before his bankruptcy. Exxon Mobil, 544
U.S. at 284. So under Rooker-Feldman, the court cannot undo the state court’s terminating
sanctions order and its resulting default judgment.
Defendant correctly states that there is a limited exception to this doctrine for extrinsic fraud (ECF
No. 71). See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2004). But as discussed
above, res judicata and the law of the case prevent Defendant from arguing that any fraud occurred.
Other federal courts have decided that Defendant did not show sufficient evidence of fraud, that
he could have raised the issue in the state appellate courts, and that the state court had an
independent ground to issue terminating sanctions because he admitted to destroying evidence.
(ECF No. 50 & 68; Bankr. ECF No. 176). Defendant’s attempt to recycle his earlier allegations
does not justify a collateral attack on the State Court Action. This court lacks jurisdiction to vacate
that default judgment. See Audre, 216 B.R. at 26 (first citing Rooker, 263 U.S. 413; and then citing
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462).
3
Nor do any exceptions to the doctrine apply. The court does not see: (1) a clearly erroneous decision;
(2) an intervening change in law; (3) substantially different evidence on remand; (4) other changed
circumstances; or (5) manifest injustice. Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876.
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Conclusion
Under Rule 60(c), Defendant cannot argue that there is newly discovered evidence or extrinsic
fraud. Res judicata and the law of the case preclude reconsideration of the circuit, district, or
bankruptcy court rulings on the nondischargeability of Plaintiff’s judgment, the approval of the
Trustee’s settlement, and Defendant’s fraud and conspiracy allegations. And the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars his collateral attack on the State Court Action. For the foregoing reasons, the court
grants Plaintiff’s judicial notice request and denies Defendant’s motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1- ER-185
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1- ER-187
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1- ER-188
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1- ER-189
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1- ER-190
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1- ER-191
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1- ER-192
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1- ER-193
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1- ER-194
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1- ER-195
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1- ER-196
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1- ER-197
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1- ER-198
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1- ER-199
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1- ER-200
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1- ER-201
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1- ER-202
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1- ER-203
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1- ER-204
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1- ER-205
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1- ER-206
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1- ER-207
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1- ER-208
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1- ER-209
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1- ER-210
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1- ER-211
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1- ER-212
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1- ER-213
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71011 of 15
1- ER-214
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71012 of 15
1- ER-215
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71013 of 15
1- ER-216
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71014 of 15
1- ER-217
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71015 of 15
1- ER-218
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2- ER-219
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2- ER-220
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225 710 3 of 50
2- ER-221
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226 710 4 of 50
2- ER-222
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227 710 5 of 50
2- ER-223
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228 710 6 of 50
2- ER-224
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229 710 7 of 50
2- ER-225
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230 710 8 of 50
2- ER-226
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231 710 9 of 50
2- ER-227
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2- ER-228
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71011 of 50
2- ER-229
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71012 of 50
2- ER-230
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2- ER-231
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71014 of 50
2- ER-232
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71015 of 50
2- ER-233
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71016 of 50
2- ER-234
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71017 of 50
2- ER-235
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71018 of 50
2- ER-236
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71019 of 50
2- ER-237
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71020 of 50
2- ER-238
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71021 of 50
2- ER-239
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2- ER-240
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71023 of 50
2- ER-241
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71024 of 50
2- ER-242
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71025 of 50
2- ER-243
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71026 of 50
2- ER-244
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71027 of 50
2- ER-245
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71028 of 50
2- ER-246
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71029 of 50
2- ER-247
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71030 of 50
2- ER-248
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71031 of 50
2- ER-249
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
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12802062, 09:59:48
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71032 of 50
2- ER-250
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
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12802062, 09:59:48
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71033 of 50
2- ER-251
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc256
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71034 of 50
2- ER-252
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc257
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71035 of 50
2- ER-253
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc258
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71036 of 50
2- ER-254
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc259
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71037 of 50
2- ER-255
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc260
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71038 of 50
2- ER-256
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc261
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71039 of 50
2- ER-257
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc262
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71040 of 50
2- ER-258
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc263
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71041 of 50
2- ER-259
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc264
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71042 of 50
2- ER-260
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc265
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71043 of 50
2- ER-261
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc266
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71044 of 50
2- ER-262
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc267
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71045 of 50
2- ER-263
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc268
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71046 of 50
2- ER-264
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc269
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71047 of 50
2- ER-265
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc270
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71048 of 50
2- ER-266
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc271
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71049 of 50
2- ER-267
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc272
2, Page 71 ofPg.
71050 of 50
2- ER-268
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc273
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 1 of 52
2- ER-269
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc274
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 2 of 52
2- ER-270
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc275
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 3 of 52
2- ER-271
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc276
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 4 of 52
2- ER-272
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc277
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 5 of 52
2- ER-273
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc278
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 6 of 52
2- ER-274
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc279
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 7 of 52
2- ER-275
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc280
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 8 of 52
2- ER-276
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc281
2, Page 71-1of 710
Pg. 9 of 52
2- ER-277
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
282 Pg. 10 of
of 710
52
2- ER-278
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
283 Pg. 11 of
of 710
52
2- ER-279
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
284 Pg. 12 of
of 710
52
2- ER-280
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
285 Pg. 13 of
of 710
52
2- ER-281
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
286 Pg. 14 of
of 710
52
2- ER-282
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
287 Pg. 15 of
of 710
52
2- ER-283
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
288 Pg. 16 of
of 710
52
2- ER-284
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
289 Pg. 17 of
of 710
52
2- ER-285
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
290 Pg. 18 of
of 710
52
2- ER-286
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
291 Pg. 19 of
of 710
52
2- ER-287
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
292 Pg. 20 of
of 710
52
2- ER-288
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
293 Pg. 21 of
of 710
52
2- ER-289
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
294 Pg. 22 of
of 710
52
2- ER-290
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
295 Pg. 23 of
of 710
52
2- ER-291
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
296 Pg. 24 of
of 710
52
2- ER-292
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
297 Pg. 25 of
of 710
52
2- ER-293
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
298 Pg. 26 of
of 710
52
2- ER-294
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
299 Pg. 27 of
of 710
52
2- ER-295
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
300 Pg. 28 of
of 710
52
2- ER-296
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
301 Pg. 29 of
of 710
52
2- ER-297
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
302 Pg. 30 of
of 710
52
2- ER-298
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
303 Pg. 31 of
of 710
52
2- ER-299
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
304 Pg. 32 of
of 710
52
2- ER-300
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
305 Pg. 33 of
of 710
52
2- ER-301
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
306 Pg. 34 of
of 710
52
2- ER-302
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
307 Pg. 35 of
of 710
52
2- ER-303
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
308 Pg. 36 of
of 710
52
2- ER-304
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
309 Pg. 37 of
of 710
52
2- ER-305
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
310 Pg. 38 of
of 710
52
2- ER-306
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
311 Pg. 39 of
of 710
52
2- ER-307
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
312 Pg. 40 of
of 710
52
2- ER-308
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
313 Pg. 41 of
of 710
52
2- ER-309
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
314 Pg. 42 of
of 710
52
2- ER-310
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
315 Pg. 43 of
of 710
52
2- ER-311
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
316 Pg. 44 of
of 710
52
2- ER-312
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
317 Pg. 45 of
of 710
52
2- ER-313
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
318 Pg. 46 of
of 710
52
2- ER-314
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
319 Pg. 47 of
of 710
52
2- ER-315
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
320 Pg. 48 of
of 710
52
2- ER-316
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
321 Pg. 49 of
of 710
52
2- ER-317
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
322 Pg. 50 of
of 710
52
2- ER-318
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
323 Pg. 51 of
of 710
52
2- ER-319
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-1
324 Pg. 52 of
of 710
52
2- ER-320
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc325
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 1 of 50
2- ER-321
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc326
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 2 of 50
2- ER-322
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc327
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 3 of 50
2- ER-323
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc328
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 4 of 50
2- ER-324
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc329
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 5 of 50
2- ER-325
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc330
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 6 of 50
2- ER-326
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc331
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 7 of 50
2- ER-327
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc332
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 8 of 50
2- ER-328
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc333
2, Page 71-2of 710
Pg. 9 of 50
2- ER-329
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
334 Pg. 10 of
of 710
50
2- ER-330
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
335 Pg. 11 of
of 710
50
2- ER-331
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
336 Pg. 12 of
of 710
50
2- ER-332
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
337 Pg. 13 of
of 710
50
2- ER-333
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
338 Pg. 14 of
of 710
50
2- ER-334
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
339 Pg. 15 of
of 710
50
2- ER-335
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
340 Pg. 16 of
of 710
50
2- ER-336
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
341 Pg. 17 of
of 710
50
2- ER-337
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
342 Pg. 18 of
of 710
50
2- ER-338
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
343 Pg. 19 of
of 710
50
2- ER-339
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
344 Pg. 20 of
of 710
50
2- ER-340
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
345 Pg. 21 of
of 710
50
2- ER-341
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
346 Pg. 22 of
of 710
50
2- ER-342
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
347 Pg. 23 of
of 710
50
2- ER-343
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
348 Pg. 24 of
of 710
50
2- ER-344
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
349 Pg. 25 of
of 710
50
2- ER-345
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
350 Pg. 26 of
of 710
50
2- ER-346
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
351 Pg. 27 of
of 710
50
2- ER-347
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
352 Pg. 28 of
of 710
50
2- ER-348
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
353 Pg. 29 of
of 710
50
2- ER-349
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
354 Pg. 30 of
of 710
50
2- ER-350
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
355 Pg. 31 of
of 710
50
2- ER-351
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
356 Pg. 32 of
of 710
50
2- ER-352
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
357 Pg. 33 of
of 710
50
2- ER-353
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
358 Pg. 34 of
of 710
50
2- ER-354
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
359 Pg. 35 of
of 710
50
2- ER-355
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
360 Pg. 36 of
of 710
50
2- ER-356
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
361 Pg. 37 of
of 710
50
2- ER-357
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
362 Pg. 38 of
of 710
50
2- ER-358
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
363 Pg. 39 of
of 710
50
2- ER-359
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
364 Pg. 40 of
of 710
50
2- ER-360
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
365 Pg. 41 of
of 710
50
2- ER-361
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
366 Pg. 42 of
of 710
50
2- ER-362
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
367 Pg. 43 of
of 710
50
2- ER-363
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
368 Pg. 44 of
of 710
50
2- ER-364
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
369 Pg. 45 of
of 710
50
2- ER-365
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
370 Pg. 46 of
of 710
50
2- ER-366
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
371 Pg. 47 of
of 710
50
2- ER-367
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
372 Pg. 48 of
of 710
50
2- ER-368
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
373 Pg. 49 of
of 710
50
2- ER-369
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-2
374 Pg. 50 of
of 710
50
2- ER-370
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc375
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 1 of 20
2- ER-371
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc376
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 2 of 20
2- ER-372
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc377
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 3 of 20
2- ER-373
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc378
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 4 of 20
2- ER-374
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc379
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 5 of 20
2- ER-375
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc380
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 6 of 20
2- ER-376
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc381
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 7 of 20
2- ER-377
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc382
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 8 of 20
2- ER-378
Case 18-90158-LT Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc383
2, Page 71-3of 710
Pg. 9 of 20
2- ER-379
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
384 Pg. 10 of
of 710
20
2- ER-380
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
385 Pg. 11 of
of 710
20
2- ER-381
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
386 Pg. 12 of
of 710
20
2- ER-382
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
387 Pg. 13 of
of 710
20
2- ER-383
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
388 Pg. 14 of
of 710
20
2- ER-384
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
389 Pg. 15 of
of 710
20
2- ER-385
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
390 Pg. 16 of
of 710
20
2- ER-386
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
391 Pg. 17 of
of 710
20
2- ER-387
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
392 Pg. 18 of
of 710
20
2- ER-388
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
393 Pg. 19 of
of 710
20
2- ER-389
Case: 23-55750, 07/11/22 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 07/12/22
12802062, 09:59:48
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 71-3
394 Pg. 20 of
of 710
20
2- ER-390
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
395 Pg. 1 of 19
1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

3 JUDGE LOUISE DECARL ADLER, PRESIDING
4
5
6 IN THE MATTER OF: )

)
7 )
CARLTON ROARK )
8 ___________________________________) CASE NO. 18-04093-LA
)
9 SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION ) ADV. NO. 18-90158
)
10 v. )
)
11 CARLTON ROARK )
___________________________________)
12
13
14
15 1) PRETRIAL STATUS CONFERENCE (FR. 12/13/18);
16 2) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM

FOR DETERMINATION OF NON-DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT
17 PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. SECTION 523(A)(6)
FILED BY J. BARRETT MARUM.
18
19
20
21
22 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
23 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
24 THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2019
25
26
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT BY PATRICIA A. CALLIHAN
27 DEPARTMENT NO. 2 CSR 13375
325 W. F STREET
28 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

2- ER-391
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
396 Pg. 2 of 19
18-04093-LA (19-90158) THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2019
1 APPEARANCES
2 FOR THE PLAINTIFF/MOVANT:
3 SHEPPARD MULLIN
BY J. BARRETT MARUM
4 501 WEST BROADWAY, 19TH FLOOR
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101
5
6
7 FOR THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:
8 CARLTON ROARK, PRO SE
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2- ER-392
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
397 Pg. 3 of 19
1 -o0o-
2 THE CLERK: IN THE MATTER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY
3 CREDIT UNION VS. CARLTON ROARK.
4 PRETRIAL STATUS CONFERENCE FROM 12/13/18;
5 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
6 MR. MARUM: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR.
7 BARRETT MARUM AND TRAVIS ANDERSON FOR SAN DIEGO
8 COUNTY CREDIT UNION.
9 MR. ROARK: CARLTON ROARK, PRO SE DEBTOR.
10 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. ROARK, AS YOU KNOW IF
11 YOU'VE READ YOUR MINUTES OF THE TENTATIVE RULING FROM THIS
12 HEARING, THE COURT HAS POSTED A TENTATIVE TO GRANT THE MSJ IN
13 FAVOR OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION, AND IT'S A PRETTY
14 EXTENSIVE TENTATIVE RULING THAT ANALYZES THE BASIS FOR THE
15 COURT'S DECISION.
16 I THINK I AM FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH ALL ASPECTS OF
17 THIS AND THE DEFENSES THAT YOU'VE RAISED, AND I THINK THAT,
18 BASED ON THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE COURT, WHICH ARE WHEN THE
19 COURT MAY APPLY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL -- WHEN MUST APPLY
20 COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL -- AND WHAT THE COURT IS BARRED FROM
21 DOING UNDER THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE, THAT SUMMARY
22 JUDGMENT IS INEVITABLE. BUT IF YOU HAVE ANYTHING THAT YOU
23 THINK THE COURT HAS MISSED IN THIS TENTATIVE RULING, THEN
24 THIS IS THE TIME TO RAISE IT.
25 MR. ROARK: I'LL BE SHORT, YOUR HONOR. I WANTED TO
26 ASK: DOES THIS COURT RECOGNIZE THE ONE EXCEPTION TO
27 ROOKER-FELDMAN RECOGNIZED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT THAT APPLIES
28 TO THIS CASE?

2- ER-393
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
398 Pg. 4 of 19
1 THE COURT: YES, OF COURSE.

2 MR. ROARK: BECAUSE THE CASE LAW SHOWS THAT IT'S
3 NOT JUST FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT MAKES IT EXCEPTION, BUT
4 FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT PREVENTED THE PRESENTATION OF
5 EVIDENCE OF THE FRAUD ON THE COURT. AND I BELIEVE -- I WENT
6 OUT OF MY WAY TO SHOW SO MUCH EVIDENCE IN THAT REGARD.
7 NOTHING THAT I'M ALLEGING REGARDING FRAUD ON THE
8 COURT WAS EVER PRESENTED TO THE COURT. IN FACT, THE FINAL
9 JUDGMENT FROM THE JUDGE IN THE STATE COURT ACTION PROVES THAT
10 THEY DID NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF ANY OF THAT EVIDENCE,
11 BECAUSE THE TERMINATING SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED SO EARLY
12 THAT -- THE TERMINATING SANCTIONS WERE IMPOSED AS A FUNCTION
13 AND AS A RESULT OF FRAUD ON THE COURT, SO AT THAT POINT
14 FORWARD I COULDN'T SAY ANYTHING. I WAS UNABLE TO BRING UP
15 ANYTHING, AND I HAD TO GO FORWARD TO THE COURT OF APPEAL AND
16 THE STATE SUPREME COURT WITH LITERALLY NOTHING IN THE PAPERS
17 BECAUSE WE HAD JUST STARTED DISCOVERY. SO FROM EVERYTHING
18 THAT I'VE READ, THE ONE EXCEPTION IN TWO CIRCUIT COURTS --
19 THE NINTH AND ONE OTHER I CAN'T REMEMBER -- IS THAT THERE'S
20 AN EXCEPTION TO ROOKER-FELDMAN ON THAT BASIS.
21 I JUST THINK IT'S OVERWHELMING THE EVIDENCE THAT I
22 QUALIFY FOR THAT EXEMPTION. AND I THOUGHT THERE'S DISCRETION
23 OFFERED TO THIS COURT IN SOME OF THE BACKSTOP MEASURES AND
24 STATUTES TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.
25 THE COURT: LET ME HEAR FROM MR. MARUM ON THIS,
26 PLEASE.
27 MR. MARUM: YOUR HONOR, I WAS JUST REREADING
28 MR. ROARK'S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

2- ER-394
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
399 Pg. 5 of 19
1 AND I DON'T SEE AN ARGUMENT THAT IS JUMPING OUT AT ME. I

2 DIDN'T SEE IT WHEN I READ IT ORIGINALLY, AND I DON'T SEE IT
3 NOW WHEN I READ IT AGAIN, ANY ARGUMENT THAT JUMPS OUT AT ME
4 THAT IS THIS FRAUD ON THE COURT ARGUMENT.
5 THE COURT: THAT IS THE ONE EXCEPTION TO
6 ROOKER-FELDMAN, FRAUD ON THE COURT.
7 MR. MARUM: YES, THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. BUT
8 TO EVOKE THAT EXCEPTION, MR. ROARK WOULD NEED TO POINT TO
9 SPECIFIC FACTS THAT RESULTED IN THE FRAUD ON THE COURT. HE
10 WOULD ALSO NEED TO ESSENTIALLY SHOW THAT THE ACTIONS IN THE
11 STATE COURT CASE DENIED HIM ACCESS TO THE COURT ITSELF, TO
12 THE PROCEEDINGS.
13 THE CASES ON FRAUD ON THE COURT AS AN EXCEPTION TO
14 THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE TYPICALLY LOOK AT ACCESS TO THE
15 COURTS AS AN ISSUE, SO -- WHERE A WITNESS IS CONCEALED OR
16 SOMETHING OF THAT NATURE. AND THAT DOESN'T SEEM TO BE THE
17 CASE HERE. THERE'S NOTHING IN MR. ROARK'S OPPOSITION THAT
18 EXPLAINS WITH ANY SPECIFICITY WHAT FACTS WERE CONCEALED OR
19 PREVENTED FROM BEING DISCLOSED TO THE COURT AND WHY IT WAS
20 THAT, IF THERE WAS SOMETHING THAT HE BELIEVED HE SHOULD HAVE
21 BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT TO THE STATE COURT, HE COULD NOT HAVE
22 RAISED THAT ISSUE ON APPEAL.
23 THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT I WAS GOING TO ASK HIM
24 NEXT, IS FRANKLY WHETHER OR NOT THIS ISSUE OF THERE BEING A
25 FRAUD ON THE COURT WAS RAISED IN ANY OF THE APPELLATE LEVELS
26 IN STATE COURT, BECAUSE IT WOULD SEEM THAT'S THE BEST PLACE
27 TO RAISE THEM.
28 MR. MARUM: AND I DON'T BELIEVE THAT IT WAS, YOUR

2- ER-395
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
400 Pg. 6 of 19
1 HONOR. I DON'T KNOW FOR CERTAIN BECAUSE I WASN'T INVOLVED IN

2 THE BRIEFING ON THE STATE COURT APPELLATE SIDE. BUT I
3 BELIEVE THIS IS A NEW ARGUMENT THAT'S BEING RAISED FOR THE
4 FIRST TIME HERE. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER MR. ROARK RAISED IT
5 IN STATE COURT OR NOT, IT'S SOMETHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
6 RAISED AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL IN STATE COURT. AND I -- HE
7 CERTAINLY SHOULD HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY OR SHOULD HAVE AT
8 LEAST TRIED TO DO THAT IN STATE COURT.
9 BUT I THINK THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR PURPOSES
10 OF THIS MOTION TODAY IS THAT THERE'S NO EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF
11 A COURT THAT MR. ROARK HAS IDENTIFIED THAT I CAN FIND IN HIS
12 OPPOSITION THAT SHOWS HOW HE WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS ABILITY TO
13 PRESENT EVIDENCE IN THE STATE COURT ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT
14 THE JUDGE ENTERED TERMINATING SANCTIONS.
15 THE COURT: TERMINATING SANCTIONS, RIGHT.
16 MR. MARUM: WHICH IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR
17 DISCOVERY ABUSE. IT'S PERFECTLY CONSTITUTIONAL. IT'S
18 AUTHORIZED BY BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW. AND THE COURT TOOK
19 EXTENSIVE BRIEFING IN STATE COURT AND HAD AT LEAST ONE OR TWO
20 HEARINGS ON THIS ISSUE. SO I DON'T THINK THAT MR. ROARK HAS
21 DEMONSTRATED TO THE LEVEL THAT HE WOULD NEED TO AT THE
22 SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE THAT THIS EXCEPTION APPLIES. QUITE
23 FRANKLY, HE'S RAISED THIS EXCEPTION A COUPLE TIMES IN ORAL
24 ARGUMENT BUT NEVER REALLY BRIEFED IT AS FAR AS I CAN TELL,
25 AND HE'S HAD MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO DO THAT.
26 I THINK IT'S HIS BURDEN. WE CARRIED OR OUR BURDEN
27 ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. WE SHIFTED THE BURDEN TO HIM. HE
28 HASN'T MET HIS BURDEN. I THINK THE COURT'S TENTATIVE IS

2- ER-396
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
401 Pg. 7 of 19
1 EXACTLY CORRECT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED.

