(Transaction_Society Book Series, Ta_S-10) Yaacov Ro'i - Soviet Decision-Making in Practice_ the USSR and Israel, 1947-1954 (Transaction_Society Book Series, Ta_S-10)-Transaction Publishers (1980)

The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
The Monograph Series
SOVIET DECISION MAKING IN PRACTICE

à
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Uriel D a n n — Iraq U n d e r Q a s s e m
David K i m c h e — T h e Afro-Asian Movement*
Itamar R a b i n o v i c h - Syria U n d e r the Ba'th 1963-66*
A r y e h Yodfat — Arab Politics i n the Soviet Mirror*
B e n j a m i n S h w a d r a n — The M i d d l e East, Oil a n d the Great
Powers*
N i s s i m Rejwan — Nasserist Ideology*
B e r n a r d Reich — Quest for Peace*
* Titles distributed by Transaction Books
EDITORIAL BOARD
Haim Shaked (ch airman
Gabriel Baer Elie Kedourie
Uriel Dann Shimon Shamir
SOVIET DECISION
MAKING IN PRACTICE
The USSR and ISRAEL
1947-1954
YAACOV RO'I
To the memory of
Fred and Hanna Rau
First published 1980 by Transaction Publishers
Published 2017 by Routledge
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Library of Congress Catalog Number: 79-64857
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Ro'i, Yaacov.
Soviet decision making in practice.
(The monograph series - Shiloah Center for Middle

Eastern and African Studies)
Based on the author's thesis, Jerusalem, 1972.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Russia—Foreign relations—Israel. 2. Israel
—Foreign relations—Russia. 3. Jewish question
(1948- ) 4. Jews in Russia—Politics and govern-
ment—1917- I. Title. II. Series: Mekhon
Shiloah le-heker ha-Mizrah ha-tikhon ve-Afrikah. The
monograph series.
DK68.7.I8R64 327.47'05694 79-64857
ISBN 0-87855-267-7
ISBN 13: 978-0-87855-267-2 (hbk)

Contents
Abbreviations 10
Acknowledgments 11
PARTI: THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET DECISION IN
FAVOR OF A JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE 13
1. The Period of Non-Commitment, February
1945-April 1947 15
Inter-Power Diplomacy 15
The Immigration Issue 25
The Middle Eastern Scene 33
Soviet Activity in the Arab East 33
The Palestine Question 38
Attitude to the Yishuv 42
Prospects and Pressures for U.N. Discussion
on Palestine 46
2. The Die Is Cast 65
The First Special Session of the U.N. General
Assembly 65
World Jewry and the East-West Conflict 73
Federation or Partition? 76
The USSR Supports Partition 84
PART II: THE COINCIDENCE OF INTERESTS 107

3. From Resolution to Implementation: The
International Arena, 30 November 1947-14 May
1948 109
4. The Palestine War: Soviet Aid to the Yishuv and
the State of Israel 139
Immigration 141
Arms Supplies 149
5. Direct Contacts, May 1948-April 1949 169
Dialogue Based on Coinciding Interests 169
The Soviet Diplomatic Mission in Israel 174
The Israeli Diplomatic Mission in Moscow 183
Frustrations and Doubts 206
6. Soviet Backing at the United Nations, May 1948-
May 1949 231
The Soviet Union Identifies with Israel 231
Soviet Domestic and International Require-
ments Diverge 250
Signs of Dissonance: The End of the Pales-
tine War and Israel's Application for U.N.
Membership 264
PARTIU: SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND SOVIET

JEWRY 295
7. The Offensive Against Soviet Jewry 297
The Jewish Minority Within the Soviet
"Family of Nations" 297
The Outlawing of the Soviet Jewish Minority 312
8. Soviet Internal Developments and the Attitude to
Israel 339
The Role of Israel and the Worsening Posi-
tion of Soviet Jewry, 1949-52 339
The Slánsky Trial 356
The Doctors' "Plot" 372
The Severance of Diplomatic Relations 377
PART IV: THE METAMORPHOSIS IN SOVIET-ISRAELI
RELATIONS 397
9. The Soviet Global and Regional Perspective, May
1949-March 1953 399
The Soviet Reappraisal of the "Colonial
World" 399
The Arab East and "Regional Defense" 402
Arab "Neutralism" in the International Arena 411
Israel's Role in Soviet Middle Eastern and
Global Policies 417
Israeli "Progressive" Groupings and Front
Organizations 423
10. The Soviet Stand on the Arab-Israeli Conflict,
May 1949-March 1953 445
The Conflict in the Context of Soviet Middle
Eastern Policy 445
Jerusalem 451
The Arab Refugees 454
Border Incidents 457
The Suez Canal and the Arab Embargo 459
11. Soviet Criteria and Tactics Revised, 1953-54 469
The Resumption of Relations 469
The Soviet-Arab Rapprochement 479
Afterword 499
Bibliography 503
Index 511
ABBREVIATIONS
AFL — American Federation of Labor

AFP — Agence France Presse
ANA — Arab News Agency
BBC — British Broadcasting Corporation
CGT — Confédération Générale du Travail
CIO — Congress of Industrial Organizations
CTK — Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar (Czechoslovak Press
Office)
CZA — Central Zionist Archives
DDWB I — Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, Part I*
Doc. — Document
DP — Displaced Person
DWBI — Digest of World Broadcasts. Part 1 *
FALP — For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy (organ of the
Cominform)
GAOR — United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records
IDFW — International Democratic Federation of Women
JTA — Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Daily News Bulletin
MR — Monitoring Reports *
MVD — Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del (Ministry of
Internal Affairs)
OHD — Institute of Contemporary History, Oral History Division,
Hebrew University
PAP — Polska Agentura Prasowa (Polish Press Agency)
R. — Radio (station)**
Res. — Resolution
Rev. — Revision
RFE — Radio Free Europe
SCOR — United Nations, Security Council, Official Records
Suppl. — Supplement
SWB I (III, IV) - Summary of World Broadcasts, Part I (III or IVJ*
TASS — TeJegra/noe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza
(Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union)
TUC — Trades Union Congress
UPI — United Press International
WFDY — World Federation of Democratic Youth
WFTU — World Federation of Trade Unions
* Published by the BBC Monitoring Service

* * The language of a radio broadcast is given only when it is not the local language.
Thus if Radio Moscow broadcasts in Russian or Radio Cairo in Arabic, the language
is not noted.
Acknowledgments
This volume has been produced with the assistance of two
research centers at Tel Aviv University which I have had and
still have the benefit of belonging to, the Russian and East
European Research Center and the Reuven Shiloah Center for
Middle Eastern and African Studies. My first acknowledgments
are therefore to the staff, both academic and administrative, of
both centers, and particularly to Ms. Philippa Lewis for valu-
able help in editing my rather difficult manuscript. My thanks
also go to Mrs. Edna Liftman of the Shiloah Center for her cap-
able administrative assistance. I should also like to acknow-
ledge here the financial generosity of a Canadian friend of the
Shiloah Center.
I am likewise deeply indebted to the Society for Research on
Jewish Communities for its immense help both in the stages of
research for this volume and in preparing the manuscript.
This study is based on a doctoral thesis I submitted to the
Senate of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1972. My
supervisors during my Ph.D. studentship were Prof. Shmuel
Ettinger and Dr. Jonathan Frankel, both of the Hebrew Univer-
sity, and my next debt of gratitude is to them for their valuable
advice and endless patience.
A further round of thanks is due to the numerous individuals
who have helped me in putting together the bits of a very com-
plicated jigsaw puzzle. Some of the people I have interviewed I
have mentioned by name; others have preferred to remain
anonymous. Several of my sources are Jews who have come
from the Soviet Union in recent years and who were able to
supply me with information that I was unable to find in written
material. To all of these too I am sincerely grateful for the time
they have given me and the interest they have shown in putting
out as full and comprehensive a study of a tricky subject as the
evidence has made possible.
12 THE USSR AND ISRAEL: 1947-1954
Finally, I want to express the hope that my wife, without

whose encouragement I would never have embarked on my
thesis, and my four children, who for two or three years hardly
saw me, will find in this volume a small compensation for the
inconvenience it has caused them.
PART ONE:
THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET

DECISION IN FAVOR OF A
JEWISH STATE IN PALESTINE
1
The Period of Non-Commitment

February 1945-April 1947
INTER-POWER DIPLOMACY
The early months of 1945 saw the legitimization of the Soviet

position as a major world power. The Yalta Conference in
February of that year, the second and last summit conference of
the three great war leaders before the surrender of Nazi Germany,
sealed the arrangements agreed upon between the Allied powers
in the preceding months. These included USSR domination of
Eastern Europe, the division of Germany and the conditions of
Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Prior to the war, the Soviet
Union had appeared on the international scene as an isolated,
revolutionary state, the main tenet of whose foreign policy had
been "socialism in one country." Now, as a result of its diplomatic
achievements, as well as of its military victories, the USSR had
changed its entire image. It had become the head of a large empire
that seemed to be approaching the most expansionist ambitions
ever entertained by Tsarist or Soviet Russia.
The new international constellation and particularly its own
newly-won position within it formed the context, inter alia, of
the Soviet Union's policies in what it termed "the Arab East."
To make good its claim to being a world power, which it
understood to mean having a hand in political decisions con-
cerning problems in which it had no immediate interests and in
areas where it was unable to demonstrate its physical prowess,
the Soviet leadership was ready in the first instance to cooper-
15
ate with its allies. Later it could hope for a more active and
independent role, perhaps taking advantage of the differences
of opinion and purpose of the two "Anglo-Saxon" powers.
The Soviet stand on the issue of Palestine's political future was
a case in point. In the three and a half years since the USSR's entry
into the war on the side of the Allies in June 1941, a plethora of
contacts had been maintained between leaders of the Yishuv, as
the Palestine Jewish community was known, and the Zionist
Organization on the one hand, and Soviet diplomats and other
representatives on the other. In particular from the fall of 1943 the
Soviet Union, in its preparations for a peace settlement, began
seriously to probe developments in the Yishuv and to try to
comprehend its socio-political trends and inclinations. Yet the
resulting direct ties were probably not the decisive factor in
determining the Soviet position. The Soviet ambition to secure a
political standing in the Middle East through active participation
in the discussions in international forums of developments in the
region and in the decisions concerning it, compelled Moscow to
adopt a stand identical with or close to that of its English-
speaking allies, i.e. — in late 1944 or early 1945 — a pro-Jewish
position. Thus during the war the Soviet Union moved from
denying the Yishuv any recognition as an advance post of a
Jewish National Home, let alone of a Jewish state, to commend-
ing the Jewish cause in Palestine and approving the strengthen-
ing of the Jewish National Home as a step toward the estab-
lishment in Palestine of a Jewish state or commonwealth. 1
However, the international constellation that had brought this
about altered very soon after Yalta. On 27 February 1945, less than
a month after Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill were reported to
have agreed to hand over Palestine to the Jews and to continue
Jewish immigration at least for the immediate future, 2 the British
prime minister announced his government's decision to refrain
from bringing the Palestine issue before the United Nations. This
meant that there would be no international discussion
of Palestine's future political status, let alone any chance of re-
placing Britain's mandate for Palestine with an international
trusteeship.
Until now the USSR had had every reason to believe that an
international trusteeship would be established in Palestine as a
preliminary stage to evacuation by the Brtiish: 3 the Dumbarton
Oaks preliminary conference had laid down in September 1944
that the founding conference of the U.N. would redetermine the
nature of trusteeship regimes and resolve the details of transition
The Period of Non-Commitment 17
from the mandatory system, due to be abolished, to the new

regimes. It had followed from this belief that if Moscow
coordinated its policies with those of its allies, it could also hope
to be represented in this transitional government. The British
government's decision of late February deprived the Soviet stand
on Palestine, including the support of the Jewish cause there, of
its raison d'être.
It is possible that the interpretation of the Soviet stand as
agreeing to give Palestine to the Jews was somewhat exaggerated
either intentionally or by implication. 4 It seems, however, fair to
assume that Stalin had been asked by Roosevelt informally — for
Palestine was not officially discussed at Yalta — whether he
would cooperate with the United States on this issue (as the State
Department had suggested Roosevelt should do before
committing the U.S. government to any Palestine settlement 5 ),
and that the Soviet leader had intentionally impressed the
President with the concordant nature of his stand on Palestine.
This reading of developments would accord with a State
Department memorandum of a conversation in June 1945 with
Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the Administrative Committee of
the World Jewish Congress and member of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine Executive, according to which Czechoslovakia's Foreign
Minister Jan Masaryk had "given assurances" to Jewish repre-
sentatives at the U.N. Founding Conference in San Francisco,
"based on a recent visit to Moscow, that the Soviet Union
would favor a Jewish State in Palestine. This," the memoran-
dum went on, presumably quoting Goldmann, "was in line
with what the Zionists had been told by President Roosevelt on
his return from Yalta, when he had remarked that, to his sur-
Drise, Stalin had not appeared opposed to Zionism." 6
David Ben Gurion at a New York press conference in June,
had made a statement which, although more cautious, seemed
to have identical implications — that the Soviet Union would
not oppose the establishment of a Jewish state if Britain and the
United States supported this. 7 Ben Gurion had been told of
Soviet support for Jewish demands by British Colonial Secretary
Oliver Stanley on 7 May. Stanley had added, moreover, that
Britain did not intend to quarrel with the Arab states and peo-
ples and would therefore abandon the Mandate, yet without
tipping the scales in favor of the Yishuv by cooperating with
Moscow^and Washington to set up a Jewish state. 8
Whatever the USSR's degree of sympathy or readiness to show
support for the Jewish cause in Palestine in late 1944 and the early
weeks of 1945, it is certain that a substantial change occurred in

its public position following Churchill's statement of late
February 1945. In the subsequent period only a few non-ruling
Communist parties expressed a measure of open support for the
Jewish cause 9 although Soviet officials sometimes did so
privately, in the course of direct contacts with representatives of
the Yishuv. The First Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Cairo,
Aleksei Shvedov, actually said on one occasion that the fact that
three of the USSR's deputy foreign ministers were Jews was a
guarantee that the Jewish case got a square deal. 10 Viktor Kokin,
Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in London, similarly told a
delegation of the Yishuv's League for Friendly Relations with the
USSR in August 1945 that the USSR found itself in a very delicate
position on the question of Palestine since it was in the British
sphere of influence. The Soviet diplomat called on the Yishuv to
understand the Soviet dilemma and refrain from asking the USSR
to make any clear-cut declarations or any commitment on its
intentions regarding Palestine's political future until this basic
circumstance changed. 1 1
A similar view was expressed by the Soviet Consul in Beirut,
M.N. Agronov, who on a visit to Palestine in May 1946 told Jewish
representatives that his government still supported the resolution
taken at the founding conference of the World Federation of Trade
Unions in London in February 1945 — supported by its
delegation at the time — that the Jewish people must be enabled
to continue in the construction of Palestine as its National Home.
Yet, Agronov insisted, this did not mean that the Soviet
government had ''become pro-Zionist"; it would finally clarify
its position when the Palestine question eventually came up at
the United Nations. 12
Meanwhile, the Soviet media — the press, periodicals, radio
broadcasts, public lectures — indicated growing attention to
Palestine. Yet, while wary for the most part of committing
themselves on the question of that country's political future, they
occasionally demonstrated open support for the Arab stand. As
early as June 1945 the director of the State Department Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson, noted that
Professor Evgenii Korvin of the USSR Academy of Sciences had
supported the Arabs over Palestine in a public lecture he had
given in Moscow. 13
The British decision to refrain from placing Palestine on the
international agenda did not, however, prevent the Soviet
delegation at the United Nations Founding Conference from try-
ing to evoke discussion on Britain's Palestine Mandate. It even

supported an Arab appeal to renew discussion on this issue, 14
after previously supporting a U.S. resolution against introducing
changes in the provisions of the Palestine Mandate — the
adoption of which had seemed to preclude the possibility of
further discussion.
The reason for the Soviet volte-face was almost certainly
tactical, and not any desire to damage Jewish interests.The
Trusteeship Council Chairman (the New Zealand prime minister)
told Jewish Agency representative Eliahu Epstein (later Elath) that
the Soviet move should not be seen as directed against the
Yishuv. In his view, the Soviet delegation knew full well that
there was no chance of changing the resolution already adopted;
yet it considered it important that the Arab League record in its
books that when the British opposed the Arab stand on so central
an issue for them, the Soviet Union was the only great power that
supported them. 1 5
On 31 May Epstein was received by the secretary of the Soviet
delegation, Kiril Novikov, on whose desk lay the memoranda
disseminated by the Jewish Agency and the other Jewish
delegations at San Francisco. The Jewish Agency memorandum,
given at the beginning of the month to the Soviet, Ukrainian and
Belorussian delegations, had outlined the history of Britain's
Palestine Mandate, including the British government's violations
of the conditions laid down in the Mandate, and had expounded
the Yishuv's demands of the United Nations Conference. Epstein
explained to Novikov that Soviet efforts to change the terms of the
Mandate meant undermining the legal basis on which Jewish
rights in Palestine depended. The Yishuv did not consider the
Mandatory regime in any way satisfactory and aimed at achieving
political independence and total emancipation from all forms of
British custodianship. Yet until the attainment of its ultimate aim,
Epstein pointed out, the Yishuv had to retain the rights afforded it
by the Mandate. Any change in Palestine's juridical status would
thus discriminate against the Jews and harm their struggle for the
independence of Palestine from British rule and the establishment
there of a Jewish state.
The Jewish Agency representative further stressed that Arab
opposition to the Yishuv was supported by the Arab League,
which relied on Britain. The latter sought to freeze the position
existing in the Near East through Arab reactionary forces,
which, for their part, feared the Jewish National Home as a car-
rier of social and economic progress in the region. 16
While Novikov refused to commit himself on this issue, Soviet

sources stated explicitly that the USSR had had no intention of
doing injury to the Zionist position but had sought to prevent a
freezing of rights recognized under existing mandates that would
make their future alteration impossible. After protracted dis-
cussion and contacts, the Soviet Union agreed to an amended
formulation, in which the Jewish Agency representatives actually
saw an improvement of their position. 17
In a statement made on 9 June 1945, on the eve of his departure
from San Francisco, Nahum Goldmann expressed his satisfaction
that the Zionists had achieved their immediate purpose, namely
the maintenance of the status quo. The "real fight for our
demands," he said, "begins now ... in London, Washington,
Moscow and every political center in the world." 1 8
The San Francisco Conference put an end to Soviet hopes of
achieving influence in the Arab East by participating in solving
the Palestine question through cooperation with Britain and the
United States within the framework of a post-war settlement. Yet
although the USSR realized that an official British move was
necessary to have Palestine's future discussed in the international
arena, it made one last effort in the fall of 1945 to set the ball
rolling. At the three-power Foreign Ministers' Conference held in
London from 11 September to 2 October 1945, Molotov proposed
to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that the Soviet Union
withdraw its troops from Iran in return for a British withdrawal
from Egypt and Palestine. The Soviet thesis was that the USSR
had more right to maintain a military presence in northern Iran
than had Britain in Egypt and Palestine, in view of the fact that the
former bordered on Soviet territory, whereas Cairo and Jerusalem
were far removed from London. 19
It was not mere wishful thinking that had led the Soviet
government to conclude that it would have a part in deciding
Palestine's political future. A similar assumption had prevailed in
Washington (see p. 17) and even after the San Francisco Con-
ference State Department officials argued that Britain could not
continue administering Palestine in accordance with a mandate it
had received from an international organization that had ceased
to exist. This, they contended, meant, on the one hand, that the
United States, which had certain obligations by virtue of its 1924
agreement with Britain, 20 as well as having undertaken certain
commitments toward both Jews and Arabs, must define its
position; and, on the other, that the Soviet Union would become
an element that could not be ignored. 21
The British government, meanwhile, continued to evade any

international discussion of the Palestine issue. At the same time,
in order to strengthen the base of its rule in Palestine, Britain
decided to commit the United States to the continuation of the
Mandatory regime. At Potsdam, at the last of the three summit
conferences of the three Allied powers, held from 17 July to 2
August 1945, the British began bilateral discussions on Palestine
with the Americans. Churchill and his successor Clement Attlee,
who became prime minister in the course of the Potsdam
Conference, initiated talks with Roosevelt's successor Harry
Truman (Roosevelt had died in April). Truman, asked at a press
conference on 16 August whether he had talked about Palestine
with Stalin as well, replied in the negative, adding that the Soviet
Union was not in a position to be a factor in Palestine. The
President said that he himself would like to enable as many Jews
as possible to enter Palestine, but the practical aspects of this
policy must be coordinated with the British and the Arabs since
its implementation had to be peaceful so as to avoid the need to
dispatch half a million U.S. troops to preserve the peace in
Palestine. 22
The negative response that Washington's position evoked in
the Arab countries led U.S. diplomats there to press the
Administration to coopt Moscow in its discussions and decisions
on Palestine. They reported to their government that the Soviet
Union was gaining considerable political advantage from being
excluded by the Western powers from participation in pro-Jewish
measures. Director-General of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry Fadil
Jamali, Washington was informed, Jiad quoted the Arab League's
Secretary General, 'Abd ar-Rahman 'Azzam as saying that if
Palestine were an international issue, then the Soviet Union was
no less an interested party than the United States. If it were not,
then the United States had no role to play in it either. Jamali
pointed out that because of the Soviet Union's rapidly growing
interest in the Near East it should be consulted over Palestine and
added that the Soviet envoy in Baghdad, Grigorii Zaitsev, was
actively propagating the Soviet position of hostility toward
Zionism and stressing the contrast between his country's stance
on this issue and American support of the Zionist movement. 2 3
The U.S. chargé d'affaires in Baghdad cabled to Secretary of State
James Byrnes: "One Government has pursued a policy which has
been notably successful here. It has made no declarations of
policy or preference, and Arab nationalists look on it as being
sympathetic. That gov(ernmen)t is USSR. ... Trend among
extreme nationalists is to look to Soviet Union for help against

Zionism and nations sympathetic thereto. Soviet Union's secret
weapon hereabouts has been its ability to maintain silence, and
this weapon has been effective in building up goodwill and
considerable measure of influence while retaining for USSR full
liberty of action." 2 4
Following the President's announcement of his contacts with
Britain over Palestine, Director of the State Department Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs Loy Henderson expressed
further reservations about this procedure. His advice was to seek
to reach an agreement on the Palestine question among the United
States, Britain, the Soviet Union and, if possible, France so as to
deprive the USSR of the tactical advantages of non-commitment.
In this way, Henderson claimed, no power would be able to shift
the responsibility for the situation in the area onto the shoulders
of other powers. Otherwise — that is without agreement among
the powers — Jews and Arabs would conclude that by sufficiently
disturbing the peace they would be able to influence the decisions
of the powers. 2 5
Although the State Department was most concerned by the
improved Soviet position in the Arab world, it also warned that
despair and impatience were driving certain elements among the
Jews, notably the young, "into the arms of Moscow." 2 6
Despite such advice and warnings to beware of a hapless
involvement in the Palestine question, Truman wrote Attlee on 31
August asking him to allow 100,000 displaced persons (D.P.s) to
enter Palestine from the camps in Central Europe. Indeed, this
might have solved the problem of the D.P.s in the Western
occupation zones of Germany and Austria, estimated in August
1945 as numbering 50,000-60,000, without substantially
changing the Jewish-Arab equilibrium in Palestine. 27
The British government, however, suggested the creation of a
joint Anglo-American committee to look into the entire problem
of the Jews in the Western occupation zones and related issues
(repatriation, emigration, etc.). On 13 November 1945, after
negotiations on the terms of reference, fields of activity and
competence of the proposed committee, Bevin in London and
Truman in Washington announced that an Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry was to be set up to examine both the Jewish
question in Europe and the situation in Palestine (Bevin's
statement, made in the House of Commons, even now reflected
the British attempt to keep the two problems separate.) 28
The Soviet reaction to this announcement related less to the
declared purpose of the Committee than to the fact that it

institutionalized Anglo-American cooperation at the expense of
the Soviet Union. Moscow had been seeking maximum
cooperation with its wartime allies within the framework of the
post-war settlement, especially in those areas that were not part of
the recognized Soviet sphere of influence. In particular, the USSR
sought to join forces with Washington, as the only two really great
powers in the post-war constellation. This point was stressed by
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmitrii Manuil'skii with reference to
the Anglo-American Committee in a conversation with one of its
American members, Bartley Crum. 29 The Soviets contended that
there was a certain logic in a joint Soviet-American front against
an obsolescent imperialist power. 3 0
The Soviet Union was not alone in seeing the Committee as an
instrument, or at least reflection, of increasing East-West
confrontation. The instructions the members of the Committee
received from both the U.S. State Department and the British
Foreign Office were issued in the same spirit. Evan Wilson, who
accompanied the Committee on behalf of the State Department,
warned it that if its conclusions were interpreted as pro-Jewish in
the Arab countries, the latter were likely to turn to the USSR for
support. Harold Beeley, his Foreign Office counterpart, also made
it clear that the Palestine issue must be seen in the context of
forceful Soviet expansionism. As a result, he maintained, the
United States would do well to join Britain in setting up a cordon
sanitaire against Soviet perpetration, composed of the Arab states
and in which Palestine, were it to be declared an Arab state,
would become an important link. 31
The Soviet reaction to the setting up of the Committee was
expressed in a public lecture given in Moscow in February 1946
which referred to latest developments connected with the
Palestine problem, including: a. the struggle over immigration,
with the Zionists exploiting the difficult situation of the Jews in
Western Europe caused by "fascist barbarity"; b. the armed
conflict in Palestine, where "Zionist saboteurs and the secret
Zionist organizations" were fighting both the Arab population
and the British Administration; and c. the appointment of the
Anglo-American Committee, to which — the Soviet lecturer
maintained — Jews and Arabs alike were opposed. The attempt to
solve the Palestine problem outside the United Nations by means
of a committee in which neither of the sides directly concerned
was represented and through material help for the Jews in Europe
was, to say the least, "astonishing." "The Palestine problem," the
lecturer went on, "has become an international issue, in which

the interests of England, the United States and the entire Arab
world clash. There can be no question but that the United Nations
has to solve this complex and many-sided issue, and not
individual interested powers." Moreover, "the progressive public
throughout the world is of the opinion that the Jewish question
can and must be solved first and foremost by the uprooting of
fascism," and the total elimination of racialism. 32
The Anglo-American Committee, another Soviet commentator
wrote, was the outcome of "the desire of the powers which set
[it] up to evade the international obligations they had
assumed." Great Britain "had involved the United States in her
tangled affairs in Palestine in order that the Americans might
carry some share of the responsibility for Britain's refusal to
grant Palestine independence." 33
In view of this attitude, it was not surprising that the
Committee met with Soviet obstructionism in Europe — the
Soviet authorities prevented its members from visiting Romania,
Hungary and Bulgaria or the Soviet occupation zones in
Germany and Austria 34 — while the Palestinian Communists
refused to participate in its hearings. 3 5 Nevertheless, to ensure
that the Committee members became acquainted with the
Communist argumentation, the Jewish Section of the British
Communist Party gave evidence before them during their stay in
London, while the USSR allowed them to visit Poland, the
country under its domination with the most poignant Jewish
problem.
Soviet censure of the Committee grew in the wake of the report
it published on 30 April 1946. The Soviet media pointed out the
anti-Arab implications of the Committee's conclusions and
recommendations (these suggested inter alia the virtual abolition
of the 1939 land purchase and immigration restrictions, calling
specifically for the immigration of 100,000 Jewish D.P.s). 36 The
Committee's recommendations, one Soviet source pointed out,
were "hazy," included no "concrete proposals for the solution
of this truly urgent problem" other than that concerning the
D.P.s — which was intended "to divert world opinion from the
obviously unsatisfactory situation in the Western zones of
Germany in respect to denazification and the eradication of
fascism" — and had "not met with the approval either of the
Arab or Jewish population of Palestine." 3 7 In addition, Soviet
sources laid special emphasis on the exacerbation of the military
situation in Palestine from May 1946, stressing that this was a
direct consequence of the report and its handling by London and

Washington.38
These reactions reflected above all feelings of frustration and
impotence in the face of Anglo-American cooperation and
coordination of policies. Moscow was clearly put out at being
circumvented in the international arena at a time when its own
vision of its international role included active participation in
the solution of all international problems. The Soviet leadership
was also annoyed at Britain's methods of sidestepping its
obligations and even more so at the American endorsement of
London's tactics and policies, in consequence of which Britain
seemed likely to be able to maintain its dominant role in the
Middle East as a whole and in Palestine in particular. As for
Palestine, so long as the Soviet Union was powerless to influence
relevant developments it was determined not to make its
weakness manifest by declaring its choices and inclinations. It
would content itself meanwhile with trying to bring about a
change in the basic international constellation surrounding
Palestine. Eventually, it felt certain, Britain would be compelled
to refer Palestine to the international community; it was more
than probable, too, that Anglo-American cooperation on
Palestine would break down. When these changes occurred, the
USSR would have ample opportunity to commit itself to one or
another solution of the Palestine problem in such a way as to
make its influence felt.
THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE
With its hands tied on the level of inter-power diplomacy, the

Soviet Union was determined to influence developments con-
nected with the Palestine question in other ways.
One major aspect of the Palestine problem was in fact largely
given over to direct Soviet influence: the Jewish question in
Eastern and Central Europe. The USSR's domination of Eastern
Europe and its control of significant areas in Central Europe gave
it considerable leverage regarding the survivors of the Jewish
communities there. Soviet officials had learned from their
contacts with Zionist and Yishuv representatives during the war
that, in their opinion at least, these survivors were the most
obvious source of immigration to Palestine, both as a result of
the Holocaust and because these countries had provided most of
the immigrants that had reached Palestine after the Soviet Union
had closed its own doors to emigration. Moreover, it soon
became clear that most Jews who had survived the horrors of
concentration camps, ghettoes and other forms of persecution
were unable and unwilling to rebuild their lives upon the ruins
of their former homes and saw Palestine as an obvious
alternative. Finally, this aspect of the Palestine question
permitted, indeed almost called for, activity behind the scenes,
i.e. without compelling Moscow to make any political or
strategic pronouncements that might commit it one way or
another when Palestine's political future eventually came up for
international discussion.
In principle, the Soviet Union declared its opposition to mass
immigration to Palestine as a remedy for European Jewry. Soviet
comment on the recommendations of the Anglo-American
Committee endorsed the Committee's conclusion that emigration
could not solve the problem "inasmuch as a million of Jews are
involved." 3 9 In the Soviet view these Jews had to reconstruct
their lives in Europe, which had in turn to be cleared of fascist
and racialist tendencies and manifestations. 40
In practice, however, the Soviet Union assisted Jews to emi-
grate from territories under its control in Eastern and Central
Europe to the Western occupation zones in Germany and Aus-
tria, knowing full well that these Jews intended continuing to
Palestine. 41 As Soviet Consul Agronov told two representatives
of the Yishuv who passed through Beirut in April 1946, the
USSR differentiated between Zionism and the struggle to open
Palestine's doors to immigration. It thus contributed to building
up the main center of pressure which made the international
community aware of the urgency of a speedy solution to both
the Jewish question in Europe and the issue of Palestine's polit-
ical future.
The Soviet attitude to the "Brichah," the Hagana-supervised
rescue operation which accounted for most of the organized —
and some of the unorganized — westward movement of Jews,
was not a priori sympathetic.
The Brichah's operations in the USSR — where in fact it had
begun its activities, organizing the departure of a small number
of Jews from the Rovno and Vilnius areas in late 1944 and early
1945, before the end of the war — contradicted some of the most
basic tenets of Soviet policy which firmly opposed the departure
of Soviet citizens from the USSR. (In 1945 the Soviet Union was
engaged in a massive repatriation campaign to the USSR of
former Soviet citizens or inhabitants of areas annexed to the
USSR during the war.) Even when the issue was emigration from
Soviet-dominated Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet

authorities were apprehensive, not without justification, that the
Brichah was helping to transfer a number of Soviet Jews,
including officers and soldiers, who had defected from the
Soviet armed forces. The British, incidentally, repeatedly took
advantage of this fear in order to persuade the Soviet
authorities to close their borders. But the main Soviet reserva-
tion was apparently that the departure of large numbers of peo-
ple from the new People's Democracies was in itself an act of
anti-Soviet propaganda that cast aspersions on the new Soviet-
dominated and -oriented regimes of Eastern Europe, especially
with regard to the anti-Semitism there. 42
Nevertheless, the Soviet officers and troops who guarded the
frontiers of the Soviet-controlled countries and occupation zones
often extended help to the Brichah. 43 While there were cases of
obstructionism on the part of the Soviet military in certain
localities, these do not seem to have been the result of any policy
intended to prevent the westward movement of Jews, but rather
of temporary technical difficulties or specific local needs and
conditions (for example, the sporadic hermetic closing of a given
frontier as a measure against smuggling). 4 4
The USSR's political representatives in the newly-established
People's Democracies were also mostly willing to allow Jews to
leave these countries. So, very often, were the East European
regimes themselves, since they saw their Jewish populations as a
turbulent element that merely added to the difficulties of
establishing orderly government. Although, as a result of
domestic considerations, the East European governments made
sporadic attempts to restrict or even prohibit the departure of
their Jewish citizens, the only Communist or pro-Communist
groupings which were consistently opposed to Jewish
emigration were the Jewish Communist organizations. 45 While
the entire question of the relationship between Moscow and the
East European regimes is beyond the scope of this study 4 6 and it
is generally almost impossible to detect the measure of active
Soviet intervention in the internal affairs of the Peoples'
Democracies, it is appropriate to note that in a number of
instances when the local Soviet authorities and other Soviet
representatives were asked to support Jewish emigration from
Eastern Europe they stated explicitly that they would do so. 47
The departure of the first immigrant ship, Max Nordau, from a
port in Soviet-occupied territory (Constanza, Romania) in May
1946, was understood in the Yishuv — and by the Western
powers — to indicate that the USSR was not opposed to Brichah

activities as such. 4 8
Perhaps the most important direct and conscious Soviet
contribution to Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to Central
or Western Europe and eventually to Palestine was the
repatriation of East European Jews from the USSR to their
countries of origin, particularly Poland. Although statistical data
concerning East European Jewish demography in this period are
inadequate, there can be no doubt that most of the Jews who left
Poland in a generally western direction in the years 1945-47 had
reached Poland from the Soviet Union in the same period. In
summer 1945, before repatriation began, there were thought to
be approximately 50,000 Jews in Poland, while in the year 1946
some 150,000 left the country for the Western occupation zones
of Germany and Austria, a further 90,000 Jews remaining in
Poland in 1947. 49 This meant that of the 250,000 to 300,000
Polish Jews in the Soviet Union at the end of the war, 50 nearly
200,000 repatriated to Poland. A report on conditions of Jews in
Poland presented to the World Jewish Congress in April 1946
stated that 1,500 Jews were being repatriated weekly from the
USSR to Poland and an equal number of Jews were leaving
Poland for the U.S. zone of Germany. 51 The USSR had originally
intended that these Jewish repatriates participate in the
reconstruction of Poland and the consolidation of the new
regime there; 52 yet it continued to enable them to repatriate and
even made new repatriation agreements that included Jews after
it had become clear that most of the Jewish repatriates were
continuing westward to the D.P. camps in order to reach
Palestine. 53
The new Polish regime seems to have agreed to this Jewish
emigration in the wake of the wave of active anti-Semitism
which, despite government legislation, overtook Poland
immediately after the war. 54 This anti-Semitism — which in
many ways was also a demonstration against the new order with
which the Jews, who played a major role in it, were identified —
reached its peak with the pogrom at Kielce on 4 July 1946 and
resulted in a mass upsurge in favor of emigration among the
Jews. 55 As early as August 1945 Emile Sommerstein, member of
the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the first
government of the new Polish regime set up in July 1944), told
the World Zionist Conference which he attended in London
that while the Polish government was doing all in its power to
alleviate the lot of its Jews, Prime Minister Edward Osobka-
Morawski had written him: ' T h e Government will facilitate the

emigration from Poland of those Jews who desire to do so, and
persons and institutions organizing such emigration will be al-
lowed to conduct their work freely." 56 In May 1946 the Polish
prime minister said at the opening of the tenth session of the
Polish National Council that his government would "not stand
in the way of Jews who desire to emigrate to Palestine and real-
ize there their national aspirations." 57
It is inconceivable that these developments were not taken into
account by the USSR, especially as the repatriation movement,
as we have seen, fed the emigration from Poland. The reciprocal
nature of the two movements became increasingly clear as both
reached their peak in the summer of 1946. In this period, with
tensions growing in Palestine, the British and the Americans —
the latter at least partly under British influence — registered
their protests with the Polish government that the repatriation to
Poland was in practice repatriation to Palestine, and that the
repatriates were being sent on to the D.P. camps as political
dynamite intended to exert Zionist pressure on the Western
powers. British diplomatic activities included in this period
further approaches to Soviet representatives in Romania as well
as to the governments of Czechoslovakia, where the Communists
controlled most of the relevant posts, and Italy. 58
Following the Kielce pogrom, the Polish Zionists established
contact with their government and particularly the security
organs (the U.B.) to discuss the need for mass emigration; there
was no chance that the foreign ministry would agree officially to
such emigration for it was striving to obtain Poland's
considerable gold reserves from the British. Antek (Yitzhak)
Zuckerman who headed the Zionist delegation in these talks
pointed out the inherent contradiction between the inability of
the Polish regime to protect its Jewish population and its refusal
to permit the Jews to emigrate legally (a prerequisite for legal
emigration, i.e. the receipt of passports, was an entry permit to
another country, which the Jews had no way of obtaining).
Zuckerman and the chairman of the Central Committee of Polish
Jews, Adolf Berman, were received by Deputy Minister of
National Defense Marian Spychalski, who agreed without
hesitation to open the frontiers to Jewish emigrants. At a further
meeting between the two sides, it was agreed that the Jewish
emigration movement should neither provide a cover for the
departure from Poland of non-Jewish opponents of the new
regime nor be used to smuggle out gold or foreign currency. The
frontier points to be used were also determined, the main

considerations in their selection being topographical suitability
and remoteness, the latter to ensure that the British would not
discover them. 5 9 On 30 July the Polish-Czechoslovak border was
duly opened — the Czechoslovak government had approved this
four days previously, with all the Communist ministers voting in
favor 60 — and it continued to serve the Brichah as the main focus
for Jewish emigration for the months to come. Even after it was
closed on 20 February 1947 some 600 Jews continued to use it
monthly until November 1947. 61
The plethora of Zionist and Yishuv contacts in Eastern Europe
included Soviet officials in the various capitals. 62 In 1946 a
delegation of the Yishuv and the Jewish Agency, embracing the
main political parties in the Yishuv, was invited to Poland by the
new government. One of its members, L. Levite, whose task was
to cultivate connections with the new Poland and its leading
figures, also sought contacts with Soviet representatives. A
number of considerations seemed to make this essential.
In the first place, the close links between the new Poland and
the Soviet Union gave the views and influence of Moscow's
representatives special weight in the Polish party's and
government's decision-making process. Even if the Soviet
representatives did not direct immediately or otherwise initiate
Polish policy in all spheres, it was to be presumed that all
politically significant decisions were taken in coordination and
agreement with the USSR.
Second, discussion of the issue of the remnants of Polish Jewry
by the representatives of the Yishuv and the USSR was certain to
exceed the bounds of the specific problem of Polish Jewry and,
given the political and social metamorphoses that were taking
place, to throw light on the Jewish question as a whole. In this
way the clarification of the specific issue would become a
touchstone for probing Soviet intentions not only on Jewish
emigration from the People's Democracies but also, indirectly,
on the entire Jewish question, including problems of Soviet
Jewry and the political value the USSR attributed to Palestine in
solving all these.
On 7 July 1946, some six weeks after a first, preliminary
conversation with the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in
Warsaw, Levite (together with Moshe Erem who happened to be
in Poland at the time) was received by the Embassy's Political
Counselor Vladimir Iakovlev, who was known to be the link
between the Polish authorities and Moscow.
In long and comprehensive talks that covered the Jews in

Poland, the Jewish question as a whole, and the political
questions connected with the Palestine problem, lakovlev
expressed his surprise that the Polish Jewish community and its
leaders tended in the main to refrain from active participation in
the life of the new Poland even though the new regime was
fighting anti-Semitism and every form of national injustice and
many of its central leading figures were Jews. (lakovlev
mentioned specifically Jacob Berman and Hilary Mine.)
He also expressed concern that the Jewish repatriates would
become a focus for anti-Soviet feelings since they did not intend
to remain in Poland following their return from the Soviet Union
but sought to depart from the Soviet sphere of influence. Levite
explained that although the intentions of the new Polish regime
regarding the Jews and their absorption were not in doubt, the
combined legacy of traditional Polish reaction and Nazism had
bred a hatred that could not be easily eradicated. The fact that
Poland had become a uni-national state after the expulsion of its
German population and the transformation of its Ukrainian and
Belorussian populations into Soviet citizens with the annexation
by the USSR of Western Ukraine and Belorussia, only served to
stress the foreignness of the Jews. In addition, the strong feelings
of loneliness, homelessness and bereavement of the few
survivors of Polish Jewry had to be taken into account. While the
Zionists valued highly the contribution made by the handful of
Jews who were loyally helping to build the new Poland, the Jews
as a whole were not capable of striking roots anew in Poland; nor
did the new Poland really need them in order to rebuild.
lakovlev was aware of the atmosphere of hostility to the Jews
among broad circles in Poland and of the expressions of hatred
for Jews and Russians alike. Yet he seemed to be implying that
the basic problem was the struggle between Polish reactionary
forces and progressive elements and not just the Jews'
acclimatization. He even admitted that there had been
manifestations of anti-Semitism in the USSR during the war,
after the Nazi invasion, but attributed the Polish Jews' failure to
take root there to their disinclination to work.
In conclusion, the Soviet counselor asked to be given a
memorandum on the chief topics they had discussed for him to
send to Moscow. When Levite expressed doubts as to the value
of this, in view of the considerable number of memoranda that
Zionist and Yishuv Labor leaders had given Soviet officials in
the past few years, lakovlev replied that because of the changed
political circumstances Soviet policy makers would be likely to

examine the questions under review in a new light. To make his
point he told Levite that in the period between the two World
Wars, Ukrainian peasants in Carpatho-Russia had approached
the Saviet Embassy in Prague asking to be annexed to their
Ukrainian homeland; yet the Embassy which had served as his
government's diplomatic representative to a sovereign Czecho-
slovak government whose territory included Carpatho-Russia
had been totally powerless to interpose. Now, however, politi-
cal circumstances had changed and Carpatho-Russia had
become a part of the Ukrainian S.S.R. This analogy by a senior
Soviet officer was a novelty and contained an indication of
change in the Soviet attitude to the Jewish and Palestine ques-
tions.
A week after this conversation Levite received confirmation
that Iakovlev's request had not been a routine display of good
manners or a make-believe preference of interests. One of
Communist Poland's central personalities informed Levite that
the Soviet counselor was astonished at not yet having received
the memorandum. Levite understood this to mean that the Soviet
official attached importance to the matter, otherwise he would
not have discussed it with his liaison in Poland or sought to
expedite the delivery to him of written material; and that leading
figures in the Polish regime were interested in bringing to the
attention of policy makers in Moscow the Jewish, or Zionist,
view of the Jewish problem in Poland and its implications
regarding immigration to Palestine and that country's political
future. 63
Shortly after meeting Levite, Iakovlev initiated a meeting with
another Palestinian then in Poland, Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair leader
Israel Barzilai. The Soviet official now made a number of further
points. His government, he said, did not consider it opportune to
declare any change in attitude on the Palestine question. The
Yishuv's disavowal of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee
report and Britain's resolve mot to allow the immigration of the
100,000 recommended in it had virtually split the Anglo-U.S.
partnership; any Soviet announcement of intent would be likely
to reunite the imperialist powers. Once again Iakovlev hinted at
the possibility of a volte-face. Moscow, he pointed out,
appreciated that slogans were not static in their political
implications; previously, for example, the USSR had opposed
Slavic brotherhood; now that this aimed to achieve progress, the
Soviet Union accepted it. The Soviet diplomat seemed to
approve the binational state Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair was

advocating, yet would not commit himself.
Returning to this same topic at a second meeting, Iakovlev said
bluntly that there seemed to be little point in supporting a
solution which evoked no response in the Arab world and had
very little backing in the Jewish camp. On the issue of
emigration, however, he admitted that the Soviet ambassadors in
Eastern Europe had been instructed to influence the governments
to which they were accredited to permit the activities of the
Brichah activists. 64
The favorable Soviet attitude to the question of emigration
from Poland to Central Europe was, then, unqualified. Whatever
the reasons, i.e. whether they evolved from considerations of
Poland's own development and domestic scene, or from a desire
to complicate the Western position in Germany and Austria, or
from the intention to precipitate international discussion of the
Palestine issue, or from a combination of all three, the Soviet
contribution to increasing the D.P. population from less than
100,000 in summer 1945 to approximately a quarter of a million
early in 1947 was a major one. This increase in turn was a
central factor in forcing the international community in 1947 to
deal with the question of Palestine's political future.
THE MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE
Soviet Activity in the Arab East
Support for Jewish emigration from the People's Democracies

was the USSR's most effective lever for affecting developments
in and concerning Palestine at a period when it was excluded
from active and direct participation in this issue. Yet this was
not the only means of influence at the Soviet Union's disposal.
Toward the end of the war the USSR had begun actively
cultivating its position in the Middle East as a whole, where the
Palestine question was but one of several acute problems that
required urgent treatment. The first stage of this activity
involved the formation of a network of direct contacts with as
broad a section of the local population as possible.
The Soviet legations which opened in the Middle East (in
Cairo, Beirut and Baghdad) in the last eighteen months of the
war carried their activities to a variety of circles in the local
public. Soviet diplomats made the most both of the prestige their
country had attained as a result of its war effort and of the
widespread disappointment with and hostility to Britain.

Western observers noted with concern the success of the official
representatives of the Soviet Union in the Arab countries.
Indeed, the USSR took great care that the diplomats it sent to
the region had the qualifications to mix easily and speedily in
the countries to which they were accredited. For instance,
Daniil' Solod, the first Soviet minister in Syria and Lebanon,
spoke Arabic — previous to his appointment he had been
professor of Semitic languages in Leningrad — while the Cairo
Legation Secretary Abdurrahman Sultanov not only spoke
Arabic but was a Muslim who ostentatiously attended religious
services and in conversations stressed the parallels between
Islam and Communism. 6 5
Soviet activity in the "Arab East" was at first mainly aimed at
the area's many minority groupings rather than at the Arab
Muslim majority. Whereas the official representatives of the
latter were linked in various ways to the West, and in particular
to the British, the former often had sympathies for the USSR
where many of them had brethren. Moreover, as minorities they
were by definition excluded from the Establishment and were a
suitable element for disruptive action. One of the first large-scale
efforts of the Soviet Union in the Arab East was a major
repatriation program among some of these minority groupings,
notably the Armenians, for which purpose a special repatriation
commission attached to the Soviet Legation was set up in
Cairo. 66
The leitmotifs of this repatriation campaign from the point of
view of Soviet Middle Eastern activities — its Soviet domestic
aspects are beyond the scope of this study — were as follows: a.
the material and technical progress of even the most backward
areas of the Soviet Union; b. the ties of blood and faith between
ethnic and religious groups in the Near East and their brethren
in the Soviet Union; c. the Soviet Union's capacity to solve the
problems of the Middle East's oppressed minorities without in
any way impairing the interests of other elements in the region
and in cooperation with the local authorities; and d. the fact of
Soviet influence and importance in the area as a power with
direct interests in it, notably in the form of large numbers of
widely dispersed citizens and other dependents or protégés who
sought to establish and maintain ties with the USSR's
representatives.
The Soviet Union's search for access to the region's religious
minorities led to the renewal — after nearly thirty years of
complete dissociation — of the ties that had traditionally linked

the Middle East's Orthodox believers with the Russian Orthodox
Church. The Patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem and
Constantinople were invited to Moscow to participate in January
1945 in the election of a new head of the Russian Church. 6 7
(The previous Patriarch of All Russia, Sergei, had died late in
1944.) Several months later, in May 1945, the Church's new
head, Aleksei, arrived for a month-long visit in the Middle East
which included Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt and had
undoubted political as well as religious motives. 68
In addition to the Soviet Church's direct links with local
clergy, the Soviet diplomats accredited to Near Eastern capitals
began to reveal an interest in the Holy Places, pilgrimages and
the various organizations and institutions connected with the
Church and the Orthodox religion. 69
This Soviet wooing of the region's ethnic and religious minor-
ities was a matter not of principle but of political expedien-
cy and necessity. It did not contradict, obstruct or preclude the
formation of contacts with Arabs and Muslims. Since the
interests of the minorities did not clash with those of the greater
part of the population, the protection and political, moral and
material assistance the Soviet Union gave the former did not
commit it to an anti-Arab position. The Soviet tactic in the
Middle East, noted by the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, of
emphasizing "affinity with the Muslims in the Soviet
Union...and Soviet success in improving the economic situation
of these people," 7 0 was no less relevant to the local majority than
to its splinter groupings.
In particular, there was fertile ground for activity among those
elements of the Muslim Arab population that were differentiated
from the ruling groups by their socio-political views. For
example, the Soviet Legation in Cairo sought to become the
patron of Egypt's workers, especially insofar as they were or-
ganized. 71 The Egyptian press reported that the Soviet Union
actually sent financial support to workers striking in Egypt and
organized the students' and workers' demonstrations that hit
Egypt in February-March 1946 following Britain's announce-
ment in January that it was not yet prepared to discuss the
amendment of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 72 The contacts
maintained by the Soviet Union's official representatives in
Cairo encompassed numerous other elements which were
likewise interested in intensifying the struggle against Britain
and perhaps in receiving material or other assistance for the
purpose. For example, at a meeting which took place on Soviet

initiative between one of the Soviet Legation's officials and rep-
resentatives of Various political groups, the Soviet diplomat
stated specifically that the Legation was interested in the estab-
lishment of a National Front united around the struggle against
Britain. 73
The political value of establishing and maintaining contacts
in the Near East was not the sole thought behind those activities.
In the more immediate run, the intensive Soviet effort to extend
the USSR's connections in the region provided it with new
and important sources of information on local trends and
developments.
Alongside its diplomatic and other activity the USSR was
also increasing the coverage of the "Arab East" in its communi-
cations media. Besides the usual themes of the region's strategic
significance, both as a communications center and a major oil
reserve, and the endeavors of the Western powers to dominate
the Middle East, the Soviet press and radio paid growing atten-
tion to the struggles of its peoples to liberate themselves from
the yoke of imperialism. As one Soviet commentator wrote in
mid-1946, it had been pointed out at both the first session of
the U.N. General Assembly and at the Security Council that
"the time had come to stabilize the situation and to establish
security in this part of the world. . .and that this could not be
achieved unless the powers which regard the Arab East as their
sphere of influence renounced colonial expansion, withdrew
their troops from these territories without delay and showed
full respect for the rights of nations to decide their destinies in-
dependently." Yet nothing was being done and "new reports
came in every day of unrest in the Middle East, reflecting an
unhealthy situation which constitutes a threat to peace." 74
The Soviet Union's principal concern was that Western
domination of the Middle East would have an adverse effect on
its own national security in a deteriorating international
situation. Although the USSR was still talking in 1946 and early
1947 in terms of cooperation with the West, 75 there was an
obvious gap between its public position and the
political-diplomatic reality of the period. Both the Soviet
leadership and the diplomatic corps privately expressed their
awareness of the worsening East-West confrontation. Stalin
himself told U.S. Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith in April 1946
that in his opinion the United States was joining up with Britain
against the Soviet Union. 7 6 The reason for this discrepancy was
the Soviet Union's lack of atomic weapons, on the one hand, and
any organizational or institutional framework of alliances, on the
other, both of which made it desirable to keep up pretenses of
preserving the wartime alliance. The West, for its part, seemed to
be successfully laying the groundwork for blocs, alliances and
other structures for coordinating policies, among others in the
Middle East.
Toward the end of 1945 Soviet attention was already being
drawn to U.S. bases in the Indian Ocean, Middle East and North
Africa,77 to the Turkish-Iraqi plan for the establishment of a
Turkish-Arab Middle Eastern bloc 78 and to attempts "to organize
an Eastern bloc — a military alliance of the Arab countries," that
would guarantee "British domination in the Middle East."79
Intentions to establish this "bloc" in the guise of a unified
Muslim world were also connected with the Transjordanian-
Turkish pact of January 1947 and King 'Abdallah of Trans-
jordan's plans to set up a "Greater Syria": the Soviet media re-
ported that 'Abdallah during his visit to Turkey had spoken of
the ties of friendship between all the countries of the East from
Afghanistan to Tangier.80
It was apparently the tendency toward cooperation among
Britain's clients in the area and their political-strategic
mobilization on the side of the Western powers that brought
home to the USSR the significance and potential of the Middle
East's centers of conflict and unrest. In an interview Stalin
granted the Lebanese minister to Moscow on 28 December 1946
— that the interview took place was in itself evidence of the
importance the Kremlin attached to the "Arab East" — the Soviet
leader was reported to have inquired about plans for establishing
a Greater Syria and to have displayed specific interest in Arab
problems, particularly the attitude of the Arab states to the
Palestine question and Turkish-Arab relations. 81
The official Soviet stand on the area's problems was reflected
in a pamphlet put out by the British Communist Party in October
1946. It called for cooperation among the three wartime allies as
the only solution to the Middle East's problems and the only way
to raise their standard of living. The region's peoples would then
be able to develop their natural resources and attain a degree of
democratic progress that would bring them national freedom and
full independence. As it was, the author of the pamphlet
maintained, the new forces emerging from among the workers
and fallahin were turning the imperialists and their local agents
not only against the nationalist and anti-imperialist trends in the
Middle East but also against the USSR, whose wartime role had
had a major influence on the peoples of the area. The result was,
on the one hand, the creation and consolidation of strategic
bases from which to destroy the national movements and
eventually also the source from which they derived so much
inspiration, namely the Soviet Union, and, on the other, the
suppression by the Arab governments of the democratic forces in
their midst. 82 The Soviet media took up the theme that the USSR
was the friend of the peoples of the Near and Middle East:
having no direct interest of its own in the area, the Soviet Union
and its policy were a "ray of hope" for their deliverance from the
imperialist yoke. 83
The Palestine Question
The USSR's growing interest and activity in the Middle East as

a whole was paralleled by a marked increase in the attention it
paid to the Palestine issue. Indeed, the features that drew Soviet
attention to the entire region attracted it in particular to
Palestine. Just as the Middle East was a key point in Britain's
imperial communications and global strategic planning, so was
Palestine in London's Middle Eastern considerations and in the
disposition of its forces throughout the entire Middle East.
Moreover, Palestine was a major theater in the anti-imperialist,
anti-British struggle of the region's peoples, in particular
because of the political and military potential of its anti-British
elements, and an obviously weak link in the generally
deteriorating British position in the region.
Convinced that sooner or later (and presumably sooner) the
Palestine question must necessarily come up for international
discussion and realizing that when this happened it would have
to break its silence and adopt a clearly defined stand on the
disagreements between Jews and Arabs, the Soviet Union set
about studying the problem's local Middle Eastern aspects. The
purpose of this was to achieve maximum influence over the
regional participants in the unfolding drama in order to ensure a
continued role in its development once the USSR's ability to
precipitate the international discussion by manipulating the
situation of European Jews became irrelevant.
Thus, when the new minister in Cairo, Aleksei Shchiborin,
visited Palestine in October 1945 prior to a protracted visit to the
USSR, one of TASS's Cairo correspondents said he had gone
there to learn of developments at first hand, since the Palestine
problem was currently being discussed in Moscow. The day

was approaching, the correspondent added, when the Soviet
Union would have a decisive say in Middle Eastern affairs and
it had therefore to keep up with developments in the area.
TASS correspondents, too, paid several visits to Palestine with
the same purpose, sometimes at the invitation of representatives
of the Yishuv, sometimes on their own initiative. At least one
such trip was conducted incognito to study the country and
investigate what interested Moscow.84 (Despite this attentiveness
of Soviet correspondents and other officials to events in the area,
the Soviet media still attributed their information on Palestine,
as well as Egypt, exclusively to Reuters with which they had an
agreement to this effect, although — as one TASS correspondent
testified — the reports that were published did not always
coincide with those received from Reuters.85)
In addition to what they saw for themselves, Soviet diploma-
tic personnel stationed in the Middle East sought written mater-
ial on Palestine. The Soviet consul in Beirut, Agronov, on a
visit to Palestine in May 1946 (see p. 18), told the secretary of
the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR, Lev Tar-
nopoler, that since his government would soon be determining
its stand on Palestine, he required "basic and objective material
on Palestine's political situation and the various Jewish sugges-
tions that had appeared and would appear in the future for sol-
ving its complex political problems." When he was duly given
copies of the testimonies recently borne before the Anglo-
American Committee of I quiry, the Soviet consul promised that
they would immediately be translated into Russian and sent to
his government.86
One of the topics in which the Soviet side to these contacts
disclosed a particular interest was the Yishuv's ability to
implement its resolve to achieve independence when the time
came. As the counselor at the Soviet Embassy in London, Viktor
Kokin, told the delegation of the League for Friendly Relations
with the USSR in August 1945 (see p. 18), the Soviet Union
considered the Yishuv a "progressive" factor and was convinced
of its military potential 87 — both features clearly being relevant
to its possible role in an anti-imperialist, anti-British struggle. By
the beginning of 1946 the Soviet press was already showing
evidence of its admiration for the effectiveness of Jewish
anti-British military or para-military activity.88 On his visit to
Palestine in May 1946 Agronov made specific inquiries about the
Yishuv's military capacity. He was told by a member of the "X"
Command that led the United Resistance Movement, Yisrael

Idelson (later Bar Yehuda), that the Hagana was able to mobilize
a force 120,000 strong, even if its current number did not exceed
60,000. This information apparently impressed Agronov
considerably. 89
Soviet representatives also maintained contact with the
Palestinian Arabs concerning Palestine's future. These went
beyond the uninterrupted links with pro-Soviet Arab groups,
such as the Communists and the Orthodox Christians. During
Shchiborin's trip to Palestine in October 1945 he was given a
memorandum by_ the former_ secretary of the Arab Supreme
Committee, 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, calling for Soviet support for
the Arab cause in Palestine and asking the Soviet Union to
refrain from assisting the Zionist effort.90 In late^ summer 1946
the Jerusalem Mufti, Amin Muhammad al-Husayni, then resident
in Cairo, conducted negotiations with the Soviet Legation there
on the same topic. The Mufti agreed in principle to a suggestion
put by Soviet diplomats in Egypt for cooperation between the
USSR and the Arabs. Although of the opinion that the time was
not yet ripe to conclude any general agreement for "cooperation
with you for the liberation of my country," he was prepared to
receive financial assistance and to work together on the plane of
intelligence. 91 Meanwhile, a number of Arab newspapers sug-
gested a pro-Soviet orientation. AJ-FaJastin, for example, called
in February 1947 for the dispatch of an Arab delegation to the
USSR, which "today is stronger than England," to ask for as-
sistance in "getting rid of the British." 92
Soviet sources stressed two main themes in their description
and analysis of the Palestine problem in this period. In the first
place, they said, Palestine played a central role in Western
strategy. It was a junction or terminal of major pipelines bringing
oil to Europe from Iraq, Iran and other parts of the Middle East,
as well as being a probable oil-producing country in its own
right. Indeed, the various conferences dealing with the Palestine
question were saturated with "the smell of petroleum." 9 3
Moreover, as one commentary noted, Palestine "lies at the center
of the world trade routes passing through the Mediterranean"
and had been "converted into a principal British strategical base
in the Arab East. A first-class naval port was established in
Haifa... . A network of military aerodromes, numerous military
barracks, highroads and railways of purely strategic importance
was built. These...enable British troops to be shifted from any
part of Palestine to the borders of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and
Saudi Arabia, and ensure the maintenance of complete British

control over the Suez Canal irrespective of whether British
troops are stationed on Egyptian territory or not." Palestine's
strategic significance explained British efforts to continue
controlling it, despite the considerable difficulties and cost.
Palestine, the above source went on, was "occupied" by 60,000
British troops and a 15,000-strong police force. It lacked "all
guarantees of human rights" and had become "a classical
example of the police-ridden state" With wholesale arrests,
police terror and curfews, 94 as well as "concentration camps
surrounded by barbed wire." 9 5
The second feature of the Palestine situation as presented by the
Soviet media was the unpopularity of the Mandatory regime. As
New Times emphasized, "both among Arabs and Jews a powerful
protest movement is developing against the traditional British
policy in Palestine, for the independence of the country, for the
democratization of the political system and the opportunity of
free and unhampered development for the Palestine people." 9 6
Just occasionally Soviet publications pointed to the possibility
of some Jewish-Arab accord. The emphasis in these instances was
on the ties between the "progressive" circles on both sides,
perhaps in the hope that any arrangement to which the pro-Soviet
elements in each national grouping were party might depend on
Soviet support. In a lengthy article in 1945 devoted to the Arab
League, Soviet orientalist Lidiia Vatolina referred to an
"interesting" solution to the Palestine question which had been
suggested in Palestine. The initiator of the plan, Dr. Judah L.
Magnes, "relying on relatively progressive circles in the Jewish
and Arab population," conceived of a bi-national state in which
Jewish immigration would continue but be "regulated in
accordance with the existing correlation of forces" between Jews
and Arabs and the country's "well-being." Even Vatolina,
however, admitted that the bi-national proposal "like so many
others, evoked controversy in Palestine itself." 97 Another
statement dated January 1947 maintained that despite imperialist
efforts to "kindle the fires of internecine and religious strife...
cooperation between Jewish and Arab progressive organizations
to fight for a free and independent Palestine and against the policy
of imperialism has been established in the country." 9 8 References
to cooperation were almost certainly based on information
received from Jewish Communist or leftist sources in Palestine
and referred to some minor instance of cooperation that was more
wishful thinking than actual action.
Most other examples of Soviet allusions to Jewish-Arab

cooperation were duly guarded. One commentator noted that the
British prevented "collaboration between the Arabs and Jewish
progressive elements," for were it to come about "British
imperialist policy in Palestine would completely fail." 99 There is
no reason to believe that Soviet policy makers may have taken the
possibility of Jewish-Arab accord into account even at this stage
(1945-46), however much it may have appealed to them as
meeting Soviet interests. As Pravda wrote in September 1946, the
Palestinian population which was "composed of two sharply
hostile national groups" would "attain its legitimate democratic
rights only when the British occupation troops evacuated" the
country. The fact that each of the country's national groupings,
the Arab and the Jewish, demanded all of Palestine for itself did
not justify British occupation. On the contrary, Pravda
maintained, in line with one of the recurrent Soviet themes
concerning Palestine, the Mandatory government merely
exacerbated the Jewish-Arab conflict, as the interests of
imperialist policy demanded the implementation of the principle
of "divide and rule." The solution suggested by the Soviet
Communist Party organ carefully evaded the issue: the only
feasible correct solution, it said, was the one offered by the Soviet
system of granting each nation "the rights of self-determination,
equality and democratic freedoms." 10°
Attitude to the Yishuv
The Arab-Jewish conflict, however, was not the main reason

for the USSR's hesitation to commit itself on Palestine's polit-
ical future. The main consideration was the international con-
stellation. A central figure in Poland's foreign policy specifi-
cally told L. Levite in August that the Soviet Union had not yet
determined its stand as it wished to see what steps the United
States and Britain would be taking. True, the same source in-
sinuated that the Yishuv's anti-British struggle might well be a
decisive factor in determining the Soviet stand. 101 Yet as long
as the issue was not raised at the U.N. evasiveness was pos-
sible, enabling Moscow to enjoy maximum maneuverability
with Jews and Arabs alike and to try to encourage both to adopt
an anti-British position.
Nonetheless, at this stage the Arab-Jewish dispute placed the
Soviet Union in a dilemma. In the short run, the Jewish Yishuv
appeared to be the more important of the two sides to the local
conflict, from the point of view of both its military potential and
its political determination; but in the final account — once the
more immediate task of ending British rule was achieved — the
Arabs, despite their current pro-British orientation, would clearly
be the more important factor.
At a meeting held in Cairo in February 1946 in which all the
Soviet representatives in the Middle East and a delegate from
Moscow were reported to have participated, one speaker said that
the Yishuv was a politically progressive factor and an important
constructive force. The Soviet Union had to take into account in
its evaluation of the situation the fact that Palestine was inhabited
by two peoples, although it was unable and did not need as yet to
take a stand on the Palestinian "national controversy." The
adaptation of Soviet policy to reality meant that Moscow could
ignore neither its own lack of direct interests and real power in
the area nor the fact that the main force in the area, the Arab
League, was a reactionary force and an instrument of
imperialism. 102
Early in June the Jewish Telegraphic Agency quoted "reliable
sources" in Jerusalem as indicating that "the general trend in
Soviet political quarters is opposed to the conversion of Palestine
into a purely Arab state." In the view of Soviet diplomacy this
would mean "complete British mastery of the Middle East" while
Jewish immigration was "bound to enhance international
interests" in Palestine and "to lead to international control over it,
thus opening the way to Russian participation in shaping the
destiny of this part of the world." 1 0 3
Moscow's short-term policy calculations directed at precipi-
tating the end of the Mandate seemed, then, to require the consid-
eration of Jewish national claims and aspirations without any
thought of a long-term commitment. TASS correspondent
Ianchenko confirmed this by saying that the USSR understood the
Yishuv's apprehensions regarding its long-term policy. Despite
current opposition to the Arab League, Moscow would one day
win over the Arabs. Palestine's remoteness from the Soviet Union
meant that direct national interests did not determine the Soviet
stand. It was therefore plausible that just as currently the USSR
seemed to be coming closer to the Jews, so, when the international
political arena changed, as it was constantly doing, Moscow
would be compelled to abandon them. 1 0 4
The Soviet Union, moreover, had no illusions about the
Yishuv's Western connections and basic Western orientation.
Previously, one Soviet source said in the summer of 1946, the
settlement of Jews in Palestine through the Zionist movement had

been intended to strengthen British rule there. Latterly, however,
British influence had "been declining in certain Zionist circles"
only to be replaced by that of the United States. American capital
had penetrated the Middle East and dominated Palestine's in-
dustry, while American politicians had played up "pro-Zionist
slogans." 1 0 5 As Agronov said shortly before, Soviet officials were
not convinced of the "independence" of the Zionist movement
although they were aware that it contained "strong and influential
progressive elements" 1 0 6 and gave these elements to understand
that they were not clear who would mold the image of the world
Zionist movement.
As distinct from the description of the Yishuv as progressive in
the context of the struggle against Britain (cf. above), the official
Soviet view denied that its socio-economic structure was
progressive. True, a number of Soviet diplomats and other
officials who visited Palestine were favorably impressed by the
Yishuv's various experiments in collective settlement. They said,
for example, that they understood that the Arab feudal leaders
were apprehensive of the penetration into the area of such ways of
life — the standard of living of the Palestinian Arabs, one of them
noted, was the highest in the Arab East as a result of the Jews'
arrival — while the British too opposed the Yishuv so as to
prevent the extension of social reform throughout the Middle
East, a development that would undermine the very base of their
predominance. 1 0 7 But even in 1946 the usual Soviet line was that
all branches of the Yishuv's economy (trade, agriculture and
industry) were controlled by foreign capital and that even its
cooperative institutions were capitalist monopolies. 1 0 8
As early as 1946, too, Soviet diplomats were accusing the
Yishuv's leading personalities and representative organizations of
deliberately counteracting any effective cooperation with the
Soviet Union. The first secretary of the Soviet Legation in Cairo
said that Ben Gurion's speeches did not "differ much from the
fascists," while those of Shertok were not "much better." The
Palestinian Jewish press was irresponsible in its treatment of the
relations between the Yishuv and the USSR, and the pamphlets
that the Jewish Agency was sending to the Soviet Union were
"pure propaganda and did not give any picture or understanding
of Palestine... . Reading them it is possible to think that Arabs do
not exist in Palestine at all." The Yishuv's commercial methods,
the Soviet diplomat complained in addition, were "not very fair
and Soviet Russia is used to clear and honest dealings," while its
cultural relations were organized both on a commercial basis and

under the auspices of the V League whose members were not "real
friends" of the USSR. 109
Indeed, apart from those elements within the Yishuv which felt
an ideological affinity to the USSR there was no official group or
institution whose task was to establish or maintain relations with
Soviet representatives. The League for Friendly Relations with the
USSR (the former V League) was a politically heterogeneous body
and Soviet diplomats sought more functional contacts. It was
stated specifically in the February 1946 meeting of "Soviet
representatives" in the Middle East referred to above that the lack
of a uniform political force in the Yishuv to conduct contacts
"with Soviet Government factors" was "regrettable." 1 1 0 The
multitudinous ties that were established and the links with
people with an endless variety of political viewpoints must have
confused Soviet diplomats and led them to cast doubt on the
political viability of the Yishuv. The question of the reliability
of the information supplied them by the Yishuv was raised by
Consul Agronov. He complained that it was unconvincing and
pointed out the contradiction between data given him on two
different occasions, presumably from two separate sources. 1 1 1
Final proof that Soviet interest in the Yishuv emanated from its
anti-British stand was provided by Moscow's ambivalent attitude
to the militant underground organizations, the Irgun Tzva'i
Le'umi ("Etzel") and the Stern Group, known too as Lohamei
Herut Yisrael ("Lehi"). At least twice senior Soviet officials
expressed in private conversation their positive evaluation of the
contribution of these bodies to the Yishuv's struggle against
Britain. 112 On the other hand, a third Soviet official voiced his
reservations on the grounds that actions directed against
non-military objectives were basically ineffective and even likely
to serve British interests by providing a pretext for the British to
remain in Palestine to preserve order. 113 Both opinions, as well as
the very fact that high-ranking Soviet personalities had a positive
evaluation of these organizations and that contacts were
maintained by Soviet and East European personnel with
representatives of both the Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi and the Stern
Group, 114 bear out the contention that the Yishuv's anti-
imperialist program and actions provided the primary crite-
rion for the Soviet view of it.
As a leading statesman of one of the People's Democracies told
a representative of the Yishuv, the struggle against imperialism
was the sole determining factor of the Soviet estimation of every
political entity at any given moment, even if in the long run its
social, political and economic structure was the crucial
element. 115
PROSPECTS AND PRESSURES FOR

U.N. DISCUSSION ON PALESTINE
Having established a wide network of contacts, with the dual

purpose of acquiring first-hand information and wielding a
certain influence on developments in Palestine itself, the USSR
began to press for the international discussion of the Palestine
question it had long anticipated. 1 1 6 During the Regular Session of
the General Assembly that took place in the fall of 1946, Soviet
delegates stressed the need for an immediate solution to the
Palestine problem under the pretext and in the context of U.N.
discussion of frameworks for changing the status of dependent
territories. On 29 October Foreign Minister Molotov, referring in
the general discussion to the establishment of an international
trusteeship system, said that the powers which held "the
mandates of Palestine and Tanganyika, Togoland and New
Guinea, etc." were merely writing "unsatisfactory drafts and
insignificant declarations" instead of taking steps to promote the
development of their territories in the direction of self-
government and independence. 1 1 7 Several days later the Soviet
delegate at the Trusteeship Council, Nikolai Novikov, returned
to the onslaught. He noted inter alia Britain's "failure to submit
a draft trusteeship agreement" for Palestine and claimed that by
trying to settle the problem of Palestine through negotiations
with the U.S. government and with Arab and Jewish representa-
tives outside the U.N., Britain was violating "the principles of
the Charter which provided for a Trusteeship System for non-
self-governing territories, including former mandates." 118
The factors that brought the Palestine question to a head and
introduced a new momentum into the diplomatic arena were
the increasing tension and violence in the country in the
months May-July 1946; 119 and a political crisis created by the
military-security situation and by two major developments
which changed the political-diplomatic context of the Palestine
question. The first of these was the Morrison-Grady Plan drafted
by an Anglo-American committee of experts in July 1946 and
published before the end of the same month in the American
press. It stipulated the setting up in Palestine of two autono-
mous cantons — one Arab and one Jewish — whose competence
was to be limited to matters of virtually no political importance,

while both the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area and the Negev were to
be ruled directly by the Mandate. President Truman himself
had reservations regarding the proposal, as he told Attlee on 12
August. 120 Pravda remarked that according to the Morrison-
Grady Plan "the sanctity of Jerusalem, like the sanctity of the
oil fields" was to remain "a British preserve" and would ensure
the continuation of British rule in Palestine. 121
The second development was the Zionist Organization's
decision to substitute a partition platform for the Biltmore
Program which had called for the establishment of a Jewish
Commonwealth in all of Palestine west of the Jordan. On 1 August
1946 in Paris an expanded Jewish Agency Executive began a
reappraisal of the situation of which the main components were:
on the one hand, the mass exodus from Poland; and, on the other,
a. the difficulty of continuing negotiations with the British
following the 29 June action; 122 b. the anomalous stand of the
United States which despite its interest in the fate of the refugees
— both for humanitarian reasons and in order to be rid of the D.P.s
in its occupation zones in Germany and Austria — had become
involved in British-initiated attempts to solve the Palestine
problem; and c. the ambivalent stand of the USSR whose
intentions were not known (and had probably not yet been
formulated). After several participants announced they were
rescinding their opposition to partition in the hope of saving the
survivors of the Holocaust still in Europe, the Executive adopted a
resolution on 5 August in favor of partition, i.e. the setting up of a
"viable Jewish state in an adequate area of Palestine."
The U.S. Government was informed of the resolution and on 4
October Truman published a statement demanding immediate
and substantial immigration to Palestine and calling for partition,
on the assumption that the gap between the Jewish Agency and
British proposals could be bridged. Despite the cautious wording
of the President's statement, the British government saw in it a
declaration of American opposition to Britain's Palestine policy.
Early in October, Bevin said Britain would not impose partition
on Palestine and if an agreement were not reached, his
government would "hand back" the Mandate to the U.N. 123
The British government made one last attempt to find a solution
of its own initiative in talks held in London with both Jews and
Arabs (separately). By February 1947, however, it was clear that
these too had failed and on 19 February Ernest Bevin told the
House of Commons that the government intended referring to the
U.N. the question of the implementation of its Palestine Mandate.