2 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, DO YOU WANT ADDRESS
3 MR. MARUM'S POINT, THAT YOU DO NOT RAISE ANY FACTS IN THIS
4 OPPOSITION?
5 MR. ROARK: YES, YOUR HONOR. ALMOST EVERY FILING
6 THAT I HAD WAS REPLETE WITH --
7 THE COURT: NO, NO. THIS OPPOSITION. THIS IS THE
8 ONE WE'RE LOOKING AT.
9 MR. ROARK: IT DID. IT'S THE AUGUST 7, 2015
10 TRANSCRIPT AND THE EVIDENCE THAT I PROVIDED PROVING FRAUD ON
11 THE COURT. IN FACT, I'D LIKE TO ASK THE COURT, IF I MAY, IF
12 I CAN FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENT THAT DISTILLS THE ISSUE
13 DOWN TO THIS ONE THING, AND IT WILL NOT INCLUDE ANYTHING THAT
14 HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT. I CAN MAKE THE
15 ARGUMENT CLEARER. MAYBE IT WAS LOST IN THE VOLUMINOUS AMOUNT
16 OF NARRATIVE IN MY FILINGS, BUT I CAN DISTILL IT DOWN TO THIS
17 ONE SPECIFIC ISSUE AND NOTHING WILL BE INCLUDED THAT HASN'T
18 ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THIS COURT.
19 I TOLD MY ATTORNEYS ABOUT THIS ISSUE AND THEY
20 LITERALLY TOLD ME REPEATEDLY, THE JUDGE WILL NOT ALLOW US TO
21 SAY ANYTHING. YOU ARE STRICKEN. I COULDN'T BELIEVE IT. I
22 HAVE E-MAILS TELLING MY ATTORNEYS THIS, AND THEY SAID, NO,
23 OUR DEFENSE IS STRIPPED. JUDGE PRESSMAN SAID, YOU CANNOT SAY
24 ANYTHING. AND TO THIS DAY I'VE NEVER ONCE HAD HIM SPEAK ONE
25 WORD TO ME, AND I'VE NEVER HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY ONE
26 THING TO HIM.
27 THE COURT: MR. MARUM.
28 MR. MARUM: YOUR HONOR, THE FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT

2- ER-397
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
402 Pg. 8 of 19
1 MR. ROARK IS POINTING TO IS THE FACT THAT TERMINATING

2 SANCTIONS WERE ENTERED AGAINST HIM AND HE WASN'T ALLOWED TO
3 PRESENT EVIDENCE, BUT THERE'S NO FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT LED
4 TO THE ENTRY OF THE TERMINATING SANCTIONS. THE TERMINATING
5 SANCTIONS GOT ENTERED IN STATE COURT BECAUSE JUDGE PRESSMAN
6 EXAMINED THE FORENSIC EVIDENCE AND CONCLUDED THAT MR. ROARK
7 HAD DESTROYED THOUSANDS OR PERHAPS EVEN HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS
8 OF FILES. A LOT OF FILES GOT DESTROYED.
9 THERE'S NO FRAUD ON THE COURT BECAUSE MR. ROARK WAS
10 NOT ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOLLOWING THE ENTRY OF
11 TERMINATING SANCTIONS, AND THERE'S NO ALLEGATION OR EVIDENCE
12 THAT JUDGE PRESSMAN ENTERED TERMINATING SANCTIONS BECAUSE
13 MR. ROARK WAS SOMEHOW THE VICTIM OF A FRAUD ON THE COURT
14 ASSOCIATED WITH THAT DECISION.
15 I DO NOT THINK THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE ANY FURTHER
16 BRIEFING ON THIS ISSUE. WE'VE HAD PLENTY OF FILINGS IN THIS
17 CASE.
18 THE COURT: LOTS OF FILINGS IN THIS CASE.
19 MR. MARUM: MR. ROARK'S HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF
20 IT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS LAWYERS TOLD HIM WHEN HE WAS OVER
21 IN STATE COURT, BUT A LOT OF THESE FACTS THAT HE'S INCLUDED
22 IN HIS OPPOSITION ARE ITEMS THAT WERE IN FACT PRESENTED TO
23 THE STATE APPELLATE COURTS, AND HE'S REPACKAGING IT NOW WITH
24 A DIFFERENT THEORY OVER HERE IN BANKRUPTCY COURT, BUT THAT
25 DOESN'T MEAN THAT THE COURT IS ALLOWED TO GET BEHIND THAT
26 DECISION. SO I DO THINK SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS STILL
27 APPROPRIATE AND I DON'T THINK WE NEED ANY ADDITIONAL
28 BRIEFING.

2- ER-398
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 61of 710
403 Pg. 9 of 19
1 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, WHAT ADDITIONAL FACTS, OTHER

2 THAN THE FACT THAT THERE WERE TERMINATING SANCTIONS LEVIED
3 AGAINST YOU IN STATE COURT, DO YOU BELIEVE COULD PERSUADE THE
4 COURT TO CHANGE THIS TENTATIVE RULING?
5 MR. ROARK: YOUR HONOR, I'M CONVINCED IF I DISTILL
6 IT DOWN, YOU'LL CHANGE YOUR OPINION. NONE OF THESE ISSUES
7 WERE RAISED IN THE APPELLATE COURT. WE WEREN'T ALLOWED TO.
8 I MEAN, WHEN I LOOKED AT OUR OPENING BRIEF, I
9 COMPLAINED TO MY ATTORNEYS, WHY ARE WE NOT SAYING ANY OF
10 THESE THINGS? AND THEY SAID IT'S NOT, QUOTE, IN THE PAPERS,
11 WHICH I GUESS IS A LEGAL TERM FOR, IF IT HASN'T BEEN
12 PREVIOUSLY INTRODUCED, YOU CANNOT RELY ON NEW EVIDENCE IN AN
13 APPEAL. AND I DIDN'T HAVE ANY OF THAT.
14 NOW, THE EVIDENCE I SAID -- AND IT WAS IN THE
15 FILINGS. IT'S AN AUGUST 7, 2015 TRANSCRIPT, WHERE
16 NORTH ISLAND LIED ABOUT MY REMOTE ACCESS TO MY WORK PC FROM
17 MY HOME PC IN ORDER TO UNDERCUT MY TESTIMONY THAT I WAS
18 INSTRUCTED BY THEM TO DELETE THOSE DOCUMENTS. WHAT I DELETED
19 WERE BONA FIDE WORK-RELATED DOCUMENTS UNDER VERY EXTENUATING
20 CIRCUMSTANCES. I WAS EXPLICITLY INSTRUCTED BY THE LEGAL
21 LIAISON FOR NORTH ISLAND I'M REQUIRED BY POLICY, IT SAYS, TO
22 DESTROY MEDIA -- THAT'S IN QUOTES -- PROTECT MEMBER
23 CONFIDENTIALITY.
24 BEYOND EVEN THAT -- AND I'M ONLY RELYING ON THAT IF
25 I'M ALLOWED TO DISTILL MY ARGUMENT IN A SUPPLEMENTAL FILING.
26 THIS DOESN'T EVEN GO TO THE ISSUE THAT MR. BARRETT MARUM WAS
27 INVOLVED -- ON THE VERY DAY I WAS TOLD THAT MY HOME PC WOULD
28 BE IMAGED, A LOAN COMES IN FROM MR. BARRETT'S CLIENT THAT

2- ER-399
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc404
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71010 of 19
10
1 REQUIRED SUCH A HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH CUSTOMER

2 CONFIDENTIALITY THAT EVEN MORE SO I HAD TO COMPLY WITH THE
3 INSTRUCTIONS OF MY EMPLOYER TO DELETE THAT INFORMATION, AND
4 THAT'S IN ALL OF MY FILINGS. THERE'S NOTHING THAT I'M
5 BRINGING UP THAT HASN'T ALREADY BEEN FILED.
6 THE COURT: I'M NOT UNDERSTANDING WHY, MR. ROARK,
7 THE FACT THAT YOU HAD THIS CLAIM THAT SOMEONE HAD LIED ABOUT
8 WHETHER YOU WERE DIRECTED TO DELETE DOCUMENTS OR FILES IN
9 YOUR COMPUTER, YOUR WORK COMPUTER, WAS NOT RAISED ON APPEAL.
10 MR. ROARK: OKAY.
11 THE COURT: WHY IS THAT -- WHY WERE YOU NOT
12 PERMITTED TO DO THIS?
13 MR. ROARK: ON AUGUST 7, 2015, NORTH ISLAND STATED
14 TO THE COURT -- THEY HAD THEIR ATTORNEY STATE THIS. AND FROM
15 WHAT I UNDERSTAND, THERE'S A STATUTE THAT EXCEPTS THIS KIND
16 OF BEHAVIOR FROM LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, WHICH IS TO HIDE THE
17 INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE.
18 THEIR ATTORNEY WAS INSTRUCTED TO TELL
19 JUDGE PRESSMAN THAT MR. ROARK COULD NOT HAVE WIPED ANYTHING
20 WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE MR. ROARK DIDN'T
21 EVEN HAVE ACCESS TO HIS WORK PC FROM HOME. I HAVE SIGNED
22 DOCUMENTS FOR AUTHORIZED REMOTE ACCESS TO MY HOME PC. I HAVE
23 30 TO 50 E-MAILS FROM THE NORTH ISLAND I.T. DEPARTMENT ON HOW
24 TO SET IT UP. THE REASON NORTH ISLAND PERPETUATED THIS FRAUD
25 ON THE COURT IS TO LEAD MR. PRESSMAN TO BELIEVE -- MR. ROARK,
26 IF YOU DIDN'T EVEN HAVE REMOTE ACCESS TO YOUR WORK PC FROM
27 YOUR HOME PC, THEN YOU OBVIOUSLY DID THIS WIPING FOR SOME
28 NEFARIOUS REASON. AND THAT'S ALL IT TOOK. THEY PULLED THE

2- ER-400
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc405
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71011 of 19
11
1 RUG OUT FROM UNDER THE VERY REASON I DID THE WIPING, WHICH
2 LEFT MR. PRESSMAN -- JUDGE PRESSMAN WITH NO OTHER DECISION
3 THAN TO ASSUME, OKAY, THEN, MR. ROARK, YOU MUST HAVE WIPED
4 FOR ALL THE THINGS THAT SDCCU HAS CLAIMED, AND THAT WAS NEVER
5 THE CASE.
6 THE COURT: ONCE AGAIN, THOUGH, MR. ROARK, WAS THIS
7 NOT SOMETHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED BY YOUR COUNSEL IN
8 ARGUMENT AGAINST THE SANCTIONS IMPOSITION -- THE TERMINATION
9 SANCTIONS IMPOSITION?
10 YOU'RE ASKING THE COURT TO GO BACK BEHIND
11 JUDGE PRESSMAN'S DECISION TO IMPOSE TERMINATING SANCTIONS ON
12 AN ARGUMENT -- FACTS THAT YOU ALLEGE JUDGE PRESSMAN DID NOT
13 HAVE BEFOREHAND AT A TIME WHEN YOU WERE REPRESENTED BY
14 COUNSEL.
15 MR. ROARK: I CAN PROVE IT.
16 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, THIS IS NOT A TRIAL COURT.
17 THIS IS NOT THE TRIAL COURT WHERE YOU BRING THIS STUFF BACK.
18 MR. ROARK: I UNDERSTOOD THAT THE EXCEPTION TO
19 ROOKER-FELDMAN APPLIES UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. I WASN'T
20 ALLOWED TO BRING IT UP BECAUSE, THREE DAYS LATER,
21 JUDGE PRESSMAN ISSUED HIS MINUTE ORDER STRIKING EVERYTHING.
22 AT THAT POINT IT COULDN'T BE BROUGHT UP. THAT'S WHAT I WAS
23 TOLD. AND I'VE ASKED OTHER ATTORNEYS. AND WHEN YOU'RE HIT
24 WITH TERMINATING SANCTIONS, THAT'S IT. YOU DON'T HAVE AN
25 OPPORTUNITY TO SAY ANYTHING. SO WHEN WE APPEALED, THE
26 ARGUMENTS WERE VERY VAGUE BECAUSE WE COULDN'T SAY ANYTHING
27 THAT WE HADN'T ALREADY INTRODUCED INTO COURT BECAUSE WE WERE
28 HOLDING IT FOR THE TRIAL.

2- ER-401
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc406
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71012 of 19
12
1 I NEVER THOUGHT THAT MY EMPLOYER CODEFENDANT, WHO

2 HAD A LOT TO GAIN FROM THIS FRAUD ON THE COURT, WOULD
3 LITERALLY PULL THE RUG OUT FROM UNDER ME AND TELL THE JUDGE,
4 OH, YEAH, HE NEVER HAD REMOTE ACCESS TO HIS HOME PC, WHICH,
5 YOU KNOW, IF I WAS JUDGE PRESSMAN, I WOULD THINK, WELL,
6 MR. ROARK, YOU MUST HAVE LIED WHEN YOU SAID IN YOUR
7 DEPOSITION THAT YOU WERE WORKING REMOTELY FROM HOME. THAT
8 COMPLETELY UNDERMINED EVERYTHING. IT LEFT JUDGE PRESSMAN
9 WITH NO OTHER CONCLUSION THAN NEFARIOUS ALLEGATION THAT SDCCU
10 WAS MAKING.
11 THE COURT: MR. MARUM.
12 MR. MARUM: MR. ROARK IS TALKING ABOUT THINGS THAT
13 HAPPENED AT A HEARING ON AUGUST 7TH. JUDGE PRESSMAN'S FINAL
14 ORDER FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS WAS AUGUST 18, 2015. IT
15 SOUNDS LIKE MR. ROARK KNEW IMMEDIATELY THAT THE STATEMENTS
16 FROM NORTH ISLAND'S COUNSEL, WHICH ARE STATEMENTS MADE ON THE
17 RECORD AT A HEARING, SO NOT EVIDENCE, JUST AN ARGUMENT OF
18 COUNSEL ON THE RECORD AT A HEARING -- HE KNEW IMMEDIATELY
19 THAT, FROM HIS PERSPECTIVE, THEY WERE FALSE.
20 THE STATE COURT HAS RECONSIDERATION MOTIONS. IF
21 THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT HE WAS AND HIS COUNSEL WERE REALLY
22 CONCERNED THAT JUDGE PRESSMAN WAS GOING TO RELY ON TO ISSUE
23 TERMINATING SANCTIONS, THOSE VEHICLES WERE CERTAINLY
24 AVAILABLE FOR HIM TO TAKE A SHOT AT PRESENTING THAT
25 INFORMATION TO THE STATE COURT. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT HE DID
26 ANY OF THAT, AND I DON'T THINK THAT THERE'S ANY EVIDENCE AT
27 ALL BEFORE THE COURT THAT JUDGE PRESSMAN -- THAT THAT EVEN
28 REALLY FACTORED INTO JUDGE PRESSMAN'S DECISION. I DON'T WANT

2- ER-402
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc407
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71013 of 19
13
1 TO GO THERE, BECAUSE THAT'S STARTING TO GET BEHIND WHY

2 JUDGE PRESSMAN DID WHAT HE DID, WHICH WE'RE NOT SUPPOSED TO
3 DO WE WHEN LOOK AT ROOKER-FELDMAN.
4 BUT THIS IS NOT A SITUATION WHERE SOMEBODY -- A
5 LITIGANT CONCEALED THE IDENTITY OF A WITNESS, PREVENTED
6 MR. ROARK FROM LEARNING WHO THAT PERSON WAS SO THAT HE COULD
7 SUBPOENA THAT PERSON TO PRESENT THEM AT TRIAL. THESE ARE THE
8 KINDS OF THINGS THAT FIT WITHIN THE EXCEPTION TO THE
9 ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE, NOT TESTIMONY THAT MR. ROARK KNEW
10 WAS IMMEDIATELY FALSE AND HAD AN OPPORTUNITY USING STATE
11 COURT PROCEDURES TO TRY TO CORRECT BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT. I
12 DON'T THINK THIS JUSTIFIES DENYING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13 MOTION, YOUR HONOR.
14 THE COURT: AT THIS POINT WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS
15 THIS. I'VE ISSUED A TENTATIVE RULING. AT THIS POINT I AM
16 NOT PERMITTING YOU TO SUBMIT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT
17 YOUR CLAIM THAT YOU SOMEHOW FIT WITHIN THE EXCEPTION. I'M
18 GOING TO REREAD THE PARTICULAR PORTION OF THE CASE, WHICH I'M
19 NOT EVEN ENTIRELY SURE YOU CITED IT IN YOUR OPPOSITION, WHERE
20 YOU BELIEVE THERE IS AN EXCEPTION -- WHERE I ACKNOWLEDGE
21 THERE IS AN EXCEPTION FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT, AND I WANT TO
22 TAKE A LOOK AT THAT AGAIN AND REREAD IT AND CLARIFY MY
23 UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMBIT OF BEHAVIOR THAT
24 IT BELIEVES -- THAT THAT DECISION BELIEVES CONSTITUTES AN
25 EXCEPTION TO ROOKER-FELDMAN.
26 NOW, OF THESE CASES THAT YOU HAVE CITED IN HERE,
27 YOU DON'T HAVE THEM CITED FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE,
28 MR. ROARK. WHICH ONE IS THE ONE THAT YOU'RE CITING TO THAT

2- ER-403
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc408
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71014 of 19
14
1 YOU BELIEVE STANDS FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT ROOKER-FELDMAN

2 HAS AN EXCEPTION FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT YOU FIT WITHIN?
3 MR. ROARK: WELL, I HAVE SEVERAL CASES HERE.
4 THE COURT: I'M LOOKING AT YOUR OPPOSITION BRIEF.
5 MR. ROARK: I DIDN'T CITE THE -- I CITED THE
6 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT QUALIFIED -- I
7 DIDN'T THINK I HAD --
8 THE COURT: YOU DIDN'T CITE THEM IN HERE.
9 MR. ROARK: I CITED THE FRAUD ON THE COURT. I KNOW
10 FOR A FACT THAT I CITED THE AUGUST 7, 2015 TRANSCRIPT, AND I
11 PROVIDED EVIDENCE REFUTING WHAT THEY SAID IN COURT WHICH
12 CONSTITUTES FRAUD ON THE COURT, AND IT'S AN EXCEPTION TO
13 LITIGATION PRIVILEGE BY STATUTE.
14 THE COURT: BUT YOU DO NOT HAVE THE CASE THAT YOU
15 BELIEVE STANDS FOR THE PROPOSITION?
16 MR. ROARK: NOT IN FRONT OF ME. ONLY BECAUSE I
17 JUST DESCRIBED THE FRAUD ON THE COURT. I DIDN'T THINK I HAD
18 TO CALL OUT CASES WHEN IT SEEMED TO ME TO BE CLEAR.
19 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, WHAT BRIEFS USUALLY DO
20 IS THEY HIGHLIGHT THE CASES WHICH THE PARTY THINKS STRONGLY
21 SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENT. SO YOU'RE TELLING ME THAT I'M GOING
22 TO BE THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR GOING BACK AND FINDING THE CASE
23 THAT YOU BELIEVE IS THE ONE THAT SUBSTANTIATES YOUR ARGUMENT
24 THAT THERE'S A FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT FITS WITHIN THE
25 EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICATION OF ROOKER-FELDMAN.
26 MR. ROARK: I DON'T WANT TO DO THAT, YOUR HONOR.
27 THAT'S WHY I WANT --
28 THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S WHAT I'M GOING TO HAVE TO

2- ER-404
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc409
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71015 of 19
15
1 DO, MR. ROARK, BECAUSE YOU LEAVE ME NO CHOICE. AND I WILL DO

2 IT. I CAN'T SAY I'M HAPPY ABOUT DOING IT, BUT I WILL DO IT.
3 AND I WILL LOOK AT THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT YOU'RE MAKING
4 TO TRY TO FIND OUT IF THERE'S ANYTHING THAT YOU ARE ARGUING
5 THAT FITS WITHIN THAT EXCEPTION, BECAUSE IF THERE IS NOT, THE
6 TENTATIVE RULING WOULD REMAIN AS IT IS, UNCHANGED.
7 MR. ROARK: CAN I STATE -- IT'S JUST TWO THINGS.
8 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, I THINK YOU'VE SAID ENOUGH.
9 OKAY?
10 MR. ROARK: I'M SORRY. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
11 THE COURT: MR. MARUM, ANYTHING FURTHER?
12 MR. MARUM: NOT ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION,
13 YOUR HONOR.
14 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU.
15 AT THIS POINT, THEN, THE COURT WILL TAKE UNDER
16 SUBMISSION THIS QUESTION OF WHETHER -- THIS EXCEPTION TO
17 ROOKER-FELDMAN AND DETERMINE, GIVEN THE NATURE OF WHAT
18 MR. ROARK IS ARGUING, WHICH IS THAT THERE WAS SOME TESTIMONY
19 ON AUGUST 7 -- I BELIEVE IT WAS 2016; RIGHT?
20 MR. ROARK: NO, YOUR HONOR. '15.
21 THE COURT: -- '15 THAT WAS FALSE AND THAT THERE
22 WAS NOTHING HE COULD HAVE DONE WITHIN THAT THREE DAYS BEFORE
23 JUDGE PRESSMAN EXECUTED -- OR ENTERED AN ORDER GIVING HIM
24 TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND THERE'S NOTHING HE COULD HAVE DONE
25 UNDER STATE PROCEDURE -- FOR EXAMPLE, MOTION TO
26 RECONSIDER -- THAT ALSO WOULD HAVE FIT WITHIN ROOKER-FELDMAN.
27 IF ANY OF THOSE SEEM TO SUPPORT GRANTING AN EXCEPTION, THEN I
28 THINK I WILL REOPEN FOR BRIEFING ON THIS ISSUE; BUT FAILING

2- ER-405
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc410
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71016 of 19
16
1 THAT, MR. ROARK, THE TENTATIVE'S GOING TO STAND.

2 MR. MARUM: YOUR HONOR, ONE POINT OF CLARIFICATION
3 JUST ON WHAT THE COURT -- THE COURT JUST SAID. YOU REFERRED
4 TO THE STATEMENT ON THE AUGUST 7TH HEARING AS TESTIMONY, AND
5 THAT WAS NOT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. I BELIEVE IT WAS
6 ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL, AND THAT MAY BE AN IMPORTANT
7 DISTINCTION --
8 THE COURT: OKAY. LET ME MAKE A NOTE TO THAT
9 EFFECT.
10 MR. MARUM: I THINK THAT'S AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION
11 WHEN THE COURT LOOKS AT THE CASE LAW ON THIS PARTICULAR
12 EXCEPTION.
13 MR. ROARK: YOUR HONOR, MAY I SAY SOMETHING ABOUT
14 THAT?
15 THE COURT: YES.
16 MR. ROARK: YOUR HONOR, IT WAS NOT AN EVIDENTIARY
17 HEARING. IT WAS AN ATTORNEY. AND I WAS TOLD FOR A LONG TIME
18 IT WAS PROTECTED BY LITIGATION PRIVILEGE UNTIL AN ATTORNEY
19 POINTED OUT TO ME THAT THAT TYPE OF BEHAVIOR IS STATUTORILY
20 EXEMPT FROM LITIGATION PRIVILEGE.
21 NORTH ISLAND, BY THE FRAUD ON THE COURT, WAS TRYING
22 TO CONCEAL THEIR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE.
23 IT WASN'T JUST TELLING ME TO WIPE MY HOME PC. THEY WERE
24 OPERATING A REMOTE E-MAIL SERVER WITH COMMUNICATIONS
25 RESPONSIVE --
26 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, THIS IS FAR MORE
27 INFORMATION --
28 MR. ROARK: I'M SORRY.

2- ER-406
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc411
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71017 of 19
17
1 THE COURT: -- THAN I CAN POSSIBLY USE TO CONSIDER

2 THIS VERY NARROW ISSUE ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
3 SOMETHING THAT NORTH ISLAND DID THAT PREVENTED YOU FROM
4 PRESENTING THIS EVIDENCE TO THE STATE COURT.
5 THE COURT IS NOT GOING TO REOPEN THIS TO FIGURE OUT
6 WHAT SORT OF NEFARIOUS CONDUCT NORTH ISLAND WOULD HAVE BEEN
7 GUILTY OF. AND MY QUESTION IS -- IF THERE WERE REMEDIES AT
8 THE STATE COURT LEVEL AND YOUR COUNSEL DIDN'T RAISE THEM, IT
9 WOULD SEEM THAT THAT WILL NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF FRAUD ON
10 THE COURT BY WHICH YOU WERE PREVENTED FROM PRODUCING EVIDENCE
11 TO NEGATE THESE TERMINATING SANCTIONS. IN OTHER WORDS,
12 MR. ROARK, IF YOUR LAWYER SCREWED UP, THAT IS NOT -- THAT
13 DOES NOT UNDERCUT THIS JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THEY HAD REMEDIES.
14 AND THAT'S WHAT I WANT TO LOOK AT. ALL RIGHT?
15 MR. ROARK: YES, YOUR HONOR.
16 THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER, MR. MARUM?
17 MR. MARUM: NO, YOUR HONOR, NOT ON THE SUMMARY
18 JUDGMENT MOTION.
19 THE COURT: THANK YOU.
20 THE PRETRIAL STATUS CONFERENCE SHOULD GO OVER JUST
21 BECAUSE -- GIVEN THE FACT THAT WE'RE NOT GOING TO DECIDE IT
22 IN A FINAL WAY TODAY. YOU SHOULD HAVE A HOLDING DATE. SO
23 I'M GOING TO PUT THIS OVER TO THE CALENDAR OF FEBRUARY 21 AT
24 2:00, AND THAT'S JUST FOR THE PRETRIAL STATUS CONFERENCE.
25 IF I DECIDE THAT THERE IS ENOUGH TO REQUIRE MORE
26 ARGUMENT OR BRIEFING ON THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, I
27 LIKELY WILL RESTORE THIS TO THAT CALENDAR, BUT I'LL GIVE YOU
28 DIFFERENT BRIEFING DEADLINES. OKAY.

2- ER-407
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc412
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71018 of 19
18
1 MR. MARUM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

2 REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT DATES, MR. ROARK AND I
3 HAD AGREED TO CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION. WE'D ALSO
4 AGREED TO DEFER THOSE DISCLOSURES PENDING THE COURT'S RULING
5 ON THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, AND SO I JUST WANTED TO
6 ADVISE THE COURT THAT WE WON'T BE ENGAGING IN ANY OF THE
7 DISCOVERY PROCESS OR ANYTHING ELSE UNTIL THE --
8 THE COURT: UNDERSTOOD.
9 MR. MARUM: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
10 THE COURT: THANK YOU. COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.
11 -o0o-
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2- ER-408
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:18:12
DktEntry: Doc413
2, Page 61 of Pg.
71019 of 19
19
1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2
3 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
4
5 I, PATRICIA A. CALLIHAN, COURT REPORTER, DO HEREBY
6 CERTIFY:
7 THAT I REPORTED IN SHORTHAND THE PROCEEDINGS HELD
8 IN THE FOREGOING CAUSE ON THE 31ST DAY OF JANUARY, 2019; THAT
9 MY NOTES WERE LATER TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING UNDER MY
10 DIRECTION; AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS A
11 CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
12
13 DATED THIS 14TH DAY OF MARCH, 2019.
14
15 /s/ Patricia A. Callihan

Patricia A. Callihan, CSR No. 13375
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2- ER-409
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
414 Pg. 1 of 15
1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

3 JUDGE LOUISE DECARL ADLER, PRESIDING
4
5
6 IN THE MATTER OF: )

)
7 )
CARLTON ROARK )
8 ___________________________________) CASE NO. 18-04093-LA
)
9 SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION ) ADV. NO. 18-90158
)
10 v. )
)
11 CARLTON ROARK )
___________________________________)
12
13
14
15
16 1) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S

ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT;
17
2) PRETRIAL STATUS CONFERENCE.
18
19
20
21
22 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
23 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
24 THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2018
25
26
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT BY PATRICIA A. CALLIHAN
27 DEPARTMENT NO. 2 CSR 13375
325 W. F STREET
28 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

2- ER-410
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
415 Pg. 2 of 15
18-04093-LA (18-90158) THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2018
1 APPEARANCES
2
3 FOR THE PLAINTIFF/MOVANT:
4 SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON
BY J. BARRETT MARUM
5 501 WEST BROADWAY, 19TH FLOOR
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101
6
7
8 FOR THE DEBTOR/DEFENDANT:
9 DEBTOR IN PRO SE
BY CARLTON ROARK
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2- ER-411
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
416 Pg. 3 of 15
1 -o0o-
2 THE CLERK: IN THE MATTER OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY
3 CREDIT UNION VS. CARLTON ROARK; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
4 PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT, AND PRETRIAL
5 STATUS CONFERENCE.
6 MR. MARUM: GOOD AFTERNOON, YOUR HONOR.
7 BARRETT MARUM AND SEAN MANN-O'HALLORAN FOR
8 SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION.
9 MR. ROARK: CARLTON ROARK, DEFENDANT.
10 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, THE COURT POSTED A TENTATIVE
11 RULING CONCERNING THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, AND IT IS
12 GRANTED -- OR PROPOSED TO BE GRANTED IN STRIKING PARAGRAPHS
13 15 THROUGH 64.
14 I TAKE IT YOU'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THAT?
15 MR. ROARK: I DID, YOUR HONOR.
16 THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TO MAKE FURTHER ARGUMENT?
17 MR. ROARK: I'D JUST LIKE TO MAKE A TWO-MINUTE
18 STATEMENT IF I MAY.
19 THE COURT: SURE. GO AHEAD.
20 MR. ROARK: YOUR HONOR, THE TENTATIVE STRIKES
21 PARAGRAPHS IN MY ANSWER THAT INCLUDE FRAUD ON THE COURT AND
22 CITES ROOKER-FELDMAN, WHEN FRAUD ON THE COURT IS AN EXPLICIT
23 EXCEPTION TO ROOKER-FELDMAN AND RES JUDICATA ACCORDING TO
24 CASE LAW AND FRCP RULE 60(D)(3). AS A RESULT OF MY MANY
25 OTHER REFERENCES TO FRAUD FOR BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT, I
26 BELIEVE MY REQUEST FOR RELIEF, BASED ON FRAUD ON THE COURT
27 THAT WAS USED TO SECURE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, WAS OVERLOOKED.
28 WITHOUT THE COURT'S REVIEW THAT I'M REQUESTING, FRAUD ON THE

2- ER-412
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
417 Pg. 4 of 15
1 COURT IN THE UNDERLYING STATE COURT ACTION WILL NOW EXTEND

2 INTO THIS COURT. WHILE I CANNOT AFFORD AN ATTORNEY, I DID
3 CONSULT WITH SEVERAL WHO LOOKED AT MY EVIDENCE AND AGREED
4 THAT THE JUDGMENT AGAINST ME, THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, WAS THE
5 RESULT OF FRAUD ON THE COURT BY MY CO-DEFENDANT.
6 IF THE LAW STILL ALLOWS FOR REVIEW OF FRAUD ON THE
7 COURT PURSUANT TO RULE 60 IN BANKRUPTCY CODE 105(A), WHICH IS
8 WHAT I'VE BEEN ASKING FOR ALL ALONG -- THAT'S ALL I'M
9 REQUESTING, A DENIAL FOR AT LEAST -- TO YOU IT MEANS FRAUD ON
10 THE COURT WILL STAND UNCONTESTED.
11 YOUR HONOR, I'M ALSO NOT ALLEGING FRAUD ON THE
12 COURT. I HAVE SUBMITTED EVIDENCE OF IT THAT CANNOT BE
13 DISPUTED AND ONLY FILED MY BANKRUPTCY PETITION PRECISELY FOR
14 THIS COURT'S REVIEW OF FRAUD ON THE COURT.
15 I'M BEGGING THIS COURT TO RECONSIDER THE TENTATIVE,
16 DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE, AND INSTEAD DEFER TO THE
17 MSJ'S THAT WILL BE FILED. IN MY FORTHCOMING MSJ, I WILL MAKE
18 MY CASE MUCH MORE CLEAR FOR FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT IS AN
19 EXPLICIT EXCEPTION TO ROOKER-FELDMAN AND RES JUDICATA AND
20 WILL OMIT MUCH MORE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER FRAUD
21 TO AVOID CONFUSION.
22 YOUR HONOR, THIS COMPLAINT IS EFFECTIVELY A DEATH
23 PENALTY AND HAS EXTREMELY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR ME AND MY
24 FAMILY. I'M ONLY ASKING THAT I BE ALLOWED TO USE STATUTES
25 AVAILABLE TO ME THAT ARE SPECIFIC TO FRAUD ON THE COURT THAT
26 LED TO THIS JUDGMENT.
27 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT
28 THE JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU IN STATE COURT WAS APPEALED. WAS IT

2- ER-413
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
418 Pg. 5 of 15
1 NOT?
2 MR. ROARK: IT WAS APPEALED, BUT NOTHING WAS IN THE
3 PAPERS BECAUSE OF THE FRAUD.
4 THE COURT: AND WHY WAS THAT?
5 MR. ROARK: MY CO-DEFENDANT LIED ABOUT MY ACCESS TO
6 A REMOTE COMPUTER FROM HOME.
7 THE COURT: WHY WASN'T THAT PART OF YOUR APPEAL
8 FROM THE JUDGMENT?
9 MR. ROARK: THEY SAID -- AT THE ORAL HEARING WHERE
10 THE FALSE TESTIMONY WAS GIVEN BY MY CO-DEFENDANT -- AND I DO
11 BELIEVE IT WAS IN COLLUSION WITH THE PLAINTIFF, BUT I'M NOT
12 GOING THERE. I'M JUST TALKING ABOUT MY CO-DEFENDANT. AT
13 THAT POINT JUDGE PRESSMAN SAID YOU ARE STRICKEN FROM A
14 DEFENSE. ALL OF MY ATTORNEYS TOLD ME THAT IT'S NOT IN THE
15 PAPERS, WE CAN'T EVEN BRING THAT UP ANYMORE. I LITERALLY WAS
16 STUCK GOING FORWARD WITH ALL MY APPEALS WITH NOTHING IN THE
17 PAPERS, LITERALLY NOTHING.
18 NOW, I DID TALK MAYBE TOO MUCH ABOUT A LOT OF OTHER
19 FRAUD ISSUES IN MY ANSWER, BECAUSE I WANTED TO PROVIDE
20 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT, BUT IF I CAN JUST MAKE THE CASE FOR
21 WHAT I REALLY WANTED ALL ALONG ABOUT THE FRAUD ON THE COURT,
22 I CAN STRIP 80 PERCENT OF THAT OUT AND JUST FOCUS ON THAT. I
23 LITERALLY THINK I COULD CLEAN IT UP. I JUST THOUGHT THE
24 BACKGROUND WAS IMPORTANT, AND I NOW REALIZE MAYBE IT JUST
25 MUDDIES THE WATERS AND IT CONFUSED THINGS.
26 THE COURT: WELL, LET ME HEAR FROM COUNSEL FOR THE
27 PLAINTIFF, SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION.
28 MR. MARUM: YES, YOUR HONOR. IF THERE WAS ANY

2- ER-414
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
419 Pg. 6 of 15
1 FRAUD ON THE COURT IN THE STATE LAWSUIT, THE APPROPRIATE

2 PLACE FOR THAT TO BE ADDRESSED WAS IN THE STATE COURT
3 APPELLATE SYSTEM. IT SOUNDS LIKE MR. ROARK IS SAYING TODAY
4 THAT THAT DID NOT HAPPEN.
5 THE COURT: I GATHER THAT'S WHAT HE'S SAYING.
6 MR. MARUM: I DON'T KNOW WHY THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN. I
7 DON'T KNOW WHY MR. ROARK AND HIS COUNSEL WOULDN'T PRESENT
8 THOSE ARGUMENTS TO THE STATE COURT. I'M UNAWARE OF ANY CASE
9 LAW THAT'S BEEN CITED TO THE COURT THAT WOULD ALLOW THIS
10 COURT TO ANALYZE FRAUD COMMITTED ALLEGEDLY ON A STATE COURT.
11 THE WHOLE POINT OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE, AS
12 THE COURT KNOWS, IS THAT, ONCE A STATE COURT JUDGMENT IS
13 FINAL, IT'S NOT THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO EXAMINE
14 THAT JUDGMENT UNLESS THEY'RE SITTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT,
15 LIKE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DOES FOR CERTAIN STATE COURT
16 JUDGMENTS. SO I THINK THE COURT'S TENTATIVE IS CORRECT. THE
17 RELEVANT PARAGRAPHS IN THE ANSWER THAT THE COURT MENTIONED
18 SHOULD BE STRICKEN BECAUSE THEY ALL RELATE TO THINGS THAT
19 HAPPENED IN THE STATE COURT AND ARE AN ATTACK ON THE STATE
20 COURT JUDGMENT.
21 AND THEN, YOUR HONOR, I ALSO THINK THE SAME LOGIC
22 THAT APPLIES TO STRIKING PARAGRAPHS 15 THROUGH 64 OF THE
23 ANSWER ALSO APPLIES TO STRIKING VARIOUS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
24 WHICH ARE A REHASH OF SOME OF THE --
25 THE COURT: ACTUALLY I THOUGHT THE TENTATIVE HAD
26 SAID THAT.
27 MR. MARUM: IF IT DID, YOUR HONOR, I MISSED IT.
28 THE COURT: NO. I'M TRYING TO THINK OF THE

2- ER-415
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
420 Pg. 7 of 15
1 NUMBERS. LET ME GO BACK INTO THE COMPLAINT.