The British foreign minister was compelled to admit that he was
unable to mediate or reach a compromise between two
communities whose aims were mutually contradictory and both
of which had sufficient foreign support to ignore attempts at
persuasion. At the same time London had no intention of
conceding the Mandate (it asked the U.N. how its Mandate "can
be administered...or amended"), and indeed the transfer of
military equipment from Egypt to Palestine (and Kenya) begun in
1946 — w7hen the British suggested the evacuation of their bases
in Egypt during the Bevin-Sidqi negotiations — continued until
September 1947. 124
Bevin's adviser on Near Eastern Affairs, Harold Beeley, told
Jewish Agency representative David Horowitz that Britain was
bringing the Palestine question before the U.N. in absolute
certainty that that body would confirm the Mandate and hand it
back to the British government for implementation. A change in
Palestine's political status, Beeley pointed out, required a
two-thirds majority at the U.N. which meant that both the United
States and the Soviet bloc "join together and support the same
resolution in the same terms. That," the British official went on,
"has never happened, it cannot happen, and it will never
happen!" 1 2 5
Almost simultaneously with the new crisis over the admin-
istration of the Palestine Mandate, a further development took
place which had a far-reaching influence upon the circum-
stances and atmosphere of international and particularly inter-
power politics, serving to stress the exacerbation of the Soviet-
U.S. confrontation all over the globe, but first and foremost in the
Middle East. On 24 February the British ambassador in
Washington informed Secretary of State George Marshall that the
severe economic crisis Britain was undergoing made it impossible
for it to continue giving Greece and Turkey the support they
required to withstand Soviet pressures. (These took the form of
civil war in Greece and diplomatic pressures and political and
military threats against Turkey.) Under Secretary of State Dean
Acheson said this faced Washington with "the most major
decision" it had had to deal with since the war; while British
Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton commented that the
United States was being asked "to make the largest, broadest and
most meaningful step in the nation's history, out beyond the
established frontiers of its influence." The U.S. Administration
accepted the challenge, despite the heavy burden involved. As
Truman wrote in his memoirs, the time had come for the United
States to stand at the head of the "free world."
On 11 March the President asked Congress for a major grant
($400 million) to aid Greece and Turkey. He drew comparisons
between the two systems competing for control of the world and
did not conceal his conviction that this was to be merely the
beginning of a series of new commitments resulting from this
competition. 126
The Soviet Union had been expressing its apprehensions
regarding American penetration into the Middle East ever since
the United States had given Iran the requisite political support to
withstand Soviet attempts to dominate at least the northern parts
of the country in late 1945 and early 1946. These fears grew
markedly with the U.S. announcement of its full-scale support for
Greece and Turkey as Britain's successor, and its determination to
repel Soviet expansionist tendencies on a global scale. "Truman's
recent statement...has been attacked by world democratic circles,"
Radio Moscow told its Arab audience, "U.S. expansionists attach
great importance to the penetration of their influence in the Near
East," where, together with the British, they were seeking "to
establish a regime...to bring about the submission of this zone to
Anglo-U.S. capitalism." The United States had been "looking
greedily" at Arab oil "for a long time...and they now aim to
replace Britain in this region... ." 127
The Soviet media tended to stress alternately Anglo-American
cooperation and competition in the Middle East. (This was in
accordance with Marxist-Leninist theory which stipulated both a
state of war and rivalry among the capitalist countries in all that
concerned the underdeveloped part of the world and their
common interest in its enslavement.) Over Palestine, however, the
stress was on the substantial differences between the policies of
the two Western powers.
In mid-1945 Vatolina had noted that since 1939 when the
British had changed their policy from support for the Jewish
National Home in Palestine to the containment of its develop-
ment, the Arabs had moved closer to Britain, and the Arab League
was used by London to strengthen its political and economic
position in the region. The policy of the United States, whose
status in the Middle East had been consolidated by its wartime
activity in the area, clashed with that of Britain. "A number of
influential senators and members of the House of Representatives
came out in favor of the free immigration of Jews to Palestine and
published a call for the establishment in Palestine of a democratic
Jewish state." Although, Vatolina went on, the United States had
refrained from any final commitment on the Palestine issue, not
wishing to aggravate relations with either Britain or the Arab
states, the contrary interests of the United States and Britain as
well as the speed of developments in Palestine itself would almost
certainly result in the adoption of different stands by the two
powers when the time came. 1 2 8
During the period of Anglo-American cooperation, from
October 1945 to October 1946, the Soviet media stressed
American dissatisfaction with Britain's activities in Palestine.
True, Izvestiia commented, the President had received
preliminary notification of the arrest of the Yishuv leaders on 29
June, yet the White House had officially announced Truman's
expression of regret at "the latest events" and said that the British
government had not consulted him before taking this drastic
step. 129 The same source quoted the call of a U.S. senator for the
cessation of contacts with Britain over Palestine and for the
referring of the entire problem to the U.N. 130
The Soviet Union received the British government's February
1947 announcement that it was bringing the Palestine question to
the U.N. with manifest satisfaction, although it was doubtful (not
unjustifiably, as we have seen) whether Britain intended in fact to
evacuate the country. Britain, the Soviet press and radio
continued to assert, looked at Palestine and the problem of its
future political status from the point of view of sea and air bases,
pipelines and strategic positions. "On the other hand," Radio
Moscow pointed out, "Palestine progressives believe that the first
and most essential step towards the solution of the Palestine
problem is the evacuation of foreign troops from the country and
the creation of a truly democratic and national Government." 1 3 1
In the first few days following Bevin's announcement, the
Soviet government seemed to have hoped — as in 1945 — that
Britain, the United States and the USSR would cooperate to
achieve a Palestinian settlement. Radio Moscow quoted Labour
M.P. Konni Zilliacus' appeal to the British government to keep its
1945 election promise to bring the Soviet Union as well as the
United States into partnership in the Middle East, and in Palestine
in particular. The three powers "could achieve a just settlement in
Palestine and pursue a policy of economic and social
development in the Middle East with international control of oil
resources." 1 3 2
Within a few days, however, the differences of opinion and the
lack of coordination between the two Western powers on the
question of Palestine became evident. The Soviet media were

quick to publish these Anglo-American dissonances. The
chronicle of international events published by New Times for
February 1947 included three items relating to Palestine: 10
February, Jews and Arabs at the London conference finally reject
Britain's ultimate proposals for Palestine (the Bevin Plan which
was basically similar to the Morrison-Grady Plan and had been
proposed by the British foreign secretary on 7 February); 25
February, Bevin opens the debate on Palestine in the House of
Commons with an attack on U.S. policy on Palestine; 26 February,
the White House publishes its reply to Bevin's criticisms. 133 ' T h e
Palestine question," the same source wrote, with a certain
measure of exaggeration, "is the focus of one of the sharpest
clashes between British and American interests in the Middle
East." 134
The Soviet Union possibly considered that Washington would
be loth to exacerbate the Soviet-American confrontation in areas
that were not part of the frontal collision between them and that,
therefore, the case of Palestine was basically different from Iran,
Turkey and Greece. Whatever its reasoning, Moscow obviously
intended to take advantage of this instance of unconcealed
Anglo-American friction to mitigate the increasing Soviet-
American tensions.
inter alia, the USSR sought to achieve this by paving the way
toward a rapprochement with U.S. Jewry whose political
influence, both in the conduct of American foreign policy and in
the United States' economic life the Soviet leadership played up
considerably. Indeed, the two co-chairmen of the American
Zionist Emergency Council, Abba Hillel Silver and Stephen Wise,
had previously approached the Soviet government to support
Jewish demands in Palestine. 135
As yet, however, the appeal to U.S. Jewry was not a tactic of
major import. In the first weeks following the British govern-
ment's decision, when Radio Moscow's Yiddish service was
casting aspersions on Britain's intentions, its Arabic program
was stressing the opinion of "Arab circles" that the U.S. stand
on Palestine was an attempt to consolidate the influence of
American capitalism. 136 In other words, the main feature of
Soviet tactics was the awareness and over-emphasis of the
Anglo-American clash of interests over Palestine and the desire
to use this to cooperate with Washington to achieve Britain's
evacuation of Palestine (despite Anglo-American cooperation in
other arenas.)
• • •
The period February 1945-February 1947 thus ended the way it

began, with Soviet preparations for an international colloquy on
Palestine at which that country's political future would be
discussed and settled. In early 1945, however, the USSR was
prepared to commit itself tq a pro-Jewish position to be able to
participate in a settlement together with its wartime allies — both
of which seemed to be committed to supporting the Zionist cause
and program. The beginning of 1947, on the other hand, found the
Soviet leadership apparently undecided on the details of the
arrangement it sought for Palestine, beyond the resolve to do
everything in its power to precipitate Britain's withdrawal from
the country.
The reasons for this change were inherent in the developments
of the two years under discussion. The most important of these
from the Soviet point of view was the British attempt to evade its
obligations, specifically the submission of its Palestine Mandate
for international approval and consensus, and to commit the
United States to this strategem by coopting Washington in its
policy-making processes. The Soviet leadership, which had
observed the Anglo-American partnership over Palestine with
close attention and marked concern, drew its own conclusions
from the entire episode including the ultimate failure of the
partnership to elaborate a viable settlement, These were: to refrain
from committing itself to any political action regarding Palestine
as long as it lacked the power to influence its implementation; to
develop its own means of leverage vis-d-vis the Palestine
question; and to become acquainted with both the objective
factors and the groupings and personalities pertinent to the
Jewish-Arab confrontation so that it might have maximum
influence on the local level when the time arrived for the Krem-
lin to make its decision. The obvious divergence of views be-
tween the United States and Britain, in addition to the very fun-
damental clash of interests between Jews and Arabs and the
increasingly deteriorating security situation in Palestine, left no
room for doubt that despite the British decision of February
1945 not to bring the Palestine question up for international
discussion, this discussion could not be put off for long.
The Soviet course of action was a logical outcome of this
reasoning. While assiduously refraining from any public
statement of support for the Jewish cause, the USSR aided and
abetted Jewish emigration from Eastern to Central Europe if not
solely at least partly to apply the most effective pressure on the

West to change British immigration policy in Palestine and
precipitate the anticipated international debate of the Palestine
issue as a whole. Simultaneously, still without making any
irrevocable declarations of intent besides their willingness to
contribute actively to weakening the British position in the
Middle East as a whole and in Palestine in particular, Soviet
officials visited Palestine and established and maintained a
plethora of contacts with Jews and Arabs alike both in and out-
side the country.
By the time the British government announced its resolve to
refer the Palestine question to the U.N., the Soviet position was far
stronger than it had been just two years previously. The reasons
for this were twofold: the USSR had proved its ability to
influence developments in and around Palestine by helping
emigration from the People's Democracies to Germany and
Austria, as well as improving its connections in Palestine and
throughout the Middle East; in part too, the Soviet standing had
benefited from objective circumstances — the inability of the
British government, both alone and together with the Americans,
to prevent the deterioration of the Palestine situation. This failure
seemed to necessitate a change in the status quo, although the
British hoped for a confirmation of their Mandate, and any such
change must strengthen the USSR whether directly, by bringing it
some measure of official political sway over events in Palestine, or
indirectly, simply by weakening the British position.
The moral of 1945 in mind, and determined not to demonstrate
its basic impotence in an area where it had no physical presence
or strength, the USSR continued, therefore, to abstain from any
declaration of its intentions regarding Palestine's political future
until this became unavoidable.
Notes
1. True, there had been some indications in the immediate pre-war

period of a certain change in the Soviet stand, yet these had had no
practical expression at the time. For the Soviet attitude on the question
during the period of June 1941 to February 1945, see my article "Soviet
Policy in the Middle East: the Case of Palestine during World War II,"
Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique 15, no. 3-4 (July-December
1974):373-408.
2. Roosevelt imparted this to American Zionist leader Rabbi Stephen
54 THE USSR A N D ISRAEL: 1947-1954
Wise on 16 March -Joseph [Cohen] to Chaim Weizmann, 18 March 1945

(Weizmann Archives, Rehovot).
3. For American thoughts in the same direction in the late war years,
see Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943, vol.
4, pp. 811 and 815-22; and 1944, vol. 5, pp. 593-94 and 601-2.
4. Roosevelt may, for example, have told Wise that Stalin had agreed
with his own position and let Wise understand the latter as he thought fit.
Thus the Economic Adviser to the U.S. Legation in Egypt, Lt.-Col. Harold
Hoskins, reported that Roosevelt had told him Stalin was neither
pro-Zionist nor anti-Zionist-H. Hoskins to Paul Ailing, deputy director
of the State Department Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, 5
March 1945, Foreign Relations. . . 1945, vol. 8, p. 691. For a discussion of
this question, see Joseph Heller, "Roosevelt, Stalin and the Palestine
Problem at Yalta," The Wiener Library Bulletin 30, New Series, Nos.
41/42 (1977):25-35.
5. Foreign Relations. . . Î945, vol. 5, p. 655.
6. From Memorandum of Conversation by Evan Wilson, 20 June 1945,
ibid., p. 712. The following took part in this conversation in addition to
Goldmann: Loy Henderson, director of the State Department Office of
Near Eastern and African Affairs; Gordon Merriam, chief of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs; and Evan Wilson, of the same division.
7. JTA, 28 June 1945.
8. David Ben Gurion, Medinat Yisrael Ha-Mehudeshet (English title:
The Restored State of Israel) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971), vol. 12, p. 65.
(Ben Gurion's book has been rendered in English under the title Israel, A
Personal History, Tel Aviv: Sabra Books, 1971; yet although officially a
translation, the English version is not accurate and is less full than the
Hebrew. I have therefore decided to use the Hebrew original for purposes
of reference.)
9. For the stand, for example, of the Palestinian Communist Party
(P.C.P.), cf. JTA, 8 March, 9 April and 3 June 1945; for that of Western
Communist parties, see JTA, 18 July 1945.
10. "P 261", from Cairo, to the Jewish Agency Political Department, 12
June 1946, CZA, S25/486. The three Jewish deputy foreign ministers were
Maksim Litvinov, Ivan Maiskii and Solomon Lozovskii - a l l of whom, as
it happened, lost their positions in 1946; yet even without this
development, Shvedov's remark must have sounded somewhat cynical
(cf. chap. 7). ("P" was a Jewish Agency contact in Cairo who reported
regularly to Jerusalem, cf. n. 19 below. I have not been able to identify
him.)
11. From report given by Shlomo Kaplansky, a member of the
delegation that met with Kokin, in the protocol of a League Secretariat
meeting, 26 September 1945, CZA, S25/5717.
12. L. Tarnopoler to the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR,
22 May 1946, CZA, S25/486. For the relevant resolution, see Jewish
Chronicle, 23 February 1945.
13. Foreign Relations. . . 1945, vol. 8, p. 712. Academician Evgenii
Korvin, a historian of international law, was a member of the Soviet
delegation on the U.N. Preparatory Commission in London.
14. The united stand of the Arab states was the result of their
consolidation within the Arab League which had officially come into
being in March 1945 and was making its first appearance in the
international arena, within the framework of the Dumbarton Oaks
proposals for "regional arrangements." For the Arab League, its origins,
structure and activities, see Robert W. MacDonald, The League of Arab
States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
15. Eliahu Elath, Yoman San Francisco (English title: San Francisco
Diary) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1971), pp. 150-53.
16. Ibid., pp. 160-61. Indeed, Soviet publications were generally
hostile to the Arab League as an important instrument of British power in
the Middle East.
17. "Report on the San Francisco Conference," undated, unsigned and
unaddressed, typewritten transcript, CZA, Z5/934.
18. CZA, Z5/934.
19. This was reported by TASS's Cairo correspondent to " P " who
passed on the information to the Political Department of the Jewish
Agency in Jerusalem on 1 January 1 9 4 6 - C Z A , S25/486.
For the Soviet military presence in Iran, which Moscow was officially
obligated to terminate within six months of the conclusion of World War
II, and the concern of international diplomacy at Soviet reluctance to
withdraw, see Yaacov Ro'i, From Encroachment to involvement: A
Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974), pp. 3-8, 17-21, 31-33.
20. For the Anglo-American agreement of 3 December 1924, see
Foreign Relations. . . 1924, vol. 2, pp. 212-22.
21. Memorandum by William Yale, of the Division of Near Eastern
Affairs, and Annex to Memorandum by the Chief of the Division, Gordon
Merriam, to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs,
Loy Henderson, 25 July 1945, Foreign Relations. . . 1945, vol. 8, pp.
717-19.
22. Secretary of State James Byrnes to Lowell C. Pinkerton, U.S.
Consul-General in Jerusalem, 18 August 1945, Foreign Relations. . . 1945,
vol. 8, p. 722. U.S. policy on immigration to Palestine cannot be entirely
separated from the difficulties put in the way of the immigration of D.P.s
to the United States which encouraged the Administration to look for a
solution in Palestine. For American policy on this question and attempts
at relevant legislation, see American ]ewish Yearbook, 5707, vol. 48, pp.
218-27; and 5708, vol. 49, pp. 212-22 and 561-62.
23. The Charge d'Affaires in Iraq, James Moose, to Secretary of State
Byrnes, 20 August 1945, ibid., pp. 723-24.
24. As above, 22 August 1945, ibid., p. 726.
25. L. Henderson to J. Byrnes, 24 August 1945, ibid., pp. 729-30.
26. L. Henderson to Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State, William Phillips, 22 June 1945, ibid.,
p. 713.
27. For the background to Truman's suggestion, see Yehuda Bauer,
Flight and Rescue: Brichah (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 76-82;
and Elath, pp. 31-32. For Truman's letter to Attlee and Attlee's replies of
14 and 16 September, see Foreign Relations. . . 1945, vol. 8, pp. 734-40;
cf. also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (New
York: Doubleday, 1956), chap. 10.
28. Foreign Relations. . . 1945, vol. 8, pp. 771-83; Truman, Years of
Trial and Hope, p. 142; and Bauer, pp. 199-201.
29. Bartley C. Crum, Behind the Silken Curtain (London: Victor
Gollancz, 1947), p. 46.
30. This argument was carefully interwoven into the more general
Leninist theory of the basic contradictions of interest between the vari-
ous capitalist countries, cf. p. 49 above.
31. Crum, pp. 16, 31 and 34-36.
32. V. Milogradov, Arahskii vostok v mezhdunarodnykh otnoshe-
niiakh (The Arab East in international relations) (Moscow: Pravda,
February 1946). Like so many public lectures on current issues intended
for use by party propagandists throughout the country, the lecture was
printed as an independent brochure, edited by the orientalist Vladimir
Lutskii.
33. New Times, 1 June 1946. {New Times, the English version of Novoe
vremia, had begun to appear in 1946.)
34. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to U.S. Chargé d'Affaires
in Moscow, George Kennan, 17 January 1946: and Kennan to Secretary of
State Byrnes, 19 February 1946, Foreign Relations. . . 1946, vol. 7, pp. 578
and 581.
35. Both Arab and Jewish Palestinian Communists protested against
the exclusion of the USSR from the Committee-/TA, 16 November 1945
and 20 February 1946.
36. Izvestiia, 3 and 5 May 1946; and Pravda, 8 May 1946.
37. New Times, 1 June 1946.
38. The Yishuv's military activities against the Mandatory had been
eased in the fall of 1945 pending the outcome of the Committee's
findings; in view of these and the British government's reaction to them it
was natural that these activities now be resumed with greater intensity
than before.
40. Cf. Milogradov's statement above, pp. 23-24.
41. Roman Frister, Bekhol Libo, Yisrael Barzilai-Sirtutim (With All
His Heart, Israel Barzilai-Sketches) (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1975),
pp. 16-17. On 28 July 1945, for instance, the Soviet commander of a
former German concentration camp (Theresienstadt) signed an agree-
ment with a Brichah leader (see below) for the transfer of the camp's
Jewish immates to the American occupation zone, in order to "repatri-
ate" specifically to Palestine —Bauer, p. 110. On another occasion, a
Brichah activist arranged a meeting between Lady Reading, chairman
of the Jewish Women's Congress, and General Ivan Konev, commander
of Soviet Forces in Austria, that led to the latter ordering the troops at
the frontiers of the Soviet zones to enable Jews awaiting permission to
depart to cross the borders —interview of Y. Bauer with Bronislaw
Teichholz, 21 October and 26 November 1966, OHD 89/4. (Teichholz
was at the time a Brichah activist operating in Vienna.)
42. Ibid., interview of Y. Bauer.
43. Bauer, pp. 166, 168, 169 and others; also Ephraim Dekel,
Binetivei Ha-Briha (In the Paths of the Brichah) (Tel Aviv: Maarakhot,
1957, pp. 467-72 and 474-76. (The English version of this b o o k -
B'riha: Flight to the Homeland, New York: Herzl Press, [197?] —is not
as full as the Hebrew original; I have therefore used the latter.)
44. Bauer, pp. 116, 130-140 and 232-42; also/TA, 30 September 1946
and 6 January 1947.
45. Jewish sources published much material on the attitude of East
European factors to Jewish emigration and ancillary issues, e.g., /TA,
1945-48, passim.
46. For the problems that characterized the establishment of the
People's Democracies in Eastern Europe and their relations with the
USSR, see for example, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity
and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, revised
edition, 1971).
47. On 22 January 1945 Nahum Goldmann sent the following telegram
from Washington to the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem: "Have intervened
Russian Embassy concerning difficulties emigration Balkan countries to
Palestine. Received official communication that Soviet government no
objection to Balkan Jews leaving for Palestine. Also authorized me
announce it publicly"—CZA S25/486. In the early stages emigrants
needed certificates from the local Allied Control Commissions, that
i s - i n Romania and B u l g a r i a - t h e Soviet occupation authorities. On the
eve of the U.N. San Francisco Conference Moshe Shertok cabled
Goldmann (26 April 1945) that emigration from these two countries was
still meeting with difficulties. He went on: "Soviet declarations they
unpreventing emigration Bulgarian Rumanian Jews. Active Soviet
support essential view securing exit permits from Allied Control
Commissions and governments concerned. Suggest Molotov be
approached view issuance necessary instructions. Representation should
cover also Hungary Poland" - C Z A , S25/487.
48. Sefer Toledot Ha-Hagana (English Title: History of the Hagana)
(Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1972), vol. 3, pp. 824 and 1130-31; also pp.
1908-14; cf. also Dekel, pp. 474-75.
49. For the requisite statistical data, see Peter Meyers, Bernard D.
Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky and Nicolas Sylvain, The Jews in the Soviet
Satellites (Syracuse University Press, 1953), pp. 240 and 256-57.
50. While the presidium of the Committee of Polish Jews in the USSR
gave a figure of 250,000 {JTA, 26 March 1945), students of the topic have
given a somewhat higher estimate, cf. Shimon Redlich, "The Jews under
Soviet rule during World War II" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New
York University, 1968), pp. 43-44.
51. JTA, 8 April 1946.
52. Cf. statement by the president of the Committee of Polish Jews in
the USSR of 25 March 1945 {JTA, 26 March 1945), as well as a number of
statements by the new Polish regime and its representatives -JTA, 22
June and 21 October 1945 and 3 March 1946.
53. For the various repatriation agreements, see Meyer et al., pp. 232 ff.
The first of these, signed with the Soviet Union Republics of Lithuania,
the Ukraine and Belorussia in September 1944, covered Poles and Jews in
these Republics who had been Polish citizens in September 1939. The
agreement with the RSFSR was concluded on 6 July 1945 and
although originally due to terminate before the end of the year was
continued throughout 1946.
54. Cf. JTA, 28 October 1945.
55. For this wave of anti-Semitism, see Meyer et al., pp. 244-53; and
Bauer, chap. 4; also JTA, 23 August, 2 September and 21 October 1945,
and 11 March, 1 April and 26 May 1946.
56. JTA, 6 August 1945. On the same occasion Sommerstein pointed
out that his membership of the first administration of the new Poland was
the first time "a Zionist as such [had been] called upon to join a
Government formed with the consent of the Soviet Union." As early as
May 1945 it was reported that the Polish government had agreed to
permit Jews to emigrate to Palestine in small groups and that
Sommerstein had requested entry certificates into Palestine to be sent to
him through the Polish Embassy in Moscow (the British government had
not yet recognized the new Polish regime) -JTA, 22 May and 3 June
1945. (Although some Jews in fact emigrated directly to Palestine,

these were only very few.)
57. JTA, 8 May 1946.
58. Bauer, pp. 247-49; and author's interview with L. Levite, 28 May
1970, OHD, 50/22.
59. Bauer, pp. 219-23.
60. Ibid., pp. 216-19.
61. ]TA, 9 March 1947; and Meyer et al. p. 25.
62. These included particularly contacts established by the various
delegations that visited these areas from the left-wing political parties
and the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR. For contacts
between the League and Soviet representatives in Prague, see, for
example, the League Secretariat to the Jewish Agency Executive, 21 May
1946, CZA, S25/5717.
63. From author's interview with L. Levite, 28 May 1970, OHD, 50/22.
64. Frister, pp. 17-23. For the issue of a bi-national state, cf. above
p. 41.
65. From copy of report by Colliers correspondent Frank Gervasi,
"Russia versus Britain in the Mediterranean," 12 February 1945, CZA,
S25/485; also Frank Gervasi, To Whom Palestine? (New York: D.
Appleton-Century, 1946), chap. 9, pp. 159-80.
66. One of the first actions of Soviet Minister in Cairo, Nikolai
Novikov, on reaching Cairo was to publish an appeal to the "White
Russians" in the area calling upon them to register at the Soviet Legation
and promising that the Soviet authorities would ignore their past
activities. Most of these "Whites," whose numbers were estimated at
3,000 in Egypt, 2,000 in Syria and Lebanon, and a further 2,000 in
Palestine, were said to have responded to this call —report by Gervasi as
above.
The main campaign, however, was directed toward the Armenians of
whom some 300,000 inhabited the four above-mentioned Near Eastern
countries. Large numbers of these were already registered as Soviet
citizens at the Soviet missions in Cairo and Beirut before the end of the
war, as well as in Baghdad and at the two senior Soviet embassies in the
Middle East in Tehran and Ankara, their sum total being reported as
225,000 (ai-Musawvar, 21 March 1947). Tens of thousands at least
"repatriated" to Soviet Armenia in the years 1945-47. For the repatriation
commission's interest in the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, see Liga "V"
Lemaan Rusiya Ha-Moatzatit, Ha-Mazkirut Ha-Artzit ("V" League for
Soviet Russia), no. 3 (4 June 1945).
67. Gershon Svet to Chaim Weizmann, 21 January 1945, Weizmann
Archives. The Patriarch of Antioch, in particular, had for some time been
seeking to increase Soviet influence among his flock.
68. For the visit of Aleksei, see S.Y., "The Russian Church in the
Middle East," Hed Ha-Mizrah 4, no. 8-9 (13 July 1945):5-6; also an
unsigned memorandum entitled "The Visit of the Russian Patriarch in
the Middle East," 2 July 1945, CZA, S25/485.
For the position and problems of the Orthodox Church in the Middle
East at the time, cf. also Henry J. Psomiades, "Soviet Russia and the
"Orthodox Church in the Middle East," Middle East Journal 11, no. 4
(Autumn 1957):371-81.
69. The Soviet Vice-Consul in Beirut, for example, who visited
Palestine in May 1945 showed considerable interest in the Holy Places of
Jerusalem's Old City as well as in the question of pilgrimages, although
the official reason for his visit was "to investigate methods of combating
a well-known parasite that was causing devastation in extensive areas
of the USSR"—Y. Rabinovich to the Jewish Agency Political Depart-
ment, 18 May 1945, CZA, S25/486.
70. Averell Harriman to Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, 13
December 1944, Foreign Relations. . . 1944, vol. 5, pp. 646-48.
71. Gervasi noted that when Egyptian laborers had complaints to make
against their employers they would draft a memorandum to them, with
copies to the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs and to the Soviet
Legation. He also reported that one of TASS's two Cairo correspondents
was making a full-time study of the working and living conditions of the
Egyptian peasants." For sources see n.65.
72. Cf. New Times, 15 December 1946. For the political context and
implications of these strikes, see also following chapter.
73. These developments were reported by one of the Jewish Agency's
contacts in Cairo on 8 January 1947, CZA, S25/484. The meeting was
attended by representatives of the Muslim Brothers, the Misr al-Fatat
(Young Egypt), the youth organization of the National Party (Hizb
al-Watan) and the Wafd.
75. Stalin talked of cooperating with the West in interviews he gave
Alexander Werth in September 1946; UP correspondent Hugh Bailey a
month later; and Harold Stassen in April 1947.
76. Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia
and New York: J.P. Lippincott, 1950), pp. 50-54. Shortly afterward the
First Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Cairo, Aleksei Shvedov, said
that every country and every people had to state on whose side they
were in the cold war—"P 296" from Cairo to the Jewish Agency, 12
June 1946, CZA S25/486.
77. Novoe vremia, 1 December 1945.
78. Ibid., 15 November 1945. In September 1945 the Iraqi Regent
A b d al-Ilah and Prime Minister Nuri as-Said visited Ankara to discuss
T h e P e r i o d of N o n - C o m m i t m e n t 61
proposals for the formation of a Middle Eastern bloc, and a Turkish-Iraqi

treaty was finally approved in 1947— Majid Khadduri, independent Iraq
(London: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1960), pp. 346-47.
79. New Times, 1 December 1946.
80. R. Moscow in English, 10 and 11 December 1946, R. Moscow, 11
and 13 January 1947/MR 2671, 2691 and 2692; and R. Moscow in
Persian, 25 January 1947/DWB Í, 27 January 1947.
81. JTA, 2 January 1947.
82. I. Rennap, "Iraq and the Middle East," inside the Empire
Quarterly 5, no. 3 (October 1946).
83. R. Moscow in Arabic, 9 November 1946/MR, 2649.
84. " P " (Cairo) to M. Shertok, 1 January 1946, CZA, S25/486.
85. Yeshayahu Klinov to the Jewish Agency Political Department, 18
December 1945, ibid.
86. L. Tarnopoler to the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR,
22 May 1946, ibid.
87. From report given by Shlomo Kaplansky in the protocol of a
meeting of the League Secretariat, 26 September 1945, (see n. 11 above).
Kokin had met a year previously with Moshe Shertok, and in January
1945 had held lengthy talks with Mordekhai Orenstein (Oren) who was
in London to attend the founding conference of the World Federation of
Trade Unions—from author's interview with M. Oren, 6 June 1971, OHD
50/25.
88. E.g., New Times, 1, 7 and 15 February 1946.
89. From interview by Yaacov Bar-Haim with L. Tarnopoler, 21 April
1967, OHD 42/23.
90. JTA, 17 December 1945.
91. Husayni suggested the Soviet Legation send him 4,000 Palestine
pounds and expressed his hopes it would also provide him with
comprehensive reports of happenings in Palestine, especially
concerning "Jewish problems." He was. however, doubtful on the
subject of Palestine Communist activity, reports of which he considered
exaggerated, and therefore of the local basis which the Soviet party
suggested for its aid to the Arab cause—from Hebrew translation of
letter from the Mufti to the Chargé d'Affaires at the Soviet Legation, 16
September 1946, CZA, S25/485.
92. AJ-FaIast7n editorial, 23 February 1947, quoted by JTA, 24 Feb-
ruary 1947. (AJ-Faiastin was owned by the Orthodox Christian 'Isa al-
*lsâ.)
93. R. Moscow in Arabic, 14 January 1947/DDWB I, 16 January 1947.
For the hopes of finding oil in Palestine at this time, cf. geophysical
surveys prepared by the Iraqi Petroleum Company in the northern
Negev—Peretz Grader, Neft Beyisrael (Oil in Israel) (Jerusalem: Misrad
62. THE USSR AND ISRAEL: 1947-1954
Ha-Pituah, 1961), p. 35.

94. New Times, 1 August 1946.
95. Pravda, 30 September 1946.
97. Lidiia Vatolina, "The League of Arab Countries," Mirovoe
khoziaistvo i mirovaia poJitika 7 (1945):21-33.
98. R. Moscow in Persian, 28 January 1947/DWB Í, 30 January 1947.
99. R. Moscow in Arabic, 30 November 1946/MR, 2664.
101. Author's interview with L. Levite, 28 May 1970, OHD, 50/22.
102. Y. Rabinovich to the Jewish Agency Political Department, 21
February 1946. (The document found in Rabinovich's papers after his
death was shown me by Mr. Yaacov Bar-Haim.)
103. JTA, 9 June 1946.
104. "P 96" from Cairo, 1 January 1946, CZA, S25/486.
106. L. Tarnopoler to the League for Friendly Relations with the
USSR, 22 May 1946, CZA, S25/486.
107. "P 96" and "P 100" from Cairo, 1 January and 1 February 1946,
CZA, S25/486. One of the TASS correspondents, comparing the kibbutz
with the Soviet kolkhoz and sovkhoz, said that while the kibbutz was a
progressive socialist experiment, it was unduly idealist and therefore
not likely to exist for more than ten or fifteen years; moreover, it was
unrealistic to try to base a country's economy on self-sacrifice.
108. Cf., e.g., New Times, 1 August 1946.
109. "P 2 6 1 " from Cairo, 12 June 1946, CZA, S25/486. For the V
League see my article, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: the Case of
Palestine during World War II."
110. Y. Rabinovich to the Jewish Agency Political Department, 21
February 1946 (see n. 102).
111. L. Tarnopoler to the League for Friendly Relations with the
USSR, 22 May 1946, CZA, S25/486.
112. The first such evaluation was made by Andrei Vyshinskii in a
conversation with the Jewish Agency representative in Bucharest,
Joseph Clarman, following the assassination of Lord Moyne on 1
November 1944—Nathan Yalin-Mor, Lohamei Herut Yisrael (English
title: The Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) (Tel Aviv: Shikmona, 1947),
p. 367.
Vladimir Iakovlev expressed a similar opinion in his above-
mentioned conversation with L. Levite—from author's interview with
L. Levite, 28 May 1970, OHD, 50/22. Cf. also Izvestiia, 4 July 1946.
113. "P 96" from Cairo, 1 January 1946, CZA, S25/486.
114. The Stern Group maintained contacts with leading East Euro-
T h e P e r i o d of N o n - C o m m i t m e n t 63
pean Communists, including George Dmitroff and Rudolf Slánsky, as

well as with French Communist leaders, in all of whom it encountered
a positive evaluation of its anti-British activies—Yalin-Mor, especially
pp. 345-48, 387-94. It is worth noting that by the end of 1943 the Stern
Group was already calling for a pro-Soviet orientation, in view of the
Soviet interest in the region and its consequent rivalry with Britain
which made it a natural ally for the Yishuv—He-Hazit, nos. 7, 12, and
13; also Miriam Getter, ' T h e ideology of 'Lehi' " (English title), unpub-
lished M.A. Thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1967, pp. 49-56.
For Etzel's activities in Eastern Europe and its contacts with Soviet
representatives, see Ely J. Tavin, He-Hazit Ha-Shniya (English title: The
Second Front, the Irgun Tzvai Leumi in Europe 1946-1948) (Tel Aviv:
Ron, 1973), pp. 92, 95-96 and 152-57.
115. Author's interview with L. Levite, 28 May 1970, OHD, 50/22.
116. The USSR was calling simultaneously for U.N. discussions of
other issues pertinent to the "Arab East," notably Egypt; see following
chapter.
117. GA OR, 1st Session, Part II, 42nd Plenary Meeting, 29 October
1946.
118. GA OR, 1st Session, Part II, 4th Committee, 78th Meeting, 11
November 1946.
119. In addition to the events of May 1946, already mentioned above,
this period saw a number of major military or para-military incidents
such as the "night of the bridges" on 17 June, the British
counter-operation of "Black Saturday" (see n. 122 below) and the
blowing up of the government offices in the King David Hotel in
Jerusalem by Etzel on 22 July. For details of the events in Palestine in
the 1946-early 1947 period, see e.g. Jacob C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for
Palestine (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), pp. 224-83.
120. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 150-53.
121. Pravda, 30 September 1946. The Soviet press had followed the
developments leading up to the elaboration of the Morrison-Grady Plan,
e.g., Izvestiia, 11 July 1946.
122. In this action, known as Black Saturday, many of the Yishuv
leaders were arrested, and an extensive search for arms, especially in
the agricultural settlements, was carried out; cf. Hurewitz, p. 254.
123. See Bauer, pp. 200-59. The Jewish Agency Executive decision of
5 August was ratified as part of the Zionist Organization's official
platform at the 22nd Zionist Congress which was held in Basel in
December 1946.
124. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East,
1914-1956 (London: University Paperbacks, Methuen, 1965), pp. 156-70.
For the Bevin-Sidqi negotiations, cf. below chap. 2, n. 49.
125. David Horowitz, State in the Making (New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1953), p. 14.
126. For a detailed description of the origins and early stages of what
became known as the Truman Doctrine, see Foreign Relations. . . 1947,
vol. 5, pp. 1-484; also Monroe, Britain's Moment, pp. 158-59; and Andre
Fontaine, History of the Cold War from the October Revolution to the
Korean War, 1917-1950 (New York: Vintage Books, Random House,
1968), pp. 290-92.
127. R. Moscow in Arabic, 19 March 1947IDWB Î, 23 March 1947.
128. Vatolina, "The League of Arab Countries."
129. Izvestiia, 4 July 1946.
131. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 22 February 1947/DWB I,
4 March 1947.
132. R. Moscow, 24 February 1947/DWB Í, 26 February 1947. Zilliacus
had been speaking in Glasgow on 23 February.
133. New Times, 14 February and 7 March 1947. On 28 February
1947 Pravda too drew attention to Washington's reaction to Bevin's
attack and the furore it evoked in the U.S. Senate. For Truman's
comments on the incident, see Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp.
153-54.
134. New Times, 7 March 1947.
135. JTA, 20 February and 10 June 1946. Silver's appeal to the USSR
had been made at the American Jewish Conference held in Cleveland on
18 February 1946, while Wise had called for Soviet support for the
establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine on the occasion of
the U.S. tour of Ilya Ehrenburg in June 1946. At a dinner in honor of the
Soviet Jewish writer he had said: "We American Jews are tremendously
eager to have a heartening word from the Soviet Union in respect of the
ancient unfulfilled dream of the Jewish people."
136. R. Moscow in Arabic, 19 March 1947/DWB Í, 23 March 1947.
2
The Die is Cast
THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE

U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
On 2 April 1947, some six weeks after announcing its

intention to refer its Palestine Mandate to the U.N., the British
government presented Secretary-General Trygve Lie with a
formal request to include the Palestine question on the agenda
of the forthcoming Regular Session of the General Assembly
(due to begin in September). The British Note also asked, as a
preliminary measure, to convene urgently a special session of
the General Assembly to set up a commission that would
prepare the ground for the discussion at the Regular Session.
Within less than a month, on 28 April, the First Special Session
of the U.N. General Assembly was convened at Lake Success. 1
The first contribution of the Soviet delegation to the debate
was the request of its head, Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, to extend the discussion beyond the technical,
procedural question of setting up the commission to
comprehend the Palestine question as a whole. 2 Two days later,
on 1 May, the Soviet, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Yugoslav
delegations sided with the Arab states in urging that an item
calling for the termination of the British Palestine Mandate and
the declaration of Palestinian independence be included in the
agenda of the Special Session. 3
The position adopted by the Soviet delegation accorded with
65
the demand the USSR had been articulating for two years, to
have the Palestine question discussed at the U.N. It gave no
hint of the direction Soviet policy would take when discussion
in fact took place. The Soviet-Arab alignment at this juncture
did not mean that Moscow shared the Arab desire to precipitate
the establishment of an independent Palestine before the Jewish
population became unduly large.
Indeed, Gromyko's second appearance on 2 May proved that
the Soviet position was not swayed by Arab interests: he
pointed out to the General Committee that just as the Arab
position was being given an official hearing at the U.N., so too
should the Jewish position. "It is well known," he said, "that
the question of Palestine is largely a question of arrangements
which are to be made for the Jews, and that the Palestine
question cannot fail to be of interest and even of concern to the
Jewish population of Palestine." If "the appropriate Jewish
organizations" were to be deprived of the right to express "their
views . . .this would be equally incomprehensible both to the
Jews, including the Jews of Palestine, and to many others, non-
Jews." 4
Gromyko reiterated this demand on the following day before
the Plenary, insisting that to invite the Jewish representatives to
the Special Session "would enable us to study more fully and
thoroughly those facts which are unknown to many, and to hear
the population, of which, so far, we are in fact aware only from
fragmentary and often mutilated press reports . . . .
"The Soviet delegation," Gromyko went on, "is concerned
with only one thing regarding the consideration of the Palestine
problem. It is concerned with applying every effort to reach a
just solution of this question, guided by the interests of the
Palestine population and the maintenance of peace and
security."
The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Gromyko noted, was said to
be representative of the Palestinian Jewish community; the
Assembly should therefore invite its representatives to present
their case. Nor would the Soviet delegation be opposed to the
participation in the debate of other Jewish organizations should
it be decided that this might be beneficial. 5
While the General Committee rejected the suggestion that a
Jewish Agency delegation appear at Plenary meetings, it
decided to permit their participation at the committee level.
Although the initiative for this compromise proposal was
American, the Belorussian and Yugoslav delegations were party
The Die is Cast 67
to its formulation, and it was acceptable to the Soviet

delegation. 6
It is important at this stage to discuss very briefly the con-
tribution of the East European delegations to the U.N. Palestine
debate and their relationship to Soviet policy in this issue. The
positions of the various states seem to have been clearly defined
and they seem to have been allotted specific roles by Moscow
by virtue of their very divergences: of the three East European
states represented at the U.N. (in addition to the three Soviet
delegations) Poland and to a slightly lesser degree Czechos-
lovakia adopted a virtually pro-Jewish stand and Yugoslavia
one that was fairly close to the Arabs. 7 Moreover, the East
European members of the bloc appear to have exerted a certain
influence over the Soviet Union, mainly in the sphere of infor-
mation. Whereas the Soviet Union had no official representation
in Mandatory Palestine, despite its sporadic hopes of achieving
this, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland had consular rep-
resentatives in the country. In January 1947, a month before
Bevin's announcement, the Czechoslovak and Polish consuls
received instructions from their respective governments to sup-
ply them with political and statistical data on the situation in
Palestine for transmission to their delegations at the U.N. 8
Indeed, it was rumored at the time that the Soviet bloc was
actually planning to put the Palestine question on the agenda of
the next General Assembly Regular Session. 9 This material was
placed at the disposal of the Soviet U.N. delegation and the
information provided, for example, by the Polish Consul in Tel
Aviv was the immediate source for some of the statements
made by Gromyko at the First Special Session of the General
Assembly. 10
We see, then, that the activities and speeches of the East
European delegates at the U.N. are directly relevant to the study
of the Soviet position. They seem to have reflected Soviet
thinking even when they exceeded limits set by the official
Soviet line or appeared to contradict it, and the interaction, as
well as the contrast, between the two often help to throw
additional light on Soviet policies. The differences apparently
resulted largely from the Soviet conception of the role of a
major power as placing restrictions on the USSR that were not
incumbent on the People's Democracies. Thus, the latter were
freer of such considerations as the fear of alienating the Arabs. 11
On the other hand, the East European states sometimes
qualified their utterances lest they appear to be committing the
Soviet Union in instances where the latter's policy had not yet
been resolved or announced. 12
Two leitmotifs of the East European stand on Palestine also
require special mention. The first of these concerned the
Holocaust, the Poles in particular revealing a sense of
commitment to the Jewish people after Poland's own Jewry and
so much of all of Europe's pre-war Jewish population had been
exterminated on Polish territory. Although Gromyko also raised
the issue of the Holocaust and its relevance to the Palestine
question at the First Special Session, there is reason to doubt
the sincerity of his statements, given the Soviet Union's attitude
to the entire issue of the Holocaust and its policy toward its
own Jews (topics that will be dealt with in chapter 7). However,
the speeches of the Polish delegation, for example, conformed
with statements constantly reiterated by the Polish leadership,
whose policy of suppressing anti-Semitism has already been
mentioned.
The second major theme was that of the living link between
the new People's Democracies and the Yishuv. On the one
hand, constant contacts were being maintained between
representatives of the Yishuv and the East European regimes
(cf. chapters 1 and 4). On the other hand, there was reason to
suppose that the immigration from Eastern Europe would create
an atmosphere favorable to the Soviet bloc within the
Palestinian Jewish population and a cultural and emotional link
with Eastern Europe. Although British charges that a mass
bolshevization of Palestine and the Middle East was being
attempted through these immigrants were grossly exaggerated,
almost to the point of absurdity, 13 the immigrants undoubtedly
included a small number of Jews with Communist views or
sympathies, and there are indications (see chapter 4) that the
Soviet and East European authorities contemplated a certain
infiltration of left-wing groupings into Palestine by this means
and even made an occasional attempt to carry this out.
Polish representative Josef Winiewicz stressed both these
themes in his speech in the General Committee on 2 May. The
issue before the Assembly was the Arabs' right to establish an
independent Arab state in Palestine. Yet it had been brought up
"because of the many difficulties that have arisen" in settling
the problem of Palestine's Jews. This problem, he pointed out,
concerned the Polish delegation directly since nearly half of the
Palestinian Jewish population spoke Polish and showed "a keen
interest in the fate of the Polish people." There was also a
The Die is Cast 69
"moral aspect of this case" from the point of view of his

delegation; Hitler had made Poland a mass grave, the scene of
the physical extermination of the three and a half million Jews
who had lived in Poland before the war and of Jews from other
European countries as well. The Polish government therefore
had a commitment to the fate of the Jewish people as a whole
and the Jewish refugees in particular. 14
The concept of an immediate relationship with the Yishuv
was in sharp contrast to the Soviet delegation's insistence that
the USSR had no direct link with or immediate interest in
Palestine. Gromyko's main argument was that the USSR had the
right, or even obligation, as a great power to participate actively
in all stages of the discussion and the political decisions
regarding the Palestine question.
On 8 May the Soviet deputy foreign minister proposed that
the five permanent members of the Security Council be
included in the Special Committee to be set up by the First
Special Session. "It is difficult to understand," Gromyko main-
tained, "why the [U.N.] as a whole takes upon itself the respon-
sibility for . . .decisions and for their preparation, whereas the
great Powers, who bear the greatest responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, decline this
responsibility." The Soviet Union, Gromyko went on, "is pre-
pared to take upon itself, together with the other permanent
members of the Security Council and together with the United
Nations as a whole, the responsibility not only for final deci-
sions which may be taken by our Organization on the Palestine
problem, but also for the preparation of the decisions .. .an
important and responsible stage." The Committee's composition
should be the outcome of "political and geographical" consid-
erations intended to ensure that it be both "representative" and
"efficient." The participation of the five powers would surely
promise an easier agreement on Palestine at the forthcoming
Regular Session in September.
Enlarging on a theme he had touched upon on 3 May,
Gromyko insisted that the USSR's interest in the Palestine
question was "political," not "material," that of a member of
the U.N. and the Security Council. This time, in order to
emphasize his country's lack of self-interest, Gromyko
introduced a new element into his discussion, apparently
intended to deny the existence of any Soviet attempt directly to
influence developments in Palestine, although the implications
of his words went far beyond this. "The Soviet Union,"
Gromyko said, "is not directly interested in the Palestine

problem, from the point of view let us say, of the emigration of
Jews to Palestine, since as far as I am aware, the Jewish
population of the Soviet Union does not show any interest in
emigration to Palestine." 1 5
Although the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP), set up by the decision of 15 May with which the
First Special Session concluded, did not include the five per-
manent members of the Security Council, two Soviet bloc
states, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, were represented among
its 11 members. The Committee was given a free hand in inves-
tigating the situation in Palestine and the issues relevant to it
and was instructed to present to the Regular Session of the
General Assembly not later than 1 September a report embrac-
ing proposals for the solution of the Palestine problem. 16 A
Soviet suggestion that the Committee's terms of reference
include instructions to prepare proposals "on the question of
establishing, without delay, an independent democratic State of
Palestine" was defeated, the United States delegation having
asserted that this would be prejudging the issue and that the
Committee should be in a position to make whatever recom-
mendations it thought fit.17
On 14 May Gromyko returned in the Plenary to the question
of the U.N.'s responsibility to solve the problem. His first
premise was that the Mandatory had failed to fulfill the
obligations Britain had assumed upon accepting the Mandate.
Gromyko stressed that both Jews and Arabs were opposed to the
Mandatory and, as the Anglo-American Committee had pointed
out a year before, Palestine had become an "armed camp" ruled
by a regime of terror.
"The aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people,"
Gromyko contined, "are linked with the problem of Palestine
and its future administration. . . . During the last war, the
Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering. . . .
Only about a million and a half Jews in Western Europe
survived the war" and many of these were without homes or
means of existence and were "still continuing to undergo great
privations." The U.N. "cannot and must not regard this
situation with indifference. . . . The time has come to help these
people not by word, but by deeds." It was necessary to learn
the lesson of experience, that "no Western European state was
able to provide adequate assistance for the Jewish people in
defending its rights and its very existence." It was this fact
The Die is Cast 71
which explained "the aspirations of the Jews to establish their

own state. It would be unjust . . . to deny the right of the Jewish
people to realize this aspiration."
The failure of the Mandate, on the one hand, and the Jews'
right to establish their own state, on the other, were the basic
factors that must guide the discussion of Palestine's future.
There were, Gromyko said, innumerable proposals on this
score, of which he chose to mention four:
" l . T h e establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State, with
equal rights for Arabs and Jews;
4
'2.The partition of Palestine into two independent States, one
Arab and one Jewish;
"3.The establishment of an Arab State in Palestine; without
due regard for the rights of the Jewish population;
"4.The establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, without
due regard for the rights of the Arab population."
The last two Gromyko rejected out of hand. It was an
"indisputable fact that the population of Palestine consists of
two peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. Both have historical roots
in Palestine. Palestine has become the homeland of both," and
each played "an important part in the economy and cultural life
of the country." Neither "unilateral solution" mentioned above
was justified either by "the historic past" or "the conditions
prevailing in Palestine at present"; nor would it "achieve an
equitable solution . . . especially since neither would ensure the
settlement of relations between the Arabs and the Jews which
constitutes the most important task.
"All this leads the Soviet delegation to the conclusion that
the legitimate interests of both the Jewish and Arab populations
of Palestine can be duly safeguarded only through the
establishment of an independent, dual, democratic,
homogeneous Arab-Jewish State. . . . It is well known that this
plan for the solution of Palestine's future has its supporters in
that country itself. Contemporary history," Gromyko pointed
out, provided "examples of the peaceful collaboration of
different nationalities within the framework of a single state"
with each nationality enjoying "unlimited possibilities for
contributing its labour and showing its talents . . . in the
common interest of all the people."
However, "if this plan proved impossible to implement, in
view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and
the Arabs . . . then it would be necessary to consider the second
plan which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine." This
was justified only if Jewish-Arab relations "proved to be so bad
that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the
peaceful co-existence of the Arabs and the Jews." 1 8
To see this last point in proper perspective it should be noted
that Soviet sources had been stressing for several months the
deterioration in Jewish-Arab relations even though attributing it
to British instigation (cf. p. 42). Presumably, therefore, the
USSR had few illusions in May 1947 regarding the likelihood
of implementing a solution based on Jewish-Arab coexistence
within a single political entity.
Gromyko's speech, as interpreted by most of the Yishuv
leadership, 1 9 seemed to remove the Palestine problem from the
realm of power politics by bringing the Soviet and U.S.
positions closer. 20 Yet while the Jewish Agency Executive
representatives considered that the Soviet Union was likely to
favor the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine—as Moshe
Shertok told Under Secretary Dean Acheson 21 —the State
Department believed that the USSR had adopted a
"non-committal position" at the First Special Session as it was
not yet "ready to come out forthrightly on the side of the
Arabs." 22
Indeed, U.S. official circles received Soviet statements and
activities at the First Special Session with evident dissatisfac-
tion. The USSR, they noted with apprehension, was now "in an
excellent tactical position for the future" having gained credit
with both the Jews and Arabs. Moscow had stolen a march on
Washington; the implication of its tactics had been that the
Soviet Union was the one great power "willing to assume its
responsibilities in relation to this matter." This was especially
so since the U.S. government had decided to postpone making
its own suggestions until the Regular Session in the fall. 23 Rep-
resentatives of the Yishuv tried to mitigate this American nega-
tive reaction, pointing out that since the policy laid down by
Gromyko did not clash with that of the United States, the latter
could implement its own policy and fulfill its obligations to the
Jewish people in regard to its National Home without stirring
up great power controversies. The traditional Anglo-American
fear that sympathy for Jewish aspirations might drive the Arabs
into an alliance with the USSR no longer seemed valid.
Moreover, just as there was no cause to fear Soviet-Arab coop-
eration for other reasons —specifically that the ruling Arab cir-
cles feared the implications for the domestic political, social
The Die is Cast 73
and economic spheres—so too there were no grounds to

apprehend that the fundamentally democratic Yishuv would
become affiliated with Soviet Communism and totalitarianism.24
Despite Jewish reassurances to the Americans, U.S.-Soviet
cooperation looked as remote as ever. The British government
seemed at this stage to have gauged correctly that it could bring
the question of Palestine's future before the U.N. without
endangering its own Mandate.
WORLD JEWRY AND THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT
In the months that followed the First Special Session,

Moscow—like Washington—appeared to view the Palestine
question first and foremost within the context of the worsening
Soviet-American confrontation. This period saw not only the
promulgation of the Truman Doctrine as U.S. law, but also the
beginning of the Marshall Plan for the economic recuperation of
Europe, which resulted in the final division of Europe in the
summer of 1947. The Soviet counter-measure—Andrei Zhdanov's
announcement at the Conference of European Communist par-
ties in Wilcza Gora (Poland) concerning the division of the
world into two camps and the setting up of the Cominform for
purposes of propaganda and the interchange of information
among Communist parties—presaged a new phase in the
super-power confrontation.
The Soviet Union intensified its attacks on the United States'
Middle East policies25 as well as on U.S. activities in other areas.
The Soviet media pointed out that although "until very recently
the Middle East was regarded as the traditional preserve of British
imperial interests," Britain's financial and military commitments
were proving "an intolerable burden" and it was yielding "to a
stronger partner and rival." "American oil interests" influenced
U.S. policy on Palestine, where Washington was negotiating with
Britain for military bases. The United States had "stubbornly
resisted" Soviet and Arab proposals for Palestine's independence
at the recent Special Session of the General Assembly, had already
previously "exploited" the Palestine issue "as a pawn in the big
political game for mastery of the Middle East," making
contradictory promises to Jews and Arabs in the process.26
Against the background of increasing East-West tensions the
Palestine question was very important for the Soviet Union not
only—perhaps not even chiefly—as a central issue in Middle
Eastern politics. The Soviet Union was striving in this period to

win support among Western public opinion, notably among what
it considered or termed its "progressive" groupings. The Jews, as
a traditionally non-conformist element and an influential group in
Western and particularly American society and politics, were an
obvious target for Soviet propaganda. Just as it had made
immediate use of Bevin's 19 February statement in its attempted
rapprochement with the Jews of the Western world, 2 7 so now the
Soviet Union used Gromyko's speech to prove to them that it
represented the force of progress and anti-racialism and to enlist
their support in the East-West confrontation.
The Soviet Yiddish broadcasts to North America, which were
the main instrument for approaching American Jewry, had been
doubled at the beginning of 1947 as part of the intensified
propaganda effort among Western Jewry. 28 Their main theme was
the need for Jews the world over to dissociate from the policies of
the Western governments and to identify unreservedly with those
of the Soviet Union. As Itzik Fefer, the Soviet Jewish writer and
central figure of the Soviet Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, 29 told
Radio Moscow's Yiddish-speaking audiences in North America, it
was insufficient to maintain a neutral position in the "conflict
between the Anglo-Saxon bloc and Slavdom. . . . The Jewish
masses throughout the world must unite more closely with the
progressive forces of all peoples and fight until the world is
purged of the torch-bearers of the Middle Ages." Even after World
War II, "wars were still in progress between democracy and the
remnants of Fascism, between truth and lies, between justice and
wrong, between the fighters for freedom and the oppressors. That
was how the conflict between East and West appeared, and to
stand aloof . . . meant helping the growth of reaction" and the
consolidation of "the remnants of Fascism. Neutrality was merely
a pseudonym for treason." 3 0
Anti-Semitism in the Western world was a recurrent theme in
these Yiddish programs as in the press and radio services
intended for Soviet domestic consumption. 3 1 In the United States,
Radio Moscow asserted, anti-Semitism, a component part of the
racial theory that preached the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon
race, was increasing constantly side by side with anti-negro
discrimination. 32
The Soviet media indicated recurrently the connection between
Western, "Anglo-Saxon" anti-Semitism and developments in
Palestine such as the anti-Semitic outbreaks that followed the
hanging there of two British sergeants on 1 August 1947. 33 The
The Die is Cast 75
British government's indifference to these pogroms was said to

complement its treatment of Jewish D.P.s and its "bloody"
colonialist policy in Palestine. 34
Fefer too spoke of the Palestine issue and the Soviet stand on it.
Although it had been criticized as pro-Jewish by "Arab reaction-
aries'' and as pro-Arab by "Jewish reactionaries," Gromyko's
speech had proved to the whole world "what Soviet justice,
Soviet desire for friendship among nations and the Soviet struggle
for peace really are."35 Why, Fefer asked, should Jews and Arabs
not live together in Palestine in the same way as many peoples
inhabited the USSR without the slightest animosity. If foreign
powers only refrained from interfering unnecessarily, Jews and
Arab would reach agreement and build a joint democratic state.
In line with the official Soviet formula of cooperation between the
progressive circles of both peoples and their joint struggle against
a common enemy, which pointed the way to the possibility of the
desired bi-national state, Fefer drew attention to a strike
conducted conjointly by 60,000 Jewish and Arab workers "against
their bosses." 36 Fefer reiterated Gromyko's statement that if the
bi-national state was not a viable solution then Palestine must be
partitioned; the main thing was that the peoples of Palestine
themselves solved the Palestine problem, and not any external
power. The Jewish people must achieve its aim, the Soviet
Yiddish writer concluded, by establishing ties with the
peace-loving peoples and not by means of deals and contracts
with "imperialist circles." 37
The Soviet Union's stand on Palestine as stated by Gromyko
— the call to terminate the Mandate and recognize the right of
both Arabs and Jews to an independent existence in Palestine, and
the emphasis on the vicissitudes suffered by the D.P.s—was thus
given considerable publicity. Yet while this was done primarily to
win Western Jewish support, it was also intended to impress
favorably other, non-Jewish, groupings apparently presumed to
be concerned at the lot of the Jews in the wake of the Holocaust.
Evidence that the USSR considered that its Palestine policy was
likely to prove an asset even beyond Jewish circles in the West
was provided by the publicity given in its central information
media to the enthusiasm with which world Jewry greeted
Gromyko's speech.
In an article entitled "The Jewish Press in the U.S.A. Welcomes
A. A. Gromyko's Speech," Izvestiia noted the positive comments
which Gromyko had evoked. One paper had written that "despite
disappointments . . . resulting especially from the fact that the
United States had not fulfilled earlier promises to the Jews

regarding Palestine, the Jewish people can now take heart in view
of the favorable stand taken by the Soviet Union on the issue of
Jewish rights." Moreover, the same source had continued,
"Gromyko's speech has the greatest historical significance not
only for Zionists, but for the entire Jewish people, since it
supports the right of the Jewish people to establish its own
national home." The paper, Izvestiia wrote, "predicts that
Gromyko's explanation of the Soviet stand will compel the U.S.
delegation at the U.N. and the U.S. government to alter their
present hesitant position and to clarify their own views on the
Palestine question." 38 TASS stressed the many congratulatory
telegrams the Soviet deputy foreign minister had received,
mentioning in particular that of the American Council of Jewish
Workers which comprised over one and a half million members.39
The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington,
Mikhail Vavilov, confessed that the Soviet government was
satisfied with the reaction of the Jewish public in the United
States and elsewhere to Gromyko's statement. He himself had sent
to Moscow cuttings from the Jewish press praising the USSR's
Palestine policy, and reports on talks with American Jewish
leaders from which he had concluded that the great majority of
U.S. Jews were Zionists or Zionist sympathizers and that the
support for the Jewish struggle in Palestine was not restricted to
any specific grouping or organization.40
FEDERATION OR PARTITION?
The undoubted innovations of Gromyko's speech notwith-

standing, the USSR continued in the summer of 1947 to pursue
an ambivalent policy regarding the solution of the Palestine
problem. There were indeed indications that Moscow had not
yet made up its mind which of the two alternatives favored by
Gromyko it would opt for.
Officially it seemed still to prefer a federated bi-national state.41
On the pretext of trying to achieve unanimity, for example, the
Soviet delegation at the session of the W.F.T.U. General Council
held in Prague in June 1947 tried to retract the resolution on the
Jewish National Home adopted by the London Conference in
February 1945.42
True, the USSR refused to participate actively in attempts to
limit immigration to Palestine. It informed U.N. Secretary-General
Lie on 25 June 1947 that it did not intend to be a party to
The Die is Cast 77
preventing what was termed illegal immigration into Palestine.

The Soviet Union did not consider itself obliged to comply with
Britain's request to prevent the transit or sailing of Jews intending
to reach Palestine.43 Yet this was an anti-British line rather than
one that committed the Soviet Union to any specific solution of
the Palestine issue.
Nor were the unpublished statements of Soviet and other East
European officials and diplomats much more specific. Yugoslav
Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Velebit stated privately that the
USSR and its allies had come to the conclusion that Central
European Jewry could be successfully absorbed in Palestine
alone, especially since no other country would admit any large
number of Jews. However, he warned the Yishuv that if it wished
to prevent future misunderstandings with the Soviet government,
it should not read into Gromyko's speech things he had neither
said nor implied, or emphasize only what seemed to tally with its
own aspirations. In other words, Velebit cautioned against
concluding that the USSR was calling for the establishment of a
Jewish state.
Yet if a Jewish state was established in Palestine, Velebit went
on, the Slav bloc would consider it a factor for peace in the Middle
East and not a focus for international intrigue. In his opinion,
peace was vital for the Jews, for if a further war broke out those
Jews who had survived the last war would be the first to suffer
both in Palestine, sandwiched between the USSR and the West,
and in Europe where reactionary elements were awaiting revenge
and restoration of the old regimes.44
Both the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister and the first
secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Mikhail Vavilov,
stressed in their contacts with Jewish Agency representative in
Washington Eliahu Epstein that Gromyko's speech had been the
outcome of a thorough analysis of the situation on the part of the
Soviet government. Vavilov said too that Palestine was the only
solution for the Jewish D.P.s in Europe45 and that the Soviet
government understood the Jews' desire and need for statehood
and believed they could achieve it. Yet, he went on, the USSR had
not yet decided which of the solutions—partition or a single
bi-national state—it would favor. Moscow had no direct interest
in Palestine. On the one hand, it was of the opinion that the Jews
were building a peaceful, democratic and progressive community
which could help obstruct the anti-Soviet intrigues so easily
stirred up among the ruling circles in the Arab countries; on the
other hand, the Soviet government considered that the Yishuv's
social and economic structure was basically capitalistic and that

its social experiments in collectivism had nothing to do with
Marxism. The Soviet Union would therefore give priority to the
solution that appeared to be the more realistic and constructive. 46
Although one Soviet diplomat, the Soviet ambassador to
Argentina, Mikhail Sergeev, was reported to have said that Soviet
policy held that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine
was a "necessity," 4 7 this may well have been an oversimpli-
fication, resulting from wishful thinking, of his actual statement.
Soviet caution and ambivalence regarding Palestine's political
future were especially marked in the USSR's relations with the
Arabs both in its propaganda —notably in its Arabic broadcasts
—and on the diplomatic level in the Arab capitals. 48
Indeed, Soviet reservations—almost reticence —on this issue in
the months following the First Special Session were the result of
uncertainty not only about the eventual findings of UNSCOP, but
also about the chances of Egypt's appeal to the Security Council
for the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the
evacuation of Egyptian territory by British troops, on which issue
the USSR had a priori a clear-cut stand.
As early as December 1946, when it was suggested that Egypt's
demand to abrogate the 1936 Treaty be brought before the
Security Council, the Egyptian minister in Moscow announced at
a press conference there that Egypt could rely on the USSR's
adopting a favorable position. The Soviet media, quoting the
minister, said that the Egyptian people was disgusted with its
government's hateful policy of confusion and error 49 and that the
protection of the Suez Canal should be given to Egypt. 50 Soviet
support for the proposal to bring the matter before the Security
Council and for the British evacuation of Egypt was so
unequivocal that certain Egyptian sources attributed the very
proposal to the USSR government. 5 1
There was ample reason for the USSR to desire the evacuation
of British forces and bases from Egypt at a time when the fear of a
third world war was rampant. The British military presence in
Egypt was perhaps even more vital than its Palestinian
counterpart to the Western disposition of forces in the Middle
East, one of the declared purposes of which was to prevent and
repulse any Soviet attempts to penetrate the region militarily. 52
The Soviet New Times quoted an Egyptian paper as saying that
Bevin had told the Egyptian ambassador to London that a Soviet
threat vis-a-vis Egypt existed and that it was not in the Egyptian,
or the British, interest to expose Egypt and the Middle East to the
The Die is Cast 79
danger of a Soviet invasion.53

In the period December 1946 to January 1947, between the
publication of the proposal to approach the Security Council and
the Egyptian government's decision to do so, and_again when the
Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Mahmud Hasan, finally
brought Egypt's complaint to the Security Council on 11 July
1947, the Soviet media devoted considerable attention to Egypt
and Britain's failure to fulfill its obligations toward that country.54
Nor was Soviet support for the aspirations of Egyptian
nationalism merely moral; as we saw in the previous chapter, the
USSR was endeavoring to strengthen and rally the anti-British
groupings in Egypt from the extreme left to the extreme right.55
On 20 August Gromyko told the Security Council that the USSR
government supported the Egyptian request for the evacuation of
British forces and bases from Egypt (although it had reservations
about the other element included in the Egyptian complaint—the
unification of Egypt and the Sudan). The Soviet Union, he said,
"understands and sympathizes" with Egypt's "national aspira-
tions . . . towards an independent existence on the basis of sover-
eign equality with other states and peoples." 56
Gromyko's speech and the stand of the USSR and Poland
throughout the debate enhanced their popularity in Egypt and the
Arab world.57 The Egyptian question was, however, dropped by
the Security Council58 and the Soviet government turned its
attention to Palestine.
Almost simultaneously with the Security Council vote on Egypt
UNSCOP concluded its report. On 27 August the Committee,
which was unanimous on the need for ending the British
Mandate, voted on the form of government that was to replace the
Mandatory. The majority of its members favored partition with
economic union, and a minority the establishment of a federative
state. The basic assumptions on which the majority vote rested
were that the demands of both sides were at one and the same
time justified and contradictory; and that partition alone could
enable the national aspirations of the two peoples concerned to be
realized. While there was no hope for political cooperation in a
single political entity, economic cooperation, it was thought,
would benefit both sides and therefore not be prone to sabotage. In
addition, the establishment of a Jewish state would remove the
main issue of controversy, while the concomitant determination
of definite boundaries would necessarily impose limits on
immigration and mitigate fears concerning expansionist
tendencies on the part of the Jewish State. The majority proposal
included a number of recommendations, the most important one

stipulating that after a two-year transition period, beginning 1
September 1947, Palestine would be divided into two states, one
Arab and one Jewish, with the City of Jerusalem remaining a
separate entity, as an international trusteeship. 5 9
The two representatives of the Slav bloc, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia, took opposite sides on the voting. Whereas
Czechoslovakia opted for partition, the Yugoslav delegate still
favored the establishment of a single, federative state. He referred
to instances of Arab-Jewish cooperation, especially among the
workers on both sides, and indicated those groups which sought a
solution on the basis of mutual respect and equal rights. 6 0 In view
of later developments, it is perhaps tempting to suggest that this
disagreement was a result of the incipient Soviet-Yugoslav rift.
Yet, although the seeds of the rift certainly existed in 1947 and
even earlier, the Yugoslavs still considered themselves an integral
part of the Slav bloc and there is no reason to believe they might
have sought to anger Moscow on an issue that was not vital to
them, such as Palestine. (Even after the rift became public,
Yugoslavia continued for a long time to vote with the Soviet bloc
at the U.N.) On the contrary, Yugoslav policy on Palestine seems
at this stage to have been specifically coordinated with that of the
USSR. Not only did Yugoslav officials identify with the Soviet
position (for example Deputy Foreign Minister Velebit in his
above-mentioned statements); but Yugoslavia also put its ports
at the disposal of Jewish immigration and when Czechoslovakia
began supplying the Yishuv with arms in 1948 in a coordinated
Soviet bloc effort to help the Jews in Palestine, Yugoslavia—
despite its officially pro-Arab stand—again put its ports, and
even airfields, at the disposal of the combined effort.61 Rather
than any Soviet-Yugoslav collision of interests, the
Czechoslovak-Yugoslav disparity seems to have been a manifes-
tation of the tacit agreement between the Soviet Union and the
East European People's Democracies that the latter were to
enjoy maximum maneuverability on issues on which the inter-
national community had not yet made its decision (cf. above).
In this way, the USSR was able to stand simultaneously on both
sides of the fence.
The behavior of Czechoslovak diplomats and officials
provided further indications that at the end of August 1947 the
USSR had not elaborated any conclusive position, or was at
least preserving silence on the subject even with its allies.
Czechoslovakia's delegate on UNSCOP, Karel Lisicky, although
The Die is Cast 81
voting with the majority and despite opinions he expressed

privately, did his utmost in the Committee's discussions to
avoid committing his government to partition. Moreover, even
though the Czechoslovak line claimed to be in accord with that
of the USSR, Foreign Minister Masaryk told Shertok that when
he had discussed Palestine with Stalin, the latter had told him
that Prague's stand was known to him, that Czechoslovakia was
not tied in this matter and that it would not be forced to
conduct policy contrary to its desires. 62 The date of Stalin's
conversation with Masaryk is not known, yet it seems certain
that the USSR found it convenient at this stage to appear to be
represented by two opposing positions on the Palestine
question.
On 2 September, in a further talk with Jewish Agency
representative Epstein, Soviet Embassy First Secretary Vavilov
stressed that his government's position was identical with that
laid down by Gromyko in May. Vavilov was to be a member of
the Soviet delegation at the forthcoming session of the General
Assembly and had received instructions to obtain data on a
number of practical aspects of the problem additional to his
preliminary findings. He was interested particularly in the stand
of U.S. Jewry on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine;
the attitude of the American non-Jewish public to Zionism and a
Jewish state; and prospects for relations between the Jewish state
and the USSR. Epstein outlined the traditionally close ties
between U.S. Jewry and Zionism: he noted the adoption by
most U.S. Jewish organizations of the Biltmore Program; the
cooperation in support of the Zionist cause between the Ameri-
can Jewish Labor Council and 150 other labor organizations;
and the American Jewish Committee's support of most Zionist
demands in the wake of the Anglo-American Inquiry Commit-
tee. Epstein stressed, moreover, that there was virtually no
organized opposition to Zionism or the establishment of a Jew-
ish state in Palestine among the United States' five million
Jews.
As for non-Jewish opinion, Epstein referred to the sympathe-
tic attitude of the Administration from Wilson to Truman; Con-
gress's Joint Resolutions of 1922 and 1945 in support of the
Jewish National Home in Palestine; and the two major parties'
resolutions on Palestine at their 1944 national conventions. He
stressed in this connection the support of Zionism in the
American Labor Movement and the help given it by the Execu-
tives of its two major organizations, the C.I.O. and the A.F.L.
On the question of relations likely to exist between the future

Jewish state and the Soviet Union, the Jewish Agency
representative said the former must be vitally interested in
satisfactory relations for geographic, economic and political
reasons alike. In view of both the USSR's relative proximity to
Palestine and the possibility of economic interchange, the Jewish
state would seek ties of amity and mutual understanding.
Epstein pointed out the spirit of friendship for the Soviet people
that had been expressed in the activities of the V League and the
Yishuv's appreciation of Gromyko's 14 May speech.
Although, Epstein concluded, the structure of the Jewish
community was likely to remain that of a Western democracy, its
outlook would be progressive and it would aim at construction
and development. The Jews, like the USSR, had no interest in
perpetuating the misery, disease and squalor that prevailed in
the region, and the contribution they would make to its
regeneration, based on the conceptions of equality,
independence, social reform and international cooperation,
accorded with the interests and hopes of the Soviet Union in
the Middle East. 63
The failure of the Egyptian complaint to the Security Council
which freed the Soviet government's hands over Palestine, the
presentation of the UNSCOP report and recommendations, and
the opening of the General Assembly Regular Session, all
contributed to ending Soviet vacillation over Palestine's political
future. Yet it was the British government's announcement of 26
September that it had decided to abandon the Mandate that
finally made Moscow commit itself. The British decision was
taken suddenly: British military headquarters in the Canal Zone
learned almost overnight that the ferrying of stores and supplies
to Palestine, started in 1946 as a concomitant of the Bevin-Sidqi
negotations and the possibility of quitting Egypt, must stop. The
reason for this change was probably as much Egypt's failure to
terminate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which meant that a British
base could remain in the Canal Zone until 1956, as the
complexities, expense and frustration inherent in administering
Palestine. 64
As long as the British Mandate remained, the USSR could be
content with seeking a change without specifying its nature.
From the moment, however, that Britain announced its intention
of evacuating Palestine the international community and particu-
larly the major powers had to determine their position on the
form of government that would succeed it. True, the Soviet
The Die is Cast 83
media continued to express their doubts as to whether even now

Britain really meant to quit Palestine. The Palestine problem,
they maintained, continued to offer the British government a
pretext to justify its presence and administration in Palestine;
having fanned Jewish-Arab hatred and incited the two peoples
against each other, Britain was still seeking to prove its
indispensability as the custodian of order and security in the
Arab East. 65 The Arab League's very call to its member states to
take military action was said to mean that the British forces "will
remain where they are, and the fuss made about the
concentration of Arab troops along Palestine's frontiers will
serve to hide the real aims of the British and U.S.
monopolists." 6 6 Yet, despite such assertions, there is every
indication that Moscow now appreciated that a change in
Palestine's political status was imminent. (The suspicion of
imperialist intentions every time a withdrawal of this type was
contemplated was a Soviet propaganda stereotype.)
The U.S. State Department and the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
were also preoccupied in late September and early October with
working out their own position on Palestine. On 30 September a
State Department position paper, trying to gauge the Soviet
stand, noted: "The Soviet Union has thus far avoided taking a
position, but the [U.S.] Embassy in Moscow and other observers
are convinced that, in the final showdown, the Soviet Union will
support the Arab States." The relevance of the Soviet stand to
the determination of that of the U.S. government, according to
the State Department, was that the latter "should be established
with due regard to the requirement of a two-thirds vote in the
General Assembly." 6 7
Meanwhile, the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly
approached the Arab states with an explicit offer to support the
Arabs on Palestine if they would support the election of the
Ukraine to the Security Council, a suggestion reiterated to the
Lebanese delegation by a member of the Polish delegation as late
as 1 October. The Arabs, Saudi Amir Faysal and Iraqi Foreign
Minister Fadil al-Jamali told members of the U.S. delegation,
were loth to link themselves in any way with the USSR, yet there
was considerable feeling that the Arab states should arrange a
voting deal with it to cover all major issues (including Greece,
Korea, "warmongering") provided it support them over
Palestine. 68
As Ambassador Paul Ailing of the U.S. delegation told
Lebanese delegation member Charles Malik, the raising of such
Arab intentions with the United States was no less than a form of
blackmail. In fact, there is no evidence that the Arab states
actually agreed to the Soviet suggestions. In any case, in these
very days David Horowitz, now of the Jewish Agency delegation
to the Assembly, was told by a Yugoslav delegation member,
President of the Yugoslav Senate Vladimir Simic, that it had
been decided at a closed meeting of the Slav caucus to reject the
UNSCOP minority suggestion supported by Yugoslavia. This
meant, Simic stressed, that from the point of view of the Soviet
bloc the proposal for a federative state was now a dead letter. At
about the same time, Horowitz heard from a senior East
European statesman that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei
Vyshinskii had told the bloc delegations that the Jews were
entitled to their own home and independent state. 69
THE USSR SUPPORTS PARTITION
Although the Soviet decision in favor of partition was thus

apparently taken in the first days of October, Moscow was in no
hurry to make it public. The Second Regular Session of the
General Assembly which had opened on 16 September had, on
23 September, set up an Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine
Question. This forum heard the first member of the Slav bloc,
Czechoslovakia, declare its support for partition on 3 October,
followed on 8 October by Poland. But it was only after U.S.
delegate Herschel Johnson had committed his government too to
this solution, on 11 October, that the Soviet representative,
Semen Tsarapkin, made his own pronouncement.
Despite the "merits and advantages" of the UNSCOP minority
proposal, Tsarapkin told the Ad Hoc Committee on 13 October, it
was "impracticable" since "relations between Arabs and Jews
had reached such a state of tension that it had become
impossible to reconcile their points of view on the solution of
the problem." The partition plan, on the other hand, "offered
more hope of realization."
In reaching a decision, Tsarapkin went on, the main point was
"the right of self-determination of hundreds of thousands of Jews
and Arabs living in Palestine," and their right too "to live in
freedom and peace in a state of their own." Tsarapkin reiterated
the tenets pronounced by Gromyko in May, specifically the need
"to take into account all the sufferings and needs of the Jewish
people, whom none of the states of Western Europe had been
able to help during their struggle against the Hitlerites and the
The Die is Cast 85
allies of the Hitlerites for the defence of their rights and their
existence." This was why "the Jewish people were . . . striving to
create a state of their own and it would be unjust to deny them
that right. . . . Every people—and that included the Jewish
people—had full right to demand that their fate should not
depend on the mercy or the goodwill of a particular state."
The USSR, Tsarapkin went on, "approved the majority plan in
principle"; while it also approved some of the details such as
economic union, "a means of bringing the two peoples together
and preparing for closer political relations in the future" (which
Tsarapkin described as "the desirable goal") others required
"very careful examination and . . . necessary amendments." The
Soviet delegate took exception to a. the proposed frontiers
between the two states: "isolated districts connected by narrow
corridors could not constitute a satisfactory solution"; b. the
suggested length of the period of transition and the form of the
country's government during this period "of capital importance
both from the standpoint of the maintenance of peace in
Palestine and from that of the future of the two states"; and c. the
status of Jerusalem. 70
The Arabs were apparently surprised by the Soviet move.
Until a very few days before Tsarapkin's statement they seem to
have expected Soviet support for their position. The basic
assumption of the pressure they had exerted on the U.S.
government to oppose partition in the first weeks of the Regular
Session had been that any other stand would drive the Arabs
into the arms of the Soviet Union. Once it became clear that
Moscow favored partition, Arab reactions were vehement. The
Egyptian al-Jumhuriyya was quoted as saying that this meant an
end to the friendly relations that the Arabs had begun to show
toward the USSR. 71
The Soviet Union, for its part, sought to prove its friendship
for the Arabs even after declaring support for the very solution
that the Arabs were united in opposing. The main Soviet
contention was that the Soviet motivation was anti-British and
not anti-Arab. Radio Moscow's Arabic broadcasts referred to the
USSR's support in 1946 for Syrian and Lebanese demands for
the British and French withdrawal from the Levant countries
and to its recent support for Egypt's appeal to the Security
Council. Soviet policy, it was maintained, called for the
evacuation of imperialist forces from the countries they were
subjecting (Egypt, Palestine, Greece, Indonesia, Korea). The
Soviet Union, always ready to aid an oppressed people in its
struggle for its legitimate rights, was trying to enable the people
of Palestine to shape their own fate. The Soviet support for
partition was not based on any direct Soviet national interest
and could not be fairly interpreted as constituting a threat to
the Arab countries, as both Arab reactionary circles and the
Western Imperialists were making out in an attempt to unite the
Arabs in an Eastern anti-Soviet bloc and to distract them from
their struggle against Western exploitation. 72
Meanwhile the Soviet U.N. delegation was studying the
problems that Tsarapkin had mentioned as requiring further
investigation and discussion. It proposed meeting with Jewish
representatives in New York (although according to Soviet
diplomatic practice, the official version was that the Jewish side
had sought these conversations).
At a first meeting held on 18 October between the Soviet
representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee, Tsarapkin and Boris
Shtein, and Shertok, Epstein and Horowitz, the former requested
to hear the Jewish position. Shertok explained that the Yishuv's
main interest was a. the confirmation of the UNSCOP majority
proposals and the appointment of a sub-committee for their
implementation, and b. undelayed immigration. On the subject
of frontiers, the Jewish representatives demonstrated that the
argument used by those who sought to reduce Jewish territory
—that their intention was to minimize the Arab population of
the Jewish state —was absurd since the Negev and other districts
which they wanted to remove from Jewish control were virtually
unpopulated. Moreover, the Jewish representatives stressed,
there were instances such as Haifa, where a Jewish majority
administered a locality in cooperation with the Arab minority.
Still on the territorial issue, the Jewish representatives then
pointed out the importance of the Galilee for the Jews; stated the
Jews would ultimately accept Jaffa's exclusion from the Jewish
State; and, finally, explained the geographical and demographic
structure and subdivision of the Jerusalem area, mentioning the
possibility of parcelling it into three separate entities, or of
including its Jewish section in the Jewish State and bringing the
nearby Jewish settlements into the zone to be put under
international trusteeship.
Regarding the implementation of partition, the Jewish side
said that while the Yishuv would not drive out the British by
force, it would certainly not hold them back "by their shirt
sleeves." The Yishuv was of the opinion that it must be prepared
to take over at once in the Jewish districts; nonetheless, the U.N.
The Die is Cast 87
must appoint somebody with authority to control the transfer of

power and the execution by all sides of U.N. decisions. The
military force for the Jewish area would have to be either a
Jewish one, armed from abroad, with just a small token U.N.
unit, or a U.N. force operating with Jewish help. The two sides
agreed that the U.N. Trusteeship Council was not an appropriate
body for supervising the implementation of partition and the
evacuation of the British; yet while the Jewish representatives
favored the establishment of a special body for this role,
Tsarapkin and Shtein stressed the advantage of entrusting this
task to the Security Council which was empowered to deal with
military matters.
In conclusion, the Jewish representatives said they were not
"enthusiastic" about economic union, yet were ready to accept it
if necessary. Tsarapkin, for his part, expressed the hope that this
first conversation would be followed by others.
Shertok reported on these contacts at a meeting of the Jewish
Agency Executive. The Soviet Union, he said, would not agree
to the U.N. sending out a military force which did not include
Soviet soldiers. Since, however, the United States would not
accept this, as Shertok had in fact pointed out to the two Soviet
diplomats, and since it was essential for the success of the entire
plan that the United States and the USSR be in agreement, there
was no alternative but to consign all talk of a U.N. force to
oblivion. The Soviet Union would, on the other hand, agree to a
division of labor by which the authority for the defense policy of
the Jewish area remained with the U.N. while a Jewish force
under Jewish command was responsible for putting it into effect.
Shertok reported on these contacts at a meeting of the Jewish
Agency Executive. The Soviet Union, he said, would not agree
receiving arms from foreign sources. It must, moreover, be set
up, trained and equipped before the British left so as to be able to
take control directly upon the British withdrawal without any
vacuum occurring. Tsarapkin and Shtein had inquired about the
military equipment the Yishuv lacked and needed and whether
there were people to man and use new equipment. To the latter
question Shertok had replied that in principle there were, since a
large number of Palestine Jews had served in the British army
during the war; yet if, for example, the United States and the
USSR supplied weapons, these would have to be accompanied
by instructors to teach the Jews how to use the arms they were
unacquainted with. A further remark, however, that the Yishuv
would also need volunteers for the economy to continue
functioning had met with an unequivocally negative reaction.

Concerning Jerusalem the Soviet delegates had said that, after
further thought on the matter, they preferred it to be a part of the
Jewish state, with only the Old City, within the walls, as
international territory. 73
The systematic approach of the two Soviet diplomats to the
complex problems of working out a viable partition plan and
their obvious sympathy for the Jewish position were also seen in
their vigorous and logical contributions to the discussions held
in the various U.N. committees where they supported most of the
Jewish territorial demands. 7 4
The Jewish Agency's representatives also discussed the
USSR's Palestine policy with U.S. officials in view of, on the one
hand, the very fundamental link between the Soviet stand on
Palestine and the East-West conflict and, on the other, the
pertinence of Soviet-U.S. relations to the American
Administration's attitude to developments in Palestine. The
deterioration in Soviet-American relations during 1947 was
indeed a complicating factor from the Yishuv's point of view. As
early as August 1947 Jewish Agency Political Adviser Lionel
Gelber was claiming that while the Yishuv needed U.S.
mediation with the British government on the issue of the
immigration of the D.P.s, Washington "would be less likely to
act . . . if the voice of Russia was also raised in this matter. The
one thing President Truman would not do . . . was respond in a
direction sought by Moscow. Whatever is accomplished by the
White House," Gelber insisted, "must never appear to have been
done under pressure from the Kremlin or in conformity with
Russian wishes . . . . To bring Moscow . . . into the picture was to
increase American reluctance to intervene." 7 5
During the U.N. Palestine debate in October-November
American diplomats and officials constantly reiterated that if the
Yishuv sought cooperation with the U.S.A. it must take into
account American reservations regarding Soviet intentions. On
31 October Samuel Kopper, adviser to the U.S. U.N. delegation,
informed Gelber that the Americans were worried about the
impending departure from Romania and Bulgaria of immigrants
to Palestine. Gelber replied that if Kopper was implying that all
immigrants from Eastern Europe were Communists, he had
heard similar arguments from Bevin in 1946 when the American
authorities of the U.S. occupation zones were winking at the
passage of these immigrants. Surely, Gelber insisted, it was
innocuous to desire to run away from Romanian anti-Semitism. 76
The Die is Cast 89
On 31 October too Gelber met with Director of the State

Department Office of Political Affairs Dean Rusk. It emerged that
U.S. apprehensions related not only to infiltration into the
Middle East, but also to the entire issue of general Soviet policy
regarding Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe. Rusk pointed
out that Soviet pressure was compelling the United States to
cooperate with Britain. The issue of the prospective immigration
from Constanza of the 10-15,000 Jews estimated to be crowded
on the Pan York and Pan Crescent7777 was so vital to U.S. interests
that Washington would treat it as a solely foreign policy
question without considering domestic pressures at all. The
Jewish Agency must prevent the departure of the two ships for as
long as the U.N. Palestine deliberations continued. Otherwise,
American efforts on behalf of the Jews at the U.N. would be
undermined or ruined.
On 2 November Gelber informed Rusk that the Jewish Agency
accepted the United States government's request to delay the two
ships. Rusk, for his part, advised the Yishuv to avoid any
appearance of a tie-up with the USSR even if Soviet Palestine
policy were in fact disinterested, like that of the United States.
Although it was possible, Rusk went on, that the sailing of D.P.s
from Constanza reflected Soviet humanitarianism, this could be
interpreted as a great power maneuver in which the D.P.s were
being used as pawns to embarrass the Anglo-American grouping.
U.S. circles, Rusk said, were agreed that the main instrument of
American policy against the USSR was the Marshall Plan and
that the chief Soviet aim was to undermine this plan. If the
Soviet Union won over the Jews of Europe and perhaps even of
the United States it would achieve a marked success. Gelber
replied that since the United States and the USSR were pursuing
parallel aims over Palestine, there was no reason why the Jews of
Europe should be more grateful to the latter. On the contrary, if
the Marshall Plan succeeded, they would have an additional
reason for gratitude to the United States, which would be
helping them directly as well as assisting European and
Palestinian Jewry alike by a positive Palestine policy.
In two further meetings, the first with Kopper and the second
on 21 November with Rusk, Gelber assured the Americans that
the Jewish Agency was doing all in its power to influence the
situation in the Black Sea "in the direction of tranquility" until
the end of November. Rusk said that he had been informed that:
a. quotas on ships at the Black Sea ports were assigned according
to ideological groupings, one of these being called—according to
State Department information — "Jewish Marxist Youth"; b. Lehi,

the Stern Group, had close connections with the Romanian
Ministry of the Interior through Soviet instrumentality; and c.
preference in the quotas and on the ships was being given to
young Jews, aged 18 to 34, with military training. Rusk named
three camps in Romania where this military training was being
given and added that the immigrants needed neither Romanian
passports nor exit permits but were said to have received
Uruguayan visas issued by the Uruguay Consul in Prague. The
United States was having increasing difficulties with the British
over Palestine and a further Exodus-type incident would make
matters even worse. 7 8
Meanwhile, a measure of coordination and collaboration had
been achieved between the Soviet and U.S. delegations in one of
the two sub-committees of the Ad Hoc Committee. Sub-
Committee Number One was composed of nine members, all of
them supporters of partition; its terms of reference were to work
out a detailed proposal for the implementation of the UNSCOP
majority recommendations, In his progress report of 11
November, the Sub-Committee's chairman, Polish delegate
Ksawery Pruszynski, remarked on the atmosphere of cooperation
which had prevailed and particularly on common efforts of the
U.S. and Soviet representatives. On 19 November, when the
sub-committees presented their final reports, Sub-Committee
Number One's reporter, the Uruguayan Rodriguez Fabregat,
noted the same, pointing out that the working group that had
revised the proposal for implementing partition had comprised
the representatives of the United States, the USSR, Canada and
Guatemala. "The work of Sub-Committee 1," he said, "should be
an example to all." The United States and the USSR had worked
in concert, draft resolutions had been adopted unanimously and
considerable results had been achieved. The Sub-Committee's
work had essentially been the result of cooperation "inspired by
a desire for peace and justice." 7 9
Indeed, the instances in which agreement was achieved on a
number of the issues under dispute between the Soviet and U.S.
delegations demonstrated the intentions of both powers to
straighten matters out between them as a preliminary to the
adoption of a partition resolution. Although, as we have seen,
both were intent on obtaining the two-thirds majority necessary
to get a partition resolution adopted, the very fact of agreement
between them entailed a mutual concession—especially perhaps
on the American side as it meant allying with the Soviet Union
The Die is Cast 91
against Britain. On the Soviet side the concession was above all
one of principle and prestige —given the recent enunciation of
the theory of the world's division into two camps—and was
made up for by the tactical achievement of splitting the
Anglo-U.S. front.
The differences between the two sides were chiefly the result
of Soviet endeavors to endow the Security Council with ultimate
responsibility for the implementation of partition—as against
U.S. suggestions to leave the administration of Palestine in
British hands until the two states were established. Since, the
Soviet delegation argued, Britain had stated categorically that it
would not implement any U.N. decision not agreed on by both
parties, and the Arabs rejected partition, the U.S. proposal meant
that both states would remain on paper.
On 3 November Tsarapkin presented the Sub-Committee with
a 10-point proposal on the transfer of authority from the
Mandatory to the two independent states. It suggested: (1) the
termination of the Mandate as from 1 January 1948; (2) the
withdrawal of U.K. troops as quickly as possible, at most within
four months of the above date; (3) the stipulation of a transition
period of maximum one year between the abrogation of the
Mandate and independence; (4) the setting up of a special
commission with its seat in Palestine composed of the
representatives of Security Council members, through which
the Council would exercise administration in the country in the
transition period; (5) the taking of measures by the commission
to establish Jewish-Arab frontiers as per the partition resolution;
(6) the election by the Commission, after consultation with the
democratic parties and social organizations of the two states, of
provisional councils of government (one in each state) their
activities to be carried out under the Commission's direction;
(7) the holding of elections by the provisional councils, along
democratic lines, to the two constituent assemblies not later
than six months after their formation, with the election
regulations elaborated by the councils and approved by the
Special Commission; (8) the elaboration of a democratic
constitution by each constituent assembly and the election of a
government; (9) the establishment —under the supervision of
the Special Commission —of administrative organizations of
central and local government; and (10) the speedy formation by
the provisional councils of an armed militia, each from the
citizens of its own state, that would be sufficiently large to
maintain internal order and prevent frontier clashes. General
military and political control over the militias' activities was to

be exercised by the Special Commission, although operative
command would be in the hands of national commanding
personnel.
Herschel Johnson asserted in the Sub-Committee that the
Soviet plan varied only in minor details from the U.S. proposals.
The U.S. delegation discussing the Soviet proposals agreed that
while "it would be highly undesirable to endow an organ of the
Security Council with full government powers in Palestine . . .
the prospects for approval of a partition plan in the Assembly
would be prejudiced if it proved impossible for the United
States and the USSR to reach agreement in the Ad Hoc Sub-
Committee." This was the context in which the U.S. delegation
authorized Johnson "to continue to press for adoption of the
U.S. plan preserving a flexible attitude to permit future com-
promise if necessary."
However, a telegram to this effect to the State Department
evoked a request on the part of delegation Adviser Gordon Knox
not to smooth over the one basic substantial disparity. He
suggested that to clarify the U.S. delegation's position, a
reservation should be added that the United States "would not
agree to any plan (short of action taken under Chapter VII of the
[U.N.] Charter) which placed the administration of Palestine
under the Security Council and thereby gave the Soviet Union a
negative control over its development through use of, or threat
to use, the veto power." 80
The USSR was contemplating also the possibility of
dispatching a U.N. force with, inter alia, U.S. and Soviet troops
to help implement partition. This, too, aroused American
apprehensions yet led, paradoxically, to the two powers'
adopting a joint position on the need for attaining Palestine's
independence quickly and setting a date for it; the U.S.A. even
thought the Soviet suggestion of a year as the maximum
transition period to be too long. Johnson and Major-General
John Hilldring, also a member of the U.S. U.N. mission, pointed
out in a memorandum, presumably for the State Department,
that "the setting up of an early and specific date for
independence is the best way to avoid saddling the United
Nations with the responsibility for administering the area and
for implementing its recommendations, and hence is the best
way to make sure that neither American . . . nor Russian troops,
nor any form of voluntary constabulary be employed, although
the latter device might appropriately be used in the
The Die is Cast 93
internationalization of . . . Jerusalem." 8 1
One analysis of the Soviet proposals highlighted the
fundamental nature of the differences between the Soviet and
U.S. proposals despite their apparent similarity. In a
memorandum to Johnson and Hilldring, Knox suggested that
the Soviet intention was first and foremost to create chaos. In
the period between 31 December 1947—after which, according
to the Soviet proposal, Britain's troops would have no legal
authority and therefore no basis for maintaining order—and the
establishment of the two states, the administration of an area
torn by civil strife would be in the hands of an inexperienced
Commission representing eleven states "which presumably
would be at logger-heads." Moreover, the subordination of the
Commission to the Security Council and the transference to the
Commission of such functions as determining borders and
electing the two provisional councils of government, as well as
its control of the activities of the armed militias, Constituent
Assembly election procedures, constitution-making and the
setting up of government organs—all these would give the
USSR tremendous political leverage. This was apart from the
obvious traps inherent in such terms as holding elections on
"democratic lines" and elaborating "democratic constitutions,"
which aroused memories of widely divergent interpretations of
similar terminology in Germany, Austria and Korea. The Soviet
proposals, in Knox's opinion, "set up a very cumbersome and
highly complicated rule of authority which would be difficult
to make function even if members of the Special Commission
could agree among themselves; even if there were no inherent
right of appeal from the Special Commission to the Security
Council; and even if it could be assumed that the inhabitants of
Palestine . . . desired by all means to make the partition plan
work successfully and smoothly." As conditions were, the
Special Commission would need to appeal to the Security
Council for force so as to be able to "proceed with its alleged
duty of setting up two independent states against the wishes of
the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine." Since in turn the
Security Council had no force which could act, it would have
to act under Article 106 of the Charter which meant the
dispatch of troops of the great powers. This "would be
extremely dangerous to the peace and security of that area, and
perhaps lead to the division of Palestine into zones," possibly
repeating the experience of Germany, Austria and Korea. 82
On 6 November a meeting of the working group brought out
the essential differences between the U.S. and Soviet viewpoints

and proposals. As against the Soviet demand for termination of
the Mandate by 1 January 1948, followed by a transition period,
the United States called for the termination of the Mandate on 1
July 1948, simultaneously with the attainment of Palestine's
independence. To the Soviet suggestion that the Security
Council be responsible for administering Palestine prior to
independence, the United States proposed that Britain undertake
such steps as had to be taken preparatory to independence, with
the advice and assistance of a U.N. commission selected by the
General Assembly. 83
Despite the serious nature of these discrepancies, they were
eventually overcome with the help of compromise suggestions
put forward by the remaining, Canadian and Guatemalan,
members of the Sub-Committee's working group. The two
super-powers' unusual readiness to make concessions was the
combined result of their joint interest in and considered
commitment to partition, and their awareness that only a
resolution accepted by both of them would make partition
possible. Thus the United States conceded that the U.N.
Commission to supervise partition be responsible to the Security
Council, and the USSR agreed that the Commission be made up
of three to five small states only. A compromise was also reached
on the date of the termination of the Mandate, viz. 1 May 1948.
On 25 November the Ad Hoc Committee completed its activity
with the adoption of the UNSCOP majority partition proposal
— after a number of amendments —and the Palestine question
was returned to the Plenary.
The Soviet delegation had already insisted in the Ad Hoc
Committee that in view of the urgency of "a radical solution of
the Palestine problem," to prevent a further deterioration of the
situation there the U.N. must adopt a resolution at the current
Regular Session. The partition plan as elaborated by S u b -
Committee One, Tsarapkin told the Committee on 24 Novemr
ber, was a "practicable" solution and its adoption by the General
Assembly "would be of benefit not only to the Arab and Jewish
peoples but also to the United Nations and all peace-loving
peoples." Without mentioning the Arab countries specifically,
the Soviet delegate reprimanded those U.N. member states
which claimed that the General Assembly lacked the authority to
deal with the Palestine question and censured Britain for its
reservations regarding the implementation of partition. 84
Two days later Gromyko in the Plenary made yet another
The Die is Cast 95
lengthy programmatic speech in which he laid down once more

the basic tenets of the Soviet position. He reiterated the
contention that the USSR "has had no direct material or other
interests in Palestine," except as "a member of the United
Nations and . . . a great power that bears, just as do other great
powers, a special responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace," and he explained once again the Soviet
delegation's acceptance of partition as the only workable
solution. The USSR, Gromyko continued, "cannot concur" in the
view that the partition solution was directed "against the Arab
population in Palestine and against the Arab States in general . ..
on the contrary the USSR delegation holds that this decision
corresponds to the fundamental national interests of . . . the
Arabs as well as of the Jews." Gromyko rejected the Arab claim
that partition meant "an historic injustice . . . if only because,
after all, the Jewish people has been closely linked with
Palestine for a considerable period of history. Apart from t h a t . . .
we must not overlook the position in which the Jews found
themselves as a result of the recent world war" in which they
"suffered more than any other people."
Partition would be "of profound historical significance"
precisely because it would "meet the legitimate demands of the
Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whom . . . are still
without a country, without homes." Finally, Gromyko noted,
partition conformed with "the high principles and aims of the
United Nations" specifically with "the principle of the national
self-determination of peoples," which was also fundamental to
Soviet policy "in the sphere of nationality problems."
In response to the "aspersions" cast on his government's
foreign policy by some Arab delegates, the Soviet deputy foreign
minister reminded the Arabs that the Soviet government and
peoples "have entertained and still entertain a feeling of
sympathy for the national aspirations of the nations of the Arab
East" and their "efforts . . . to rid themselves of the last fetters of
colonial dependence." The Soviet delegation drew a distinction
between "the clumsy statements made by some of the
representatives of the Arab States . . . obviously . . . under the
stress of fleeting emotions, and the basic and permanent interests
of the Arab people. The USSR delegation," Gromyko went on,
"is convinced that Arabs and the Arab States will still, on more
than one occasion, be looking toward Moscow and expecting the
USSR to help them in the struggle for their lawful interests, in
their efforts to cast off the last vestiges of foreign dependence."
Gromyko made two further points, both of which were not

new to the Soviet argumentation. First, he censured the British
refusal to cooperate in the implementation of partition,
especially since Britain in bringing the entire question before the
U.N. had declared its readiness to carry out the U.N.'s decisions,
provided that responsibility for action that might have to be
taken was not Britain's alone, and also because the Mandate had
failed and was hated by Arabs and Jews. Second, he reiterated
that despite Arab protests the General Assembly and the U.N. "as
a whole" had a right to consider the Palestine question. Even
more, he considered that the Assembly "in view of the situation
that has arisen in Palestine" was "bound to take the requisite
decision."
The partition plan drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee,
Gromyko concluded, stipulated that the "practical implement-
ation of the measures necessary to give it effect rests with the
Security Council" and was "in full accord with the interest of
maintaining and strengthening international peace and with the
interest of increasing cooperation between states." 8 5
On 29 November Gromyko spoke out against attempts to
postpone voting. The inquiries and deliberations undertaken and
conducted by the U.N., he insisted, had been sufficiently
thorough. There was no reason to believe that postponement
would introduce new elements; on the contrary, it would merely
confuse the issue and "mean wrecking the settlement of the
Palestine question."
On the same day, 29 November, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted by the requisite two-thirds majority a resolution to
partition Palestine, 33 members voting in favor, 13 against and
10 abstaining. 86
• • *
The period of the U.N. deliberation of the Palestine question,

from the British government's call for the convening of a General
Assembly Special Session, in April 1947, to the passing of the
partition resolution by the Assembly's Second Regular Session
on 29 November 1947, thus saw a definite dynamism in the
Soviet attitude to Palestine's political future, After a lengthy
period of reticence and non-commitment the USSR gradually
and carefully elaborated a clearly-defined policy that entailed a
very specific commitment.
The step-by-step evolution of this policy showed that Soviet
The Die is Cast 97
support for partition was not the result of any rational, let alone
emotional, obligation toward the establishment of a Jewish state
per se. Soviet reasoning was that of a major world power,
without the limitations occasionally imposed on the Western
powers by domestic or foreign public opinion. The Soviet aim
was first and foremost the termination of the British Mandate
over Palestine and the evacuation of British forces and bases
from the country. The second purpose was to ensure that the
USSR would have as strong a position as the other powers in the
new equilibrium that would necessarily arise from the change in
Palestine's status.
That Moscow's thinking was not altruistic or a priori
pro-Jewish did not make it any the less insistent in seeking
partition. On the contrary, the fact that the solution sought by
the Jews in Palestine coincided with a Soviet national strategic
objective made the USSR all the more obdurate once it had
become clear that partition was a viable aspiration. It was for this
reason that, for example, the Soviet Union, despite its declared
policy of inter-bloc conflict, was prepared to make the
concessions inherent in cooperation with the United States,
without which the U.N. resolution in favor of partition was
inconceivable. In other words, once the USSR decided that
partition was a sine qua non for putting an end to British rule
and military presence in Palestine, and that this in turn was a
prerequisite for further gains in the game of power politics, it
was not prepared to imperil the success of a partition resolution
by inflexibility in the international forum. Moreover, even before
the General Assembly had adopted its partition resolution, the
Soviet Union was putting out feelers toward practical
cooperation with the Yishuv as the local element which most
desired the same immediate end.
Notes
1. GA OR, 1st Special Session, 68th, 69th and 70th Plenary Meetings,
28 April and 1 May 1947.
2. GA OR, 1st Special Session, General Committee, 28th Meeting, 29
April 1947.
3. GA OR, 1st Special Session, 71st Plenary Meeting 1 May 1947.
Although the United States supported Britain in opposing the Arab
draft resolution, which was in fact rejected, the Special Session adopted
a resolution not to impose restrictions on the discussions in the
98 T H E USSR A N D ISRAEL: 1947-1954
Assembly's General Committee (as opposed to the Plenary). In this way

the attempt to limit the debate to the terms of reference of the
commission that was to be set up was circumvented, a Western repulse
which commentators attributed to Gromyko, e.g., Christian Science
Monitor, 7 May 1947.
4. GA OR, 1st Special Session, General Committee, 33rd Meeting, 2
May 1947.
5. GA OR, 1st Special Session, 73rd Plenary Meeting, 3 May 1947.
6. GA OR, 1st Special Session, General Committee, 33rd Meeting and
75th Plenary Meeting, 2 and 5 May 1947.
7. Czechoslovakia was not, it is true, an officially Communist regime
until February 1948, yet most of its key positions were occupied by
Communists or Communist sympathizers, and it belonged to all intents
and purposes to the Communist bloc.
As for Yugoslavia, the differences of opinion between Moscow and
Belgrade had not yet come into the open, and Yugoslavia too was an
unequivocal member of the bloc (see p. 80). Yugoslavia had at least two
major reasons for its stand: it was itself, like the USSR, a multi-national,
federal state; moreover, it had a considerable Muslim population
(mostly opposed to the Tito regime, cf. below chap. 3, n. 21).
8. JTA, 19 January 1947. Yugoslavia's deputy foreign minister,
Vladimir Velebit, later told the Jewish Agency's political representative
in Washington, Eliahu Epstein, that the governments of Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia had done the Yishuv a considerable
service in transmitting correct information on Palestine to the relevant
Soviet institutions and officials both before and during the First Special
Session through their Palestinian offices, which had a more direct
access to this information than had the USSR and were better
acquainted with what he termed the successes of the Yishuv —E. Epstein
to Jewish Agency Executive, 25 June 1947, CZA, S25/483.
9. Ha-Mashkif, 19 January 1947, quoted by JTA, 20 January 1947.
10. Author's interview with Raphael Loc, 6 December 1970, OHD,
60/28. Loc was Polish consul-general in Tel Aviv from summer 1946 to
December 1949.
11. When, for example, the Arab states took punitive measures
against Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1948 for their material and
political support of the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab
relationship with the Soviet Union was not substantially affected; see
below.
12. In August 1946, for example, the head of the Polish Foreign
Ministry's Political Department, Josef Olszewski, told a representative of
the Yishuv that Poland's Ambassador to Washington and permanent
representative to the U.N., Professor Oskar Lange, had received
The Die is Cast 99
instructions to support Jewish demands when the occasion arose. Yet,

Olszewski pointed out, Poland had not yet announced its position
publicly since such a declaration would be interpreted, even if not
necessarily justifiedly, as reflecting the Soviet stand, and this had not
yet been resolved —from author's interview with L. Levite, 28 May 1970,
OHD 50/22. For Levite's activities in Poland in summer 1946, see p. 30;
for the circumstances of Soviet non-decision at the time, cf. pp. 4Iff.
13. During the course of the First Special Session, the Palestinian
Jewish press reported a secret memorandum sent by the British to
leading American politicians concerning the pro-Communist leanings
of Palestinian Jewry. The document was said to have insinuated too that
most of the inmates of the Cyprus concentration camps, to which illegal
immigrants to Palestine had been deported, were Communists—/TA, 14
May 1947. For an earlier reference to this thesis, in the context of the
Anglo-American Inquiry Committee, see above p. 22.
14. GA OR, 1st Special Session, General Committee, 32nd Meeting,
2 May 1947.
15. GA OR, 1st Special Session, 1st Commitee, 51st Meeting, 8 May
1947. For a further Soviet interpretation of the term "direct interest,"
see p. 77 below. Izvestiia which reported Gromyko's speech on 11 May
significantly omitted the reference to Soviet Jewry.
16. GA OR, 1st Special Session, A/309, 15 May 1947.
17. GA OR, 1st Special Session, 1st Committee, 53rd and 57th
Meetings, 10 and 13 May 1947.
18. GA OR, 1st Special Session, 77th Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1947.
19. Different groupings, however, referred to different aspects of
Gromyko's speech, Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair, for example, stressing in
particular Soviet support for a federative Arab-Jewish state, as
advocated by itself (e.g., in a programmatic pamphlet distributed on the
eve of the First Special Session to workers' parties throughout the
world, and also to Soviet officials under the title "A Progressive Plan for
the Solution of the Palestine Question").
20. Cf. Moshe Shertok's speech at the National Trade Union
Emergency Conference for Labor Palestine in Atlantic City, JTA, 19
May 1947.
21. Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, p. 1095.
22. Memorandum by Director of the State Department Office of
Special Political Affairs, Dean Rusk, to Dean Acheson, 27 May 1947,
ibid., pp. 1088-89. During the early stages of the First Special Session,
U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow Elbridge Durbrow had cabled the
Secretary of State that Soviet policy was based on opposition to the
formation of a Jewish state in all or part of Palestine and support for the
Arab side in the controversy —ibid., pp. 1081-82.
23. JTA, 16 May 1947; also Dean Rusk's memorandum as above.

24. E. Epstein to Sumner Welles, 29 May 1947, CZA, S25/483.
25. E.g., R. Moscow in Arabic, 15 July, 23 and 25 August 1947, R.
Moscow in Persian, 5 August 1947, and TASS, 21 August 1947/SWB Í,
18 July, 8, 22, 25 and 29 August, and 2 September 1947.
27. Cf. p. 51.
28. Yiddish broadcasts to North America had been operating since
1942. In 1945 Radio Moscow put out two weekly half-hour Yiddish
programs, early in 1946 one daily quarter-hour program and early in
1947 a daily half-hour program. This continued until January 1949
when the Yiddish broadcasts were stopped altogether (cf. p. 316).
29. Many of the Yiddish broadcast commentators were associated
with the Committee which had been set up during the war for
propaganda among Western Jewry; for the Committee, see below chap.
7.
30. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 8 July 1947/SWB Í, 11
July 1947.
The natural alliance between Jews and the USSR had been a major
feature of Soviet propaganda to Jewish audiences since the end of the
war (and even earlier). In a Jewish Communist organ that appeared in
Britain, for example, the Soviet Jewish commentator David Zaslavskii
had written in the early summer of 1945 that while Hitler had "tried to
separate the Jews from other people as 'a peculiar race' . . . he mixed the
dead bodies of Jews with non-Jews in common graves and those graves
have become joint monuments to the victims of Fascism. Hitler wanted
to rouse all mankind against the Jews but he only succeeded in
cementing the Jews more closely with other peoples, Jewish blood
mixed with the torrent of blood shed for the freedom of mankind."
Zaslavskii went on: "Where the Red Army stands, there Fascism will
be pulled out by the roots. There the foundations of anti-Semitism, too,
will be destroyed . . . . The Red Army brings with it lessons of
friendship and peaceful co-operation among peoples. . . . It has
extended the area of democracy in Europe and where democracy
triumphs, the Jews breathe more freely.
" . . . It is the duty of the Jews everywhere to support the Soviet
people in their struggle for genuine peace. It is not only a question of
gratitude to the power which saved the Jews of Europe from complete
annihilation. It is in the vital interests of the Jews themselves, for only
in the complete victory of the Soviet Union in the field of international
co-operation is guaranteed the regeneration and further progress of all
the Jewish people"—Jewish Forum, May-June 1945.
31. E.g., R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 31 August 1947/SWB
The Die is Cast 101
Í, 8 September 1947. For further details, see below pp. 302 and 304-5.
Another broadcast claimed that Britain's cities were seeing anti-Jewish
outbreaks in which fascist gangs were assaulting houses and shops
with impunity and beating up children and old people in broad day-
light, while the authorities stood aloof. The British fascist leader, Sir
Oswald Mosley, was holding numerous meetings in London, and the
market was flooded with his publications advocating racial hatred and
a crusade against the USSR and the democratic nations—R. Moscow in
English for the U.K., 29 September 1947/SWB Í, 3 October 1947.
32. R. Moscow in English for N. America, 18 October 1947/SWB Í, 22
October 1947.
33. TASS for the Provincial Press, and R. Moscow in Yiddish for N.
America, 7-10 August 1947, and R. Moscow in English for Great Britain,
11 August 1947/MR, 11 and 13 August 1947; also Pmvda, 17 August
1947; R. Moscow, 19 August 1947/SWB Í, 22 August 1947; and Krasnaia
zvezda, 20 August 1947.
34. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 3 December 1947/SWB Í, 8
December 1947.
35. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 24 June 1947/SWB Í, 27
June 1947.
36. Three weeks earlier a Soviet Arabic broadcast had referred to a
joint Jewish-Arab strike in May 1947, presumably the same one as Fefer
was talking of, in which 35,000 workers were said to have participated.
It is worth stressing that despite Soviet theory concerning the
cooperation of Jewish and Arab workers, this was a major source of
controversy among the Arab labor organizations in Palestine itself, the
Communists and their sympathizers being among the principal
opponents of cooperation with Jewish organizations in strikes— see n.
60 below.
July 1947.
38. Izvestiia, 20 May 1947.
39. TASS Town Service, 23 May 1947/SWB Í, 26 May 1947. (TASS
had special news bulletins for the use of the local media; e.g., also,
TASS for the Provincial Press.)
40. Vavilov made these remarks in conversations with Jewish Agency
Washington representative Eliahu Epstein —E. Epstein to the Jewish
Agency Executive, 31 July 1947, CZA, S25/9299.
41. Soviet media barely mentioned the possibility of partition in this
period, apart from Fefer's reference above (which was unaccompanied
by any comment).
42. JTA, 16 and 17 June 1947. For the February 1945 resolution, see
above p. 16.
43. JTA, 27 June 1947.

44. E. Epstein to Jewish Agency Executive, 25 June 1947, CZA,
S25/483.
45. Vavilov illustrated his point by referring to Congress's freezing of
Representative Stratton's proposal (HR 2910) that the U.S.A. permit the
entry into the country during four years of 400,000 D.P.s above the
quota stipulated by U.S. immigration legislation—American Jewish
Yearbook, 5708, vol. 49, pp. 220 and 561-62; cf. above chap. 1, n. 22.
46. E. Epstein to Jewish Agency Executive, 31 July 1947, CZA,
S25/9299.
47. )TA, 8 June 1947.
48. The Jewish Agency Political Department's third review of Soviet
policy toward Palestine for May-June 1947, undated, CZA, S25/9299.
49. Egyptian Prime Minister Isma'il Sidqi resigned on 9 December
1946 after the Egyptian rejection of the Bevin-Sidqi agreement of
October and a new government was formed by Mahmud Fahmi Nuq-
rashi; Nuqrashi had been dismissed from this post as a result of British
pressure in the wake of the anti-British demonstrations of February
1946 (cf. above p. 35) that had followed Britain's postponement of
suggestions to amend the 1936 Treaty. For the situation in Egypt in the
period between December 1945, when the Egyptian government offi-
cially asked London to begin talks on amending the 1936 Treaty, and
December 1946, see P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), pp. 359-64; and John Marlowe,
AngJo-Egyptian Relations (London: Frank Cass, 2nd edition, 1965).
50. TASS and R. Moscow in Arabic, 19-22 December 1946/MR, 2679.
The Egyptian Senate's debate over this matter on 20 January 1947 was
broadcast by R. Moscow, 24 January 1947/DWB Í, 27 January 1947.
51. New Times, 15 December 1946, quoting the Egyptian paper Le
Journal d'Egypte.
52. Elizabeth Monroe attributes the British request to postpone the
discussion of any amendment of the 1936 Treaty (cf. above n. 49) to the
Middle East's vulnerability to Soviet pressures —Monroe, Britain's
Moment, p. 155.
53. New Times, 27 July 1947.
54. E.g., R. Moscow, 1 and 7 January 1947/DWB Í, 3 and 9 January
1947; New Times, 27 July 1947; and R. Moscow, and R. Moscow in
Arabic, 28 July 1347/MR, 30 July 1947.
55. Cf. pp. 35-36.
56. SC OR, 2nd Year, No. 80, 20 August 1947.
57. ANA, 25 August and 12 September 1947, and R. Damascus,
25 September 1947/SWB ÍÍÍ, 28 August, 25 September and 2 October
1947.
The Die is Cast 103
Poland was the only state that voted on 28 August against the draft
resolution that called upon the British and Egyptian governments to
continue negotiating the issue and to resort to other peaceful methods of
settlement at their choice should negotiations fail, the USSR, together
with Syria and Colombia, abstaining —SC OR, 2nd Year, No. 86, 28
August 1947.
58. After two further barren votes on 29 August and 10 September,
the Egyptian complaint became to all intents and purposes a dead letter
although Gromyko as president of the Security Council for September
1947 ruled that it remain officially on the agenda —SC OR, 2nd Year,
Nos. 87 and 88, 29 August and 10 September 1947.
59. GA OR, 2nd Session, Supplement No. 11, UNSCOP Report to the
General Assembly [September 1947], vol. 1. The other recommendations
related to the period of transition, the question of an immigration quota,
the establishment of a constituent assembly in each area (the Arab and
the Jewish), special ordinances for Jerusalem and the relationship of the
two states with this separate unit.
60. He mentioned on the Arab side the National Liberation League,
the League of Intellectuals and the Trade Union Movement, and on the
Jewish side Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair, Ihud, the Communist Party and the
League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement.
Following the break-up of the Jewish-Arab Palestine Communist Party
in 1943, Palestinian Arab Communist activity in fact centered on: the
National Liberation League (set up in 1944); the Union of Arab
Intellectuals (formed in 1941); and the Federation of Arab Workers'
Sections (founded in 1940) and other workers' unions. The main centers
of .activity of this Federation, presumably the Trade Union Movement
referred to by the Yugoslav representative, were Haifa and Nazareth.
The Federation, however, had links with Arab nationalist circles and
opposed the activities of Arabs who collaborated with Jewish workers in
the League of Palestinian Workers that in turn collaborated with the
Histadrut; the League of Palestinian Workers was recognized by the
International Conference of Trade Unions held in Paris in the fall of
1945 as representing 5,000 Arab workers.
For the activities of Arab nationalist worker organizations, and the
Federation and the collaboration of Jewish and Arab workers, see
Yaacov Shimoni, Aravyei Eretz YisraeJ (The Arabs of Israel) (Tel Aviv:
Am Oved, 1947), pp. 358-72; for the National Liberation League, see
Yehoshua Porat, ' T h e Origin, Nature and Disintegration of the National
Liberation League, 1943-1948," Ha-Mizrah He-Hadash 14, no. 4 (1964):
354-66.
61. See below chap. 4. For the Yugoslav stand, see also pp. 67 and 84
and n. 7 above; GA OR, 2nd Session, Supplement No. 11, vol. 2, pp.
48-64; and Horowitz, pp. 275-78.

62. Ibid., pp. 184 and 198.
63. E. Epstein to members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 11
September 1947, CZA, S25/9299.
64. Monroe, Britain's Moment, pp. 157 and 165-67.
65. New Times, 19 November 1947.
66. R. Moscow in Persian, 14 October 1947/SWB I, 17 October 1947.
67. Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, 30 September
1947, Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1166-70.
68. Memorandum of Conversation at the U.N. between Amir Faysal
and_Shaykh Hafiz Wahba of the Saudi delegation, Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri as-Sa'id and Foreign Minister Jamali, and Ambassador George
Wadsworth and Samuel Kopper of the U.S. delegation, 3 October 1947,
ibid., pp. 1171-73.
69. Horowitz, pp. 239 and 256-57. (I have not been able to learn the
exact date of Horowitz's conversation with Simic, nor of the meeting of
the Slav caucus.)
70. GA OR, 2nd Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine
Question, 13 October 1947, pp. 69-71.
71. R. Beirut, 9 and 18 October and 3 November 1947, ANA, 14 and
17 October 1947, R. Sharq al-Adna, 14 and 19 October 1947/SWB III, 16
and 23 October and 6 November 1947; R. Moscow, 15 October 1947/MR,
16 October 1947; and al-Ahrom, 17 October 1947.
72. R. Moscow in Arabic, 15, 19, 30 and 31 October and 4 November
1947/SWB Í, 20 and 24 October and 3, 5 and 7 November 1947.
73. From protocol of Jewish Agency Executive meeting in New York,
26 October 1947, and M. Yuval to D. Ben Gurion, 26 October 1947, CZA,
$25/9299; see also Horowitz, pp. 270-72.
74. Ibid., p. 266.
75. L. Gelber to Members of American Section of Jewish Agency
Executive, 25 August 1947, CZA, Z5/1323.
76. It is perhaps of interest that a few days earlier Loy Henderson,
director of the State Department Office of Near Eastern and African
Affairs, had told Eliahu E p s t e i n - w h o had expressed concern at rumors
"that would-be immigrants to Palestine embarking from Rumanian ports
were, in fact, communist agents" — that the Department doubted the
credibility of such rumors — Memorandum of conversation by Loy
Henderson, 22 October 1947, Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, pp.
1196-97.
77. The British Foreign Office was reported to have estimated the
number of immigrants due to embark on the two ships as 18,000 —U.S.
Ambassador in London Louis Douglas to Secretary of State Marshall, 28
October 1947, ibid., pp. 1215-16. Ultimately the ships in fact carried
The Die is Cast 105
somewhat more than 15,000 immigrants.

78. L. Gelber to the Jewish Agency Executive, 31 October and 21
November 1947, CZA, Z5/463; and 5 November 1947, CZA, Z5/1323. For
Rusk's account of his 31 October talks with Gelber, see Foreign
Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1229-30. Secretary Marshall himself
wrote Bevin on 7 November (ibid., pp. 1247-48) of conversations with
Jewish Agency representatives on the subject. In talks between the two
foreign ministers in London later in the month, Bevin again noted that
"British information indicated that Jewish groups moving from the
Balkan states to Palestine iltegally contained many indoctrinated
Communists which presented a serious threat to Middle East
stability" —G. Marshall to Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett, 25
November 1947, ibid., pp. 1287-89. U.S. efforts to stop the sailing of the
ships did not, in fact, cease after 29 November, cf. Memorandum of
Conversation with Jewish Agency Representatives by Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Political Affairs Norman Armour, 12 December 1947,
ibid., pp. 1311-12. When the ships finally sailed late in December
Robert McClintock, Special Assistant to Dean Rusk, drafted a suggested
press statement for use by Lovett deprecating clandestine emigration to
Palestine. Lovett, however, did not use this material —ibid., pp. 1321-22.
For further details on the Pan York and Pan Crescent operation in the
context of the immigration from Romania and Bulgaria, see Sefer
Toledot Ha-Hagana, vol. 3, pp. 1178-90.
Question, 21 and 22 October and 19 November 1947. For the S u b -
committee and its work, see Jorge Garciá-Granados, The Birth of Israel
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 250-65.
80. Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, pp. 1231-34.
81. Ibid., pp. 1210 and 1233. Loy Henderson, director of the State
Department Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, wrote to
Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett on 24 November: "I wonder if
the President realizes that the plan which we are supporting for
Palestine leaves no force other t h a n local law enforcement
organizations for preserving order in Palestine. It is quite clear that
there will be wide-scale violence," which meant the materializataion of
the eventuality envisaged by Herschel Johnson at the Ad Hoc
Sub-Committee on 22 November, namely "that if the situation . . .
should develop into a menace to peace, the matter would naturally
come before the Security Council and that the United States along with
the other four Great Powers, would be prepared to share responsibility
for removing this menace. Our plan," Henderson stressed, "envisages
apparently the despatch of American, Soviet and perhaps other troops
to Palestine in order to preserve law and order. It seems to me that we
ought to think twice before we support any plan which would result in
American troops going to Palestine. The fact that Soviet troops under
our plan would be introduced into the heart of the Middle East is even
more serious" —ibid., p. 1282.
82. Ibid., pp. 1234-37.
83. U.S. U.N. Representative Warren Austin to Secretary of State
Marshall, 7 November 1947, ibid., pp. 1242-43.
Question, 24 November 1947.
85. GA OR, 2nd Session, 125th Plenary Meeting, 26 November 1947.
86. GA OR, 2nd Session, 128th Plenary Meeting, 29 November 1947.
PART TWO:
THE COINCIDENCE
OF INTERESTS
3
From Resolution
to Implementation:
the International Arena,
30 November 1947-
14 May 1948
The unequivocal and consistent support of partition that had

characterized the Soviet stand on Palestine in the period
between 13 October and 29 November 1947 remained Soviet
policy after the partition resolution had been adopted.
This support, now directed at ensuring that the General
Assembly resolution would be implemented as speedily as
possible, was particularly manifested in the political and moral
assistance granted to the Yishuv both within the U.N. and
outside it. Its most vigorous expression was the Soviet
opposition to the U.S. attempt of March 1948 to postpone the
establishment of the Jewish and Arab states. Yet even before the
end of 1947 there were signs of Soviet-American disagreement as
a result of a chain of events which threatened the
implementation of partition.
On 2 December, just three days after the adoption of the
partition resolution, Trygve Lie drew the attention of the
President of the Security Council to the sections of the resolution
concerned with the Council's role in its implementation. 1 These
stipulated that a. the Commission of five small states appointed
by the General Assembly to supervise the implementation of its
resolution on behalf of the U.N. and to take over the
109
administration of Palestine "as the mandatory Power withdraws

its armed forces" —henceforth the Palestine Commission —was to
operate under "the guidance" of the Security Council and to
present it with monthly reports; b. the Security Council was to
"take the necessary measures as provided for in the [partition]
plan for its implementation; and c. were a situation constituting
a threat to peace" to occur in Palestine, the Council "in order to
maintain international peace and security" would operate the
relevant articles of the U.N. Charter (39 and 41) "by taking
measures . . . to empower the Commission . . . to exercise in
Palestine the functions . . . assigned to it." Although the Council
itself was to determine whether such a situation had arisen, the
29 November resolution specified that the Council was to
consider as "a threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression . . . any attempt to alter by force the settlement
envisaged by this resolution." 2
One week later, on 9 December, the Security Council convened
for its first debate on the Palestine question, with the above letter
of the U.N. Secretary-General on its agenda. The different
approaches of the USSR and the United States to the role of the
Security Council were immediately stressed. Gromyko insisted
that the Council "should implement the resolution of the
General Assembly," while Herschel Johnson said that although it
would "carry out the specific requests made of it by the General
Assembly," the Council did not assume "responsibility for
implementation of the entire resolution." In the end, the Council
decided for the time being to agree to differ, leaving the
Palestine question on its agenda. A formula was accepted which
noted that the Council "received the letter from the
Secretary-General enclosing the resolution of the General
Assembly concerning Palestine and, being seized of the
question, decided to postpone discussion." 3
In Palestine itself the security situation was deteriorating. An
attack on a Jewish bus on the day after the adoption of the
partition resolution was the first of a series of increasingly
frequent and serious Arab-Jewish incidents. Moreover, the
military situation and therefore the eventual implementation of
partition were affected by initiatives taken by the Arab states on
the one hand, and by the United States and Britain on the other.
Although the Arab League which convened the heads of the
Arab states in Cairo in the second week of December decided
against sending their armies to join in hostilities in Palestine as
long as the Mandatory remained, it resolved that the Arab states
From Resolution to Implementation 111
should finance and equip those Arabs who were conducting

military actions in Palestine and set up recruiting and training
centers on their own territories to assist them. 4 Washington
meanwhile announced at the very beginning of December that it
was putting a total embargo on military equipment to the Middle
East, a decision which primarily affected the Jewish Yishuv that
had already been purchasing war materiel in the United States;
the Arab states, which also purchased arms in the United States,
had other sources notably by virtue of the bilateral military and
defense treaties and agreements several of them had with Britain.
London's main contribution to this chain of events was the
statement in Parliament in mid-December by Colonial Minister
Arthur Creech-Jones that the Mandatory would terminate its
administration of Palestine on 15 May 1948 and that until that
date it would not transfer any authority to the Palestine
Commission, the members of which would not even be allowed
to enter Palestine until 1 May 1948.
These developments aggravated the urgency of in particular
two issues raised at Lake Success during October-November: the
question of setting up an international U.N. force to ensure the
implementation of partition; and the training and equipment of a
Jewish military or police force that would be ready to operate
within the boundaries of the Jewish State immediately upon the
termination of the Mandate. The Jewish Agency representatives
in New York had already found a community of interest with the
Soviet U.N. delegation on both these questions. U.S. opposition
to the presence in the Middle East of any force that might
include Soviet troops 5 —and there was no way of establishing a
U.N. force from which the USSR would be a priori
excluded—was a blow to both the Yishuv and the USSR, while
the U.S. arms embargo provided the background to a
Jewish-Soviet understanding regarding military assistance. 6
The Palestine Commission began its activities on 9 January
1948. The main focus of its attention was the security situation
in Palestine and the urgency of setting up an international force
to implement partition. When the Commission presented its first
progress report to the Security Council on 30 January, it pointed
out that a special report would be composed covering these two
issues. As a result the U.N. Secretariat prepared a memorandum
on the relationship between the Commission and the Security
Council which included a discussion of both the Security
Council's responsibilities within the framework of the partition
resolution and "the question of an international armed force for
Palestine." The U.N. Secretariat stated on the former issue: "The

Security Council may not issue instructions altering the essence
of the Plan of Partition. Its instructions should always aim at the
implementation of this Plan." It might, however, "elaborate or
supplement" it or "adjust a detail which would prove to be
unworkable." As to the second point, it was clear in view of the
declared policy of the British government, that the militias
envisaged by the 29 November resolution would not be formed
before the end of the Mandate "and the problem arises as to how
public order and security are to be kept in Palestine immediately
after the termination of the mandate. . . .
"It should therefore be examined," the U.N. Secretariat went
on, "(a) whether the Commission can enlist and employ an
armed force and (b) under what conditions the Security Council
may provide an international armed force." 7
The Palestine Commission presented its special report on 16
February. This said that since the Commission was a purely
executive organ lacking the freedom to deviate in any way from
the partition resolution, the political body under whose
guidance it functioned, i.e., the Security Council, must resolve
what political steps were needed to ensure implementation of
partition insofar as these were not specified in the 29 November
resolution. The security aspect of the problem was, according to
the Commission, the decisive one, and if some way were not
found to overcome this obstacle the necessary preliminary
conditions for any possible implementation would not exist. "It
is the considered view of the Commission," its special report
stated, "that the security forces of the Mandatory Power must be
replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force." Without this
"effective assistance" which it could receive only from the
Security Council, the Palestine Commission felt it could not
"discharge the great responsibility . . . entrusted to it by the
General Assembly." 8
The Soviet Union had continued to follow developments
concerning Palestine with close interest. It sought consistently to
justify the partition resolution, to point out the Soviet
contribution to its adoption, and to censure efforts to obstruct its
implementation. The U.N. decision, Radio Moscow maintained,
enabled the Arabs and Jews in Palestine "to develop their own
political lives on the principle of national self-determination and
to be masters of their own fate." It also provided for "the
possibility of a solution on a large scale of the problem of the
Jewish refugees, victims of Hitlerism, who still linger in the
British and U.S. camps in Germany, Austria, Italy and Cyprus." 9

Speaking on 30 December 1947 at a "U.S.-USSR Palestine
Friendship Dinner" arranged by the American Committee of
Jewish Writers, Artists and Scientists (a virtual "front organ-
ization"), Gromyko urged that measures be taken to ensure the
"speediest and most effective" implementation of the partition
resolution. He added that the Security Council was "ready in the
case of necessity to deal with this situation." 1 0
The Soviet communications media highlighted the fighting in
Palestine which was renewed after 29 November 1947. Although
it was impossible to ignore the Arab-Jewish collision inherent in
these clashes, Soviet sources still emphasized the British role in
fanning Arab-Jewish enmity and argued that the British support
of Arab efforts to prevent the implementation of partition was
part of the British campaign to consolidate its array of forces in
the region. 1 1
The British, Soviet sources argued, were not only inciting the
two peoples to mutual hatred; the British-officered and -financed
Arab Legion was taking an active part in some of the fighting;12
and the British government was negotiating with 'Abdallah on
employing the Legion for police tasks in the Arab part of
Palestine when the Mandate terminated. For his part 'Abdallah,
who intended annexing the Arab part of Palestine to
Transjordan, had promised Britain use of Jaffa as a military base
in return for assistance in carrying out this plan. 1 3 The Soviet
media also charged that demobilized British soldiers were
joining the Arab forces as volunteers and that the Mandatory was
not only turning a blind eye to the illegal entry of armed Arab
gangs into Palestine and the smuggling into the country of arms
from the neighboring Arab countries, but actually aiding these
activities. 14 Soviet sources noted that whereas the partition
resolution had stipulated that the British evacuate a port by 1
February 1948 to facilitate Jewish immigration, British U.N.
representative Sir Alexander Cadogan had declared on 20
January that the British government had no intention of doing
this before 15 May. His pretext had been that an increase in
immigration would further undermine the already unstable order
and security in Palestine and strengthen the Jews' ability to
withstand an Arab offensive. 15
The USSR also blamed Washington for the bloody clashes taking
place in Palestine, stressing particularly what it termed U.S.
hypocrisy. The Jewish press abroad was quoted as saying that the
U.S. government had late in November supplied the Arab countries
with $41 million worth of rifles and ammunition, 1 6 yet, following

the imposition of the arms embargo, it had confiscated materiel in
New York warehouses intended for Tel Aviv and Haifa. 17 The main
American interest in the region, according to TASS, was strategic,
as the Eastern Mediterranean was in their, as in the British, view, a
major battlefield in the cold war. The U.S. and British governments
were therefore discussing strategic plans for the area and the
establishment of sea and air bases in Palestine and Cyprus. 1 8
(Neither the Soviet Union nor the U.S.A. was keen to mention the
joint effort they had made in October-November to have a partition
resolution adopted.)
The two Western powers had common interests with Arab
"reaction" which, Soviet sources pointed out, was opposed to the
interests of the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab peoples. Instead of
regarding the partition resolution as the beginning of Palestinian
independence, Trud commented in January 1948, Arab reaction
saw it as a basis for initiating a campaign against both the Jews and
Arab "progressive" elements. In the wake of the 29 November
resolution "a wave of pogroms" had swept over Palestine, and
pogroms were planned also against the Jews in Syria, Egypt,
Transjordan and Aden. Simultaneously, a campaign had been
started with the consent of the Arab League against "progressive
organizations in several of the Arab countries, accompanied by
vulgar slanders against the USSR," the pretext being, as the Syrian
Minister of the Interior had declared, the Soviet vote in favor of
partition. 19
A Radio Moscow program, defending partition as destined to
bring stability to the region and to enable the Arabs to put an end to
imperialist intervention in their affairs, said that those Arabs who
were the "so-called defenders of the Arab cause," had maintained
close ties with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, as well as
with British imperialists and Wall Street financiers. "People who
do not hesitate to sacrifice their own national interests are now
undertaking to organize an Arab a r m y t o save Palestine." Arab
League Secretary-General 'Abd ar-Rahman 'Azzam, "apprehensive
of the success of the progressive movement among the Arabs, . . .
was using the Palestine question to establish an alliance of the
reactionary rulers of the Arab League states against the wills of
their own peoples . . . to distract Arab public opinion from the
manoeuvres of the Anglo-U.S. imperialists and their treaties with
the Arab countries." 2 0
The connection between Nazi Germany and the Arab forces
fighting in Palestine, and the participation of fascist and
anti-Soviet elements in the Arab armies were recurrent Soviet

themes throughout 1948 and early 1949. One report stated that no
less than 50,000 German army officers and soldiers were in Egypt,
as well as units of General Anders' Polish troops. 2 1
Parallel to their attacks on Arab "reaction" and its opposition to
the partition resolution, the Soviet media attributed a positive
stand to "Arab democratic organizations." There was no specific
body, however, that they could name as actually favoring partition,
although they did claim that the Arab members of the "League for
the Struggle Against Anti-Semitism" had urged the Arabs to live in
friendship with the Jews and not let themselves be misled by
provocateurs and "hitlerite propagandists." Their appeal was said
to have noted that "the foundation of a Jewish state is an ac-
complished fact." 22
A long article in Izvestiia by Soviet commentator on Middle
Eastern affairs Semen Belinkov summarized the Soviet stand on
the partition resolution and Arab and Western efforts to frustrate it.
International reaction, Belinkov wrote, was taking advantage of the
resolution to kindle "a chauvinistic nationalist atmosphere" in the
Arab East. The Arab League which headed "the campaign against
partition" was "rattling its sabre and recruiting volunteers into the
'Arab army'. The member countries of the League are financing 'the
march' into Palestine and the reactionary Arab leadership is calling
all the Arabs to a jihad, a holy war, a call that was immediately
taken up by the Anglo-American instigators of a new war." 5,000
veterans of the British and American armed forces had "expressed
their desire to serve in the 'Arab army'."
The Soviet commentator then described the demonstrations that
had taken place in the Arab countries, the "Goebbels-like
anti-Soviet cock-and-bull stories" and "the excesses and threats"
against the powers that had supported partition, and ridiculed the
Arab leaders' claim that "the setting up in Palestine of an
independent Jewish State with a population of less than three-
quarters of a million can comprise a threat to the 35 million
Arabs of the neighboring countries.
"The Arab reactionaries," the article claimed, "are trying to
exploit economic factors in their agitation against partition . . . in
particular the circumstance that recently the products of Jewish
industry in Palestine are competing in the Near Eastern markets
with those of the poorly developed and technically backward Arab
industry. It is, however, precisely those who are frightening the
Arabs with the competition of Jewish goods who are of their own
free will opening the doors of their countries to the flow of
American wares whose sale at dumping prices really comprises a

serious threat to the establishment of an Arab national industry.
' T h e artificially fanned struggle over the Palestine question,"
Belinkov wrote further, "is intended to distract the attention of the
broad masses from the . . . situation in which the Arabs find
themselves as a result of imperialist domination and the enormi-
ties of the arbitrary rule of the Arab feudais and effendis." In the
wake of World War II, according to Belinkov, the Arabs were
seeking the evacuation of foreign troops and were no longer
prepared to accept foreign rule. This trend was embodied in the
"trade union, workers' organizations and progressive political
parties" that had appeared in a number of Arab countries. Yet the
Arab rulers were merely "taking advantage of the Palestine
question to intensify the taxation burden and in particular to create
new armies, earmarked for various military adventures in the Near
East." Britain was using these "instigators of civil war in Palestine.
. . people with a murky political past, racists, foreign agents" as
well as the Egyptian and Iraqi armies which it in fact controlled and
armed, and also that of Trans Jordan, "the most efficient army in the
Arab East," to frustrate the partition resolution and imperil peace
in the region so as to ensure the continuation of its own
predominance in the Middle East. 23
The Security Council convened six times between 24 February
and 5 March 1948 to discuss the Palestine situation. It sought to
set up a suitable framework for discussion of the Palestine
Commission reports and in particular the international force
which the Commission considered essential in view of the de-
velopments since 29 November 1947. The United States and the
USSR agreed that the great powers, the permanent members of
the Council, must deal with this problem, yet they differed con-
siderably in the emphases of their respective positions. Gromyko
accused the U.S. delegation of attempting to delay and confuse
the process of consultation (by taking testimony from the in-
terested parties) that had rather to be simplified and made more
effective, while the head of the U.S. delegation, Senator Warren
Austin, maintained that although his government favored parti-
tion, the U.N. Charter did not empower the Security Council to
impose political settlements; its activity, he insisted, was di-
rected toward the preservation of peace and not the imposition
of partition. On 5 March the Council adopted a resolution based
on a draft presented by the U.S. delegation but altered in parts
as a result in particular of Soviet opposition to its original
recommendations—the last but one of the six sessions was actu-
ally interrupted to enable Soviet-U.S. contacts to reach an agreed

formula. The resolution called on the Council's permanent
members "to consult" and make within ten days "recom-
mendations to [the Council] regarding the guidance and
instructions which the Council might usefully give to the
Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolu-
tion of the General Assembly." The resolution also appealed "to
all governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine,
to take all possible action to prevent such discords as are now
occurring in Palestine." 2 4
During these great power consultations (from which Britain was
excluded a priori as a party concerned, although twice called in to
give testimony), Gromyko stressed that his government would
insist on implementation of the partition resolution. He pointed
out that all ways of achieving an Arab-Jewish conciliation had been
exhausted and that the great powers had been entrusted with their
current task after the Council had rejected an American suggestion
advocating an attempt to reconcile Arabs and Jews. 25
On 19 March the Council met to hear and discuss the report
of the great power consultations. 2 6 Austin served as spokesman
and was supported throughout by his French and Chinese
colleagues. He told the Council that there was general
agreement that partition could not be implemented peacefully.
Whereas, he pointed out, the Jewish Agency of Palestine
accepted partition as a minimum plan, the Arab Higher
Committee rejected any solution based on the setting up of a
Jewish state. The Mandatory, Austin went on, had confirmed
that there had been infiltrations into Palestine of both armed
elements—by sea and by land —and war materiel. Given the
lack of agreement between the Arabs and Jews, the gradual
withdrawal of British forces would result in even greater
violence and disorder. If the Mandate were terminated before a
peaceful settlement were achieved, large-scale warfare must be
expected between the two communities. The Security Council,
the U.S. delegate concluded, must therefore make clear to the
sides and governments concerned that it would not allow a
threat to international peace to erupt in Palestine, and do all in
its power to stop violence and restore peace and order in
Palestine.
Gromyko voiced a number of reservations. The most
important were: a. his delegation did not accept the comparison
between infiltration into Palestine by land and sea. Everyone
knew "what type of infiltration is of most danger from the point
of view of implementing the Palestine resolution" which had

indeed stipulated that a threat to peace meant any attempt to
change the partition settlement by means of force. (This
distinction was likewise stressed by Jewish Agency
representative Abba Hillel Silver who rejected any similarity
between the infiltration of Arab armed bands and the
immigration of Jews from D.P. camps); b. Austin had not given
an accurate rendering of the Jewish Agency's information on
the possibility of implementing partition. Gromyko admitted
that he himself, however, had certain doubts whether partition
could be implemented by peaceful means and therefore agreed
that the Security Council take appropriate steps; yet, he
insisted —as had the U.N. Secretariat six weeks before — , the
Council did not have the authority to alter the decision of the
General Assembly.
At a second meeting on the same day, the head of the U.S.
delegation introduced a new element into the debate. Since, he
said, it was "clear that the Security Council is not prepared to go
ahead with efforts to implement this plan in the existing situation,"
the U.S. government proposed a provisional trusteeship for
Palestine that would not be detrimental in any way to "the
character of the eventual political settlement." Austin called for
the convention of a second special session of the U.N. General
Assembly to deal with setting up the proposed trusteeship regime
before the date fixed for the termination of the Mandate, i.e. 15 May
1948. 27
The suggestion for a provisional trusteeship had originated in
the State Department but was also supported by the President. 28 Its
main purpose was tactical, to postpone the implementation of
partition and to transfer discussion of the Palestine question from
the Security Council to the Trusteeship Council, which the Soviet
Union virtually boycotted (cf. p. 87) and where there was no veto. 29
On 30 March Austin presented the Security Council with two
draft resolutions. The one called upon the Jewish Agency and the
Arab Higher Committee to "make available" representatives to
discuss with the Council arrangements for a truce between the two
communities; it also urged all armed groups in Palestine, Arab and
Jewish, to cease immediately all acts of violence. The second
proposal requested the U.N. Secretary-General "to convoke a
special session of the General Assembly to consider further the
question of the future government of Palestine." The American
delegate explained that he had avoided any specific reference to
the proposed provisional trusteeship as Washington did not wish
to delay a decision on convening a special session of the Assembly.

Gromyko responded by recalling the "long . . . t h o r o u g h . . . [and]
exhaustive consideration" the various U.N. bodies had given the
problem prior to the adoption of the partition resolution and the
conclusion, to which the U.S.A. had been party, that partition was
both a just solution and one that "presented advantages over
any other possible solution." He dismissed American attempts
to demonstrate that partition could not be imposed by peaceful
means as lacking any factual basis. Moreover, the Security
Council had dealt only sparsely with this aspect of the problem
and its permanent members had not discussed it at all in their
consultations. The Council had not exhausted all possible peaceful
means nor had it adopted any resolution to ensure partition.
Gromyko doubted whether imposing a trusteeship regime would
involve less bloodshed. Abba Hillel Silver, he pointed out, had told
the Council that the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Le'umi had
resolve on 23 March that the "Jewish people and the Yishuv"
would oppose any attempt to postpone the establishment of the
Jewish State and would reject a trusteeship regime, however
provisional. "The only way to reduce bloodshed," Gromyko
insisted, was "the prompt and effective creation of two states in
Palestine. If the United States and some other states block the
implementation of partition and regard Palestine as an element in
their economic and military-strategic considerations, then any
decision on the future of Palestine, including the establishment of a
trusteeship, will mean the transformation of Palestine into a field of
strife and dissension between the Arabs and the Jews . . . [and] will
only increase the number of victims." Gromyko was convinced that
a trusteeship regime contradicted the interests of both peoples
populating Palestine, as it would prevent them from setting up
their independent states. As for the U.N., it would be back where it
had started a year previously when it had initiated its first
discussion of the Palestine issue. 3 0
Despite Soviet opposition the Security Council adopted a
resolution on 1 April, on which the USSR and the Ukraine
abstained, which called for the convening of a special session of the
General Assembly to look into the question of Palestine's future
government. The Council also adopted a resolution, this time
unanimously, calling for an immediate cease-fire in Palestine. On
the same day the President of the Council announced that a special
session of the Assembly would open on 16 April. (U.N. regulations
stipulated a 15-day interval between the decision to convene such a
session and its opening.) 3 1
Comment in the Soviet media during the Security Council

debates from 24 February to 1 April reiterated the themes of the
previous months: the infiltration into Palestine of armed groups
from the Arab countries; Britain's efforts to frustrate the
implementation of partition, including active participation in
some of the military incidents in order to justify the retention of its
own troops in the country; the Arab League's subordination of its
policy to British interests; and finally the various Western attempts
to strengthen their positions by anti-Soviet propaganda and
suppression of Arab "democratic organizations" to convince the
Arabs of the existence of a Communist threat and create a pretext
for a framework of regional defense.
The volte-face of the U.S. government was a further target for
Soviet censure, both during the period that preceded the 1 April
resolution on convening a General Assembly special session and in
the weeks that followed. TASS referred in particular to presidential
candidate Henry Wallace's attacks on the Administration,
accusing it of responsibility for weakening the U.N. first by
circumventing that body in its direct aid to different countries
through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, and now by
reneging on the partition resolution. This was the context, the
same source continued, of the U.S. attempt to transfer the
treatment of the Palestine question and particularly the issue of
that country's future government to the Trusteeship Council,
which was dominated bv the U.S.A. and Britain. 32
In mid-April the Cominform organ, For a Lasting Peace, For a
People's Democracy, summarized the Soviet position in an article
by the Palestinian Jewish Communist leader Shmuel Mikunis
under the caption "The Peoples of Palestine Struggle for National
Independence." 3 3 It began with a description of British attempts at
"fomenting disorders in Palestine and inciting the Arabs against
Jews" and of the resulting casualties and economic difficulties.
The British and the Americans, with whom Britain had been
compelled to share its influence in the Middle East, were seeking to
set up a "Turkish-Arab 'Eastern Bloc'," a project which would be
seriously obstructed by the formation of "independent Jewish and
Arab states." The peoples of Palestine, who "welcomed the
U.N. decision to create two independent states in Palestine"
had been inspired in their struggle by the position at the U.N.
of "the Soviet Union and the new democracies." The allies of
Anglo-American imperialism were the Mufti of Jerusalem's
"feudal-bourgeois circles," while "the industrial bourgeoisie"
sought the incorporation into Transjordan of "the section of
Palestine earmarked for the Arab state." Among the Jewish

population, too, there were groups "connected with Anglo-
American monopoly capital," namely "the big bourgeoisie" and
its "private army," the terrorist organizations, Etzel and Lehi
which had in the past months "committed monstrous provo-
cations against absolutely innocent Arabs."
Mikunis went on: "Jewish agencies in Jerusalem [the reference is
almost certainly to the Jewish Agency for Palestine] and their
branches in Washington and London, which represent the
coalition of the bourgeois parties with the right-wing Labour Party
Mapai show neither readiness nor determination to fight for the
realization of the U.N. decisions in the spirit of complete
independence for Palestine." This policy "has caused widespread
indignation among workers and in the ranks of the 'Hagana'."
On the other hand, "the Communist Party, the Arab National
Liberation League and all progressive elements in Palestine are
fighting for the faithful carrying out of the U.N. decision . . . . The
Arab and Jewish working people, who for years have been waging a
joint struggle for their vital interests, will not allow the agents of
imperialism to split their ranks. Despite widespread chauvinist
agitation, the unity of the Arabs and Jews is growing stronger in the
struggle for national independence."
In the name of his party Mikunis demanded that "the Jewish
trade unions and the Jewish Agency make a clear and unequivocal
declaration to the effect that in the Jewish state . . . there will be no
race discrimination, that the working people be guaranteed the
right to elect and be elected to Parliament, the right to work, leisure
and education, and that the peasants get the land necessary for
their existence."
Simultaneously, he went on, "the Communist Party is
campaigning for the unity of the working class and of all
progressive forces" and for a united front with Mapam, 3 4 "the
progressive wing in the Zionist movement in Palestine." Such
"an all-embracing national democratic front" would "spur the
militant enthusiasm of the popular masses. Its establishment is
an urgent task which, if solved, would make it possible to
isolate the fascist and pro-imperialist circles and would
facilitate the winning of independence, democracy and peace
among the peoples." 3 5
The Security Council convened on 15 April for a further
debate on Palestinian developments (its agenda now including
the Palestine Commission's second progress report, in addition
to the first progress report and the special report mentioned
above). The Council's President (Alfonso Lopez of Columbia)

said a number of unofficial meetings of Council members had
been held, while he personally had met with official
representatives of the two sides to the Palestine conflict, yet no
progress had been made toward a truce, as laid down in the
Council's 1 April resolution. He had, however, circulated
among Council members a draft resolution (S/722) intended to
promote this end. The president's announcement evoked a
request from the Ukrainian and Soviet delegates, Vasilii
Tarasenko and Gromyko, to postpone the voting until they
received instructions from their respective governments,
specifically in view of the Jewish Agency's proposed
amendments to the draft resolution. 36
When the Council reconvened a day later Gromyko stated
that although the USSR was in favor of a truce, which indeed it
was the Council's task to establish, the truce must be a just one,
not prejudicial to "the legitimate interests of either side."
Taking exception to the same sub-paragraph as had the Jewish
Agency's Moshe Shertok the day previously, and for similar
reasons, Gromyko said the call for a cessation of "all activities
of military or para-military nature, as well as acts of violence,
terrorism and sabotage" was directed against one side and
"would not create the appropriate favourable conditions for the
establishment of an effective truce." Gromyko also referred to
Shertok's remarks on the sub-paragraph concerning the call "to
refrain from bringing into Palestine armed bands or individuals,
whatever their origin, armed or capable of bearing arms." The
USSR delegation considered that "such a resolution" would
"fail to meet the lawful and incontestable rights of the Jews"
and would "aggravate their position." Gromyko pointed out
that the origin of the armed groups that had in fact entered
Palestine since 29 November was well known to the Security
Council. Moreover, immigration was not directly connected
with the issue of a truce and their "artificial" linking would
make a truce harder to achieve. A third sub-paragraph that call-
ed on the two sides to "refrain from importing or acquiring or
assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition ot
weapons and war materials" was likewise described by
Gromyko as being directed against only one side. The Soviet
delegation, he said, could support this only if it were linked
with a call for "the expulsion of the armed bands and detach-
ments which invaded Palestine from outside" and for "prevent-
ing the further invasion of Palestine by armed bands and
detachments."
From the military aspects of the draft resolution, the Soviet
deputy foreign minister turned his attention to its political
features, in particular the injunction to "refrain, pending future
consideration of the future government of Palestine by the
General Assembly, from any political activity which might
prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either community."
The point of the truce, Gromyko insisted—as had Shertok
before him—was the cessation of military action. Yet this
clause, which meant the discontinuation of "all political
activities connected in any way with the resolution of the
General Assembly on the partition of Palestine, which is still in
force," relegated "the military aspect of the truce . . . to the
background."
The resolution finally adopted by the Security Council on 16
April (S/723) took only one of these objections into account. Its
first and second sub-paragraphs were adopted unanimously, the
first as worded in the draft resolution, the second after the
introduction of changes intended to permit the entry into
Palestine of unarmed Jewish immigrants. The amended version,
suggested by Shertok and acceptable to both the Soviet and
U.S. delegations read: to "refrain from bringing and from
assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed
bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever
their origin." The Soviet and Ukrainian delegates abstained on
the remaining sub-paragraphs. 3 7
During the month that the Second Special Session of the
General Assembly was in sitting, the Security Council met on
three further occasions. On 23 April the U.S. delegation
initiated a Security Council debate on the grounds that
developments in Palestine since the adoption of the resolution
on the cessation of hostilities had not shown that it was being
implemented. Senator Austin suggested the establishment of a
Truce Commission, composed of the Jerusalem consuls of those
member states on the Security Council which had consular
representatives in that city —apart from Syria as an interested
party—namely the U.S.A., France and Belgium. This
commission, Austin suggested, would report regularly to the
Security Council, while the Secretary-General would provide it
with the necessary personnel to implement and supervise the
truce.
Tarasenko and Gromyko after him denounced the American
proposal. They both considered that the sub-paragraphs which
the U.S. delegation had insisted upon including in the 16 April

resolution were intended to make its implementation
impossible. The proposal to set up a Truce Commission was no
more promising, and as a result the United States would tell the
General Assembly Special Session that the Security Council's
endeavors had failed and that the Assembly must therefore
approve a trusteeship regime for Palestine.
Gromyko argued that it was hardly surprising that the 1 and
16 April resolutions had been ignored by the two sides since
they were "defective . . . ill-conceived and ineffective" and did
not impose any obligation on those who bore real responsibility
for what was happening in Palestine. "How," he asked, "is it
possible to arrange a truce, so long as armed groups and
formations which have entered the country for the special
purpose of waging war for the disruption of the United Nations'
Plan of Partition of Palestine remain in Palestine? ... Jews and
Arabs are paying with their blood for the inability of the Se-
curity Council to take more or less effective measures to ensure
a return to normal conditions in Palestine."
He also attacked the proposed Truce Commission, since no
"objective progressive policy in favor of the Palestine popula-
tion" could be expected from a commission, representing the
"colonial powers in whose interest it is to perpetuate colonial
conditions."
While Gromyko denied that the USSR was "asking for
membership on the commission," he argued that the U.S. step
was "designed to allow it to take over the whole question,
including control over the truce. The United States already has
a finger in the Palestine fire and now wants to put both hands
into it." (There can be no doubt that the rather absurd criteria
for the composition of the Truce Commission were specifically
intended to exclude the USSR and any of the Soviet bloc
states.) 38 Despite Soviet objections, however, the Council
adopted the U.S. resolution on appointing a Truce Commission
to aid it in implementing the 1 April truce resolution. Once
more the USSR and Ukrainian delegations abstained. 39
The two additional Security Council meetings took place on 7
and 12 May, their agenda being the Jewish Agency's concern at
the Arab states' threat to invade Palestine after 15 May and the
Truce Commission's request for 50 officers to supervise traffic
between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. On this second issue,
Gromyko pointed out that the Security Council had not
authorized the Commission to undertake police tasks. Neither
meeting passed any resolution; the Truce Commission was

merely requested to provide the Council with further
information. 40
Meanwhile, the Second Special Session of the General
Assembly held its opening session, on 16 April, and on 19
April it transferred the discussion of Palestine's future
government to its First (Political) Committee, where the issue
remained until 14 May. The U.S. representative, whose
government had initiated the decision to convene the Special
Session, opened the discussion in the First Committee.
Although, Austin pointed out, the U.S.A. had supported the
partition resolution at the time, its peaceful implementation had
been made impossible by Arab opposition —partly of Arabs
from outside Palestine —a stand which, Austin admitted, was a
clear violation of the U.N. Charter. Since the Mandatory had
announced the termination of the Mandate on 15 May and since
the Security Council had rejected the tasks imposed upon it to
implement partition, the U.S. government had decided it must
take an emergency initiative to prevent a further deterioration
of the situation in Palestine. Austin stressed that his govern-
ment was suggesting only a temporary trusteeship; this need
not involve any long-term change of substance in the partition
resolution, which would be returned to after order was restored
in Palestine. 41
On the same day Gromyko renewed his attack on the U.S.
suggestion to alter the partition resolution. He attributed the
Security Council's inactivity and ineffectiveness to the U.S.
stand which had been aimed at undermining the partition
resolution as early as 9 December 1947 (cf. p. 110). It was,
moreover, the position of the United States, Britain and some
other Security Council member states that had caused "the
peoples and governments concerned" to ignore the appeal to
put an end to disorder, for they realized they could "continue
to provoke disorders with impunity. . . . Certain states,"
Gromyko went on, "were guided neither by the needs of the
population of Palestine, nor by the common interest of the
United Nations, but by the political, economic, military and
strategic interests of one or two Powers. . . . Certain powerful
circles behind those interests were trying to transform Palestine
into a strategic and military base and into an economic
dependant of the United States."
He reiterated Soviet charges that the Mandatory had failed to
fulfill its obligations to implement the partition resolution
(refusal to open a port for purposes of immigration, refusal to

allow the Palestine Commission to enter the country before 1
May, etc.). He also repeated his tenet that the partition
resolution was a just solution since it conformed with both the
interests of international security and "the level of political,
economic and cultural development" of the peoples of
Palestine. 42
Tarasenko continued in the same vein. The Mandatory had
not taken up the Palestine Commission's request, which was
based on the 29 November resolution, that it mark the borders
of the two states; it had not permitted the Palestine Commission
to start creating a police force in the two states, as a result of
which Palestine would be left on 15 May without any security
force; finally, the British government had informed the
Palestine Commission that it would not permit provisional
councils of government to be established in either the Jewish or
the Arab state before the termination of the Mandate.
Tarasenko concluded that nothing had happened to justify
the change in the U.S. position. Just as prior to the adoption of
the partition resolution the United States had not made its sup-
port of partition conditional upon its peaceful implementation,
so now there was no objective motive for the U.S. volte-face. It
was not clear why Washington was prepared to send troops to
impose a trusteeship regime —which did not conform to the
wishes of either people in Palestine and could be implemented
by force alone—and yet was not prepared to impose the General
Assembly's partition resolution, on the grounds that it would
not be implemented peacefully. 43
On 23 April the attack was taken up by another member of
the Soviet delegation, Aleksandr Paniushkin, at the time Soviet
ambassador to Washington. He too accused Britain and the
U.S.A. of trying to prevent implementation of partition, the
former by its activities in Palestine itself, the latter by its tactics
at the U.N. The British government had adopted a variety of
measures to delay the gradual transfer of authority to the
Palestine Commission, including several in the spheres of civil
service and the economy designed to prevent orderly
administration in the country on the termination of the
Mandate. This had military implications also since not only
would the Mandatory not be replaced by another authority but
the Arab municipal police units were not to be dispersed
together with the rest of the police force on 15 May, and thus
the latter's arms, which the British had agreed to hand over to
the Palestine Commission, were likely to come into the

possession of irresponsible elements. Moreover, Paniushkin
claimed that Britain was responsible for the infiltration into
Palestine of the armed bands which were helping the
Palestinian Arabs in their opposition to partition. 44
Soviet support of the Jewish cause can be seen not only in
the content of the speeches of the Soviet, Ukrainian,
Belorussian and East European delegates at the Special Session.
The frequency and considerable length of these speeches were
an important delaying tactic. On 27 April U.S. delegate Philip
Jessup complained that the date of the termination of the
Mandate was approaching, yet the First Committee had not
even referred to the details of the U.S. proposal. 45 Gromyko
replied that before the Assembly decided on the fundamental
issue his delegation saw no point in discussing the details; in
the view of his government there was no legitimate justification
for discussing an alternative solution until the partition
resolution was rescinded. Moreover, by any political criteria,
the U.S. proposal was absurd. While the U.N. was discussing
whether to replace partition by another solution on the grounds
that it could not be implemented, practical measures were in
fact being taken in Palestine to implement partition. Many
people the world over, Gromyko concluded, were wondering
whether the emergency situation that was developing in
Palestine was not being exploited to impose a colonial regime
in that country. 4 6
The Soviet representatives continued in this vein, criticizing
the trusteeship proposal as violating the right of both the Jews
and the Arabs of Palestine itself to achieve their own
independent state: the Jews had "an irresistible desire for
independence," Semen Tsarapkin told the Assembly's First
Committee, and "who could believe that the same did not apply
to the Arabs?"
The partition resolution was not the reason for the current
situation in Palestine, which had rather come about precisely
because the resolution had been undermined. If the Mandatory
had permitted the Palestine Commission to enter the country
and "enabled the Jews to organize themselves in their own state
and if the neighbouring states had not been encouraged to
invade Palestine . . . the Arab and Jewish states would now be a
reality." Surely, the Soviet delegate insisted, the Arabs of
Palestine "were no less worthy of independence because they
lived inside and not outside the borders of Palestine."
The pretext for the U.S. trusteeship proposal, Tsarapkin went

on, was the need to establish peace in Palestine. Yet this same
proposal admitted the need to dispatch troops to Palestine so as
to "subjugate" its two peoples. It looked as though the U.S.
suggestion would bring about a struggle even "bloodier" than
that generated by the British Mandatory regime.
Tsarapkin then criticized some of the details of the trustee-
ship plan, notably that the conditions under which trusteeship
would come to an end were so vague that it could easily be
perpetuated and that the structure of the suggested legislature
guaranteed an Arab majority, which meant that the Jews would
not have the same rights as the Arabs.
The U.S. trusteeship proposal, Tsarapkin concluded, had
therefore, to be rejected unconditionally. No amendment could
make the proposal acceptable as in its very substance it
contradicted one of the U.N.'s basic principles, the right of
national self-determination and independence with self-
government. 47
British Colonial Minister Arthur Creech-Jones made a
compromise proposal that "a central, neutral authority" be set
up to act in the name of the U.N., "further the cause of
mediation and . . . take over certain assets." Although there was
no time to establish "a new central regime" that might "run the
essential services and enforce order" such a proposal —provided
it be given a legal basis by the U.N. —seemed to him to be
feasible, especially as it did not necessitate any retreat from the
principle of independence, such as the two sides discerned in
the trusteeship plan. 4 8
By this time Washington had doubts about the viability of its
trusteeship proposal. Rusk suggested to Under Secretary of
State Robert Lovett that the United States, Britain and France
"undertake immediate diplomatic action seeking to work out a
modus Vivendi'' between 'Abdallah and the Jewish Agency that
would "call for, in effect, a de facto partition of Palestine." 4 9 No
such suggestion was, however, put to the General Assembly.
Nonetheless, as late as 9 May the U.S. U.N. delegation was
elaborating the text of "an arrangement for [a] possible
provisional regime" to come into being with the U.N. as
administering authority on the conclusion of the Mandate. Two
days later Rusk reminded Jessup and John Ross, also of the U.S.
U.N. Mission, that the President had at no stage decided "to
impose a trusteeship against the wishes of either community"
and that trusteeship had been interlocked with the proposed
truce (see p. 118 above). Since neither Jews nor Arabs had in
fact accepted, let alone requested, trusteeship and since a state
of war continued in Palestine, both sides having rejected the
truce, trusteeship must be relinquished. Yet, the American
delegation at Lake Success was still reluctant to accept the force
of events.
On 4 May Gromyko rejected Creech-Jones' proposal together
with that of the United States, maintaining that it contradicted
the partition resolution and was not basically different from the
U.S. suggestions. The main purpose of Gromyko's speech was,
however, to drive home the point he had already made on 27
April: while alternative solutions were being sought at the U.N.
on the grounds that partition could not be implemented, it was
in fact being realized. The Jewish state was "in existence." 5 0
Even so, also on 4 May, the Political Committee referred to a
sub-committee the task of formulating a provisional trusteeship
proposal. The sub-committee was to take into special consid-
eration three factors: the likelihood that its proposal would be
accepted by the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine; the
possibility of putting it into effect; and its cost. 51 When the
Political Committee reconvened on 13 May (it had one earlier
meeting on 11 May to discuss questions relating to Jerusalem
only 52 ) Gromyko denied the possibility of considering the
sub-committee's recommendations before 14 May on the
grounds that a respite was necessary to study them carefully.
Both he and Polish representative Juliusz Katz-Suchy argued
that a resolution must not be precipitated on the pretext that
time was pressing. 5 3
As late as 14 May when the Political Committee convened for
the last time, a mere seven hours before the termination of the
Mandate, Czechoslovak representative Vladimir Houdek
protested that even though the suggestions presented were
unfamiliar to most of the Committee's members, both the
Committee and its sub-committee had demanded the immediate
adoption of a resolution based on them. A number of other
delegates, notably Katz-Suchy and Tarasenko, proceeded to
make lengthy speeches at this meeting. Eventually, before
Gromyko had even expressed his own reservations about the
sub-committee's recommendations, it was decided to stop the
debate in order to continue it in the Plenary. (While the main
feature of the speeches of the Soviet bloc delegates was their
length at a moment when time was running out fast, it is of
interest that Tarasenko accused the U.S.A. of intending to
achieve a truce rather than any permanent peace to retain an

opportunity for further intervention in Palestinian affairs. Any
final solution of the Palestine problem, the Ukrainian delegate
insisted, would be a serious blow to both U.S. oil interests and
American militarist circles who saw Palestine as a U.S. military
stronghold. 54 )
The First Committee concluded its session just two and
one-quarter hours before the time fixed for the termination of
the Mandate. An hour later the Plenary convened. Its first topic
for discussion was a proposal to alter the status of Jerusalem
from that laid down in the partition resolution to a regime
supervised by a provisional U.N. authority. This attempt having
failed—the Soviet delegation was one of its opponents —
discussion reverted to the draft resolution that had been put
before the Plenary, i.e. the First Committee's suggestion to
appoint a mediator. Although this proposal, as Katz-Suchy
pointed out, did not mean any substantive alteration of Pales-
tine's status it was opposed by Gromyko on the grounds that it
implied imposing "a provisional regime of a transitional
nature" over and beyond partition. This was "unjustifiable to
say the least" given the situation in Palestine "a feature" of
which, the Soviet deputy foreign minister pointed out, was the
"existence" of one of the two states due to come into being in
accordance with the 29 November resolution, i.e. the Jewish
State. The opponents of partition would merely "take advan-
tage" of the new proposal "to complicate the existing situa-
tion."
Gromyko took this opportunity to point out that while his
government welcomed the establishment of one of the two
states, the situation was not wholly satisfactory. "For strange
and somewhat obscure reasons" the representatives of the Arab
states as well as of the U.S.A. and Britain did not support the
establishment of an Arab state in Palestine. Unlike these states
whose policies were both inherently contradictory and also
contradicted the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine, as well
as of the U.N., the USSR was conducting a consistent policy
that made the interests of the people of Palestine its first
consideration. 55
Indeed, the blatant internal inconsistencies of the U.S. stand
were limelighted on 14 May when President Truman announced
his government's de facto recognition of the Jewish State, almost
simultaneously with the demand of the U.S. U.N. representative at
the Second Special Session that no U.N. member state recog-
nize any state that might come into being in Palestine. 56 The same
Soviet newspaper which noted this antinomy stressed that the
tasks to be assigned to the Mediator must be purely technical. It
reported too that the Jews opposed the appointment of a mediator
with political powers, as they saw in this a violation of the 29
November resolution. 57
On the same day, 14 May 1948, the establishment of the State of
Israel was proclaimed and the activity of the Second Special
Session of the General Assembly—convened to find an alternative
to the establishment of two independent states in Palestine—came
perforce to an end. The Special Session did pass a resolution
calling for the nomination of a mediator to "arrange for the
operation of common services necessary to the safety and
well-being of the population of Palestine"; to "assure the
protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in
Palestine"; and to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future
situation of Palestine." 5 8 Nonetheless, the purpose of the Session,
the replacement of the Mandate with a temporary trusteeship, was
not attained.
• • •
In the five and a half months between the adoption of the

partition resolution and the date fixed for the termination of the
British Mandate over Palestine, the coincidence of interests that
had begun to characterize the relationship between the USSR and
the Yishuv became consolidated. The reason for this was twofold:
on the one hand, the USSR's persistent support of partition and, on
the other, the growing reservations about partition held by the
United States, the power toward which the Yishuv and its
institutions were basically and traditionally oriented. The
convergence of the Soviet and Jewish stands led to unequivocal
expressions of support for the Yishuv by the Soviet and other
Soviet bloc representatives at the Security Council and the General
Assembly Second Special Session.
It might even be said that this Soviet-Jewish coincidence of
interests foiled the various attempts made in the international
arena to thwart the implementation of partition. These attempts,
made by Britain from the very beginning—the British government
had announced even before the adoption of the 29 November 1947
resolution that it would oppose any solution that was not
acceptable to both sides (cf. p. 91)—reached their climax with the
U.S. government's announcement in March 1948 that it too was

abandoning partition. Claiming that the solution resolved upon by
the General Assembly could not be put into effect, Washington
suggested that the Mandatory regime be followed by a provisional
trusteeship.
In 1945 the Soviet Union had been amenable to the idea of an
international trusteeship. At that time this would have meant that
the USSR, as an ally and partner of the two Western powers, would
have been at least a party to the discussion of Palestine's political
future and perhaps also to the administration of the trusteeship
regime. In early 1948, however, there was no reason to suppose that
any such Soviet-Western cooperation could be achieved in
practice, Moreover, the General Assembly's decision of November
1947 offered the USSR more far-reaching advantages than could a
trusteeship. On the global strategic level it entailed a seed of
discord between Washington and London and a promise of
disagreement on the American domestic scene. In the Middle East
partition meant a major breech in British hegemony, which was
almost certain in one way or another to encourage, or even lead
directly to, further encroachments upon Britain's predomi-
nance in the Arab world.
When the United States called for the convening of a second
special session of the General Assembly to seek an alternative to
partition, even if seemingly as a provisional arrangement, the
USSR found a further advantage in supporting partition. The
consistent Soviet position on this issue presented it to the world in
the somewhat unusual role of major advocate of a central U.N.
resolution.
For all these reasons, strategic and tactical, global and regional,
the USSR did all in its power to prevent the partition resolution
from being altered.
In the course of the four weeks that the Special Session lasted, the
Soviet Union and its allies played a central role in obstructing the
attempt to replace the 29 November 1947 partition resolution by
any other solution of the Palestine problem. Unable to muster a
majority, the Soviet bloc took to filibustering with a considerable
measure of success. The USSR had proved its significance despite
general, and particularly Arab, discounting of its potential at the
U.N., where it could rely only on the support of its own satellites. 59
Before the Special Session could agree on any substantial
resolution that might prejudice partition, the Jewish State, one of
the two states partition was to give birth to, had come into being.
Notes
1. SC OR, 2nd Year, Suppl. No. 26, Annex 48, Doc. S/614, 2 December
1947.
2. GA OR, 128th Plenary Meeting, Res. 181(11), 29 November 1947.
3. SC OR, 2nd Year, No. 106, 9 December 1947.
4. Cf. Robert Macatee, Consul General at Jerusalem, to Secretary of State
Marshall, 31 December 1947, Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, p. 1324.
5. See above p. 92. Again after 29 November, in talks with Bevin on
2 December, Secretary Marshall admitted that "the greatest fear of the
U.S. military authorities . . .was the presence of a Russian force in
Palestine"—Marshall to Lovett, 6 December 1947, ibid., pp. 1301-2.
6. For the beginning of Soviet-Jewish Agency contacts in New York,
see pp. 86ff. On 8 December Shertok told Henderson that in view of
the necessity for "the Jewish authorities to he prepared militarily to
take over gradually from the British authorities as the latter withdrew
their armed forces," the Jewish Agency was turning to the United
States "for assistance in the first instance." Yet if it proved impossible
"to obtain such assistance .. .the Jewish authorities would perforce be
obliged to turn elsewhere. Military supplies were considered by Mr.
Shertok to include reasonable quantities of all types of small arms plus
heavier equipment including planes, machine guns, mortars, anti-
aircraft and tanks. Military advisers were necessary ... in order that the
Jewish authorities might best utilize the forces, equipment and terri-
tory at their command" —ibid., p. 1303.
A/AC.21/13).
8. SC OR, 3rd Year, Suppl. Document S/676.
9. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 11 December 1947/SWB I, 15
December 1947.
10. JTA, 1 January 1948.
11. R. Moscow, 17 January 1948, quoted by Kol Ha-Am, 18 January
1948; and Izvestiia, 18 January 1948. Western plans for an anti-Soviet
Middle Eastern bloc (cf. above p. 37) returned to the Soviet headlines
in January 1948 with the abortive British-Iraqi Portsmouth Treaty (for
details, see Khadduri, pp. 262-67).
12. Cf. R. Moscow, 9 January 1948, and R. Tashkent in English, 11
January 1948/SWB Í, 12 and 15 January 1948; alsoPravda, 10 January 1948.
13. TASS, 7 December 1947/SWB Í, 15 December 1947.
14. R. Moscow for Soviet Asia, 7 January 1948/SWB Í, 12 January 1948;
and Kol Ha-Am, 2 February 1948.
15. izvestiia, 27 January 1948; andKoJ Ha-Am, 29 January 1948. Part I,
paragraph 2 of the 29 November resolution laid down: "The Mandatory
Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the
territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate

to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the
earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February
1 9 4 8 " - G A OR, 128th Plenary Meeting, Res. 181(11).
December 1947.
17. Izvestiia, 7 January 1948.
18. TASS in Russian for abroad and for the Provincial Press, 4 February
1948/SWB I, 9 February 1948.
19. Trud, 7 January 1948. The measures against "progressive" ele-
ments referred to steps taken in Syria and Lebanon against the local
Communist party as well as the closing down of the friendship
associations with the USSR which existed in both countries. (The
premises of the Syrian Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR in
Damascus had been broken into and looted by an angry but organized mob
as early as 30 November 1947, together with the U.S. Legation in the same
city—Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, p. 1292; cf. below.)
20. R. Moscow in Arabic, 20 January 1948/SWB Í, 23 January 1948. For
the actuality of the treaty issue, cf. n. 11 above.
21. R. Moscow for Soviet Asia, 6 March 1948/SWB Í, 12 March 1948,
quoting inter alia Krasnaia zvezda. (General Anders had headed the army
that during World War II held allegiance to the Polish government-in-exile
situated in London and was opposed to the new Polish regime.) See also,
for example, New Times, 9 June 1948; Pravda, 14 June 1948; Vecherniaia
Moskva, 19 June 1948. The Arab armies also absorbed in the winter of
1947-8 groups of Yugoslav Muslims who opposed the Communist regime
in their own country —R. Sharq aJ-Adna, 13,15 January 1948; R. Cairo, 13
January 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 22 January 1948; and SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 36-51,
270th Meeting, 19 March 1948.
December 1947. The author has been unable to identify the organization
referred to as the League for the Struggle against Anti-Semitism, which
was presumably extremely small and obscure (if it indeed existed).
23. izvestiia, 20 January 1948.
24. SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 16-35 and 36-51, 24, 25 and 27 February, and
2 and 5 March 1948, and Resolution S/691.
25. Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 699-741, passim;)TA,
11 and 12 March 1948; and SCOR, 3rd Year, Nos. 36-51, 270th Meeting, 19
March 1948.
26. On 16 March, the date originally set, the president of the Security
Council had announced that the consultations were not yet terminated and
proposed a postponement of the powers' recommendations until 19
March - S C OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 36-51, 267th Meetings, 16 March 1948.
27. SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 36-51, 270th and 271st Meetings, 19 March
1948.
28. On 19 January the State Department Policy Planning Staff had sent a
report to Secretary Marshall, recommending that the United States "take
no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition" and suggesting
that "when and if the march of events" demonstrates that the partition
plan "offers no reasonable prospect for success without the use of outside
armed force, we should then take the position that we have been obliged to
conclude that it is impracticable and undesirable for the international
community to attempt to enforce any form of partition in the absence of
agreement between the parties, and that the matter should go back to the
UN General Assembly." The report suggested that the United States
cooperate in investigating "the possibilities of any other suggested
solution such as a federal state or trusteeship."
One of the main reasons for the concern of the Policy Planning Staff
was that partition would facilitate Soviet military and political
penetration of the Middle East. This might take the form a. of bringing
in Soviet forces to help implement partition which would provide
"Communist agents" with "an excellent base from which to extend
their subversive activity, to disseminate propaganda, and to attempt to
replace the present Arab governments by 'democratic peoples'
governments.' " This would also mean outflanking the U.S. "position
in Greece, Turkey and Iran"; b. of exploiting "the explosive character
of the situation created by partition" by aggravating friction. Evidence
was indeed "accumulating that the USSR may be covertly or indirectly
supplying arms not only to the Jews but to the Arabs" (see following
chapter); c. of creating "a pretext on the basis of 'self-determination of
minorities' to encourage the partition of areas in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and
Greece"—Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 546-54.
Relating to the report, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs at
the Department, Dean Rusk, said on 26 January that "a major change in our
Palestine policy would require the approval of the President as well as of
leading Members of Congress" —ibid., pp. 556-57. On 4 February U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq, George Wadsworth, was told by Truman that he was
in "close touch" with the situation, and "saw alike with the State
Department" —ibid., pp. 592-95.
Truman indeed seems to have accepted the trusteeship suggestion,
although his Special Counsel, Clark Clifford, had on 8 March presented
him with a lengthy memorandum stressing the correctness of partition
precisely from the point of view of U.S. national security interests —ibid.,
pp. 690-96. The President, however, refused to consider the temporary
trusteeship as contradicting partition and his own Palestine policy. It was
to be a provisory step since, on the one hand, reality had shown that
partition would not be achieved peacefully and, on the other hand, no

solution had been found regarding the dispatch to Palestine of a U.N. force.
The United States, as we have seen, had been opposed since the beginning
of the U.N. debate on Palestine to the inclusion of Soviet troops in such a
force, yet its establishment with the sole participation of small states was
out of the question. Nor did the President favor the dispatch of U.S. forces
to impose partition (cf. p. 21) despite domestic pressures, while his
military advisers informed him that the United States was in no position to
send the amount of troops that would be necessary were unrest to
spread—Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 42; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope,
pp. 159-65; and Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 744-49.
29. ]TA, 28 March 1948.
30. SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 35-61, 275th Meeting, 30 March 1948. (For
Abba Hillel Silver's statement, see ibid., 274th Meeting, 24 March 1948.)
31. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 52, 1 April 1948.
32. Pravda Ukrainy, 4 April 1948.
33. Both the Palestine Communist Party and the Arab National
Liberation League were reported to have established ties and even
"working relations" with the Cominform Bureau in Belgrade almost
immediately after its inception in the fall of 1947 —U.S. Consul-General in
Jerusalem Robert Macatee to Secretary Marshall, 11 November 1947,
Foreign Relations . . . 1947, vol. 5, p. 1255.
The Cominform organ expressed only those views which had been
confirmed by the Soviet Communist Party whose representative, Pavel
ludin, was both head of the Cominform Bureau and chief editor of its
paper. Therefore, any difference between the opinions expressed in
Mikunis' article and the official Soviet viewpoint must be explained not as
a deviation from Moscow's position but by the measure of permissiveness
and flexibility allowed in articles signed by non-Soviet Communist
officials who were free of the need to maintain relations with government
circles in their own countries and whose writings in no way committed the
Soviet Union.
34. Mapam had come into being in January 1948 as an
amalgamation of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair and Ahdut Ha-Avoda. The
Palestine Communist Party had suggested cooperation with Mapam in
a greetings telegram it had sent to the party on its establishment, yet
its approach had not met with a positive response—Kol Ha-Am, 25 and
30 January 1948. It is perhaps of interest that Mapam too had had
personal contacts with ludin and the Cominform since February 1948,
i.e. within a few weeks of the party's coming into being. However,
neither the Cominform, whose raison d'être was the creation and
maintenance of "exchange of information" among and coordination
with Communist parties, nor Mapam, despite its unequivocal

pro-Soviet orientation in the ideological sphere, had the organizational
instruments necessary for institutionalizing these ties.
35. FALP, 15 April 1948.
38. Although the State Department has published its papers for the year
1948, it has in no way hinted that this was the case; the editors have,
however, by their own admission, omitted certain documents for reasons
given in the preface to the volume.
40. SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 64 and 65, 7 and 12 May 1948.
41. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 118th Meeting, 20
April 1948.
April 1948. It is perhaps relevant to Gromyko's argumentation that in
addition to the assertion of the U.S. chiefs of staff that the United States
could send only a symbolic force to Palestine (see n. 28 above), Defense
Secretary James Forrestal told Truman that if the United States estranged
the Arabs over Palestine, there was a danger that the Arabs would cut off
U.S. access to their oil—Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 162; Foreign
Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 632-33.
43. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 121st Meeting, 22
April 1948. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff indeed estimated that in order to
"maintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship" the following
forces would be required:
"Army —1 Corps of 3 Infantry Divisions plus appropriate Corps, Service
and Special Troops, totalling 100,076 personnel
"Naval —6 Destroyers (or destroyer escorts), 6 PCs (for harbor patrol), 1
Air Reconnaissance Sqdn. About 3124 personnel
" A i r - 1 Sqdn Troop C (16 a/c), 2 Sqdns Ln Type (32 a/c), 1 Sqdn photo
Ren (25 a/c) (Photo equipped Fighter Bombers) Necessary Maintenance
Units. About 921 personnel."
It was suggested that the United States and Britain provide 45% each of
the above troops and France the remaining 10%—Foreign Relations . . .
1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 797-800.
44. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 123rd Meeting, 23
April 1948.
45. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, Documents A/C.1/277
and 278 (undated).
April 1948. For the practical measures Gromyko was referring to, see n. 50
below.
47. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 135th Meeting, 3 May
1948.
1948.
49. Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 895; also ibid., pp.
949-53 and 965-69.
1948. Indeed, a Provisional State Council had been elected in April 1948
comprising 37 members, as well as a 13-member National Administration
which was to become on 15 May the Jewish State's provisional
government. For these two institutions, their powers, composition and
tasks, see Ben Gurion, pp. 80-89.
51. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 137th Meeting and
Document A/C.l/292, 4 May 1948.
1948.
53. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 139th and 140th
Meetings, 13 May 1948.
54. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 1st Committee, 141st Meeting, 14 May
1948.
55. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 135th Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1948.
56. Truman, Years o/Trial and Hope, p. 164; and Safran, p. 42. Different
opinions had already been voiced within the Administration on the issue
of recognizing the Jewish State on its birth. Already on 4 May Austin was
urging Marshall that Washington should prepare itself to take up a
position in view of the likelihood of Soviet recognition. At a conversation
attended by both Truman and Marshall, Clifford had suggested a U.S.
announcement of recognition even before midnight of 14-15 May
(Palestine time), only to be attacked by Lovett and Marshall—Foreign
Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 897, 972-77. For the extreme
disconcertment of the U.S. U.N. Mission upon Truman's announcement,
see ibid., p. 993. It is perhaps also of interest that at the above conversation
Marshall denied stories about a personal message from himself to Ben
Gurion early in May —the reference being apparently to a report that
Marshall had warned the Jews not to establish their State (Ben Gurion, p.
273) claiming he "did not even know that such a person existed."
58. GA OR, 2nd Special Session, 135th Plenary Meeting, 14 May 1948.
59. Samuel Kopper of the State Department Office of Near Eastern and
African Affairs thus summed up talks he had in February with Arab U.N.
delegates: "they feel that any further United Nations action will depend
entirely upon the U.S. position. The role of the Soviet Union is discounted
. . . " -Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp\ 644-45.
4
The Palestine War:

Soviet Aid to the Yishuv
and the State of Israel
Soviet support of the Yishuv in its struggle for independence

was not limited to the endorsement of partition in the interna-
tional arena, but also took other forms of assistance.
The speeches of Soviet representatives at the U.N. had drawn
attention in particular to two spheres in which the Arabs of
Palestine received foreign aid: war materiel which came from
the West—either via the Arab states or from British stores in the
area—and reinforcements of manpower, mostly Arab from
neighboring countries and partly Muslim from other countries.
A very interesting analogue existed between Western activities
on behalf of the Arabs, especially as reflected in the
considerable Soviet coverage given them, and the aid proffered
by the Soviet Union and bloc to the Jews. This was a blatant
but generally typical example of how Soviet propaganda attacks
on an opponent may serve as a cover for parallel Soviet activity
and as an indication, if not actual proof, of the nature of Soviet
actions. The emphasis on the active participation of the
Western powers on the Arab side was intended to justify, and
demonstrate the need for, Soviet aid to the other side.
The Soviet press and radio left no room for doubt concerning
the USSR's involvement in and commitment to the struggle of
the Jewish people of Palestine in the ''Palestine War". They
reiterated constantly that this was in fact a war of
independence, noting at the same time that support of wars of
independence was a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy.
139
Perhaps the most significant expression of obvious sympathy

for the Jews was a Radio Moscow home service description of
the invasion of the State of Israel by the armies of the Arab
states in May 1948: the Arab ranks were being filled with
"Fascist remnants of various nationalities specially recruited for
the purpose." Palestine, the broadcast warned, might well
become a second Spain. 1
The need to come to the aid of the State of Israel was
emphasized by the Soviet (Jewish) commentator David
Zaslavskii, whose articles were a faithful weather-vane of the
official Soviet position. Britain, he wrote, found itself "up
against people who stubbornly defended their independence,
their human rights and their national dignity." The Labour
Government had "cold-bloodedly prepared the ground for the
wholesale extermination of the Jews, for a bloody massacre of
defenceless people, for a new Oswiecim." Yet Britain had not
succeeded in coercing the Palestine Jews "into submission" nor
in disarming and repressing them. On the contrary, "the
proclamation of the Jewish State of Israel and subsequent events
have created a new factor in the international arena." Even so,
Britain "remains in Palestine and does not mean to leave" the
country. "Its own hands having proved too weak, it wants to
strangle the Palestine Jews with the hands of the Arabs . . . .
[Britain] is relying on the help of the forces of international
reaction. It is the duty of international democracy to foil [its]
plans." 2
This attitude was more than an exercise in apologetics; it also
explained the aid the Soviet bloc gave the Yishuv in the
months preceding the establishment of the State of Israel, and
the State in the first months of its existence. True, the
immediate source of the two principal forms of this
aid—immigrants and military matériel—was Eastern Europe
and not the USSR itself. Nonetheless, a number of indications,
and occasionally actual proof, bear out the thesis that it was
initiated and urged by the Soviet Union. (In this too an obvious
formal parallel existed between Western aid to the Arabs, the
origin of which was not the leading Western power, the United
States, but the states that the Soviet Union called U.S. satellites,
notably Britain.)
Soviet Aid to the Yishuv 141
IMMIGRATION
Immigration from Eastern Europe had played a central role in

the developments that had led to the establishment of the State
of Israel; according to Lewis Douglas, U.S. Ambassador in
Britain, "Soviet assistance to thousands of Jews from Soviet
satellite states to come to Palestine . . . was extremely
successful in embarrassing the U.K. and was [a] factor in British
decision to leave Palestine." 3 It continued to be a major issue
after the birth of the Jewish State. From the Israeli point of
view, it remained a question of prime importance in later years
as well, yet in the 1950s and 1960s it was less vital to the very
existence of the State than in 1948.
The basic assumptions that enable us to assign the Soviet
Union a major role in encouraging and helping the immigration
movement in the period 1945-47 remain valid for the year of
the actual establishment of the State of Israel. However,
whereas prior to November 1947, the permission granted to
Jews to leave Eastern Europe was largely intended to exert
pressures on the Western powers to find a solution to the
Palestine question in the international arena, once the U.N. had
adopted partition, such a policy must have had a different
motivation.
With the outbreak of the Palestine War and the concomitant
developments described in the preceding chapter — Britain's
refusal to meet its commitments in the realm of immigration, on
the one hand, and the infiltration of armed bands into Palestine
from the neighboring countries with the purpose of
participating in the fighting, on the other—the issue of
immigration took on a new dimension. It now became a central
factor in the Yishuv's war effort.
In the first year or so of its existence, roughly corresponding
to the duration of the war, Israel solicited Soviet assistance in
this sphere. Indeed, the official Soviet stand on the principle of
Jewish immigration to Israel, despite certain reservations, was
not negative. It was based on two tenets: a. that since a Jewish
problem existed only in capitalist states, Israel had come into
existence as a refuge for their Jews and immigration would
naturally come from these states (cf. the speeches of Gromyko
and other Soviet representatives in chapter 2); and b. that since
Israel could not absorb even all the Jews inhabiting the
capitalist world, the Jewish State had to promote the struggle of
the forces of progress there, and there was no sense in seeking

emigration from parts of the world where there was no Jewish
problem. As Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin told
Israel's first minister in Moscow, Golda Meyerson (later Meir),
on 15 September 1948: Israel had the dual task of absorbing the
immigration from the capitalist world and taking the road of
progress. It was, he insisted, essential for the welfare of the
Jews who would necessarily remain in the capitalist world "to
struggle . . . for democratization everywhere." Mrs. Meyerson,
for her part, said Israel hoped for Soviet support on the issue of
immigration "as in a number of other matters liable to be
included on the agenda at the U.N. Assembly in Paris," Israel
would not tolerate "any attempt to impose . . . from without
this or that immigration policy," as this would not only be
prejudicial to immigration but also to Israel's very sovereignty.
Nor would Israel accept the proposals of U.N. Mediator Count
Folke Bernadotte to take Arab demands on this issue into
account. It considered the ban on the immigration of Jews of
military age to be the most pernicious of all the restrictions laid
down in the truce conditions and likely to "serve as a
precedent for foreign intervention in this sphere in peacetime
as well." 4
At a further meeting on the same day—with head of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry Middle and Near East Department Ivan
Bakulin—Mrs. Meyerson pointed out that immigration was a
sine qua non for "the construction of the State and its
consolidation" and stressed that every Jew who wished to go to
Israel must be allowed to do so. Bakulin insisted that only Jews
in "non-democratic countries" had any impetus to go to Israel,
but he was not worried about any dearth of immigrants: the
D.P.s together with a large number of Jews in the different
countries where Jews were deprived of their rights would
provide as many immigrants as Israel could absorb. To Mrs.
Meyerson's estimate that Israel intended to take in about one
million people in the next five years in addition to the Jews of
the Arab countries whose very lives were in danger, Bakulin
remarked that this meant that immigration could not solve the
Jewish problem in the capitalist world. If the first million
would have to wait five years and the next million a further
similar period the Jews "suffering persecution and discrimina-
tion," whose number was far greater than two million, could
not be expected to wait in patience. Bakulin, like Zorin,
insisted that the millions of Jews who remained in the
Diaspora would have to solve their problem by struggling in

their countries of residence "on behalf of democracy and
socialismo 5
However, in view of the urgency of immigration for Israel's
very existence in its war of independence, it was not prepared
to rest content with Soviet approval of the principle of
immigration. Israel was determined also to raise with Moscow
the practical issue of immigration from the East European
countries, since from them alone could the Yishuv receive a
reinforcement of manpower against the will of the Western
powers.
Indeed, given Soviet interest in the Yishuv's success in the
war, the USSR had a very cogent reason to encourage
immigration to Palestine from the People's Democracies—as
long as the war continued. True, in their contacts with
representatives of the Yishuv and, after 15 May, of the State of
Israel, Soviet officials were persistently wary of admitting that
the USSR countenanced, let alone abetted, such immigration.
Yet different Soviet personalities did insinuate in unofficial
conversations that the People's Democracies had received
unequivocal directives to this effect. This was the purport of a
conversation which a Soviet representative in Sofia, for
example, is reported to have had with a representative of the
Israeli left; the East European states had received instructions,
he said, to help the Jews in the war even though the Soviet
Union's own hands were tied by its position as a major power
with explicit international obligations. 6
There were a number of indications that the emigration from
Eastern Europe was not only the result of Soviet pressures but
was considered by the USSR as a means of military aid to the
Yishuv: a. the unstinted Soviet support of the Yishuv and the
Jewish State in the Palestine War, both in the international
arena and in the press and radio, as mentioned above. To this
must be added the emphasis placed by Soviet diplomats and
media on Western reinforcement — in various ways — of the
Arabs' fighting personnel; b. while Soviet officials refrained
from admitting that the USSR was actively encouraging Jewish
emigration from Eastern Europe, they did not deny it, apart
from a few tongue-in-cheek statements. On the contrary, Soviet
representatives were ready to consider it specifically, for
example in their meetings with Mapam officials both in Eastern
Europe and in Israel (see below and cf. pp. 177-78); c. the fact
that immigration to Palestine emanated from all the states of
Eastern Europe during 1948 was a definite indication of

coordination and/or of a common brief. The agreement
concluded with Romanian Foreign Minister Anna Pauker in
July 1948, despite the opposition of the Romanian authorities to
Jewish emigration, was a significant corroboration that such an
injunction existed as the need of the hour; d. the nature of the
emigration from Romania and the fact that it took place from
the conclusion of the agreement until early 1949 also
demonstrated that the authorities viewed it as a contribution to
the Israeli war of independence. Indeed, in several of the East
European countries, Jewish candidates for emigration
underwent a period of pre-emigration military training (cf. also
charges in the fall of 1947 regarding the military training of
emigrants from Romania, see p. 90). This must have had
explicit Soviet approval; 7 e. the ideological invalidation of
emigration from the People's Democracies —despite Soviet
acceptance in principle of immigration to Palestine as a, if not
the, fundament of Israel's very existence—rested on the thesis
that Israel was unable to absorb even all the Jews of the
capitalist world for whom the Jewish State had been
established. It seems that this argumentation had a long-term
goal, being intended primarily to exclude Soviet Jewry from
such emigration (see below) and thus did not preclude selective
emigration from Eastern Europe for the specific purpose of
solving the Yishuv's immediate need for manpower in its war
of independence. The confirmation of this need and the Soviet
interest in the Yishuv's success in that war gave rise to this
emigration.
In Czechoslovakia, for instance, the authorities placed
facilities—a military camp, training ground and arms —at the
disposal of would-be Jewish emigrants, many of them former
officers and soldiers in the Czechoslovak army, some of them
members of the Zionist Organization, others of the Communist
party. This operation, which came to include Jewish officers
from Palestine who coordinated the training program, was
directed by a non-Jew, Antonin Suchor, the officer in charge of
Intelligence and Tank Corps instruction in the Czechoslovak
army. Suchor and a very few other non-Jewish experts even
visited Israel to train Israeli officers to use weaponry purchased
in Czechoslovakia. 8 Although these Czechoslovak Jews were not
organized in an official military unit—Israel rejected a
suggestion to be sent a military contingent from
Czechoslovakia —they were called a brigade after the
International Brigade that had participated in the Spanish War. 9

The training of Israeli pilots and other groups of officers and
experts in Eastern Europe was another aspect of Soviet bloc
military aid; the first pilots who trained on Messerschmidts
completed their course just two days before the establishment
of the State of Israel; 11 more pilots left for Czechoslovakia
during May; and a third group in August for a five-month
training period (see below). The Czechoslovaks also suggested
training armored corps officers and experts and paratroopers, as
well as taking senior commanders into their military academy,
while Polish Party Secretary-General Wladislaw Gomulka
proposed accepting Israelis into the Polish General Staff
Academy. 1 0
It is possible that the telephone conversation which Shmuel
Mikunis claims to have had in Prague with the office of Georgii
Malenkov in the Secretariat of the Soviet Communist Party, on
the supply of arms and recruiting of youth in Eastern Europe
for participation in the Israeli war of independence, 1 1 was
concerned with the training of such cadres in Czechoslovakia. It
is perhaps appropriate to note that although Mikunis told Ben
Gurion on 24 May, between his second and third trips to
Eastern Europe in that year (1948), that he had discussed arms
supplies in the different East European countries—in Bulgaria
with Prime Minister George Dmitroff, in Yugoslavia with
Minister of the Interior Aleksander Rankovic, in Romania with
Party Secretary Vasile Luca, in Czechoslovakia with Foreign
Minister Vladimir Clementis and in Poland with Prime Minister
Jacob Berman and Foreign Minister Zygmund Modzilewski —
the contribution of the Palestinian (or Israeli) Communists to
the operation of purchasing arms seems to have been very
ancillary. (The basic agreements had been reached prior to
Mikunis' trips and contacts.) This may not have been so in the
case of recruitment of volunteer youth or cadres.
The negotiations which the Israeli envoy Mordecai Namir
conducted with Anna Pauker in July 1948 on emigration
centered on its military implications. The original purpose of
Namir's trip had been to explore the possibilities of purchasing
oil in Romania, chiefly also for Israel's war needs; yet in the
course of his contacts, Namir raised the issue of emigration,
upon which Mrs. Pauker confirmed that the Soviet bloc had a
definite interest in aiding Israel and agreed in principle, in
connection with the Israeli war effort, to a monthly emigration
quota of 5,000. These emigrants were to leave Romania as
repatriates, in accordance with the conditions for emigration

stipulated by the East European countries in the period from
1945-47 (see chapter 2). Jewish members of the Romanian
Communist Party were even told by their party officials that it
was their duty to go to Israel to fight imperialism: their place as
Jews and Communists was in the ranks of those fighting the
Jews' war of independence. 1 3
It was thus evident, even apart from the various indications
from Soviet and East European sources, that the emigration
from Eastern Europe to Palestine and the other forms of East
European aid to Israel, were a result of the Soviet Union's
support of Israel's war of independence. Similarly, when
toward the end of 1948 new obstacles to Jewish emigration
from Eastern Europe appeared, 1 4 it was logical to conclude that
this was linked with a change in the Soviet stand, and contacts
were made with Soviet representatives to discuss Jewish
emigration from the various bloc countries. On 12 December
Shertok raised the question in both its historical and practical
aspects with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii
in Paris. The Israeli foreign minister was particularly concerned
with Romania as the East European country with the largest
Jewish population. He asked the USSR to appreciate the
contradiction between its support for Israel and the difficulties
being raised in the path of emigration. Vyshinskii stressed that
any direct Soviet intervention in this issue was in itself
problematic, especially in view of the youth and sensitivity of
the regimes concerned.
In a talk with Soviet Minister in Israel Pavel Ershov in late
December, Ben Gurion also pointed out this contradiction. He
linked the immigration issue with Israel's domination over the
Negev—in which the USSR manifested direct interest—
maintaining that without immigration Israel could not
guarantee its control over this area which had to be urgently
populated and developed. 15 Shertok had also insisted to U.S.
U.N. delegation member John Foster Dulles in November that
Israel had to arrange to bring immigrants from Eastern Europe
"and that these arrangements required friendly relations with
[the] Soviet Union." 1 6
In March 1949, Shertok—now Sharett —notified Ershov of
Israel's complaint to Anna Pauker concerning the violation of
the July 1948 agreement. When the Soviet diplomat said this
was not the affair of the Soviet Union, Sharett pointed out that
there were definite indications that the entire issue of East
European emigration required coordination among the Soviet

bloc states, and Romania might perhaps wish to consult with
Moscow, or the USSR with Bucharest. If all countries had
adopted the Romanian position, the Israeli foreign minister
maintained, Israel would not have come into existence and the
British would still be ruling Palestine. Moreover, he insisted, it
could not be denied that East European Jewry longed to go to
Israel, as shown by recent demonstrations in front of the Israeli
Legation in Bucharest. 17
In the following month Israeli diplomacy made yet a further
effort. On 15 April 1949, on the eve of her departure from the
USSR to take up a ministerial post in the Israel government,
Israel's first minister to Moscow took her leave of Vyshinskii,
who had become Soviet foreign minister in March. Requesting
Soviet assistance in facilitating Jewish emigration from
Romania and Hungary, Mrs. Meyerson referred to the USSR's
relations of "profound friendship" with these two states and
asked it to use its "friendly influence" over the emigration
issue. Israel, she claimed, had come into existence so as to
enable immigration and would continue to exist only if there
was "a large and speedy immigration." Furthermore, if Israel
were not speedily reinforced by an increase in population and
the settlement of its empty areas, it would not attain peace.
Romania and Hungary had half a million Jews. Israel agreed
that those who were either needed for the economic
construction of their present countries or who did not wish to
go to Israel should remain where they were. It also agreed to
setting a deadline for emigration as an incessant emigration was
a clearly embarrassing phenomenon. Yet Israel was asking that
those Jews who wished to go and were not vital to the
economic existence of the countries concerned be permitted to
leave within a given period.
In reply, Vyshinskii referred to his Paris conversation with
Sharett in which he had told the Israeli foreign minister that
the USSR could not intervene. He, Vyshinskii, understood
Israel's need for a big immigration. Yet, both Romania and
Hungary, besides being young states which needed every
able-bodied man, had dire political problems. They were still
fighting domestic reaction, while the Jews were the most loyal
element to the new regimes; after their sufferings under Horthy
and Antonescu they had a vital interest in the new democratic
order. It was no simple matter to allow half a million citizens to
emigrate. The Soviet foreign minister did not consider
necessary a total and indiscriminating ban on emigration; but,

he insisted, it was a very complex problem. 1 8
The issue of Jewish emigration from Romania was also
brought up by Mapam representatives in their contacts with
Soviet officials in Eastern Europe and in Israel (see next
chapter). Although they were again given the response that
Romania was a sovereign state, the Soviet side was nonetheless
willing not only to hear the Israeli argumentation but even to
consider the possibility of arbitrating between the two parties.
In addition to its significance for Soviet-Israeli relations and
as a yardstick for the Soviet position on the Palestine war,
immigration to Palestine from Eastern Europe was an important
factor in inter-power relations (both Anglo-American relations
and the relations of the United States and Britain with the
USSR) as well as in the relations of all three powers with the
Arab states, on the one hand, and the Yishuv, on the other.
The opponents of this immigration used the argument which
they had been putting forward since 1945, that the raison d'être
of Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe was the Soviet
Union's desire to increase its influence in the Middle East,
among others by infiltrating Communist and pro-Communist
elements into the area. During a conversation with Israel's
Special Representative in Washington Eliahu Epstein, Under
Secretary of State Robert Lovett said that U.S. "intelligence
reports indicated that such penetration might be occurring." 1 9
This argument which was increasingly used following the Pan
York and Pan Crescent incident of November-December 1947
(see pp. 88-90) was refuted by both Zionist and Soviet sources.
Strongly denying the idea at the annual conference of the
British Zionist Federation in February 1948, Jewish Agency
Executive member Berl Locker recalled that during World War
II Zionist pleas to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish refugees
had been rejected on the pretext that their numbers might
possibly include Nazi agents. 2 0 Referring to the same "fantastic
and malicious lie" in a speech at a Jewish Relief Fund dinner
in Milwaukee in the same month, Moshe Shertok pointed out
that the immigrants who had sailed on the two ships in
December had been carefully screened by Jewish Agency
officials in Romania. Moreover, he said, the protests in the
Romanian Jewish Communist press against this emigration
showed that it could not be considered as a party effort to
infiltrate the Middle East. 21
The Soviet press and radio likewise criticized protests which
the British and U.S. governments registered with the Bulgarian

authorities early in 1948 that the latter were permitting the
emigration of Jews to Palestine. Radio Moscow noted that the
British protest included a warning to Sofia, in view of the
Bulgarian government's attempt to become a U.N. member, to
cease acting in contradiction to the appeal of the U.N. to all
peoples of the world not to exacerbate the security situation in
Palestine. The British Empire, Radio Moscow pointed out, was
making every effort to extend assistance to Germany, while the
British government mobilized its resources to withhold help
from Germany's victims. Pravda, for its part, argued that the
uproar London was raising over immigration to Palestine from
Eastern Europe was directed at the Arab world; in wooing the
latter Bevin had resolved "to drag out of the archives, the old
mouse-and-moth-eaten scarecrow of 'the red danger'. "
Moreover, the British Foreign Office announcement of 2
February that the Pan York and Pan Crescent had had large
numbers of Communists on board "including about 1,000 who
spoke Russian" and the British and American press reports of
" 'Moscow's agents' sent to the Arab East to organize
disturbances and uprisings" had been echoed in wild
exaggerations in the Middle Eastern information media. 2 2
Indeed, despite Soviet denials, the Soviet policy first on
partition and later on the Palestine War, in particular the
immigration of East European Jews to reinforce the Yishuv,
caused friction with the Arab world. Arab sources claimed to
see in the departure of the Pan York and Pan Crescent the
beginning of a new Soviet policy directed toward invading
Palestine. 23
ARMS SUPPLIES
The second category of Soviet bloc assistance to the Jewish

side in the Palestine War was no less crucial than that of
immigration. Ben Gurion, who had no unduly pro-Soviet
leanings, said later that the arms purchased in Czechoslovakia
had "saved" the young State of Israel. 24 Although, once again,
evaluation of the role played by the USSR must necessarily be
based on circumstantial evidence, there can be little doubt that
the arms deals with Czechoslovaka were a substantial
ingredient of Soviet policy toward the establishment of the
Jewish State. The evidence and data available seem sufficient to
prove that there were Soviet instructions to, or pressure on,
Prague to supply arms to the Yishuv. Given the relationship

between the USSR and the People's Democracies, specifically
the impossibility of Czechoslovakia's deciding of its own accord
to supply arms; and the coordination of the various East
European states in transmitting this materiel and their uniform
policy on the issue at large, we can safely conclude that, as in
the case of Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe, the actual
arrangements and agreements were at least confirmed, and
probably initiated, by Moscow.
In October-November 1947 the Jewish Agency delegation to
the U.N. General Assembly had brought to the notice of Soviet
delegates Tsarapkin and Shtein the fact of the Yishuv's need for
military equipment and details of its specific requirements (see
p. 87). Although the Soviet side had not made any positive
proposals on this score, it had demonstrated a direct interest in
this problem, raising such cogent questions as the Yishuv's
ability to handle equipment it might receive. As one of the
figures connected with these arms purchases has written, "the
Soviet delegation at the U.N. . . . was undoubtedly a decisive
factor in enabling the purchase [of arms] in Czechoslovakia and
permission for their transportation through Hungary and
Yugoslavia." 25
True, the substantive stage of the negotiations up to the
actual signing of the first contract at least took place prior to
the coup that made Czechoslovakia officially Communist, at a
time when two veteran non-Communist friends of the Zionist
cause, Edward Benes and Jan Masaryk still served as
Czechoslovak president and foreign minister respectively.
Nevertheless, the country was to all intents and purposes a full
member of the Soviet bloc in 1946-47 (see p. 29 and chapter 2,
n. 7). In the words of the above source, "the administration of
'yesterday' which was in transition had neither the capacity nor
the courage to decide or to help us in the job of purchasing and
transferring [arms]." 2 6 Moreover, one of the ministries most
closely connected with arms deals, the Ministry of National
Defense, was headed by a Communist sympathizer, Ludvik
Svoboda (although not a party member, Svoboda had been a
marshal of the Soviet army during World War II and had
returned with it to liberate Czechoslovakia). 27 Finally,
Masaryk's own steps were closely guarded, the real power in
his ministry being his deputy, Czechoslovak Communist Party
Politburo member Vladimir Clementis. It is also relevant to note
that Clementis was known to have approached Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Vyshinskii to confirm a proposed arms deal

with Egypt in the same period, and that this deal came to
nought because Vyshinskii rejected it. Not only, presumably,
must a similar procedure have been followed regarding arms
supplies to the Yishuv—if the initiative was in fact Czecho-
slovak and not Soviet—but Vyshinskii was actually reported to
have said in connection with the suggested deal with Egypt
that the USSR had resolved to give comprehensive support to
the Jews in Palestine and would not countenance the streng-
thening of "fascist" Egypt. 28
There is indeed some evidence to suggest that Clementis
played a central role in the early stages of the arms deal with
the Yishuv. The head of the Jewish Agency European Political
Department, Moshe Sneh, visited Czechoslovakia in July 1947
in his official capacity and met with Deputy Foreign Minister
Clementis. Sneh's purpose was to get a confirmation in
principle of an arms deal, and this he in fact received from
Clementis some weeks later. 29 It was presumably because of this
positive reply that Otto Felix (later Uriel Doron) and Mordekhai
(Munya) Mardor were sent to Czechoslovakia in September to
start preparing the ground for practical measures, meeting with
the relevant persons, etc. 30 A few days after 29 November a
former leader of the Zionist Revisionist Party, and at the time
head of Lloyd's department for heavy industry in Central and
East Europe, one Dr. Stephen Klinger, appeared in the Paris
offices of the Revisionists with prospectuses of the
Czechoslovak Sbroika munitions plant and suggestions that the
Yishuv purchase arms directly from the factory. The
Revisionists transmitted the proposal to Jewish Agency
Executive member Shaul Meirov (later Avigur) who was then in
Paris, and he in turn resolved to send Ehud Avriel to
Czechoslovakia to examine its details. 3 1
The Czechoslovak government's interest in selling arms to the
Yishuv may have emanated from its desire for dollars. But
while this may explain the motivation behind the Czechoslovak
approach to the Yishuv regarding the implementation of the
deal, it cannot in any way detract from the fact that such an
initiative must have depended on Soviet approval. 3 2
The measure of coordination achieved among the various East
European states on the transfer of materiel purchased by the
Yishuv in Czechoslovakia to different Mediterranean ports was
also almost certainly Soviet inspired. 3 3 Indeed, transit
demanded no less attention and effort than the actual purchase.
Most of the arms reached the Yugoslav coast after transit

through Hungary, and some went to Romanian ports. 34 Once
again, it is beyond the scope of this study to describe Soviet
bloc decision-making processes; it is, however, likely that in
this event coordination was attained as a result of a caucus
meeting of bloc delegations at the U.N., or of East European
representatives in some other place. Yugoslavia, specifically,
was reported to have agreed to the transit of arms through its
territory and their loading in Yugoslav ports after "an
intimation from above," presumably after Jewish pro-
tests to Soviet officials at Yugoslav reluctance to cooperate. 35
The actual process of negotiating the details and implementa-
tion of the arms deals with Czechoslovakia began with Avriel's
journey to Czechoslovakia in December. 36 Avriel and those who
accompanied him entered at once into negotiations with a
number of munitions factories and subsequently also with gov-
ernment circles. 37 The deliveries began in March 1948 —Deputy
Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky of the government that came
into power in the wake of the Communist coup of February told
a Histadrut delegation that month that the new regime would
adopt its predecessor's policy over Palestine; the first plane
reached Palestine on 31 March and the first boat, which had
sailed from Yugoslavia, in mid-April. 38
While the first three contracts covered only small
arms—machine guns, rifles and ammunition—three further
contracts included larger items, notably aircraft. The fourth
contract signed on 23 April 1948 was for 10 Messerschmidts
and the fifth, signed a few days later, for 20 more aircraft. The
first five contracts, namely those concluded before Israel's inde-
pendence, amounted to just over 11 million dollars (out of a
total of 19 millions worth of arms purchased in Europe in this
period.) 39
The first aircraft arrived in Israel within a week of the
establishment of the State (at its birth, Israel did not have a
single plane). 40 On 20 May the sixth contract, for the purchase
of 15 Messerschmidts, was signed, 41 and on 23 May Ben Gurion
received a telegram from Avigur to the effect that Avriel had
begun negotiating a further deal, to include aircraft, tanks and
field artillery to be purchased on credit, and which the
Czechoslovak government had approved in principle. On 27
May Ben Gurion noted in his diary: "About to purchase 30
more Messerschmidts, 30 Spitfires, 9 Mosquitos. The last are
capable of reaching here by themselves [the Messerschmidts
had to be sent as freight and put together in Israel]. Are also

ready to sell us 30 tanks of 16 tons, as well as 30 more for the
end of June, and 20 further tanks of 9 tons. Will perhaps
approve 6-month credit of 10 million dollars, on condition of
immediate payment of 20%." 4 2 On 9 June Avriel arrived in
Israel with news that new contracts had been signed for "tanks,
artillery, rifles, and planes and ammunition"; he also reported
that an Israeli ship flying an Italian flag had been loaded with
further matériel and was waiting in a Yugoslav port for sailing
orders. 43
Shortly before the establishment of the Jewish State a
suggestion was floated to purchase arms in Poland as well. In
April 1948 Antek (Yitzhak) Zuckerman, a former leader of the
Warsaw Ghetto who had extensive contacts in the new Poland,
went to Poland to examine details of a possible deal. In
Warsaw, Zuckerman met with a Defense Ministry official who
presented him with a lengthy list of German military equipment
to be found in Polish military depots (the Poles, like the
Czechoslovaks, were at the time in the process of adapting to
Soviet equipment, and German arms were not being used by the
Polish Armed Forces).
The Polish authorities, then, were not adverse in principle to
an arms deal. The plan was, however, turned down by the
leadership of the Yishuv, although Zuckerman had discussed it
with both Yitzhak Sadeh and Yisrael Galili—Chief Commander
Armored Divisions Hagana and Commander-in-Chief Hagana
respectively—before his trip, receiving from them details of the
actual weaponry needed. The reason for rejecting the proposed
deal was apparently technical, although political motives may
offer an additional explanation. While the Czechoslovaks, for
example, invited the Yishuv representatives to the munitions
plans to examine the materiel before negotiations reached con-
clusive stages, the Poles would not take the weaponry out of
the depots, let alone display its qualities and capabilities, before
clinching the deal; Zuckerman returned without even having
seen the arms. The Poles were also unable to supplement the
Czechoslovak equipment with the items which the Yishuv
needed, but apparently suggested much the same equipment as
the Yishuv was already receiving from Czechoslovakia.
Nonetheless, it seems that a small number of Polish ships
brought some military equipment to Israel, as well as Polish
Jewish volunteers desiring to participate in Israel's war of inde-
pendence. 4 4
Meanwhile, Western and Arab sources were accusing Israel of

purchasing Soviet arms and the USSR of supplying arms to
Israel. These charges were intended to demonstrate both Soviet
endeavors to penetrate the region and Israeli pro-Soviet
orientations, as well as to stress the Soviet violation of the
Security Council resolutions of 16 April and 29 May. (This was
supposed inter alia to offset Soviet claims to be the sole power
abiding by the U.N. resolutions in view of U.S. and British
efforts to circumvent the partition resolution. 45 ) The official
TASS denial of "rumors" that the USSR was supplying arms
and ammunition to Israel stated that while "representatives of
several Jewish organizations have unofficially approached the
Soviet Union with a request to deliver arms to the State of
Israel, . . . the Soviet Union which adopted in the Security
Council the widely-known position directed at the cessation of
hostilities and the maintenance of peace in Palestine,
considered it impossible to grant any help to either of the
belligerents at the present time." 4 6
Despite Soviet denials the accusations continued. In
September a Western news agency reported that an Arab
passenger plane had been shot down by a Yak fighter plane, of
the type used in the Soviet air force. 47 One month later, Radio
Cairo claimed that large numbers of Soviet troops were fighting
with the Israelis; and in November the Arab News Agency said
that in addition to troops, Israel had received from the USSR
armored cars, mortars, machine guns and other equipment sent
by the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union during World War II. 48 In the
same month the Soviet media once again reacted to reports
spread by Western news agencies that the USSR was supplying
Israel with arms, including aircraft, via Czechoslovakia and that
Soviet troops were to be found in the Israeli lines and positions.
The purpose of this story was —according to New Times—to
distract attention from the British supplies of aircraft, tanks and
artillery to Transjordan and Iraq which the Israelis had
reported. Indeed, New Times stressed, the Israeli Foreign
Ministry spokesman had rejected the entire story as a
groundless calumny, declaring that "among the foreign
volunteers fighting in the Israeli army, there is not a single
Soviet citizen." 4 9
As early as June the Mapai daily, Davar, too had refuted
charges that Israel was purchasing Soviet arms. Not only was
Israel capable of defeating the Arab armies, it said, without
approaching the USSR for arms; such an approach would also
entail obvious risks for Israel's international relationships. 5 0

Nonetheless, Israeli Military Attaché Brigadier Yohanan Ratner
'met on 5 October 1948 with First Deputy Chief of Staff General
Aleksei Antonov to discuss the possibility of Soviet military aid
to Israel.
Their conversation centered on: the Palestine War, the Arab
League armies, the quality of the Israeli forces, officer corps
and equipment, the possibility of a renewal of hostilities—this
was the period of the second truce—and the intrinsic value of
the Negev and Jerusalem. In connection with possible Soviet
aid, Ratner suggested both long and short officer-training
courses and the supply of German equipment that had fallen
into Soviet hands; he also raised the question of an air or naval
base to serve as a depot from which the weaponry could be sent
on its way.
Antonov did not commit himself to any supply of arms, yet
his basically positive attitude can be inferred both from the
holding of talks and from his request during the first
conversation for a detailed list of the weaponry required. It was,
however, over a month before the Israeli Ministry of Defense
supplied this information. When it arrived, Mrs. Meyerson and
Brigadier Ratner paid a visit to the head of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry's Middle and Near East Department, Ivan Bakulin, and
presented him with a long shopping list that included Spitfire
and Mustang fighter planes, T-34 and other tanks, and
anti-aircraft, anti-tank and field artillery.
The Israeli position as far as military equipment was
concerned, the Minister told Bakulin, had greatly improved
during the months since the State had come into existence, yet
there were still serious gaps. Although the war seemed to be
nearing its end, Israel had to be on the alert. ''Reports of British
reinforcements, the arrival of Yugoslav Nazis, and the like,
necessitate Israel to be prepared and on guard. Following your
assistance to us in the political sphere," Mrs. Meyerson
continued, "we are now turning to you with another sort of
request." The Israeli minister to Moscow said that the Legation
had received from Ben Gurion the list it had asked for
following Ratner's talk with Antonov.
Taking up the cudgels, Ratner described his contacts with
Antonov and clarified Israel's needs. "We know," he noted,
"from one of our people who is occupied in these matters in
another country, that the Soviet Union has pertinent German
equipment outside its borders that can be sold, however, only
upon instructions from here. The equipment we have received

until now has also been to a considerable extent German made,
although we have also acquired British-made equipment. A
number of the Eastern bloc countries also have German
equipment, acquired when they were Nazi satellites, and which
they no longer need since they are transferring to new sources
of weaponry. It is to be anticipated," the Israeli military attaché
insisted, "that the next stage of the war, if it is renewed [since
Ratner's meeting with Antonov, Israel had broken open the
siege to which its settlements in the south had been subjected,
captured Beersheba and completed the conquest of the Galilee]
will mean a more advanced technical level of fighting. In the
air, for example, the war was at first one-sided, conducted by
the enemy alone; afterwards our airforce also put in an
appearance . . . . The enemy is also certainly trying to learn
from the past and will endeavor to improve his capabilities ....
The areas of fighting are constantly growing, permitting and
necessitating more mechanized equipment, air reconnaissance
and other improvements in the field of weaponry. In fighting
for the Negev we are not so naive as to rely entirely on the U.N.
resolution on our frontiers; it is essential to concern ourselves
with attaining a sufficient military capability to retain it, and
this depends on the nature and quantity of the equipment we
have."
Bakulin promised to transmit Israel's needs and requests, but
he also warned the Israelis of "the gravity" of the issue. While
he appreciated Israel's difficulties and "the Soviet stand on
Israel's cause is well known, it is necessary to bear in mind that
the U.N. exists and that it resolved to prohibit the dispatch of
war matériel to the two sides. True, others are violating this
resolution. British officers are serving as instructors in the Arab
armies. I should not be surprised if American officers were also
discovered. But if arms supplies from us are discovered, there
will be an uproar. Even now, although it is utterly unfounded,
there are people who try to cultivate rumors that you achieved
your victories with the help of Soviet officers and pilots. If such
a situation really occurs—I fear it will not only inconvenience
us but will also make your position very difficult. The Arabs'
friends have a geographical advantage, they have stores etc.
close by, and then they will be able to do publicly and on a
large scale what they are now compelled to do secretly on a
limited scale."
In conclusion, Bakulin said once more that he would pass
everything on. He did not, however, need the actual Israeli list
in writing till a decision in principle was taken. 5 1
Indeed, the Israeli overtures remained unanswered. On 19
January 1949, nearly two months after the above conversation,
Mrs. Meyerson vainly tried to get Bakulin to make some
statement on the subject. 52 On 14 April, in her farewell
conversation with Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii, Mrs.
Meyerson told him of the request for both arms and officers'
training and went on: "It is possible that we are entering a
period of peace with our neighbors [armistice agreements had
already been signed between Israel and three of its four
neighbors], but we have to remain on the alert and to
strengthen and improve the capability of our small army. The
question of arms was also put before Mr. Bakulin and I would
ask you to give it your consideration." Vyshinskii claimed that
he was not acquainted with the matter and that it had
presumably been dealt with by the military. He too stressed the
difficulties involved. "We have only to give you a small pistol
and it will immediately be said we have given you an atom
bomb. Moreover, there will be a multiplicity of comment on the
special aspects of such an arrangement: an alliance between the
Soviets and the State of Israel, who have a partner akin to
both—Karl Marx, the Socialist and Jew—an alliance intended to
attack the world and send it back into primeval chaos." The
Soviet foreign minister promised, however, to investigate the
matter and see how things stood. 53
The entire incident—the Israeli overtures and the Soviet
treatment of them—raises many questions. Both sides seem to
have had doubts. The Israeli authorities delayed their replies to
Ratner's requests for details of arms and information on
officer-training courses by the Soviet Union. The reason for this
may well have been extraneous to the bilateral relations
between the two countries, specifically the Israeli public's
preoccupation in the latter months of 1948 with the bitter
controversy over the disbandment of the Palmah (a separate
unit in the Israeli armed forces in which Mapam exercised a
strong influence). At a time when the Israeli armed forces were
not in direct need of military equipment Ben Gurion and the
Mapai leadership understandably vacillated over a measure that
would have increased Israel's political dependence on the
Soviet bloc.
The Soviet side, for its part, seems at first to have welcomed
the proposal, perhaps for the very reason that the Israeli
leadership dithered. However, further consideration on the very

delicate matter of implementation on the one hand, and of the
implications and consequences of such a deal on the other,
evoked uncertainty in the Kremlin. The USSR which was not
supplying arms to any state whatever outside the Soviet bloc
had no desire to appear before the world as a violator of a U.N.
arms embargo and as an arms supplier to a party in an
international conflict. Nor was there much chance that an arms
deal between Israel and the USSR might remain secret—just as
the Czechoslovak deals had come into the open. Furthermore,
the USSR was beginning in late 1948 and early 1949 to have
reservations about Israel (see following chapters) which can
only have been augmented by the steps taken by the Israeli
authorities to limit the activities of left-wing groupings among
the Israeli officer corps.
Indeed, these same months also witnessed first a slowdown
and finally a total stoppage of the military aid Israel had been
receiving from the People's Democracies. In addition to the
military base Czechoslovakia had put at the disposal of the
Yishuv and the new Israeli State for the purpose of military
training, it had assigned an autonomous air base at Zátec from
which most of the arms sent to Israel by air were dispatched.
This included both arms purchased in Czechoslovakia and
equipment bought in other countries that needed to make a
stopover on the way to its destination; in July 1948, too, three
bomber aircraft actually flew from Zátec on bombing operations
(against Cairo, Gaza and El Arish). 54
The pretext for disrupting these activities was the
intervention of the U.S. government. In the wake of the first air
transport of materiel on 31 March, the American embassy in
Prague had instructed the crew of the transport plane that had
taken the arms (who were U.S. citizens) to stop carrying arms to
Israel; indeed, the air transport of arms stopped until mid-May,
when flights were resumed (partly in American planes and
partly in aircraft hired in Czechoslovakia). In the period 20
May-10 August, the air transport of weapons to Israel became a
virtual airlift, 95 flights taking off from Zátec in these weeks, 30
of them in the most critical period preceding the first truce
(which began on 11 June). This operation was terminated on 11
August, when—following the disclosure at a press conference
held in Western Germany by two Czechoslovak pilot deserters
that Czechoslovakia was maintaining an arms contraband
service to Israel—U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt lodged
an official request with the Czechoslovak government to put a
stop to the delivery of arms to Israel.55
Although the base at Zátec was closed at the outset for only
two weeks, it was not reopened for Israeli use and no substitute
base or field was put at the Israelis' disposal as an autonomous
unit. The arms deliveries which continued to be flown to Israel
were no longer intensive; some left from other airfields in
Czechoslovakia while other equipment was freighted to
Yugoslavia and from there flown to its destination.56
The delivery of matériel from Czechoslovakia to Israel seems
to have continued, though sporadically, until December 1948.
In November Under Secretary Lovett reported that U.S. and
Panamanian aircraft were still shipping "fighter aircraft and
arms from Czechoslovakia to Israel." By early December, U.S.
Chargé d'Affaires James Penfield was reporting to Washington
that Czechoslovakia was "radically restricting its aid to Israel
and that Czech policy toward Israel has recently become
deliberately and markedly less friendly .... We would assume
... that this change is at Moscow's order and reflects a new turn
in over-all Soviet policy."57 It has been difficult to ascertain the
precise date or reason for the termination of deliveries,
although it appears that the initiative was Czechoslovak or
Czechoslovak-Soviet and not Israeli, and that Prague's—or
Moscow's—motives were not solely or even chiefly connected
with U.S., British and Arab protests and pressures.58 The
reasons seem rather to have been domestic or connected with
developments in the Soviet bloc: the campaign against Zionism
and its institutions in the People's Democracies and the
concomitant reassessment of the State of Israel and its war of
independence (see chapter 6). In any case, the military
authorities were instructed in December to stop the delivery of
spare parts to Israel;59 a group of Israeli pilots due to complete
their training in Czechoslovakia in January 1949 (cf. above) had
also to interrupt their course and return home. 60
• • •
The military aid which the Soviet bloc extended to the

Yishuv and the State of Israel during their war of independence
was a major factor in enabling the Jews to register important
successes in the 1948 Palestine War and also a significant
episode in the promotion of Soviet political and strategic
ambitions in the Arab East. The desire that the British be
expelled from Palestine and their position in the entire region

weakened justified the unusual step of exceeding the bounds of
purely political backing in the international arena as well as the
political risks involved in strengthening Israel's fighting
potential both with personnel and arms supplies. Moreover, by
encouraging young Jews to emigrate from Eastern Europe to
take part in the Israeli war of independence, the USSR was
exceeding these bounds not only in the political arena, by
possibly overplaying its cards, but also in the ideological
sphere, as Soviet theory advocated the emigration to Israel only
of Jews from the capitalist world.
The Soviet stand on military aid to the Yishuv and the
apologia and hopes it entailed were given expression by
Shmuel Mikunis at a press conference in Prague on 22 June
1948. 61
The Israeli paper Ha-Aretz described the very holding of the
conference as an important Israeli achievement and noted that
it merited a considerable public response. The Czechoslovak
Information Ministry official present at the conference had
introduced Mikunis as a member of "the [Provisional] Council
of the State of Israel," rather than as the secretary-general of
Israel's Communist party. Moreover, Mikunis, Ha-Aretz wrote,
had described the Yishuv's struggle for existence and the
situation in Israel in a way that any Israeli leader could accept.
He had then called upon "the democratic forces of the world"
and "the fraternal Communist parties everywhere to support the
war of the Israeli people for its country's independence," and
"urged the Jewish masses to enlist and go to Israel to fight side
by side with their brethren."
Mikunis used the opportunity to criticize the Israeli
government for agreeing to a truce and to negotiations with
" 'the Anglo-American agent Bernadotte' without first hearing
the opinion of the Constituent Assembly and for contenting
itself with reacting to the Soviet demand for observers on
Bernadotte's staff with a mere statement that it had no
objection, instead of actually reiterating the demand. Mikunis
pointed out in particular the 'apprehensions provoked by the
negotiations being conducted in London and Washington by
[Nahum] Goldmann, [Berl] Locker and President Weizmann in
the name of the State of Israel . . . . The masses are full of
astonishment why the efforts of the [Israeli] Foreign Ministry
continue to be concentrated in London and Washington in
conformity with the time-tested routine of the Jewish Agency,
and neglect the slightest action necessary for the the acquisition
of real friends.' The speaker called for a friendship alliance
with Russia and the People's Democracies and the inclusion in
the government of a representative of the Communists."
Replying to questions as to "why the Jews are holding
territory belonging to the Arabs and whether the Jews wish to
take hold of all of Palestine," Mikunis had said: " T h e conquest
of Arab territories was a temporary strategic necessity brought
about by the war. It is, however, true that there are reactionary
and chauvinistic circles who would like to hold on to
everything.' An American Jewish journalist asked him 'whether
the State of Israel would not lose the support of American
Jewry if it joined the Soviet bloc totally and officially.' Mikunis'
reply was: 'American Jewry's support does not depend on our
policy toward the USSR. It emanates from the justified desire of
American Jewry to support the State of Israel because it is a
Jewish state and not because of its political connections with
this or that power.' " Mikunis went on to stress the need to
differentiate between U.S. Jewry to whom Israel had
understandable and justified sympathies and the U.S.
government. Vis-a-vis the latter, Mikunis said, there should be
no connection for four reasons: a. Saudi Arabia, one of the
states attacking Israel, was virtually an American colony; b. the
conditions of the suggested 90 million dollar loan would
throttle the young state which did not need the money anyway;
c. U.S. Jewry had alone collected 270 million dollars since the
beginning of the year for the Yishuv and the State, and "the
Jews in other countries are also giving us a lot and will
continue giving"; d. it had been proved that if Israel had "stood
firm" till now, it was due not to the United States but "chiefly
to the USSR and the Eastern democracies." 6 2
In other words, the assistance extended by the Soviet bloc to
the State of Israel was intended to prove both to Israel and to
Western Jewry that whereas in the West only the Jews stood by
the Jewish State, the Soviet bloc as such was its real friend: it
was this powerful factor in the international arena which was
the most loyal and devoted ally of the State of Israel in its war
of independence.
Notes
1. R. Moscow, 22 May 1948/SWB I, 28 May 1948. For the theme of fascist

elements in the Arab ranks, cf. p. 114.

3. Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part. 2, p. 1531.
4. Mordecai Namir, SheJihut Bemoskva (English title, Israeli Mission to
Moscow) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971), pp. 52-53. For the appointment of
Bernadotte and his proposals, see chap.6.
5. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
6. Author's interview with Mordekhai Oren, 6 June 1971, OHD, 50/29.
7. The camp used for the purpose in Poland —in Lower Silesia —had
originally been put at the disposal of Jewish organizations who sought to
organize self-defense against possible pogroms (cf. p. 28). Many of the
800-900 immigrants who sailed from Szeczecin toward the end of 1948
had received some training at this camp. Those who sailed on the single
boat that brought immigrants directly from Poland in this period included
a group of 50 or so Jewish officers in the Polish armed forces who were
simultaneously members of the Communist Youth Organization, a further
demonstration of the official nature and Soviet confirmation of this
emigration of young Jews — from the point of view of the issue at stake it is
irrelevant whether these were convinced Communists who aimed at
eventually engaging in political activity in Israel, as some undoubtedly
were, or whether this party affiliation emanated from career
considerations —from interview of Mr. Aharon Kedar with Aryeh
Abramowski, 7 April 1965, OHD, 4/59.
8. From author's interview with Dr. Michael Stepanek (at the time press
adviser to National Defense Minister Ludvik Svoboda), 11 November 1971;
also Shimon Orenstein, Alila Beprag (English title: Adventure in Prague)
(Tel Aviv: Am Hassefer, 1968), chap. 7; Arnold Krammer, The Forgotten
Friendship (University of Illinois, 1974), pp. 109-11; and Eliahu Saharov,
who mentioned five Czechoslovak technicians as having accompanied the
first Messerschmidt—Maariv, 22 April 1969. Orenstein was recruited to
help in the purchase of arms in Czechoslovakia early in 1948 (see below)
and after the establishment of the State of Israel joined the Israeli Legation
in Prague as assistant trade attaché. After leaving the foreign service in
1950 Orenstein returned several times to Czechoslovakia in the employ of
a private firm, and was arrested there in December 1951 —see p. 364. He
took part as a witness in the Slánsky trial —see p. 370 —and was himself
tried and sentenced to life imprisonment in August 1953, yet was released
and returned to Israel in August 1954.
9. Author's interview with Stepanek, as above, and Y. Ben Horin to the
author, December 1971. Considerable confusion arose as a result of the use
of the term "brigade" for something that was not in fact a fighting
contingent. Israel's refusal to receive any such force may have been
because the proposal was connected with the activities of Shmuel
Mikunis—cf. below and Orenstein, chap. 7.
Soviet A i d to t h e Y i s h u v 163
10. Ben Gurion, pp. 128 and 137, and Ze'ev Schiff, "Stalin Ordered the
Supply of Arms to Israel," Ha-Aretz, 3 May 1968. For the pilot and
paratrooper training programs, see also Krammer, pp. 89-94.
11. See Schiff. For Malenkov's status at the time see below chap. 7.
12. Ben Gurion, p. 131.
13. Namir, pp. 28-34; and private sources. Anna Pauker had already
been personally involved in the Pan York and Pan Crescent affair. Cf. Ehud
Avriel, Open the Gatesl (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), chap.
25.
14. By November the anti-Zionist campaign, which Namir had already
noted in July, was at its peak in both Romania and Hungary; a similar
campaign was beginning in Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously Bulgaria
decided to terminate all Zionist activity, and the Polish authorities put
new restrictions on emigration and closed the Palestine Office that had
been operating in Warsaw. (For further details of anti-Zionist activity in
Eastern Europe, cf. p. 216 and chap. 8.)
15. For Shertok's talk with Vyshinskii, see Ha-Aretz, 17 December
1948; Namir, p. 100; and below; for Ben Gurion's talk with Ershov, see
Voice of Israel in Arabic, 29 December 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 6 January 1949.
For the Soviet stand on the Negev, see chap. 6.
16. Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1620.
17. These demonstrations had taken place in February 1949.
18. Namir, pp. 116-21.
20. ]TA, 3 February 1948. Locker took advantage of the opportunity to
praise the Romanian government for showing understanding of the
position of its Jewish citizens of whom some 50,000 had registered for
emigration, and for not seeking to obstruct their emigration.
21. JTA, 4 February 1948.
22. Pravda, 8 February 1948; TASS in Russian for abroad, 8 February
1948/SWB Í, 13 February 1948; also Kol Ha-Am, 8 February 1948; and
Aynikeit, 14 February 1948.
23. ANA, 29 December 1947/SWB ÍÍÍ, 8 January 1948. For the
deterioration of Soviet-Arab relations in this context and its political
implications, cf. pp. 85-86, 95 and 114-15. British Labour M.P. Richard
Crossman has noted that many people in London, including Bevin
himself, feared that Jewish immigration to Palestine would bring huge
numbers of Communists into the region—Author's interview with Mr.
Crossman, 17 September 1970.
24. Schiff.
25. Meir Mardor, Shelihut AJuma (English title: Clandestine Mission)
(Israel: Maarakhot, 1958).
26. Ibid., p. 183.
27. According to one account Svoboda assembled the officers of his

General Staff and a number of other senior commanders just after the
adoption of the partition resolution and called for the dispatch to the
Yishuv of the best arms the Czechoslovaks had at their disposal —from the
author's interview with Dr. Michael Stepanek, see above n. 8.
28. E. Loebl, "Soviet Imperialism and Anti-Semitism," American
Zionist (June 1970): 11 (Loebl was at the time head of a department in
the Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Ministry). Regarding the projected
Czechoslovak-Egyptian deal, it was reported at the end of February 1948
from Cairo, that negotiations were being undertaken for the purchase of
arms, ammunition and arms factories between the two countries and that it
was suggested that Czechoslovak experts come to Egypt to help set up a
small-arms factory— Kol Ha-Am, 1 March 1948. At an earlier date,
however, a deal had been concluded with Syria for the purchase of small
arms. A Syrian military delegation had visited Czechoslovakia in
November 1947. It, like the Yishuv, agreed to pay for the arms in hard
currency. The arms were transferred to Yugoslavia, via Hungary, in March
1948. For the lot of these arms, one shipload of which eventually found its
way to Israel, cf. Mardor, pp. 200-61.
29. From author's interview with Dr. Sneh, 22 December 1970, OHD,
50/24.
30. Sefer Toledot Ha-Hagana, vol. 3, pp. 1525-26.
31. Shimshon Yunicman, ed. Isaac Ramba (Tel Aviv, 1962), pp. 325-36.
Yunicman's version was confirmed by Mr. Shaul Avigur in a conversation
with the author on 11 July 1971. See also Avriel, chap. 24.
32. For the Czechoslovak need for dollars, cf., e.g., Loebl's article, n. 28
above.
33. Cf. n. 35 below.
34. Cf. Shimshon Yunicman, p. 238. According to Yunicman, the
Romanians even told the Israelis they were ready to help to make a
shipload of arms destined for the Arabs, in conformity with the earlier
arms agreement with Syria, disappear on its way to its destination.
35. Mardor, p. 189. According to Mardor, Poland, Romania and
Yugoslavia all rejected at first approaches for transit of materiel through
their territories. It is relevant to note that Yugoslavia was still susceptible
to Soviet pressures and did not wish to deviate from bloc operations that
did not directly affect its national security, not only in the fall of 1947 —cf.
p. 80 — but even in the spring of 1948, i.e. after a further deterioration of its
relations with the Kremlin, and still in the summer of the same year, after
the rift had become public. In other words, Yugoslavia's consent to the use
of ports and even airfields for the transit of arms for the Yishuv must be
seen in the context of Soviet policy, although consent was given regarding
the first airfield in mid-June 1948 and regarding a second even later —ibid.,
Soviet A i d to t h e Y i s h u v 165
p. 294; also Schiff. For a description of the deterioration of

Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the early months of 1948, see Milovan Djilas,
Conversations with StaJin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962),
pp. 133-86.
36. It will be remembered that within a week or so of the outbreak of
fighting in Palestine on 30 November 1947 the United States placed an
embargo on arms deliveries to the Middle East, which chiefly affected the
Yishuv in view of Arab relations and treaties with Britain; cf. p. 111.
37. Officially the arms deal was arranged with Ethiopia (cf. Mardor, p.
181) since international law permitted the sale of arms to government
bodies only and the Yishuv and the Zionist Organization were in
international law private organizations; cf. Orenstein, p. 69. It is perhaps of
interest that when Avriel spoke to Masaryk, the Czechoslovak foreign
minister implied that his own decision had to take into account the
opinion of his Communist deputy, Clementis—Avriel, p. 335.
38. Ben-Gurion, pp. 76 and 95; Mardor, p. 189, and Avriel, chap. 25.
39. Ben Gurion, pp. 103 and 109.
40. Ibid., pp. 123 and 131. For the difficulties in bringing the planes, see
ibid., p. 287.
41. Mardor, p. 287.
42. Ben Gurion, pp. 129 and 132. While the Messerschmidts were
Czechoslovak-made —Czechoslovak factories had begun constructing
them under German occupation and continued making them after
liberation —the Spitfires and apparently also the Mosquitos had been
given Czechoslovakia by Britain after the war. Indeed, all the arms made in
Czechoslovakia and sold in this deal were made after German models,
apart from the ZB-37 machine-gun, which, however, had also gone out of
use with the transfer to Soviet equipment. This restriction to weaponry no
longer in use in the Czechoslovak armed forces was the reason that Israel
was unable to purchase field artillery in Czechoslovakia, although Dr.
Stepanek has said that Svoboda proposed the inclusion in the deal of these
arms as well.
43. Ibid., p. 129, cf. also, ibid., pp. 139 and 258-59.
44. This portrayal of the still-born Polish arms deal is based chiefly on
the interview of A. Kedar with Y. Zuckerman, 5 July 1965, OHD, 4/53; also,
for specific details, see the author's interviews with M. Oren, 6 June 1971,
OHD 50/29, and with Professor Juliusz Katz-Suchy, 13 June 1971. Political
tensions accompanied the suggested Polish arms deal; Zuckerman, for
example, was convinced that it was rejected for political reasons. Pos-
sible differences of opinion, however, in the Yishuv leadership concern-
ing the desirability of increasing arms supplies from Eastern sources
seem to have been an ancillary consideration. For a later approach
concerning arms, see n. 51 below.
45. For Soviet claims, cf. chap. 3, passim; for the Security Council
resolutions in question, see pp. 123 and 237-40.
46. Pravda, 8 August 1948. The approach of the Jewish organizations to
Moscow can hardly have been concocted for the purpose of the denial, yet
it is not clear to what organizations the Soviet news agency was referring.
The only Jewish body known to have raised the issue officially was the
Palestinian Communist Party (cf. above); there may have been appeals
from Jewish front organizations in the West such as the American
Committee of Writers, Artists and Scientists which Gromyko had
addressed in December 1947 (see p. 113).
Possibly, too, the reference was to Jewish organizations in Eastern
Europe which were very active on behalf of the Yishuv in the period
immediately before and after the establishment of the Jewish State. The
Jews of Poland collected contributions in the first half of 1948 which paid
for the packing of the arms purchased in Czechoslovakia and for food for
Israel. The Jews of Romania and Bulgaria celebrated Israel's independence
by mass demonstrations and sent telegrams on the occasion to Stalin and
the leaderships of their own countries —R. Warsaw in Yiddish, 15 May and
12 June 1948; andR. Sofia in English, 17 May 1948/SWB Í, 21 and 28 May
and 25 June 1948.
47. For TASS's denial of this charge, see Pravda, 26 September 1948.
48. R. Cairo, 24 October 1948, and ANA, 25 November 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 28
October and 2 December 1948.
For further charges of a similar ilk, cf. ANA, 30 March and 28 November
1948,R. Cairo, 5 June, 20 July and 30 November 1948, R. Sharq al-Adna', 2
July 1948, R. Damascus, 17 July 1948, R. Beirut, 3 August 1948, and R.
Baghdad, 22 November 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 8 April, 10 June, 8, 22 and 29 July, 12
August, and 2 and 9 December 1948.
49. New Times, 18 November 1948; for the publicity given this
information in Arab sources, see, R. Cairo, 6 November 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 11
November 1948. Shertok assured Secretary Marshall that "men had come
from all parts of the world to help Israel" yet "no men or munitions had
been received from the Soviet Union"—Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5,
part 2, p. 1578.
50. Davar, 9 June 1948.
51. Namir, pp. 74-77. At about this same time Israel's minister in
Poland, Israel Barzilai, made enquiries about the possibility for arms
purchases —especially tanks and artillery —in Poland. His request,
however, was not taken up —Frister, pp. 47-48.
52. Namir, p. 98.
53. Ibid., pp. 118-19.
54. Mardor, pp. 271-83.
55. Ibid., pp. 286-89; Davar, 3 August 1948; also Schiff; and Orenstein,
pp. 71-72. On July 1, Dean Rusk's Special Assistant Robert McClintock

noted that the Czechoslovak Government "had actively conspired in gun
running by air from Prague to Palestine" and went on: "It is regrettable to
report that the aircraft used in the operation apparently are American.
Thus far it does not seem that Mr. Steinhardt . . . has been successful in
doing anything to suppress this traffic." On the same day Secretary
Marshall sent a letter to a number of U.S. diplomatic missions, including
the one in Prague, to draw the attention of the governments to which they
were accredited of violations of the Security Resolution of 29 May. A CIA
report late in July made a further reference to the supply of weaponry
to Israel with the active cooperation of East European govern-
ments—Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 1177, 1179 and
1247-48. The State Department documents make no mention of
Steinhardt's actual complaint to the Czechoslovak government and its
effects.
56. Mardor, pp. 298-301 and 315.
57. Penfield added: The Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior "is reliably
reported to have taken lead in opposing continuation of program and
character of trainees Embassy's informants state that attempt was made
to educate trainees in Communism and recent inspection of [Israeli] pilots
by Red Army officers consisted principally of political examinations but
that program has completely failed to create indoctrinated cadre for Israeli
army"—Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1652.
58. For Arab protests and pressures, cf. ANA, 8 November 1948, R.
Cairo, 8 and 18 November 1948, andR. Beirut, 10 November 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ,
18 and 25 November 1948; for Czechoslovak-U.S. contacts subsequent to
the Ambassador's request to close the Zátec base, cf. R. Prague, 6
September 1948/SWB Í, 10 September 1948; and Jewish Chronicle, 12
November 1948.
Twenty years later Ben Gurion said arms supplies had stopped with the
end of the Israeli war of independence (hostilities terminated early in
January 1949). Israel, he said, had "sufficient arms and the entire affair was
finished." Mikunis, on the same occasion, was more explicit. He attributed
the stoppage of deliveries to the change in the Soviet bloc attitude to Israel
which in turn he attributed to a. the Soviet Jews' identification with Israel
and b. the first American loan to Israel (see later chapters) —Schiff.
59. From author's interview with Dr. Stepanek (cf. n. 8 above).
60. Schiff.
61. Reservations mentioned above concerning the danger of making
analogies between statements of Middle Eastern Communist party
representatives and Soviet policy do not apply when these statements
are made in a Communist capital, since this involves their previous
confirmation by the appropriate authorities. In this way, Mikunis'
168 T H E U S S R A N D ISRAEL: 1947-1954
statement in Prague, like his article in the Cominform publication, can be

seen as indicating Soviet intentions. In this specific instance, moreover, a
Communist source has borne evidence that the Mikunis press conference
was coordinated a priori with Soviet representatives in Prague—from
author's interview with Zondel Abin (Berl Balti), 26 February 1970, OHD,
50/18.
62. Ha-Aretz, 9 July 1948. The very success of Mikunis' press
conference, according to Ha-Aretz, demonstrated the favorable attitude of
the local authorities to the State of Israel. The conference lasted three
hours, took place in a large hall filled to capacity, and included a group of
foreign correspondents, headed by the TASS representative in Prague.
Mikunis spoke in Russian which was translated into Czech.
For the various allusions—the truce, negotiations with Bernadotte,
Soviet demands for observers, the proposed U.S. loan —see chapters 5 and
6.
5
Direct Contacts,
May 1948-April 1949
DIALOGUE BASED ON COINCIDING INTERESTS
On 17 May 1948 the Soviet government announced its decision

"to recognize officially the State of Israel and its Provisional
Government," 1 which made it the first government to accord the
new state de jure recognition.
The exchange of telegrams between Shertok and Molotov, in
the course of which the above declaration was made, opened an
intensive dialogue between the two states that lasted for just about
one year. Institutionalizing earlier contacts, the new relationship
reflected the basic coincidence of interests between the two sides
during Israel's war of independence but also revealed a number of
no less fundamental contradictions in general outlook, concep-
tions and orientations, and certain inherent difficulties of a very
specific nature.
In the first stage the dialogue centered on the Palestine War.
The USSR was supplying Israel with arms and supporting it in the
international arena. Moscow was vitally interested in the defeat of
the Arab armies that had invaded Israel on the day of its birth and,
later, in obstructing the Bernadotte Plan that seemed likely to
deprive the Jewish State of both territory and sovereignty. The
Soviet side reiterated endlessly the theme of Britain's support of
the Arabs, the treaties which several of the Arab states had with
Britain, and the equipment, training and even staffing of the Arab
armies by the British. Israel's frontiers were also a major Soviet
169
concern, specifically the need for Israel to retain the strategic

areas allotted it by the partition resolution, and they provided a
central issue for discussion between the two states. (The entire
topic of the Palestine War which was the primary context of
Soviet support for Israel in the international arena will be
enlarged upon in the following chapter.)
The immigration issue was a further focus of discussion. While
from Israel's point of view the legitimacy of its demand for Jewish
immigration was first and foremost a question of principle, the
USSR was primarily interested in its implications for the Israeli
war effort. It was this criterion that determined the official, public
support the Soviet Union gave to Israel's efforts to circumvent
the truce conditions laid down by the Security Council and to
precipitate immigration from the camps in Germany, Austria
and Cyprus, as well as from other countries beyond the Soviet
sphere of influence. It was also the reason for continuing sup-
port behind the scenes for Israel's demand for immigration from
Eastern Europe (see pp. 141-49).
The Soviet Union's interest in Israel's military victories involved
measures to consolidate Israel's international position and status.
Moscow thus pressed persistently for Israel's acceptance to U.N.
membership which was granted in May 1949. There was also
discussion of a possible Soviet loan to Israel and trade between the
two countries, including supply of a number of Israel's basic needs
(see pp. 207-8). Finally, the dialogue necessitated consideration
of Israel's international orientation, and here too the Soviet go-
vernment showed its interest in cultivating Israel's goodwill over
and above the latter's needs in its war of independence.
In the fall of 1947 the USSR had assigned to Western, par-
ticularly American, Jewry a mitigating role vis-à-vis their own
governments' foreign policies (see pp. 74-76). In 1948, after the
establishment of the State of Israel, despite the Soviet principle
that denied the possibility of any intermediate position in a deteri-
orating cold war situation, Soviet officials and communications
media were suggesting that Israel preserve a position of neutrality
between the two world camps. Now, as in 1947, this contradiction
might have resulted from divergencies of opinion within the Soviet
leadership, with the party elite, for example, opposing the group-
ings responsible for implementing foreign policy.
There are, however, no grounds for any such supposition. The
explanation seems to be in Soviet endeavors at the time to set up
front organizations in the West, where the Jews were seen as a
traditionally progressive group and therefore potential members
Direct Contacts 171
of these organizations. Indeed, the Soviet denigration of Israel's

ties with the U.S.—when it came—concerned Israel's orientation
toward the U.S. Administration and specifically excluded its links
with U.S. Jewry which the USSR viewed favorably, still hoping
that Israel would have influence over Western Jewry, whose
weight in the international arena was estimated by the Soviet
leadership to far exceed that of the State of Israel. Soviet officials
indeed tried to convince Israeli representatives with whom they
met that since Israel could absorb only a small part of Western
Jewry it must give official encouragement to the forces of progress
in the West—the success of which alone could bring about a
solution of the Jewish problem there. A further possible ex-
planation of the exceptional attitude toward Israel was the latter's
location in the Middle East; the USSR had not yet integrated
this area into its global policy as an independent entity and Soviet
thinking was prone to exaggerate the dependence of its component
states on the colonial powers. Israel, which had demonstrated
its military ability to defend its independence, was clearly an
unusual phenomenon in its "semi-colonial" surroundings.
The official policy of the Israeli government once again
coincided with that of the USSR. Since the Jewish people was
divided between the two camps and Israel needed the political
assistance in the international arena of the leading power in each
camp, Israel adopted a policy based on neutrality. As early as 17
June 1948 Ben Gurion told the Provisional State Council that
Israel had no interest in a quarrel with the great powers but
desired rather friendship with both blocs. The United States, he
said, had considerable influence in the U.N. where the Palestine
question was on the agenda, while Israel needed no one to push it
into amity with the USSR. 2
The Tel Aviv correspondent of the Czechoslovak news agency
CTK noted—referring to a Mapam suggestion of 4 June 1948 that
Israel conclude a treaty of mutual aid against aggression with the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland—that while the sym-
pathy of the populace inclined to the USSR, the State's foreign
policy would be to strike a balance between East and West. It
was pointed out "in official government circles," the CTK corre-
spondent went on, that any one-sided foreign policy would be
detrimental to immigration, while a one-sided pro-Soviet ori-
entation would be likely to impair Israel's ties with the strongest
Zionist grouping, i.e. in the United States, which "represented
the strongest source of economic assistance to Israel for the next
few years." 3
On 3 August Ben Gurion was asked by an AFP correspondent

what Israel's stand would be in the case of an East-West conflict.
The reply was that Israel did not desire a neutrality of "indif-
ference" yet it had respect for both sides and, although recog-
nizing the debt of civilization to the West, it realized too that it had
much to learn from Eastern Europe. Moreover, while 65% of
the Jewish people lived in the West, the remainder inhabited the
East. 4
The government which Ben Gurion set up after the first general
elections of January 1949 upheld this view. Within days of the
elections Ben Gurion said that the new government (which had
not yet been formed) would seek friendship and cooperation with
both the United States and the USSR. 5 Late in May the director of
the Government Press Information Office, Yosef Gravitzky, ex-
plained that the Israeli policy of non-alignment was not the re-
sult of any attempt to evade current issues but of the dispersion of
the Jewish people, the country's geographical and strategic
position, and the fact that it was the first state that had been
established as a result of Soviet-U.S. cooperation. 6
True, the Jewish spokesmen of the Eastern bloc denied the
possibility of Jewish neutrality and called for unequivocal
identification with the forces of "democracy and progress." In
July 1948 Jewish representatives from Poland and Bulgaria (and
Mapam delegates) at a World Jewish Congress meeting in Mon-
treux declared their support for the forces of popular democracy
and their opposition to the division of the world into two hos-
tile camps. Michal Mirski, editor of the Central Committee of
Polish Jews organ, Dos Naje Lebn, said two grave dangers
threatened the Jewish nation: anti-Semitism and the tendency to
split the world into two camps, which made world Jewish unity
impossible. Mirski called upon the World Jewish Congress to
help in uniting the forces of world Jewry with the democratic
elements in order to wage a common struggle on behalf of the
Jewish State and against anti-Semitism and war. Radio War-
saw's Yiddish service pointed out that "the democratic forces of
the world" had "always shown understanding for the Jewish
people and helped —headed by the USSR —in the creation of the
State of Israel." It went on: "World Jewry cannot conduct a pol-
icy of neutrality. Our bloody history has convinced us that we
can exist only in conditions of a democracy. . . . Only by a clear
and consistent anti-Imperialist and anti-Fascist policy, based on
the democratic forces, can our existence and the existence of
the young State of Israel be assured." 7
Direct Contacts 173
Nonetheless, the official Soviet line vis-d-vis Israel—as distinct

from the Jewish people—was more realistic, calling upon it to
adopt a policy of independence regarding the inter-bloc struggle.
In February 1949 Soviet Ambassador in Washington Aleksandr
Paniushkin invited Israeli Ambassador Eliahu Elath to discuss
reports that had appeared in the Western press concerning the
possibility of Israel's inclusion in the Marshall Plan. Paniushkin
stressed that the USSR had no intention of demanding Israeli
participation in the Soviet bloc knowing that the great majority of
the Israeli population were not Communists. The Soviet Union
desired merely that Israel preserve complete independence from
all foreign influence and domination. Elath denied that Israel was
thinking of Marshall Plan aid and confirmed his government's
determination to defend its independence and desire to retain
Soviet friendship. 8
In her farewell meeting with Vyshinskii, Mrs. Meyerson made a
similar declaration. The Israeli government (which she was
joining as minister of labor) was resolved, she told the Soviet
foreign minister, not to be dragged into any bloc or group of states
directed against this or that world force and "particularly against
the USSR." She was authorized to say that all the elements
responsible for the conduct of Israeli policy were agreed that
Israel must preserve neutrality. The entire Negev being Israeli as
far south as Aqaba, Israel was in a position to commit itself to
maintaining its independence and to refusing to allow military
bases, either British or other, to be established on its territory.
Vyshinskii, for his part, expressed his satisfaction at hearing so
unequivocal a statement which "is in absolute accord with our
intentions and wishes." 9
The Soviet-Israeli dialogue was thus in the first period largely
devoted to the common interests of the two parties. In the words
of Shertok shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel:
"We have had our first historic, face-to-face encounter with the
USSR . . . . I can say from my own experience that I have not felt a
need for any adaptation or change of style in thought or
expression, or for any additional flavorings—either to elucidate
matters that it was my duty to explain to Soviet officials or to
attain a feeling of mutual understanding or a more or less com-
mon language." 1 0
The conduct of the dialogue was entrusted very largely to the
diplomatic representatives of the two governments. As early as 25
May Molotov informed Shertok—in reply to a request on the part
of the Israeli foreign minister—that "the Soviet Government
agrees to the establishment of a Mission of the State of Israel in