2 MR. MARUM: I DO HAVE THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
3 NUMBERS THAT WE SOUGHT TO BE STRICKEN, YOUR HONOR, IF THAT
4 WOULD BE HELPFUL.
5 THE COURT: ISN'T THE 62 THROUGH 64 AFFIRMATIVE
6 DEFENSES? I THINK THOSE ARE THE NUMBERS. LET ME GO BACK
7 INTO IT. NO, THEY ARE NOT.
8 OKAY. IT'S THROUGH THE -- BASICALLY THE
9 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES START AT 65 AND GO TO 82, WITH A
10 RESERVATION ON 83 AND ANY OTHERS MR. ROARK CAN THINK OF.
11 MR. MARUM: AND OUR REQUEST WAS TO STRIKE
12 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 1 THROUGH 6, 8 TO 15 --
13 THE COURT: I'LL GET BACK IN HERE. 1 THROUGH 6.
14 MR. MARUM: 8 TO 15.
15 THE COURT: OKAY.
16 MR. MARUM: AND THEN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 17 AND 18
17 AS WELL.
18 THE COURT: I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY I MISSED POSTING
19 THIS PART OF IT, BUT IT HAPPENS. AND HERE IT IS ON YOUR
20 MOTION. THERE WERE NOTES ABOUT IT, BUT IT NEVER MADE IT INTO
21 THE ANALYSIS. I'M GOING TO TAKE A LOOK AT THAT AND MAKE SURE
22 THAT IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE REST OF THE TENTATIVE, THE
23 ONES THAT YOU'VE TALKED ABOUT. I THINK IT LIKELY IS, BUT I
24 DON'T KNOW WITHOUT LOOKING AT IT MORE CAREFULLY. THERE IS AN
25 OBLIQUE REFERENCE TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THE TENTATIVE,
26 BUT IT WASN'T ACTUALLY SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED, SO I THINK I
27 OWE YOU A LETTER ON THIS ONE.
28 ANYWAY, ANYTHING FURTHER CONCERNING THE

2- ER-416
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
421 Pg. 8 of 15
1 FRAUD-ON-THE-COURT ARGUMENT THAT MR. ROARK HAS MADE?

2 MR. MARUM: NO, YOUR HONOR.
3 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, MR. MARUM SAYS -- AND IT HAS
4 SOME WEIGHT -- CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT -- THAT IF THERE WERE A
5 FRAUD ON THE COURT, WHY WASN'T THAT RAISED AT THE STATE COURT
6 LEVEL?
7 MR. ROARK: I BROUGHT THAT UP. MY ATTORNEY SAID
8 JUDGE PRESSMAN SAID YOU NO LONGER HAVE A DEFENSE. IT
9 HAPPENED CONCURRENT WITH THE HEARING WHERE -- THE TERMINATING
10 SANCTIONS. IT WAS THE EXACT ORAL HEARING THAT LED TO
11 TERMINATING SANCTIONS. AT THAT POINT EVERYTHING BEFORE IT
12 AND IN THAT HEARING COULD NOT BE -- IN FACT IT WAS MENTIONED
13 IN MY APPELLATE BRIEF. THERE'S NOTHING IN THE PAPERS.
14 THAT'S WHY I HAD NO CHANCE AT ALL. HERE'S WHAT I'M WORRIED
15 ABOUT.
16 THE REPORTER: SLOW DOWN, PLEASE.
17 MR. ROARK: I'M SORRY.
18 THE JUDGMENT -- AND I CAN SHOW IT EASILY -- WAS
19 BASED ON FALSE TESTIMONY OF A MATERIAL FACT. I'M NOT JUST
20 SAYING BECAUSE THEY LIED ON ONE THING THAT SOMEHOW I GOT THIS
21 JUDGMENT. THEY LIED ON PIVOTAL AND MATERIAL TESTIMONY THAT
22 THE JUDGE BASED --
23 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, DON'T YOU SEE THAT THAT IS
24 SOMETHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP IN THE STATE COURT
25 AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL? AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT KIND OF ADVICE
26 YOU GOT ON THE APPEAL. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU DID THIS IN PRO
27 SE OR WHAT YOU --
28 MR. ROARK: NO.

2- ER-417
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 60of 710
422 Pg. 9 of 15
1 THE COURT: -- DID. BUT IT WOULD SEEM THAT, IF YOU

2 HAD EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AND PROVED YOUR TESTIMONY, THAT ON
3 APPEAL IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. FOR IT TO START TO BE
4 CONSIDERED HERE -- I MEAN, HOW IS THAT NOT ME GOING BACK AND
5 REVIEWING WHAT JUDGE PRESSMAN DID?
6 MR. ROARK: FROM WHAT I'VE READ, 60(D)(3), FRAUD ON
7 THE COURT, DOESN'T EVEN HAVE A TIME LIMIT. IN FACT, FROM
8 EVERYTHING I'VE READ -- AND I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT BLOGS. I'M
9 TALKING ABOUT ON LEGAL SITES -- THIS IS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS
10 ISSUE. I MEAN, AND NOW IF --
11 THE COURT: BUT, MR. ROARK, IF THE STATE COURT
12 DOESN'T RECOGNIZE IT AS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS ISSUE, WHY IS IT
13 INCUMBENT ON THIS COURT TO DO SO?
14 MR. ROARK: MY UNDERSTANDING WAS THE BANKRUPTCY
15 COURT HAS THAT AUTHORITY UNDER 105(A), 60(B)(5) AND (6). AND
16 60(D)(3) SPECIFICALLY SAYS FRAUD ON THE COURT. AND I'M ONLY
17 ASKING, LET ME MAKE THAT ARGUMENT.
18 THIS COURT PREVIOUSLY SAID THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS
19 ON THE PLAINTIFF, BUT THAT'S HARDLY A BURDEN IF THE DEFENDANT
20 IS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW HOW FRAUD ON THE COURT LED
21 TO THE JUDGMENT. I MEAN, NOW I'M BEING STRICKEN WITH OLD
22 PARAGRAPHS, ALL MY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND THE ONLY THING
23 LEFT IS THE HEADING AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE A JUDGMENT
24 SECURED BY A DEFAULT JUDGMENT BASED ON FALSE TESTIMONY, THAT
25 I CAN'T SPEAK TO. I'VE NEVER HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
26 EVIDENCE, NOT IN STATE COURT AND NOW NOT IN BANKRUPTCY COURT.
27 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, I THINK THE STATE COURT
28 PRECLUDED YOUR ABILITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF WHAT IT

2- ER-418
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc423
2, Page 60 of Pg.
71010 of 15
10
1 BELIEVED YOU DID --

2 MR. ROARK: UH-HUH.
3 THE COURT: -- WITH RESPECT TO VIOLATING A COURT
4 ORDER, WHICH IS WHY THE TERMINATING SANCTIONS WERE ENTERED
5 AGAINST YOU.
6 MR. ROARK: UH-HUH.
7 THE COURT: YES, I SUPPOSE IT WAS DEFAULT IN THAT
8 RESPECT, BUT IT'S A DEFAULT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF YOUR OWN
9 CONDUCT, SO IT'S REALLY HARD FOR THE COURT TO SEE THAT
10 SOMEHOW YOU WERE DEPRIVED OF THE ABILITY TO LITIGATE. YOU
11 WERE LITIGATING.
12 MR. ROARK: YOUR HONOR, THE COURT NEVER HEARD THE
13 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT DIRECTIONS FROM MY EMPLOYER FOR SECURE
14 WIPING AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVING IT. THEY ALSO DENIED
15 THAT I HAD REMOTE ACCESS. SO THE COURT WOULD BE LED TO
16 BELIEVE THAT ANY WIPING I DID ON MY HOME COMPUTER WAS FOR
17 NEFARIOUS REASONS. IT WAS NOT. NORTH ISLAND --
18 THE COURT: BUT, MR. ROARK, I GUESS WHAT I'M
19 STRUGGLING WITH HERE IS, WHY IS THIS NOT SOMETHING THAT
20 SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED IN THE STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS,
21 EITHER AT THE TRIAL LEVEL -- AFTER JUDGE PRESSMAN STRUCK YOUR
22 PLEADINGS, I GUESS YOU DIDN'T HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY -- BUT AT
23 THE APPELLATE LEVEL. AND I BELIEVE YOU HAD PETITIONED THE
24 CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT. DID YOU NOT?
25 MR. ROARK: I DID, BUT THERE WAS NOTHING TO GO ON.
26 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. ANYTHING
27 FURTHER?
28 MR. ROARK: NO, YOUR HONOR.

2- ER-419
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc424
2, Page 60 of Pg.
71011 of 15
11
1 THE COURT: MR. MERUM, ANYTHING FURTHER?

2 MR. MARUM: JUST VERY BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR.
3 I HAVEN'T HEARD ANYTHING THAT COULDN'T HAVE BEEN
4 PRESENTED TO THE STATE COURT AT SOME LEVEL. HE'S TALKING
5 ABOUT THINGS THAT HAPPENED IN THE STATE COURT PROCEEDING,
6 ALLEGEDLY FALSIFIED OR PERJURIOUS STATEMENTS MADE IN THE
7 STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS. THAT SEEMS TO ME TO FALL SQUARELY
8 WITHIN THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE. AND WITHOUT MR. ROARK
9 CITING TO A CASE THAT PROVIDES SOME TYPE OF AN EXCEPTION FOR
10 THE CONDUCT THAT HE IS ALLEGING OCCURRED, I THINK THE COURT
11 SHOULD SUSTAIN ITS TENTATIVE.
12 THE COURT: THANK YOU.
13 WELL, AS I SAID, I REALIZE NOW THAT I'M LOOKING AT
14 THIS, WE DID NOT ADDRESS YOUR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AS WELL,
15 ALTHOUGH OBLIQUELY IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE TENTATIVE IT
16 DOES. SO WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS TO ISSUE A LETTER TO YOU
17 AND TO MR. ROARK THAT ENCOMPASSES A REVISED TENTATIVE SO THAT
18 YOU CAN UNDERSTAND WHAT THE COURT IS RULING AND HAVE A FULL
19 DISPOSITION.
20 LET ME ASK YOU ONE QUESTION, MR. MARUM. IF THE
21 COURT GRANTS YOUR MOTION TO STRIKE AND AUGMENTS IT WITH THE
22 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, IS THERE ANYTHING LEFT?
23 MR. MARUM: YES, YOUR HONOR. THERE ARE ONE OR TWO
24 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES THAT SURVIVE THAT ARE APPROPRIATE
25 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, IF THE FACTS SUPPORT THEM, TO THE
26 COMPLAINT. AND I STILL NEED TO BRING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
27 JUDGMENT THAT THE STATE COURT JUDGMENT HAS MET THE ELEMENTS
28 OF NONDISCHARGEABILITY.

2- ER-420
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc425
2, Page 60 of Pg.
71012 of 15
12
1 THE COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU.

2 ALL RIGHT. I'LL TRY TO GET THAT TO YOU CERTAINLY
3 BEFORE NEXT WEEK. THANK YOU.
4 MR. MARUM: YOUR HONOR, WE WERE ON FOR A STATUS
5 CONFERENCE AS WELL TODAY. DID YOU WANT TO TAKE THAT UP?
6 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GET YOUR LETTER. YOU'RE
7 GOING TO DO AN ORDER. WHERE WILL YOU GO NEXT ASSUMING THE
8 TENTATIVE IS ALONG THE LINES AS THE TENTATIVE IS AT THE
9 CURRENT TIME? ARE YOU GOING TO BE BRINGING AND MSJ, AND IF
10 SO, WHEN?
11 MR. MARUM: I THINK BOTH MR. ROARK AND THE CREDIT
12 UNION AGREE THAT THIS IS A CASE THAT SHOULD BE DECIDED ON MSJ
13 ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, SO WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING
14 ONE NOW. I'LL BE IN A POSITION WHERE I COULD FILE IT NEXT
15 WEEK. IF THE COURT HAD A HEARING DATE THAT WOULD WORK WITH
16 THAT FILING --
17 THE COURT: I'M THINKING PERHAPS THE 31ST OF
18 JANUARY -- OH, WAIT. THERE'S NOTHING SET FOR THAT. WE COULD
19 DO IT THE 24TH OF JANUARY.
20 WE'RE GOING TO HAVE CALENDAR ON THE 31ST, ARE WE
21 NOT, KAREN? THERE'S NOTHING ON. THAT'S WHAT I'M ASKING.
22 THE CLERK: YEAH, WE DO HAVE A CALENDAR, JUST
23 NOTHING SCHEDULED YET.
24 MR. MARUM: YOUR HONOR, THE 31ST WOULD BE BETTER
25 FOR ME. I HAVE TO BE IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA ON THE 24TH.
26 THE COURT: WELL, LET'S GIVE YOU A 2:30 TENTATIVE
27 DAY, AND WE'LL MOVE THE PRETRIAL STATUS CONFERENCE OVER TO
28 THAT DATE AND TIME. IF YOU DON'T FILE YOUR MSJ IN SUFFICIENT

2- ER-421
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc426
2, Page 60 of Pg.
71013 of 15
13
1 TIME TO GET IT ON THE JANUARY 31ST CALENDAR, I APPRECIATE

2 YOUR CONTACTING MS. FEARCE AND -- SO WE CAN MOVE THE STATUS
3 CONFERENCE TO A DIFFERENT TIME AND PERHAPS EVEN A DIFFERENT
4 DATE. IF NOBODY SHOWS UP FOR CALENDAR ON THE 31ST, THERE'S
5 NO REASON TO HAVE ONE STATUS CONFERENCE ON THE CALENDAR.
6 MR. MARUM: I UNDERSTAND. CERTAINLY WILL, YOUR
7 HONOR.
8 THE COURT: THANK YOU. ANYTHING FURTHER?
9 YES, MR. ROARK.
10 MR. ROARK: YOUR HONOR, IF YOU TELL ME WHAT
11 DEADLINE I HAVE TO GET AN MSJ IN -- AND I GUESS AFTER THE
12 TENTATIVE IS AFFIRMED, I'LL KNOW WHAT IS LEFT FOR ME TO
13 ARGUE.
14 THE COURT: ARE YOU GOING TO DO YOUR OWN
15 CONTRA-MSJ?
16 MR. ROARK: YES.
17 THE COURT: MR. MARUM IS TALKING ABOUT DOING IT
18 SOMETIME NEXT WEEK OR THE WEEK -- NOT THE WEEK AFTER. THAT'S
19 IN THE MIDDLE OF A HOLIDAY -- THE 31ST. YOU'D HAVE TIME TO
20 FILE IT BY AS LATE AS THE 3RD OF JANUARY AND STILL HAVE IT ON
21 FOR HEARING ON THE 31ST OF JANUARY.
22 MR. ROARK: I WAS HOPING TO GET MAYBE UNTIL
23 JANUARY 15TH TO GET IT FILED.
24 THE COURT: MR. ROARK, YOU COULD FILE IT WHENEVER
25 YOU WANTED AND SCHEDULE IT WHENEVER YOU WANT IT, BUT IF HE
26 FILES HIS ON TIME, HE CAN GO FORWARD ON THE 31ST. IT'S NOT
27 DEPENDENT ON WHAT YOU DO. SO LONG AS HIS IS NOT GRANTED, YOU
28 STILL HAVE A SHOT OF GOING FORWARD ON YOURS.

2- ER-422
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc427
2, Page 60 of Pg.
71014 of 15
14
1 MR. ROARK: IF HIS IS GRANTED, THEN IT'S MOOT.