Moscow headed by a Minister or Charge d'Affaires to undertake
consular functions also, and is prepared in its turn to establish a
Soviet Mission in Tel Aviv." 1 1
THE SOVIET DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN ISRAEL
Before the end of June the two governments published the

names of their respective envoys to each other's capitals, 12 and on
9 August the Soviet diplomatic mission reached Israel to open the
first foreign legation in the new state. 13 The mission comprised a
staff of 17 (apart from accompanying families). It was headed by
Pavel Ershov, who had previously served at the Soviet Embassy in
Ankara, and included Counselor Mikhail Mukhin, who quickly
became known as the mission's strong man and central
personality; First Secretary Vladimir Roshkov; two second
secretaries, Nikolai Sergeev and Mitrofan Fedorin; and cultural,
trade and military attachés, Mikhail Popov, Aleksandr Semeshkin
and Vasilii Chekin respectively. 14 At the very end of the year
the USSR diplomatic personnel was augmented by a TASS rep-
resentative, who in common with TASS representatives else-
where, enjoyed full diplomatic immunity (see below).
Radio Moscow was quoted as noting the warm reception given
the Soviet mission. On 11 August Ershov was received by Shertok
and Director-General of the Foreign Ministry Walter Eytan, and on
17 August he presented his credentials to Prime Minister Ben
Gurion (President Weizmann was abroad). The latter occasion
provided the opportunity for "light conversation." 1 5
In the first months the staff of the Soviet Legation made every
effort to establish numerous contacts with Israeli institutions and
public figures. Ershov paid visits to the members of the
Provisional Government; the press reported the Soviet diplomat's
visit to Minister of Labor and Construction Mordekhai Bentov on
8 September, to Minister of Justice Pinhas Rosenblueth (Rosen) on
13 September, and to Minister of Transport David Remez three
days later. Ershov also met with the mayor of Tel Aviv, Yisrael
Rokah. 16
Both sides organized parties and other opportunities for further
contacts. On 22 October President Weizmann held a luncheon in
honor of the Soviet envoy to which he invited the Polish Consul,
Raphael Loc, as well as Bentov, Rosenblueth and Remez, TASS
reporting the Israeli government's holding of a reception in honor
of the Soviet Minister. On 31 October the Israeli foreign minister
Direct Contacts 175
held an ''acquaintanceship party" for Ershov and his staff with

representatives of Israeli political and cultural institutions and
public figures.17 The Soviet Legation, for its part, invited to its
reception on 7 November to celebrate the anniversary of the
October Revolution, members of the Provisional Government and
Constituent Assembly as well as a wide range of the Israeli public,
in all some 300-400 guests. On 20 December the Minister arranged
a dinner in honor of President Weizmann and on 27 December in
honor of Ben Gurion. 18
This early period was also characterized by frequent contacts,
within the framework of the Legation's official activities, between
the Soviet diplomats and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. One of the
Soviet side's chief objectives in these meetings was to obtain
first-hand and up-to-date information on the progress of the
Palestine War. 19
The efforts of the Soviet Legation to extend its ties in Israeli
society were not restricted to the minister's official activities.
Despite several factors which could have hindered these
efforts—Soviet isolationism which reached its apex in the latter
half of 1948 and the concomitant practice of Soviet diplomatic
personnel the world over to lead a segregated existence; the
objective restrictions imposed on the USSR in its relations with
other states in the late 1940s by its very limited trade potential
and economic maneuverability (see pp. 207-9); and, in the case
of relations with Israel, the added constraint on any step or
contact that might complicate the very delicate issue of Soviet
Jewry and its attitude toward Israel—the members of the Legation
staff in Tel Aviv sought contacts with different sectors in Israeli
society as well as with individuals, each diplomat according to
his particular functions.
On Ershov's arrival the Israeli press noted his expert knowledge
of the composition of Israel's political parties and of the relative
strength of the country's various political forces. 20 It was,
however, chiefly Mukhin and Roshkov who were responsible for
political relations. They conducted regular meetings with
representatives of all the bodies and groupings in the country
which were interested in and prepared for such contacts; this may
not have included the Israeli Communist Party, as relations with
local Communists did not normally or necessarily pertain to the
official and public activity of a Soviet diplomatic mission which
Moscow clearly wished to remain aloof from local domestic
entanglements.
The connection with the Israeli Communist Party was indeed
problematic. Although the Soviet Legation often seemed to ignore

the party almost conspicuously and did not nurture links with it
on the same pattern or level as with other leftist elements,
Communist sources have indicated that such links in fact
existed on the level of interchanges of information. In addition to
their purely informative purpose, these links were intended to
serve as a guide for and influence on the local party, especially
regarding the Soviet position on current international issues, such
as the rift with Yugoslavia, disarmament, etc.; the Soviet
diplomats steered clear of Soviet domestic developments.
The main channel for communicating instructions, however,
remained contacts maintained outside Israel, particularly in
Eastern Europe, with Israeli Communist functionaries either by
Soviet party representatives or by appointed intermediaries in
Western parties, notably the French Communist Party. Israeli
Communists have noted that Soviet diplomats in Israel refrained
from giving their contacts with them the form of party ties. The
Israeli Communist Party's leading institutions did not even know
the identity of the members of the Legation's own party aktiv,
although they knew that the Legation, like every Soviet
government institution, had a party cell; the role of the aktiv was
in fact restricted to the internal problems of the Soviet mission
and did not include any authorization to represent the Soviet
Communist Party vis-à-vis other bodies. Similarly, no Soviet
diplomat was ever present at meetings of the Israeli party's
Central Committee. 21
In particular, Mukhin met regularly and openly with the two
political secretaries of Mapam (Yaacov Riftin and L. Levite
and —after the latter's resignation in October 1949 —Yisrael
Galili}. 22 The establishment of the Amalgamated Workers'
Party —Mapam —in January 1948 (see chapter 3, n. 34) cannot but
have been of interest to the USSR in view of the party's orientation
which had implications for both foreign policy, particularly
regarding the struggle against Anglo-American imperialism, and
domestic politics. In the latter the political, social and economic
processes advocated by Mapam had an obvious common
denominator, for example, with what was in fact occurring in the
East European People's Democracies. Moreover, Mapam com-
prised a possible viable alternative to Mapai as —unlike the
various Communist groupings —it was a large and undisputably
Zionist organization with deep roots in all spheres of the Yishuv's
existence. Mapam had numerous thriving kibbutzim and other
settlements and its members filled key posts in the army as well as
Direct Contacts 177
in the country's economic life and social and political

mechanisms.
The relationship established between the Soviet mission in
Israel and Mapam was a natural development in 1948-49, given,
on the one hand, the similarity of terminology and manner of
thinking and Mapam's aim of imposing a pro-Soviet orientation
on Israel's foreign policy; and, on the other, Soviet aid to the State
of Israel and support for its struggle in the international arena.
This did not mean that the USSR made its support for Israel
conditional on its foreign policy orientation. But since the USSR
was assisting Israel for its own political and strategic
considerations, including a direct interest in developments in the
Palestinian theater, which was a major focus of world interest at
this period, it was logical that the Soviet diplomats' contacts in
the country, the prime purpose of which was to enable them to
comprehend its trends and developments, should be with the
circles close to them in the fields outlined above. 23
Almost immediately after the arrival of the Soviet mission the
leaders of Mapam sought to establish contact with its members
with the aid of the Polish consul in Tel Aviv, Loc. The two
political secretaries had their first meeting with Ershov on 23
September, in the presence also of Aleksandr Semeshkin. Their
principal conversations, however, which became weekly or at
most fortnightly occurrences, were with Counselor Mukhin,
although Ershov occasionally put in an appearance. The two
Mapam secretaries, for their part, who were charged by the party
with the responsibility for contacts with the Soviet Legation,
sometimes brought to these meetings Israeli public figures whom
the Soviet diplomats expressed a desire to meet (on one occasion
Yitzhak Sadeh, on another Yisrael Galili, etc.).
These talks were mainly informative. The Mapam secretaries
would give their evaluation of political developments in Israel,
the disposition of forces in Israel's public life, and the State's
economic problems in which the Soviet side manifested
considerable interest. From time to time subjects that the Soviet
diplomats considered intervention in their affairs would come up.
While the Mapam secretaries did not raise the issue of Soviet
Jewry, which they knew that the Soviet representatives would not
agree even to discuss—the subject was also evaded by Israeli
leaders in their meetings with Soviet officials in this period—they
did initiate discussion on Romanian Jewry and immigration from
Romania (cf. preceding chapter). The Mapam secretaries also
protested at anti-Israel and anti-Zionist publications or articles
that were beginning to appear toward the end of 1948, notably

Izrail' Genin's The Palestine Problem to which Levite wrote a
reply. 24
One of the Mapam secretaries preserved his notes from the first
meeting with Ershov (they were taken originally for the purpose
of reporting to the party's Political Committee). The topics
discussed can be taken to indicate the contents of other such
conversations and the subjects that interested the Soviet
diplomats. The two Mapam officials began by describing the
composition and characteristics of their party. Ershov thereupon
asked a wide range of questions concerning the kibbutzim and
other forms of settlement, the strength of Mapam in and outside
Israel, and the party's stand on foreign and domestic policy
issues, specifically the status of Jerusalem, the Arab refugees, and
immigration. The Soviet minister claimed that he was not quite
clear about Mapam's standing: on the one hand, he noted, it was
represented in the Provisional Government; on the other, it was
subjected to a variety of restrictions. Ershov, for example, knew
that there were disputes over the distribution of posts in the
foreign service and that no Mapam members had been included in
the Israeli mission to Moscow. The minister also wanted to know
more about the party's role as a revolutionary socialist party: its
program, its plans, its election platform for Israel's approaching
first general elections, and its views on democracy's prospects in
the State of Israel. Ershov raised the issue of the establishment of
"a popular front for democracy," i.e. Mapam's attitude to the
Israeli Communists. The Soviet Union was clearly interested in
rallying its sympathizers and associates, especially since
Mapam's inclusion in the post-election government was generally
expected. (The Soviet media duly welcomed the formation in
October 1948 of the Israel Communist Party —Maki—as also the
decision of Maki and "the Hebrew Communists" to establish a
joint election program. 25 ). Reacting to a suggestion that the two
sides persist in their contacts, Ershov asked how Mapam thought
this should be done; he for his part expressed a desire to become
acquainted with the party newspaper. 2 6
Throughout the first period of these contacts the basic attitude
of the USSR to the State of Israel was one not only of sympathy but
of active support, inter alia on the theoretical plane —i.e. the
justification in principle of the ingathering of the exiles, the
immigration to Israel of the Jewish Diaspora as the raison d'être of
Israel's existence (see preceding chapter). Nonetheless, the
fundamental transformation in Soviet policy on the establishment
Direct Contacts 179
of a Jewish state in Palestine did not carry with it any change in

the traditional attitude to Socialist Zionism. The Soviet diplomats
in Israel manifested definite reservations about Mapam's views on
the Jewish question and its self-appointed task as the bearer of
socialism and revolution in the Jewish world, based on its
premise that the Jewish people's path to socialism must lead
through territorial concentration. These reservations received
their most extreme expression in the complete ban imposed on
discussion of the Soviet Jewish question. In other words, the
ground existed for a positive link between the two parties, in that
both saw the Palestine War as an anti-imperialist war of
independence while the Soviet Union, with its proclivity for
categorization, compared Mapam with Pietro Nenni's much-
favored Italian Socialist Party. Yet an unbridgeable gap separated
the two as a result of the different evaluation of Mapam's stand on
all that concerned the Jewish Diaspora.
As for Mapai, Israel's ruling party, Moscow viewed it as a right
socialist party, a category that was anathema to Soviet thinking at
this time. Nonetheless, Soviet representatives in Israel maintained
a punctilious impartiality on the diplomatic level in their
relations with government circles and clove scrupulously to the
political line toward Israel which the specific historical situation
of 1948 dictated.
The Soviet diplomats in Israel also conducted themselves with
respect and appreciation toward a wide range of Israeli public
figures —irrespective of their party affiliation—and indeed
attained a considerable measure of sophistication in distin-
guishing between the great variety of views, opinions and
positions that characterized different Israeli groupings and
individuals. The Soviet diplomats were, for example, openly
sympathetic toward moderate right-wing non-party figures (such
as Chaim Weizmann or Interior Minister Yitzhak Grinbaum) and
to individuals connected with the popular public bodies that
sought in one way or another to promote an Israeli-Soviet
rapprochement (such as the League for Friendly Relations with
the USSR and, from early 1949, the Israeli Peace Movement —cf.
pp. 423-25). The Soviet Legation made a conscious effort to
maintain direct and constant contact with this last category
despite its awareness that the defined purpose of most of its
elements was to acquire Soviet support for the national liberation
struggle of the Jewish people of Palestine and that the hegemony
over these bodies appertained to independent forces in Israeli
society.
Indeed the Soviet Legation revealed considerable interest in the

League for Friendly Relations with the USSR. Similar leagues in
other countries also served as front organizations and performed a
major role in extending the ties of the Soviet diplomatic missions
with the local public.
The League's activities made the Soviet mission aware of the
sympathy toward the USSR prevalent at the time in Israel. The
Soviet diplomats' first contact with the League was a
several-thousand-strong mass meeting it held in their honor in
Tel Aviv a few days after their arrival. 27 At a League Center
meeting at the end of August 1948 Shlomo Kaplansky said: "I
noticed that the Soviet Legation is very interested in the League's
activity. [Its members] know there is considerable goodwill
among the public. They are ready to help in intensifying ties."
Kaplansky had discussed the matter with Ershov and he told the
Center that now, after the Legation's establishment, it had to work
out an action program. In the course of the ensuing discussion,
League executive member Yitzhak Yitzhaki voiced the opinion
that the starting point for the League's activities must be the
Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv and the Israeli Legation in Moscow. 28
In particular, the League was in direct contact with one of the
Legation's second secretaries, Fedorin, who represented VOKS
(the All-Soviet Association for Cultural Relations) and was
charged with maintaining relations with the League. A League
publication noted that the arrival of a Soviet diplomatic mission
removed one of the main obstacles in its activities which had
suffered previously from lack of any convenient channel for
regular contact. The coming of the Legation opened "new
horizons and broad opportunities for activating the League." 2 9
The cooperation between the League and the Soviet Legation
included the supply by the latter of written material, the
organization of public meetings and cultural events, film
showings, etc., and eventually activities in different sectors of the
public, such as the trade unions. League functionaries who
maintained relations with the Legation included the Tel Aviv
branch secretary, Misha Edelberg, who held regular talks with
Fedorin and met from time to time also with Roshkov and
even with Minister Ershov. Another League activist, Shlomo
Zirulnikov, also met regularly with Mukhin and Roshkov. Their
talks, which according to Zirulnikov were held in an atmosphere
of reciprocal confidence, covered a wide variety of topics
connected with the situation in Israel. The two diplomats often
asked for Zirulnikov's views on specific issues that interested
Direct Contacts 181
them, such as the affairs, policy and activities of Maki (to which
Zirulnikov was close without at any time being an official
member). Like Mapam Secretary Levite, Zirulnikov was much
impressed by the Soviet diplomats' pertinent and realistic
evaluation of trends in Israeli society and its leadership,
particularly among the left wing of the workers' movement. 3 0
A central feature of the Soviet Legation's contacts and activity
in Israeli public life and its acquisition of information was its
interest in the Israeli press and information services (cf. Ershov's
first conversation with the two Mapam secretaries, above). A
customarily important aspect of the activity of diplomatic
missions in general and Soviet ones in particular, the publicity
and information activities of the Soviet Legation in Israel
extended far beyond organizing cultural events. This sphere of
action too was within the jurisdiction of Second Secretary
Fedorin who established contacts with the Government Press,
Radio and Cinema Agency (attached to the Ministry of the
Interior) as well as with the Government Press Office. The arrival
in Israel of TASS representative Egorov in December 1948
increased the possibilities open to the Legation in this field. Once
more the Legation operated through, and with the active
assistance of, the bodies that sought to promote Soviet-Israeli
relations, such as the League for Friendly Relations and the Peace
Movement, and the left-wing parties. Although evidence of these
operations is necessarily very largely circumstantial, the data
available—the express interest of the Soviet minister himself in
the contacts with the press; the existence of considerable and
influential groupings which wanted to achieve an Israeli
pro-Soviet orientation; and the known activities of Soviet
missions and agents in other countries (e.g., the planting of
British Foreign Office Press Department official Guy Burgess)
—support the hypothesis that the Soviet Legation acquired
considerable influence in the Israeli communications media. One
of the figures connected with the Maki newspaper Kol Ha-Am has
confirmed, for example, that it received requests from the Soviet
Legation to emphasize certain developments that the Legation
considered important, particularly in the international arena,
such as the convening of the Peace Congress, the establishment
and build-up of the Peace Movement, etc. (see chapter 9). 31
This influence served a dual purpose: in the first place, it
guaranteed the infiltration of material that the Soviet Union
wanted the Israeli public to receive; second, it aided the USSR's
own propaganda and information (agitprop) services which
endeavored always to give foreign sources for their foreign news,

even if these based their information on items insinuated by
Soviet officials or agents. Whether the Israeli press in fact
published news or articles that were Soviet-initiated or -inspired
or wiiether the USSR merely sought material written entirely by
Israeli journalists, it contained much of value to Moscow in the
latter's endeavors both to probe into the essence of the new State
and to describe for its own propaganda purposes the Israeli
regime and its domestic and foreign policies. The considerable
quantity of material about Israel published in the Soviet media on
the basis of Israeli publications in 1948 and later demonstrated at
the very least the efficiency of the Soviet Legation's surveys of the
Israeli press and the importance the Soviet authorities attributed
to this activity. 32
Inter alia, the Soviet Legation evolved a special interest in
Israel's minorities, as was the wont of other Soviet diplomatic
missions in the region (see p. 34). Yet despite previous Soviet
contacts with Palestinian Arabs, the Soviet diplomats who arrived
in Israel in 1948 at first manifested no special interest in Israel's
Arab inhabitants. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the
Legation soon established and maintained contacts with
individual Israeli Arabs and perhaps even groupings, especially
with Communists or Communist sympathizers, some of whom
appeared at the various official functions held by the Legation.
Eventually too Soviet diplomats began to visit Nazareth and other
Arab areas and to emphasize their participation in activities
organized by Arab fellow-travelers. (It is not unlikely that the
Soviet diplomats' eventual interest in and sympathy with Israel's
Arab population attracted considerable numbers among them to
the Israel Communist Party. 33 ) The Soviet diplomats also found an
opening among followers of the Orthodox Church in Israel, over
the property of which the USSR sought and soon obtained
hegemony. 3 4
The activities of the Soviet Legation in Israel in the first year or
so of its existence therefore seem to reveal the limitations that
inhibited Soviet diplomats at the time in all countries outside the
Soviet bloc. Severely restricted as far as any diplomatic initiatives
were concerned by the very nature, composition and status of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry and its missions abroad, they were
further constrained, on the one hand, by Soviet isolationism,
then at its peak, and, on the other, by the extremely limited
economic potential and resources of the Soviet Union for use in
its foreign relations. Partly as a result of the combination of all
Direct Contacts 183
these factors and partly as a result of the natural proclivities of

the Soviet authorities, the Legation's main attention and efforts
were directed toward acquiring information and maintaining
unofficial political relationships, notably with individuals and
groups who seemed likely to influence the Israeli domestic
arena. Thus, the Soviet diplomats in Tel Aviv became familiar
with the country's political life, especially the complexities of
the domestic array of forces and personal and factional
divergences, contradictions and divisions.
THE ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN MOSCOW
At first glance there seemed to be a certain similarity between the

position of the two legations, the Soviet in Tel Aviv and the Israeli
in Moscow, in that each was looked to by a section of the local
population as a potential redeemer. Yet not only were the hopes of
the Israeli left regarding the USSR and those of Soviet Jewry
regarding Israel engendered by basically different circumstances,
but the degree of maneuverability enjoyed by the two diplomatic
missions was in no way comparable. The potential base for the
Israeli Legation's activity among Soviet Jewry was far broader than
the Israeli government had contemplated, but the Soviet
authorities took severe measures against those Jews who focused
their national ambitions on Israel and its diplomatic mission in the
Soviet capital.
Golda Meyerson arrived in Moscow on 2 September 1948
accompanied by a staff that included a counselor, Mordecai Namir;
a first secretary and consul, Aryeh Levavi; a second secretary,
Aryeh Lapid; a military attache', Brigadier Yohanan Ratner; a trade
attaché, Moshe Bejerano; and a few other members not of
diplomatic rank. 35 The event was duly recorded by the Soviet
press, 36 and the minister and her companions were warmly
welcomed by Soviet officialdom. On 7 September Mrs. Meyer-
son was received by Foreign Minister Molotov 37 and on 10 Sep-
tember she presented her credentials to the Acting Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, LA. Vlasov.
In addition to members of the Israeli Legation, a number of
Soviet officials were also present on the occasion: Deputy For-
eign Minister Valerian Zorin; Secretary of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet Aleksandr Gorkin; Head of the Foreign Minis-
try Middle and Near East Department Ivan Bakulin; and Head of
the Ministry's Department of Protocol Fedor Molochkov. 38
The special cordiality that characterized the Soviet authorities'
attitude to the Israeli mission was the subject of conversation in

the small foreign colony in the Soviet capital. The Bulgarian
minister, Naugen Nikolov, U.S. Ambassador Smith and U.P.L
correspondent Henry Shapiro all noted that the Israeli minister
and her staff were the center of attention at the October Revolu-
tion anniversary celebrations in 1948. On other occasions too
the Israeli Legation's role of favorite was likewise demonstrated,
both at receptions or parties held by other diplomatic missions
and at its own functions. Ratner merited special attention at the
Red Army Day reception held on 23 February 1949 by Chief of
General Staff and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces Sergei
Shtemenko. The Soviet officials who attended Mrs. Meyerson's
farewell party on 13 April 1949 were of higher rank and more
numerous than was customary in similar instances, including
Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Guseev and Soviet military
figures. At the 1949 Independent Day reception on 5 May the
Soviet guests included Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin; Moloch-
kov; head of the Foreign Relations Department at the Ministry
of Armed Forces, General Ilya Seraev; deputy head of the For-
eign Ministry Middle and Near East Department, Aleksei
Shchiborin; and the chairman of VOKS, Kiseleva. 39
Despite this display of sympathy, the Israeli Legation suffered
from the beginning from all the hardships that were the lot of every
foreign diplomatic mission in the Soviet capital and for which the
members of the Legation were extraordinarily unprepared.
Diplomats accredited to Moscow in Stalin's later years were unable
to conduct regular diplomatic activity; their approaches to and
contacts with the relevant representatives of the Soviet
government were complex and rare and the cause of endless
embarrassment and annoyance. 4 0 In addition, foreign diplomats,
in common with other foreigners, were kept under permanent
surveillance as potential spies; all foreign missions were obliged to
employ solely Soviet house-staff, doorkeepers and chauffeurs, who
regularly transmitted information on all comings and goings of the
diplomats and their families and anyone else who maintained
contact with them. The walls and telephones of embassy offices
and dwellings were bugged, and sporadic scandals involving
foreign diplomats were arranged to ensure the requisite tension
and vigilance. A foreign diplomat who emerged into the streets of
Moscow was always followed, whether openly or clandestinely,
and any trip outside the capital, even to areas officially open to
non-Soviet citizens, required a special permit and entailed end-
less trouble. 41
Direct Contacts 185
Indeed, in certain ways the obstacles placed in the way of the

Israeli Legation in its everyday activity were more serious than
those encountered by its counterparts from other countries.
Unlike other missions from outside the bloc which were
suspected of spying and sabotage activities despite the distance
the local population was careful to preserve and their virtual
lack of contact with Soviet citizens, the Israeli mission had a
very large circle of potential contacts within the Soviet public.
The Soviet government made every effort to stress to both the
Israeli diplomats and to its own Jewish subjects that it
acknowledged no link whatever between them; yet, it was unable
to eliminate Soviet Jewry's emotional link with Israel even when it
succeeded in severing practically all actual contacts with Israel's
representatives in the USSR.
Despite the official attitude of friendship to them, it was
made clear to the Israeli diplomats that they must not delude
themselves into thinking that their activity would be less
constrained than that of other foreign representatives. On the
contrary, in October 1948 Levavi, who was responsible for the
Legation's cultural and information activities, suggested to
Vasilii Zonov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press
Department, that the Legation follow in the footsteps of a few
other foreign missions and put out a bulletin to survey Israel's
military, economic and cultural situation, including statistical
information, and emphasizing Israel's relations with the USSR.
Zonov's reaction was not negative and the Legation prepared
four hand-outs of a purely informative character of which one
only was actually printed (it was stenciled at the U.S. Embassy).
Its 150 copies were sent to foreign embassies in Moscow (about
one third), to a number of institutions (newspapers, libraries,
etc.), and a very few to some of the larger Jewish communities
and one or two Jewish kolkhozes. But before a single bulletin
could be properly prepared and printed (in Israel), Zorin
invited Mrs. Meyerson on 8 February 1949 and complained that
the Legation was publishing a bulletin which it was sending to
Jewish organizations, communities and kolkhozes as well as
private individuals and in so doing was exceeding its
jurisdiction. It was discovered later that a number of addressees
of the Israeli Legation bulletin had been punished for receiving
it. The Soviet deputy foreign minister stipulated that the
bulletin might be sent only to foreign diplomatic missions and
the Soviet Foreign Ministry. On the same occasion Zorin
protested at other forms of contact the Israeli Legation was
maintaining with Soviet Jews. 42

The Soviet leadership had apparently not considered that its
own Jewish citizens might be significantly attracted by the State of
Israel, although there had reportedly been signs of Zionist
inclinations among individual Soviet Jews immediately after the
war. 43 The statements stressing the need for a Jewish state to solve
the problem of the Jews in the capitalist world whose governments
had not been able to afford them physical protection and denying
the interest of Soviet Jews in developments in Palestine (see p. 70)
were apparently not intended solely as a warning to Soviet Jewry
but actually reflected Soviet official thinking.
Soviet Jews, however, do not seem to have been impressed by the
distinction so carefully drawn between them and their brethren in
the West. On the contrary, Soviet descriptions of developments in
Palestine actually inspired Soviet Jews to manifest their
identification with Palestinian Jewry's war of independence,
especially as these descriptions revealed Soviet support for that
struggle.
Even Ilya Ehrenburg, who was trained in the way of thinking
of the Soviet authorities and was surely sensitive to messages
transmitted between the lines, allowed himself in the winter of
1947-48 to express his positive attitude to the Yishuv's war of
independence and to the Jewish State that was about to be born.
Asked on a visit to Poland about Soviet Jewry's view of the
speeches of Gromyko and Tsarapkin on Palestine, Ehrenburg
replied that Soviet Jewry, which was keenly interested in the
life of Jews outside the USSR, especially in the wake of the war,
warmly welcomed the stand adopted by the Soviet U.N.
delegation on the Palestine question. It was natural, he went on,
that Soviet Jewry followed with interest the war of the Yishuv.
Even though he personally did not believe that Palestine could
absorb all the Jews of Europe and therefore favored the
reconstruction of European Jewish life, the shift to a sovereign
and independent existence in Palestine would be of great value
to the Jewish people. 4 4 Writing about Poland in the Soviet New
Times, Ehrenburg actually compared the new Poland with the
Palestinian Jewish Yishuv, in both of which a major
reconstruction effort was being undertaken. 4 5
It is hardly likely that other Jews, whose Jewish identity
and awareness were certainly no less developed than
Ehrenburg's —even if their opportunities for expressing them were
more limited—lagged behind him. In the year from the fall of 1947
until the fall of 1948 these took at face value the official Soviet
Direct Contacts 187
version that Palestine's Jews were waging a national struggle of

independence, a movement that was no different from similar
manifestations which the USSR cultivated as part of the universal
struggle against colonialism. Just as the Soviet authorities
encouraged their citizens to express their sympathy for the
national liberation movements in Indonesia, Greece, and so on,
there seemed to be no reason this should not apply to the Yishuv.
For 30 years, the Yiddish writer Itzik Fefer said, the USSR had been
struggling consistently for the independence of such small states
as Abyssinia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Indonesia, Korea and now Pa-
lestine. 46
Indeed, the Yiddish organ of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee,
Aynikeit, welcomed Soviet support first of the Yishuv and later of
the Jewish State. It also gave abundant information on
developments in Palestine, especially on the course of the fighting,
reiterating constantly that a Jewish state was being established
there. In an article entitled ' T h e Soviet Union—the Real Defender
of the Jewish People," the Yiddish writer David Bergelson wrote
that the Soviet U.N. delegation had exposed "the fact" that the
Jewish people and Palestine had been linked over a long period. 47
Shortly after the adoption of the partition resolution, the publicist
L. Goldberg wrote an article, also in Aynikeit, under the caption
' T h e Historic Decision Concerning Palestine" in which he stressed
that the resolution had fostered satisfaction in the entire
democratic world and "first and foremost throughout the masses of
the Jewish people." 4 8
In the fall of 1948, in one of his last articles, Fefer stressed that the
State of Israel was the concern of the entire Jewish people. It had
been established, he said, against the will of the British and
American imperialists and with the unreserved support of the
democratic countries, headed by the Soviet Union. Had the fascists
not been routed on the Volga they would have reached Palestine;
the warriors of Stalingrad and the workers of Leningrad had
contributed more to the State of Israel than had Marshall's Zionists
in the United States. 49
The establishment of the Jewish State was actually marked by the
dispatch of at least two telegrams of congratulation from Soviet
Jewish organizations to Israel's first president, the one from the
Presidium of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the other from
Moscow's Jewish community. 5 0
If these were the opinions voiced openly by Jewish public figures
and the media placed at their disposal, i.e. by people and organs
whose views could be counted upon as reflecting government
policy, it was logical for other Jews to presume that they too could
express their own positive attitude. A large number of Jews saw in
the open Soviet support for the establishment of the Jewish State
and, from 15 May, for Israel, license to express their own emotional
link and even sense of identification with the Yishuv's national
liberation movement. It was not even unduly far-fetched for Jews,
Soviet citizens, to conclude from their government's stand that this
included substantial tangible assistance to Israel in its struggle
against imperialism. From here it was but a short step to offering
their own services within the framework of this assistance. While
there are no data to indicate how many took this step, it seems
reasonable to estimate that the number of young Jews who actually
approached the authorities with such requests reached hundreds,
if not thousands. 5 1
This feeling was also manifested at public lectures on the Arab
East as a whole and the Palestine issue as such. While most public
lectures in the Soviet Union were very sparsely attended, these
were habitually crowded (this had been the case since 1946). At
one such lecture in the summer of 1948 a member of the audience
asked if he could emigrate to Palestine. The reply, as recorded by
the British journalist Alexander Werth, was pointed: "A Soviet
citizen should be ashamed to ask such a question." At another
lecture in this same period, the lecturer was asked: ''If a Soviet
citizen wants to go to Israel, what has he to do?" He was told that
since the USSR was approaching Communism, it was not likely
that anyone would wish to leave the Soviet motherland. If,
however, there were such people, they should approach the
Foreign Ministry. 52
In 1948 the chairman of the Executive of the New Zionist
Organization, Meir Grossman, met in Paris with two Jewish
members of a Soviet trade delegation. One of them, Grossman
recorded, not only asked endless questions concerning Palestine
but also told him of the state of mind of Soviet Jewry, its growing
interest in Palestine and its immense satisfaction that the USSR
was helping Israel. For years it had been forbidden to mention
Zionism and Palestine, and Jews had forgotten what these meant to
them, and suddenly the curtain had risen. In the spring of 1947,
this Jewish member of the Soviet delegation went on, a change
became apparent in the Soviet media's treatment of the Palestine
question. Not only did items on Jews and Palestine multiply, but
their tone became friendly. "All of a sudden we were told that the
Jews were fighting, partners in the struggle against the English and
the Arabs. We read and listened to this strange transformation and
Direct Contacts 189
did not cease to wonder. The older generation became intoxicated;

the younger generation was astonished: where did this Jewish
national movement and underground spring from? A war of
liberation is not reaction . . . [and] when it became clear that the
USSR was taking a positive stand on the establishment of a Jewish
state and afforded it recognition, people ceased hiding their
feelings. Many Soviet writers who for years had not touched upon
any Jewish topic suddenly discovered inside themselves strong
sentiments of sympathy and justified both Soviet policy and the
Jews' national aspirations. The Jews are a people like any other
people with the right to establish their own state and precisely in
the Holy Land.
"It is difficult," Grossman went on quoting his Soviet Jewish
acquaintance, "to describe the internal enthusiasm of Soviet Jews,
many of whom severed all links with Judaism in all its forms a long
time ago . . . . The most characteristic is the wonderful reaction of
the assimilated youth that suddenly discovered that it is part of a
universal people and that besides the Soviet mother country it has a
mother country of its own." Zionism would probably never be
permitted in the one-party Soviet state; nor would the masses be
able to emigrate. Yet there would be trade relations, people would
travel back and forth. "The main thing is that Soviet Jewry will no
longer be isolated, orphaned and cut off from the Jewish people.
We have been miserable all the time because of the feeling that we
are a lost tribe. This feeling has now passed. We feel part of the
Jewish community."
The second Jewish member of the Soviet trade delegation told
Grossman how Jews in the Soviet Union listened to Hebrew
broadcasts from Tel Aviv. Those who still knew Hebrew would sit
for hours by their transmitters and drink in thirstily the Voice of
Israel's news programs, songs and even lectures. "The Jews," he
said, "follow every d e v e l o p m e n t . . . they sing Israeli songs and the
news about the Israeli government, army and Constitutent
Assembly is passed on from mouth to mouth." The Soviet Jewish
official asked Grossman, "Do you understand? This is our war." 5 3
The establishment of the Jewish State and the fact that this event
was officially supported by the Soviet government not only buoyed
up Soviet Jewry but also evoked a desire to emigrate to Israel. Aryeh
Levavi, the Israeli Legation's first secretary, wrote in November
1948: "It is absolutely obvious that there is a tremendous urge
among Soviet Jewry to immigrate to Israel. This longing exists in
all strata of society and in all age groups. There are reports of hosts
of youths who served in the army or are studying in universities
and who are now awaiting the opportunity to go to Israel and take
part in Israel's war of independence. People of middle age brood on
their Zionist memories and pray they will be able to see with their
own eyes the realization of the dream of generations. This desire is
common both to the Jews of the Western areas that have recently
been added to the USSR, and to those who have always lived in the
Soviet Union. It seems that the desire burns also in the hearts of not
a few holders of important posts and offices, even in the ranks of the
party.
" Although we knew the fact itself all the time," Levavi went on,
"we were surprised at the intensity of the phenomenon." The
Israeli diplomat explained: "the establishment of our State and our
war of independence made a tremendous impression upon Soviet
Jewry. The attitude of the average Jew here is not one of sympathy,
but of pride, identification, and intense pain at the barriers. Here
too, one hears Jews saying the stand of the Yishuv and of the State
of Israel has straightened their backs. The non-Jews will not be able
to say any more that the Jews are scared of fighting." Levavi, too,
was of the opinion that the USSR's consistent support of Israel had
"greatly augmented the impact of events in Palestine on Soviet
Jewry." 54
On the establishment of the State of Israel thanksgiving services
were held at a number of synagogues throughout the Soviet Union,
while many Jews celebrated the occasion in their homes. In
Moscow some 2,000 Jews including many young people and
intellectuals gathered spontaneously in the main synagogue.
Congratulating each other with traditional Jewish greetings they
wondered aloud whether they too would be allowed to go to Israel.
A few weeks later the synagogue officials organized a special
service to mark the event. This time a crowd of some 20,000 people
assembled, so that thousands remained in the streets outside the
building. The synagogue was decorated with slogans ("Long live
the State of Israeli" and "The People of Israel Lives!") which
the crowd took up and kept on chanting. The rabbi, Shlomo
Shleifer, made a short speech in which he stressed that the
State of Israel had been established with Soviet help. The direc-
tor of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults, the gov-
ernment office responsible for religious organizations and
activities outside the Russian Orthodox Church, also spoke. 55
On 11 September 1948 the second Saturday after their arrival in
Moscow, the members of the Israeli Legation visited the
synagogue. Namir had met with Rabbi Shleifer and other officials
of the community the day previously to prepare the visit, and the
Direct Contacts 191
diplomats were welcomed in front of the building by the

community's secretary, Issachar Davidov, and deputy head, Eliahu
Krupitskii. Mrs. Meyerson and the other women were taken to two
special boxes in the women's gallery while the men were seated on
the dais in the main section of the synagogue. The Israelis noted
two great gold-lettered plaques, relics of the special service held
several months before, hanging in the most conspicuous part of the
building, one with the Hebrew slogan ' T h e People of Israel
Lives!," the other announcing in Russian that "on 14 May 1948 the
State of Israel was proclaimed." The congregation filled the
synagogue, most of them elderly people, although some were of the
25-35 age group, including a few soldiers. The service over, Mrs.
Meyerson descended to the men's section to make the
acquaintance of Rabbi Shleifer (in accordance with his request) and
was met with stormy applause and shouts in Hebrew of "hurrah"
and "shalom".
The scene was the occasion for great excitement, women crying,
and hugging and kissing Israel's first minister to the USSR. Namir's
daughter wrote in her diary how at noon, during their lunch break,
a stream of Jewish youths poured into the synagogue, their eyes
aflame and their faces showing that they knew they were taking a
grave risk. "But at that moment everything that had been repressed
during all the years of their exile here burst forth and they seemed
to be saying 'let happen what may.' " The excited crowd did not
leave the Israeli diplomats alone in the streets outside either,
thronging around them in a fashion that aroused a great deal of
attention, which "embarrassed us and was of course not good
for them." The Israelis split up to put an end to the procession,
yet those who were near Mrs. Meyerson accompanied her back
to the Métropole Hotel where the Legation was accommo-
dated. 56
Jewish question, Palestine, and anti-Semitism, written by
Ehrenburg at the request of its editor and which was an
unmistakable warning to Soviet Jews that identification with Israel
could not be tolerated. The Soviet people, the writer maintained,
had great sympathy for the Jews who had endured the tragedy of
the Holocaust and had now "finally attained the right to exist in
their own land," and for the struggle of the young State of Israel
against the Anglo-Arab armies. Yet, the Jewish problem would be
solved not by "Utopians" or "diplomats" let alone by military
victories; its solution depended not on events in Palestine but on
the triumph in all countries of socialism over capitalism,
nationalism, fascism and racism. In the first place, it was only
anti-Semitism and persecution that had created what

"obscurantists" called "the mystic ties among the Jews of the
whole world"; in essence there was no greater connection among
Jews than among people with red hair or snub noses—were these
groups persecuted, they too would band together. Second, Israel
could not accommodate more than a small part even of the Jews of
the United States who were being threatened currently by the
growing racism there; what was called the Jewish problem must
therefore be solved in the Jews' countries of residence the world
over. Third, the State of Israel was ruled by bourgeois leaders who
were dominated by Anglo-American capital and had betrayed the
interests of the working and fighting people. Finally, the Jews of
the People's Democracies and even more so those of the USSR were
bound to their socialist native countries in which anti-Semitism
was prohibited. The Jews had contributed to the socialist
construction of these countries and had fought heroically side by
side with their other inhabitants against the common enemy. Thus,
while the sympathies of all Soviet people, not only of Soviet Jews,
lay with the struggle of Israel's toilers, Ehrenburg insisted, "every
Soviet citizen understands that it is not only a question of the
state's national character but also of its social order. The citizen of a
socialist society looks upon the inhabitants of any bourgeois
country—including the people of the State of Israel—as people
who are still on the way, who have not yet emerged from the dark
forest. A citizen of a socialist society can never envy the lot of
people who carry upon their shoulders the burden of capitalist
exploitation.
"The lot of the Jewish toilers in all countries," Ehrenburg
concluded, "is linked with the lot of progress and socialism. Soviet
Jews together with all Soviet people are building their socialist
mother country. They do not look to the Near East; they look only to
the future. I think, too, that the workers of the State of Israel who are
far removed from the mysteries of Zionism, who toil and strive for
equity, look now to the north—to the Soviet Union, the pioneer of
mankind on the path of a better future." 5 7
The Yiddish-language media took up Ehrenburg's line of
thinking, Itzik Fefer in Aynikeit and Grigorii Zhits on the air. The
latter disputed the claim of the "ringleaders of Zionism in Israel
and their henchmen in capitalist countries" that the State of Israel
was the Jewish homeland. This claim, according to Zhits, sounded
"clumsy and strange" to Soviet Jews who had their "own beloved
Socialist country" which represented "the most progressive social
order in the world . . . . We say proudly," Zhits went on, that the
Direct Contacts 193
Jewish workers together with the other peoples of the Soviet Union
"have exceeded their targets and have become master craftsmen,
skilled engineers and heads of undertakings" instead of adopting
such "traditional" Jewish trades as tailoring and shoemaking. 5 8
If Soviet Jews had previously permitted themselves delusions
concerning the Soviet government's intentions, there was no room
for any such misunderstanding after the publication of
Ehrenburg's article in the official daily paper of the Soviet
Communist Party. Nonetheless, thousands of Jews demonstrated
their identification with the State of Israel and affection for its
minister in Moscow during the High Holy Days, the New Year and
Day of Atonement, that fell shortly after the appearance of
Ehrenburg's article.
On both these festivals the Jews once more thronged Moscow's
main synagogue and the streets around it (an estimate that reached
the West at the time spoke of 20,000 people). 59 Among them were
people of all strata of society and all ages. Some of them had come
from distant cities; many had not been in a synagogue for years, and
many others had never been at all. Mordecai Namir recorded the
scene on the first day of the New Year: "When we reached the street
where the synagogue is we found . . . thousands of people pushing
their way toward the entrance. As soon as they noticed us they
burst into a tremendous ovation with shouts of 'shalom' and
'hurrah' (in Hebrew) that lasted a long time. With great difficulty a
narrow lane was formed in the midst of the crowd through
which we finally walked the distance that separated us from the
synagogue doors. Inside the synagogue hall, which was
overflowing with people of all ages, including a large number
of young people (aged 20-30) we sensed once more, as on the
first visit, the mute, close and palpable contact with thousands
of pairs of eyes burning with deep Jewish feeling . . . . We
noticed that the two plaques that we had seen previously . . .
were no longer there . . . .
"At the end of the service Golda was one of the first to go out
into the street. By the time we had all managed to get out of the
building she had been taken prisoner by the tremendous and
excited crowd . . . . We broke up into small groups that were
surrounded by a mass of people intoxicated with excitement
and who had no words to express their abundance of love and
pride at our being in their midst . . . . Finally, they all joined
into an immense demonstration that gradually advanced in the
direction of the main street nearby . . . . It is impossible to
describe the enthusiasm of the crowd. A few trucks that stood
in the street were taken over by Jewish boys and girls who
mounted them, shouting and clapping; they did the same from
all the windows and verandahs of the houses . . . . More than
once Golda was pushed and shoved to the point of danger,
although groups of young people led by a girl surrounded her
in a protective chain, accompanying her in this fashion all the
way. Only when we got to the main street where the trams had
meanwhile been held up, were we able by a miracle to extract
ourselves from the crowd. The youths who accompanied us got
hold of a passing taxi, quickly sat Golda inside together with
several members of the Legation . . . . One Jew . . . said to us:
T h i s is the Moscow Jews' answer to Ehrenburg'." 6 0
On the Day of Atonement the staff of the Legation went to the
synagogue again. This time, however, the authorities tried to
prevent a demonstration. "On the eve of the Day of Atonement,"
Namir has related, "we arrived there by a secret arrangement and
were taken into the synagogue courtyard with the help of a police
escort and entered the synagogue hall through a side door. For the
women to go to their boxes upstairs they had to cross the entire
length of the men's hall. A police officer and several policemen saw
to this in a courteous fashion and paved the way for them in the
midst of the packed hall. The entire congregation rose to its feet and
followed with tremendous tension every movement of the
members of our entourage. Excited attempts at applause and cries
of 'welcome', 'next year in Jerusalem' and the like, were started but
did not turn into a general demonstration of cheering because of
numerous entreaties in Yiddish and Russian by the synagogue
officials, asking the congregation to bear in mind that they were in
a holy place and that it was a holy day . . . .
"The service over," Namir went on, "we decided to stay behind
and wait till the congregation broke up, for our exit meant that our
womenfolk would again cross the hall into the courtyard. But this
time the synagogue officers' explanations and pleas were to no
avail; nobody moved. This went on for a long time until finally the
police officer and his men had no alternative but to repeat their
performance. They brought Golda and the other ladies down-
stairs, led them back through the hall accompanied by the
blessings of the congregation, a mass of men and women, youths
and girls, who were all in a state of complete intoxication. In order
to circumvent the large crowd that was waiting in the street
knowing that on the night of the Day of Atonement we would
assuredly return to the hotel by foot, the policemen took us out
through the corridor of a private house whose doorway led to the
Direct Contacts 195
very end of the street. Yet even this subterfuge was to no avail. The
secret got out and a crowd of several hundreds joined us . . . and
escorted us as far as the hotel, completely refusing to heed the
policemen who requested them to scatter. Even in the middle of
town, by the Métropole Hotel . . . they stood a long time without
moving . . . .
"On the following morning," Namir continued, "the police
were reinforced and in fact imposed exemplary order. The long
narrow street was packed from end to end with many
thousands of people, as on the New Year, but as soon as we
appeared . . . the crowd split into two as though by a magic
wand, a narrow path was cut, through which we all passed in
single file accompanied by homage and greetings. . . . During
the memorial service for the departed, after the prayer for the
'millions of victims of fascism', the choir held a special prayer
for the dead of the Israeli army. The prayer had been
formulated beforehand by the rabbi in consultation with me,
and it read: 'in the sacred memory of the heroic warriors of the
Israeli armed forces who fell in the struggle for the freedom of
the people and the country'." The congregation's enthusiasm
reached its height at the end of the closing prayer which
finishes with the invocation: "Next year in Jerusalem." Many
people came to shake hands with the Israeli Legation members;
there were even some brief chats, questions about family in
Israel, and so on. One man told the Israelis that it was
impossible to obtain the issue of the magazine Ogonek that
contained a picture of the Israeli minister presenting her
credentials as the Jews had snatched it up in the newspaper
stands, while pictures of Golda Meyerson during the New Year
demonstration were being sold illegally. 61 The Israeli minister
vividly realized as a result of these demonstrations that the
doubts in Israel as to the existence of any link between Soviet
Jewry and Israel, let alone the strength of this tie, were divorced
from the reality of 1948. All she could tell the Jews who
thronged round her on the New Year was "Thank you for hav-
ing remained Jews." 6 2
The authorities could no longer doubt the intense Jewish
awareness of Soviet Jewry; nor could they go on pretending to be
able to keep Moscow's policy toward Soviet Jewry separate from its
relations with Israel. Once the point had been driven home with
considerable poignancy by the demonstrations of the Jewish
Holy Days, the Kremlin took further and more severe steps to
suppress its Jewish citizens and prevent them from expressing
any sympathy for or connection with the capitalist West, to

which Israel was already being accused of being subservient.
Simultaneously, a new and complex dimension entered the
relationship between the two states.
It is not clear when and how the decision was taken to persecute
Jews who sought and maintained contact with the Israeli Legation
in Moscow. It seems fair to assume that even before the Legation
was opened the Soviet security forces had begun taking steps
against Jews who manifested any undue interest in developments
in Palestine. Polish Jewish repatriates who reached Poland
apparently in September-October 1948 reported that a few young
Jews who had tried to cross the Soviet-Iranian frontier in an attempt
to reach Israel had been taken into custody by the Soviet
authorities; others, who tried to cross into Turkey, were also
arrested. 63 (Although the very attempt to leave the USSR in this
fashion was in itself a criminal offense, there can be no doubt that
in the files of the offenders their destination must also have been
noted.) Yet, the steps taken at an early stage do not seem to have
been widely known. The same repatriates noted that the friendly
reception accorded Mrs. Meyerson by the Soviet authorities had
given the Jews the impression that applications to go to Israel now
had a greater chance of success. 64 Again, although arrests of
participants in the Holy Day demonstrations began almost at once,
it seems that no decision of principle had been taken, or at least was
known even among the higher echelons of the Soviet
Establishment by as late as 7 November 1948.
On that day the Jewish wife of Foreign Minister Molotov,
Polina Zhemchuzhina, was extremely friendly toward the Israeli
diplomats at the reception held by the minister on the
anniversary of the October Revolution. Although Zhemchuzhina
herself no longer held any of her earlier posts in the party,
Molotov was a member of the Politburo in addition to being
foreign minister. After Mrs. Meyerson had conversed with
Molotov, Namir has recorded, "his wife took her aside and told
her with candid joy: 'I've been looking for you all the time'." At
first a Foreign Ministry interpreter translated their conversation
which contained "a profusion of questions about Palestine, the
State of Israel, the Yishuv, constantly moving with alacrity from
one issue to another. . . . The two became especially frank when
it emerged that they could converse in Yiddish." Their talk
lasted a long time, Mrs. Molotov showing obvious excitement
and joy and calling over "different ladies, public figures in both
the party and the State, presenting the Israeli minister to them
Direct Contacts 197
with unconcealed pride, inter alia, she said in a fluent

Lithuanian Yiddish: 'I have been told you go to the synagogue
here. Very fine, go, go, the Jews want to see you! . . . When
Golda asked her whence her excellent Yiddish, she said several
times: 'After all I am a Jewess!' [Ich bin a Yiddishe tochter]."
When they discussed the kibbutz, together with Mrs.
Meyerson's daughter, and touched upon "the method of
absolute equality and full partnership in work and life, she said
the system did not seem plausible to her." Moreover, she went
on, "in these conditions all Jews will not agree to come to
you."65 Mrs. Meir has recalled her commenting that "People
don't like sharing everything. Even Stalin is against that. You
should acquaint yourself with Stalin's thoughts and writings on
the subject." Taking farewell, she embraced the Israeli
minister's daughter and said "with tears in her eyes. . . . 'Be
well. If everything goes well with you, it will go well for all
Jews everywhere.' " 66
Very shortly after this date, however, the Soviet authorities
began to take steps to sever all contact between Soviet Jewry and
the diplomatic representatives of the State of Israel. The Jews had
not heeded earlier warnings 67 that official Soviet sympathy for
Israel did not mean any deviation from the line expressed by
Gromyko when he excluded Soviet Jewry from that part of the
Jewish people for which a haven in Palestine was necessary. Even
the increased number of security men at the Moscow synagogue
had not deterred the crowds that had assembled there on the Jewish
New Year and the Day of Atonement.68 True, the arrests which
followed these demonstrations were not officially connected
with them;69 yet toward the end of the year all contact with the
Israeli Legation and its officials was physically prevented.
In December 1948 it was intimated to the Israeli Legation that
Soviet Jews had been forbidden any written contact with it—the
Moscow synagogue officials apologized that they could not even
receive from one of the diplomats an illustrated Jewish Foundation
Fund calendar—and on 1 January 1949 when some of the Israeli
diplomats visited the synagogue, members of the congregation
were blatantly prevented from making any contact with them. 70
When they visited the Moscow Yiddish Theater in January 1949
the members of the Israeli Legation were conspicuously
accompanied by security men and no one was able to approach
them at all. (On their first visit, in mid-September, they had been
surrounded by an enthusiastic crowd, in the foyer, by the exit,
etc.)71 In the same month, when Mrs. Meyerson was in Israel on a
visit, Moscow Jews said she had been recalled by her government
because her visits to the Moscow synagogue displeased the Soviet
authorities. 72 Such rumors, which the Jews attributed to the
M.V.D., multiplied in the following months. Early in March the
Legation staff heard of rumors that Mrs. Meyerson was being
summoned home (she had meanwhile been asked to join the
government) following a Soviet complaint about her connections
with officials of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and her
demand to permit Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. It was irrelevant
that the Legation had not established contact with these Jewish
cultural figures who at this time were being persecuted for their
"nationalist" proclivities, or that the minister does not seem to
have discussed Soviet Jewish emigration on any occasion. 73
The Jews interpreted these stories as an attempt by the regime to
use the public displays of Jewish sympathy for Israel and contact
with the Israeli diplomats as a pretext for the repressive measures
being taken clandestinely in this period (November 1948-January
1949) against Jewish cultural figures and institutions. 7 4 Although
it had apparently been decided almost a year before to eliminate
Soviet Jewish culture, expression of Soviet Jewish identification
with and obvious sympathy for Israel possibly served as a catalyser
in the implementation of this decision. Indeed, the main tenet of
the anti-Jewish policy was the Jews* connections with the West and
Moscow's alleged apprehension that they would become a fifth
column and threat to the country's security.
In this context the Israeli Legation's presence made the posi-
tion of Soviet Jewry more difficult. First, Israel was already
being associated with the imperialist West, as in Ehrenburg's
article. Second, the Soviet Union, as we have seen, had
intended its support for Israel to neutralize American Jewry in
the inter-bloc confrontation. In this way Moscow could retain
U.S. Jewish sympathies while freeing its hands to deal with its
Jewish problem as a purely domestic affair, especially since the
Soviet Union's increasing isolationism was making the Iron
Curtain well-nigh impenetrable. The ties between the Israeli
Legation and Soviet Jews upset this calculation; they created a
crack in the barrier of secrecy and also provided the Soviet Jew-
ish minority with potential patrons to replace U.S. Jewry.
The contacts the Israeli diplomatic mission in Moscow
established with local Jews from the opening of the Legation until
the Israeli minister's summons to Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin in
February 1949 (see p. 185), which was the first official intimation of
trouble, were diverse. In addition to their visits to the Moscow
Direct Contacts 199
synagogue and the Yiddish Theater, the Israeli diplomats met

several times with synagogue officials, 75 talked with a number of
Jews active in non-Jewish fields, received a few Jews in the
Legation itself and corresponded with a few more in response to
inquiries concerning relatives in Israel.
Jewish members of the political and intellectual elites and the
representatives of Jewish religious institutions presumably
thought there would be no harm in maintaining contacts with the
Israeli diplomatic staff. Their meetings with representatives of a
state whose war of independence the USSR was supporting
were held either in their official capacity or on official
occasions. The Israeli diplomats thus met Ehrenburg, film
script-writer Mark Donskoi and the film critic Abram
Krichevskii, as well as a number of non-Je wish artists, at a
Czechoslovak Embassy reception late in October. Donskoi was
clearly excited by the encounter with the Israelis and did not
hesitate to enter into outspoken conversation in Yiddish. He
was enthusiastic at the idea of making an Israeli film in a land
rich in exciting themes such as the drainage of swamps, the
conquest of the desert, the "tower and stockade" settlements,
the struggle against the British and the war against the Arabs.
He expressed willingness to go to Israel for a year to help make
such a film, although the Legation would have to approach the
Soviet Foreign Ministry with an official request. A month later
Namir and Ratner met Donskoi again at the Albanian Legation's
Independence Day party and he remained by their side
throughout the party. He told his Israeli acquaintances that he
had talked with Minister of Cinematography Ivan Bol'shakov
about his plan to go to Israel to film what was happening there
and that the minister had reacted favorably, making such a visit
conditional only on the confirmation of the foreign minister.
Donskoi suggested that the Israeli Legation hold a party for
important Jewish figures in the USSR, mentioning specifically
Colonel David Dragunskii.
Ehrenburg, introduced to Mrs. Meyerson by TeJepres correspon-
dent Ralph Parker, evaded any discussion of Jewish or political
questions, apart from a remark that Jews were assuredly forbidden
to talk English, the language of the camp of reaction. Yet when
Donskoi introduced him to Namir, Ehrenburg complained he had
not yet received the Hebrew translation of his book The Storm. 7 6
These few Jewish figures were presumably disillusioned in the
course of time, experiencing perhaps additional constraints
following these contacts. For example, Zhemchuzhina's conver-
sation with Mrs. Meyerson may conceivably have contributed to

her banishment to Kazakhstan early in 1949, 77 while Donskoi's
remarks to the Israeli diplomats may have been partly conducive to
his active role at the meeting of the cinema workers' aktiv in late
February 1949 which denounced the cosmopolitans in the
cinematographic profession. 78
Most other Jews, however, who established contact with Israeli
diplomats were surely conscious of the fact that they were taking a
considerable risk, as all contacts with foreigners—including
foreign diplomats—had become a virtually anti-Soviet activity in
the wake of the State Secrets Act of 9 June 1947. 79 The keen and
direct interest shown by Soviet Jewry in Israel in the fall of 1948 led
indeed to large-scale arrests and deportations even though the
official charges referred to economic offenses, general hooli-
ganism (creating disturbances in public places), etc. 80
A few Jews actually came to the Legation offices. The Israeli
diplomats did not at first fully appreciate the dangers involved
and suggested to Jews who wanted to meet in public places that
they come to the Métropole. Yet they soon realized that this
caused their guests some "inconvenience . . . in view of the
surveillance of the doorkeepers and security service people at
the entrance and on every floor."81 The visitors included at
least one person who came in his official capacity, the head of
the Moscow Jewish Community, Samuil' Chobrutskii. Several
were Jews from outside Moscow (Riga, Kharkov, Bessarabia,
Bukhara, even Birobidzhan). 82 These visitors brought first-hand
information on the situation of Soviet Jewry, 83 and some came
with a specific purpose: they wanted help to go to Israel,
principally to take part in the fighting there, although such
requests mostly seem to have been addressed to Soviet bodies,
particularly the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.
One such visitor, formerly an artillery officer who had merited
the Red Star Award in the war, asked to join the Israeli army, to
which he was convinced he could be beneficial. Apparently seeing
the step as natural and legitimate, he had actually gone to the
Soviet Foreign Ministry to ask the address of the Israeli Legation.
He suggested, moreover, that his wife be sent part of his salary until
she and their child joined him in Israel and he had even resigned
from his job in the Ministry of the Interior in view of his pending
emigration.
Another visitor appeared at the Legation in officer's uniform.
Since the war he had been attached to a Soviet military delegation
in one of the People's Democracies, and now wished to know if
Direct Contacts 201
permission could be acquired to join the Israeli army, or whether

there was a chance of persuading the Soviet government to send
any official military delegation to Israel in which he could
participate. He said that rumors were rife among his friends that
Soviet officers were going to Israel and that young Jews were all on
tenterhooks. The officer connected this with anti-Je wish
discrimination in the Soviet Union, especially in the universities:
"if people cast doubts on our rights here, very well, let us go to our
own country."
A third former officer who visited the Legation was employed as
a lecturer in an institute of higher learning. He had been trying
since May 1948 together with a number of friends to find a means of
assisting the Jewish State. He had discussed the question with
Grigorii Heifetz who headed the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
after the murder of Mikhoels in January 1948 (see chapter 7),
suggesting that the Soviet Jewish community organize some such
assistance even if it were only a modest contribution, such as the
dispatch of medical supplies. Heifetz rejected the suggestion; nor
did an article the officer gave him for publication in Aynikeit ever
appear. Meanwhile, the officer and his friends intended their own
contribution to be far more substantial; they sought to volunteer to
the Israeli army. He maintained that if it was just whispered that the
Soviet authorities allowed Soviet Jews to go to Israel, even
clandestinely, 10,000 young men with military experience and of
varying ranks would go from Moscow alone. Nor, the officer
insisted, need any such voluntary recruitment be connected with
emigration; it could just be a provisory step. He asked the Israeli
diplomats to try to influence the Soviet authorities to permit this.
The officer had approached: former Deputy Foreign Minister
Maksim Litvinov who had cautioned him against going too far and
exposing himself to charges of nationalism; Politburo member and
Deputy Prime Minister Marshal Kliment Voroshilov who had read
his application but refrained from any reaction; and Stalin's
personal secretary who had told him on the phone to act in
accordance with his conscience.
One of the former officers who visited the Legation in late
January 1949—the man was a graduate of a Soviet military
academy and bearer of several medals—went straight from the
Métropole Hotel to the passport office (OVIR) at the Ministry of the
Interior and asked to be allowed to emigrate to Israel. He was
dismissed from his job as a result and had no chance of getting any
alternative permanent work. Two months later the man was
summoned from his place of residence, Stalingorsk, to OVIR in
Moscow. Asked whether he wished to retain or relinquish his

Soviet citizenship upon going to Israel, he replied that he wanted
to retain it. In any case, he was told by officials he had nothing to
hope for; although in theory the application could be dealt with if a
request for his emigration was received from relatives in Israel, it
was intimated quite clearly that he should let the matter drop and
that "ten fathers" would not be able to get him out of the Soviet
Union. Following the conversation the man paid a second visit to
the Legation where he said he was anticipating arrest at the very
least. 84
Another visitor to the Legation was Pinhas Heifetz who had been
born in Palestine, served in the International Brigade in Spain, and
after being disabled had gone to the USSR. After his visit to the
Legation, he was summoned to the local authorities in his place of
abode, reprimanded for leaving the locality without a permit and
warned that if he repeated the offense he would receive a two-year
prison sentence. Nonetheless, two or three months later he
appeared in the Legation a second time, once more without a travel
permit. The Legation was unable to help despite his Palestinian
passport. A member of the Legation staff saw one of the
doorkeepers going to a telephone booth, and Heifetz was duly
detained at the Metro (underground) station and ordered to go to
the nearby police station. He was sent back to his home town and
not heard of again. 85
Other visitors included the first actual emigrant, a disabled
World War II veteran. The Legation had received his entry visa to
Israel as early as October 1948 at the official request of the Soviet
Foreign Ministry; six months later he was given his exit permit, a
travel ticket and his pension. He told the Legation staff that 200
families in his home town —Firgana in Kazakhstan—saw in him
the vanguard of their own emigration. 86 Others also reported
considerable interest in emigration to Israel and some optimism
that it was feasible. A Bukharan Jew who came to the Métropole
Hotel in late November or early December 1948 said that all the
"Jews of the East" would be ready to go to Israel at once if they
could. Early in January 1949 a woman teacher at a sovkhoz reported
to the Legation that Jews in her locality were also interested in
emigrating to Israel, since —as she stressed—their non-Jewish
neighbors did not let them forget their Jewish identity. A woman
from Riga who had consulted a party official in her town before
coming to the Legation had been told she had nothing to fear from
attending openly to the question of her emigration to Palestine. 87
In addition to visitors, the Legation also received a certain
Direct Contacts 203
amount of correspondence from local Jews. Here, too, the initiative

was usually that of the local Jews, although there were
instances—besides the bulletin which it sent to several Jewish
communities—in which the Legation wrote to Jews at the request
of relatives in Israel.
Most of the correspondence, like most of the visits, centered on
the question of emigration to Israel. In September 1948, within
days of their arrival, Israel's diplomatic representatives received
letters through the post from Jews applying to go to Israel. Some of
the applicants were stateless, i.e. Jews who had fled to the Soviet
Union during the war and wished to be granted Israeli citizenship.
On 20 October 1948 the deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry
Middle and Near East Department, Aleksei Shchiborin, handed
Minister Meyerson two letters from Jews in Kharbin concerning 82
such refugees, mostly of German but partly also of Polish origin,
who sought to emigrate to Palestine and asked the Israeli Legation
both to give them entry permits and to get the Soviet government to
allow them right of transit through Soviet territory. 88 This was the
first of a protracted series of frustrating contacts, at the end of
which, after about a year, the Kharbin Jews left for Israel by sea
without Soviet assistance of any sort. Three months later the
deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Consular Department,
Ismail Konzhukhov, told Namir and Levavi that the emigration of
stateless Jews was not the concern of the Foreign Ministry but of the
bodies that dealt with domestic matters, who "decide on every case
separately." 89
In a conversation with Mrs. Meyerson on 19 January 1949
Bakulin asked her if her staff was meeting with Jews. 90 Yet it
was over two weeks later that the minister first came to
appreciate the extent of the Soviet authorities' opposition to
contact with Soviet Jews. On 8 February Deputy Foreign Minis-
ter Zorin summoned her to discuss the Legation's direct con-
tacts with Soviet citizens and its institutional link through its
bulletin (see p. 185). Zorin read out a statement that "the Israeli
Legation is sending letters to Soviet citizens of Jewish national-
ity and encouraging them to leave the confines of the State, to
relinquish their Soviet citizenship and to immigrate to Israel,
promising them early permits. These activities," Zorin stressed,
"are illegal and do not conform with the status of a diplomatic
mission. The Soviet Foreign Ministry proposes to the Israeli
Legation in Moscow to cease these activities." Mrs. Meyerson
replied: "I consider it superfluous to emphasize that our Lega-
tion neither has nor ever had any intention to prejudice in any
way the laws and customs of this state. Our Legation has never
sought either in writing or orally to incite Soviet Jews to leave the
USSR. I know only two things: a. there have been a few isolated
cases of Jews with relations in Israel who have sought entry permits
to our country; and b. in a few more cases Israeli residents, relatives
of Soviet citizens, have requested entry permits for their relations.
In both cases our Legation replied to those concerned that the
Government of Israel preferred to give them entry permits after
they present the requisite exit documents." (All in all, the Legation
had up to this date expressed readiness to grant entry permits to
30-40 Soviet Jews.)
"How careful we are to preserve arrangements here in these
matters," Mrs Meyerson went on, "can be shown by instances of
quests for relatives. In accordance with the instructions of the
official in charge of consular affairs we let you have every address
and await your reply."
Namir has noted that prior to this conversation not a single
approach to the relevant Soviet authorities had been replied to, 9 1
although the Legation had endeavored from the very first to
coordinate its activities with the norms requested of it. As early as
21 September 1948 Namir had asked the Foreign Ministry Consular
Department "to find out if we can have a free hand in the quest for
relatives by means of a direct approach to the [Soviet] citizens
concerned." It was finally agreed that the Israeli Legation in
Moscow would from time to time transmit the material it received
from Israel to the Consular Department, which in turn would
undertake the actual quests and provide the Legation with the
relevant replies. Soviet citizens in quest of relatives in Israel, the
Soviet official made clear, "know that they have to approach the
respective government institutions in the customary manner." 9 2
In a talk with Vyshinskii in January Mrs. Meyerson returned
to the subject. She asked about exit permits from the USSR for
parents all of whose children were in Israel and for children
who had remained in the Soviet Union as a result of the war
while their parents had gone to Israel. Vyshinskii said this was
a very complex question. In the first place, each case had to be
treated separately; second, the entire issue was not in the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry but of the "relevant
institutions," i.e. the Ministry of the Interior; third, a
prerequisite of permission to leave the USSR for good was a
surrender of Soviet citizenship, which could be granted only by
the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. 93
On the whole, however, although the Israeli Legation in
Direct Contacts 205
Moscow considered the establishment of links with Soviet

Jewry one of its principal functions, Israel's diplomatic
representatives did not raise any subject that had a direct
bearing on the Soviet Jewish minority in their early contacts
with Soviet officialdom. They accepted the Soviet insistence
that its Jews, even as individuals, were outside the bounds of
Israeli diplomatic activity. In particular, the Israeli diplomats
refrained from discussing the immigration to Israel of Soviet
Jews—as distinct from that of Jews from Eastern
Europe 94 —apart from an occasional reference to the possibility
of the immigration of a few individuals. The reasons for this
seem to have been the following:
a. The agenda of talks between the two governments included
topics equally vital to Israel's existence and which had a chance
of being dealt with satisfactorily. Israel could not let the Soviet
Jewish issue, despite its importance, obfuscate these questions
or diminish the chances of their desired solution at a period
when Soviet aid in Israel's struggle for survival was a para-
mount Israeli need. One of these questions was presumably that
of Jewish immigration from the People's Democracies which the
USSR was prepared to countenance in practice, if not in theory.
Another was political support in the international arena. Con-
cerning "our main interest, that of the chances of permitting
immigration from here," Namir wrote Shertok in December
1948, "if our status at the U.N. were finally consolidated . . . 95
and we did not need to worry so much about every hand that
was risen for and against, the present time might, indeed,
oblige us to undertake a 'frontal attack' in the form of a
thorough and direct discussion. Since the debate [on Israel's
U.N. membership] will continue in April, we must weigh up
and weigh up many times if it is worth our while at this stage
to place on the scales of Soviet diplomacy a complex Jewish
problem which has implications also for Soviet domestic pol-
icy, lest, Heaven forbid, it prove a burden upon Israel's foreign
policy." 96
b. The Israelis were both psychologically and technically
unprepared for any action on this score. The mental
unreadiness apparently sprang from lack of awareness of the
dimensions and intensity of the Soviet Jewish awakening, and a
deep-rooted conviction, dating from the 1920s, that Soviet
Jewry was largely lost to the main body of the Jewish people.
Indeed the Israelis seem to have been no less —and perhaps
more—surprised than the Soviet authorities by the High Holy
Day demonstrations of October 1948 97 and did not appear

immediately to appreciate their full significance, let alone their
actual consequences, or even to be aware of the persecution
which Soviet Jewry was suffering at the time. This latter
misjudgment emanated from a combination of the psychological
and technical drawbacks, namely the Israelis' lack of experience
of both the mechanisms of Soviet "diplomacy" and the
circumstances of everyday life in the USSR. The Israeli
diplomats in Moscow, although physically behind the Iron
Curtain, had in fact no means of penetrating it—besides the
sporadic contacts with Jews which the Soviet authorities were
bent on preventing. Thus, the Israeli government had perforce
to accept the Soviet Jewish question as beyond its scope and
reach and, in the period under discussion, to reconcile itself to
the unequivocal Soviet denial of any connection between the
State of Israel and the Soviet Jewish population.
Nonetheless, the Israeli Legation was unable to carry out
Israel's intentions to steer clear of the Jewish question in its
relations with the Soviet government. Both Soviet Jewry's
emotional tie with Israel and the Soviet authorities' unofficial
linking of the Legation's activities to developments in the life of
Soviet Jews—as seen in the stories spread among the Jews first
in Moscow and later throughout the Soviet Union 9 8 —made it a
passive and unwitting participant in the Soviet Jewish drama.
FRUSTRATIONS AND DOUBTS
The Soviet Jewish reaction to the establishment of the State of

Israel and to Soviet support of the Jewish State cast a shadow
on the relations between the USSR and Israel. There were,
however, a number of other difficulties inherent in the basic
policies and stands of both governments that troubled the
dialogue between them.
One element which contributed to changing the atmosphere
of the dialogue from one of sympathy to one of dissonance was
the USSR's lack of preparedness for cultivating friendly
relations with states outside the Soviet bloc. Despite the
ideological concession Moscow made in recognizing Israel's
special status as a neutral state —in a period when Soviet
foreign policy was based on the theory of the division of the
world into two camps—the Soviet Union was conceptually
unwilling and/or unable to appreciate the practical implications
of such a status. It did not seem to take into account that to
Direct Contacts 207
enable a small state to maintain a non-aligned existence,

Moscow too must be prepared to make the effort to grant it vital
forms of aid; otherwise the circumstances of the cold war made
a pro-Western orientation inevitable. Nor were Moscow's
reservations on this score solely theoretical; they coincided, as
did most of its ideological positions, with contemporary reality.
In the immediate post-war period of large-scale economic
recovery and reconstruction the USSR could not easily afford to
give practical assistance to foreign countries. Whatever the
primary reason—whether ideological or practical-technical
—the fact remained that the USSR was unable to make any
economic commitment to the State of Israel.
One of the chief foci of Soviet criticism of Israel was the 100
million dollar loan to Israel which the U.S. government
announced early in 1949. The question of a loan had been
raised by Chaim Weizmann in a conversation with Truman as
early as May 1948. This had been followed in early June by an
official application of the Provisional Government of Israel for a
loan of 100 million dollars for the implementation of Israel's
Four-Year Plan for resettlement and development. Yet, although
Elath had reported in June that the President favored the loan,
both the Export-Import Bank and the State Department doubted
the economic and political wisdom of the loan, particularly in
view of continued hostilities in Israel. The confirmation of the
loan was indeed postponed until after the Israeli elections of
January 1949. In February Finance Minister Eliezer Kaplan
signed an agreement for the first instalment of the loan ($35
million),99 and on 8 March the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset)
was asked to confirm the entire loan. In the course of the
ensuing debate, on 17 March, the government informed the
opponents of the loan (Mapam and Maki) that it would agree to
accept a similar loan from the Soviet Union and/or the People's
Democracies.100
TASS, however, when reporting the Knesset debate, signifi-
cantly omitted any reference to the possibility of a Soviet loan.
The Soviet news agency referred neither to the government
statement nor even to the proposal of Maki member Meir Wilner
that Israel conclude an economic agreement with the Soviet
Union and the East European countries on "a free basis of
export-import exchanges, on a basis of economic assistance
without the enslavement of our economy and without political
enslavement." TASS merely reported Mikunis' criticism of the
U.S. loan as enslaving, restricting Israel's economic
independence and strengthening the U.S. position in the
region. 101
The Israeli government raised the matter officially in its
contacts with the USSR. In her 14 April farewell talk with
Vyshinskii, Israel's first minister to Moscow said that Israel did
not wish to restrict its options to the United States and
suggested that the Soviet government grant Israel a long-term
credit loan similar to the American one, that had —she pointed
out—been given on a purely commercial basis without any
political conditions. Israel, Mrs. Meyerson explained, did not
have the financial resources to make cash purchases but desired
to expand its trade with the USSR on the same basis as it had
been doing hitherto, namely long-term credits. Vyshinskii
promised to clarify the matter with the new Minister of Trade
Mikhail Menshikov. 102 The Israeli Commercial Attaché Moshe
Bejerano conducted parallel conversations with a senior official
at the Foreign Trade Ministry, one of the directors of Vneshtorg,
mainly on the purchase of Soviet commodities on a five-year
credit to the value of $100 million, 20 or 25 percent of its value
to be covered by Israeli goods. As late as October 1949
Vyshinskii told an Egyptian correspondent that the USSR had
not rejected Israel's request for a loan but was discussing the
grant of a loan on terms similar to that of the United
States 103 —although the USSR did not in fact grant any loans to
states outside the Soviet bloc in this period.
By spring 1949 Soviet-Israeli trade relations had terminated to all
intents and purposes despite their promising start. In the summer
of 1948, even prior to the arrival of the Israeli diplomats in the
Soviet capital, Israel had initiated contacts with the Soviet Union
on possibilities for importing Soviet goods. On 10 September,
during her conversation with Vlasov and Zorin — following her
presentation of credentials — Mrs. Meyerson mentioned Israel's
need to import wheat and its hope to purchase wheat in the USSR
(of which the two Soviet officials were cognizant). Indeed, Israel
purchased 10,000 tons of Soviet wheat toward the end of 1948, for
which it paid in sterling (Israel's interest in Soviet wheat came to
an end when it joined the International Wheat Conference in March
1949). 104
In 1948 Moscow also suggested the sale of other
commodities, especially raw materials, for sterling payment, an
unusual step for the USSR. The reason for this, as for the wheat
deal, seems to have been a desire to undermine yet another
aspect of British policy in Palestine; Britain had frozen the
Yishuv's sterling monies before the termination of the Mandate
Direct Contacts 209
and withheld them from the Jewish State in the early stages of
its existence. The USSR, which referred on more than one
occasion to Israel's economic hardships because of the
economic chaos the British had left behind, 1 0 5 presumably
wanted to push the Israeli government into trying to unfreeze
its sterling assets. As late as December 1948 Israeli Trade
Minister Peretz Bernstein said in reply to a question put by
Mikunis in the Provisional State Council that commercial
relations between the two countries had started off well, that a
number of deals in vital commodities had been concluded and
that both governments desired to consolidate these ties. 106
Nonetheless, contacts were difficult not only because of
Soviet evasiveness; some fell through because of technical ob-
stacles on the Israeli side, for its new governmental machinery
and inter-departmental bureaucracy provided a cumbersome
framework for effective commercial negotiations. 107 The talks
that broke down included negotiations with Nefteksport on the
export of crude oil to Israel, with Sovfrakht on a regular cargo
service from Odessa to Haifa, and Israeli proposals to export
potash to the USSR. 108
When early in 1949 commercial relations finally came to a
standstill, Israeli Counselor Namir put the responsibility on the
Israeli, rather than the Soviet, side—specifically on Israel's lack
of foreign currency and a dispute that arose following an Israeli
attempt to retract a contract Bejarano had actually signed. 109
Cultural relations were even more frustrating. They were
made virtually impossible a priori by the growing Soviet
isolationism and severance of all ties between Soviet citizens
and all foreigners in the latter half of 1948 and early 1949.
From approximately June 1948 there seem to have been no such
connections between Israel and the USSR. This applied not
only to individual Jews and the few Jewish institutions in the
Soviet Union, 1 1 0 but even to institutional information exchanges
between Soviet public bodies and Israeli front organizations, 111
except through the agency of the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv.
On the advice of the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry
Department of Protocol, Fedor Molochkov, Namir paid a visit
on 23 September 1948 to the VOKS offices where he was
received by the Society's Secretary Kiseleva. The Israeli
diplomat described to her the activities of the League for
Friendly Relations with the USSR and suggested an exchange
of exhibitions, only to be told that although VOKS had not
heard from the League for a very long time it was prepared to
renew ties between them, and that if the Israelis wanted to

discuss exhibitions the League must approach VOKS officially.
The conversation also touched upon contacts in the fields of
science, sports and theater. It was agreed that VOKS would
discuss the invitation of a Soviet producer to direct plays in
Israeli theaters after the Israeli side made some specific
suggestions. A visit of Israeli sportsmen to the USSR, the VOKS
official maintained, was "a more complex matter" and would
have to be discussed with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. VOKS
would, however, be happy to deal with the creation of ties
between the Israeli Medical Association and parallel bodies in
the Soviet Union. 1 1 2
Following Kiseleva's suggestions Namir brought up the
question of ties between Israeli sportsmen and Soviet sport
organizations with the deputy head of the Middle and Near East
Department of the Foreign Ministry, Aleksei Shchiborin, a
suggestion Shchiborin promised to investigate. One month
later, too, the Legation handed VOKS a written request for the
invitation to Israel of a Soviet stage director (it suggested Iurii
Zavodskii of the Moscow Mossoviet Theater) and of Soviet
musicians (suggesting specifically David Oistrakh and the
pianist Grigorii Ginzburg). The Israel Philarmonic Orchestra,
the Legation noted, was also interested in receiving works by
Soviet composers and if Soviet musicians were interested in
Israeli musical compositions, the Legation was ready to
establish a basis for cooperation. On 19 January 1949, Bakulin
told Mrs. Meyerson and Namir that while VOKS was the body
that must deal with these requests he could say that he doubted
their practicability. During the season, he said, Soviet artists
were busy, while in the vacation they wanted their time to
themselves. Moreover, by Soviet conceptions, Israel was "still
in a position of military tension . . . and most people would be
afraid of going there."
Summing up its activity and achievements in the cultural
field in the first half year of its work in Moscow, the Israeli
Legation described them as slight, if not entirely
non-existent. 113
This was not, however, any reflection of the Soviet attitude
toward Israel but rather of the general environment and
circumstances of Soviet policy making. It seems, for example,
that altogether only two foreign artists visited the USSR in the
period September 1948-April 1949 and these came from Eastern
Europe (a Polish singer and a Czechoslovak conductor). The
Direct Contacts 211
Soviet attitude to Israel thus cannot be examined in this period

on the level of cultural or commercial relations and contacts
even though frustrations in these two spheres marred the
Soviet-Israeli relationship to a certain extent.
A far more specific weathervane was the view of Israel
expressed in Soviet publications in the winter of 1948-49.
These revealed specific reservations that belied the impression
that nothing had changed since May 1948.
The USSR's expectations regarding the State of Israel have been
an issue of considerable disagreement. True, Soviet sources had
already indicated before 1947 that the Soviet Establishment
considered that the Jewish Yishuv had an inevitably pro-American
orientation (see p. 44). Yet, East European sources, as well as Israeli
Communist and left Zionist groupings and certain elements within
the USSR, particularly Soviet Jews, indicated hopes that Israel
might in fact develop and maintain a virtually pro-Soviet stand on
international issues and perhaps even a leftist regime. 114 They
perhaps thought that Soviet support of Israel emanated from an
assumption of this kind. These sources believed or hoped that the
first elections, of January 1949, would show their assumptions to be
correct. It is reasonable to suppose that Mikunis used some such
argument in his talks in the early summer of 1948 with East
European and perhaps also Soviet leaders, namely that the
immigration from Eastern Europe and the Czechoslovak arms deals
would strengthen the Israeli left. Jews who suggested to Grigorii
Heifetz, apparently in October 1948, that the Soviet Jewish
community give some assistance to the State of Israel (cf. p. 201),
were told that any Israeli industrial undertaking would not be
Soviet- but U.S.-initiated; in any case, he advised Soviet Jews
not to maintain contacts with Israel or Israelis for the next two
or three months —until the elections, and after them "we shall
see." 1 1 5 On the very day of the Israeli elections a Polish paper
said their outcome would "solve to a great extent the question
whether the reconstruction of Israel will take place on the
model of a people's democracy or whether it will become a sort
of Palestinian caricature of the West European Third Force." 1 1 6
The day after the Israeli elections, yet before their results
were known, TASS virtually belied the tenet that Moscow
placed any hopes on their outcome. The Soviet news agency
said in the name of Mikunis that the elections were "neither
free nor democratic, and that tens of thousands of Israeli
citizens were not included in the electoral lists." 1 1 7 It seems
reasonable to assume that the use of a statement by Mikunis as
an apologia for the anticipated election outcome was intended

to link the error, disillusionment and disappointment of certain
groupings regarding the Israeli regime to the Israeli Communist
leader's argument that the enlistment of Jewish volunteers in
the East European countries and the supply of arms would
increase Soviet influence in Israel and so to indicate that such
aid had no valid justification from the Soviet point of view. It
was surely no coincidence either that New Times published at
this time a further item on Western allegations that the USSR
was supplying arms to Israel, "just another vicious anti-Soviet
invention" that had "ignominiously subsided." 1 1 8
Since the USSR had not taken into account the establishment
of a "progressive" regime in Israel, it stands to reason that it
was not influenced in its attitude to Israel either by the election
results or even by the exclusion of Mapam from the Israeli
government that was finally formed early in March. Although
Moscow had expected Mapam, which was Israel's second
largest party, to join the government (cf. p. 178), its communi-
cations media noted with equanimity that Mapam itself had
refused to enter it. 119
Final evidence that Israel's domestic trends did not influence the
Soviet attitude toward it was the fact that these developments of
late January to March 1949 were not accompanied by any change in
the stand taken by the Soviet media regarding Israel. For well over
three months after the elections Soviet publications virtually
refrained from references to Israeli internal developments.
In fact, the first signs of a change could already be detected
in the latter half of 1948. The very sympathetic and positive
descriptions of the new Jewish State that had characterized
Soviet publications in the first months after its establishment
had stopped appearing by the end of that summer, to be
replaced by a number of derogatory allusions, and even direct
references, to Israel toward the end of the year. The basic
transformation in the official position toward Israel was
presaged several weeks before the Israeli elections, in
mid-December 1948, with the publication of Izrail' Genin's The
Palestine Problem. This pamphlet, which appeared in 150,000
copies, was put out by the Ail-Union Society for the Dissemina-
tion of Political and Scientific Knowledge (subordinate directly
to the Soviet Party's Agitprop Department). In it, the author
pinpointed the main Soviet reservations about trends within
Israel:
a. Its Provisional Government had not been democratically
Direct Contacts 213
elected by the country's Jewish population; it represented

merely those parties that belonged to the Zionist movement and
which, although they included workers, all had a
national-bourgeois ideology. Moreover, Zionism, Genin went
on, taking up a traditional Communist argument, was especially
hostile to the workers' movement, blurred class contradictions
within the Jewish people and distracted the workers' thoughts
from the class struggle.
b. The Yishuv and its institutions were intrinsically capitalist.
' T h e Jewish colonization trusts set about purchasing lands in
Palestine, acquiring them through concessions from the British
authorities and/or acts of purchase from feudal Arab landlords,
who had previously leased the land to the fallahin (the Arab
peasants). The Zionists expelled the fallahin often by use of
force from the lands they had been cultivating. . . . The
settlement fund lands . . . are leased out to settlers and
agricultural cooperatives"; these in turn became "totally
dependent upon capitalist monopolies" including "capitalist
banks, the T n u v a ' Company which has a monopoly on
marketing agricultural produce, and the 'Keren Hayesod'
organization [the Jewish Foundation Fund] which gives credits
to Jewish agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises....
On the Zionist farms there are not a few hired laborers, Jewish
and Arab." The authorities refrained from taking "the required
measures to restrain the greed" of "the small group of
middlemen who are becoming rich at the expense of the
people's suffering," for indeed while prices were rising "the
real wage of the workers is falling." The "ruined Jewish
working population of Western Europe, persecuted in their
native countries by Fascist and pro-Fascist regimes," that had
gone to Palestine, had "sunk into a position of economic
dependence on the Jewish capitalists who exploited the
immigrants to consolidate their own positions and tried to
delay the development of the growing class struggle. With this
end in view the Jewish bourgeoisie also set the Jewish laborers
against the Arabs."
c. Criticism notwithstanding, all the parties of the Zionist
Organization except the Revisionist had accepted the partition
resolution, and the State of Israel had been fully recognized by
the USSR and the People's Democracies.
Genin proceeded to desribe the Israeli political scene. The
Zionist Organization, he noted, had a very motley social
composition, including "representatives of the big and petty
bourgeoisie, urban artisans, agricultural settlers and backward

strata of laborers." As for its parties, Genin wrote: "A major
political role in the Zionist movement" was played by Mapai,
"a social-chauvinistic party of the Right Socialist type" which
embraced both "representatives of the petty bourgeoisie and the
backward working strata, advocates the position of the national
bourgeoisie and conducts a policy of class cooperation with the
big bourgeoisie." Mapai dominated the Workers' Federation
(the Histadrut) which comprised "not only trade unions, but
also small craftsmen, the agricultural producer cooperatives,
credit unions, the Workers' Bank (Bank Ha-Poalim) and the
Settlement Agency." The Zionist Organization, Genin noted,
also included Mapam which had stated at its founding
convention "that it seeks to extend cooperation and mutual
understanding with true democracies everywhere and above all
with the USSR and the People's Democracies."
Mapam, however, opposed in reality the formation of a
united front with the Israeli Communist Party (cf. p. 178), the
"truly revolutionary party of the Palestinian Jewish workers"
which stood outside the Zionist movement. Maki, according to
Genin, "reflects the aspirations of the popular Jewish masses of
the country . . . has a consistent anti-imperialist stand pressing
for the country's genuine independence. Maki advocates a fully
democratic life in both the political and social spheres and
struggles to achieve the unification of the State of Israel's
working class and all its progressive forces.
"The Communist Party," Genin went on, "is striving to create
a broad national democratic front of all the parties,
organizations and associations of the working class and the
broad masses of the population who are struggling for
democracy, independence, and friendly cooperation and
good-neighborly relations with the Arabs. . . .
"According to Mikunis, the dissatisfaction of the popular
masses of the State of Israel with the policy of the Provisional
Government is growing constantly. They wonder why the
Israeli Foreign Ministry follows in many things the instructions
of London and Washington, inter alia, Mikunis says, the popu-
lar masses support the Communist Party's demand that the
Government approach the USSR and the countries of the new
democracy with a proposal to conclude a friendship treaty.
"The Israeli Communist Party," Genin continued, "considers
that it is essential to reinforce the Provisional Government
without delay with representatives of the progressive forces.
Direct Contacts 215
[This formula is particularly instructive since Mapam was party

to the Provisional Government.] In particular, the Party is
struggling for the inclusion of Communists in the Government.
Mikunis says this will strengthen more than hitherto the
struggle for the formation of a national democratic front and the
mobilization of all forces for victory. This mobilization has to
be implemented not only in the military, but also in the
economic sphere. The entire economy has to cater to the needs
of defense: a property tax must be levied, the profits of the
wealthy have to be assessed, production must be supervised
and assistance to soldiers' families must be organized."
Finally, Maki was pointing out "the danger of an agreement
between Zionism and imperialism" and urging the Israeli
populace to be "vigilant." Indeed, the Western powers were
relying not only on "the Arab feudal-bourgeois elite" to
implement their intrigues in the Middle East, but also on "the
Zionist leaders, some of whom have a pro-English and some a
pro-American orientation." 1 2 0
Genin's pamphlet was sufficient proof of new breezes, yet it
was not the sole manifestation of the basic deterioration in the
Soviet attitude toward Israel. In December 1948 New Times
devoted an article to anti-Soviet remarks in the Israeli press.
True, these were not ascribed to the Israeli government or
"ruling circles" (although one of the references was to Beterem
which was put out officially by Mapai circles); yet this example
of restraint, which showed that the transformation was not yet
in full swing, did not alter the significance of the article.
Neither signed nor attributed to any specific source, the New
Times article was presumably based on information supplied by
the Soviet Legation in Israel. Its first premise was that while
"the justice and honesty of the Soviet stand on the Palestine
question has, naturally enough, evoked a feeling of gratitude
among the great majority of the people of Israel . . . there are
groups and publications . . . which assume a manifestly hostile
attitude towards the Soviet Union." New Times quoted three
specific examples: Beterem, which had "recently published an
article stuffed with slanderous fabrications concerning the
position of Jews in the Soviet Union," namely that "they are
denied medical care, deprived of the freedom of speech and
organization, etc."; the "Zionist organ," Ha-Mashkif, which
published a "ridiculous . . . report . . . that the Soviet envoy in
Tel Aviv went out 'gathering information' under pretext of a
pleasure stroll"; and Ha-Boker, according to which "the Israeli
mission in Moscow is placed in difficult conditions." During

the U.N. General Assembly session which had just terminated,
New Times maintained, the Israeli "reactionary newspapers did
their best to slur over and ignore the speeches of the Soviet
delegates in defence of Israel." 121
It is unlikely that the articles in Ha-Mashkif and Ha-Boker
singled out by New Times could have caused Moscow any
undue resentment since they in no way exceeded the bounds
set by innumerable articles in the Western press. The Soviet
authorities would hardly, however, have been expected to take
in their stride the article in Beterem and Meir Grossman's
above-mentioned Ha-Mashkif interview with the two members
of the Soviet commercial delegation in Paris, entitled "the Jews
of Russia 'Discover' the Homeland."
This links the official manifestation of the change in the
Soviet attitude to Israel, as expressed in Soviet publications,
with the unofficial manifestation in the form of rumors about
the Israeli Legation and the alleged reason for Mrs. Meyerson's
recall to Israel (see p. 198). It also ties up with the more explicit
attacks on Zionism that appeared in the East European media in
the winter of 1948-49 as a virtually inevitable concomitant of
the campaign against bourgeois nationalism that had taken on
new proportions following the open rift with Yugoslavia in
June 1948. 122 These attacks indeed were a cause for Israeli
concern not only per se but also because they presaged a more
far-reaching change in the Soviet stand toward Israel than was
yet discernible in the USSR. As Shertok said at a press
conference in April 1949, he knew of no change in the Soviet
policy of consistent support for Israel in the international arena,
yet his government was "gravely distressed" by the anti-Zionist
campaign being conducted in some of the states that were close
to the USSR. 123 Moreover, the East European anti-Zionist turn
had immediate practical implications in the People's
Democracies, First, it led to the elimination of the Zionist
organizations that had existed in these countries until this
time —their very existence indeed apparently accounted for the
intensity and severity of the anti-Zionist campaign; in the USSR
itself, where there had been no Zionist movement since the
1920s, a sudden, open offensive against Zionism would have
been difficult to explain. Second, the anti-Zionist drive put an
end to the military aid given Israel in the first months of its
existence (see p. 159), and to all intents and purposes also to
the emigration from Eastern Europe to Israel (see pp. 146-48).
Direct Contacts 217
Nonetheless, Israel itself was not directly attacked at this time

in the East European media. 1 2 4
The Soviet press and radio made only very sparse references
to Israel in the early months of 1949. Although Genin's message
was unequivocal, his pamphlet had no immediate sequel. It
announced to the rank of party propagandists that a basic
change was underway but the sign for further measures was not
yet given, presumably as a result of the obvious inconvenience,
if not actual embarrassment, of directing one's fire against an
object that was still officially in favor. In mid-May 1949, for
example, the Israeli Legation in Moscow learned from a foreign
correspondent there that the TASS correspondent in Tel Aviv
had cabled news of a demonstration of unemployed workers in
Haifa; yet the report did not appear in the Soviet media. 1 2 5 The
one topic that was given some attention was the dissensions
among, and polarization of, Israeli society, some of the major
expressions of which focused on precisely those subjects that
were of prime concern for Soviet foreign policy. In mid-April
1949 Pravda published an item entitled "Israel's reactionaries
endeavor to prevent participation of Jewish delegation at World
Congress of Peace Partisans"; the paper specified in particular
the efforts made by the ruling party's organ, Ha-Dor, to obstruct
the participation at the congress of Israeli "progressive
elements." 1 2 6 TASS noted that an Israeli preparatory committee
representing all "the public and political organizations" in
Israel which adhered to the convening of the congress had
elected delegates, although only those delegates already abroad
would attend, the remainder being refused exit permits. Radio
Moscow meanwhile called upon all political, trade union,
scientific and cultural organizations as well as all the country's
progressive citizens to support the congress and in so doing to
demonstrate their dedication to peace and their determination
not to be dragged into the net of the warmongers. 1 2 7 Radio
Moscow also reported in mid-May the celebration organized by
the Israeli-Soviet Friendship Society on the occasion of the
second anniversary of Gromyko's speech. The Society's
secretary, it was noted, emphasized "the consistency and
friendly sincerity of the Soviet attitude on the Palestine
question" and insisted, to the accompaniment of stormy
applause, that "the people of Israel would not permit their
country to be converted into an Anglo-U.S. military base." 1 2 8
* * *
The direct contact between the USSR and Israel thus

confused and disrupted the conduct of Soviet-Israeli relations
even during a period in which the official Soviet attitude
toward Israel was sympathetic and in which the USSR gave
Israel public support in the international arena. The connection
was further disturbed by developments in the international
arena in general and within the Eastern bloc in particular
which were not in any way a function of, or even linked per se
with, the Soviet-Israeli relationship.
The Soviet Jewish reaction to the establishment of the State of
Israel and to official Soviet support of its war of independence,
on the one hand, and the exacerbation of the cold war and the
Soviet rift with Tito, with the resulting hermetic sealing of the
Iron Curtain and the campaign against bourgeois nationalism,
on the other, belied the viability of the Soviet-Israeli
partnership.
In the spring of 1949 both sides were still maintaining the
semblances of friendship and goodwill. The new Soviet foreign
minister, Andrei Vyshinskii, demonstrated an obviously
friendly attitude in his farewell conversation with Mrs.
Meyerson on her departure from the USSR in April. Shortly
before, in mid-March, Vyshinskii had confirmed in a talk with
Namir that the persistent Soviet support of the Jewish people's
just demands and of the State of Israel's endeavors to guarantee
its independence since the beginning of the international
debate on Palestine had conformed with the fundamental
principles of Soviet foreign policy. On the same occasion, too,
the Soviet foreign minister expressed the hope that the friendly
relations between the two states would continue, to their
mutual advantage. 129 Mrs. Meyerson, for her part, made two
separate statements in April in one of which she stressed her
conviction as to the positive attitude of the USSR toward Israel,
while in the other she said she would always remember the
profound understanding for Israel's problems demonstrated by
the Soviet officials she had met with as minister in Moscow. 130
Despite these expressions of goodwill, there were signs that
the partnership was wearing thin. Indeed, if the basis of the
Soviet-Israeli community of interests and the Soviet purpose in
supporting the Yishuv and the State of Israel throughout 1948
are borne in mind, it will not be difficult to .comprehend the
change that was occurring. By the spring of 1949 Britain had
Direct Contacts 219
been ousted from Palestine and Israel's place and viable

existence among the community of nations were established. In
other words, there was no longer a strategic, geo-political
necessity for Moscow to continue its support for Israel (nor,
incidentally, any vital necessity for Israel to seek that support).
Moreover, one of the fundamental conditions of Soviet support,
the severance of Soviet Jewry from the State of Israel, had not
been fulfilled. On the contrary, the institutions responsible for
internal security and the bodies which were conducting the
purge in the Soviet intellectual community of cosmopolitan
elements—suspected of disloyalty to the Soviet Union and
being a danger to their socialist motherland by virtue of their
attachment to kindred groupings abroad—now had positive
proof of a living link between Jews in the USSR and the new
Jewish State. (The months December 1948-April 1949, as will
be shown in chapter 7, saw the peak of the anti-cosmopolitan
campaign.)
Finally, although the USSR does not at any stage seem IU
have entertained hopes that a Soviet-oriented regime would be
established in the Jewish State, Israel's linkage with the U.S.
government, and not merely with U.S. Jewry, provided obvious
proof that there was no real hope for any substantial or
long-sustained neutrality. This linkage, which was given
manifest expression in the $100 million loan, was all the more
decisive in view of, on the one hand, Israel's urgent need for
economic assistance and, on the other, the Soviet Union's
physical and conceptual inability to give any parallel aid.
Notes
1. R. Moscow, 17 May 1948/SWB Í, 21 May 1948; and Izvestiia, 18

May 1948. Both the broadcast and the press published Molotov's
telegram to Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok together with the latter's
15 May telegram to his Soviet counterpart announcing the
establishment of the Jewish State in accordance with the 29 November
1947 resolution, calling for Soviet recognition and expressing gratitude
for Soviet support for the creation of the State.
2. Davar, 18 June 1948.
3. R. Prague, 5 June 1948/SWB J, 11 June 1948.
4. Voice of Israel, 4 August 1948/SWB III, 12 August 1948.
5. Voice of Israel in English, 31 January 1949/SWB III, 10 February
1949.
6. Voice of Israel, 27 May 1949/SWB W, 31 May 1949.

7. PAP in English, 3 July 1948, and R. Warsaw in Yiddish, 6 July
1948/SWB Í, 12 July 1948. A similar theme was voiced by Itzik
Fefer-R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 23 August 1948/SWB Í,
30 August 1948.
8. Namir, p. 114.
9. Ibid., pp. 116-21.
10. Davar, 29 July 1948.
12. Pravda, 26 June 1948.
13. U.S. Minister James McDonald arrived on 12 August, and the
two missions resided for a short period in the same building, the Gat
Rimon Hotel in Tel Aviv. The Soviet minister was dean of the
diplomatic corps until McDonald superseded him on being appointed
ambassador on 4 February 1949.
14. Davar, 10 August 1948; Pravda, 11 August 1948; and James C.
McDonald, My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951 (London: Victor Gollancz,
1951), p. 35.
15. Davar, 12 August 1948; Ha-Aretz a n d / T A , 13 August 1948; and
Ben Gurion, p. 255.
16. Davar, 9, 14, 17 and 22 September 1948.
17. Voice of Israel in English, 22 and 31 October 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 28
October and 4 November 1948; and TASS in Russian for abroad, 23
October 1948/SWB Í, 29 October 1948.
18. Davar, 8 November and 21 December 1948; and Voice of Israel
in Arabic, 29 December 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 6 January 1949. For the content
of the talk with Ben Gurion, cf. p. 146.
19. Counselor Mukhin, for example, visited the Foreign Ministry in
the wake of the shooting down of the five British Spitfires on 7 January
1949 (see following chapter). Reuter as well as Arab sources attributed
to the visit the purpose of suggesting military aid to Israel—R. Paris, 9
January 1949, and R. Baghdad, 10 January 1949/SWB ÍÍÍ, 13 and 20
January 1949.
20. Ha-Mashkif, 11 August 1948.
21. The author's resume of the Legation's relationship with Maki is
based chiefly on his interview with Zondel Abin (Berl Balti), at the
time a Maki Central Committee member, 26 February 1970, OHD 50/18.
22. The discussion of these ties and their role in the relationship
between the two states seems essential to any attempt to examine
Soviet-Israeli relations, despite the inherent methodological dangers.
(The dangers emanate from two sources: an inclination to exaggerate
the significance of contacts between any Soviet diplomatic mission and
domestic factors in the country to which it is accredited; and
Direct Contacts 221
retrospection —which may lead to cynicism that can distort a correct

historical evaluation of factors other than the political-strategic, that
seems to provide the leitmotif of Soviet foreign policy in general and
Middle Eastern policy in particular.)
23. The author is grateful for information on the activities of the
Soviet diplomatic staff in Israel in general and its relationship to
Mapam in particular to Mr. L. Levite, who was also party to some
aspects of the analysis (cf. my interview with him, 28 May 1970, OHD
50/22). I was not, however, able to accept Mr. Levite's premise that the
Soviet Union's contacts with Mapam were also connected with hopes
for the creation in Israel of a revolutionary situation, for although in
the circumstances of the period such an anticipation was not
unusual —in view of the world's general instability and widespread
expectations of social and political revolutionary change—the USSR
seems to have accepted a priori the fact that Israel belonged to the
capitalist world. This does not detract from the assumption that
Mapam considered its major Zionist mission to be the search for paths
to the "world of tomorrow," a task that it alone was capable of
fulfilling. Indeed, one of the resolutions adopted at its founding
convention in January 1948 included an appeal to the workers of the
world and to the USSR. This was the framework of the connections it
established and maintained in Israel and abroad with left-wing
movements and organizations, including Communist parties. Mention
has already been made of the visit of a Mapam leading figure to the
Cominform offices in Belgrade in the" spring of 1948; and of the
comings and goings of left-wing individuals and delegations in Eastern
Europe both before and after the amalgamation of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair
and Ahdut Ha-Avoda. Correspondents of Communist organs visiting
Israel in 1948 (J'Humanité and the British and American Daily Worker)
also sought contact with the Mapam Center, since they found that the
Israeli Communist Party, which came into being as such during 1948,
was neither an influential political factor nor represented in either the
agriculture or military sector of the country.
24. The reply, dated March 1949, appeared in stencil under the
caption "In the margin of the pamphlet —The Palestine Problem." The
Soviet mission countered such protests by saying that all that was
published in the USSR did not necessarily receive official sanction.
Manifestly, it did not welcome the attempt to polemicize with Soviet
publications, especially as Levite's exegesis was disseminated among
Soviet institutions—the Foreign Ministry, a number of embassies,
etc.—the same addresses to which Mapam sent its Russian-language
information bulletin. For the official nature of Genin's pamphlet, cf. p.
212.
25. Trud, 26 January 1949. The reunification of the Arab and Jewish
Communists who had split in 1943 (cf. above, chap. 2, n. 60) was
announced in mid-October 1948. The Hebrew Communists had organ-
ized as a party in October 1947 in succession to the Communist
League of Palestine which had been established in 1945. The Hebrew
Communists eventually dispersed in August 1949, a resolution of a
party convention announcing the event and advising its members to
join Mapam since it had not been possible to attain the party's ends
through a separate existence.
26. His chief intention was presumably to investigate possibilities of
influencing it or using it to publish specific information and to give
expression to certain views; cf. pp. 181-82.
27. JTA, 16 August 1948.
28. From protocol of the meeting, 30 August 1948 (in the private
possession of Mr. L. Tarnopoler).
29. Yedidut Yisrael-Brit Ha-Moatzot, May 1949.
30. It was this carefully elaborated evaluation of the Israeli political
scene, according to Zirulnikov, that later enabled the USSR to exploit
the transformation in Soviet policy toward Israel, first from active
support to reservation and then to a totally negative stand, to polarize
the differences prevalent in the workers' movement —from author's
interviews with S. Zirulnikov, 11 February, 25 March and 15 April
1970, OHD, 50/16, and M. Idelberg, 13 December 1970.
31. From author's interview with Zondel Abin, see n. 21 above.
32. The Legation must have employed both Jewish and Arab
inhabitants of the country to summarize and render into Russian the
material from the local press and radio thought to be of interest to
Moscow.
The detailed and comprehensive account of the composition,
working and activity of another Soviet diplomatic mission by a Soviet
diplomat, Aleksandr Kaznacheev, who defected to the West can greatly
help us to understand the activity of the Soviet Legation in Israel,
despite the obvious differences in the circumstances, etc., of the two
missions. Kaznacheev narrates how the Soviet diplomats had to read
English-language publications, since only one member of the Legation
knew the language of the country concerned. Special employees were
hired to read newspapers in the vernacular and translate the sections
that were of particular interest to the Soviet Union, most of which
referred specifically to the USSR, domestic developments in the
country concerned or to the regional area. The TASS representative,
who was officially connected to the embassy although directly
subordinate to TASS in Moscow, employed further translators and
editors who put out daily TASS bulletins for dissemination in local
Direct Contacts 223
government offices and among political organizations. Finally, the

Legation received articles prepared by Soviet security and intelligence
services to be disseminated among local agents for publication in one
or more of the local organs, usually with a pro-Soviet orientation. The
paper would reproduce this material, sometimes with slight changes,
and sign it "our special correspondent" and then it would be sent back
to Moscow a. to appear in Soviet media and b. to be rechanneled to
Soviet missions in other countries of the regions concerned. The main
purpose of this operation, according to Kaznacheev, is to worsen
relations between neighboring countries and between the different
countries of the world and the West—Aleksandr Kaznacheev, inside a
Soviet Embassy (Philadelphia and New York; J. P. Lippincott, 1962).
33. This is the considered opinion of a central Maki figure, Berl
Balti, see interview, n. 21.
34. R. Haganah in Arabic, 4 July 1948, and Voice of Israel in Arabic,
27 July 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 8 July and 5 August 1948; Jewish Chronicle, 16
July 1947; and Davar, 27 July 1948; also R. Cairo, 9 January 1949, and
R. Damascus, 10 February 1949/SWB ÍÍÍ, 13 January and 17 February
1949. For Soviet interest in the Orthodox Church in the area, cf. also
p. 35.
35. For the composition of the Legation staff, see Davar, 30 August
1948. The non-diplomats included the minister's private secretary, a
single Russian and Hebrew secretary for the entire Legation, a
French-language secretary and a chauffeur. Levavi as consul was
appointed immigration officer by Israeli Minister of Immigration
Moshe Shapiro on 26 October 1948 (Namir, p. 293); the actual
inclusion of consular functions in the activities of the two legations
agreed upon in the preliminary exchange of letters between the two
foreign ministers in May 1948 (cf. p. 174) was presumably intended by
the Soviet authorities first and foremost to enable their diplomatic
personnel in Israel to establish contact with Armenians and other
potential repatriates, Soviet citizens, etc.
36. Pravda, 3 September 1948. The Soviet press also listed Mrs.
Meyerson among those who offered their condolences on the death of
Andrei Zhdanov (he had died on 31 August)—Pravda, 5 September
1948.
38. Izvestiia, 11 September 1948. As head of the Presidium of the
R S F S R Supreme Soviet, Vlasov was the senior deputy of the
chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Nikolai
Shvernik.
39. Namir, pp. 82, 86 and 115-16; and Voice of Israel in English, 11
April 1949/SWB III, 21 April 1949.
40. For the isolation which foreign diplomatic missions as a whole

suffered in the USSR, cf. Namir; Bedell Smith, pp. 98-108; and
Harrison E. Salisbury, Moscow Journal (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1961). Non-bloc missions were kept segregated also from the
missions of the Soviet bloc countries which presumably had their own
difficulties. The naivety of the Israeli diplomats is probably best
illustrated by Mrs. Meyerson's hopes that on Friday evenings "local
people would drop in . . . for a piece of cake and a cup of tea with
us"—Golda Meir, My Life (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Steimatsky, 1975),
p.202. The futility of its activities and the concomitant frustrations led
inter alia to the reduction of the Israeli Legation staff in the late Stalin
period (cf. Israeli Government Yearbooks).
41. Bedell Smith, p. 183; Salisbury, pp. 239, 286, 303-8 and 377;
Namir, pp. 79 and 157-58; Annabelle Bucar, The Truth About Ameri-
can Diplomats (Moscow: Literaturnaia gazeta, 1949); and R. Moscow,
27 and 28 February, and 1 March 1949/SWB I, 4 March 1949.
42. Namir, pp. 109-11.
43. The American Jewish writer Ben-Zion Goldberg who in 1946
visited the USSR and its main Jewish centers as the guest of the Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee had recorded a lively interest among Jews in
events in Palestine—The League for Friendly Relations with the USSR
(Hebrew), no. 10 (November 1946). When Goldberg spoke at the main
synagogue in Moscow on Passover, his references to Palestine and the
struggle of the Yishuv had met with loud applause. This had recurred
on other occasions in other communities he had toured.
44. Kol Ha-Am, 29 January 1948.
45. New Times, 1 January 1948.
46. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 7 January 1948/SWB I, 12
January 1948.
47. Aynikeit, 11 December 1947.
48. Ibid., 13 December 1947.
49. Ibid., 6 October 1948.
50. Voice of Israel in English, 28 June 1948/SWB III, 8 July 1948; for
the Committee's telegram, see p. 305.
51. Professor Mikhail Zand, then a student at Leningrad University,
has given a concrete example. "Upon the outbreak of Israel's war of
independence," he recalled many years later, "I knew no rest. . . . I
wrote a letter to Stalin, saying: 'We ask the USSR which is supporting
the Jews' war against imperialism to permit young Jews through the
intermediacy of student organizations, to go to Palestine to help in the
struggle against imperialism, and to serve in this way the interests of
the USSR'. . . . I did not sign the request with my name," Zand went
on, "but with two surnames, as if two Jewish youths had written the
Direct C o n t a c t s 225
letter. . . . 1 received no reply (presumably because the M.V.D. — the

Ministry of the Interior —did not discover the identity of the writer).
My closest friend Lunia Rothstein . . . received 'a reply'. He wrote a
similar letter to Stalin and signed his own name. Shortly afterwards he
was sentenced to eight years in a Soviet prison"—Maariv, 9 July 1971.
For further examples of Jews who sought to go to Israel to fight in its
war of independence, see pp. 200-2.
52. Jewish Chronicle, 3 September 1948.
53. Ha-Mashkif, 19 November 1948.
54. Namir, pp. 293-94.
55. Cf., e.g., Voice of Israel, 12 September 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 16
September 1948; and Jewish Chronicle, 29 October 1948.
56. Namir, pp. 48-50; and Voice of Israel, 12 September 1948/SWB
ÍÍÍ, 16 September 1948.
57. Pravda, 21 September 1948. In a conversation with Shlomo
Zirulnikov, activist of the Israeli League for Friendly Relations with
the USSR, in 1948 (cf. pp. 180-81), the Soviet Legation's first secretary,
Vladimir Roshkov, mentioned that during their preparations for
coming to Israel the Soviet foreign minister had talked of the affinity
and mutual attraction of Jews the world over, a phenomenon whose
irrational nature had left Roshkov at least with a feeling of impotence
and mystic apprehension. From author's interview with Zirulnikov, see
n. 30 above.
58. R. Moscow in Yiddish, 26 October 1948/SWB Í, 1 November
1948.
59. Jewish Chronicle, 8 October 1948.
60. Namir, pp. 64-66.
61. Ibid., pp. 66-67. The prayer for those who had fallen in the
Israeli war of independence was read again the following year on the
Day of Atonement, but after that was heard no more.
62. Meir, p. 206; for the conviction prevalent in Israel that Soviet
Jewry had lost almost all ties with the Yishuv, see above, p. 205.
63. Jewish Chronicle, 29 October 1948; and Maariv, 28 January 1972
(Weekly Supplement, pp. 30-31).
64. Jewish Chronicle, 29 October 1948.
65. Namir, pp. 83-84.
66. Meir, p. 208.
67. See chap. 7.
68. It has been suggested that the actual demonstrations were in part
at least a provocation. This idea is based upon the premise that the
authorities could have prevented them from taking place had they
wished to, especially since the demonstrations must have been largely
anticipated following the reception given the Israeli diplomats on their
first visit to the synagogue, as well as other indications of Soviet

Jewish interest in Israel. According to this theory, the point in holding
the demonstrations was to enable the authorities to note the number,
nature and identity of their participants —author's interview with
Moshe Sneh, who suggested this version, December 1970, OHD 50/24.
69. Cf. p. 200.
70. Namir, pp. 19 and 254.
71. Ibid., pp. 62-63 and 98.
72. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
73. Cf. ibid., pp. 51, 61 and 87. It is perhaps of interest that Namir
had asked the acting head of the Middle and Near East Department at
the Soviet foreign ministry on 27 September 1948 "to find out the
possibilities for contact with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
(which, to our surprise, had not approached us)." This request is one
of several indications that the Israeli diplomats were under the illusion
that the local Jews maintaining contact with them were in no danger if
such contact were established through official channels.
74. For the elimination of Jewish culture in the USSR in late 1948,
its background and implications, see chap. 7.
75. Namir's 10 September talk with the synagogue officials (see p.
190) had been conducted in Hebrew, lasted two hours and included an
active discussion of developments in and concerning Israel; it had
been followed by a meeting between Second Secretary Levavi and
Rabbi Shleifer on 26 September, when the former had brought six
Israeli etrogim (a citrus used in the rites of the Feast of Tabernacles).
This time the talk covered the attendance in synagogue of the Legation
personnel at the forthcoming Jewish festival services, as well as
technicalities connected with the handing over to the Moscow
synagogue of a Scroll of the Law sent through Israel's diplomatic
representatives by the Great Synagogue in Tel Aviv. In the end the
Israeli diplomats brought the Scroll to the synagogue in a ceremony,
the attendance at which was carefully restricted —Namir, pp. 46-48,
63-64, and 154. For a later contact, held in an atmosphere of
reservations and misgivings, see p. 197 below.
76. Namir, pp. 69 and 86-89.
77. For Zhemchuzhina's exile, which lasted till after Stalin's death,
its context, and implications for Molotov himself, cf. Svetlana
Alliluyeva, Letters to a Friend (London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 119,
127 and 204; also Khrushchev Remembers (London: Andre Deutsch,
1971), pp. 259-61.
78. Izvestiia, 27 February 1949; and Vecherniaia Moskva, 28
February 1949. For the significance of these aktiv meetings in the
context of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, cf. pp. 317 and 319.
Direct Contacts 227
79. This Act which both defined the nature of state secrets and
increased the punishment for their disclosure, included just about
every possible topic of discussion in the category of state secrets.
80. The Israeli Legation for its part attributed the rumors about these
reprisals against Jews who had participated in the High Holy Day
demonstrations or otherwise manifested sympathy for Israel, to the
atmosphere of fear that characterized Stalinist Russia and bred all
kinds of exaggerated stories —Namir, p. 154.
81. Ibid., p. 39; cf. n. 40 above.
82. Ibid., pp. 67-68 and 264; cf. below.
83. E.g., a Jewish employee of a Moscow museum who paid several
visits to the Legation—ibid., p. 264.
84. Private sources.
85. Namir, pp. 71 and 125-26.
86. Ibid., pp. 126-27. In late April 1949 the Voice of Israel reported
that the first immigrant from the USSR had reached Prague.
87. Private sources.
88. Namir, pp. 72 and 197-300.
89. Ibid., p. 298.
90. Ibid., pp. 98-99. Mrs. Meyerson told Bakulin that there were
meetings, but only very rare ones.
91. Ibid., pp. 109-10.
92. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
93. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
94. Cf. pp. 150 ff. As late as the end of 1950, in a talk with Sharett,
Vyshinskii expressed satisfaction at immigration to Israel from
Romania —Namir, p. 301.
95. Israel had applied officially for U.N. membership on 29
November 1948, see p. 264.
96. Namir, p. 254. That this was not the original intention of Israeli
diplomacy was pointed out by Gershon Agronsky, the editor of the
Palestine Post, who said early in October on a visit to Ireland: "Jews
are not allowed to leave Russia for Palestine, and one of the first tasks
of the Israeli Minister to Moscow will be to try and negotiate for
facilities which will permit at least those with relatives in Israel to
leave"— Jewish Chronicle, 8 October 1948.
97. Cf. p. 190.
98. These rumors claimed that Israel's diplomats in the Soviet
capital had contacted Jews in the synagogue and sought to intervene
with the Soviet government on the immigration to Israel of Soviet Jews
(see pp. 197-98) and also linked the name of Mrs. Meyerson with the
arrests in December 1948-January 1949 of well-known Jewish figures,
although in fact no connection existed between them, as well as with
the demonstrations in the synagogue in October which the Soviet

authorities were specifically said to have disapproved of.
99. Ben Gurion, pp. 140, 149, 215-16 and 379; McDonald, p. 125;
Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 1, p. 154. Also Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol.
5, part 2, pp. 1043, 1073, 1104-5, 1120-21, 1170, 1261-62, 1301, 1306,
1313, 1345-46, 1391, 1432, 1468-69, 1514, 1633, 1674, 1676, 1679 n.
and 1690.
100. For the debate, see Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 1, pp. 58-59 and
147-68.
101. Ibid.; and Izvestiia, 20 March 1949.
102. Namir, pp. 118-19.
103. Ibid., pp. 142 and 156.
104. Ibid., pp. 46, 64 and 155.
105. Cf., e.g., Aleksandr Paniushkin's statement at the Second
Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly —GA OR, 2nd Special
Session, 1st Commitee, 123rd Meeting, 23 April 1948.
106. Davar, 24 December 1948.
107. Namir, p. 155.
108. Voice of Israel in Yiddish, 29 December 1948, and in English, 2
and 22 February 1949/SWB ÍÍÍ, 6 January, 10 February and 3 March
1949.
109. Namir, p. 155.
110. On 26 September Rabbi Shleifer told Israeli Legation Secretary
Lapid that for some three months parcels had not been arriving from
Israel, as had previously been customary —ibid., p. 63. The dispatch of
the Jewish Agency's Russian-language PaJcor bulletins also stopped at
this period.
111. Thus in June 1948 the organ of the Israeli Communist Youth
League KoJ Ha-Noar published a letter from the Soviet Anti-Fascist
Youth Committee signed by "leading secretary" N. Rogol'skaia to the
League coordinator, Sasha Hinin, which began: "We have received
your letter and agree to your suggestion concerning exchanges of
letters and information." Soviet youth, the letter claimed, was very
interested in "developments in Palestine . . . the way of life, work and
studies of your youth" and asked for material on "the activities of your
movement" and its attitude to the World Federation of Democratic
Youth. The Soviet Committee would, for its part, send "brochures,
books, articles from journals and newspapers, information on Soviet
youth." Moreover, "comrades wishing to correspond with young
Soviet people can write to the address of our committee. In their letters
they should note with whom they wish to correspond, their occupation
and age. By means of this correspondence we shall establish and
intensify the ties between the youth of our countries." Despite its
Direct Contacts 229
promises, this letter does not seem to have had any sequel.
112. Namir, pp. 57-58. Although Namir talks of the V League, the
reference is clearly to the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR
(the V League having changed its name in December 1945). For the
League's complaints that it had no viable channel of contact with
Soviet bodies, cf. p. 180. As for VOKS, it was going through difficult
times, including organizational changes which must have limited its
authority and reflected on its activities. The society's main activities
were contacts with foreign friendship associations, front organizations,
groups of left-wing intellectuals, e t c . - T A S S , 8 October 1948/SWB Í, 15
October 1948.
113. Namir, pp. 61, 94 and 134-35.
114. R. Prague, for example, said on 4 January 1949 [SWB I, 10
January 1949) that Britain "felt alarmed about her position in the
Middle East, since a relatively strong military power had arisen there
whose political views seemed . . . much too favourably inclined
towards the East."
115. Private sources; it is probably relevant that Heifetz, like the
Committee's first secretary, Shakhno Epstein, had connections with the
Soviet secret services and had filled an intelligence post in the U.S.A.
before joining the Committee—cf. David Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 415, 435, 439,
467 and 469.
116. Kurier Codzienny, quoted by R. Warsaw, 25 January 1949/SWB
Í, 31 January 1949.
117. Trud, 26 January 1948. Mikunis had made this statement on 20
January and a similar one on the following day—KoJ Ha-Am 21, 23
and 25 January 1949.
119. Izvestiia, 11 March 1949. East European sources, on the other
hand, significantly noted that Mapam's exclusion from the government
conformed with U.S. w i s h e s - P A P in English, 14 March 1949/SWB Í,
18 March 1949. Mapam had secured 19 out of 120 seats in the Israeli
Knesset, and Maki together with the Hebrew^ Communists —a further 5.
For the formation of the government and the negotiations that
preceded it, see Ben Gurion, pp. 361-69.
120. I. A. Genin, Palestinskaia problema (The Palestine Problem)
(Moscow: Pravda, 1948).
121. New Times, 16 December 1948. The article in Beterem which
aroused Soviet indignation was presumably Harry Schwartz's "How
Russia Solved the Jewish Problem" (Beterem, September 1948, pp.
14-19). Schwartz noted that there were no Jews among "the rising stars
of Soviet political life. . . . One can hardly find Jews any longer among
the USSR's representatives abroad. . . . American journalists in

Moscow report that Jews are no longer accepted for training for
diplomatic missions. . . . The author of these lines has noticed that
Pravda and Izvestiia hardly mention the national affiliation of Jews
when they report their attainment of orders of merit of one sort or
another," as was the practice in the case of members of other
nationalities. In addition, Schwartz went on, anti-Semitism was
increasing, while the Jewish centers had disintegrated. He noted that
the U.S. Yiddish publicist Ben-Zion Goldberg, who was
considered —he stressed —a sympathizer with the USSR, had written in
Der Tog that there were no Jewish neighborhoods in the Soviet cities,
no Jewish religious functionaries, hospitals, old-age homes, clubs,
charities or educational institutions.
As for Ha-Mashkif, it had published several articles—in addition to
that of Meir Grossman (cf. pp. 188-89) attacking the USSR on the
difficult position of Soviet Jewry and calling for the release of arrested
Zionists, the study of Hebrew and permission of emigration to Israel.
The paper had also, however, attacked Minister Ershov, notably in an
article called "Ershov's Cocktail Party," which had charged him with
inviting to the 7 November Revolution celebration only the editors of
Davar, A J Ha-Mishmar and Kol Ha-Am, while ignoring the rest of the
journalist community.
122. For the attacks on Zionism in Eastern Europe in these months
see Meyer, et a l , pp. 130-37, 309-12, 459-62, 535-37 and 613; also
Namir, p. 28; cf. also chap. 4, n. 14 above.
123. Voice of Israel in English, 24 April 1949, and Voice of
Jerusalem, 25 April 1949/SWB IV, 3 May 1949.
124. R. Budapest, for example, on 10 January 1949 {SWB I, 14
January 1949), pointed out that while Israel's leaders were the same
Zionist politicians who had for two decades been the obedient
instrument of British imperialism, it was undeniable that Israel, which
was struggling for its existence, represented the most active
anti-imperialist element in the Middle East.
125. Namir, p. 135.
126. Pravda, 16 April 1949.
127. R. Moscow, 20 April 1949, and TASS, 21 April 1949/SWB I, 26
April 1949.
128. R. Moscow, 17 May 1949/SWB I, 20 May 1949. The "Israeli-
Soviet Friendship Society" is presumably the League for Friendly Rela-
tions with the USSR.
129. Namir, p. 113.
130. Voice of Israel, 1 and 19 April 1949/SWB III, 9 April 1949, and
SWB IV, 26 April 1949.
6
Soviet Backing
at the United Nations,
May 1948-May 1949
The international arena had been largely preoccupied with
the Palestine question for just over a year when the State of
Israel came into existence. This event did not, however, relegate
the problem to the background; for nearly another year the
Palestine War continued to ensure that it remain in the center
of the stage.
During this period the Soviet Union rendered Israel all-out
assistance from the central rostrum of its political struggle. The
convergence of Soviet and Israeli interests received its fullest
and most open expression at the United Nations. Earlier the
USSR had made a significant contribution to the success of the
partition recommendation of the UNSCOP majority and,
following the adoption of the partition resolution on 29
November 1947, had demanded and promoted its unqualified
and speedy implementation. Now it continued to insist upon
both the justness and the viability of that resolution.
Concomitantly, it gave Israel every support in its determination
to withstand not only the military onslaught of the Arab armies
but also the simultaneous political assault of the Arab states at
the U.N. where the Arabs were supported consistently by
Britain and often also by other powers.
THE SOVIET UNION IDENTIFIES WITH ISRAEL
The establishment of the State of Israel was of obvious

significance for the Soviet Union. Yet it was not a landmark
231
that necessitated a reassessment of Soviet policy on the

Palestine question. It did not terminate the Palestine War that
had been in progress since 30 November 1947 but rather
exacerbated it. Although it signified a further step in the
struggle to expel the British from Palestine, it did not in itself
comprise a final stage in the campaign to deprive Britain of its
strategic positions and political influence in the country.
The entry into Palestine of the armies of five Arab states
merely served, therefore, to bring to a climax previous
manifestations of Soviet support for the Jewish cause. In the
first months of Israel's existence the sympathy voiced by Soviet
officialdom in its encounters with Israeli diplomats and other
representatives was thus coupled not only with increased
military aid in the form of Czechoslovak arms and a
coordinated Communist bloc immigration effort. It was also
accompanied by a very meaningful demonstration of support
for the Israeli cause at the U.N.
In this period Soviet support for Israel was also reflected in
no uncertain terms by the Soviet press and radio. Although at
first they had no representatives in Palestine, the Soviet media
relayed TASS reports from Arab and Western countries and
made use of a wide variety of sources. These included
information put out by the sides directly concerned in the
fighting though, as the B.B.C. monitoring services noted, "the
Voice of Israel was more generously quoted." All in all, the
B.B.C. recorded that during the second half of May Palestine
"occupied more of Moscow's broadcasting time than any other
question . . . a great mass of material on the progress of events
being put out for the Soviet press and foreign, as well as home,
listeners being provided with a number of commentaries." 1
The general tone of the reporting was sympathetic to Israel.
The Jewish State's struggle was described as a national
liberation war, while the Arab armies were portrayed as
invaders and aggressors who violated the basic norms of
international law and custom and whose connections included
not only Britain but also former Nazi officers. The measure of
identification with the Israeli cause was clear too, from
allusions to the Arabs as "the enemy" or "adversary." (It made
little difference to the effect of such wording that it was used in
citations from foreign sources.)
On 17 May the Soviet central press quoted "the Tel Aviv
press" to inform its readers that the armies of the Arab states
had "invaded the Jewish State of Israel." 2 The Cominform organ
Soviet Backing at the U.N. 233
likewise noted that hardly had the formation of the State of

Israel been announced when "the five British-controlled Arab
states: Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq and the Lebanon acting
on the instructions of the British Government, declared war on
Israel". Their simultaneous crossing into Israel "from the South,
North and East . . . proved that the new slaughter had been
arranged beforehand in accordance with a well prepared plan." 3
The Soviet public was reminded repeatedly of the
participation of British officers and soldiers in the Arab armies
and of the inspiration, assistance and instructions these
received from Britain. Moreover, it was stressed, Britain even
retained forces in Palestine for some six weeks after Israeli
independence, troops that were said to be taking an active part
in the fighting on the Arab side and generally obstructing the
Israeli war effort.4
On the whole, Soviet reports introduced an element of
ridicule as well as censure into their criticism of the Arab
invasion of Palestine. Despite the size of the Arab armies they
were being put to shame by the Israelis. "From the moment of
its inception," New Times wrote, "the new state had been
under the necessity of waging a defensive war against the
incursion into Palestine of the regular armies of Arab countries"
together with the Arab Legion and "the 20,000 'volunteers' " of
"the so-called 'Palestine Liberation Army' . . . recruited in
various Arab countries from among members of reactionary and
semifascist organizations" and including "a certain number of
German Nazis." The Egyptian command, moreover, the Soviet
source noted, had ordered its troops to "exterminate the Jewish
civilian population on their way."
The ineffectiveness of the Arab military effort was attributed
inter alia to "serious rivalry" among the Arab governments
which was revealed "from the very first days of the invasion."
New Times noted that Saudi Arabia and Egypt sought, together
with "the Hitlerite ex-mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni,
who aspires to be president of a 'united and indivisible
Palestine'," to counter the advance of the Transjordanian army.
The Syrians and Lebanese, according to the same source, were
also apprehensive lest 'Abdallah seize with Iraqi help "the
Mediterranean littoral and northern part of Palestine" and then
"proclaim his 'Greater Syria'," a plan to which 'Abdallah, "in
sending his troops into Palestine," was in fact "trying to give
practical shape." 5
The corollary of Arab ineffectiveness in the field was Jewish
military prowess and success. Contrary to Arab reports,

Izvestiia noted before the end of May, Israel controlled most of
new Jerusalem and the territory allotted the Jewish State by the
partition resolution. The Jewish forces had repulsed the
onslaught of five Arabs armies and gone over to the offensive,
notably in the Galilee. 6 Although the Arab leaders had reckoned
that they would achieve "an easy victory," one Soviet
commentator wrote, "events have shown that such hopes are
vain." 7 In a public lecture in Moscow in mid- or late June 1948,
a Soviet commentator said that the truce alone had prevented
the Jewish forces from actually defeating the "Arab
reactionaries" and "British puppets." 8 (The reference is to the
first truce that came into effect on 11 June —see below.)
The rejection of the Arab argument regarding Palestine
followed logically from the above. "The leaders of the notorious
League of Arab countries," Pravda wrote, "do not conceal that
the purpose of the military operations conducted by the Arab
States is the annihilation of the recently formed State of Israel."
The Arab states sought to use their armed forces to prevent the
Jewish people of Palestine from implementing its right of
national self-determination and of forming its own independent
state. The action of the Arab countries could only be described
as an act of completely unprovoked aggression which violated
the legitimate rights of the Jewish people and flouted the
fundamental principles of the United Nations Organization
Charter. Pravda continued: "To depict the State of Israel's Jew-
ish population of several hundred thousand as a threat to the
tens of millions of Arabs who inhabit the Near East is to mock
at the facts, to scoff at sound reason." 9
A considerable proportion of Soviet reporting on Palestine
was devoted to the speeches of the Soviet U.N. delegation
which, Pravda emphasized, continued to back the partition
resolution, in contrast to the Western states which violated it
and sought to retract it. The paper argued that Britain could not
pretend to support the U.N. when it suited it (as it had done
over Iran and Greece) and yet ignore the U.N. when it was
convenient, as in the case of Palestine. 10
The Soviet U.N. delegation, however, did not content itself
with enjoying its unusual status as supporter of a major U.N.
resolution. The USSR's continued support of Israel at the U.N.
had two practical purposes: the strategic military purpose of
ensuring the total withdrawal of Britain from Palestine, which
meant in fact guaranteeing Israel's independent existence; and
the tactical political goal of securing and preserving recognized

Soviet participation in the international handling of the
Palestine issue. The latter was to be attained by concentrating
this handling in the Security Council, which on the whole
suited Israeli ends as well; the Western powers, headed by the
U.S.A., sought on the other hand to prevent any active Soviet
participation in the settlement of the Palestine question by
establishing a number of ad hoc bodies and frameworks to deal
with Palestine.
Between 15 and 29 May the Security Council convened for no
less than 20 sessions, the sole issue on the agenda of most of
them being the Palestine situation. At the first of these sessions,
Ukrainian delegate Vasilii Tarasenko, in reply to an Egyptian
statement that the intervention in Palestine was designed solely
to restore order and security in that country, said that
"according to the rules of the international community, each
Government has the right to restore order only in its own
country." 1 1
Two days later Gromyko urged the Council to adopt a
resolution calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and
the postponement of all other issues until after the cease-fire.
He was referring to a U.S. draft resolution, which a. stipulated
that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to and
violation of the peace; b. ordered all the governments and
authorities concerned to end their military activity, refrain from
fighting and order a cease-fire within 36 hours; c. ordered the
Truce Commission to report to the Council concerning the
implementation of b.; and d. suggested the dispatch of a
questionnaire to the seven Arab states, the Arab Higher Com-
mittee and the Provisional Government of Israel. 12
On the following days Gromyko and Tarasenko continued to
stress the danger to peace inherent in the situation in Palestine
which—they pointed out —meant that the handling of the
situation fell within the jurisdiction of the Council. The armed
struggle in Palestine, Tarasenko said, was not far from full-scale
war between certain Near Eastern states and involved much
fighting and destruction, including the constant bombing of Tel
Aviv with its toll of victims from among the city's "peaceful
population," including women and children. The procedures
suggested by the U.S. draft resolution meant incessant
postponement and were reminiscent of the procedures
employed by the League of Nations, which as a result had
proved incapable of dealing with serious situations. The clause
in the U.S. draft that sought to activate the Truce Commission,

a body that had no authority and was totally ineffective, would
likewise delay the adoption of any resolution.
Gromyko made one further point: the partition resolution had
remained in force since "not a single Government which
adopted a sceptical or negative attitude towards [it] was able to
obtain the adoption of any other decision to replace it."
Moreover, it had been implemented in so far as the Jewish State
was concerned remaining "unimplemented only as regards the
part dealing with the creation of an Arab State." The Soviet
deputy foreign minister expressed his astonishment at the
indifference of the Arab and "certain other" states to the
non-establishment of the Arab state. "The Arab countries," he
noted, "are prepared to accept any decision, if only they can
thwart the possibility of the creation of an Arab State in
Palestine together with the creation of a Jewish State." 1 3
On 20 May Gromyko continued the attack. None of the Arab
states, he said, had any right to dispatch soldiers to Palestine,
which was not part of the territory of any of them but
comprised a separate entity. Nor had Britain, which hoped in
this way to continue dominating Palestine and was in fact at
war with Israel since the Transjordanian army was subordinate
to the British High Command, as well as being officered and
financed by the British; only the day previously the Council
had received a document informing it of the transfer of arms
and equipment from Suez to Aqaba for the Arab Legion. 14
The Soviet position on the Palestine War and the
establishment of the Jewish State, Gromyko assured the Arabs
on the next day, was not directed against the Arabs. Just as
British policy was in fact designed to suppress the national
liberation movement of both of Palestine's peoples, so that of
the USSR was intended to aid all such movements. The Soviet
Union "sympathizes with the wish of the peoples of the Near
East, including the Arab peoples, to liberate themselves from
foreign influence. The sympathy for every movement of
national liberation from foreign influences including the
sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of the Arab peoples is
one of the expressions of the principled policy of the USSR
which supports the sovereignty and independence of all
peoples, large and small. We cannot identify these vital
interests of the peoples of the Arab East with the efforts of
certain Arab statesmen to frustrate the decision of the General
Assembly."
Gromyko then expressed his reservations about the

appointment on 20 May of Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte as
U.N. mediator (in accordance with the General Assembly
Special Session resolution). His authority, Gromyko said, did
not exceed that of the Truce Commission which had proved
itself unable first to prevent and later to restrain the fighting.
The decisive factor was and must be the Security Council. "If
we adopt good resolutions, the situation improves; if we adopt
bad decisions, or if we do not adopt any decisions at all, the
situation not only does not improve, but deteriorates. . . . The
chief responsibility for events in Palestine is vested in the
Security Council." 1 5
On 22 May the Security Council adopted the greater part of
the U.S. draft resolution. The paragraph that defined the
Palestine situation as a violation of and threat to the peace
which, according to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, meant
enabling the Security Council to undertake sanctions against
such a violation, was, however, not adopted, although both the
U.S.A. and the USSR voted in favor. 16 Nonetheless, fighting
continued, since—as Pravda noted—while the Israeli
Provisional Government stated its readiness to comply, the Arab
states declared they would ignore the Council's decision
"unless the Jewish forces surrendered unconditionally." 1 7
On 27 May Tarasenko complained that the Security Council
was demonstrating its ineffectiveness. "We are faced," he said,
"with a very peculiar situation. Instead of the Security Council
dictating a line of conduct to the states which invaded illegally
the territory of another state . . . the invading states are
imposing their line of conduct and their conditions upon us."
Moreover, the Arabs' behavior was being endorsed by both
Britain and the United States, while U.S. equipment was being
sent, through Britain, to the armies that had invaded Palestine
and were waging a war against Israel. 18
At the same session Gromyko—in view of the non-
implementation of the previous resolution—proposed a new
draft resolution calling once more for a cease-fire within 36
hours; the British delegation also put a proposal including: a. a
call for a four-week cease-fire; b. an embargo on war matériel
and a prohibition of the entry into Palestine of "fighting
personnel" during the truce period; c. maximum care in the
defense of the Holy Places; and d. supervision of the cease-fire
by the Mediator. 19
Tarasenko attacked the British draft resolution as "intended
to strangle the State of Israel and the Jewish people in

Palestine." It also meant "compelling the Security Council to
accept some form of non-intervention regarding the events
taking place in Palestine. . . . All the positive measures laid
down in the British resolution . . . are in the interest of one side
only and are directed openly against the interests of the other
side." In particular, he criticized suggested limitations on
Jewish immigration, insisting that "the question of immigration
into the State of Israel is the domestic affair of the State of
Israel. The Security Council has neither the right nor the ability
to encroach upon the sovereign rights of a state. . . . Some
delegates at the Council have argued that this immigration
threatens the security of the Arab States. I want to point out
first of all that we do not know of a single instance of incursion
into the territory of another state by the armed forces of Israel
except out of self-defence when they were compelled to repulse
the attacks of the armed forces of other states on Israeli
territory. This was self-defence in the full sense of the word." 2 0
Gromyko was no less decisive in his condemnation of the
British proposal which, he noted, sought to stop the
immigration of men of military age although the partition
resolution had given the Jewish State unqualified authority in
all that concerned immigration. It also aimed at stopping the
import into Palestine of war materiel, although Britain was
giving active assistance in different ways, including the
delivery of military equipment, to one side. Finally, the British
draft resolution laid down that the U.N. Mediator could
recommend to the Security Council a settlement of the Palestine
problem, i.e. could make recommendations concerning
Palestine's future political structure, as if nothing had been
done and as if the partition resolution did not exist. The
Security Council, Gromyko insisted, had no power to pass a
resolution that differed from that of 29 November 1947.
Moreover, any such resolution would only be "one more piece
of paper" as the State of Israel would not accept it. Britain was
suggesting that the U.N. pass sanctions against the Jewish State
which was the victim of aggression, and free from all
responsibility those states which were in fact responsible for
"the present situation in Palestine."
Gromyko reiterated the charge that Britain was exploiting the
situation to reinforce its own position in the area, which was
against the long-term interests of the Arabs too. The USSR
could not ignore "the insufferable character of the adventure
being organized currently in Palestine." Nor could the U.N.,

and the Security Council in particular, tolerate a situation in
which the Council's resolutions intended to end hostilities were
not taken into consideration.
The Arab delegates reacted sharply to the Soviet stand.
Charles Malik of Lebanon, while thanking Gromyko for his
favorable attitude toward Arab national aspirations, remarked
that "the USSR's policy on the Palestine question precludes any
reaction to Soviet sympathy not only from Arab statesmen and
ruling circles . . . but also from J h e masses of the Arab
peoples." Syrian delegate Faris al-Khuri said: "We have always
appreciated the Soviet stand on Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, but
over Palestine, the Soviet Union is adopting an opposite
position. There the USSR is supporting precisely the uninvited
guests trying to give them more rights than to the owners of the
country. . . . From these facts," Khuri continued, "we can
conclude that the Soviet stand in the other instances did not
result from sympathy for the Arabs but perhaps from hatred of
the guests. . . . Its stand was not designed to protect weak
peoples but to lessen the authority of its opponents. Such a
motive will of course lessen our gratitude."
During the vote on the two draft resolutions, on 29 May, the
Council rejected the Soviet proposal, although the U.S.A. voted
in favor, and adopted that of Britain. The Soviet Union
supported only those paragraphs calling for a cease-fire and
protection of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. 21
The Security Council resolution led to a further spate of
comment in the Soviet media. This time they devoted especial
attention to the U.S. stand. Washington was "in accord with
British ideas as far as the main point is concerned . . . to
prevent a just democratic solution of the problem—the
emergence of a Palestine free from colonial oppression," yet
there were "differences," accounted for by U.S. electoral
considerations. These explained the "twists and turns" of the
U.S. position: courting the Jews while promising help to the
Arabs, trying to sabotage the partition resolution and yet when
Israel "came into being, they produced a new trick and
recognized it de jacto." At the latest Security Council debates,
the U.S. delegation had not even tried to have its own
resolution accepted. Instead, after formally supporting the
Soviet resolution, it had "played an active part in forcing the
acceptance" of the British proposal. 2 2
The Soviet media noted that both sides accepted the truce:
the Arabs — although Faris al-Khuri "said quite clearly that the
Arab states would agree to the cessation of military operations
only if they were certain that the Jewish State would be
liquidated" 23 — and the Jews—although the resolution gave a
definite advantage to the Arabs. 24 Nonetheless, Israel had
expressed a single reservation, that the truce should not be
exploited by the Arabs to achieve by political means what they
had failed to achieve by warfare, above all the prevention of
immigration. 25 Izvestiia reported a press conference held by
Shertok on 9 June in which he said that Israel had accepted the
truce although its conditions were obviously objectionable to it
and Israel had no need for a truce from a military point of view.
"The striking increase in the strength of the Jewish State," the
Israeli foreign minister was quoted as saying, "enabled it to
withstand the first onslaught of the aggression undertaken
against it. The Jewish State is taking root quickly and deeply"
and time was on its side. Izvestiia also attributed to Shertok a
statement that the outcome of the Arabs' aggression had been
disastrous for them: 200 Arab villages had been evacuated, and
the Arab inhabitants of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre and Tiberias had
abandoned these towns which were now under Jewish
control. 26
The 29 May resolution had instructed Bernadotte to "concert"
with the Truce Commission "to supervise the observance" of
the cease-fire (including the implementation of the paragraphs
prohibiting the entry into the countries involved in the
Palestine War of either "fighting personnel" or "war material").
The Mediator and Commission were to be provided for the
purpose "with a sufficient number of military observers."
Bernadotte was informed of the resolution in Cairo, where he
had arrived on 28 May and set up his headquarters (later,
toward the end of the first truce, he moved to Rhodes) and he
immediately requested the diplomatic representatives of the
USSR, the United States and Britain there to clarify with their
respective governments whether they could supply him with
observers. But in the course of his contacts with the
"Provisional Jewish Government," as he reported six weeks
later, he was told that it would reject the presence of British
observers. (Israel, like the USSR, considered Britain a party to
the Palestine War.) As a result, Bernadotte was compelled to
change his criteria for choosing observers and suggested to the
Truce Commission that the governments they represented
provide the requisite personnel. 2 7
The Soviet government, however, was unwilling to surrender

its right to participate in the staff of observers because of such
arbitrary considerations. On 7 and again on 10 June Gromyko
told the Security Council that the Soviet Union wanted a small
number of Soviet citizens to be included among the military
observers. It was incomprehensible why U.S., French and
Belgian observers should be stationed in Palestine and not
Soviet ones. The USSR had no less convincing reasons than the
United States for including a small number of Soviet military
observers on the Mediator's staff.28
Gromyko returned to the theme on 15 June when he told the
Council that his government intended sending just five
observers. "No one can understand" a situation, he insisted, in
which the USSR "cannot send five persons, while the United
States can send a party of twenty-one . . . especially as the
information available shows that the United States is sending
not only military observers but even ships (likewise at the
Mediator's request) and, if press reports are correct, it is either
sending or has already sent or intends to send even aircraft."
The Soviet delegation proposed a draft resolution to provide
the Mediator with a staff of 30 to 50 military observers taken
from all countries represented on the Security Council which
might wish to dispatch observers, excepting only Syria (as a
party to hostilities in Palestine). The Council, however, rejected
the suggestion on the same day; this evoked from Gromyko an
attack on the United States which, he asserted, was trying to
circumvent the partition resolution and take advantage of the
truce not to resolve the Palestine question but to accomplish a
deal over Palestine among certain states outside the U.N. 29 The
topic was not closed hereafter, 30 yet the USSR made no further
attempts to dispatch even a token number of its own citizens to
serve with the Mediator.
When the truce itself came into force on 11 June, the Soviet
media reiterated constantly that the Arabs were violating it, 31
sometimes relying on Israeli news items for these reports.
Britain, too, was accused by the USSR of violating the truce.
It was depriving Israel of oil, thus transgressing the Security
Council's injunctions not to change the balance of forces. It was
also providing Arab armies with officers to plan new military
offensives, supplement training and correct some of their errors
in military leadership. The Soviet media even reported the
existence of secret treaties between Britain, on the one hand,
and Egypt and Transjordan (individually), on the other, by
which Britain agreed to provide Egypt with war matériel and

eventually even evacuate it if Egypt agreed to hand over the
Negev to Transjordan. 32
As for the United States, Pravda maintained, it was doing the
very opposite of strengthening the U.N. in the latter's attempt to
implement the partition resolution. Washington actually desired
to "exclude the U.N. from participation in solving the Palestine
question" on the grounds that sanctions against infringements
of U.N. resolutions on Palestine would "further the growth of
Soviet influence." 33
The Soviet identification with the Israeli position was not
confined to the strictly military plane. Soviet sources published
information on foreign interference with immigration to Israel.
In particular, they protested the arrest in Israel by U.N.
personnel of immigrants aged 18 to 45 and their dispatch to
special camps for the duration of the truce. 34
Since Israel's security and basic rights were being
undermined by the Arab armies, on the one hand, and the U.N.
staff and Western powers, on the other, the forces of democracy
obviously had to rally to Israel's side. Indeed, it was at this
period, in the first month or so of Israel's independent
existence, that the Soviet leadership appears to have decided
just this, and to involve the People's Democracies as well. 35
The political threat to Israel's security was expressed in the
proposals Bernadotte put before the Arab states and Israel at the
end of June 1948. The most important of the Mediator's "series
of suggestions," as he called them, was the formation of a
"union" comprehending the original Mandatory territory of
Palestine on both sides of the Jordan, headed by a Central
Council and comprising an Arab and a Jewish member. The
declared purpose of this union was to promote the economic
interests of its two partners and coordinate foreign and defense
policy.
The Mediator's suggestions included a section "for
consideration" on "territorial matters." The changes proposed
under this caption were: the partial or complete inclusion of the
Negev in the Arab area; partial or complete inclusion of the
Galilee in the Jewish area; inclusion of Jerusalem in the Arab
area with municipal autonomy for the Jewish sector and a
special committee to protect the Holy Places; reconsideration of
the status of Jaffa; establishment of a free port in Haifa, to
include the refinery and pipeline terminals; and a free airport at
Lydda. 36
The Soviet New Times attacked Bernadotte's suggested

"union" as a return to the federal state suggested by the
UNSCOP minority and rejected by the U.N. General Assembly
in favor of partition. 37 TASS, for its part, denounced
Bernadotte's suggestions as an Anglo-American plan. ' T h e new
frontiers" would be guaranteed by the two Western powers
which would also receive "free access" to Palestine's resources
"and possible rights for the creation of military bases" in Haifa
and Acre, as well as a number of airfields. 38
What apparently also worried Moscow was the fact that there
were "influential Right-wing politicians in the State of Israel"
who were prepared to consider the Bernadotte suggestions. 39
Yet although a number of Israeli ministers supported several of
the Mediator's proposals and Shertok declared himself ready to
go to Rhodes to discuss them if Arab delegates also came, the
Provisional Government eventually rejected them for reasons
similar to the Soviet reservations on the subject: the absence of
any reference to the partition resolution and the right of the
Jewish State to the territory alloted it by that resolution; and the
replacement of the Arab state stipulated by the partition
resolution by Transjordan, which Israel — like the USSR —
considered a substantial change in the balance of forces. Ben
Gurion's personal reaction to the suggestions was particularly
close to that expressed by the Soviet media: "Those who
suspect" that the Mediator was "a Bevin agent are not too far
off the mark." 4 0
The Arabs too rejected Bernadotte's proposals on the grounds
that they involved recognition of the Jewish State, or, as the
Soviet press reported, because they were based on the principle
of partition, "although in new form," and allowed for free
Jewish immigration. 4 1
Toward the end of the four weeks allotted for the truce,
reports of Arab violations of its conditions increased in the
Soviet media. It was stressed too that while Israel had agreed to
prolong the truce in accordance with Bernadotte's appeal to the
two parties, the Arabs were impatiently awaiting the renewal of
fighting as the only way of solving the Palestine question. 42
On 7 July, two days before the truce was due to expire, the
Security Council was convened at Bernadotte's request. Before
the beginning of the debate the Council's President, Ukrainian
Foreign Minister Dmitrii Manuil'skii, called upon Abba Eban to
take his seat at the Council table as the representative of the
State of Israel (hitherto Israel's representatives had been
addressed as delegates of the Jewish Agency). The debate

begun, Gromyko attacked Bernadotte for ignoring the partition
resolution. "Instead of carrying out his mission, which was to
implement the truce and restore by peaceful means the
situation which was created in Palestine as a result of the
attitude adopted by certain Powers, the Mediator decided that
he could override the United Nations. . . .
"Instead of the formation of two independent states he
proposes the creation of some kind of dual State comprising
Transjordan and the present Jewish State, and represents this as
a union between those two States. In doing so, the Mediator
visualizes a different kind of Transjordan from that which exists
in fact. According to his scheme, territory which was
earmarked. . . for the Arab State should be attached to
Transjordan, including even . . . Jerusalem, which according to
the same decision should be governed on the basis of a special
statute."
The Mediator's intention of preventing the implementation of
the 29 November 1947 resolution ignored the fact that "one of
the States provided for by [it] not only exists but is carrying out
definite political and economic measures as a sovereign State."
Moreover, his proposals "provide for a redrawing of the Jewish
State boundaries, with the aim of cutting down the territory of
that State and transferring the cut off portions to Transjordan."
Gromyko concluded that, as the Soviet delegation had
foreseen, the Mediator was being used by those states which
regarded Palestine as a " p a w n " in the "political game" being
played in the Middle East "at the expense of the interests of the
peoples" of the region and "to the prejudice of international
peace." In order to strengthen their economic and strategic
interests in the region these states were pressing for military
bases "despite the wishes of the populations concerned,"
inciting the Arabs against the Jews and playing on the national
feelings of both, and trying to have the U.N. resolution on
Palestine revised. 43
On the same day Izvestiia published the official Israeli reply
to Bernadotte's suggestions. While restricting itself to the
transmission of information it was undisguisedly sympathetic
to the Israeli position. It noted Israel's objections to Bernadotte's
proposals, pointing out that the latter ignored the partition
resolution, "the only solution of an international character" so
far, as well as "a number of prominent facts connected with the
Palestine situation, notably the establishment of the sovereign
State of Israel on the territory allotted to the Jews by the General

Assembly resolution, and other territorial changes resulting
from the attack upon Israel of the Palestinian Arabs and the
Arabs of the neighboring states." The Israeli provisional
government, Izvestiia wrote, had pointed out to Bernadotte that
the Jews had agreed to the partition resolution "as a
compromise proposal which demanded weighty concessions"
from them, the area assigned to the Jews being "minimal." This
concession had not been justified by events and the Israeli
government "has come to the conclusion that this area has now
to be changed in order to guarantee the security and
independence of the State of Israel from Arab aggression."
The new State would not agree to "any violation or
restriction of the sovereignty of the people of Israel. The State
of Israel seeks to establish peaceful relations with its neighbors
and cooperation with them in all fields." Yet the international
agreements necessary for the implementation of this policy
could only commit Israel if they were "the result of
negotiations on the basis of equality between representatives of
the free and sovereign State of Israel and representatives of
other countries."
Finally, the Israeli provisional government had been
"profoundly outraged" by the suggestion concerning Jerusalem:
"the Jewish people, the Jewish State and Jerusalem," it had told
Bernadotte, "will never agree to the Arab domination of
Jerusalem" 44
On 8 July, Manuil'skii suggested that the Security Council
ask the Mediator and the parties concerned for detailed
information about the Egyptians' violation of the truce;
Gromyko supported the proposals, requesting that the two sides
transmit their information directly to the Council. 45 On the
same evening at a dinner given by Trygve Lie in honor of
Gromyko, the latter told Jessup —in reply to a comment that the
Security Council would have to act if reports of hostilities were
confirmed—that the USSR would be prepared to vote for a
resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 46 The Soviet
press and radio also devoted considerable attention to the
renewal of hostilities, maintaining that it was the aggression of
the Arabs which had wrecked the truce. 4 7 Once again the Soviet
media demonstrated an obvious preference for Israeli reports of
developments on both the political and military fronts. 48 Radio
Moscow was even quoted as saying that "the Israeli Army's
great victories against the Arabs" resulted from the Jews'
patriotic spirit, and that "the Israeli soldier is firmly convinced

that he is fighting for a just cause and to safeguard his rights
against the Arabs, who are puppets of British imperialism." 4 9
The Security Council met from 13 to 15 July to discuss a
renewal of the truce. On 14 July Gromyko once more attacked
the Arab states, Britain and the Mediator. In Gromyko's
opinion, moreover, the situation had deteriorated because the
Security Council had made only "inadequate," "toothless"
decisions on Palestine "directed, in essence, not against those
who openly declared that their aim was to sabotage the General
Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947, but more against
those who are faithfully abiding by that resolution." The USSR,
he reminded the Council, had already in previous debates
proposed that that forum "order the parties concerned to end
military operations in Palestine," yet the Council had
complicated unnecessarily the resolutions it had adopted, to the
general detriment of the situation. As to the draft resolution put
forward by U.S. delegate Philip Jessup on 13 July, the Soviet
delegation would support the paragraphs "directed" toward
ending hostilities. It would not, however, agree to the
paragraph which "places practically the whole problem of
adjusting the situation in Palestine in the hands of the
Mediator"; since "experience" had shown him "unable to solve
that problem . . . the Security Council ought to take it into its
own hands." The suggestion that Jerusalem be demilitarized
was likewise "entirely unacceptable", both per se, as
contradicting the partition resolution, and because "what is
contemplated" for implementing the demilitarization proposal
"is a force created within the framework of the United Nations
and placed at the Mediator's disposal." 5 0
On the following day Jessup replied to Gromyko, welcoming
in the process "the conversion of the representative of the
USSR to the cause of full support for the General Assembly's
resolutions," a conversion he hoped would be "global in its
application." Manuil'skii then took the floor. He accused
Bernadotte of having "created the conviction among the Arabs
that he had come to Palestine not to help in implementing the
General Assembly decision but to bargain over the deviations
from it that might be made to the benefit of one party and the
prejudice of the other." This had led the Arabs to reject the new
truce proposal and try "by military operations to bring pressure
to bear on the United Nations to shelve" that decision.
In addition, the Ukrainian delegate asserted, Bernadotte was
promoting the interests of the oil companies and allowing them

"to spread the legend" that the General Assembly resolution
could not be implemented "because of the stubbornness of the
parties concerned," an obstinacy his own suggestions had re-
inforced. These had been based—as the Mediator had informed
the Council—on requests by the U.S., British and French
governments that he endeavor to get the Haifa refineries and
terminal working as they considered "that it was of great
importance for the entire world that we should get crude or
refined oil to the different countries of the world, because there
is, as you all know, a shortage of oil in the world."
Manuil'skii maintained that the armed struggle against Israel
was "a channel through which the British colonialists are
trying to divert the Arab world's dissatisfaction with its
situation, thereby paralyzing its struggle for political and
economic independence and for national revival." The oil
companies, too, while generally considered pro-Arab, did not in
fact relate to the Arabs as partners but as the "victims" of their
"secret" agreements. Only the Soviet Union followed a policy
of principle always standing for "what is right." Those Arab
statesmen who "disregarding facts" accused the USSR of
"supporting one side in the Jewish-Arab dispute" should
remember its support of Syria and Lebanon in 1946 and Egypt
in 1947.
During the voting on the U.S. draft, which the Security
Council adopted on 15 July, the Soviet and Ukrainian
delegations voted in favor of the paragraphs they had supported
in their speeches, specifically those that called for a new truce,
to begin within three days and to be unlimited a priori, and
abstained on the rest of the draft. Speaking again after the
voting, Gromyko and Manuil'skii commented that the
supervision of the truce and police duties by U.N. Secretariat
personnel had nothing in common with the international force
the U.N. Charter had authorized the Security Council to
create—a force that had not been set up specifically in order to
prevent certain states from participation in these functions
within the framework of the U.N. 51 (It is perhaps of interest that
the United States was at this stage contemplating the possibility
of allowing Soviet observers to participate in the Mediator's
staff, as a means of "bringing [the] USSR into line" regarding
the Security Council Resolution of 15 July. 52 )
The Soviet media likewise expressed the two aspects of the
Soviet stand on Palestine: its general tactical implication in the
context of the USSR's endeavor to improve its position in the

U.N., and the specific relation to developments in Palestine
itself. ' T h e authority of the international security organization,"
one Soviet source wrote, "is . . . at stake. The democratic public
cannot accept this state of affairs. The General Assembly
decision must be carried out. It is not only a matter of the
United Nations' authority; it is also a matter of preserving peace
in the Middle East and of maintaining international security." 5 3
TASS meanwhile, reporting the Security Council decision to
the Soviet public, pointed out that it contained no
condemnation of the Arabs as aggressors and that the actual
cease-fire would "give advantage to the Arab countries and do
harm to the State of Israel." 54
The second truce came into force, in accordance with the
Security Council resolution, on 18 July. Yet the Palestine issue
continued to demand the Security Council's attention. On 2
August Sir Alexander Cadogan of Britain asked the Council to
include on its agenda the position of the Jewish D.P.s in Europe
and of the Arab refugees in Palestine and the adjacent
countries. Although Cadogan did not intend the Council
actually to deal with the former question, since a number of
specialized agencies were handling it, Manuil'skii requested
authorized data on the D.P.s and the detainees held by the
British in Cyprus. True —Manuil'skii agreed —there was some
information on the Jewish groups in question. While the
Council had "not a single scrap of paper, not a single
memorandum and absolutely no statistics" concerning the
"displaced persons of Arab origin," it was known, for example,
that "a large number of 'displaced' persons of Jewish
nationality" were concentrated in camps in Europe "under
conditions usually reserved for criminals"; it was known too
that other displaced persons of Jewish nationality were living
"in the most wretched plight" in Cyprus. 55
The parallel demand for data on the two issues made them
formally interrelated, which was obviously to Israel's benefit.
Faris al-Khuri insisted that they were not to be connected. 5 6
True, Arab sources linked the issues of Jewish emigration from
Eastern Europe with the Arab refugee question in order to
explain Soviet opposition to the unimpeded return of the Arab
refugees to their homes, yet it was manifestly different when
they were officially connected by the U.N. On this plane, the
Arab contention continued to be (as in previous years) that
Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe was tantamount to
Soviet penetration of the Middle East. The Jews who were

streaming from Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia to Genoa
claiming they were fleeing from Communist tyranny had,
according to Radio Damascus, left their native countries in
order to serve the Soviet interest in the Middle East and to join
the Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi, which was operating on instructions
from Moscow. 57
The Soviet delegation took pains to exonerate Israel from any
blame for the fate of the Arab refugees. When the Security
Council renewed its discussion on 18 August, Iakov Malik
charged that: "A prolonged study of the Palestine question in
the United Nations gives us every reason to believe that the
guilt and responsibility for all the privations and sufferings of
[the Arab refugees] lie with the Government of the United
Kingdom and with the British military authorities in the Near
East. A large share of the responsibility rests also with certain
influential circles" in the U.S.A. To the "selfish interests" of the
U.K. "strategists" and the U.S. oil companies "have been
sacrificed the peaceful labour and tranquillity of half a million
Arabs who have been forced to leave their homes as a result of
hostilities instigated from abroad."
As the problem had been created by political developments
and considerations it could not be solved by such "palliatives"
as the British delegation proposed, namely "placing at their
disposal tents and medical supplies." The "sabotaging" of the
29 November resolution had both prevented the solution of one
problem—the Jewish displaced persons— and led to the
creation of another—the Arab refugees. Its implementation
alone would solve the Palestine problem as a whole and in the
process would restore the half million Arab refugees to their
work and peaceful existence. 58
On the following day, 19 August, the Security Council
adopted a British proposal to refer to the U.N. Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) and the International Refugee
Organization (IRO) the minutes of its discussion of the Jewish
D.P. and Arab refugee problems for their further treatment. 59
Commenting o n j h e Security_Council debate, the Soviet press
reported that Faris al-Khuri had come out with the
"well-known" statements about "the Jews 'being aggressors',"
while Israeli representative Eban had "stated that his
Government was not responsible for the flight of Arab refugees
from Palestine" which had taken place before its creation, "at a
time when Palestine was still under the control of the
mandatory power. Eban declared once again that the

Government of Israel . . . is prepared and wants to begin direct
negotiations with the Arabs in order to attain a general
settlement, including the question of the Arab refugees." 60
SOVIET DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL

REQUIREMENTS DIVERGE
In the late summer and fall of 1948 the Soviet media gave
markedly less coverage to the Palestine question than
previously. This may have been a concomitant of the new truce
and the resultant diminishing of tensions and news value (or
the equivalent Soviet criterion). Yet certain themes and
emphases in this period indicate the possibility of a different
interpretation.
Despite its continued identity of interests with Israel on most
of the practical questions raised at the U.N., the Soviet Union
was beginning to qualify expressions of support for Israel
directed toward its own public. The reason for this was
presumably the encouragement which Soviet Jews had derived
from official Soviet identification with the Israeli cause. Thus,
for example, the traditionally pejorative term "Zionist" began to
reappear, having virtually vanished from the Soviet media after
Gromyko's May 1947 speech at the First Special Session of the
U.N. General Assembly; it was now, moreover, used with
reference to Israel. The first known use of the word in August
1948 was particularly interesting: the Zionists were depicted as
those likely to agree to reducing the size of the State of Israel,
TASS reporting that the U.S. government had promised Syrian
Prime Minister Jamil Mardam that it would apply pressure on
the Zionist leaders to this end. 6 1
Simultaneously, Soviet sources were charging the Arab
governments with cooperating with Britain and the United
States in using the Palestine War to stall "the Arab peoples'
efforts for reform and progress." 6 2 The Arab rulers' subservience
to Anglo-American designs, which was seen inter alia in a
vicious slander campaign against the USSR ever since Moscow
"came out in favour of a just decision of the Palestine problem
and for the carrying out of the United Nations decisions on
Palestine," had evoked a "wave of dismay and dissatisfaction"
throughout the Arab world. 63
While it is obviously necessary to beware of attributing
undue significance to the clichés in which the Soviet
information media abound, the combination of these two

themes indicated at least the possibility of a new alignment of
forces, with the United States and the "Zionist leaders" on the
one side and the USSR and the Arab groups which sought
"reform and progress" on the other. For those who may have
wondered who were the Zionist leaders alluded to, New Times
was explicit: just as it was necessary to distinguish between
Arab reaction and "the anti-imperialist national-liberation
movement of the Arab peoples," so it was impossible to ignore
the lack of political homogeneity within the State of Israel.
Here, too, "the interests of the broad democratically-minded
mass of the Jewish population" were in contrast to "the
interests of the Zionist bourgeoisie and its leaders who . . .
orientating themselves on London and Washington . . . have
done no little harm to the Jewish people. They too share the
responsibility for the Palestine tragedy." 6 4 While there was still
no specific mention of the government of Israel, the implication
was clear.
These first signs of a revised Soviet attitude to Israel were
not, however, reflected in the USSR's stand on the Palestine
War when this again attracted the attention of the U.N. in
mid-September, with the drawing up of the "Bernadotte Plan"
and the assassination of the U.N. Mediator. Both the Soviet
representatives speaking at the U.N. and the Soviet press and
radio reporting these events continued to be undisguisedly
sympathetic to Israel.
Soviet comment on the Bernadotte assassination was
designed to perform a dual function: to stress that the Israeli
government was in no way connected with the actual murder
and indeed had conducted itself correctly in its wake, and to
place responsibility on Britain. Two days after Bernadotte was
killed Pravda reported that the Israeli government was taking
measures to arrest the murderers and had already arrested all
the leaders of both the Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi and the Stern
Group. 65 Several days later Radio Moscow announced that a
number of British Intelligence agents had been caught during
the raid on the Stern Group premises. 6 6 According to New
Times, Bernadotte had been "the victim of the Anglo-American
policy which he himself so zealously served." Referring to
insinuations "in the reactionary press" that Communists had
been involved in the Mediator's murder, it wrote: "Everybody
knows that the Communists have always and everywhere
categorically condemned acts of terrorism and vigorously
discountenanced assassination as a political weapon."