2 THE COURT: RIGHT. OKAY? THANK YOU.
3 -O0O-
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2- ER-423
Case: 23-55750, 03/14/19 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 03/14/19
12802062, 12:16:56
DktEntry: Doc428
2, Page 60 of Pg.
71015 of 15
15
1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2
3 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
4
5 I, PATRICIA A. CALLIHAN, COURT REPORTER, DO HEREBY
6 CERTIFY:
7 THAT I REPORTED IN SHORTHAND THE PROCEEDINGS HELD
8 IN THE FOREGOING CAUSE ON THE 13TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2018;
9 THAT MY NOTES WERE LATER TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING UNDER
10 MY DIRECTION; AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPT CONTAINS A
11 CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
12
13 DATED THIS 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2018.
14
15 /S/ PATRICIA A. CALLIHAN

PATRICIA A. CALLIHAN, CSR NO. 13375
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2- ER-424
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
429 7101 of 37
3- ER-425
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
430 7102 of 37
3- ER-426
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
431 7103 of 37
3- ER-427
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
432 7104 of 37
3- ER-428
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
433 7105 of 37
3- ER-429
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
434 7106 of 37
3- ER-430
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
435 7107 of 37
3- ER-431
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
436 7108 of 37
3- ER-432
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:Entered
10/02/2023, 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 of Pg.
437 7109 of 37
3- ER-433
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
438 71010 of 37
3- ER-434
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
439 71011 of 37
3- ER-435
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
440 71012 of 37
3- ER-436
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
441 71013 of 37
3- ER-437
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
442 71014 of 37
3- ER-438
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
443 71015 of 37
3- ER-439
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
444 71016 of 37
3- ER-440
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
445 71017 of 37
3- ER-441
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
446 71018 of 37
3- ER-442
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
447 71019 of 37
3- ER-443
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
448 71020 of 37
3- ER-444
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
449 71021 of 37
3- ER-445
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
450 71022 of 37
3- ER-446
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
451 71023 of 37
3- ER-447
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
452 71024 of 37
3- ER-448
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
453 71025 of 37
3- ER-449
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
454 71026 of 37
3- ER-450
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
455 71027 of 37
3- ER-451
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
456 71028 of 37
3- ER-452
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
457 71029 of 37
3- ER-453
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
458 71030 of 37
3- ER-454
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
459 71031 of 37
3- ER-455
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
460 71032 of 37
3- ER-456
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
461 71033 of 37
3- ER-457
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
462 71034 of 37
3- ER-458
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
463 71035 of 37
3- ER-459
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
464 71036 of 37
3- ER-460
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc
2, Page 5 ofPg.
465 71037 of 37
3- ER-461
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc466
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 1 of 25
3- ER-462
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc467
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 2 of 25
3- ER-463
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc468
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 3 of 25
3- ER-464
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc469
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 4 of 25
3- ER-465
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc470
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 5 of 25
3- ER-466
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc471
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 6 of 25
3- ER-467
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc472
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 7 of 25
3- ER-468
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc473
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 8 of 25
3- ER-469
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc474
2, Page 5-1of 710
Pg. 9 of 25
3- ER-470
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc475
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 10 of 25
3- ER-471
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc476
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 11 of 25
3- ER-472
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc477
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 12 of 25
3- ER-473
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc478
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 13 of 25
3- ER-474
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc479
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 14 of 25
3- ER-475
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc480
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 15 of 25
3- ER-476
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc481
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 16 of 25
3- ER-477
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc482
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 17 of 25
3- ER-478
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc483
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 18 of 25
3- ER-479
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc484
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 19 of 25
3- ER-480
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc485
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 20 of 25
3- ER-481
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc486
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 21 of 25
3- ER-482
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc487
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 22 of 25
3- ER-483
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc488
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 23 of 25
3- ER-484
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc489
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 24 of 25
3- ER-485
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc490
2, Page 5-1 of Pg.
710 25 of 25
3- ER-486
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc491
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 1 of 25
3- ER-487
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc492
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 2 of 25
3- ER-488
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc493
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 3 of 25
3- ER-489
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc494
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 4 of 25
3- ER-490
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc495
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 5 of 25
3- ER-491
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc496
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 6 of 25
3- ER-492
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc497
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 7 of 25
3- ER-493
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc498
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 8 of 25
3- ER-494
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc499
2, Page 5-2of 710
Pg. 9 of 25
3- ER-495
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc500
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 10 of 25
3- ER-496
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc501
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 11 of 25
3- ER-497
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc502
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 12 of 25
3- ER-498
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc503
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 13 of 25
3- ER-499
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc504
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 14 of 25
3- ER-500
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc505
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 15 of 25
3- ER-501
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc506
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 16 of 25
3- ER-502
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc507
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 17 of 25
3- ER-503
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc508
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 18 of 25
3- ER-504
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc509
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 19 of 25
3- ER-505
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc510
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 20 of 25
3- ER-506
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc511
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 21 of 25
3- ER-507
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc512
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 22 of 25
3- ER-508
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc513
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 23 of 25
3- ER-509
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc514
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 24 of 25
3- ER-510
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc515
2, Page 5-2 of Pg.
710 25 of 25
3- ER-511
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc516
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 1 of 51
3- ER-512
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc517
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 2 of 51
3- ER-513
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc518
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 3 of 51
3- ER-514
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc519
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 4 of 51
3- ER-515
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc520
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 5 of 51
3- ER-516
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc521
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 6 of 51
3- ER-517
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc522
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 7 of 51
3- ER-518
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc523
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 8 of 51
3- ER-519
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc524
2, Page 5-3of 710
Pg. 9 of 51
3- ER-520
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc525
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 10 of 51
3- ER-521
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc526
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 11 of 51
3- ER-522
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc527
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 12 of 51
3- ER-523
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc528
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 13 of 51
3- ER-524
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc529
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 14 of 51
3- ER-525
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc530
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 15 of 51
3- ER-526
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc531
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 16 of 51
3- ER-527
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc532
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 17 of 51
3- ER-528
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc533
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 18 of 51
3- ER-529
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc534
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 19 of 51
3- ER-530
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc535
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 20 of 51
3- ER-531
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc536
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 21 of 51
3- ER-532
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc537
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 22 of 51
3- ER-533
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc538
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 23 of 51
3- ER-534
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc539
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 24 of 51
3- ER-535
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc540
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 25 of 51
3- ER-536
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc541
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 26 of 51
3- ER-537
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc542
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 27 of 51
3- ER-538
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc543
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 28 of 51
3- ER-539
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc544
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 29 of 51
3- ER-540
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc545
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 30 of 51
3- ER-541
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc546
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 31 of 51
3- ER-542
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc547
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 32 of 51
3- ER-543
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc548
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 33 of 51
3- ER-544
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc549
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 34 of 51
3- ER-545
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc550
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 35 of 51
3- ER-546
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc551
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 36 of 51
3- ER-547
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc552
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 37 of 51
3- ER-548
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc553
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 38 of 51
3- ER-549
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc554
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 39 of 51
3- ER-550
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc555
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 40 of 51
3- ER-551
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc556
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 41 of 51
3- ER-552
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc557
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 42 of 51
3- ER-553
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc558
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 43 of 51
3- ER-554
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc559
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 44 of 51
3- ER-555
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc560
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 45 of 51
3- ER-556
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc561
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 46 of 51
3- ER-557
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc562
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 47 of 51
3- ER-558
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc563
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 48 of 51
3- ER-559
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc564
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 49 of 51
3- ER-560
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc565
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 50 of 51
3- ER-561
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc566
2, Page 5-3 of Pg.
710 51 of 51
3- ER-562
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc567
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 1 of 47
3- ER-563
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc568
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 2 of 47
3- ER-564
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc569
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 3 of 47
3- ER-565
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc570
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 4 of 47
3- ER-566
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc571
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 5 of 47
3- ER-567
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc572
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 6 of 47
3- ER-568
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc573
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 7 of 47
3- ER-569
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc574
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 8 of 47
3- ER-570
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc575
2, Page 5-4of 710
Pg. 9 of 47
3- ER-571
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc576
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 10 of 47
3- ER-572
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc577
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 11 of 47
3- ER-573
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc578
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 12 of 47
3- ER-574
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc579
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 13 of 47
3- ER-575
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc580
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 14 of 47
3- ER-576
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc581
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 15 of 47
3- ER-577
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc582
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 16 of 47
3- ER-578
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc583
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 17 of 47
3- ER-579
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc584
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 18 of 47
3- ER-580
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc585
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 19 of 47
3- ER-581
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc586
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 20 of 47
3- ER-582
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc587
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 21 of 47
3- ER-583
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc588
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 22 of 47
3- ER-584
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc589
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 23 of 47
3- ER-585
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc590
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 24 of 47
3- ER-586
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc591
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 25 of 47
3- ER-587
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc592
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 26 of 47
3- ER-588
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc593
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 27 of 47
3- ER-589
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc594
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 28 of 47
3- ER-590
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc595
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 29 of 47
3- ER-591
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc596
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 30 of 47
3- ER-592
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc597
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 31 of 47
3- ER-593
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc598
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 32 of 47
3- ER-594
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc599
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 33 of 47
3- ER-595
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc600
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 34 of 47
3- ER-596
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc601
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 35 of 47
3- ER-597
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc602
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 36 of 47
3- ER-598
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc603
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 37 of 47
3- ER-599
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc604
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 38 of 47
3- ER-600
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc605
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 39 of 47
3- ER-601
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc606
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 40 of 47
3- ER-602
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc607
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 41 of 47
3- ER-603
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc608
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 42 of 47
3- ER-604
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc609
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 43 of 47
3- ER-605
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc610
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 44 of 47
3- ER-606
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc611
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 45 of 47
3- ER-607
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc612
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 46 of 47
3- ER-608
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc613
2, Page 5-4 of Pg.
710 47 of 47
3- ER-609
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc614
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 1 of 31
3- ER-610
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc615
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 2 of 31
3- ER-611
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc616
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 3 of 31
3- ER-612
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc617
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 4 of 31
3- ER-613
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc618
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 5 of 31
3- ER-614
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc619
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 6 of 31
3- ER-615
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc620
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 7 of 31
3- ER-616
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc621
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 8 of 31
3- ER-617
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc622
2, Page 5-5of 710
Pg. 9 of 31
3- ER-618
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc623
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 10 of 31
3- ER-619
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc624
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 11 of 31
3- ER-620
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc625
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 12 of 31
3- ER-621
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc626
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 13 of 31
3- ER-622
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc627
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 14 of 31
3- ER-623
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc628
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 15 of 31
3- ER-624
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc629
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 16 of 31
3- ER-625
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc630
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 17 of 31
3- ER-626
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc631
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 18 of 31
3- ER-627
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc632
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 19 of 31
3- ER-628
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc633
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 20 of 31
3- ER-629
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc634
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 21 of 31
3- ER-630
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc635
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 22 of 31
3- ER-631
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc636
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 23 of 31
3- ER-632
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc637
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 24 of 31
3- ER-633
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc638
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 25 of 31
3- ER-634
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc639
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 26 of 31
3- ER-635
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc640
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 27 of 31
3- ER-636
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc641
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 28 of 31
3- ER-637
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc642
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 29 of 31
3- ER-638
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc643
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 30 of 31
3- ER-639
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc644
2, Page 5-5 of Pg.
710 31 of 31
3- ER-640
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc645
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 1 of 66
3- ER-641
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc646
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 2 of 66
3- ER-642
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc647
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 3 of 66
3- ER-643
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc648
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 4 of 66
3- ER-644
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc649
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 5 of 66
3- ER-645
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc650
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 6 of 66
3- ER-646
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc651
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 7 of 66
3- ER-647
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc652
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 8 of 66
3- ER-648
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
10/02/2023, Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc653
2, Page 5-6of 710
Pg. 9 of 66
3- ER-649
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc654
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 10 of 66
3- ER-650
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc655
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 11 of 66
3- ER-651
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc656
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 12 of 66
3- ER-652
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc657
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 13 of 66
3- ER-653
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc658
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 14 of 66
3- ER-654
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc659
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 15 of 66
3- ER-655
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc660
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 16 of 66
3- ER-656
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc661
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 17 of 66
3- ER-657
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc662
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 18 of 66
3- ER-658
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc663
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 19 of 66
3- ER-659
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc664
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 20 of 66
3- ER-660
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc665
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 21 of 66
3- ER-661
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc666
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 22 of 66
3- ER-662
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc667
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 23 of 66
3- ER-663
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc668
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 24 of 66
3- ER-664
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc669
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 25 of 66
3- ER-665
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc670
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 26 of 66
3- ER-666
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc671
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 27 of 66
3- ER-667
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc672
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 28 of 66
3- ER-668
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc673
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 29 of 66
3- ER-669
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc674
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 30 of 66
3- ER-670
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc675
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 31 of 66
3- ER-671
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc676
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 32 of 66
3- ER-672
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc677
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 33 of 66
3- ER-673
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc678
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 34 of 66
3- ER-674
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc679
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 35 of 66
3- ER-675
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc680
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 36 of 66
3- ER-676
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc681
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 37 of 66
3- ER-677
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc682
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 38 of 66
3- ER-678
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc683
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 39 of 66
3- ER-679
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc684
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 40 of 66
3- ER-680
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc685
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 41 of 66
3- ER-681
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc686
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 42 of 66
3- ER-682
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc687
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 43 of 66
3- ER-683
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc688
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 44 of 66
3- ER-684
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc689
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 45 of 66
3- ER-685
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc690
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 46 of 66
3- ER-686
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc691
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 47 of 66
3- ER-687
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc692
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 48 of 66
3- ER-688
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc693
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 49 of 66
3- ER-689
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc694
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 50 of 66
3- ER-690
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc695
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 51 of 66
3- ER-691
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc696
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 52 of 66
3- ER-692
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc697
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 53 of 66
3- ER-693
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc698
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 54 of 66
3- ER-694
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc699
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 55 of 66
3- ER-695
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc700
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 56 of 66
3- ER-696
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc701
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 57 of 66
3- ER-697
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc702
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 58 of 66
3- ER-698
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc703
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 59 of 66
3- ER-699
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc704
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 60 of 66
3- ER-700
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc705
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 61 of 66
3- ER-701
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc706
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 62 of 66
3- ER-702
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc707
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 63 of 66
3- ER-703
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc708
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 64 of 66
3- ER-704
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc709
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 65 of 66
3- ER-705
Case 18-90158-CL Filed10/02/2023,
Case: 23-55750, 10/23/18 ID:
Entered 10/24/18
12802062, 14:58:05
DktEntry: Doc710
2, Page 5-6 of Pg.
710 66 of 66
3- ER-706
Hon. Laura S. Taylor – Chief Judge, United States District Court,
Southern District of California
Judge Taylor has served as a United States Bankruptcy Judge for the
Southern District of California since January 2008. She commenced a
seven year term as Chief Judge in October of 2012.
In January 2013, Judge Taylor was appointed to a seven year term on the
Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. In August of 2019, she became
its Chief Judge.
Judge Taylor served as the Conference Chair for the 2012 Ninth Circuit
Judicial Conference and as Program Chair for the 2011 Conference. She
previously served on the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Judges Education
Committee and the Ninth Circuit Pro Se Committee. She also served on
the Federal Judicial Center's Chief Judge Education Committee.
She actively participates in educational programs in the area of bankruptcy law and most recently participated
in programs sponsored by the American College of Bankruptcy, the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Trustees, the San Diego County Bar Association, the San Diego Bankruptcy Forum, and the State Bar of
California. She is an active member of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, and previously served
as Chair and currently serves on the U.S. Trustee Liaison Committee. She also is a Master in the Louis M.
Welsh Inn of the American Inns of Court.
In March 2019, Judge Taylor was inducted as a Fellow of the American College of Bankruptcy.
From 1983 – 1995 and from 1998 to 2007, Judge Taylor was an associate and partner at Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton LLP where she practiced in the Finance and Bankruptcy practice group. For most of her
career she was resident in the San Diego office. From June 2005 to November 2007, she served as the San
Diego office’s Administrative Partner.
From January 1995 to February 1998, Judge Taylor practiced pro bono law. She was the founder of the San
Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program’s Special Education Project (the “Project”). The Project provided pro bono
legal services to disabled foster youth and low income families with disabled children. In connection with her
pro bono service, Judge Taylor received the San Diego Bar Association's Public Service Award for 1996, the San
Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program's Attorney of the Year Award for 1997, and the State Bar President's Pro Bono
Service Award for 1997.
Judge Taylor received her B.A. with Highest Honors from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
and her J.D. with Honors from Duke University. Judge Taylor is married to the Honorable Timothy B. Taylor,
Judge of the Superior Court of the State of California.
Source: https://extendedstudies.ucsd.edu/getattachment/Courses/EVNT/EVNT-70045/Hon-Laura-S-Taylor-Bio.pdf.aspx
11/28/23, 4:08 AM The Hon. Christopher B. Latham Becomes Chief Bankruptcy Judge
FBA, San Diego Chapter Dec 7, 2021 5 min read
The Hon. Christopher B. Latham Becomes Chief

Bankruptcy Judge
The U.S. District Court for the Southern

District of California has appointed the Honorable
Christopher B. Latham as Chief Bankruptcy Judge
for a seven-year term effective November 1, 2021.
In this role, Judge Latham is responsible for
ensuring the Bankruptcy Court’s rules are
observed and that its business “is handled
effectively and expeditiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 154(b).
Judge Latham takes over the Chief Judge

duties from the Honorable Margaret M. Mann.
Judge Mann had served as Chief Judge since
October 1, 2019. During her term, she guided the
Bankruptcy Court through the challenges posed
by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court
implemented guidelines for mandatory telephonic
hearings, temporarily suspended “wet signature”
requirements, and made other changes to safely
continue its operations throughout the pandemic.
Judge Mann also oversaw the Bankruptcy Court’s
selection of a new Clerk of Court: Michael
Hon. Christopher B. Latham
Williams.
“Being a Chief Judge during the past two tumultuous years has been a privilege because of the support
of my colleagues, our Clerk of Court Michael Williams, and our court family,” Judge Mann said in a statement.
“I know Judge Latham will be a great leader for our Court in the future.” Judge Mann will remain a
Bankruptcy Judge, with her current term set to expire in 2024.
Introducing Chief Bankruptcy Judge Latham

Judge Latham is a Southern California native who received his bachelor’s degree from the University of
California, Irvine. He later earned a master’s in anthropology from Yale University and graduated from Yale
https://www.fbasd.org/post/the-hon-christopher-b-latham-becomes-chief-bankruptcy-judge 1/3
Law School.
Judge Latham started his legal career as a law clerk for the Hon. Earl B. Gilliam, U.S. District Judge for
the Southern District of California. He then entered practice with Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP. After
fourteen years at the firm, Judge Latham joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of
California. As an Assistant U.S. Attorney, he oversaw criminal bankruptcy fraud prosecutions and handled a
variety of civil matters, including bankruptcy, tax, eminent domain, and mortgage fraud cases. Judge Latham
also served on the San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program’s Board of Directors and regularly performed pro
bono service. He was appointed as a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge on October 1, 2012 – filling a vacancy left by
Judge Peter W. Bowie. The San Diego Chapter had the opportunity to ask Judge Latham about being a
Bankruptcy Judge and his background.
Judge Latham, how did you first become interested in bankruptcy law?
I actually started my career as a bankruptcy lawyer, after a judicial clerkship in our district court. When
I was a summer associate in 1991 there were strong signs of a recession brewing following the First Gulf
War. So I was plainly told to take a bankruptcy course in law school and be prepared to join the firm in that
department. I loved the class, and also enjoyed practicing bankruptcy law as a young attorney. After the
economy picked up again, I ultimately switched to commercial litigation. Then when I went to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office some years later, I had the chance to work on bankruptcy cases there. They were very
interesting matters to be handling, representing the government’s interests. In connection with that work, I
was also invited to take on criminal bankruptcy fraud cases. And that was really fascinating as well.
What is your favorite part about being a Bankruptcy Judge?
Well first, I absolutely love being a bankruptcy judge. It is a true honor to serve in this role. My fellow
judges are brilliant and a joy to be around. As for the work itself, I enjoy the law and motion practice, as well
as the numerous trials we have. It’s also wonderful working with law clerks. I hire a new one each year, and
view that as an important way to help the formation of attorneys in the profession. More generally,
bankruptcy is just a very gratifying area to be a jurist in. When you think about it, most all interested parties
are expected to come out better because of the bankruptcy. A debtor with a discharge obviously does.
Unsecured creditors as a group end up sharing more equitably in any distribution available to them. And
seeing businesses get back on their feet to continue their economic activity and employment of people is
particularly satisfying. Happy things don’t always occur in court, but much of the time the chances of such
an outcome are higher in bankruptcy than in other practice areas, I think.
What makes a successful advocate in bankruptcy court?
I would say that successful advocates in bankruptcy practice are those who understand and maintain
the right balance between zeal and achieving the client’s ends in the most reasonable way. Good attorneys
are typically civil and reliable. They never mislead or exaggerate to the court. I like to be able to rely on what
counsel tell me. But the trust is easily lost if their assertions don’t accord with reality. Most every bankruptcy
case involves – in one way or another – insufficient funds. This means that efficiency and a spirit of
compromise are key and highly valued in a bankruptcy practitioner. The most wasteful cases are those that
have some emotional or psychological motivation in the background. That can lead parties, and so their
counsel, to pursue ends that don’t always make economic sense. And this in turn can frequently result in
waste, inefficiency, and less to go around for everyone.
What qualities do you look for in law clerk applicants?
Working with law clerks – mentoring and training them – is one of the great joys of my position. I look
for individuals who have done well in law school, top 25% at least, and who can write well. I also require
some type of academic journal work. It doesn’t have to be the main law review, but they need to have that
experience. It’s just invaluable for training their attention to detail in writing as well as mastering the
Bluebook format. Also, I want to see that they have some real interest in the subject area. I don’t always
require a bankruptcy course during law school, but I need to see the affirmative reason why they’re seeking a
bankruptcy clerkship as opposed to another type. Even then, many of them are surprised to hear how
essentially all of the federal civil practice is replicated in bankruptcy through adversary proceedings. So
while it sounds like a narrow experience, in fact it’s quite broad-based.
Anything else interesting in your background that you would like to share?
I will just share that before law school, I was a graduate student in anthropology. I was working my way
toward a Ph.D. with a focus on modes of subsistence (mostly to do with agriculture) in the Pacific Islands.
There came a point when I realized I was perhaps not cut out for that field after all, and so I returned to my
earlier plan of becoming a lawyer. I ended with a master’s degree, and I’m happy I did!
11/28/23, 4:30 AM Senate Confirms Todd W. Robinson to the Southern District
FBA, San Diego Chapter Sep 16, 2020 2 min read
Senate Confirms Todd W. Robinson to the Southern