Moreover, the British had gained from the assassination for, as
the Israeli government had noted, "this criminal act was a stab
in the back of the Army of Israel and an attempt to isolate Israel
from the United Nations. . . . The British press is frankly saying
that the death of Bernadotte will clear the way for a revision of
the General Assembly's decision on Palestine." British
Intelligence, New Times concluded, apparently considered
"that at the present juncture a dead Bernadotte was better than
a live Bernadotte." 6 7
Simultaneously the Soviet media censured the Bernadotte
Plan which the Mediator had dispatched to U.N. Secretary-
General Lie in the form of a "progress report" on 16
September—the day before his death—as the basis for the Gen-
eral Assembly discussion of the Palestine question. (The Third
Regular Session of the Assembly opened on 21 September.) The
main controversial premises that comprised Bernadotte's con-
clusions were:
a. "A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there
are no sound reasons to think it will not continue to do so";
b. "The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed by
formal agreement between the parties concerned or, failing that,
by the United Nations";
c. "Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity
and integration . . . should be the major objective of the
boundary arrangements" which "should not, therefore, be
rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in
the resolution of 29 November [1947]";
d. "The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes
by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their
homes, should be affirmed and made effective with assurance of
adequate compensation for the property of those who may
choose not to return";
e. "International responsibility should be expressed where
desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees,
as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with
regard to boundaries and human rights."
Bernadotte proposed replacing the "existing indefinite truce
by a formal peace or, at the minimum, an armistice which
would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization
of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad
demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision."
The territorial "revisions" of the partition resolution which
Bernadotte contemplated included:

" 1 . The definition of the Negev as Arab territory.
2. The inclusion of Ramleh and Lydda in Arab territory.
3. The definition of the Galilee as Jewish territory."
In addition, the Mediator proposed that "the disposition of the
territory of Palestine not included in the Jewish State should be
left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation
with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommenda-
tion, however, that in view of the historical connexion and
common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be
compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine
with the territory of Transjordan." As in June, Bernadotte called
for the port of Haifa and the Lydda airfield to be free zones
"with free access for interested Arab countries," although
regarding Jerusalem he retracted his earlier ideas and now sug-
gested "effective" U.N. control with "maximum feasible local
autonomy" for the Arab and Jewish communities.
Finally, the Mediator called for the formation by the U.N. of a
conciliation commission to "ensure the continuation of the
peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine," foster "the
cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews," and
supervise the observance of arrangements the U.N. might lay
down on the issues specified in the Plan." 6 8
As in the case of Bernadotte's June suggestions, now too the
Soviet and Israeli governments found themselves at one.
Foreign Minister Shertok's declaration of Israel's policy and
intentions on the eve of his departure for the General Assembly
in Paris was virtually identical with the declared position of the
USSR. Shertok told the Provisional State Council on 27
September 1948 that he was going to Paris to frustrate the
adoption of Bernadotte's Plan so that the 29 November 1947
resolution remain the international legal basis for the settlement
of questions connected with Palestine. 69 A month later, on his
return to Israel from the U.N., Shertok reported to his
government that certain delegations considered the "tearing
away" of the entire Negev from Israel a dreadful injustice (from
the Israeli point of view this was the most practically
meaningful of Bernadotte's proposals, and the main diplomatic
effort of the Israeli government at the time was directed toward
its frustration). Shertok went on: "The Eastern bloc stands
steadfastly at our side. . . . In the Security Council the Russians
act as if they were our emissaries." 70
Indeed, the USSR was making marked efforts to thwart the

Bernadotte Plan. In principle it continued referring to the
partition resolution as the only basis for solving the Palestine
question, although this position was now mitigated by a
growing readiness to deviate from it to a certain extent in favor
of Israel. 71 The Soviet Union had so far adhered consistently to
the 29 November resolution in its official statements chiefly in
order to frustrate attempts to prevent the fulfillment of the
resolution's main purpose—the establishment of two
independent states in Palestine; and to dislodge the British
from the Negev and Palestine's other strategic points and
consequently also to keep any Arab state that was officially
connected with Britain, either directly or through the Arab
League, away from these areas. Once the USSR realized that the
democratic and independent Arab state due to be formed in
Palestine was not coming into being, it saw no further reason to
urge Israeli concessions merely in order to preserve the
minutiae of the November 1947 resolution —especially since the
Israeli side based its claims for revision of these details on the
fact that the resolution was not being implemented with regard
to the formation of the Arab state.
On the diplomatic level, Soviet officials maintained contact
with Israeli representatives, in Moscow, in Israel and at the
U.N. The meetings which Israeli diplomats in the Soviet capital
held with the Soviet Establishment from September 1948
revealed the fundamental Soviet support for the Israeli position.
In his conversation with Mrs. Meyerson on 7 September
Foreign Minister Molotov stressed that the USSR's support for
Israel was part and parcel of its general policy of support for
national wars of independence and that Moscow did not intend
terminating its aid now that Israel had become an established
fact. He expressed his conviction that Israel would be a success
and that the relationship between the USSR and Israel would be
one of friendship. Mrs. Meyerson's remark that Israel had
discovered during its war of independence that there must be
frontier changes vis-à-vis the original partition proposal, evoked
the comment: "Obviously many questions will still arise, and
we shall have to deal with them." 7 2
Just over a week later the Israeli minister met with Deputy
Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin to discuss with him the issues
likely to come up at the approaching General Assembly. She
referred to Bernadotte's intentions regarding the Negev, an
area—she said—that was vital to Israel for the fulfillment of its
settlement plans, as well as for its oil. 73 As for the northern

boundary, the Jews, she said, had agreed to the partition border
in this area on the assumption that the other suggestions of the
partition resolution would be fulfilled. Meanwhile, the war had
shown that Israel's security necessitated adjustments, and Israel
had occupied some of the territory allotted to the Arab state,
without there being anyone to restore it to. She pointed out too
that the new part of Jerusalem was also entirely in Jewish
hands.
The Israeli minister noted that Bernadotte had supported the
prohibition of immigration of Jews of military age, which had
been one of the conditions of the truce, although this
constituted foreign interference in Israel's domestic affairs.
Finally, she maintained that the Arab refugee problem was
being exaggerated, particularly by the British, for military and
political reasons. Israel had not driven out the Arabs; they had
left their homes as a result of pressure on the part of the Mufti
of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Since, however, they had
departed and the Israeli population had become relatively
homogeneous, there seemed to be no point in resettling them
on Israeli territory and "artificially creating a complicated
problem," especially given the vast unpopulated areas in the
Arab countries. In view of the experience in population
transfers following the two world wars a similar idea should
not be ruled out regarding Israel. Zorin heard Mrs. Meyerson's
discourse sympathetically and said that it would help his
government determine its policy at the U.N. 74
At the U.N. in Paris, Soviet and Israeli officials were also hav-
ing talks. Soviet diplomats were said to have encouraged
Israel's representatives at the U.N. to withstand British and U.S.
pressure to accept the Bernadotte Plan as a basis for a settle-
ment. The Soviet diplomats were quoted by the Israeli news-
paper Davar as saying that if Israel yielded to the pressures of
the Western Powers, the Soviet Union was liable to withhold its
support of Israel. 75 Moscow's representatives, moreover, were
indicating a willingness to qualify privately their public insis-
tence on the implementation of the partition resolution in all its
details, particularly regarding the Galilee but also with refer-
ence to Jerusalem. 76 In short, the Soviet stand was characterized
by realism, tempered only by the hope that the Arab state in
Palestine might still come into being. 7 7
The simultaneous campaign against the Bernadotte Plan in
the Soviet information media pointed out that the plan implied
the automatic subordination of the Negev and "other Arab ter-

ritories of Palestine" to "British rule" and the conversion of
Israel into "a dwarf country." They also paid considerable
attention to the oil factor. They stressed that the international-
ization of Haifa would enable the British to continue deriving
their profits from the oil refineries. 78 One source analyzed the
anticipated disadvantages for Israel of the proposed substitution
of the Galilee for the Negev as follows: although at first sight
this appeared "a fine bargain for the Jews," it meant that Israel
would lose all access to the raw materials necessary for its
growing chemical industry as well as to the Negev oil deposits,
estimated by Western experts to be "the most plentiful in the
whole of the Middle East," and deposits of thorium and other
minerals. 79
On 14 October the Security Council met to discuss the com-
plaints of Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche and Truce Commis-
sion Chairman John Macdonald about the difficulties encoun-
tered by the U.N. supervisers because of the Arabs' and Israelis'
lack of cooperation in implementing the conditions of the truce.
A Chinese-British draft proposal was suggested to amend the
situation, but the Council did not reach the voting stage. 80
On 15 October hostilities were renewed in Palestine as a
result of the Israeli decision to break through to its settlements
in the southern part of the country that had been cut off by the
Egyptian forces in contradiction to the truce conditions. The
Soviet media, which had previously reported Arab truce
violations, were careful to show that Arab claims that Israel had
broken the truce represented only part of the story. 81
When the Security Council met on 19 October, Iakov Malik
called for the immediate cessation of hostilities. He suggested
that all other issues be postponed until a cease-fire was
achieved and proposed that Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche be
asked to initiate negotiations between the sides on all questions
that had arisen in connection with the Negev.
In fact, the Soviet and Ukrainian delegates voted with the rest
of the Council only on the part of the resolution that called for
a cease-fire, abstaining on the remainder. On 22 October, after a
delay in order to enable Israel to complete a number of actions
it considered vital (notably the taking of Beersheba) the
cease-fire entered into effect.82
Meanwhile, on 20 October, the Israeli minister in Moscow
met with the acting chief of the Middle and Near Eastern
Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Aleksei Shchiborin,

to inform him on the latest developments in Palestine: a. the
establishment of an ''All-Palestine Government" in Gaza under
the Jerusalem Mufti, the violent opposition this had evoked on
the part of King 'Abdallah and the attitude to it of Egypt and
Iraq; 83 b. the Lebanese plan to annex the Galilee, a plan
which —she explained—meant changing the balance of forces in
Lebanon by the addition of tens of thousands of Muslims to that
country's population; c. the plan to bring to Palestine U.S.,
Belgian and French troops to implement the inter-
nationalization of Jerusalem; and, in reply to questions put by
Shchiborin, d. the immediate background to the resumption of
hostilities on 15 October, Israel's military successes against the
Egyptians and its readiness nonetheless to put an end to
fighting in return for U.N. guarantees for the unhindered
passage of convoys to the settlements in the Negev. 84
A further Security Council session took place on 26 October
to discuss an Egyptian complaint of Israeli violations of the
Negev cease-fire, and a report by the Acting Mediator on the
position in both the Negev and the Lebanese sector. 85 Fawzi
al-Kaukji had broken the truce in the north on 22 October, pro-
viding the background for the Israeli counter-attack of 28 to 31
October that brought the entire Galilee under Israeli control. 86
Meanwhile, Soviet sources reported that Lebanese forces had
made a number of attacks upon Israeli positions —despite the 19
October resolution that had ordered both sides to cease fire.
This report ignored the fact that the 19 October resolution
referred specifically to fighting in the Negev and the parties
involved in it.
Indeed, the Soviet press and radio were still unquestionably
pro-Israeli in all that related to the Palestine War. Izvestiia, for
example, wrote that the Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese
delegates had "contended" in their Security Council speeches
that the truce had been violated solely by Israel and
"demanded" that the Security Council "undertake measures to
stop the operations of the Israeli forces, which they called
aggressive." The Israeli delegate, however, had "shown" that
the breaking of the truce resulted from "the chaos caused by the
Egyptian forces' invasion of the Negev which is an inseparable
part of the State of Israel. He noted that the Egyptian side does
not want to conduct negotiations as envisaged by the Security
Council resolution of 19 October. According to the representa-
tive of the State of Israel," Izvestiia went on, "the withdrawal of

the troops of both sides to the positions occupied by them
before 14 October must mean in effect the withdrawal of the
Arabs from the entire territory assigned by the General Assem-
bly resolution of 29 November 1947 to the State of Israel." 87
When the Security Council reconvened on 28 October,
Malik—in line with the Soviet stand of the past several
months—called for direct negotiations between the parties
concerned in the war with the assistance of the Acting Mediator
who, he noted, had stressed the importance of replacing the
truce by "a lasting official peace."
On the following day, Malik opposed Bunche's suggestion
that the sides withdraw to their positions as of 14 October as a
prerequisite to negotiations, contending that the withdrawal
had been prescribed in the 19 October resolution as a subject of
negotiation. The Soviet delegate reiterated the theme that the
Security Council must examine a priori the viability of its
resolutions and create the conditions that would help ensure
their realization; if it continued to adopt resolutions without
concern for their fulfillment nobody would take them seriously.
The current need was for the Council and Acting Mediator to
investigate all possible ways toward negotiations. 88
At a further Council meeting on 15 November, Malik
commented on the situation in the north of Palestine, where, he
noted, "the armed clashes" had been initiated by "the irregular
units of a certain Kaukji," for whose activities Lebanon was
responsible, while the Israeli forces had fought "a defensive
action." It appeared, however, from the Acting Mediator's
report to the Council that the situation on this front had
changed to the disadvantage of those who had begun the
fighting.
Malik then went on to criticize two suggestions included in
the Bernadotte Plan. He opposed replacing the truce by "a
so-called 'permanent' armistice" since there was no "substantial
difference" between the two terms. The Security Council must
seek "progress from a state of truce to the next stage on the
road to a peaceful settlement," which was in fact peace.
Malik—like Israeli representative Eban —also criticized the
proposed formation of demilitarized zones, which were
necessarily "peculiar to a truce" and not "to a peace settlement
or to peace," and "could only complicate the Palestine problem
and become a source of misunderstanding and conflicts,

demanding a considerable increase in the number of United
Nations observers." All this ''would result in mediation
developing into a system of interference in the internal affairs
of the Government concerned." 8 9
On 15 November, too, simultaneously with the debate in the
Security Council, the Political Committee of the General
Assembly finally began its discussion of Bernadotte's "progress
report." The Assembly Plenary had on 24 September relegated
the report as a whole to the Political Committee and part three,
concerning the refugee problem, to the Third Committee. The
two postponements of the discussion in this forum had been
attributed by the Soviet media to U.S. endeavors to refrain from
raising the issue in the Assembly until after the U.S.
presidential elections so as not to jeopardize the all-important
Jewish vote—an example of "how the interests of the small
nations are being sacrificed to serve the political wire-pulling of
big capitalist countries." 9 0
The Soviet attitude to these elections is in itself relevant to
our discussion. Prior to them the Soviet media had been
stressing the USSR's pro-Israel position in all that concerned
the Palestine War, apparently in order to influence the U.S.
elections, as the aim of winning the sympathy of U.S. Jewry
had been an important factor in Soviet policy on Palestine since
late 1947. The Soviet leadership and Stalin in particular pinned
considerable hopes on Henry Wallace who, dismissed from the
Truman Administration in September 1946 for his criticism of
its intransigence toward the Soviet Union, had formed the
Progressive Party to compete in the 1948 elections. Moscow
saw in Wallace's candidacy a reflection of a popular movement
toward reconciliation with the USSR. Given Wallace's strength
in the State of New York, where he had won half of the million
votes he had polled altogether, and his emphasis on minority
groups, the Palestine War was a convenient platform for
demonstrating Wallace's contention that the U.S. government
was not doing all it could for the sake of peace. While Moscow
cannot have hoped that Wallace would win the elections, it
considered aiding his campaign an assignment of major
significance. 91 It is, then, in this light that Soviet commentary
on Palestine and especially on U.S. policy and intentions
regarding Palestine during October and the first days of
November (notably in Radio Moscow's Yiddish program) must
be viewed. Wallace, it was noted, called for full recognition of

Israel, while the Truman Administration, which had afforded it
only de facto recognition, was said to be operating against
Israel. The State Department's senior officials openly opposed
the Israeli State, and the United States had been "officially
concerned in all the British manoeuvres aimed at placing Israel
in an impasse." 9 2 Although Washington had retracted its
support of the Bernadotte Plan, 93 the Soviet media continued to
stress earlier U.S. support of this "notorious" plan as a result of
its conformity with U.S. and British strategic interests,
notwithstanding its implications: the stifling of the economy
"of the young State and . . . the loss of Jewish independence." 9 4
"If there are people among the working Jewish population [in
the United States] who believe the false U.S. propaganda to the
effect that the United States has assumed the role of advocate
for the Jews in Palestine," Radio Moscow told its Yiddish-
speaking audience in North America, events "must have disil-
lusioned them." 95
When discussion of the Bernadotte Plan was underway in the
Political Committee, Soviet reports gave prominence to the
Israeli deposition. TASS, for example, gave a full summary of
Shertok's presentation of his government's objections to the
Mediator's proposals. The Soviet media also portrayed the
aggressiveness of the Arab representatives toward Israel. In long
speeches "sharply attacking the Jews," TASS recorded, the rep-
resentatives of the Arab Higher Committee, Syria and Egypt
"even rejected the Mediator's recommendations allotting only
an insignificant scrap of land to the State of Israel." The Arab
representatives "tried to justify the aggressive actions of the
Arabs against the State of Israel and lay the blame for Arab
aggression on Israel, the victim of that aggression, and called
for the Jewish State's total annihilation." Finally, Izvestiia
reported, the Syrian Faris al-Khuri maintained that "the Jews,
as it were, want . . . 'to link their state with the ^lav group'." 9 6
The Arabs, for their part, attacked the USSR. Khuri accused the
USSR of "inventing the concept of Jewish nationalism, nation-
alism relating in normal international terminology to people
living in a single country under a single government"; the
Saudi representative, meanwhile, pointed to the supply of
Czechoslovak arms to Israel (neither of these charges was
reported in the Soviet press). 97
On 22 November Semen Tsarapkin made a lengthy speech
calling once more for the implementation of the partition
resolution. True, the Jewish State had come into being and "in
fact exercised sovereignty over the whole of the territory
assigned to it" by that resolution. Even Bernadotte had
recognized the existence of Israel as an independent state in his
final plan, yet he had proposed "a reshuffling of territory which
would jeopardize the very life of the Jewish State." The Negev
comprised two-thirds of the Jewish area, while the
compensation the Mediator suggested for its loss was "the
small area" of the Western Galilee. Nor did Transjordan need
the Negev, as it already had "enough desert." Finally,
Tsarapkin insisted, the attainment of peace necessitated the
withdrawal of "all foreign armed forces from the territory of the
Jewish and Arab States . . . created by the Assembly's
decision." 9 8
Three days later the Soviet delegation laid before the
Committee an official proposal for the evacuation of all foreign
troops from the whole of Palestine." "The presence of these
troops had caused the war, the present disorders and sufferings
of the population; moreover, it was an obstacle to the
re-establishment of peace . . . and might at any moment bring
about the resumption of hostilities." In order to avoid
"ambiguity or misunderstanding," the Soviet delegate specified
that he was referring to "the troops of certain foreign
Governments." _
The Soviet proposal evoked Arab counter-attacks. Mahmud
Fawzi of Egypt asserted that the troops referred to by Tsarapkin
"were in no way foreign or at least . . . less foreign than
others." The troops of the Arab countries adjacent to Palestine
had been compelled "to intervene in that country . . . to check a
menace to the maintenance of peace and international stability
. . . which threatened to spread to their countries." They "had
done so at the request of the vast majority of the legal residents
of Palestine" and were "therefore welcome visitors." The Arab
"efforts . . . to stabilize the situation . . . had met with a certain
amount of resistance owing to the presence of truly foreign
troops, especially those that had come from Eastern Europe and
which constituted not only a military, but a political, economic
and social danger as well." Fawzi took exception to the logic of
Soviet and Polish proposals for "all Arab troops to leave
Palestine," while those troops remained. "The Arab inhabitants
of Palestine," Fawzi stressed in addition, "had been driven
from their land with the help of arms, the source of which was
known to the USSR representative."
Tsarapkin returned to the attack at another meeting on the

same day. The "synchronization" between the departure of
British troops and the immediate "invasion of Palestine by Arab
forces" showed that the latter was "part of the U.K. plan" to
prevent the implementation of partition. "That it had been
successful only in preventing the creation of an Arab State in
Palestine was due solely to the quick action of the Jewish
people in defending the area assigned to them." The adoption
of the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of the Arab armies
"was an essential first step in the creation of conditions
necessary for the peaceful development of Israel and for the
establishment of^an Arab State."
To this Fawzi replied that "it was the Zionists who were
guilty of aggression, as could be seen from the continuous flow
of troops and war materials which they were procuring from
Eastern Europe . . . . More and more troops, trained in
accordance with a specific ideology, were arriving every day
from Eastern Europe to assist the Zionists." 1 0 0
During the Political Committee discussions on the following
days Tsarapkin expressed his support for the Polish proposal
regarding the composition and competence of the Conciliation
Commission referred to in Bernadotte's "progress report." 1 0 1 In
particular, the Soviet delegate stressed the importance that the
Commission be composed of five members, their identity to be
determined by the principle of equal geographic distribution.
The British proposal, which Tsarapkin attacked sharply, 102
talked on the other hand of three members and urged that the
Commission's activity be guided by the Bernadotte report's
conclusions — including boundary changes. Although an
amended British proposal on the formation and composition of
the Commission was eventually adopted, its final formulation
omitted the paragraph that saw in the late Mediator's Plan the
territorial basis for a Palestinian peace settlement. 103
On 4 December the Political Committee renewed its
discussion of the Soviet proposal on the withdrawal of foreign
troops. Fawzi's statement that "any proposal for the withdrawal
of foreign troops from Palestine ought to apply to all who were
not of Palestinian nationality," was countered by Tsarapkin.
"Foreign troops," he said, referred to troops or armed forces of
foreign states. The nationality of the individuals concerned was
not relevant. "No one," he insisted, "would dispute the lawful
right of the Government of Israel to maintain its army in
Palestine to defend its country."
Soviet Backing at the U N . 263
On the same day, the Committee rejected the Soviet proposal

by 7 to 33 with 8 abstentions, with only the five Soviet-bloc
delegations and Yugoslavia and Guatemala voting in favor. 104
The Political Committee ended its discussion of the Palestine
situation on 4 December, and on 11 December the question
appeared before the Plenary. From this platform Vyshinskii
renewed the attack on British and U.S. attempts to annul,
circumvent and change the resolution of 29 November 1947; the
very raising of the Palestine question at a fourth session of the
General Assembly was evidence of these intentions. The Soviet
deputy foreign minister stressed the inconsistency of the British
government's stand; after refusing to support the partition
resolution on the grounds that no agreement on it had been
achieved between Jews and Arabs, it was now adhering to the
Bernadotte Plan which both sides had rejected. Britain, he
claimed, reiterating previous Soviet charges, had sought to
aggravate the situation in Palestine so as to provide a pretext
for retaining its dominion there as the keeper of law and order.
Once this had failed, a Mediator had been appointed as an
instrument to realize British and U.S. plans, and indeed,
instead of adjusting Jewish-Arab relations and achieving an
armistice, he had been preoccupied with preparing political
plans for replacing partition by a new solution. Vyshinskii
repeated the Soviet demands for the withdrawal from Palestine
of foreign troops and the appointment of a Conciliation
Commission as suggested originally by Poland. Were the
Commission to include members who were a priori hostile to
the partition resolution, this would complicate the situation and
lead to the endless postponement of a final settlement. 105
On 11 December too, in accordance with a Plenary resolution,
representatives of the five great powers met to discuss the
composition of the Conciliation Commission. Still on the same
day French representative Armand Parodi reported to a further
Plenary meeting that four of the five powers had agreed on
forming a commission composed of France, the United States
and Turkey. The U.S. U.N. delegation insisted that no eastern
bloc state be included in the commission. 1 0 6 The Soviet
delegation continued to oppose this, desiring a five-member
commission composed of small powers only and including
Poland which, Vyshinskii insisted, was in a position—unlike
the two great powers proposed as Commission members—to
adopt an objective stand over Palestine.
The Plenary, however, adopted the proposal of the four
powers, 1 0 7 and on 12 December the first session of the Third

Regular General Assembly was closed.
One more act in the international tussle was over. The
USSR—and Israel—had much to be content with. True, a
Conciliation Commission of three Western states had been set
up. The Assembly had also resolved that "the refugees wishing
to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date,"
and that all refugees be compensated for loss of or damage to
property. 108 Yet, the decisions taken had not referred to those
sections of the Bernadotte Plan which were in the eyes of both
the Soviet Union and Israel the main points of controversy: a.
the undermining of the 29 November 1947 resolution, a
possibility to which the 11 December 1948 resolution made no
allusion whatever; and b. the changing of frontiers, particularly
in the Negev and Haifa, and the annexation by Transjordan of
Palestinian territory. Consequently, the Soviet media duly noted
the failure of the Bernadotte Plan. 109
Thus, although discordances were beginning to appear in
their relationship toward the end of 1948 and although there
was in fact no working alliance between the two states, the
Soviet and Israeli positions were still largely identical on most
of the central issues that together comprised the Palestine ques-
tion.
SIGNS OF DISSONANCE: THE END OF THE PALESTINE WAR
AND ISRAEL'S APPLICATION FOR U.N. MEMBERSHIP
Before the conclusion of the General Assembly discussion of

the Bernadotte Progress Report, the Security Council began its
discussion of Israel's application for U.N. membership
presented by Shertok to Trygve Lie on .29 November 1948. 110
The USSR supported Israel's application wholeheartedly.
Replying to the opponents of Israel's membership, who
expressed doubts as to the legitimacy of Israel's existence and
its readiness to comply with U.N. directives, Malik told the
Security Council on 2 December: "The State of Israel has been
created and exists in accordance with a resolution passed in the
General Assembly . . . its territory is clearly defined by an
international decision of the United Nations." Israel, Malik
went on, had shown that it fulfilled the U.N. Charter
membership conditions: "Ever since its birth this State declared
that it wished to live in peace and entertain peaceful relations
with all its neighbours and with all the nations of the world. It
is not to blame for the fact that this appeal did not meet with
any response either from its neighbours or from some of the
most distant states." Despite "the difficulties encountered by [it]
since the first stages of its existence," Israel had "proved its
vitality and its ability to assume and fulfil international
obligations, particularly those . . . imposed on it by the United
Nations, and especially by the Security Council."
Once again a very sharp exchange took place between the
Soviet and the Arab delegations. Faris al-Khuri of Syria
attacked the USSR stand. In particular, he said, the official
position adopted by the Soviet delegation did not represent the
opinion of the 25 or 30 million Soviet Muslims who joined
with the hundreds of millions of Muslims and Arabs the world
over in opposing Israel's acceptance to the U.N. Malik
questioned Khuri's statement and claimed he was "inadequately
informed. . . . The peoples of the USSR, irrespective of whether
they are of the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic or any other faith,
follow the firm principle which is based on the
self-determination of nations and the right of every people to
independent statehood."
The Security Council returned to the subject on 15 and 17
December. Once more Malik defended Israel's right to exist,
insisting that insofar as territorial "complications" had arisen,
they resulted "from a variety of circumstances and from the
attitude of neighbouring states." On 17 December Malik said: "a
modification of the frontiers of the State of Israel is, of course,
possible, but that is the affair of the State of Israel and not of
those who are trying by force to deprive it of territory which is
legally its own, or to change the frontiers of that territory
against the wishes of the State of Israel." Malik went on to
ridicule the attempts of British delegate Sir Alexander Cadogan
"to cast doubt on the peace-loving character of the State of
Israel and, at the same time, to pass off Transjordan, with its
notorious King 'Abdallah as a model peace-loving state." Malik
also attacked as strange and dangerous the Syrian theory that
"inasmuch as the territory and frontiers of the State of Israel
and its right of existence are contested by some of its neighbour
states, the State of Israel does not exist as a sovereign State and
cannot be recognized as such." This was, he said, "reminiscent
of the 'theories' . . . preached by the fascist aggressors who
claimed world mastery. According to these theories, it was
enough for Hitlerite Germany to cast doubt on the existence of
one of its neighbour states for that state to cease to exist, and
for its territory to be seized and absorbed into the territory of

Hitlerite Germany."
Malik went on: "References have also been made to the fact
that no elections have so far been held in the State of Israel,
and that no representative institutions have been set u p . " Yet
the Soviet delegation rejected this too as a valid argument
against Israel's acceptance to U.N. membership. "It is clear to
all," Malik said, "that it was foreign aggression which forced
the State of Israel to concentrate its whole strength and
attention on self-defence. If the State of Israel, like any other
state in a similar position, were allowed a short period of
peaceful existence, there can be no doubt that elections would
be held and that representative democratic institutions would
be set u p . "
In conclusion, Malik pointed to the paragraph in the partition
resolution which provided for the admission of the two
Palestinian states to the U.N. There was, he insisted, no reason
to postpone the Jewish State's application. "The Jewish state
has been created; it exists, and the Security Council has every
reason to consider the question of its admission to membership
favourably." 111
Although both the USSR and the United States, once again
voting together, favored Israel's application, the Security
Council rejected it. Describing the vote, Izvestiia wrote that
Israel's request had not been approved since five delegates
headed by Britain had "employed the notorious 'shameful
veto'—a means exposed by the USSR delegation in the session
of the General Assembly." 1 1 2
However, the joint stand taken by the USSR and the United
States on this issue did not signify any lessening of tensions, let
alone cooperation, between them. While Soviet comment on
events concerning Palestine was first and foremost anti-British,
the United States was by no means spared: the American stand
was described as appearing more moderate for tactical
reasons, 113 yet basically identical with the British in that it too
reflected "the world struggle between two camps." Both,
moreover, had intervened in Palestine and taken advantage of
the Palestine War to promote their own interests and weaken
the anti-imperialist struggle in the Arab East. 114 The fact that
the partition resolution was "likely to have very beneficial
effects" for the Arab countries as a whole —in addition to giving
the peoples of Palestine "the prospects of the independent and
democratic development of their economic, political and
cultural life" —was said to have brought Britain and the U.S.A.
to join forces to thwart it. Together with their "puppets in the
Arab League," New Times wrote, they started preparations for
the Palestine War immediately after that resolution had been
passed. It was as a preliminary measure for "this deliberately
engineered war," for example, that the Arab governments had
undertaken "a vicious reign of terror against democratic
organizations . . . Communist parties, trade union organizations
[and] progressive periodicals" (see p. 114 and chap. 3, n. 19). In
May the Arab armies invaded Palestine and a war began
"which is absolutely alien and harmful to the interests of all the
Arab peoples, but very useful to the imperialists." The latest
development in this chain of events was said to be "the so-
called Palestine Arab Congress" which, convening in Jericho on
1 December 1948 and proclaiming 'Abdallah King of Transjor-
dan and Palestine, had been intended both to strengthen the
ruler most closely linked to Britain and to exacerbate inter-Arab
disputes (cf. p. 257). 115
Other sources referred specifically to what the Soviet media
called the United States' hypocritical, two-faced stand on the
State of Israel. On the one hand, Washington helped the Arabs
directly. The Arab armies, the Soviet Yiddish commentator
Leonid Epstein said in a Yiddish broadcast early in 1949, had
"resumed war operations" following receipt of "new financial
aid from the British and increasing supplies of arms and
military material from the U.S.A. and Britain." 116 At the same
time the United States hoped to "occupy" the Negev through
"an understanding with the reactionary elements in the Israeli
Government" and so favored its "annexation . . . to the Jewish
State." 1 1 7
The Soviet media's stress on U.S. pressures on Israel became
particularly marked in early January 1949. In view of the
political impasse created by, on the one hand, the Arab refusal
to enter into negotiations and, on the other, the refusal of a
great power — Britain — to recognize the Negev as part of
Israel, and the military impasse created by the continued
presence of Egyptian forces in the Faluja pocket and in the
Negev, Israel had decided upon Operation Horev. The political
objective of the resumption of hostilities was to compel the
Egyptians to initiate armistice negotiations, the assumption
being that once Egypt negotiated the other Arab states would
follow suit. The military objective was to put an end to the
Egyptian military presence on Israeli territory. 118
On 29 December Malik called in the Security Council for an

immediate cessation of hostilities and negotiations between the
Arabs and Israel on the basis of the resolutions of 19 October
and 16 November, that had stipulated negotiations between the
two parties either directly, or through the agency of the Acting
Mediator. The Soviet delegate stressed that nothing had as yet
been done to implement negotiations since, although Israel had
"at once accepted the proposal," the Arab states "so far as we
know" had not. He accused Britain of acting all the time to
thwart Arab-Israeli negotiations and of seeking their further
postponement by trying to activate the Security Council
Committee of Seven set up by its 4 November resolution and
which, Malik claimed, had died a natural death, 119 and the
Conciliation Commission, which had not yet come into being.
There was, in the Soviet view, no need for any machinery other
than the Security Council and the Acting Mediator.
The Soviet media closely followed the events in Palestine,
contrasting Arab-British aggression with Israel's desire for an
armistice and negotiations. Izvestiia, for example, reported that
on 1 January —"the [29 December] United Nations injunction
concerning the cessation of hostilities notwithstanding"—the
Israeli capital (then Tel Aviv) was attacked from the air and the
sea, no less than 100 bombs being dropped in the air attack. 120
Several days later the same source reported the agreement of
both Israel and Egypt to a cease-fire and pointed out that the
Israeli government had agreed to order its troops to cease fire,
"seeing in this measure a proposition for negotiations with the
Egyptians concerning a final peace settlement in Palestine." 1 2 1
But the most interesting element in the fighting was the role
of Britain and the United States. Radio Moscow (quoting Israeli
sources) reported that "British assault and diversion troops and
armoured units" had been ordered to assume positions in the
Suez Canal area in readiness to invade the Negev. Whether or
not British troops would actually occupy the Sinai peninsula
and positions along the Egyptian frontier, it went on, depended,
however, on the U.S. attitude. In this connection TASS stated
that the U.S. government had informed the government of Israel
that it would postpone full recognition and the granting of the
loan that was being negotiated should Israeli troops enter
Egyptian territory. 122
The picture drawn by the Soviet press and radio of the
United States' economic and diplomatic pressures on Israel was
indeed close to reality. The U.S. minister to Israel, James
McDonald has described in detail these pressures to enforce an

Israeli withdrawal from positions it occupied westward of the
international boundary that had separated Mandatory Palestine
and Egypt (Israeli troops had reached and occupied Bir 'Asluj
and Abu 'Ajila in the Sinai Peninsula, although unable to take
the Gaza Strip). On 31 December McDonald received
instructions from Washington to transmit to the government of
Israel Britain's threat that unless it withdrew its forces from
Egyptian territory, Britain would invoke its obligations under
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 to come to Egypt's help and
enter the war against Israel. Delivering the British demand, the
U.S.A. "declared sharply that Israel must withdraw its troops at
once if the war were not to spread." The U.S. message included
such phrases as "grave consequences," "review of our attitude,"
"no desire to act drastically," and so on.
On the same day the Israel Defense Forces were ordered to
withdraw to the international frontier (Rafah-Auja) and by 2
January there were no Israeli troops on Egyptian territory. In
addition to Ben Gurion's verbal guarantee to McDonald,
President Weizmann addressed a letter to President Truman: he
expressed his concern at British interference between Egypt and
Israel; said it was in deference to the United States that Israel
had surrendered its strategic position on Egyptian territory and
withdrawn without insisting that Egypt withdraw from Israeli
territory; and urged Washington to prevent further British
"intrigue" with the Arabs that might deter a peaceful
settlement. 123
Britain, however, was not to be satisfied with diplomacy
alone. On 7 January a number of British planes made a
reconnaissance sortie over Israeli positions. Five of them were
shot down, in response to which Britain dispatched troops to
Aqaba and demanded compensation from the government of
Israel. Yet this time the United States was not sympathetic. The
State Department informed McDonald that the incident would
"not be allowed to exacerbate the Middle East situation."
Truman himself told British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks that
neither the reconnaissance flight nor the landing in Aqaba had
any justification, even from the tactical point of view. He,
Truman, considered Anglo-U.S. cooperation essential but, he
added, cooperation meant Britain consulting the U.S.A. In
Britain, too the incident was severely criticized. 124
The Soviet media were full of the air incident. TASS also
reported the arrival in Transjordan of reinforcements and
equipment from bases in Egypt and Iraq and the alerting of

British troops in the Suez Canal Zone, and gave details of
British arms supplies to Egypt in the past months. TASS
pointed out that British troops were stationed in Sinai and the
Nile Valley, although the 1936 Treaty stipulated the
maintenance of bases in the Canal Zone only. Soviet broadcasts
told of the negative reaction within Britain to "Britain's
dangerous role in Palestinian affairs" resulting from its attempt,
in the words of a Soviet commentator, to recover its positions
as "participant in the Palestine conflict and to enable her to
have her say in settling the situation." A British source was
quoted by TASS as saying that Britain might "quite easily find
herself in a state of war with the only Middle Eastern country
that is at all effective from the military point of view." Once
more the Soviet press and radio stressed the strategic
significance of control of the Negev from both the purely
military point of view (as linking the Red Sea with the
Mediterranean) and that of its natural resources. 19 - 5
It was reported in the West that the U.S. government was
apprehensive about the Soviet reaction to British operations and
that the firmness of the U.S. stand vis-à-vis Britain was the
consequence of information on the Soviet position passed on to
the United States and Britain by Secretary-General Lie. 126
Meanwhile, preparations were underway for Arab-Israeli
negotiations. The Soviet press reported that on 8 January
Bunche had told the Committee of Seven that the cease-fire had
come into effect the day previously and that Egypt and Israel
had accepted his invitation to participate in negotiations. The
Committee, Komsomol'skaia pravda noted, came to the
conclusion that any further action on its part or on the part of
the Security Council was superfluous at the present junction
given the two sides' acceptance of a cease-fire and the
forthcoming direct talks between them. 1 2 7
The negotiations that in fact put an end to the Palestine War
were openly welcomed by the Soviet media. When the Rhodes
talks between Egyptian and Israeli representatives began under
the auspices and through the mediation of Dr. Bunche, Radio
Moscow said the Israeli and Egyptian decision to begin direct
peace negotiations had "created a feeling of satisfaction among
all who really desire peace in Palestine." 1 2 8 The conclusion of
the talks and signing of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice on 24
February were likewise given considerable publicity. 129 On 3
March 1949, at the first Security Council meeting devoted to a
discussion of the Palestine question since 29 December and

which reopened the debate on Israel's application for U.N.
membership, Malik voiced his government's satisfaction at the
successful outcome of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. "Ever
since the Palestine question first arose," he stated, "the USSR
delegation has maintained that direct negotiations between the
two parties were the best way of settling the disputes which
have arisen between the State of Israel and the Arab States.
Events have justified this stand." 1 3 0
It was an obvious corollary that the British continued to be
depicted as desiring, and actually attempting to achieve, the
failure of the negotiations. 131 TASS claimed that Britain even
sought a resumption of hostilities. 132 Indeed, the focus of Soviet
anti-British comment in the period January-March 1949 was
Britain's military activity in the area, particularly in and around
Aqaba, "war measures" that were being undertaken, moreover,
"with the connivance of the U.S. Government, whose influence
in maintaining the imperialist system in the Arab countries is
no less than Britain's." In mid-January it was reported that
British reinforcements were continuing to reach Transjordan
(Mafraq, Ma'an and Aqaba), i.e. in addition to those dispatched
to Aqaba earlier in the month. Britain was camouflaging its new
plot by throwing up "a smokescreen of lies, fabrications and
intrigues concerning mythical Czechoslovak arms and Soviet
help for the State of Israel. In doing so Britain hopes to kill two
birds with one stone—to rob the Arab countries of their
independence and to influence the Arab nations against Soviet
Russia." 133
Arab independence was to be further undermined by the new
pacts which Britain was seeking to conclude with the Arab
countries as the quid pro quo for its military and political
assistance against Israel. 134 These in turn were part of British
activity aimed at "the formation of a so-called regional Middle
Eastern or East Mediterranean bloc to supplement the Atlantic
pact." 1 3 5
This was the context in which the USSR viewed Israel's
occupation of Umm Rashrash—later Eilat — on 10 March 1949.
The completion of the Israeli occupation of the Negev meant
the much desired interruption of the territorial contiguity of the
British position in the Middle East. Some time before, probably
toward the very end of 1948, Semen Tsarapkin had, sought out
Moshe Shertok in Paris to inform the Israeli government
urgently and secretly that he, Tsarapkin, had learned from
reliable sources of Egyptian preparations to occupy the northern

tip of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Soviet government, its
representative made clear, was of the considered opinion that
the Israel Defense Forces should anticipate this move and take
over the area at once. Tsarapkin is reported to have said: "the
Israeli Army must rush there with a large force as quickly as
possible; this is a vital matter for the State of Israel." 136 When
Israel finally occupied Eilat, the Israeli Legation in Moscow
reported the satisfaction of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. 137 True,
the reaction of the Soviet media to the last military action of the
Palestine War was reserved, and only the sparest and most
laconic reporting was given to an event whose significance the
USSR fully appreciated. 138 Yet this was almost certainly not the
result of any thoughts of possible Israeli membership in a
pro-Western regional bloc that from the Soviet point of view
would eliminate the long-term strategic implications of the
Israeli occupation of the southern Negev (for Soviet
apprehension about a Middle Eastern defense bloc and Israel's
possible adherence to it, see also p. 276). The qualified nature
of Soviet public reaction was an almost inevitable concomitant
of the beginning of the Soviet reappraisal of its own
relationship with Israel (the reasons for which, as we saw in the
previous chapter, were in no way relevant to Soviet Middle
Eastern strategic considerations). Another factor was perhaps
also the anti-cosmopolitan campaign, at its height in March
1949, which must also have prevented positive commentary on
the Jewish State from being published in the Soviet Union. 1 3 9
Thus, for example, none of Malik's statements expressing a
positive evaluation and even praise of Israel in December 1948,
let alone in March 1949 (cf. below), found their way into the
Soviet media.
The Soviet appraisal of the Palestine War and its political and
strategic implications as expressed in the winter of 1948-49 was
far from uniform—in itself an indication that Soviet policy on
this issue was changing. The main difference among the
various formulae concerned the relationship between the
United States and Britain, and the transformation in the Soviet
stand was probably largely the result of the increasing
Anglo-U.S. cooperation and coordination in the Middle East.
By the end of 1948 the USSR's earlier hopes for cooperation
with the United States against Britain were no more. Partly as a
result of the militancy of Soviet foreign policy, particularly the
Berlin crisis, which encouraged both Washington and London
to increase their cooperation in the international arena as a

whole, and partly as a result of the final failure of the various
projects and plans—notably that of Bernadotte—to replace the
partition resolution by alternative solutions of the Palestine
problem, and the end of the Palestine War (with the various
peace negotiations), the two Western powers made conscious
efforts to coordinate their policies on Palestine. Two major
treatises on the Palestine problem published in Moscow in
mid-December 1948 pinpointed the change that was taking
place in the Soviet Establishment. The first, a lengthy historical
article on the development of the Palestine problem since
World War I in the monthly Voprosy istorii, stressed that the
Arab-Jewish war of 1948 was "the first open breach in
Anglo-American relations since the time of the Second World
War" and "revealed the deep contradictions that have long
separated England and the U.S.A. in this crucial part of global
politics." Even this article, however, went on to express the
new formula of Anglo-U.S. cooperation: "of course, more
powerful motifs also have been and are at work than the
discrepancies between the Anglo-Saxon powers over the
Palestine question; their common anti-Soviet policy, their joint
preparation of Palestine as a bridgehead for a new world war,
and the common fear of the English and U.S. imperialists of the
national-liberation movement of the oppressed peoples of the
Near and Middle East." 140
The new line was given its first specific and detailed
expression in the second publication, Izrail' Genin's The
Palestine Problem. This comprehensive official account of
current developments in Palestine which, as has been noted,
heralded the new trend of criticizing Israel (cf. pp. 212-15)
accused the United States and Britain of joining hands to
frustrate the partition resolution, their unity emanating —
according to Genin also — from their struggle against the
USSR. 141 This tendency to demonstrate the unity of purpose of
the two Western powers in Palestine gained the upper hand in
the course of the early months of 1949 142 in the general context
of the campaign against their preparations for a third world war
and the danger that nuclear weaponry be employed in this war
(the atom bomb was still an American monopoly at this time).
Concurrently the Soviet Establishment was making a
reappraisal of the "colonial and semi-colonial" world, the
forces at work within it, and their potential as allies of the
"socialist countries" in a joint anti-Western struggle. 143 In the
Middle East, the Arab countries, which in population and size

were the major force in the area as well as having on their
territories Western military bases and vast natural resources,
were the obvious focus of Soviet interest from this point of
view. Israel, on the other hand, not only comprised a very small
part of the entire area, but also lacked Western bases and had
even promised, and apparently convinced, the USSR that it
would not tolerate such bases on its territory. Therefore, the
very goal that the Soviet Union had pursued in its support for
Israel—the neutralization of specific strategic areas and the
evacuation from them of British forces and bases —was
henceforth to dictate Soviet interest in and orientation toward
the Arab countries. In Egypt and Iraq in particular conditions
seemed ripe for an anti-British movement to remove British
bases and undermine the position of the USSR's traditional
major opponent in the Middle East.
The beginnings of the new orientation provided added
stimulus to the USSR to approach the Arabs. Throughout the
period of the coincidence of interests with Israel, Soviet
officials and communications media alike had insisted on
preserving the appearances of Soviet friendship for the Arabs.
Toward the end of 1948 talks took place between Soviet and
Arab representatives at the U.N. The same Faris al-Khun, for
example, who attacked the Soviet Union for its attitude to its
Muslim citizens and for ignoring their views when elaborating
the official Soviet stand toward Israel (see p. 265), had shortly
before been the guest of Andrei Vyshinskii at the Soviet
Embassy in Paris and — according to his own statement —
discussed questions relating to developments in Palestine with
Soviet diplomats. Indeed, in the fall of 1948 Arab sources were
predicting a change in the Soviet stand on Palestine. 144 In
spring 1949 Radio Moscow warned the Arabs not to fall prey to
attempts to involve them in the warmongering policies of the
Western powers and urged them to adhere in the East-West
conflict to the USSR, which had never violated the integrity of
the Arab states and would remain a faithful friend of the Arab
peoples. 145 The Soviet Union, its media informed the Arabs,
was rapidly enhancing both its international influence and its
political and economic power, its victories already having
brought about "changes in the dependent and colonial
countries of Asia and Africa." 146
The change in attitude toward Israel was the result of
growing Anglo-U.S. cooperation, especially in the light of
American friendship toward Israel. It also reflected Moscow's

appreciation that a pro-Arab orientation would be eventually
desirable and even necessary since Israel had nothing more to
offer the USSR now that their common interest—the
establishment of a viable sovereign Israel—had been realized.
However, at first—as is customary when the media presage a
change in policy—the indications were few and not made
explicit, but merely alluded to in the central daily press.147
Despite these negative indications Soviet sources were
undisguisedly sympathetic toward Israel in a number of cases
in the early months of 1949.148 Even Genin's pamphlet, despite
its denigration of Israel's political system and domestic trends,
gave an openly favorable description of the Israeli role in the
anti-imperialist struggle. On the one side, Genin stated when
portraying the developments that had led to the Palestine War,
had been the British and the Arab feudal landlords who had
channeled the class war of the Arab fallahin into anti-Jewish
outbursts and upon whom the British had based their policy
since 1939. On the other side stood the Jews who had
"responded to the White Paper with protest demonstrations,
terrorist activities, sabotage and armed attacks upon British
troops, bases and communications lines." This confrontation
had ceased with the Second World War, but upon the
termination of the war "when, as a result of the historic
victories of the Soviet Army, the defeat of fascism led to the
liberation of the countries of the Near East from the threat of
enslavement by the fascists and to the resuscitation of the
national liberation movement in the entire East, anti-British
activities in Palestine were resumed with new vigor." Outlining
the course events had taken at the U.N., Genin noted the British
and Arab refusal to implement the General Assembly resolution
and the U.S. attempt to replace partition by an alternative
solution. The USSR, for its part, had supported partition as the
fulfillment of the national determination of the two peoples
inhabiting Palestine, and the Jewish State had duly come into
being according to the U.N. decision.
Moving on to the Palestine War, Genin continued to
demonstrate his sympathetic attitude toward the Israeli cause.
Israel's armed forces, he stressed, had repulsed the aggression
initiated against the Jewish State. Moreover, the truce
conditions were not in Israel's favor, as it alone was prevented
from enhancing its military strength either with equipment or
manpower. Indeed, "the Communist Party of the State of Israel"
had accused the Provisional Government of accepting a

disadvantageous truce with undue haste. Once again, the USSR
was shown to be in the same boat as Israel, since it too suffered
from the truce which was supervised solely by Western
representatives. 149
Despite reservations about the State of Israel, the USSR
continued to give it unqualified support in its struggle to be
accepted to U.N. membership. This practical assistance stood in
sharp contrast to the negative attitude which the above
reservations clearly implied. When the Security Council, for
example, renewed its discussion of the Israeli application early
in March, just two weeks after Izvestiia had informed its
readers that the Mediterranean filial of the Atlantic Pact that
was to be formed would include Israel, 150 Iakov Malik stated
categorically: "it is well known that the Israeli Government is a
peace-loving Government which loyally complied with the
requirements of the United Nations." 151
On the following day Malik once more advocated
concurrence with Israel's request. He spoke vehemently against
the "far-fetched and artificial excuses" to prevent the State of
Israel from becoming a member of the United Nations. Both
those raised in December, some of which were now obviously
no longer valid —such as the argument that Israel had no
elected government—and the new ones, were all irrelevant to
the issue under debate. The USSR, Malik concluded, "supports
the Israeli Government's application and will vote for that
State's admission to the United Nations."
The Council meeting of 4 March agreed to transfer the issue
to the General Assembly, the next and final stage in the
procedure. 1 5 2 When the Third Session reconvened early in
April Malik requested the Assembly to bring the issue to a vote
without further debate. There was, he maintained, nothing to
add to all that had already been said on the Palestine question
during the past two years at two special and two regular
sessions of the General Assembly as well as in constant
meetings of the Security Council. The USSR delegation was
convinced that the acceptance of Israel to the U.N. would not
complicate such outstanding problems as the status of
Jerusalem, the fate of the Arab refugees and the general issue of
international peace and security. On the contrary, Malik said, it
would facilitate their solution. 153 Despite the Soviet stand, the
question was brought before an ad hoc committee that devoted
to its discussion no less than ten meetings between 3 and 9
May 1949. Soviet delegate Aleksandr Soldatov reiterated at the

committee statements made earlier by Malik, directed against
attempts at postponing Israel's acceptance to the U.N. Soldatov,
too, saw fit to insist that unconditional acceptance would not
release Israel from implementing U.N. decisions on the refugees
and the internationalization of Jerusalem so as to restore
friendly and stable relations between Arabs and Jews. 154 On 9
May the committee adopted a resolution to accept Israel; all the
Soviet bloc delegations voted in favor. 155
Reporting these events, Izvestiia noted that Israeli delegate
Eban had ''tried to assure the delegates of the readiness of the
government of Israel to cooperate with the U.N. in
implementing the Assembly's decisions on Palestine. Yet he
avoided a direct reply to the question whether the Israeli
government would effect the recommendations included in
these resolutions. He pleaded the changed circumstances since
the adoption of these resolutions and showed the need for a
further discussion in the U.N. Conciliation Commission of the
issues touched upon in the resolutions." The Soviet bloc was
represented in the debate by Polish delegate Jan Drohojowski
who pointed out—as Izvestiia duly noted—that the Polish
government had constantly and unconditionally supported the
idea of creating a Jewish national state, "in contrast" to the
policy of "certain states for whom the Palestine question and
the question of creating the State of Israel were a means for
achieving specific political goals." 1 5 6
Following the vote in the Ad Hoc Committee, the question of
Israel's acceptance to the U.N. was returned to the Plenary.
Here on 11 May the requisite two-thirds majority voted in favor
of Israeli membership, by 37 votes against 12 with 9
abstentions; all the Soviet bloc delegations again supported the
Israeli request.
Once more the only Soviet bloc delegate who took the floor
was Drohojowski. The Israeli representative, he noted, had
given binding assurances that his government earnestly desired
to be a useful U.N. member and to uphold the U.N. Charter and
its principles. Indeed, the Polish government expected Israel to
fulfill all the obligations of a U.N. member. He reminded his
audience with satisfaction of Israeli assurances concerning the
Holy Places, the safety of and free access to which were of
direct interest to the Polish government. Poland hoped for the
settlement within a reasonable time of the problems
outstanding between Jews and Arabs, including a just solution
of the Arab refugee problem, in cooperation with those Arab

groups who were opposed to imperialist designs in the Middle
East. Poland had given the Jews active assistance in the
fulfillment of their aspirations for a national home and state of
their own. Yet, he continued, "the period of sentimental
interest in the fate of Israel had come to an end; an era of
cooperation based on mutual interest was beginning. The
Jewish people, advancing along peaceful and progressive lines,
could rely on the assistance of Poland, the Soviet Republico and
the people's democracies of Europe." Drohojowski was
convinced that Israel would "doubtless remember that those
countries had been its true friends at the troubled time of its
emergence," whereas Britain and the United States "had been
ready to betray the new State before its birth." Israel must also
bear in mind that the United States' subsequent "change of
policy . . . had occurred for reasons of political expediency
divorced from any sense of justice or faith in Israel's future."
Israel's leaders must take into account that "the life of a State
could not be founded on such a precarious basis . . ., that the
selfish interests of the international reactionary movements
would try, and were indeed already trying, to mortgage the
political future of the new state," and finally "that Israel was
deeply indebted to the working classes."
Poland, for its part, its delegate told the General Assembly,
"would watch the future of Israel with sympathetic interest." It
favored Israel's admission to the U.N. because it believed that
this would further the cause of peace, "but the fate of the new
State lay in the hands of its own people, and depended upon
the wisdom of its leadership." 1 5 7
This speech contained an undisguised warning to Israel and
was a public statement of the Soviet bloc's revised policy
toward Israel. (That this announcement of a change for the
worse was delivered by the delegation that had been the most
active in supporting the Jewish cause in Palestine since May
1947 was a characteristic tactic of Soviet policy.) Accordingly,
the Soviet media announced the fact of Israel's acceptance to
U.N. membership unobtrusively, without comment and without
mention of the Soviet bloc stand during the voting. 158
Two days after the General Assembly vote, and without
heeding that warning, Israeli Chargé d'Affaires Mordecai Namir
paid a visit to the Near and Middle East Department at the
Soviet Foreign Ministry "to express officially our thanks for the
support of its government for our acceptance to the U.N." 1 5 9
• • •
The USSR had given its support to Israel in its struggle for
independence and later for full recognition by the international
community as a permanent, stable and viable factor within it.
From November 1947 and until May 1949 the Soviet Union
had not flinched for an instant from its resolve to help in the
establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine that would
be fully independent and sufficiently strong to assert, enjoy and
defend its sovereignty.
Throughout this period the USSR had shown awareness of
the serious nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in 1949 it had
recognized the inherent limitations of the armistice agreements.
The USSR knew that Israel depended in many ways on the
United States and its Jews, particularly on the economic level;
yet it believed that this dependence would not come to include
the military sphere and would not lead to Israel's joining the
Western camp in the cold war.
The USSR was acquainted with Israeli domestic politics and
sought to consolidate its ties with groups with a fundamentally
pro-Soviet orientation, particularly the amalgamated left-wing
Zionist party Mapam. This was part of a general policy of
winning the organized sympathy for Soviet foreign policy
objectives of a wide public in states outside the Soviet bloc,
through a variety of front organizations.
Yet, as we saw in the previous chapter (pp. 211-12), there is
no ground for assuming that the support accorded to the State
of Israel in a variety of fields at the time of its establishment
and in the first period of its existence emanated from any
presumption that a left-oriented state was in the making. Were
this the case, the disappointment that led to the change in the
Soviet stand would have been caused by Israel's first general
elections at the end of January 1949, while indications of a
change in the Soviet stand appeared in fact in the weeks and
even months before the elections.
A number of factors of a very different nature—totally
unrelated to Israeli internal politics—would seem to account for
the change and its timing. One of these, toward the end of
1948, was the intensified repression of indications of a Jewish
national awakening in the USSR. The Soviet Jewish reaction to
the establishment of the Jewish State was a concomitant—and
an expression—of this awakening and apparently also a major
factor, from the point of view of the Soviet authorities, in
necessitating its immediate and total repression. Another

contributory element, as we shall see in the next chapter, was
the anti-cosmopolitan campaign with its openly Jewish
emphasis. The two trends combined to hinder any positive
Soviet attitude toward Jews anywhere (and it must be borne in
mind that in Soviet eyes the State of Israel and its army were
first and foremost a Jewish state and army, as the Soviet media
frequently described them 1 6 0 ). Moreover, their implication was
that the Jews seemed to be desiring to break through the Soviet
Iron Curtain, potential traitors to the Soviet mother country and
even possible allies of the USSR's chief antagonist in the world
arena which was allegedly making an all-out effort at world
domination.
To turn to Soviet foreign policy, Israel's first year saw the
achievement of the main goals that the USSR had aimed at
when deciding to support the Jewish State. As Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister Zorin said at a party held by the Israeli
Legation in Moscow on the occasion of the State's first
independence day anniversary, Israel had in this period solved
its principal problems: it had driven out the British, become a
fully-fledged independent state, inflicted a military defeat on
the Arabs and compelled them to agree to peace talks. British
troops, he noted, were still stationed near Eilat, yet they did not
seem to comprise any threat to Israel. "They will not be able to
attack you without a reasonable pretext, and there are no such
pretexts," while the disintegration of their imperial power and
the consequent need to take into account such factors as the
U.N., international opinion, etc. barred them from an "outright
onslaught." In short, Zorin concluded, Israel had had "a very
fruitful year." 161
Indeed, Israel's acceptance to the U.N. and the armistice
agreements which it signed with its Arab neighbors signified in
Soviet eyes the culmination of a process that had begun with
the partition resolution. These events were not only landmarks
representing the attainment of the aims which the USSR had
had when supporting Israel's establishment. They also made a
reappraisal of policy necessary and a change in the Soviet
attitude to Israel well-nigh inevitable.
In 1949 the Soviet media were already indicating anti-Israel
tendencies in Moscow. It is not clear whether these early signs
were linked in any way with internal dissensions in the Soviet
leadership and it is impossible to pinpoint such differences of
opinion. (In Stalin's last years the exact nature of the tasks and
activities of his leading lieutenants was even more obscure

than is usually the case in the USSR.) It is, however, reasonable
to assume that the various groups responsible for internal
security were hostile to Israel and warned their colleagues in
the ruling clique against maintaining friendly ties with it.
These circles presumably adhered to the isolationist trend that
characterized the Soviet Union in the years 1948-1953 and were
connected with the repressive campaign against any focus of
Soviet Jewish national identity, including the link with world
Jewry as a whole and Israel in particular. On the other hand,
the elements which controlled the Peace Movement and
directed parallel operations throughout the world must have
viewed with favor the extensive sympathy within Israel for the
USSR and its international goals. The circles responsible for
determining inter-state relations seemingly also considered
Israel, to quote Vyshinskii, the most genuine democracy in the
East 162 and the political entity in the Middle East that was most
independent of the Western powers.
Yet even such groups which may a priori have been
sympathetic to Israel presumably noted its isolation in the
Middle East, which necessarily restricted the effectiveness of
Israeli political trends or currents. (The anti-Israel speeches of
Arab delegates at the first World Peace Congress in April 1949
must have evoked some such reflections.) Insofar as Moscow
still hoped that Israel might be a fomenting influence in the
Middle East that would help bring about socio-political
transformations in the Arab states and unsettle the Arab
regimes, it can only have thought in terms of an indirect
influence: as a result of Israel's very existence and its defeat of
the Arab armies. Therefore, even a positive Soviet evaluation of
Israel's international or regional role did not necessitate a
friendly attitude toward Israel. On the contrary, the very hopes
which the USSR was beginning to entertain regarding the
colonial and semi-colonial world (see also chapter 9) meant a
new orientation toward the Arab states. Furthermore, the Arab
states were basically linked with Britain, whose influence and
prestige were clearly waning. This must have encouraged hopes
of a coordinated Soviet-Arab anti-Western effort, while Israel's
ties were first and foremost with the U.S.A., the new great
power whose influence in the area was constantly on the
increase.
Notes
1. SWB I, 31 May 1948. During the preceding period—as of late

1944 and early 1945 —events in Palestine had already been covered by
TASS correspondents in the neighboring countries, specifically Egypt,
cf. p. 38. The first TASS representative reached Israel in December, see
p. 181.
2. Pravda, 17 May 1948.
3. FALP, 1 June 1948.
4. Izvestiia, 14 May 1948. (The British evacuation was completed on
30 June 1948.)
5. New Times, 26 May 1948.
7. R. Moscow, 29 May 1948/SWB I, 4 June 1948.
8. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 4 July 1948/SWB I, 19 July
1948.
9. Pravda, 30 May 1948.
10. Pravda, 29 May 1948.
11. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 66, 15 May 1948.
12. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 67, 17 May 1948. The Truce Commission
had been set up on 23 April and consisted of the consuls in Jerusalem
of the United States, France and Belgium. See chap. 3.
16. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 72 and Resolution S/773, 22 May 1948.
17. Pravda, 25 May 1948.
19. Ibid., Documents S/794/Rev. 1 and S/795.
22. R. Moscow in Polish, 1 June 1948/SWB I, 7 June 1948.
23. R. Moscow, 30 May 1948/SWB I, 4 June 1948. The Arab
acceptance of the cease-fire was reported by izvestiia on 3 June 1948.
24. New Times and Izvestiia, 2 June 1948.
25. Izvestiia, 9 June 1948.
26. izvestiia, 10 June 1948.
27. New York Times, 14 July 1948.
28. SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 80 and 82, 7 and 10 June 1948. The U.S.
U.N. Mission was not certain "whether it might not in fact be useful
for the United States to agree to the Soviet Union sending a few
military observers to Palestine and the Near East." But Rusk's Special
Assistant Robert McClintock told Jessup and Ross that Washington
could not rely upon Gromyko's promise that "the Soviet

Representation would be kept to a minimum." Moscow might for
example ask for three Soviet destroyers to be sent to patrol off the
Palestine coast just as the United States had (see following note).
Moreover, the U.S. government had not altered its stand on limiting
observers to the Truce Commission states and could not afford now to
"wobble"—Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 112-13.
29. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 84, 15 June 1948. The ships Gromyko
referred to were three U.S. destroyers which, together with a French
corvette, were put at Bernadotte's disposal to fulfill functions in
relation to the supervision of the truce. Izvestiia pointed out on 21
June 1948 that the commander of this unit was to report to the
Mediator via the U.S. Legation in Cairo; cf. Foreign Relations . . . 1948,
vol. 5, part 2, pp. 1140-41.
30. Gromyko raised the subject again in the Security Council —SC
OR, 3rd Year, No. 93, 7 July 1948 —while Pravda noted on 7 August
that Bernadotte's staff comprised 152 officers, 55 of whom were
American, 50 French and 47 Belgian.
31. The first such report, attributed to TASS sources in Paris,
actually predated the commencement of the truce—izvestiia, 11 June
1948. On one occasion Pravda wrote that Bernadotte had informed the
Israeli provisional government of an Egyptian violation and told it that
Israel's armed forces were free to conduct counter-measures to ensure
the transit of food to Jewish settlements in the Negev, which the
Egyptians endeavored to prevent— Pravda, 27 June 1948.
32. TASS in Russian for abroad, 11 June 1948, R. Moscow in English
for India, 17 June 1948, and R. Moscow in English, 1 July 1948/SWB J,
14 and 21 June and 5 July 1948.
33. Pravda, 30 June 1948.
34. Pravda, 15 June 1948. The Soviet public was reminded that this
procedure had no legal basis— Izvestiia, 17 June 1948. Izvestiia in fact
printed an official Israeli protest which argued that the limits put on
immigration were contrary to the 29 May resolution and imperilled the
truce, as well as depriving thousands of people who had spent years
behind barbed wire of their freedom -Izvestiia, 8 July 1948. The 29
May resolution had in fact prohibited for the duration of the cease-fire
a. the introduction of fighting personnel into the countries involved in
the Palestine War and b. the mobilization or submitting to military
training of men of military age "introduced" into these areas. The
distinction was intended specifically to permit freedom of
immigration.
35. Cf. chap. 4 for the concerted immigration of East European Jews
as a Communist bloc contribution to the Israeli war effort and the
coordinated transfer of war matériel; also for the comparison of the

Palestine and Spanish Wars (p. 140).
36. SC OR, 3rd Year, Suppl. for July 1948, Document S/863, 27 June
1948. For developments relevant to the Bernadotte suggestions, see
Netanel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword (Jerusalem: Massada, 2nd
revised edition, 1968), pp. 305-11.
38. TASS and R. Moscow in Arabic, 2 July 1948/SWB Í, 5 July 1948.
While Bernadotte's suggestions made no mention of either the United
States or Britain, they were welcomed by the foreign ministers of the
two countries —Elizabeth Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy'," St.
Antony's Papers, no. 11 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), p. 13; cf.
n. 79 below; Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1186. In fact,
there had already been some agreement between the two governments
on arrangements for internationalization of Haifa so as to enable in
particular the reopening of the refineries which both governments
considered as essential for the European Recovery Program —ibid., pp.
1132-33. It soon became apparent, however, that Washington
contemplated this as a merely temporary arrangement, whereas
London was thinking in terms of a permanent arrangement —ibid., pp.
1157-58. The U.S. U.N. Mission generally favored giving Bernadotte
"as free a hand as possible" and pointed out to Marshall that "friendly
delegations" expressed the view that Anglo-American cooperation was
essential "to prevent growth of Soviet influence in area" —ibid., pp.
1161-71. Indeed, the feeling in Washington that the British government
was seeking ways to increase U.S. commitments and responsibilities
that had been rampant before the British evacuation of Palestine
seemed by late June to have given way to a conviction that "a new
'entente cordiale' " had been established and a desire to continue
"cordial and intimate working relations" —ibid., p. 1178.
39. TASS and R. Moscow in Arabic, 2 July 1948/SWB I, 6 July 1948.
40. Ben Gurion, pp. 213-23.
41. Pravda, 3 and 8 July 1948. For the stipulations concerning
immigration, see Lorch, p. 307. It has been suggested that Abdallah let
it be understood that he would accept Bernadotte's plan; however, he
made no public statement that allowed for any such assumption —ibid.
42. Izvestiia, 5 and 9 July 1948; TASS and R. Moscow in Slovak, 7
July 1948/SWB I, 12 July 1948; and Pravda, 8 July 1948.
43. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 93, 7 July 1948.
47. Pravda, 12 July 1948; also SWB I, 16 July 1948.
48. E.g., Izvestiia, 11 and 27 July 1948; and Pravda, 19 July 1948.
49. R. Haganah in Arabic, 12 July 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 22 July 1948.
54. TASS for the Provincial Press, 16 July 1948/SWB I, 23 July 1948.
55. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 100, 2 August 1948.
56. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 103, 13 August 1948.
57. R. Damascus, 4 August 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 12 August 1948. The
USSR was reported to oppose the return of the Arab refugees because
it wanted a maximum number of Jewish immigrants, especially those
with Communist leanings, to be absorbed in Palestine; in order to
enlarge the Jewish-inhabited area, a large number of Arabs had to be
driven from their homes— R. Sharq al-Adna, 8 August 1948/ibid.
58. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 106, 18 August 1948. (The estimates of the
total number of the Arab refugees varied; Cadogan had talked on 2
August of 550,000 and Egyptian delegate Mahmud Fawzi on the same
date of between 350,000 and 500,000, of whom 250,000-300,000 had
been allegedly driven from their homes before the termination of the
Mandate; their expulsion was indeed one of the pretexts for the Arab
invasion of 15 May.)
59. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 107, 19 August 1948. Later in the year, the
Soviet media returned several times to the Arab refugee issue. In
November Shertok was reported as having given "facts demonstrating
that Arabs were fleeing under pressure from the Arab Supreme
Committee"—R. Moscow, 17 November 1948/SWB Í, 22 November
1948. British and U.S. attempts to deal with the problem at the U.N.
Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee were likewise the butt of
Soviet criticism—TASS in Russian for abroad, 4 November 1948, and
R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 13 November 1948/SWB Í, 8 and
22 November 1948. For the discussion of the Arab refugee problem at
this committee, see GA OR, 3rd Session, 3rd Committee, 108th, 109th,
117th and 118th Meetings, 20, 21, 29 and 30 October 1948.
60. Izvestiia, 20 August 1948. The Soviet media had already
reported both Israeli suggestions for direct talks and their rejection by
the Arabs, "even though the masses of workers in the Arab East had
hoped that ruling circles in the Arab states would accept the
suggestion"— Pravda Vostoka, 8 August 1948; Pravda, 12 August 1948;
and R. Moscow in Arabic, 19 August 1948/SWB Í, 23 August 1948. Cf.
also p. 245.
61. TASS in Russian for abroad, 19 August 1948/SWB I, 23 August
1948.
(For one of the rare references to Zionism in the interim period, cf. p.
311; for ensuing references in the fall of 1948, cf. pp. 177 and 212ff).
62. R. Moscow in Arabic, 5 September 1948/SWB Í, 10 September
1948.
63. New Times, 1 September 1948.
65. Pravda, 19 September 1948. Pravda made similar statements on
the following day.
66. R. Moscow, 23 September 1948/SWB Í, 27 September 1948.
68. "Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,"
submitted to the Secretary-General for Transmission to the members of
the United Nations, GA OR, 3rd Session, Suppl. No. 11 (A/648).
69. Ben Gurion, p. 291.
70. Ibid., p. 302.
71. For the sympathetic attitude the Soviet press showed as early as
July to Israeli reservations concerning the territorial stipulations of that
resolution, see p. 245. An Arab diplomat accredited to the Soviet
Union was told by Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin in late September
that Soviet support of the Partition Resolution was subject to review
since the Partition Plan was not being carried out—Foreign Relations
. . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1432.
72. Namir, pp. 41-42.
73. For hopes regarding Negev oil deposits, see chap. 1, n. 93; cf.
also p. 256.
74. Namir, pp. 52-54.
75. Davar, 26 September 1948.
76. Voice of Israel in English, 6 and 12 October 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 14
and 21 October 1948; and Palestine Post, 12 October 1948.
77. This hope can hardly have been too strong, and Moscow was
apparently prepared to accept the Israeli contention that if the Arab
state were set up Israel would be prepared to negotiate with it on its
own excesses vis-à-vis the partition resolution.
78. New Times, 7 October 1948; and Pravda, 16 October 1948. It
was presumably in this connection that the British were said to be
planning to build a canal from the Gulf of Arabia to Palestine's
Mediterranean littoral — TASS in Russian for abroad, 23 September
1948/SWB Í, 27 September 1948.
79. R. Moscow in English for the U.K., 26 October 1948/SWB Í, 1
November 1948. The Soviet and Israeli appraisal of the Bernadotte
Plan as a U.S.-British deal has been borne out by a British historian,
Elizabeth Monroe, who suggests that U.S.-British coordination must be
seen against the background of the siege of Berlin. Bernadotte's June
proposals, which were not basically different from his final plan, had
become known to the two governments during their discussion of how
to react to the siege. Bevin and Marshall considered the Mediator's
suggestions a compromise between the demands of Israel and
Transjordan, at the same time creating the possibility of a land bridge
between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world that was vital to the oil
interests of Western Europe. According to Miss Monroe, the State
Department was consistently demanding the implementation of
Bernadotte's recommendations from late June (when they were put
forward) through October—Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy'," p. 13.
80. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 116, 14 October 1948.
81. R. Moscow, 20 October 1948/SWB Í, 25 October 1948; and
Izvestiia, 21 October 1948.
82. For the fighting in the Negev ("Operation Yoav") and its
context, see: Ben Gurion, pp. 294-301; and Lorch, pp. 402-34.
83. For the "All-Palestine Government" and reactions to it, see n.
115 below.
84. Namir, pp. 71-72.
85. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 121, 26 October 1948.
86. For the fighting in the Galilee ("Operation Hiram") and its back-
ground, see Ben Gurion, pp. 304-6; and Lorch, pp. 443-55.
87. Izvestiia, 27 October 1948. Israel's willingness to negotiate all
outstanding questions pertaining to the situation in the Negev had
been observed and stressed beforehand by Soviet sources, cf. Izvestiia,
20 October 1948.
88. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 122, 28 October 1948; and SC OR, 3rd
Year, No. 123, 29 October 1948.
89. SC OR, 3rd Year, No. 125, 15 November 1948.
90. Izvestiia, 22 and 24 October 1948; TASS in Russian for abroad,
22 October 1948, and R. Moscow in English for the U.K., 26 October
1948/SWB I, 25 October and 1 November 1948. Truman had indeed
urged the U.S. U.N. delegation to endeavor to postpone the debate on
the Bernadotte Plan until after the U.S. presidential elections—Foreign
Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1490.
91. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1: Year of Decisions (New York:
Doubleday, 1955), pp. 555-60; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp.
213 and 221; Marshall D. Shulman, StaJin's Foreign Policy Reap-
praised, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 30; and
Documents on International Affairs, 1947-48 (Oxford: Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1952) pp. 163-64.
For earlier Soviet interest in Wallace, see p. 120. (The Soviet leader-
ship's pretensions vis-à-vis U.S. presidential elections were seen again
when Khrushchev attributed Kennedy's 1960 victory to the Soviet
campaign against Nixon.)

1948.
93. Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy'," p. 13.
1948.
95. R. Moscow in Yiddish, 3 November 1948/SWB Í, 8 November
1948.
96. TASS in Russian for abroad, 16 November 1948 and R. Moscow,
17 November 1948/SWB Í, 22 November 1948; and Izvestiia, 17 and 18
November 1948.
97. GA OR, 3rd Session, 1st Committee, 204th and 205th Meetings,
18 and 20 November 1948. The statement attributed by Izvestiia to
Khuri was not included in the Official Records of the Political Com-
mittee, yet these, unlike the minutes of the Security Council, are only
brief summaries and far from being verbatim reports. It certainly
reflected the spirit of Khuri's charges.
98. GA OR, 3rd Year, 1st Committee, 206th Meeting, 22 November
1948, and Brit Ha-Moatzot Utekumat Yisrael (The Soviet Union and
the Establishment of Israel), a Hebrew collection of Soviet speeches at
the U.N. on Palestine put out by the Israel-USSR Friendship League
(Tel Aviv, 1950), pp. 176-83.
99. GA OR, 3rd Year, 1st Committee, Annexes, Document A/C. 1/401,
25 November 1948.
100 . GA OR, 3rd Year, 1st Committee, 215th and 216th Meetings,
29 November 1948.
101. The Polish proposal called upon the Conciliation Commission:
"(1) To assist the interested parties to enter immediately into direct
negotiations to reach on the basis of the resolution of 29 November
1947 a permanent settlement which shall include the final designation
of the boundaries of the State of Israel and the establishment of an
independent Arab State over the rest of the area of Palestine . . .;
"(2) To appoint under its supervision, a boundaries commission
which shall draw up the final boundaries of the State of Israel and of
the Arab State in Palestine . . .;
"(3) To establish the economic union and promote good relations
between the State of Israel and the Arab State in Palestine;
"(4) To call into consultation all those organs and agencies of the
United Nations which may assist in working out plans both for the
resettlement of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons and for
their repatriation where feasible in the areas from which they have
come" —ibid., Documents A/C.I/400 and Corr. 1, 25 November 1948.
102. GA OR, 3rd Year, 1st Committee, 218th ana1 219th Meetings, 30
November and 1 December 1948.