District
Updated: Feb 22, 2021
On September 16, 2020, the U.S. Senate confirmed Assistant U.S. Attorney Todd W. Robinson as a U.S. District
Judge for the Southern District of California. Robinson fills the seat formerly held by Judge Marilyn L. Huff,
who took senior status in September 2016.
Born in Jacksonville, Florida, Robinson received his B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1989.
While at U.C. Berkeley, Robinson was the Captain of the Varsity Swimming Team and an NCAA Division I
Swimming All-American (1989).
Robinson later received his J.D., with honors, from Georgetown University Law Center in 1993. During law
school, Robinson participated in a clinical program with the Office of the State’s Attorney in Annapolis,
Maryland. Under the supervision of an Assistant State’s Attorney, Robinson tried six jury trials and
approximately twenty misdemeanor bench trials.
After law school, Robinson began a long career as a federal prosecutor. From 1993 to 1997, he served as a
Trial Attorney for the Department of Justice’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section in Washington, D.C. In
1997, he joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California as an Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Robinson briefly left the Department of Justice to work as an Operations Officer for the Central Intelligence
Agency in 2004. He returned to the Southern District’s U.S. Attorney’s Office in 2005, where he remained
until his confirmation.
As a federal prosecutor, Robinson tried approximately forty felony cases to verdict. Many of those cases
involved multiple defendants and several weeks of trial. His professional honors include a Director’s Award
for Superior Performance by a Litigation Team from the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (2017); a Director’s
Award for Superior Performance as an Assistant U.S. Attorney from the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys
(2011); and Commendation Letters from FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III for investigations that led to
charges and successful prosecutions (2003, 2008, 2011).
Robinson will be the Southern District’s first new District Judge since Judge Cynthia Bashant took the bench
in May 2014. The Southern District still has several vacancies, and four nominations are pending before the
Senate.
https://www.fbasd.org/post/senate-confirms-todd-w-robinson-to-the-southern-district 1/1
Joel C. Golden, Esq. (State Bar No. #47904)
Golden Law Firm
2356 Moore Street, Suite 201
San Diego, CA 92110 F LEClerk of MI Sypivid. Pp,
Phone: (619) 294-7919

4 Fax: (619) 296-8229 JUN 21 2018
Attorney for Plaintiff CARLTON ROARK
6 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

7 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO — CENTRAL DIVISION
8
CARLTON ROARK, an Individual, Case No.: 37-2018-00016182 CU-WT-
9
CTL
10 Plaintiff,
V. PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED
11 COMPLAINT FOR:
NORTH ISLAND FINANCIAL CREDIT I. DISCRIMINATION ON THE
12 UNION ("NIFCU"), a California BASIS OF AGE IN VIOLATION
corporation, a division of California Credit OF CALIFORNIA
13 Union, a California corporation; and GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 12940(a);
14
CALIFORNIA CREDIT UNION ("CCU"), 2. DISCRIMINATION ON THE
15 a California corporation, WHICH BASIS OF RELIGIOUS
MERGED WITH NIFCU AND AFFILIATION IN VIOLATION
16 ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND OF CALIFORNIA
LIABILITIES; and GOVERNMENT CODE
17 SECTION 12940(a);
3. RETALIATION FOR
18 STEVE O'CONNELL, an individual, and COMPLAINTS OF AGE AND
in his capacity as Chief Executive Officer; SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
19 and AND HARASSMENT IN
VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA
20 JEFF STONE, in his capacity as Board GOVERNMENT CODE
21 Member; and SECTION 12940(h);
4. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
22 DOES 1 through 30 inclusive VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY;
23 Defendants. 5. WHISTLEBLOWER
24 RETALIATION IN VIOLATION
OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
-)5 SECTION 1102.5(d);
6. UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT
26 BASED UPON AGE IN
)7
-
GOVERNMENT CODE
28 SECTION 12940(h);
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

— —
1 7. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
2 GOVERNMENT CODE
SECTION 12940(h); AND
3
8. FAILURE TO TAKE STEPS TO
4 STOP DISCRIMINATION AND
HARASSMENT VIOLATION OF
5 CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
CODE 12940(k).
6
7 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ON
ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
8 COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF, alleging against Defendants as follows:
9
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
10
1. Plaintiff, CARLTON ROARK, (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Roark") is a natural person who
11
is, and at all relevant times was, a resident of San Diego County, State of California.
12
13 2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, NORTH ISLAND
14 FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION ("NIFCU") is a corporation incorporated in and doing

15 business within the State of California, county of San Diego.
16
3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that on February, 8, 2017 NIFCU
17
merged with California Credit Union ("CCU"), a California corporation doing business
18
19 within the State of California, county of Los Angeles and that NIFCU now operates in San
20 Diego County as a division of CCU. As a result of said merger, CCU became subject to all o
21 the debts, liabilities and obligations of NIFCU in the same manner as if incurred by CCU as
22
so stated in the Plan of Merger, marked as "Exhibit A" and attached hereto, agreed to by
23
NIFCU and CCU.
24
25 4. Defendant, STEVE O'CONNELL, ("O'Connell") is a natural person who is, and at all
26 relevant times was, a resident San Diego County, State of California and an employee and
27 officer of NIFCU at all times acting within the scope of his employment.
28

1 5. Defendant, JEFF STONE, ( "Stone") is a natural person who is, and at all relevant times was
2 a resident of San Diego County, State of California and member of the Board of Directors of
3 NIFCU, acting within the scope of his employment.
4 6. The true names and capacities of Defendant DOES 1 thru 30 inclusive, whether corporate,
5
associate, individual, partnership or otherwise who directly or indirectly, have willfully
6
7 conspired, and/or are continuing to willfully conspire, to aid and abet or conceal the unlawful
8 practices alleged herein are unknown to Plaintiff and Plaintiff therefore pursuant to section
9 474 of the Code of Civil Procedure, sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff
10
will seek from the court leave to amend this Complaint to identify them when their true
11
names and capacities have been ascertained.
12
13 7. The tortious acts and omissions alleged herein were performed by Defendant O'Connell,
14 certain NIFCU employees and members of management, with the knowledge and approval o
15 certain NIFCU Board members and Stone in particular, who willfully allowed, condoned
16
and/or rewarded those engaging in such unlawful practices with total disregard for the law
17
causing harmful consequences to Plaintiff and others. Moreover, CEO O'Connell engaged in
18
the persistent practice of inappropriate fraternization with certain N1FCU employees for the
19
20 sole purpose of securing quid pro quo alibis and false testimony to conceal his unlawful
21 behavior in return for his promises for their career advancement.

22
8. Plaintiff also timely filed his charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
23
and on August 8, 2017 and was issued a "Right to Sue" letter by the California Department
24
of Fair Employment and HOusing ("DFEH") and this action is timely filed.
25
26 9. Defendants were/are aware of the unlawful employment practices engaged in by O'Connell,
27 who, at all relevant times, was CEO of NIFCU, and who is now CEO of CCU, the parent
28

-3-
1 company that NIFCU now operates in San Diego as a division of CCU. O'Connell was the
2 former COO of CCU.

3 10. On August 17, 2012, several years after NIFCU's unsuccessful attempt to hire Plaintiff away
4
from San Diego County Credit Union ("SDCCU") years earlier in 2005, an act that angered
5
SDCCU's CEO at the time, NIFCU learned that Plaintiff had been laid off from SDCCU
6
with others and was available for employment. For the next six weeks NIFCU's Chief Credit
7
8 Officer at the time, Jeff Stone ("Stone"), and Robert Reck ("Reck"), head of NIFCU's
9 Business Services department, met and corresponded with Plaintiff to secure a commitment
10
from him to choose NIFCU over other job offers Plaintiff was considering.
11
12 11. Stone and Reck offered Plaintiff temporary employment on October 5, 2012 with the promis
of full employment if he could originate $6,000,000 in commercial real estate loans within
13
14 six months. Plaintiff doubled that goal in almost half the time. As a result, Plaintiff was hired
15 on as a full time employee by NIFCU after only three months, on January 5 th 2013, and
16
shortly thereafter given the title of Vice President. Plaintiff was offered temporary
17
employment with NIFCU because of NIFCU's hiring freeze at the time and to prevent
18
Plaintiff from accepting any competing job offers elsewhere.
19
20 12. Within the first few weeks of his employment at NIFCU Plaintiff began to witness first and
21 secondhand accounts of age discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, religious

22 discrimination, suspicions of NIFCU wrongdoing, and retaliation on an alarmingly frequent
23
basis. The primary offenders, making these comments and engaging in these discriminatory
24
acts, which were offensive to Plaintiff, were CEO O'Connell and Angela Brill ("Brill"),
25
26 O'Connell's compliance clerk, and others which acts continued to increase unabatedly
27 creating a hostile work environment which adversely affected the terms and conditions of
28

1 Plaintiffs employment, finally resulting in his termination. The lingering effects of the
2 discrimination, harassment and retaliation continue to the present day.

3
13. Soon after hiring on at NIFCU in late 2012, Defendants learned that Plaintiffs separation
4
agreement with SDCCU prohibited him from raising any allegations of wrongdoing by
5
SDCCU, so NIFCU management raised the issue themselves by telling Plaintiff it was
6
7 communicating with Rita Winton of Grossmont Schools Federal Credit Union about web
8 sites alleging wrongdoing by SDCCU. During this time, Plaintiff also learned that NIFCU
9 management had previously inspected the books, records and loan files of SDCCU in 2011-
10
2012 that immediately thereafter became the subject of anonymous allegations accusing
11
SDCCU of wrongdoing.
12
13 14. A few months later into his employment at NIFCU, Plaintiff learned that Scott Norris
14 ("Norris"), the son-in-law of a NIFCU Board member working at SDCCU, had been raising
15 concerns about SDCCU'S wrongdoing since 2010 and was frustrated that his concerns were
16
ignored. Norris was terminated from SDCCU in May of 2013 and subsequently filed a
17
lawsuit in October of 2013 (San Diego Superior Court, Case Number: 37-2013-00072781-
18
CU-WT-CTL) based upon his termination which he claimed was in retaliation for reporting
19
20 SDCCU'S wrongdoing as a whistleblower in violation of California Labor Code 1102.5.
21 However, not only were the allegations in the Norris lawsuit similar to many of the
22
anonymous allegations of SDCCU wrongdoing NIFCU was corresponding with others about,
23
but near the bottom of page 5 in the Complaint, Norris stated it was an unnamed credit union,
24
possibly NIF CU, who was reporting SDCCU for wrongdoing. When SDCCU filed suit over
25
26 the anonymous allegations, NIFCU designated the deposition testimony of Scott Norris, and
27
28

-5-
1 NIFCU management as confidential which had the desired effect of further concealing facts
2 implicating NIFCU in this Complaint.

3 15. Below is a listing of just some of the many incidents by NIFCU involving, and/or
4
demonstrating the propensity for, continuing violations of State and Federal employment
5
laws related to age discrimination and harassment, unlawful retaliation, and sexual
6
7 harassment without all the context and detailed background information.
8 16. Soon after October, 2012, when O'Connell was hired by NIFCU as its new CEO in the same
9 week Plaintiff was hired, O'Connell entered Richard Hubeny's ("Hubeny") office in the
10
Member Business Lending (MBL) department to introduce himself and immediately began
11
to engage in offensive and lewd discussions that included talk about females and their
12
13 appearance at work, sex and sexual acts by O'Connell with men and women. When Hubeny
14 asked O'Connell how he was able to land the CEO position at NIFCU, CEO O'Connell's
15 shocking response was "I'm great at sucking cock and eating pussy" referring to the male
16
and female members of the NIFCU Board whom he had just made disparaging comments
17
about minutes earlier. In addition to Plaintiff personally hearing these comments, they were
18
subsequently communicated to Plaintiff by Reck who said the comments had also been
19
20 communicated to him, after it happened, by someone else present in the room at the time wh
21 Plaintiff believes was either Hubeny or Gil Espino, another employee. O'Connell's behavior
22
and comments offended Plaintiff and created a hostile work environment, characterized by
23
sexual harassment, which continued until shortly before Plaintiff's employment was
24
25 terminated in August, 2016.
26 17. Late 2012 through mid-20I3 at O'Connell's first Board meeting at NIFCU'S Santee branch,
27 CEO O'Connell repeatedly expressed concerns to Plaintiff about "older retired" NIFCU
28

-6-
members "who have nothing better to do who might show up and ask him questions" but was
2 relieved that only a handful showed up for probably just "the free treats" and was surprised
3 that retired Board member, Al George, "could even operate a smart phone at his age".
4
Plaintiff, who was over the age of forty and offended by it, has heard numerous similar ageist
5
comments from O'Connell continually up to the date Plaintiff was terminated in August,
6
7 2016.
8 18. A very short time into Plaintiff's employment at NIFCU, January 2013, SDCCU had gone
9 public about the financial improprieties alleged by anonymous others whose timing and
10
content were later learned to be similar to the allegations of Norris.
11
12 19. Also during this same time period there were communications, including those between
NIFCU management (Reck) and Rita Winton of Grossmont Schools Federal Credit Union
13
14 about web sites alleging fraud by SDCCU that were communicated to, and discussed with,
15 Plaintiff. These communications prompted Plaintiff to Google search and visit those web
16
sites including the County Recorder to which one of the sites referred. When asked by
17
O'Connell about the allegations of SDCCU wrongdoing made by Norris, months later,
18
Plaintiff acknowledged the truthfulness of some of the allegations, but was admonished to
19
20 keep quiet and was later made a scapegoat for the allegations and retaliated against, in
21 violation of California Labor Code 1102.5(d) prohibiting retaliation for reporting unlawful
22
acts.
23
20. NIFCU management's communications with another credit union about web sites alleging
24
wrongdoing by SDCCU, and prior communications discussed with Plaintiff; prompted
25
26 Plaintiff to search out those sites and the County Recorder records to which one of the sites
27 referred. This was Plaintiff's only connection to the allegations in a lawsuit from SDCCU in
28

-7-
which Plaintiff was named co-defendant with NIFCU in July of 2013. SDCCU was accusing
2 NIFCU, and now also Plaintiff, because of NIFCU's actions, of defaming SDCCU in
3 anonymous emails and online postings alleging wrongdoing. SDCCU also added a claim to
4
allege that information had been misappropriated from SDCCU to unlawfully refinance
5
SDCCU loans because some of its borrowers left SDCCU for NIFCU, a direct competitor
6
7 that had just rebuffed SDCCU's overture to merge.
8 21. Plaintiff did not misappropriate any information from SDCCU to refinance SDCCU loans at
9 NIFCU, and he provided unimpeachable evidence of his innocence in this regard to NIFCU
10
in the form of receipts for mortgage leads he lawfully purchased that included SDCCU
11
borrowers and Internet screen captures confirming where he located public contact
12
13 information for every former SDCCU borrower whose loan was refinanced at NIFCU.
14 22. N1FCU, on the other hand, had set up and was operating an email account off its corporate
15 network to communicate with SDCCU borrowers with instructions from NIFCU

16
management to delete those emails with the knowledge of NIFCU Board member Stone,
17
before and after a Preservation of Evidence Order was issued by the court. Plaintiff has
18
always denied any involvement in the anonymous allegations of wrongdoing by SDCCU and
19
20 to this date no evidence supports Plaintiffs alleged involvement. To the contrary, evidence
21 strongly suggested NIFCU as the source of those anonymous allegations.

22
23. March 8, 2013 — On this date compliance clerk Brill alluded to suspected improprieties in the
23
department where Plaintiff worked at N1FCU and attempted to enlist Plaintiffs support to
24
help make the case for firing the older men heading up the department. She had
25
26 unsuccessfully attempted the same in the past. When Plaintiff refused to comply, Brill then
27 told Plaintiff there are "too many old guys in the department" and that because of Plaintiffs
28

1 hire, the department was now "too top heavy". Brill verbally threatened Plaintiff to keep
2 quiet about her threats by reminding Plaintiff of her influence with the NIFCU Board, as the
3 fiancé of NIFCU Board member and attorney Kit Gardner and her ability to access Plaintiff
4
emails. This demonstrated further evidence of continuing age discrimination and age
5
harassment. Plaintiff sent his supervisor Reck an email of the encounter that was toned-down
6
7 because of Brill's threatened influence and access to his emails and immediately walked
8 down to Reck's office to verbally complain about the matter in greater detail. Reck however
9 was uncomfortable with the topic and Plaintiffs email and told Plaintiff to not discuss or
10
email him about topics like that and instead email them to himself. This violated NIFCU's
11
own complaint policies and procedures. Plaintiff later learned why Reck did not want those
12
emails in his inbox when Plaintiff discovered that Brill was given access to his email
13
14 'complaints about her, a breach of confidentiality, on 7-6-2013 and on 9-3-2014.
15 24. March 14, 2013 & March 19, 2013— As a follow up to Brill's harassment of Plaintiff on
16
March 8, 2013, Brill visited Plaintiff again and made a feeble attempt to challenge Plaintiffs
17
professional competence in an effort to try and make her case about his age because he was
18
19 over forty.
20 25. Early Slily, 2013 —SDCCU served a lawsuit on NIFCU and named Plaintiff as a co-defendant
21 despite the fact that he was not involved in any of the unlawful acts and his only connection
22
was his accessing the County Recorder web site that was prompted by NIFCU management's
23
communications with Plaintiff.
24
25 26. Early to mid-2013 — In one of many closed door office visits always initiated by CEO
26 O'Connell, O'Connell told Plaintiff that as the new incoming CEO and because of NIFCU's
27 low turnover over the years, he was concerned there were too many older long-time
28

1 employees with strong allegiances to the Board to whom he reported. O'Connell also
2 expressed to Plaintiff his concerns that older employees and employees of faith would be
3 most likely to find his management style, characterized by hard drinking and engaging in
4
various indiscretions and lewd behavior objectionable, and said he wanted to work with "coo
5
people" that Plaintiff understood to mean impressionable younger people.
6
7 27. O'Connell's stated motivations for engaging in age discrimination is also corroborated by his
8 clear and provable continuous pattern and practice of terminating, discriminating against, and
9 making disparaging comments about older employees several of whom he demoted and
10
terminated. Plaintiff frequently told Hubeny about O'Connell's ageist and sexist comments
11
because Hubeny requested information about O'Connell's interactions with employees.
12
Hubeny explained that he needed to manage the risks associated with O'Connell's behavior
13
14 because of O'Connell's promise of career advancement to Hubeny and others in return for
15 them "having O'Connell's back".

16
28. To demonstrate his status as O'Connell's closest confidante, Ilubeny often disclosed
17
information to others about O'Connell's unlawful behavior and employment practices.
18
According to Hubeny, and based upon Plaintiff's conversations with O'Connell and others, it
19
20 was also well known that O'Connell had a long history of engaging in grossly improper
21 fraternization with subordinates to secure quid pro quo favors and alibis in return for their
22
career advancement as part of a conspiracy to conceal O'Connell's unlawful employment
23
practices and his continuous lewd behavior. Hubeny engaged in efforts to advance his career
24
by conspiring to help O'Connell conceal unlawful employment practices and influence
25
26 witness' testimony.
27
28

- 10-
1 29. 2013 and afterwards — O'Connell, who continuously engaged in lewd behavior involving
2 comments about heterosexual and homosexual acts, frequently made references that it's time
3 to "go camping", a phrase Plaintiff later learned was urban slang for one who is
4
experimenting with his or her sexual orientation. This explained O'Connell's frequent
5
references in the workplace to heterosexual and homosexual sex acts and his lewd behavior
6
7 and created a hostile work environment which was offensive to Plaintiff.
8 30. Sometime shortly after July 5, 2013, O'Connell invited several NIFCU employees to go
9 drinking at the Karl Strauss brewery in Sorrento Valley after work where O'Connell's
10
proclivity for excessive drinking and inappropriate behavior was first witnessed prompting
11
several of those over the age of fifty to leave early. O'Connell boasted to Plaintiff days later
12
that the "older guys" who left early didn't have any "staying power", a frequent refrain of
13
14 O'Connell's about those over the age of forty.
15 31. Mid 2013 thru 2014 —In closed-door office visits with Plaintiff, O'Connell characterized
16
NIFCU Board Chairman at the time, Rebecca Collier, as a "nosy old busybody who won't
17
stay out of my business" because of her frequent emails and texts to O'Connell. O'Connell
18
described plans to remove her from the Board altogether because as an older woman "she
19
20 was too emotionally attached to the people and the history of NIFCU and can't let go".
21 O'Connell also frequently made continuous crude ageist comments about older Board
22 members and their age-related health issues when discussing his plans to remove them from
23
the Board. On another occasion O'Connell stated to Plaintiff that his secretary, Darlene
24
Banogon, was too old to be useful because she placed a package addressed to him in his
25
26 office without opening it and said he just wanted to get rid of her because of her age and
27
28

-I -
1 appearance but was concerned how it might look to his wife and others if he hired a younger
2 more attractive secretary that he preferred.
3 32.1n 2015 - Reck acknowledged his concern about O'Connell's continuing lewd behavior to
4
Plaintiff after Plaintiff expressed this same concern to Reck. Reck said N1FCU Board
5
member Stone had confided to him that the Board was investigating O'Connell over his lewd
6
7 behavior but was also concerned about the pending merger with CCU. When O'Connell was
8 investigated about his lewd behavior and unlawful employment practices in 2015, O'Connell
9 told Hubeny about the investigation to elicit his support to have his back.
10 33. Hubeny told Plaintiff that to ensure the investigation of O'Connell would not be successful,
11
he was going to reach out to some of the witnesses to sway their testimony. One of those
12
witnesses Hubeny reached out to was Kelli Beck, the former VP of Marketing at NIFCU.
13
14 Beck left the company for SESLOC Federal Credit Union shortly after O'Connell brought
15 Robert O'Grady on board as COO because, Hubeny stated, she was uncomfortable with
16
O'Connell's and O'Grady's behavior and saw no future for herself at NIFCU as a result.
17
Hubeny told Plaintiff that he planned to call Beck and butter her up with the lie that
18
O'Connell missed having her at NIFCU, how highly O'Connell thought of her, and how
19
20 O'Connell wished she hadn't left. This was intended to lead Beck into believing that the door
21 was still open for her to return some day in the future with the hope and expectation that she
22
would reciprocate and not say anything damaging about O'Connell if she were ever
23
questioned by the Board's investigator.
24
25 34. O'Connell's offensive sexist and ageist comments and behavior worsened after Hubeny
26 stated that he and/or O'Connell discovered the Bullpen Bar & Grill at 8199 Clairemont Mesa
27 Blvd, San Diego, CA 92111, next to an all-nude strip club just a few blocks away from the
28

- 12 -
1 NIFCU Administration building, where Hubeny said there were "cheap drinks and cute flirty
2 waitresses". This was a place where O'Connell expected other NIFCU employees to
3 frequently meet him and engage in drunken revelry.
4
35. Following is an abbreviated list of just some of the other events and comments from
5
O'Connell that occurred at the Bullpen Bar and communicated to Plaintiff by Hubeny, and
6
7 those witnessed by Plaintiff in closed-door office visits. These incidents demonstrate
8 O'Connell's propensity to violate, and his continuous violation of, California employment
9 laws prohibiting sexual harassment, age harassment and retaliation. They are specifically
10
alleged below:
11
• Hubeny told Plaintiff that O'Connell received lap dances from barmaids at the Bullpen
12
13 Bar next to a strip club and would then invite other younger male NIFCU employees who
14 observed the lap dances to sniff his knee;

15 Plaintiff heard Hubeny and Brandon Jensen, a co-worker, say they felt compelled to
•
16
reassure their wives that their close calls with drunk driving and bar fights, and their
17
excessive use of Uber and Lyft services because of late night and early morning drunken
18
19 revelry with O'Connell at a bar next to an all-nude strip club, would soon pay off in
20 career advancement which it did;

21 Plaintiff witnessed and was told by Hubeny of lewd comments from O'Connell offering
•
22
to impregnate Hubeny's wife who was undergoing an in-vitro fertilization type of
23
procedure and O'Connell's lewd comments about the activity Hubeny had to engage in a
24
25 the clinic;
26 • O'Connell's acceptance of sexual harassment was also demonstrated in other ways. For
27 example, O'Connell secretly employed, as a consultant, a former C-level IT executive at
28

-13-
1 NIFCU introduced to Plaintiff at O'Connell's home during a Christmas party. Hubeny
2 told Plaintiff that this person had been fired from CCU for allegedly coercing a sexual
3 relationship from an employee that resulted in settlement from CCU. Hubeny said
4
O'Connell wanted that individual at NIFCU because O'Connell said he could count on
5
him to have his back. Hubeny told Plaintiff that this C-level IT executive was being
6
7 employed secretly as a consultant, which that IT executive also alluded to Plaintiff at
8 O'Connell's home during a Christmas party, until certain CCU Board members familiar
9 with that incident could be removed from the Board, after which the IT executive fired
10
from CCU would be brought on board as an employee;
11
• In mid-2014 O'Connell hired Lisa Paul-Hill, a former SDCCU executive who he told
12
13 Plaintiff "didn't look bad for her age" because her disparaging testimony about the CEO
14 of SDCCU would be helpful in the lawsuit from SDCCU. After Ms. Paul-Hill's
15 testimony was obtained, O'Connell fired her, made jokes about her emails pleading for
16
her job back, and described to Plaintiff that the real reason for her termination was to
17
replace her with someone younger, which occurred;
18
19 • Hubeny told Plaintiff that O'Connell had boasted to him that O'Connell could pull off th
20 merger with CCU by exploiting the retirement age of Ron McDaniel, its CEO, and his
21 knowledge of McDaniel's resentment of the CCU Board for previously cutting back his
22
retirement benefit package. Hubeny said that O'Connell was going to accomplish this by
23
getting the NIFCU Board's approval to secretly pay McDaniel $1,000,000 for him to
24
25 convince the CCU Board that merging with NIFCU was in their best interest. Hubeny
26 told Plaintiff that in consideration of that payment McDaniel retired soon after, as he had
27 promised, leaving O'Connell as the surviving CEO of the two merged credit unions;
28

-14-
1 • After hearing Reck refer to Plaintiff as a member of the "God Squad", a frequently used
2 religious epithet, O'Connell began to continually ridicule Plaintiffs unwillingness to

3
engage in drunken revelry and lewd behavior;
4
• Hubeny mentioned to Plaintiff that on several occasions O'Connell complained that Mark
5
Firestone in the IT Department was a "cheap Jew" for not agreeing to occasionally pick
6
7 up the drinking tab;
8 • In approximately 2015, Hubeny divulged to Plaintiff that O'Connell boasted of using the
9 discretion he had with the NIFCU Board to settle complaints about his behavior and did
10
so with Jenny Garcia, who was reportedly paid $50,000 to not file a lawsuit and/or make
11
any disclosure of O'Connell's behavior, a topic openly discussed by others in the MBL
12
13 department;
14 • In late 2015 (and into 2016), Hubeny disclosed to Plaintiff the names of older employees
15 O'Connell had plans to remove to create new opportunities for others under the age of
16
forty. When Plaintiff reminded Hubeny of his age each time, Hubeny reassured Plaintiff
17
that he would be an exception "because of the amount of money you make for the
18
19 company";
20 • In late 2015 (and into 2016), Hubeny disclosed to Plaintiff that O'Connell's new VP,
21
Therese Caballes, learned that O'Connell and other younger male employees seeking
22
career advancement opportunities by engaging in drunken revelry with the CEO were
23
meeting at the Bullpen bar. Hubeny stated that Caballes felt she was missing out on
24
25 important "face time" with the CEO by not being invited and began popping in
26 unannounced. This upset O'Connell given that her presence forced a change in his
27 demeanor and as a result O'Connell was said to have regretted hiring her. Caballes turned
28

- 15 -
I out to be the younger, more attractive, employee who O'Connell previously confided to
2 Plaintiff and others, was the mystery hire he had been working to solicit away from
3 SDCCU as a vengeful act to their CEO for the lawsuit against NIFCU. She replaced
4
Debbie Williams, a long-time NIFCU employee who O'Connell told Plaintiff was "too
5
old";
6
7 • Mid-2014 thru August 2016 — Hubeny divulged to Plaintiff that O'Connell boasted to
8 him of the disrespectful manner in which NIFCU SVP Kevin Carlson was treated in a
9 closed door office meeting and what specifically was said when informed of his
10
termination while NIFCU Board Chairman at the time, Gene Pellerin, was in the room.
11
Hubeny further stated that O'Connell bragged about his ability to undermine the NIFCU
12
13 Board's investigation of him, with Hubeny's assistance, following Kevin Carlson's
14 complaint about O'Connell's lewd and unlawful behavior;

15 August 23, 2016- Three and a half weeks after his last deposition on NIFCU's behalf in
•
16
the SDCCU v. NIFCU lawsuit, Plaintiff was terminated, without notice, good cause or
17
severance pay, due to his age and in retaliation as a whistleblower for his reports of
18
19 discrimination and harassment. NIFCU agreed to settle with SDCCU for a significant
20 amount on the appropriations claim by SDCCU (i.e. for refinancing SDCCU borrowers a
21 NIFCU) after reportedly being sanctioned by the court, and then maliciously excluded
22
Plaintiff from its settlement for the defamation claim after allowing its attorneys to make
23
material false statements to the court to prejudice the court into issuing sanctions and
24
25 levying a judgment against Plaintiff. This act by NIFCU was so egregiously malicious
26 that NIFCU's former insurance carrier was compelled to fund Plaintiffs appeal;
27
28

-16-
1 • Defendant's CEO O'Connell also instructed NIFCU employees Hubeny and Reck to tell
2 Plaintiff after he was terminated to not obtain an attorney under the false pretense that
3 NIFCU was considering bringing Plaintiff back. This was a ruse by O'Connell intended
4
to result in Plaintiffs time for filing a Complaint expiring. Only after Plaintiff timely file Ii
5
his EEOC complaint two weeks before his one-year deadline did O'Connell quickly
6
7 endeavor to contact Plaintiff through management and corporate counsel to convince
8 Plaintiff to not file a lawsuit;

9 Following Plaintiff's termination, Reck stated he unsuccessfully appealed to O'Connell
•
10
for Plaintiff's re-hire with a spreadsheet showing that the income Plaintiff personally
11
generated for NIFCU from the $140,000,000 in loans he generated and underwrote, net o
12
13 Plaintiff's salary, benefits, and even the settlement costs that were incurred by NIFCU as
14 a result of NIFCU's own actions, were still far in excess of the income generated by any
15 other employee in the company. This demonstrated that O'Connell's decision to both
16
terminate and not re-hire Plaintiff against even the economic self-interests of NIFCU,
17
was an opportunity cost that O'Connell was willing to have NIFCU incur in order to
18
19 cover up his lewd behavior, age discrimination, unlawful whistleblower retaliation,
20 sexual harassment practices, and other illegal practices;

21 NIFCU's Board, and Stone in particular, were aware of, and knowingly allowed
•
22
O'Connell to conceal his unlawful continual employment practices concerning age and
23
sexual harassment, age discrimination and retaliation and whistleblower retaliation.
24
25 NIFCU's Board, and Stone in particular, were also aware of, and knowingly allowed
26 O'Connell to conceal NIFCU's role and involvement, and that of a NIFCU Board
27 member's son-in-law, in the anonymous allegations of wrongdoing against its competitor
28

-17-
1 SDCCU. NIFCU further concealed its complicity by authorizing its attorneys to make
2 false statements of material facts in court and by designating the deposition testimony of
3 NIFCU management and Norris, its Board member's son-in-law, as confidential which
4
had the desired effect of further concealing facts implicating NIFCU in this Complaint, as
5
opposed to Plaintiff who had nothing to hide with his non-confidential testimony;
6
7 Moreover, the NIFCU Board was not just aware of unlawful employment practices and
8 condoned it, but rewarded those who engaged in it and/or concealed it, with continued
9 employment, promotions, pay raises, conference trips and other awards.
10
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
11
WRONGFUL TERMINATION
12
13 DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF AGE IN VIOLATION OF FEHA
14 AGAINST NIFCU, A DIVISION OF CCU WHICH MERGED WITH NIFCU AND
15 ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES

16
[VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE § 12940(a)]
17
36. All previous allegations set forth in this complaint are re-alleged and incorporated herein by
18
19 reference.
20 37. Defendant NIFCU, acting through its agent Steve O'Connell acting and supervising within
21 the scope of his employment, discriminated against Plaintiff in the terms and conditions of
22
his employment due to his age being over forty by terminating him and other adverse
23
employment acts leading up to his termination. At all times mentioned herein, California
24
Government Code section 12940(a), was in full force and effect and was binding on
25
26 Defendants. This statute prohibits Defendants from discriminating against any employee
27 because he or she is more than forty years old.

28
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES •

-18-
1 38. O'Connell and Brill engaged in continuing ageist motivations, intentions, and actions that
2 had a negative impact on the treatment of employees, including Plaintiff, who were more
3 than forty years of age by creating a hostile work environment that adversely affected the
4
terms and conditions of their employment due to their age.
5
6 39. Within the time required by law, Plaintiff filed a discrimination, a harassment and retaliation
7 complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") dually filed with
8 the DFEH, alleging continual acts of discrimination, harassment and retaliation in full
9 compliance with administrative requirements and was issued a Right to Sue letter by the
10
California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") on August 8, 2017.
11
12 40. Plaintiff believes and on that basis alleges that one of Defendant NIFCU's primary
13 motivations was to have him discharged because of his age being over forty. As a result,
14 Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other
15 employment benefits and has suffered from humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and
16
physical pain and anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life all to his damage in a sum according
17
to proof.
18
19 41. Defendants' acts were intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud in
20 conscious disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights. The statutory elements for
21 punitive damages include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud
22
or malice. See Civil Code § 3294(a).
23
24 42. Malice is defined in the statute as conduct "intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
25
26 conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (1).
27
28
PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

-19-
1 43. Oppression means "despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
2 conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (2).
3 44. Fraud is "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to
4
the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
5
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (3).
6
7 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
8 DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

10
ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES
11
[VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE § 12940(a)]
12
13 45. The allegations set forth in this complaint are re-alleged and incorporated herein by
14 reference.
15 46. Plaintiff and others of similar religious persuasion were called out as being members of "the
16
God Squad" by NIFCU management, a religious epithet that served to make Plaintiff and
17
others vulnerable to those harboring antipathy towards people of faith. As indicated earlier in
18
this complaint, this is precisely what happened after Defendant O'Connell overheard the
19
20 epithet used against Plaintiff and began to question Plaintiffs unwillingness to engage in
21 lewd behavior.
22 47. These acts of discrimination were in violation of FEHA Government Code section 12940(a)
23
that was in full force and effect and binding on Defendants. This statute prohibits Defendants
24
from discriminating against any employee on the basis of religion and faith.
25
26 48. On the basis of the above and numerous other disparaging comments from Defendant
27 O'Connell, acting and supervising within the scope of his employment, about the faith of
28

- 20 -
1 others, Plaintiff believes and alleges that his faith was a substantial motivating reason in
2 Defendant O'Connell's discriminatory and retaliatory practices. These practices affected the
3 terms and conditions of his employment that ultimately contributed to the termination of
4
Plaintiff's employment.
5
49. As a result, Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and
6
7 other employment benefits and has suffered from humiliation, emotional distress, and mental
8 and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.
9 50. Defendants' acts were intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud, as defined
10
below, in conscious disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights. The statutory elements
11
for punitive damages include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
12
13 fraud or malice. See Civil Code § 3294(a).
15 plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
16
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (1).
17
52. Oppression means "despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
18
conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (2).
19
21 the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
22
23
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
24
UNLAWFUL RETALIATION FOR COMPLAINTS OF DISCRIMINATION AND
25
26 HARASSMENT ON THE BASIS OF AGE AND SEX AGAINST NIFCU, A DIVISION
27 OF CCU WHICH MERGED WITH NIFCU AND ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS
28

-21-
1 AND LIABILITIESFIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE §
2 12940(h)]
3
4
reference.
5
55. When Plaintiff complained to Reck, his supervisor, about age and sex harassment and
6
7 discrimination, which affected the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs employment, he was
8 told by his supervisor "that nothing could be done" and to email complaints to himself
9
56. When Plaintiff complained to his supervisor, Reck, about O'Connell's age discrimination
10
and harassment, he was told O'Connell was being investigated by the Board but that the
11
Board was concerned about a pending merger. Soon afterwards, Plaintiff began to suffer
12
13 from unlawful retaliation by being denied pay raises, awards, trips and recognition that
14 NIFCU acknowledged Plaintiff earned and deserved and by being terminated.

15 57. O'Connell, N1FCU management and its Board, also engaged in making false statements of
16
material facts to the court in the SDCCU v. NIFCU lawsuit, creating false evidence and
17
concealing actual evidence to make Plaintiff a scapegoat for anonymous allegations by others
18
19 of wrongdoing by SDCCU.
20 58. As a result of Defendant's retaliation including termination, Plaintiff has sustained and
21 continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits and has
22
suffered from humiliation, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, mental and physical
23
pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.
24
26 below, in conscious disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights. The statutory elements
27
28

- 22 -
1 for punitive damages include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,

4
5
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (1).
6
8 conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c) (2).
10
the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
11
12
13 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
14 WRONGFUL TERMINATION AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY

16
ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES
17
18 63. All previous allegations set forth in this complaint are re-alleged and incorporated herein by
19 reference.
20 64. California has a public policy that all employers are required to deal with their employees
21 fairly and in good faith and not retaliate against them for reporting unlawful acts.
22
65. Defendants breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when they told Plaintiff not
23
to divulge any information about SDCCU'S unlawful acts and when they kept him on as an
24
employee knowing they intended to terminate him without informing him.
25
26 66. As a result of Defendant's breach of good faith and fair dealings and retaliation by
27 terminating him, Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earning
28
PLAINTIFFS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

- 23 -
1 and other employment benefits and has suffered from humiliation, emotional distress, loss of
2 enjoyment of life and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum
3
according to proof.
4
67. The actions of Defendants were done intentionally and in a malicious and oppressive manner
5
in violation of Plaintiffs rights, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages as permitted by
6
7 California Civil Code Section 3294.
8 68. This was a violation of California Labor Code 1102.5(d), a provision for whistleblowers that
9 prohibits any employer from retaliating against an employee for reporting to his employer an
10
act that he in good faith believes to be unlawful.
11
69. As a result of Defendant's retaliation, Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain
12
13 substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits and has suffered from
14 humiliation, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life and mental and physical pain and
15 anguish, all to his damage in a sum according to proof.
16
70. Defendants' acts were intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud, as defined
17
below, in conscious disregard of and in violation of Plaintiff's rights. The statutory elements
18

22
23
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).
24
26 conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(2).
28

- 24 -
2 property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(3).
3 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
4
WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION AGAINST NIFCU, A DIVISION OF CCU WHICH
5
MERGED WITH NIFCU AND ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES
6
7 [VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE SECTION 1102.5(d)]
9
reference.
10
75. As alleged earlier in this Complaint, Defendants named in this Complaint were all aware of
11
the anonymous and non-anonymous allegations of wrongdoing by SDCCU, its merger suitor,
12
13 and Plaintiff disclosed to Defendants that many of those alleged acts of wrongdoing by
14 SDCCU were true.
15 76. Defendants told Plaintiff not to mention those unlawful acts because of the proposed merger.
16
77. Plaintiff was subsequently terminated in retaliation for reporting these unlawful acts to
17
Defendants
18
19 78. Defendants' action in telling Plaintiff to be quiet about the unlawful acts and then terminatin
20 him violated California Labor Code Section 1102.5 which prohibits retaliation against
21 Plaintiff for reporting unlawful acts.
22
79. As a result of Defendant's retaliation, Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain
23
substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits and has suffered from
24
humiliation, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life and mental and physical pain and
25
27
28

- 25 -
2 below, in conscious disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights. The statutory elements
4
fraud or malice. See Civil Code § 3294(a).
5
81. Malice is defined in the statute as conduct "intended by the defendant to cause jury to the
6
8 conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).
9
82. Oppression means "despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
10
conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(2).
11
83. Fraud is "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to
12
15 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
16
UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BASED UPON AGE
17
AGAINST DEFENDANT O'CONNELL AND
18
19 NIFCU, A DIVISION OF CCU WHICH MERGED WITH NIFCU AND ASSUMED ALL
20 NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES

21 [VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE 12940(j)(1)]
22
23
reference.
24
25 85. California Government Code Section 12940(j)(1) is applicable to Defendant O'Connell and i
26 prohibits harassment in the workplace of individuals over the age of forty because of their
27 age.
28

- 26 -
86. From the time Plaintiff began working for Defendant NIFCU in 2012, its CEO, Steve
2 O'Connell , made derogatory sexual and ageist comments to Plaintiff about Plaintiffs age
3 and other older workers which comments were severe and pervasive and persisted for about
4
four years.
5
6 87. O'Connell's comments offended Plaintiff and adversely affected the terms and conditions of
7 Plaintiffs employment as the comments and O'Connell's discriminatory actions against
8 employees over the age of forty created a hostile work environment for which Defendant
9 N1FCU is vicariously liable along with Defendant O'Connell.
10
88. As a result of Defendant O'Connell's age harassment, Plaintiff has sustained and continues t
11
sustain substantial losses of earnings and other employment benefits and has suffered from
12
13 humiliation, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, mental and physical pain and
15 89. The statutory elements for punitive damages include allegations that the defendant has been
16
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. See Civil Code § 3294(a). Defendants' acts were
17
intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud, as defined below, in conscious
18
19 disregard of and in violation of Plaintiff's rights.
20 90. Malice is defined in the statute as conduct "intended by the defendant to cause jury to the
22
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(I).
23
conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(2).

25
28

- 27 -
2 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

3 SEXUAL HARASSMENT
4
AGAINST STEVE O'CONNELL AND NIFCU A DIVISION OF CCU WHICH MERGED
5
WITH NIFCU AND ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES
6
7 [VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 12940(a)]
9 Reference.
10
94. California Government Code Section 12940(a) is applicable to Defendant O'Connell and it
11
prohibits harassment in the workplace of individuals who may be offended by sexual
12
13 comments and conduct.
14 95. From the time Plaintiff began working for Defendant NIFCU in 2012, its CEO Steve
15 O'Connell and Plaintiffs supervisor, continually made derogatory sexual comments to
16
Plaintiff and/or in his presence.
17
18 96. O'Connell's comments offended Plaintiff and adversely affected the terms and conditions of
Plaintiffs employment as the comments, whether heard directly by Plaintiff or told to him by
19
20 others, created a hostile work environment which adversely affected Plaintiffs terms and
21 conditions of employment for which Defendant NIFCU is vicariously liable along with
22
Defendant O'Connell.
23
24 97. As a result of Defendant O'Connell's inappropriate and crude sexual comments and actions
Plaintiff has sustained and continues to sustain substantial losses of earnings and other
25
26 employment benefits and has suffered from humiliation, emotional distress, loss of
27
28

- 28 -
1 enjoyment of life, mental and physical pain and anguish, all to his damage in a sum
2 according to proof.
3 98. The statutory elements for punitive damages include allegations that the defendant has been
4
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. See Civil Code § 3294(a). Defendants' acts were
5
intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud, as defined below, in conscious
6
7 disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights
10
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).
11
12 100. Oppression means "despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship
13 in conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(2).
14 101. Fraud is "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact
15 known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a
16
person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(3).
17
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
18
AGAINST NIFCU, A DIVISION OF CCU WHICH MERGED WITH NIFCU AND
19
20 ASSUMED ALL NIFCU'S DEBTS AND LIABILITIES, AND JEFF STONE IN HIS
21 CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS,

22
FAILURE TO TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION AND
23
HARASSMENT FROM OCCURRING
24
[VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 12940(k)]
25
26 102. All previous allegations set forth in this complaint are re-alleged and incorporated herein
27 by Reference.
28

- 29 -
1 103. California Government Code Section 12940(k) is applicable to Defendant NIFCU and
2 mandates that an employer such as N1FCU is required to take all reasonable steps necessary
3 to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring in the workplace.
4
104. Plaintiff complained numerous times about the derogatory comments about individuals
5
over the age of forty and crude sexual comments made by Defendant Steve O'Connell and
6
7 others but no action was taken by NIFCU supervisors to take steps to stop these comments
8 and conduct.
9 The comments and harassment was continuous and that combined with supervisors
105.
10
refusing to take appropriate action to stop it created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff
11
which adversely affected the terms and conditions of his employment.
12
13 106. The statutory elements for punitive damages include allegations that the defendant has
14 been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. See Civil Code § 3294(a). Defendants' acts were
15 intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud, as defined below, in conscious
16
disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights
17
107. Malice is defined in the statute as conduct "intended by the defendant to cause injury to
18
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
19
20 conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).
21 108. Oppression means "despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship
22
in conscious disregard of that person's rights." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(2).
23
109. Fraud is "an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact
24
known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a
25
26 person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." See Civil Code § 3294(c)(3).
27
28

- 30 -
1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for the following relief against Defendants
3
1. For compensatory damages in an amount according to proof;
4
2. For past and future lost wages and benefits and impairment of future earnings;
5
3. For mental and emotional distress in an amount according to proof;
6
7 4. For costs of suit, including attorneys' fees, as permitted by law, including those permitted
8 by Government Code Section 12965(b);

9
5. Punitive damages in an amount the court deems appropriate because Defendants' acts
10
were intentionally committed with malice, oppression and fraud, as previously alleged, in
11
conscious disregard of and in violation of Plaintiffs rights;
12
13 6. Any and all other relief as the court deems appropriate.
14
Dated: June 17, 2018
15
16 /s/Joel C. 6oldevi
Joel C. Golden, Esq.
17 Attorney for Plaintiff
CARLTON ROARK
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 JUN 21 '18 Pti12;21
26
27
28

-31-
EXHIBIT A
A0193892
015(4G970 svev •
FILED :Nut
Secretary of State
State of California
PLAN OF MERGER OF
NORTH ISLAND FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION INTO 455, FEB 1 3 20170
CALIFORNIA CREDIT UNION
This Plan of Merger is agreed to between California Credit Union, a California state-chartered
credit union, the continuing/surviving credit union ("Surviving Credit Union"), and North Island
Financial Credit Union, a California state-chartered credit union, the merging/disappearing credit
union ("Disappearing Credit Union"). The parties agree as follows:
I. Disappearing Credit Union shall merge with and into Surviving Credit Union.
2. Each membership in the Disappearing Credit Union shall be converted into a membership
in the Surviving Credit Union. Each membership in the Surviving Credit Union shall
remain a membership in the Surviving Credit Union.
3. The following amendment to the bylaws of the Surviving Credit Union shall be effected by
the filing of this Plan of Merger:
Section 300 of the bylaws of the Surviving Credit Union ("Field of Membership") is
amended as provided in Attachment "A." Such change shall be effected by the filing of
this Plan of Merger.
immediately prior to
4. The articles of incorporation of the Surviving Credit Union, as in effect
the effective date of the merger, shall remain the articles of incorporation of the Surviving
Credit Union.
5. The Board of Directors of Surviving Credit Union shall be made up of six (6) members of the
Surviving Credit Union and seven (7) members of the current Board of Directors of the
Disappearing Credit Union after the merger. The Supervisory Committee of Surviving
Credit Union shall be made up of six (6) members of the Supervisory Committee of
Surviving Credit Union and three (3) member of the current Supervisory Committee of
Disappearing Credit Union after the merger. The President/CEO of the Surviving Credit
Union will be the Disappearing Credit Union's current President/CEO, Mr. Stephen
O'Connell. The parties intend to retain the majority of the existing management and staff of
both credit unions at the Surviving Credit Union following the merger date.
6. There will be no adjustment in shares due to thc fact that after all one-time merger costs
(including early contract termination fees, related cancellations/buyouts, prepaid expenses,
and depreciation) as well as accounting for the combined Surviving Credit Union's extensive
infrastructure, product offerings, and online and mobile technology, are accounted for the
difference between the credit unions' probable asset share ratios will not be material, or
otherwise will not result in the combined continuing credit union having a larger ratio.
Moreover, members of the Surviving Credit Union will be able to receive additional products
and services resulting from the combined Surviving Credit Union.
Page I of 3
24114 030V3 Plan of Merger Alt B Clean
eaJ
A01938” .
7. Upon consummation of the merger, the Surviving Credit Union shall succeed, without other
transfer, to all the rights and property of the Disappearing Credit Union and shall be subject
to all the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the Disappearing Credit Union in the same
manner as if incurred by the Surviving Credit Union.
8. All prepaid insurance premiums of the Disappearing Credit Union will be applied to the
Surviving Credit Union in any equitable manner to which CUM1S or Berkley Regional
Insurance Company (or other applicable insurance carrier) may agree.
9. Any action or proceeding pending by or against the Disappearing Credit Union may be
prosecuted to judgment, which shall bind the Surviving Credit Union, or the Surviving Credit
Union may be proceeded against or substituted in its place.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Plan of Merger on Mateik
2016.
North Island Financial Credit Union California Credit Union

(Merging/Disappearing Credit Union) (Continuing/Survivin
(S) (S)
Alfred E. Pellerin • alter ene
Chairman of the Board Chairman the Board
; ,
(5) 1 (5)
"kt ebecca Collier- Victor Hanson
Secretary Secretary
Page 2 of 3
24114 030V.3 Plan of Merger Alt B Clean
A0793892
ATTACHMENT "A"
As a result of the merger with North Island Financial Credit Union ("Disappearing Credit
Union"), the following amendments to Section 300 of the Bylaws of California Credit Union are
effected by the filing of this Plan of Merger:
I. Section 300, subsection (i) is revised to read as follows:
(i) Members of immediate family or household of members of this credit union

which includes their spouses or domestic partners.
2. Section 300, subsection (m) is added to read as follows:
(m) Persons retired as pensioners or annuitants of any groups listed herein.
3. The following Field of Membership of Disappearing Credit Union shall be added to

Section 300:
(n) Ma result of the Merger of North Island Financial Credit Union into this Credit
Union, the following is hereby added:
Any and all persons who live, regularly work, currently attend school or
currently worship in San Diego County, California, as well as any
businesses, corporations, and other legal entities in San Diego County,
California.
(ii) Any and all persons who live, regularly work, currently attend school or
currently worship in Orange County, California, as well as any businesses,
corporations, and other legal entities in Orange County, California.
(iii) Any and all persons who live, regularly work, currently attend school or
currently worship in Riverside County, California, as well as any
businesses, corporations, and other legal entities in Riverside County,
California.
Page 3 of 3
24174 030V.3 Plan of Mergcr_Alt 0 Clean
la •f
A0793892'
CERTIFICATE OF MERGER
The undersigned certify that:
1. They are the Chairman of the Board and Secretary of CALIFORNIA CREDIT UNION
("Continuing Credit Union").
2. A plan of merger with NORTH ISLAND FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION has been duly
approved by the board of directors of the credit union.
3. A copy of the plan of merger is attached and a copy of the written approval by the
Commissioner of the Department of Business Oversight is attached hereto.
4. The total number of members of the Continuing Credit Union is (?). 5,7 . However, no
vote of the Continuing Credit Union is required.
We further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
matters set forth in this Certificate are true and correct of our own knowledge.
DATE:OZIO-S? , 2017
E-0
Walton Greene
Chairman of the oard
Victor Hanson
Secretary
24374 043V.2 DEC Cen of Merger (CCU) Clean

A0793892$
CERTIFICATE OF MERGER
The undersigned certify that:
I. They are the Chairman or the Board and Secretary of NORTH ISLAND
FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION ("Merging Credit Union").
2. A plan of merger with CALIFORNIA CREDIT UNION has been duly approved by the
hoard of directors of the credit union.
3. A copy of the plan or merger is attached hereto and a copy of die written approval by the
Commissioner or the Deparunent of Business Oversight is attached hereto.
4. If the credit union is the surviving credit union in the merger. this paragraph 4 does not
apply. If the credit union is the merging credit union in the merger, check whether
paragraph A, B or C below is applicable:
A. The total number of members of the merging credit union is
4 ,„12.7 and the plan of morwr has been duly approved by the
required vote of Me members pursuant to Section 15201 (a) or (b)
oldie Financial Code.
D B. The total number of members of the merging credit union is

and the plan of merger has been duly approved by the
required vole or the members pursuant to National Credit Union
Administration Rules.
In C. No vote of the members of the merging credit union was required,

the Commissioner of the Monument of Business Oversight having
approved the merger pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 15201
olthe Financial Code.
We further declare under penalty or perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
matters set forth in this Certificate are true and correct of our own knowledge.
DATE:
Alf d E. Palerin
Ciiiirman of the Board
•.
Rob=
Secretary
14114 044 V.3 11110 eel.' or Mulyter (M(.11)

Evidence Proving Corruption of The Federal Judiciary by The Credit Union Cartel (The Profiteers of Tax-Exempt Banking) .

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Court-Filed Evidence Proving Corruption of the Federal Judiciary

by the Credit Union Cartel (the Profiteers of Tax-Exempt Banking)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

CARLTON ROARK 9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750

SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION

APPELLANT’S INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF

• What date did the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 2

2. What are the facts of your case?

The District Court failed to recognize evidence proving attorneys as officers of

insurer CUNA Mutual, n/k/a TruStage) conspired to perpetrate an early-to-mid 2014

tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer forensic expert, to assert

1 NIFCU became a division of California Credit Union (“CCU”) in February, 2017

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 3

Court itself said, was a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015).

The scheme, based on Roark’s evidence (line 19 of 2-ER-230 to 2-ER-390, line

1–10 of 2-ER-227, line 5 of 1-ER-207 to line 2 of 1-ER-208, and line 1 of 1-ER-045

conflict of interest…” [Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, to first

of tainted/fabricated evidence produced by that non-neutral computer forensic

expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” (line 5 of 1-ER-015), and;

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 4

conspired to not only conceal the “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” of the

expert with a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…”. This was an orchestrated

Tainted/fabricated evidence from the non-neutral computer forensic expert with

a “…disqualifying conflict of interest…” for SDCCU, was then used by SDCCU to

assert wholesale spoliation by Roark to have terminating sanctions imposed on him.

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 5

tainted/fabricated evidence from the non-neutral computer forensic expert, would be

227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-053, line 3–7 of

Terminating sanctions (secured by the early-to-mid 2014 extrinsic fraud on the

to corrupt the judicial process against Roark, was (at a minimum);

corroborating, SDCCU wrongdoing, alleged by, anonymous others and in a

lawsuit from, Scott Norris (3-ER-565–584), an executive employed by SDCCU

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 6

in-law of Roger McTighe, a Board member at NIFCU, Roark’s co-defendant

employer, and a direct rival of SDCCU, and;

(b) to enforce the unenforceable anti-whistleblower provision against public policy

contained in confidential SDCCU employee separation agreements like Roark’s

(1) Raise allegations of wrongdoing against SDCCU with any Governmental

wrongdoing against SDCCU.” [Emphasis Added] (top of 3-ER-589).

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 7

“…proper to permanently delete.” (line 7 of 1-ER-111 to line 15 of 1-ER-112, line

20 of 1-ER-187 to line 13 of 1-ER-188, middle of 1-ER-193, and 3-ER-638 based

on 3-ER-623–637). Now SDCCU counsel is citing Roark’s deletion of files NIFCU

line 20 of 2-ER-227 to line 19 of 2-ER-228, line 17 of 1-ER-052 to line 2 of 1-ER-

decision regarding affirmative defenses…” (line 4–5 of 1-ER-008) even though he

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 8

acknowledging his prior instructions to Roark (middle of 1-ER-193 and 3-ER-638).

of 1-ER-207 to line 2 of 1-ER-208), witnessed (1-ER-217) the gaslighting tactic by

SDCCU counsel in a deposition to conceal Mr. Sevel’s name (line 5 of 1-ER-207 to

line 2 of 1-ER-208 based on 1-ER-214–218) and was breaching Roark’s confidential

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 9

officers of the court, is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and has no

time-bar per Roark’s legal authorities (2-ER-219–390 and 1-ER-030–073).

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT OR THE BAP. In this

390) in full (line 12 of 2-ER-244 to line 21 of 2-ER-248), to void every agreement,

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 10

18 of 1-ER-049 to line 8 of 1-ER-050, line 5–12 of 1-ER-069 and line 2–16 of 1-

ER-021). This includes the Bankruptcy Trustee settlement, the nondischargeable

mid 2014, to conceal use of tainted/fabricated evidence from a non-neutral computer

of interest…” [Emphasis Added] (line 5 of 1-ER-015) for SDCCU, to allege

9th Cir. Case No. 23-55750 Page 11

8–17 of 1-ER-050, and line 20 of 1-ER-021 to line 7 of 1-ER-022) and a September