103. GA OR, 3rd Year, 1st Committee, 223rd and 224th Meetings, 2
and 3 December 1948, and Annexes, Documents A/C.1/394, A/C.1/394/
Rev. 1 and A/C.l/394/Rev. 2, 18, 24 and 30 November 1948.
104. GA OR, 3rd Year, 1st Committee, 228th Meeting, 4 December
1948.
105. GA OR, 3rd Year, 184th and 185th Plenary Meetings, 11
December 1948.
106. Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 1595-97 and
1649.
107. GA OR, 3rd Year, 186th Plenary Meeting, 11 December 1948.
108. A detailed resolution concerning treatment of the strictly
humanitarian aspect of the refugee problem had been adopted by the
Assembly on 19 November, covering the nature of the assistance to be
given the refugees and the U.N. machinery that was to be instrumental
in its distribution —GA OR, 3rd Year, 163rd Plenary Meeting, 19
November 1948, and Resolution 212 (III), A/731.
109. E.g., Pravda Vostoka, 5 December 1948.
110. The procedure for dealing with such requests included two
stages: first, their deliberation by the Security Council and second,
after approval by the Security Council, their discussion by the General
Assembly. Israel had put out feelers concerning possible U.N. member-
ship as early as July (Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p.
1259) but these had not been followed up.
111. SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 128-130, 2, 15, and 17 December 1948.
112. Izvestiia, 19 December 1948. While a discussion of the Soviet
attitude to the veto is extraneous to this study, it is worth noting that
Syria was the only Council member to vote against Israel's acceptance
to U.N. membership, the other opponents of the Israeli application,
including Britain, abstaining. It is noteworthy, too, that the USSR,
notwithstanding its frequent and violent attacks on Western draft
resolutions, refrained from use of the veto on Palestine during the
entire period of the Palestine War.
113. E.g., TASS in Russian for abroad, 4 December 1948/SWB Í, 10
December 1948.
114. R. Moscow in Arabic, 30 November 1948, and in Yiddish for N.
America, 1 December 1948/SWB Í, 6 December 1948; and Kom-
somoVskaia pravda, 9 January 1949.
115. New Times, 23 December 1948; see also R. Moscow in English
for the U.K., 15 and 27 December 1948/SWB Í, 20 December 1948 and 3
January 1949.
On 29 September 1948, in accordance with a decision of the Arab
League, the establishment of an "All-Palestine Government" was
announced. On 1 October a Palestine Arab Congress met in Gaza

which appointed Hajj Amin al-Husayni President of the Constituent
Assembly and resolved the establishment of a number of governmental
institutions. Although the "All-Palestine Government" was recognized
by the other Arab states, 'Abdallah refused to recognize it on the
grounds that it made the unification of Palestine into a single Arab
state more difficult. He therefore convened, also on 1 October, a paral-
lel Palestinian Congress in Amman which rejected the Mufti's govern-
ment and called upon 'Abdallah to take Arab Palestine under his pro-
tection. This was the first step toward realizing 'Abdallah's plan for
annexing Arab Palestine, and on 15 November he was duly crowned
King of Jerusalem.
At the Jericho Congress, two weeks later, the thousands of particip-
ants, headed by Mayor of Hebron Muhammad 'Ali Ja'bari, called for
the unification under 'Abdallah of Palestine and TransJordan, as a first
stage toward all-Arab unity. For these developments, their implications
and context, see 'Abdallah al-Tall, Zikhronot (Memoirs) (Tel Aviv:
Maarakhot, 1964), pp. 260-62 and 272-75; and Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi,
Jordan (London: Asia Publishing House, c. 1965), pp. 49-57.
The USSR was no more sympathetic to the "All-Palestine Govern-
ment," or as lzvestiia called it "the Pan-Palestinian Government," than
to 'Abdallah and his supporters. In October, on the occasion of the
General Assembly Political Committee's discussion of its request to be
represented at the debate on Palestine, lzvestiia wrote: "This 'Govern-
ment' was set up recently by Arab leaders in the Palestinian town of
Gaza which has been occupied by Egyptian troops. It claims dominion
over the entire territory of Palestine —within the boundaries controlled
until 15 May 1948 by the British Mandate." Aleksandr Bogomolov,
Soviet ambassador in Paris and member of the Soviet U.N. delegation,
lzvestiia went on, had told the Political Committee that this govern-
ment not only had not been recognized by anybody, but its very exis-
tence was precluded by the 29 November 1947 resolution. Manuil'skii
too had opposed inviting to the U.N. the people "who call themselves
prime minister and foreign minister of the so-called 'pan-Palestinian
Government' " on the grounds that this would mean annulling the par-
tition resolution — lzvestiia, 24 October 1948. For the discussions at the
Political Committee, see GA OR, 3rd Session, 1st Committee, 169th
Meeting, 23 October 1948.
116. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 3 January 1949/SWB I,
10 January 1949.
117. TASS in Russian for abroad, 10 December 1948/SWB Í, 17
December 1948.
118. For military operations in Southern Palestine in November-
December 1948, prior to Operation Horev, see Lorch, pp. 463-78; for
Operation Horev itself, see ibid., pp. 491-526, and Ben Gurion, pp.
334-36.
119. The Committee, appointed to advise the Acting Mediator, was
composed of the Security Council's five permanent members, Belgium
and Columbia. If one or both sides failed to comply with the resolution
(to withdraw to their 14 October positions and to establish permanent
truce lines and neutral or demilitarized zones) by a date to be fixed by
the Acting Mediator, the Committee would look into methods of apply-
ing s a n c t i o n s - S C OR, 3rd Year, No. 124 and Resolution S/1070, 4
November 1948.
121. Izvestiia, 7 and 8 January 1949.
122. R. Moscow in Polish and in Yiddish for N. America, 5 January
1949, and TASS for home consumption, 6 January 1949/SWB Í, 10
January 1949.
123. McDonald, pp. 105-14. For McDonald's instructions from
Washington, see Foreign Relations . . . 1948, vol. 5, part 2, p. 1704;
McDonald was told to tell the Israelis that his government "desired to
draw attention of Israeli Govt to grave possibility that by ill-advised
action PGI [Provisional Government of Israel] may not only jeopardize
peace of Middle East but would also cause reconsideration of its appli-
cation for membership in UN and of necessity a reconsideration by this
Govt of its relations to Israel." For British communications to the U.S.
government concerning Israeli violations of the international boundary,
cf. ibid., pp. 1698 and 1701.
124. McDonald, pp. 114-17; Ben Gurion, p. 336; also Monroe, "Mr.
Bevin's 'Arab Policy'," p. 44.
125. R. Moscow, 8 and 11 January 1949, and R. Moscow in English
for N. America, 9 January 1949, and for the U.K., 11 January 1949,
TASS for home consumption, 10 and 11 January 1949, and in Russian
for abroad, 10 January 1949/SWB I, 14 and 17 January 1949; Pravda,
9-14 and 28 January 1949; Izvestiia, 9 and 11-14 January 1949; Trud,
11 January 1949; and Pravda Ukrainy, 13 January 1949.
126. Voice of Israel in Arabic, 12 January 1949/SWB III, 20 January
1949.
127. Komsomol'skaia pravda, 9 January 1949.
128. R. Moscow, 14 January 1949/SWB I, 17 January 1949. For the
Rhodes talks, see Walter Eytan, The First Ten Years (London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1958), chap. 2.
129. SWB I, 28 February 1949.
130. SC OR, 4th Year, No. 16, 3 March 1949.
131. E.g., Izvestiia, 15 January 1949; and Pravda, 26 January 1949.
132. TASS, 5 February 1949/SWB Í, 11 February 1949.

133. R. Moscow in English for the U.K., 13 January 1949, and in
Arabic, 15 January 1949, and TASS, 14 and 17 January 1949/SWB J, 17
and 21 January 1949. Previous denials of military aid had referred only
to charges relating to Soviet arms supplies, see p. 154. By now, how-
ever, Czechoslovakia had also ceased its assistance; see p. 159.
135. R. Moscow, 8 February 1949/SWB Í, 14 February 1949. For
further discussion of Soviet fears of a Western military bloc in the
Middle East, see chap. 9, section b; the Atlantic Pact (NATO) was offi-
cially and finally concluded in April 1949 but its form was clear by the
beginning of the year.
136. A\ Ha-Mishmar, 30 April 1971. Failing to find Shertok, Tsarap-
kin had transmitted his message through Mapam emissary Mordekhai
Oren who was in Paris in late 1948 and 1949; I have been unable to
date the incident referred to.
137. Namir, p. 114.
138. The only direct reference in the Soviet central press seems to
have been in Izvestiia, 11 March 1949.
139. For the campaign and the apparently contradictory connecting
of cosmopolitanism and Zionism, see chap. 7, particularly pp. 321-22.
140. P. Osipova, "From the History of the English Administration of
Palestine (1919-1930)," Voprosy istorii, no. 12 (1948): 67-88.
141. Genin, pp. 23-25.
142. E.g., R. Moscow in Yiddish, 7 January 1949/SWB Í, 14 January
1949; and Izvestiia, 15 January 1949.
143. For both the global and regional implications of these trends,
see chap.9.
144. R. Beirut and R. Baghdad, 16 November 1948/SWB ÍÍÍ, 25
November 1948.
145. R. Moscow in Arabic, 18 March 1949/SWB Í, 25 March 1949.
146. R. Moscow in Arabic, 19 May 1949/SWB Í, 23 May 1949. The
broadcast mentioned China in particular where the victories of the for-
ces of democracy would "open the door to the liberation of all Asia."
147. Thus, for example, Izvestiia, on 15 January 1949, quoted an
Arab source's reference to the Arabs' war "against the Zionists."
(According to Namir the Israeli Foreign Ministry had noted the use of
"anti-Zionist propaganda" in Soviet Arabic broadcasts as early as 25
December 1948—Namir, p. 142 —although I have found no evidence of
this in the broadcasts monitored by the B.B.C.; while these are not
comprehensive, they tend to reflect fairly faithfully the trends manifest
in Soviet radio programs and it is possible that Namir made some mis-
take.)
148. Pravda, for example, on 16 January 1949, pointed out that

while Britain was "mobilizing" its forces in the area and intensifying
their level of alertness, Israel was undertaking a general "demobiliza-
tion."
149. Genin, pp. 8-9, 14-18 and 21-22.
150. Izvestiia, 18 February 1949. The paper mentioned Britain,
France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Egypt and Israel as prospective members
of the Mediterranean pact.
151. SC OR, 4th Year, No. 16, 3 March 1949.
152. SC OR, 4th Year, No. 17, 4 March 1949; KomsomoJ'skaia
pravda, reporting the vote on 6 March, significantly omitted specific
mention of the Soviet position.
153. GA OR, 3rd Session, Part II, 191st Plenary Meeting, 13 April
1949.
154. GA OR, 3rd Session, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 43rd
Meeting, 4 May 1949.
155. GA OR, 3rd Session, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 51st
Meeting, 9 May 1949.
156. izvestiia, 12 May 1949.
157. GA OR, 3rd Session, Part II, 207th Plenary Meeting and Resolu-
tion 273 (III), 11 May 1949.
159. Namir, p. 135.
160. This was not peculiar to the Soviet press and radio and need in
no way be interpreted as having a pejorative connotation.
161. Namir, pp. 122-23.
162. Ibid., p. 142.
PART THREE:
SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS
AND SOVIET JEWRY
7
The Offensive Against

Soviet Jewry
Two factors and the contradiction between them seemed

likely to complicate or even endanger the positive relationship
formed in 1948 between the Soviet Union and the State of
Israel. On the one hand, the Soviet authorities insisted that
their support of the establishment of the Jewish State in Pales-
tine had no pertinence to the Soviet Jewish population which,
according to the official Soviet standpoint, was indifferent to a
Jewish national solution beyond the confines of the USSR. On
the other hand, significant numbers of Soviet Jews demon-
strated personal interest in developments in Palestine and the
Jewish State.
Each of these factors, and particularly the inherent conflict
between them, necessitates a digression into the subject of Mos-
cow's policy toward its Jews and the general position of Soviet
Jewry at this period. Only an analysis of the basic currents
determining both of these will give an insight into the forces at
work among the Soviet leadership, bureaucracy and public and
within Soviet Jewry which had direct implications for Soviet-
Israeli relations.
THE JEWISH MINORITY WITHIN THE SOVIET

"FAMILY OF NATIONS"
The Second World War had seen the beginning of a Soviet

Jewish national awakening of which two principal expressions
297
were the development and maintenance of ties with Jewry out-

side the USSR, after a virtual severance of all links for a period
of two and a half decades, and an intensified Jewish conscious-
ness. The main causes of this resurgence were the Holocaust in
general and the collaboration with the Nazis of so many ele-
ments of the local population in particular.
In addition, it derived a dual stimulus from the Soviet gov-
ernment. In the first place, during the war the Soviet authorities
encouraged the patriotism of the various national minorities
inhabiting the USSR to ensure their loyalty in the struggle
against Germany. To this end they relaxed the very rigorous
measures that had characterized the Soviet nationalities policy
in the 1930s. Second, the USSR developed a number of institu-
tional contacts with the outside world in order to mobilize max-
imum support for the Soviet war effort.
In this context the Soviet Union created an organizational
framework for the establishment and maintenance of contact
between Soviet Jewish public figures and Jewry abroad. Yiddish
programs had begun to be broadcast from Moscow to the West-
ern world in the summer of 1941, and in the spring of 1942 the
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee came into being, subordinated to
the Sovinformburo (the Soviet Foreign Ministry Information
Office].
As the war came to an end, and even more so after its termi-
nation, Soviet policy underwent a fundamental reorientation. Its
new goals also influenced the country's minority groupings
(national, religious, etc.) and the leadership's policy toward
them. The primary aim in the realm of domestic policy was
now the reconstruction of the Soviet economy; while in foreign
policy the major objectives were to guarantee a cordon sanitaire
that would encircle the Soviet Union from Finland to Mongolia,
and to establish the USSR's status as a principal world power.
By early 1945 the Soviet Union had indeed become the center
of a large empire which it held with the help of an impressive
number of troops (cf. also p. 15).
This new situation was accompanied in the international
arena by a rapid deterioration in the USSR's relations with its
wartime allies and, at home, by a reinvigoration of the regime's
ideological program, including the emphasis on "Soviet patriot-
ism" and the primacy of the Russians within the Soviet family
of nations, and resistance to foreign cultural influences and
"cosmopolitanism." This program required rigorous administra-
tive measures to enforce the new isolationism and to seal anew
The Offensive Against Soviet Jewry 299
the cracks that had been allowed to appear in the Soviet mono-
lith during the war as a result of the alliance with Western and
other foreign factors, the annexation by the USSR of consider-
able territories with a marked national ethos (the Baltic States,
Western Ukraine, Bessarabia), and the relative ideological relax-
ation that had been permitted in the early stages of the war. 1
The main event which heralded the new Zeitgeist, commonly
known as Zhdanovism, was a speech at a plenary meeting of
the Soviet Communist Party Central Committe in August 1946
in which Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's second-in-command, pro-
pounded its rationale. This speech was followed by three Central
Committee resolutions which laid down that Communist moral-
ity was the sole criterion and directive for Soviet cultural activ-
ity. The resultant politicization of art in all its forms quickly
encompassed other fields of Soviet life, notably higher educa-
tion, the sciences and the communications media. It also
involved an extensive campaign of what Soviet jargon knows as
"criticism and self-criticism" accompanied by purges and other
repressive measures, such as the June 1947 State Secrets Act
which embodied the physical and spiritual segregationism of
the Soviet State. The main objects of assault were: activities and
works that seemed to be irrelevant to Soviet reality and its chal-
lenges; "kowtowing" to the West and its cultural or scientific
values and achievements; and "bourgeois nationalism." The
apologists of the "Zhdanovite" ethos described it as the back-
bone of the struggle of the forces of democracy and progress
against imperialist and capitalist efforts to dominate the world. 2
These are the basic trends which form the general back-
ground against which the position of Soviet Jewry in the
immediate post-war period has to be seen. For indeed, although
the fundamentals of Soviet post-war policy were not a priori
designed as anti-Jewish measures or connected with Jews in
any way, they were particularly relevant to two essential fea-
tures of Jewish activity and being the world over: the emphasis
on the group's distinctiveness and the maintenance of ties with
fellow-members in other parts of the world. The extinction of
Soviet Jewry as a group was thus virtually a logical outcome of
Soviet post-war domestic and international circumstances.
The USSR's traditionally complex policy toward its Jewish
minority had become further complicated by foreign policy
considerations as World War II drew to a close. It was generally
anticipated, as the dimensions of the Holocaust began to be
appreciated, that the Jewish question would be a major interna-
tional issue in the post-war settlement. The Soviet leadership

assigned to its Jews a specific role in the preparations for the
discussion of this question.
In particular, Moscow seems to have thought in terms of the
active participation of Soviet Jewish representatives in an inter-
national campaign to eliminate anti-Semitism and protect Jew-
ish rights. In December 1944 the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
was authorized to dispatch delegates to a conference of the
international Jewish community should such a conference be
organized to discuss the urgent problems connected with Jew-
ish relief and rehabilitation. 3 (This was especially interesting
since the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee had suffered a number
of restrictions during 1944. 4 ).
The USSR was clearly seeking to demonstrate the progressive
character of its policy and to bolster up its image as leader of
the progressive, anti-fascist forces the world over. Early in 1945
President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Vladimir Komarov
published a statement made by Stalin —in 1931—in which the
Soviet leader described anti-Semitism as "an extreme form of
racial chauvinism . . . the most dangerous survival of cannibal-
ism. In the USSR," Stalin had said, "anti-semitism is perse-
cuted most severely as a phenomenon profoundly inimical to
the Soviet system. According to the laws of the USSR, active
anti-semites are punished with death." "The Fascists,"
Komarov had gone on, "began with stupid anti-semitic jokes in
Munich beer-halls and ended with Majdanek, with millions of
dead bodies of Jews, Frenchmen, Poles, Norwegians, Danes —all
the peoples of Europe." Earlier in the Soviet Union "we merely
felt like turning our backs on [this] infamous, vile spectacle;
today we will not turn our backs on it until we have stamped it
out, pulled it up by the roots, taken all measures against its
recurrence, and we shall not forget." 5
In March-April 1945, the Soviet authorities continued to give
prominence to the connection between Soviet Jewry and Jews
in other countries, stressing both the significance of the USSR's
direct contribution to the physical survival of the remaining
Jews and the importance of the Jews' own role in the war effort.
A call on the part of the rabbis of Palestine to Jewish com-
munities the world over to declare a day of fasting in the mem-
ory of the millions of Jews massacred by the Nazis met with the
response of the Moscow Jewish community, whose synagogue
was filled on the appointed day by the leading Jewish figures
(including such notables as Polina Zhemchuzhina, the wife of
Foreign Minister Molotov; the wife of Marshal Aleksei Antonov;

and General David Dragunskii). 6 Two weeks later, at the end of
March, the Moscow community celebrated the Passover, once
again filling the synagogue with civilians and soldiers, old and
young. Its president, Samuil' Chobrutskii, read out at the ser-
vice two telegrams which the community had received; one
from the Palestinian Chief Rabbinate, the other from Stalin who
expressed gratitude to Soviet Jews for their contribution to the
Soviet war effort.7 Material on German atrocities against the
Jews, Jewish heroism in withstanding the Germans, and the
measures adopted by the USSR and its local protégés in Eastern
Europe to rehabilitate the Jews in their countries of origin
appeared in the central Soviet press and on the air. It included
statistical data and other materials collected and disseminated
by Ehrenburg, the State Commission Investigating German
Atrocities, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the Commit-
tee of Polish Jews in the USSR. 8
By early May 1945, however, even before Victory Day in
Europe, the Soviet media were modifying their presentation of
the Jewish war role. 9 The reasons for this change were appar-
ently the anti-Semitism of the party ideologists and those
responsible for propaganda and information, as well as the gen-
eral nationalities policy that was once more condemning
expressions of national consciousness on the part of the USSR's
national minorities. In any event, the new line fitted the
increasingly anti-Semitic mood that was prevalent in the coun-
try: prominent in the Western republics recently liberated from
German occupation this anti-Semitism was quickly reflected in
the policy of the relevant republican party and government
authorities and inevitably made its way to Moscow where it fell
on fertile ground. 1 0
Despite this rampant anti-Semitism, the Soviet authorities
were careful to refrain from giving it public expression in this
period when they were courting Western progressive opinion.
Their representatives abroad continued to present the Soviet
position as before. 11 Nor did the disinclination to portray the
Jews in a positive light in the years 1946-48 —for example as
contributing to the victory over Nazi Germany—diminish the
need, given the international context, to use the example of
Soviet Jewry in propaganda abroad as proof of the advantages
and superiority of the Soviet regime and way of life.
The Soviet press and radio thus made frequent comparisons
between the favorable conditions enjoyed by Soviet Jews
because of the Soviet nationalities' policy, and the position of

their brethren in the West. Attractive even by absolute stan-
dards, they maintained, it became positively enviable in view of
Western anti-Semitism. 12 The Jews of the Soviet Union, it was
said, enjoyed full privileges, while the Jews of the United States
and Britain were experiencing the daily tribulations of anti-
Jewish discrimination and even pogroms. A single item in the
Soviet central press that virtually admitted that all was not as it
should be in the Soviet orbit referred not to the USSR but to
Poland and stressed in particular the vigorous measures taken
by the Polish government to punish the perpetrators of anti-
Jewish actions. 13 Soviet Jewish commentator David Zaslavskii
contrasted the Bolshevik theory of "the national amity of the
toiling peoples" from which Soviet Jews benefited, with the
British policy of fanning national competition and hatred that
had turned Palestine into a "beehive" and created a conflict
between Jews and Arabs which application of Soviet ideas
would have prevented. 1 4
In the field of cultural activity, too, Soviet Jewry was said to
be in a position preferable to its American brethren whose very
language, as well as their literature and press had been pernici-
ously influenced by the decadent standards of their environ-
ment. 15
The comparison between the enlightened attitude of the
Soviet authorities to their Jewish population and the dis-
criminatory policy pursued by the Western governments was
one side of the picture. The other was the apparent contradic-
tion between the progressive role assigned by Soviet foreign
policy to Jews outside the Soviet Union in their traditional
capacity as radicals and non-conformists 16 and the negation of
any positive role whatever for Soviet Jewry as a distinct
national unit.
The contradiction in the Soviet attitude to Jews at home and
abroad was felt most of all by the institution created to establish
and maintain contact between Soviet and foreign Jewry and to
bring the Soviet message to the Jewish world outside, the Jew-
ish Anti-Fascist Committee. The Committee's chief activities
indeed concentrated on justifying its raison d'être, the winning
of foreign Jewish sympathy and support for the Soviet Union,
stressing that since the struggle against fascism was still going
on, its conduct must be coordinated among Jews the world
over. At the same time, however, as it was an official
government-sponsored body and the sole Jewish organization in
the entire Soviet Union, other than the synagogue communities

and a small number of cultural societies, 17 the Committee
served also as a representative or general committee for Soviet
Jewry. At least some of its own members as well as a wide
public outside considered the committee a virtual center of
Soviet Jewish life and leader of Soviet Jewish communal and
cultural activity.
In the immediate post-war period the Committee was com-
posed of approximately 60 members, including scientists,
artists, army officers, factory directors, trade union and other
officials, 17 of whom comprised its presidium. About 80 people
were employed in its offices, among them the editorial staff of
the Committee's organ Aynikeit. The Committee's activities
were said to include: the payment of salaries to Soviet Jewish
writers; the extension of assistance to Jewish soldiers in the
Soviet armed forces; the preparation of the Black Book (see
below). In addition it received letters from both Jewish organ-
izations abroad and Soviet Jews who sought a Jewish body to
deal with their problems. These covered apparently a wide
range of issues —personal and general—arising from the various
difficulties of post-war rehabilitation, the search for relatives,
etc. 18
Gradually the Committee was deprived of its functions and
its activities were paralyzed. This applied both to the role it
was assigned officially and, even more so, to such activities as
exceeded this role. As early as September 1945 the Committee
announced that it would not continue receiving letters from
abroad inquiring about missing relatives; the reason given was
that a central information bureau was being opened by the
Executive of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the
USSR to assist Soviet citizens and foreigners seeking relatives
and friends who had been deported by enemy forces during the
war. 19 The Black Book too, which the Committee was supposed
to prepare as a memorial to the victims of the Holocaust, never
appeared in the USSR, although Ehrenburg, who participated in
its preparation, stated on a visit to Bucharest in September 1945
that the first volume, which was to be 1,000 pages long, would
soon be published —in Russian and Yiddish —in the USSR, the
United States, Britain and Palestine. 20
Even the main assignment of the Committee was curtailed.
After a reception it held for Ben-Zion Goldberg, Committee
Presidium member Major-General Aharon Katz spoke of the
need to continue the struggle against fascism and to strengthen
the ties between Soviet and U.S. Jewry. 21 Yet the Committee's
hands were very much tied when it came to deeds. At the 22nd
Zionist Congress in Basel in December 1946 the Palestinian
League for Friendly Relations with the USSR initiated a meet-
ing of activists in anti-fascist movements in Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria, the United States and several West European and
South American countries. It was resolved to call a conference
of appropriate Jewish organizations to cultivate friendly rela-
tions with the USSR and its Jews, and to invite the Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee to participate. In the end, however, no
conference took place—apparently because members of the
Moscow Committee were not permitted to travel. 22
While members of the Anti-Fascist Committee were unable to
meet their colleagues in the Palestinian, American and other
parallel societies—apart from Goldberg's USSR visit—corre-
spondence was renewed in 1947. In addition to exchanges of
telegrams on the suggested conference, the Palestinian League
asked the Committee to help a League delegation obtain entry
permits to the USSR to attend the thirtieth anniversary celebra-
tions of the October Revolution. The Committee accordingly
sent a recommendation to the Soviet Legation in Beirut, one of
whose staff told League Secretary Tarnopoler that the Legation
was taking the recommendation into consideration and "doing
everything to make our trip possible." 2 3
On the purely informational level, the Committee seems still
to have played a role in this period as an instrument of Soviet
foreign policy and a major link in carrying the USSR's message
to Western Jewry —which, as we have seen (p. 74), the Soviet
Union was seeking to tie to the forces of progress or at least
neutralize in the cold war. Not only did its individual members
do much of the broadcasting of the Radio Moscow Yiddish
program, but early in 1947 the Committee addressed a cable to
the General Council of the T.U.C. in Britain and to "all progres-
sive democratic organizations" the world over on behalf of
"Jewish public organizations" in the Soviet Union in which it
voiced "deep astonishment and profound indignation at penet-
ration of Jewish pogroms" into Britain. The Committee con-
trasted the USSR with its "fraternal collaboration of peoples . . .
where any racial discrimination whatever is punishable by law
as grave offense against state," and the "strange leniency dis-
played to instigators and organizers of Jewish pogroms in Eng-
land." The Committee demanded a vigorous campaign to
eliminate the remnants of fascism and illegalize anti-Semitism
and racialism, and some months later, on 26 August 1947, the

Committee Presidium adopted a resolution condemning "the
wave of anti-Jewish pogroms" that had spread over Britain (cf.
above and p. 74). 24
Upon the establishment of the State of Israel, the Committee
sent President Chaim Weizmann a telegram (see p. 187) in
which it noted that the forces of reaction were still striving to
throttle the Jewish people's struggle for independence. The
Committee expressed its conviction that only by taking the road
of progress and democracy would the Jewish State be able to
take a fitting place among the countries fighting for true democ-
racy. The Committee hoped that the workers of Palestine would
bear in mind "the brilliant example of Stalin friendship among
the peoples" set by the USSR and in this way overcome the dif-
ferences "imposed from outside." The Jewish State had the
support of all progressive people everywhere, and of the Soviet
Union which "has fought incessantly for the just solution of the
Palestine problem." The establishment of the Jewish State was
one of "the most significant events in the history of the Jewish
people." The Committee wished Weizmann and "the working
people of the State of Israel, victory over the aggressors, quiet
and fruitful work on behalf of all the freedom loving peoples
and the Jewish people." 2 5
This seems to be the last instance of any contact between the
Committee and Jews abord. After May 1948 it seems to have
been prevented from maintaining even this slight connec-
tion—by correspondence—with the outside world. Nonetheless,
it continued as long as it existed, voluntarily or no, to serve
Soviet Jews as the only address to which they could turn with
their personal problems. Although the Committee seems to have
taken every possible precaution to minimize its involvement in
the affairs of Soviet Jewry, it continued to be approached on
problems of Jews seeking rehabilitation within the USSR.
Increasingly too in 1947-48 it received letters from Soviet Jews
expressing the desire to initiate some form of public action on
behalf of the Jewish State being set up in Palestine with Soviet
assistance, or to participate either as an organized group or as
individuals in the Yishuv's war of independence. 2 6
Another factor that played a significant role in Soviet prop-
aganda on its Jewish policy and highlighted its inherent para-
doxes was the resuscitation of the Birobidzhan project in the
years 1946-48. From the point of view of the Soviet authorities,
the renewal of immigration to the Jewish Autonomous Region
had domestic considerations as well; yet its main purpose was

not to try to solve the problem of the Jews who, returning to
areas that had been under Nazi occupation, encountered a ram-
pant anti-Semitism that severely hampered their attempts to
recover their homes and jobs. The "echelons," as the special
trains that took emigrants to Birobidzhan were called, were
primarily intended to win over Western progressive opinion.
Indeed, the American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in
Birobidzhan (Ambijan) made an important contribution to
strengthening goodwill toward the Soviet Union among U.S.
Jewry. 27
This foreign policy objective was sufficiently important for
the Soviet Union to attempt, or pretend to be attempting, to
place its Jews on an equal footing with its other national
minorities by giving them a national territory, instead of con-
tinuing the traditional central motif of Soviet Jewish policy:
assimilation and the denial of any national Jewish group exis-
tence in the USSR. Not that the Soviet authorities had any illu-
sions about Birobidzhan's chances of success. Stalin himself
had told Roosevelt at Yalta that the Soviet Union had tried to
create a national home for its Jewish minority, but the Jews had
dispersed back to the cities and main population centers after
two or three years. 28
As early as mid-1944 a first (barren) attempt to revive interest
in Birobidzhan had clearly been designed to build up the image
of the USSR as the prime mover in a world-wide operation to
rehabilitate the remnants of European Jewry. 29 In 1946, after
over a year of total inactivity, the Soviet authorities initiated a
new Birobidzhan propaganda campaign and in January 1947 a
first echelon of Ukrainian Jews reached Birobidzhan. Over a
period of one and three-quarter years some 10,000 Jews emi-
grated to the Jewish Autonomous Region, most of them from
the Ukraine. (The last echelon reached its destination on 9
October 1948.) 30
This emigration was given great publicity by the Soviet
media, especially in Yiddish. In total disregard of the migrants'
own motivation and despite the Soviet authorities' awareness
that the claim did not correspond to reality, the media pre-
sented the migration to Birobidzhan as the solution of Jewish
national aspirations. At the beginning of 1947, on the arrival of
the first echelon, Radio Moscow had announced that a group of
Jews who had migrated to Birobidzhan had written Stalin that
in Birobidzhan "for the first time in history, our people have a
government of their own." 3 1 On the arrival of the second eche-

lon, in June —less than three weeks after the termination of the
First Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly—the Soviet
Yiddish-language media went even further. The builders of the
Jewish Autonomous Region, they maintained, were fulfilling a
great historical mission in setting up the only socialist Jewish
state in the world. 3 2
In this way the encouragement of Jewish migration to
Birobidzhan and the considerable activity, particularly on the
propaganda level, that accompanied this migration, notably in
May-June 1947 and again in the fall, at the time of the Regular
Session of the General Assembly, were specifically designed to
give extra force to Gromyko's declaration at the U.N. in May
1947 that the Jews of the Soviet Union showed no interest in
emigration to Palestine (see pp. 69-70). The publicity given to
Birobidzhan made a point of stressing: the existence of the Jew-
ish National Home of Soviet Jewry, one of the privileges and
benefits enjoyed by the USSR's Jewish inhabitants; the desire of
Soviet Jews to go there; and the actual emigration that took
place. In the second half of May 1947 mass meetings dedicated
to Birobidzhan were reported to have been held in Moscow "in
packed halls." The Soviet government's decision on the migra-
tion to the Jewish Autonomous Region of 550 Jewish families
from the Ukraine, Aynikeit wrote, indicated its paternal concern
for the thriving of the Soviet Jewish polity and for the con-
tinued development of the economy and culture of the Jewish
Autonomous Region. It suggested that an important element in
the Soviet Jews' desire to migrate to Birobidzhan was the sense
of national prestige inherent in active participation in the con-
struction of the only Jewish Socialist polity in the world. When
Soviet Jews read of the hard times in Palestine where the Brit-
ish imperialists were trying to solve the Jewish question "with
bullets and bombs," Aynikeit stated, they were all the more
aware of their own good fortune. 33
At the end of October, two and one half weeks after Tsarap-
kin announced the USSR's support of the partition of Palestine
into two independent states, Radio Moscow pointed out that
"the Soviet policy on the question of nationalities led to the
creation of a Jewish State in the Soviet Union: the Jewish Aut-
onomous Region. For centuries the best representatives of the
Jewish people had dreamed of the creation of a Jewish State,
but . . . it was only under the Soviet regime that this dream
came true." 3 4
By the turn of the year, however, a very definite change was

taking place in official references to Birobidzhan —the last men-
tion of Birobidzhan as a Jewish state seems to have been in
mid-January 1948 when, paying their respects to the memory of
Solomon Mikhoels (see below) the Soviet media said:
"Mikhoels was an ardent patriot and supporter of the Jewish
State in the Soviet Union, the Jewish Autonomous Region of
Birobidzhan, which he regarded as the best guarantee for the
further development of Soviet Jewish culture, whose form is
national and whose substance is socialist." 35
Thus, any claim regarding the "nationalist" role of the Jewish
Autonomous Region ceased in 1948. Apart from a single
instance in which Radio Moscow pointed out (in December
1948) that in Birobidzhan for the first time in history the Jewish
worker was receiving government decrees in his own tongue, 3 6
the general message throughout the year was that the Soviet
Union as a whole was the homeland of Soviet Jewry. 37 The
references to Birobidzhan merely noted the achievements of the
Jewish Autonomous Region in fulfilling the assignments
imposed on it in the spheres of industry, agriculture, etc., with-
out mention of any Jewish factor. 38
In this way, the Birobidzhan pretense petered out. Through-
out the period under question it was an open secret —despite
the intensive publicity —that only a very small number of Jews
actually wanted to migrate to Birobidzhan. Soviet Jews and
non-Jews alike knew that the Jewish Autonomous Region was
not a viable solution to the (officially non-existent) Jewish prob-
lem in the USSR. At an Israeli Legation reception in April 1949,
the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle and Near East
Department, Ivan Bakulin, noted, in connection with Jewish
immigration to Israel, that the Jews preferred geographical dis-
persion and easy work. The Soviet Union, he said, had created
different opportunities for its Jews, opening all professions to
them and giving them the possibility of territorial concentra-
tion. Yet the Jews had rejected both hard work and Birobid-
zhan; if, he concluded, they did not wish to go to Birobidzhan,
in view of the difficult conditions prevailing there, they would
certainly decline to emigrate to Israel. 39
Rumors, however, were rife in the spring of 1949 that the
Soviet authorities were planning a mass expulsion or forced
emigration to Birobidzhan. Whole communities in the Ukraine
were said to have been deported to the Jewish Autonomous
Region. 40 (In 1951-52 Jews were in fact exiled to hard labor
camps in Birobidzhan—see p. 342.) Israeli diplomats in the

USSR were apprehensive lest a migration to the Jewish Auton-
omous Region be initiated that might take on proportions so
considerable that it suppress all feeling for Israel among Soviet
Jews and have the effect of totally dividing the Jewish people, a
division that might well be of long duration if the cold war, the
division of the world into two camps, lasted. 41
This appraisal showed a misunderstanding of what in fact
was happening to Soviet Jewry. For, if in 1947 the USSR tried
to present Birobidzhan as a Jewish National Home and outlet
for the national aspirations of the Jewish people of the Soviet
Union, by 1949 it was no longer possible to make even a
superficial attempt to present Soviet Jewry as a separate entity,
let alone nationality, similar to the USSR's other national
minorities, with a right even to a fictitious territory of its own.
Not only would such an attempt have been inherently con-
tradictory to Soviet Jewish policy; it had also become techni-
cally impossible as well as worthless from the foreign policy
point of view. The USSR had given up its attempts to appeal to
U.S. Jewrv after the presidential elections of November 1948
(see p. 259). It had also eliminated the organs and information
media that had been created as a channel of communications to
Western Jewry—the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Aynikeit
and the Yiddish broadcasts —as part of a general anti-Jewish
offensive. 42
Even prior to the beginning of this anti-Jewish offensive and
the decision to exclude the Jews from the family of Soviet
national minorities, the political trends of the period had
affected Jews. Yet in the period August 1946-December 1947
attacks upon Jews and even representatives of Jewish culture
had paralleled those directed against Russians or members of
other national groupings. The "advantages" enjoyed by Soviet
Jewry at this time, as a concomitant of the Soviet nationalities
policy, meant that the demands imposed on Soviet society by
the Central Committee decisions of August and September 1946
were applicable inter alia to Soviet Jewish culture and that they
brought the same "momentum" to Yiddish literature and drama
as they did to the cultural activities of other Soviet peoples.
An unidentified Jewish writer told a plenary of the Presidium
of the Soviet Writers' Union in July 1947, in a lecture entitled
"Towards New Artistic Heights," that the Central Committee
directives on literature and art influenced the works of Jewish
writers concerned with Soviet reality, giving them "a battle
programme in the struggle for the lofty ideas of Jewish Soviet

literature and for high artistic merit." He maintained that the
party injunctions had brought new life to Soviet Jewish drama.
The works of Soviet Jewish writers, distributed by the Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee among progressive newspapers and
journals in Europe and America, not only helped consolidate
the anti-fascist forces among the Jewish masses in the West as
against those elements that were disseminating hatred and mis-
trust of the USSR; they were also a source of artistic inspiration
for all foreign progressive Jewish literature. Within the Soviet
Union Jewish writers were to have again their own periodicals,
and Jewish literary almanacs were due to appear in Moscow,
Kiev, Minsk and Vilnius. "We must," he concluded, "mobilise
the masses of the people for new creative work in which all the
peoples of our great Motherland are engaged in accordance
with the call from our Party and our leaders." 4 3
On 4 October 1947 Radio Moscow's Yiddish program put out
a broadcast under the caption "Thirty Years of Soviet Jewish
Literature." In it the acting secretary of the Soviet Jewish Writ-
ers' Bureau, Leib Kvitko, stated that Soviet Jewish literature, as
a product of the revolution, gave expression to all the aspects of
the life and needs of the Soviet peoples. 4 4
Despite the considerable influence of the politicization of lit-
erature, in accordance with the party line, on the works of
Soviet Jewish writers in Yiddish and on their Russian-language
writings on Jewish subjects in the 1946-48 period, a marked gap
existed between the publication plans of the years 1946-49 in
both spheres and what in fact appeared. This would appear to
imply that some at least of the works in question were not con-
sidered appropriate by Zhdanovist criteria. (There may well
have been a variety of reasons for not implementing these
plans.) 45
It is on record that the campaign against nationalist trends in
literature that gathered momentum in summer 1947 involved
the indictment of manifestations of nationalism in Soviet Yidd-
ish literature. In September 1947, for example, the chairman of
the Ukrainian Writers' Union, Aleksandr Korneichuk, made a
public attack on the Yiddish writer Itzik Kipnis at a plenary
meeting of the Union in Kiev in the presence of both
Kaganovich and Khrushchev. The Jewish nationalist writers,
Korneichuk pointed out, were enemies of the people just as
were their Ukrainian counterparts. 46 Commenting on the story
particularly criticized, the head of the literature section in the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Department for Soviet Jewish

Literature, Linguistics and Folklore, Chaim Loytsker, wrote in
the Ukrainian Writers' Union Yiddish organ, Der Shtern, that its
heroes were made to talk only Yiddish and to wear the Shield
of David although this was "the emblem of militant, political
Zionism, which is hostile to us as bourgeois and as an essen-
tially anti-Soviet movement." Loytsker noted that Korneichuk
had been especially angered by the fact that Kipnis had pub-
lished his story in its final, offensive form outside the USSR—in
the Lodz newspaper Dos Naje Lebn—precisely in order to bring
to his readers its "nationalist" themes; it had appeared without
them in Aynikeit. Loytsker's censure of Kipnis was part of a
lengthy article devoted to the need to bring Yiddish literature
in general into line with party requirements, and singling out a
number of writers who had deviated from the line of "our
Party." He wrote that the defects revealed, as well as the deci-
sions of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, necessitated a careful
examination of developments in Yiddish literature. Certain
writers, including several "writers of the younger generation"
(presumably those who had received all their education after
the October Revolution), had recently shown signs of bourgeois
nationalism and nationalist narrow-mindedness. Some of these
actually made frequent use of "national-historical and
legendary-Biblical stories" and Hebrew and religious terms
which were inappropriate to Soviet literature. Some writers
were also guilty of "nationalist egocentrism," restricting their
stories unnecessarily to Jewish themes.
The "most urgent task" of Soviet Yiddish literature, Loytsker
concluded his article, was "to eradicate all traces of bourgeois
nationalism and to bring into its works the lofty ideas of Bol-
shevism." 4 7
The constant stress in the Yiddish media on the Jewish cul-
tural upsurge in the Soviet Union in 1947 seems ironical in
view of subsequent events. It is nonetheless undeniable that at
the time the marked interest in Jewish cultural works and
activities shown by a considerable section of Soviet Jewry actu-
ally met with a definite response. Numerous Yiddish recitals, or
"concerts," attracting large crowds, were held in a number of
Soviet cities. 48 At the end of December literary evenings were
held to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the death of
the Jewish writer Mendele Moikher Seforim; special committees
had even been set up to prepare the celebration of the anniver-
sary (in Kiev, Chernovitz, Minsk, Vinnitsa, Bobruisk, as well as
in Birobidzhan). In Odessa alone a number of meetings were

held for the event, while in Moscow a thousand-strong audi-
ence heard the Russian writer Vsevolod Vishnevskii speak on
the brotherhood of the Soviet peoples, in addition to addresses
by Mikhoels —his last public appearance—and David Bergelson,
and poems dedicated to Mendele, read out by other Yiddish
literary figures.49
An official of the Government Printing Office, Soiuzpechat',
noted that however many Yiddish literary works were produced
they were immediately snatched up and that production lagged
behind demand in literature as well as in artistic performances.
This dearth in books following the war had to be made up. 5 0
The growing demand for Yiddish books was also stressed at a
conference on the dissemination of Yiddish literature held by
the Yiddish publishing house in Moscow, "Der Emes," on 8
September 1947 with representatives from Soiuzpechat' and
various literature dissemination institutions, and the Yiddish
writers Fefer, Aharon Kushnirov and Kvitko. 51
The inherent contradictions of Soviet Jewish policy up to the
end of 1947, although significant, were not, then, fundamen-
tally different from those of the Soviet nationalities policy as a
whole. The peculiarities of the Soviet Jewish minority, espe-
cially its demography and its ties with Jews outside the USSR,
above all in the United States, presented obvious problems that
required special, but not necessarily derogatory, treatment. On
the contrary, Soviet Jewry—or at least its official representative,
the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee—was assigned an essentially
constructive Soviet foreign policy role. While Soviet Jews had
little reason to be content at their lot as a national grouping,
they also seemed to have no cause for any more concern or
resentment than any other of the numerous Soviet nationalities.
THE OUTLAWING OF THE SOVIET JEWISH MINORITY
On 13 January 1948 an event took place that presaged a

change for the worse in the attitude of the Soviet authorities
and the singling out of the Jewish minority for special treat-
ment. Soviet Jewish policy did not change overnight with the
murder of Solomon Mikhoels, or even during the course of a
week or month; policy shifts in general, and in the USSR in
particular, tend to be the outcome of protracted processes —
whether as a result of intra-leadership deliberations and debates
or of the need for careful groundwork before such changes can
be implemented: feelers, preliminary steps, inter-institutional

coordination, the preparation of the information media, etc.
The Yiddish writer Peretz Markish was one of the first to
appreciate the implications of Mikhoels' murder and to express
his awareness of its significance for Soviet Jewry. By the end of
the year others were also becoming aware of what was happen-
ing. Ehrenburg has written that the events and particularly the
repressive measures that befell Yiddish culture in the last
months of 1948 made clear that Mikhoels had in fact been
killed (the official version was a car accident) and that his mur-
der and the developments that began to gather momentum
about three-quarters of a year later were part and parcel of a
single plan. 5 2
For approximately six months, beginning late 1947, Soviet
media presented their readers and listeners with a double mes-
sage. The old motifs were intermingled with new ones. The
former included, for example, attacks upon anti-Semitism in the
4
'Anglo-Saxon" countries, 5 3 the latter—denunciations of the "cos
mopolitan" tendencies of central Jewish figures in the West. 54
In June 1948 for apparently the last time Radio Moscow
reminded its audience that not only were Soviet Jews rooted
"life and soul" in Soviet soil, but a. their autonomous region
was successfully rising as "the crowning achievement of
Leninist-Stalinist national policy"; b. the many Stalin prizes
won by Jews were proof of the opportunities afforded by the
Soviet regime for fostering talents; c. the USSR was "the only
country in the world where the Jews had returned so quickly to
their old homes, where Jewish culture, national in form and
socialist in content, is blossoming"; and d. the USSR had
"placed itself at the head of the world's democratic forces" by
"so decisively taking upon itself the protection of hundreds of
thousands of Jews who are wandering about the countries of
Western Europe, seeking means of subsistence and a home." 55
Although foreign Jewish circles, including "progressive,"
pro-Soviet groupings, were beginning to criticize the Soviet
authorities for discrimination against Jewish culture in the
USSR and for failure to fulfill the commitments to encourage it
made in the immediate post-war period, the Yiddish cultural
figures who participated in the Soviet Yiddish information
media still insisted that Yiddish culture was flourishing in the
USSR. True, Yiddish cultural activity and creativity were sys-
tematically deprived of their Jewish content so as to conform
with the Soviet formula "socialist in content and national in
form." Yet, as late as July 1948 the acting editor of Aynikeit,

Grigorii Zhits, wrote that Yiddish culture in the USSR had a
considerable public; he mentioned specifically the "great
demand for Jewish books" as well as "packed audiences in the
Jewish theatres and at literary evenings." Moreover, he went on,
Soviet Yiddish culture had an important and positive task.
Instead of portraying the misery and hopelessness that were the
traditional subjects of Yiddish literature, "Jewish writers in the
USSR were to be found describing the lives of upright and
proud builders of socialism, of the heroes of labor, of
enthusiasts and patriots." 5 6 Yekhezkel Dobrushin, in what was
surely one of his last appearances, talked of the "rich Soviet-
Jewish literature of which there was no like in 'free' bourgeois
America" and pointed out that in the USSR "hundreds of new
writers and tens of new poets" had developed a "new Jewish
personality with a Soviet soul." 5 7
As 1948 wore on the tendency to ignore any specifically Jew-
ish factor, particularly anything that could be given a positive
interpretation, grew markedly. By about the middle of the year
the new themes were superseding the old ones. The attitude of
the Soviet authorities to foreign and Soviet Jewry was more
clearly integrated than ever. Previously, as we have seen, Soviet
propaganda had stressed the unity of the Jewish people the
world over in order to promote Soviet foreign policy objectives
and had allowed its own Jews to institutionalize their existence,
or at least some of its outward trappings, so as to win the sym-
pathy and support of Western progressive opinion. As the cold
war grew in intensity it became increasingly apparent that
Western Jewry as such was not going to be of any practical ser-
vice to the USSR. It followed logically from world Jewry's fail-
ure to prove its value as a "progressive" force that not only
were Soviet Jewish institutions superfluous, but that Soviet
Jewry as a whole, having demonstrated its attachment to and
ties with foreign Jews, could no longer be considered loyal to
the Soviet state and society.
This development cannot be separated from the general
trends of increasing vigilance and isolationism that reached
their height with the open rift with Yugoslavia in June 1948. In
particular, this first major cleavage in the Soviet bloc led to a
repression of nationalist tendencies, "bourgeois nationalism"
being Tito's central fault. 58 Yet the repression of Soviet Jewish
institutions and culture and the persecution of Jewish represen-
tative figures and activists had an additional, obviously Jewish,
aspect which was presumably strengthened by Soviet Jewry's

reaction to the establishment of the State of Israel, and the
growing anti-Semitism among the Soviet leadership.
Indeed, despite Gromyko's categorical denial of any interest
among Soviet Jews in emigration to Israel (see p. 70) and the
renewed encouragement of Jewish settlement in Birobidzhan as
the National Home of Soviet Jewry, we have seen that the crea-
tion of Israel and particularly its support by the USSR, had
evoked an intense response among Soviet Jews and actually
strengthened its feelings of proximity with foreign Jewry.
There is, moreover, considerable evidence that anti-Semitism
was increasing in the Kremlin in or about 1948. It is conceiv-
able, although somewhat difficult to prove, that this was con-
nected with personnel changes in the Soviet leadership in the
winter of 1947-48. Yet there seems no reason to suppose that
Georgii Malenkov, who seems to have superseded Zhdanov
quite early in 1948, was any more anti-Semitic than his col-
leagues, or was responsible for the deteriorating attitude to
Soviet Jewry. This need not have been the outcome of a deci-
sion taken by the entire leadership at a time when the
decision-making process was particularly disorderly (as a result
of both Stalin's own whims and the struggles and rivalries
among his potential heirs). The most plausible explanation
appears to be that Mikhoels' murder was planned and carried
out by a particular leadership group—not necessarily including
either Zhdanov or Malenkov—such as Stalin and the then
Minister of the Interior Viktor Abakumov. Whoever took the
initiative could, in any case, safely assume that such a step was
hardly likely to arouse any opposition among his (or their) col-
leagues; none of the Soviet leaders could be suspected of being
sufficiently sympathetic to the Jews or their culture to take up
cudgels on their behalf and make the leadership's Jewish policy
a focus of controversy. Moreover, Stalin himself was openly
anti-Semitic in his pronouncements at this time. 5 9
That Mikhoels' murder was a feeler, a preliminary step taken
on the initiative of only part of the leadership, rather than the
result of a policy decision of the leadership as a whole, is
surely borne out by the fact that although his death was given
considerable publicity it was not accompanied by any attack
either upon the victim or the institutions he represented (the
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of which he was president and
the Jewish State Theater of which he was director). It is difficult
to reconcile the eulogies in Pravda —its obituary talking of the
"great loss" to the Soviet theater 60 —and at Mikhoels' funeral, at

which no less a person than Aleksandr Fadeev, president of the
Writers' Union, was among the speakers, 61 with the idea that
the group responsible for ideology and propaganda, for exam-
ple, in this case Zhdanov and Suslov, was party to the murder.
Moreover, the following stages of the campaign against Yidd-
ish culture which culminated in the total elimination of its
institutions and main figures, were carried out in complete sec-
recy. 62 This time, although the hand of the secret police was
evident—there were obvious parallels with the campaigns
against national minorities suspected of constituting a danger to
national security during the war 6 3 —various groups were har-
nessed to the operation; the Writers' Union, for instance, played
a central role in the elimination of the Yiddish writers.
In November-December 1948 Aynikeit was closed; 64 the other
Yiddish publications had already stopped appearing. 6 5 The
"Ernes" publishing house was also closed, while the signboard
of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was removed from its
offices. 66 Simultaneously most of those who had been active in
the Committee and the central figures of Yiddish culture began
to be arrested. 67 Radio Moscow's Yiddish broadcasts ceased in
mid-January. 68 In the same month the Jewish Cultural Depart-
ment of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was closed and its
director arrested. 69 Early in 1949 too the Yiddish Theater in
Minsk was shut down; it was accused of Jewish nationalism
and of idealizing Jewish patriarchalism. 70 The very last Jewish
cultural institutions, a library in Moscow and the Yiddish State
Theater, named after Mikhoels following his death, were closed
in November 1949. 71
The main accusation leveled against the Yiddish writers and
other Jewish cultural and public figures was bourgeois national-
ism and occasionally even Zionism (from which most of them
were far removed). One of the specific charges concerned the
project suggested by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in 1944,
following the liberation of the Ukraine, to set up a Jewish Aut-
onomous Republic in the Crimea whose Tatar inhabitants had
been deported during the war as one of the national minorities
suspected of pro-German leanings. Toward the end of 1948 Sta-
lin decided to punish those who had been connected with the
project, arguing that Jewish rule in the Crimea was tantamount
to an attempt to sever that peninsula from the USSR and to cre-
ate there a foothold for imperialism. 7 2
The final suppression of Soviet Jewish culture, the closing of
its remaining institutions and the persecution of its representa-

tive figures were one concomitant of the intensified politiciza-
tion of all spheres of Soviet life in the latter half òf 1948. 73
Another was the campaign that gathered momentum at the very
end of the year, against Jews who not only had no leanings
toward any semblance of nationalism but actually rejected vir-
tually every manifestation of Jewish identification or conscious-
ness. For while the primary charge leveled against Tito was
national deviationism, its corollary was a heightened emphasis
on consolidating ties and discipline within the Soviet bloc,
which made cosmopolitanism a crime no less severe than
nationalism. The particular form taken by the ideological cam-
paign on the one hand and the isolationism that accompanied it
on the other, combined with a large dose of anti-Semitism,
meant that Jews qua Jews became automatically suspect in the
eyes of the custodians of the Soviet regime. They were almost
inevitably considered guilty of one or both of the main devia-
tions of the day (despite the logical contradiction between cos-
mopolitanism and nationalism) and of maintaining links (at
least potentially) with fellow Jews in the opposite camp.
The attack against Jewish cosmopolitans, unlike the elimina-
tion of Soviet Jewish culture, was given wide-scale publicity.
While cosmopolitanism had been censured since the beginning
of the ideological tightening up immediately after the war, the
first sign of a concentrated anti-cosmopolitan campaign
appeared early in June 1948. 74 It quickly spread throughout the
country. Cosmopolitanism was portrayed as the weapon of
imperialism, which was said to be using it as a cover for
encroachment upon "the national sovereignty of the peace-
loving peoples," as "a warmongers' smokescreen," an instru-
ment for achieving "world domination." 7 5
In mid-December the twelfth plenum of the board of the
Soviet Writers' Union, together with the writers' aktiv of the
entire country, discussed the development of Armenian, Latvian
and Kazakh Soviet literature and the situation of the Soviet the-
ater and cinema following the relevant Central Committee
resolutions. Recounting the discussion of a report by Secretary
Anatolii Sofronov, the literary journal Oktiabr' said that "the
advocates of bourgeois aestheticism, formalism and cosmopoli-
tanism" took part in it. Yet, "[Iosif] Iuzovskii, [Aleksandr] Bor-
shchagovskii, [Leonid] Maliugin, [Efim] Kholodov (Meerovich)
and [Iogann] Al'tman, the representatives of this hostile group
of drama critics" who "sought to conceal their anti-patriotic
views behind a smokescreen of verbose affectation" were

"unable to satisfy the plenum." 7 6
The final landmark in unleashing the public offensive against
the Jews within the framework of the anti-cosmopolitan cam-
paign was a Pravda editorial of late January 1949. It stated that
an "unpatriotic group of bourgeois ideologists," drama critics
who had "abandoned their responsibility to the people," had
infiltrated the Soviet theater's professional journals; these bear-
ers of "rootless cosmopolitanism" to whom the "sentiment of
Soviet national pride" was "foreign" were impeding the pro-
gress of Soviet literature.
These critics, Pravda wrote, "try to discredit the progressive
manifestations of our literature and art, pouncing furiously
upon precisely those works which are patriotic and politically
purposeful, under the pretext that they are, as it were, artisti-
cally imperfect." Pravda mentioned as belonging to this group
the critics who had spoken at the above plenum and A. Gur-
vich, I. Varshavskii and Grigorii Boiadzhiev, asking rhetorically:
"What idea can A. Gurvich have of the national character of the
Russian Soviet man?" Finally, Pravda attacked the group for its
clannishness, its tendency to congregate in certain institutions.
"The primary task of party criticism," it maintained, was to
"unmask and smash" these "long bankrupt Iuzovskiis and Gur-
viches." 7 7
The other papers and journals took up the theme. They reit-
erated the charges: formalism, aestheticism, kowtowing to the
West, rejection of the achievements of both Soviet culture and
science and of pre-revolutionary Russian culture. They directed
their attacks against either the critics singled out by Pravda or
other Jewish critics, literary figures and intellectuals.
The campaign entailed a variety of elements. In particular,
however, it singled out a group that was homogeneous less for
its ideas than for its ethnic background. Although it was often
difficult to demonstrate the ideological uniformity of the cos-
mopolitans, and although the individuals accused of cosmopoli-
tanism included not a few non-Jews, the national character of
the cosmopolitans as a group was easily shown. Indeed, the
campaign stressed the Jewishness of most of its victims, their
lack of roots in the Soviet Union and their tribe-like solidarity.
TASS, for example, referring to Pravda's "exposure" of these
unpatriotic "so-called critics," said they had "built themselves
a nest" in Soviet theatrical companies; it also expressed the
conviction that "an all-round purification of our theater from
the malignant influence of these worthless people will doubt-

less contribute to the appearance of new talent in the Soviet
dramatic field and to new creative achievements and victories
for our wonderful Soviet theater." 7 8 The deputy secretary-
general of the Writers' Union, Konstantin Simonov, also noted
how this group, whose "criminal activities" had been
"unmasked," not only stood "outside Soviet art" but were able,
as a result of their support of each other, to hold influential
positions in Soviet cultural life: in art associations, publishing
houses, professional magazines, and the like. 79
In the second week of February 1949 the campaign took on
new proportions, becoming a large-scale incitement and purge
operation. The central and local party press reported numerous
party meetings at which the secretaries of professional aktivs
and cells condemned cosmopolitan manifestations in their par-
ticular fields (literature, theater, music, architecture, education,
etc.). A wide variety of institutions in the fields of the informa-
tion media, higher education, the humanities and natural sci-
ences were affected by these meetings, frequent and extensive
personnel changes being the normal result of the "criticism and
self-criticism" which became their major concern. 8 0
In the latter half of February "the leader of the Bolsheviks of
the Ukraine, N.S. Khrushchev, unmasked the rootless cos-
mopolitans" at the 16th convention of the Ukrainian Party.
"With a single flourish of the pen," Khrushchev said, "they
deprive Ukrainian literature of its great traditions and its con-
sanguinity with the fraternal Russian people and fraternal Rus-
sian literature, showing a staggering disrespect for our people
and its culture." 8 1
A plenary session of the board of the Ukrainian Writers'
Union which opened in Kiev on 27 February was likewise
dedicated to the struggle against cosmopolitanism, "brother of
bourgeois nationalism." Its chairman, Korneichuk, took the key
from Khrushchev. He showed how the cosmopolitans had been
striving for years to obstruct the flourishing of a Ukrainian cul-
ture national in form and socialist in content, heaping lies and
slander upon "our national pride" and lifting "their filthy
heads" against the great writers of the Ukrainian people. The
"homeless" cosmopolitans of the Ukraine, "foes of Leninism,
representatives of corrupt bourgeois ideology . . . estheticizing
degenerates," were aided and abetted by their fellows in Mos-
cow, "pygmies" who tried "to slander the works of the Ukrain-
ian writers in the eyes of the Russian reader." Together they
had slated and ridiculed the "greatest theme" of Ukrainian lit-

erature and art and "the Ukrainian people's greatest source of
national pride," namely "that the workers of the Ukraine were
the first to follow their elder brother, the Russian people, on the
road of the great October," as well as the task of the Ukraine's
artists to "develop all the best that each national culture of the
fraternal peoples of our Motherland brings to the working peo-
ple of the whole world." Korneichuk's deputy Liubomir
Dmiterko singled out for attack "one of the monopolists of
drama criticism in the Ukraine . . . I. Gan (Kagan)" as well as
"L. Zhadanov (Lifshitz), E. Martich (Finkel'shtein)" and their
"leader . . . I. Buliarenko (Berdichevskii)." 82
The fiercer the anti-cosmopolitan campaign became, the more
the Jewishness of the cosmopolitans was stressed. When the
attack was directed against a Jew who had changed his name
for a less Jewish-sounding one, the original name would be
given in parenthesis to ensure that his ethnic origin be easily
identified (cf. above). 83 Soviet media also made frequent use of
family names as general nomenclatures, the first letter of the
name being small rather than a capital (e.g., the iuzovskiis and
gurviches; cf. below). Frequent use was also made of a series of
derogatory terms that had obviously been coined to portray
Jews as cosmopolitans: "without kith or kin"; 8 4 "passportless
vagabonds"; 8 5 and even terms that were ideologically meaning-
less, such as "the little cluster of misbegotten pygmies and
slanderers," "evil weeds," 8 6 and the like.
Occasionally too cosmopolitans would be singled out for
their connection with Jewish topics, their very interest in any-
thing Jewish serving as proof of the anti-Soviet nature of their
activities. An article in Literctturnaia gazeta entitled "Rootless
Cosmopolitans" slashed out at the authors of the glossary of the
section on "the literature of the peoples of the USSR" in the
second edition of the BoVshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, whose
"cosmopolitan, objective views" were "especially manifest in
their survey of Jewish literature and the names they included in
this section. The authors made an extremely 'curious' comment:
T h i s glossary covers all of Jewish literature'. Contemporary
Jewish literature," Literaturnaia gazeta went on, "takes up the
same space in the glossary as do the Uzbek, Kazakh and Geor-
gian together." The authors of the glossary "scoff at the princi-
ple of party spirit and the sentiment of Soviet patriotism. They
take 'all of Jewish literature' without differentiating between
countries and regimes and drag out the cosmopolitan
bourgeois-nationalist idea that plays into the hands of the

enemies of our Motherland of the existence, as it were, of a
'universal' Jewish literature. In their list Soviet writers stand in
the same row as the contemporary arch-businessmen of
America, Palestine and other countries. This 'conception' can
only be described as lackey-like kowtowing to bourgeois-
nationalist theories that are hostile to us." 8 7
The Moscow evening paper Vecherniaia Moskva, in an article
entitled "The Brazen Preachings of a Rootless Cosmopolitan,"
attacked both the Jewish religion and Zionism. "The publishing
house 'Sovetskii pisatel',' where, as is known, people without
kith and without an origin, the anti-patriot levins, danins and
so on, have been working, put out in 1948 a book by Aleksandr
Isbakh (the pseudonym of Isaak Bakhrakh) entitled Years-Life.
This is a series of autobiographical stories narrating the child-
hood and youth of a certain Aleksandr Shtein in whom we can
recognize without any effort the author himself.
"What are the ideas that the author of this rag propagates?
"In the first place the glorification of the Jewish religion. The
book, from the first page to the last, is saturated with religious
cult. . . . We become acquainted with the minutiae of the Jewish
ritual, we can even read . . . the text of the prayer for the
departed.
"This, however, is not the crux of the matter. The most
important thing is that Isbakh casts aspersions on the Jewish
people, claiming that the happiness of all Jews, irrespective of
their class origin and social position, lies in their religion. He
devotes entire pages to the description of studying the Tal-
mud." Isbakh, Vecherniaia Moskva admitted, was talking of
poor, exploited, working Jews in Tsarist Russia; it was nonethe-
less slanderous to suggest that their sole comfort in life was the
synagogue.
Yet this was not Isbakh's only crime. "He also openly prop-
agandizes . . . Zionism, talking of the Zionist Organization
which 'enjoyed great influence among the Jews of our town',
narrating about the Zionist group in the secondary school and
the 'good uncles' who sent Jews to Palestine; he even repro-
duces the text of the Zionist anthem."
After finishing his adolescence in his home town, the hero of
the book (i.e. the author) goes to Moscow where he becomes a
Zionist. A selfish, cowardly and altogether negative character,
the hero remains loyal to Judaism and Zionism—to "the old
Zionist God" —even after the October Revolution whose slogans
and aims were foreign to him. Although the narrative went up

to 1921 only, this sufficed to show the irrelevance of the new
epoch for the cosmopolitan, the anti-patriot and the
ignoramus. 8 8
A further attack on Zionism was made by Vladimir Lutskii at
an enlarged meeting of the academic council of the Institute of
Pacific Studies and the Moscow organization of the Institute of
Oriental Studies of the All-Soviet Academy of Sciences, which
convened from 4 to 6 April 1949 to discuss "questions con-
nected with the struggle against manifestations of bourgeois
cosmopolitanism in the field of Orientalistica." Lutskii devoted
"part of his speech," the historical journal Voprosy istorii
reported, "to the tasks of the orientalist front in the struggle
against Zionism —the reactionary ideology of Jewish bourgeois
nationalism." He showed that these tasks "had now become
especially topical, in that Zionism is presently one of the effec-
tive instruments of American and English imperialist policy in
the Near East. Zionism serves, moreover, at the present as an
instrument of the subversive activity of Anglo-American war-
mongering in other countries of the world. The immediate task
of Soviet orientalists dealing with the Near East is to unmask
and rout the cosmopolitan ideology of 'a single Jewish nation,'
which was subjected at the time to crushing criticism on the
part of Lenin and Stalin." 8 9
The instances in which comparisons were drawn between
cosmopolitanism and its alter ego, the Jewish bourgeois
nationalist movement, were very few in this period when the
anti-cosmopolitan campaign was at its height. Moreover, in the
days immediately preceding the orientalists' meeting in Mos-
cow, this campaign was beginning to take on a new form. Jews
continued to be censured and purged from a number of fields in
Soviet intellectual life, the free professions, educational and
academic institutions (see following chapter); yet their Jewish-
ness ceased to be specified and the crude and most blatant of
the expressions of anti-Semitism were dropped. As early as the
beginning of March, Georgii Frantsev, head of the Soviet Fore-
ign Ministry Institute of International Affairs, apparently gave
the sign for the transformation of the campaign to more general
and slightly more sophisticated lines in a programmatic article
he published in Pravda without mentioning Jews or even allud-
ing to anything that smacked of Jewishness. 90 Indeed, this was
taken up by other Soviet media in the following weeks and
months. Although these left no doubt that the individual cos-
mopolitan was a traitor to the people and the forces of progress,

the campaign now concentrated less on any specific anti-Jewish
offensive than on its broader ideological foundations, relating
these specifically to the needs of the cold war and the inter-bloc
confrontation. 91
The change seems to have been felt at the end of March. At
this time Ehrenburg, who had himself been publicly denounced
and was even rumored to have been arrested, wrote to Stalin
personally asking for a clarification of his position; for several
months, he noted, not a single article of his had appeared. On
the following day, Malenkov telephoned Ehrenburg asking why
he had not reported his awkward situation before. The writer
replied that he had spoken with Pravda Chief Editor Petr Pos-
pelov. Malenkov, however, claimed that Pospelov had not pass-
ed on the information, although Pospelov told Ehrenburg he
had done so, but to no avail. 92 It would appear from this
episode that the anti-Jewish offensive had been intended a
priori to reach a certain stage or continue for a given period
and that once it had fulfilled the role assigned it instructions
were issued to terminate it. By early May New York Times cor-
respondent in Moscow Harrison Salisbury noted that "the great
drive against 'cosmopolitanism' " seemed to be over and that
"the open attacks on Jews" had disappeared, following a con-
ference of the editors of the Soviet central press called by the
Party Central Committee. 9 3
It is somewhat difficult to ascertain precisely why the anti-
cosmopolitan campaign changed its form in March 1949 and
what role the anti-Jewish instigation was intended to play. It is
possible that Malenkov and his supporters in the party
apparatus inflated the anti-Jewish motif as a cover for the
purges or the preparations for the purges of Zhdanov's suppor-
ters in what is called "the Leningrad Affair." Indeed, on 13
March the central press reported the dismissal from their posts
of three of the major figures in this purge: Politburo member,
Deputy Prime Minister and State Planning Commission (Gos-
plan) Chairman Nikolai Voznesenskii, Leningrad Gorkom and
Raikom Secretary Georgii Popkov and Head of the RSFSR Coun-
cil of Ministers Mikhail Rodionov. 94
Another possibility is that the approaching World Peace Con-
gress necessitated a certain sophistication of the anti-
cosmopolitan campaign; at its worst it was hardly likely to
attract the progressive public in the West. Ehrenburg himself
was included in the Soviet delegation to the Congress, presum-
ably to show the world that the USSR was not conducting a
racist, anti-Semitic policy.
Whatever the reason for the change there can be no doubt
that it was not spontaneous but emanated from the highest
sources in the Soviet leadership, just as had the fierce anti-
Jewishness of the campaign in the preceding months. The trans-
formation, moreover, was formal rather than presaging a qual-
itative change: the continued attacks on cosmopolitans, despite
their broader, more general lines, were interpreted by all strata
of Soviet society as being directed against Soviet Jews.
• • •
The anti-cosmopolitan campaign of December 1948-March

1949 was primarily a link in the chain of internal developments
that set the tone for the late Stalin period. In addition, it was
partly a reaction to the hopes which the Soviet leadership had
pinned on world Jewry immediately after the war as a channel
for extending sympathy in the West for the Soviet Union. In the
years 1945-47 Moscow had looked to Western (including Pales-
tinian) Jewry as a "democratizing" force, i.e., one that would
help decelerate the ever-growing East-West conflict and neutral-
ize the prevalent anti-Soviet trends in their respective lands.
The Jews were expected to adopt such a line both out of
appreciation for the USSR's war effort against Nazi Germany
and as a result of their natural sympathies for the Soviet regime
and its values given their known tendency toward radicalism
and non-conformism in the various countries they inhabited.
On these premises, the Soviet leadership was prepared to nur-
ture certain limited aspects of Soviet Jewish distinctiveness,
though with the clear understanding that while this would
promote Soviet foreign policy objectives, especially in the field
of propaganda, it would not be allowed to interfere with the
total severance of Soviet from foreign Jewry; the sole exception
would be those few Soviet Jews whose task it was to implement
the relations with Jews and Jewish organizations.
It became apparent to the Soviet authorities in late 1947-early
1948 that the ground had been cut from under the basic
assumptions of this policy. The division of the world into two
camps, which became the Soviet bloc's official doctrine follow-
ing Zhdanov's announcement at the founding conference of the
Cominform in September (see p. 75), meant not only the aggra-
vation of the cold war, an intensification of Soviet isolationism
and the end to any hopes of an East-West rapprochement; it

also ended the policy of activating elements and groupings in
the West that were not organically or organizationally linked
with the USSR.
It became particularly impossible to do this through Soviet
Jewish institutions. Despite the careful surveillance of their
doings and the limitations put on Soviet Jewish cultural and
propaganda activities, these served as a focus for a Soviet Jew-
ish national awakening. They proved that the severance from
foreign Jewry which the Soviet authorities considered a fait
accompli after three decades of Soviet assimilationism, was lit-
tle more than a very superficial achievement. The Holocaust
had known no frontiers; together with its accompanying man-
ifestations in the USSR, it had put an end to earlier Soviet Jew-
ish illusions about their role in the new Bolshevik order. In the
immediate post-war period the entire activity of Soviet Jewish
institutions, culture and information media seemed to cry out
that Soviet Jewry was not a separate entity but an integral part
of a dispersed Jewish people that had lost over one-third of its
sons and was seeking its rehabilitation as a nation.
This disregard of the barriers erected by the current Soviet
credo made it unreasonable for the Soviet leadership to main-
tain the vestiges of Soviet Jewish culture and its institutions or
to allow the continued activity of the Jewish figures who per-
formed the role in foreign policy assigned to Soviet Jewry. The
elimination of Soviet Jewry as a distinctive unit within the
Soviet system was decided upon even before the USSR had
abandoned its appeal to world Jewry: for a short while—in
1948 —the Soviet Union assigned to the State of Israel the role
of encouraging the democratization process in Western coun-
tries with a Jewish population (see pp. 170-71). In this way, it
transferred the foreign policy role of the Jewish Anti-Fascist
Committee and the Yiddish information media to Israel.
As the year 1948 wore on the Soviet Jewish situation wors-
ened. First, the decision to establish a Jewish state in Palestine
and particularly the Soviet government's evident support of that
decision and its implementation emboldened Soviet Jews to
demonstrate their identification with developments in the Jew-
ish world outside. This trend must surely have precipitated the
elimination of Jewish culture and its institutions in the USSR.
Second, the rift with Tito gave a new momentum to the tenden-
cies already evident in the previous period: Zhdanovism at
home and an isolationist foreign policy. The new definition of
international reaction, "the forces of Wall Street," seemed to

have been made a priori to fit world Jewry.
The ideological and theoretical trends of the late 1940s and
their political and administrative implications, intended as they
were to serve much broader purposes, now virtually became
instruments of an anti-Jewish policy. Cosmopolitans of other
national minorities were attacked as individuals, but the group-
ing to which they belonged continued to be considered a
nationality in its own right and an integral part of the Soviet
community of nations, more closely linked to their Russian
"elder brother" than to fellow-nationals in other countries. The
Jews, however, were portrayed as a cosmopolitan grouping. As
such they inevitably became a foreign tribe, belonging first and
foremost to an ethnic unit whose largest and most influential
concentration lived not only outside the Soviet Union, but in
the leading capitalist state. Moreover, for the authorities in
Moscow and perhaps even more so for Soviet officialdom at the
medium and lower levels, particularly in the fields of
information/propaganda and academia, the Jews of Moscow and
the other major cities of the European part of the USSR were a
far more tangible and dangerous group than the other ethnic
groups, most of whom were thousands of miles from the center
of government. Finally, the Jews' lack of any territorial unit
made their repression and even the total elimination of their
national distinctiveness possible without in any way imperil-
ing Soviet territorial integrity.
Thus, a change occurred in Soviet Jewish policy in the winter
of 1947-48. Until the end of 1947 the Soviet authorities sought
to liken the Jews to other Soviet national minorities with a ter-
ritorial concentration of their own —even though fictitious; this
policy did not contradict the general purpose of their assimila-
tion into Soviet society, a goal that also conformed with the
norms of Soviet nationalities policy (based on the principle that
every nationality was entitled to a certain amount of cultural
autonomy provided that the national features of that culture
were restricted to external trappings). In that winter, however,
apparently in December or early January, it was decided to
exclude the Jews from the Soviet family of nations.
The signal for the change was duly given (the assassination
of Mikhoels), yet the new policy was not immediately carried
out in toto. Implementation began only after the-requisite pre-
liminaries had been undertaken at the relevant levels of the
propaganda and administrative apparatuses. Almost a whole
year after the decision had been adopted steps were taken to
eliminate the last vestiges of Jewish culture and intimations of
Jewish existence in the USSR. At the same time, along with the
fact that the Jews were deprived of any institutional or other
framework that conformed to the standards of the Soviet
regime, all restrictions were removed from attacks upon Jews.
While neither Soviet society nor the authorities considered
them Russians—their Jewishness was specified in their pass-
ports and other official papers—they were denied any other
affiliation. In this way, the Jew became in effect a foreigner in
the Soviet Union, a tribeless, rootless, homeless individual.
The decision of winter 1947-48 seems to a certain extent an
inevitable outcome of the doctrine of the division of the world
into two camps, given the Jews' ties with fellow-Jews abroad.
The administrative organs, moreover, which were entrusted
with enforcing the Iron Curtain policy, must have found in the
Jews easy victims both because of their actual or potential ties
with abroad and in view of the Soviet leadership's anti-
Semitism and parallel tendencies throughout Soviet society.
It is not in any case conceivable that the policy change was a
function of Soviet Jewry's manifestation of sympathy for the
Jewish State in the making in Palestine. First, it preceded the
major demonstrations of this sympathy—which took place after
Israel's establishment. Second, although there were signs of
Soviet Jewish interest in Palestine in 1946 and 1947 and some
arrests were made in 1947 on charges of Zionism, these do not
seem to have been sufficiently numerous or significant to have
accounted for, or even influenced, a major policy decision.
Numerous rumors —which presumably originated in the Soviet
Interior Ministry—were indeed spread in late 1948-early 1949
about the negative effects which the presence and activities of
the Israeli Legation in Moscow had on the situation of Soviet
Jewry (see p. 198); yet these must surely not be given undue
weight or credit (the use of rumors by the Soviet regime is a
topic in itself). It was clearly convenient for both the authorities
and their Jewish representative figures —Ehrenburg, for example,
was reported to have disseminated these stories —to place the
responsibility for the mass arrests and repressive measures of
the winter of 1948-49 on the subversive activities of the Israeli
minister. At the same time there can be hardly any doubt that
the Jewish reaction to the establishment of the State of Israel
and its war of independence served as a catalyzing factor once
the policy change had begun to be implemented. This, then, is
the explanation for the role Zionism and the State of Israel were
playing in spring 1949 in the anti-Jewish, anti-cosmopolitan
campaign.
Notes
1. For the state within a state controlled by Commissar for Internal

Affairs Lavrentii Beriia toward the end of the war and after, whose task
it was to implement these administrative measures, see Simon Wollin
and Robert M. Slusser, The Soviet Secret Police (London: Methuen,
1957), chap. 6. Beriia and the security organs he headed carried out
mass deportations, directed the partisan movement, and dominated
most personnel changes and developments connected with manpower
within the armed forces. The vast economic enterprise they ran—
including major industrial and agricultural assignments in the coun-
try's more remote areas as well as such specific tasks as atomic
research —had at its disposal millions of political prisoners, demobil-
ized soldiers, deportees, repatriates and prisoners of war, all of whom
had been sentenced to long periods of forced labor. In addition, Beriia
set up extensive police networks in the Soviet-occupied territories of
Central and Eastern Europe which remained subordinate to the Soviet
secret police even after these areas had become sovereign People's
Democracies.
2. The 1946 Central Committee resolutions were published in full in
a pamphlet entitled O zhurnalakh "Zvezda" i "Leningrad" (Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1952); for the State Secrets Act, see R. Moscow, 10 June
1947 and 21 September 1948/MR, 11 June 1947, and SWB I, 27 Sep-
tember 1948; for an apologia of Zhdanovism, see speech by Soviet
Higher Education Minister Sergei Kaftanov, R. Moscow, 18 October
1947/SWB I, 22 October 1947. For Zhdanov's position and the
intricacies of the internal politics of Stalin's entourage in the post-war
years, cf. Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 245-87, Djilas, pp. 147-61, and
n. 59 below.
3. The Jewish Opinion, February 1945. (The Jewish Opinion was a
monthly pamphlet put out by the British Communist Party.)
4. Cf. Leon Leneman, La Tragédie des Juifs en URSS (Paris: Desclée
de Brouwer, 1959), pp. 74-77. It is possible that this was somehow
connected with the Crimean project; see below.
5. The Jewish Opinion, February 1945.
6. From author's interview with Rabbi Elhanan Sorotchkin, 20
October 1970.
7. JTA, 1 April 1945.
T h e Offensive A g a i n s t Soviet Jewry 329
8. Jzvestiia, 12 February 1945; JTA, 17 and 19 February, 4, 7 and 20

March, 2, 6 an 18 April, and 10 May 1945; Pravda, 8 March 1945.
9. The first sign of the change was an article in Pravda, 7 May 1945,
which described the slaughter of four million people in Auschwitz
without mentioning that most of them were Jews. The Soviet Party
organ described the victims as ''Soviet citizens" and "citizens" of
other European countries, "women, old people and children."
10. The rampant anti-Semitism of the years 1944-45 has been
described elsewhere and its details are irrelevant to our study; for
these, cf. Communist Anti-Semitism (A factual up-to date report made
to the Jewish Labor Committee Annual Conference, Atlantic City, 17-18
April 1953); Binyamin West, Naftulei Dor (Struggle of a Generation)
(Tel Aviv, 1955), pp. 26 ff.; Yehoshua A. Gilboa, The Black Years of
Soviet Jewry (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) pp. 34-41.
11. The foreign ministers of Belorussia and Ukraine, Kuzma Kiselev
and Dmitrii Manuil'skii, both described the slaughter of Jews in their
respective countries on the occasion of their visit to the U.S.A. for the
U.N. Founding Conference -JTA, 7 June 1945. Early in 1946, both at
the Nuremberg trials and with reference to them, Soviet representatives
and sources made further references to Nazi anti-Jewish actions, the
courageousness of the Jews, etc., while the Soviet prosecutors called
upon Jewish witnesses to give evidence concerning the slaughter of
Jews-JTA, 4, 15, 17 and 28 February 1946.
For Soviet historiography of the Jewish role in the war, see, e.g., Dov
Levin, "Participation of the Lithuanian Jews in the Second World War"
(English title) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, 1970), part 2, pp. 34-166.
12. Cf. pp. 74-75.
13. Izvestiia, 17 July 1946; the article referred to the July 1946
Kielce pogrom, cf. p. 28.
14. Pravda, 6 October 1947. For the Soviet linking of British anti-
Semitism with developments in Palestine, see also p. 75.
15. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 28 February 1947/SWB Í,
4 March 1947.
16. Cf. pp. 74-75.
17. The American Jewish publicist Ben-Zion Goldberg, who visited
the USSR as guest of the Committee early in 1946 (cf. chap. 5, n. 43)
was told by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults that there
were 380 Jewish religious associations without, however, any central
institution—The League for Friendly Relations with the USSR (Heb-
rew) 10 (November 1946).
18. Ibid.; also Redlich, especially pp. 34-36; and private testimonies.
For conflicting views within the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and
its role, cf. Gilboa, pp. 50-52.

19. /TA, 12 September 1945. Foreign interest in a resident or citizen
of the USSR was almost certainly filed and presumably served as a pre-
text for arrest and repression beginning about 1948 when the very exis-
tence of relatives abroad was sufficient reason for arrest. Replies to
inquiries from abroad were rarely received.
20. JTA, 21 September 1945. For the Black Book, its preparation,
purpose and publication —in the United States —cf. Gilboa, pp. 72-77.
21. The League for Friendly Relations with the USSR (Hebrew) 7
(March 1946).
22. Merkaz Mapai to M. Shertok, 15 November 1946 and 20 June
1947, CZA, S25/5717; ]TA, 23 December 1946; Neie Freie Presse, 28-29
December 1946; Aharon Zisling and Shlomo Kaplansky to the Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee, 19 June 1947 (copy in possession of L. Tar-
nopoler).
23. L. Tarnopoler to Y. Rabinovich, 1 October 1947, CZA, S25/5717.
The League intended sending a 25-member delegation, but in fact no
one went.
24. The copy of the cable (in stencil) which I saw was addressed to
the World Jewish Congress and dated 9 February 1947. For the resolu-
tion, see R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 31 August 1947/SWB Í,
8 September 1947. In it the committee called once more upon the Brit-
ish trade unions and democratic and progressive organizations every-
where to fight against fascism, racialism and anti-Semitism, and for
peace.
25. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 20 May 1948/SWB Í, 28
May 1948; and Davar, 18 June 1948.
26. Cf. p. 203.
27. For Ambijan, cf. Jacob Lvavi (Babitzky), Ha-Hityashvut Ha-
Yehudit Bevirohidzhan (English title: The Jewish Colonization in
Birobijan) (Jerusalem: The Historical Society of Israel, 1965) pp. 131-
36. Albert Einstein himself became honorary president of the society in
1946.
28. Foreign Relations . . . The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945,
p. 924.
29. Lvavi, p. 101.
30. Ibid., pp. 102-7. Itzik Fefer gave the number of the Jews who
emigrated to Birobidzhan between the end of the war and September
1948 as 20,000 (R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 20 September
1948/SWB I, 24 September 1948), yet most estimates supported the
much lower figure of 10,000.
31. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 7 February 1947/SWB Í,
11 February 1947.
32. Aynikeit, 7 June 1947; and R. Moscow in Yiddish for N.

America, 8 June 1947/SWB Í, 13 June 1947. For Soviet intentions as
early as the late 1920s and early 1930s that the Birobidzhan idea serve
as a substitute for Zionism, cf. Chimen Abramsky. ''The Birobidzhan
Project, 1927-1959" in Lionel Kochan (éd.), The Jews in Soviet Russia
Since 1917 (London: Oxford University Press, 2nd revised edition,
1972).
33. Aynikeit, 31 May 1947. It was surely also in a conscious com-
parison with the Jewish national enterprise in Palestine that the editors
of Aynikeit noted that in Birobidzhan a "new class of Jewish farmers,
healthy and sturdy" was coming into being— Aynikeit, 20 September
1947.
34. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 30 October 1947/SWB Í, 5
November 1947. (The term translated by the B.B.C. as state is presum-
ably the one I have rendered as polity.)
35. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 14 January 1948/SWB Í,
19 January 1948. There were indeed a number of Jewish cultural
institutions in the Jewish Autonomous Region, such as the Kaganovich
State Theater (some of whose performances were in Russian), as well
as several Jewish publications: the Birobidzhaner Shtern which
appeared at this period five times a week and "the literary, artistic,
social and political almanac" Birobidzhan. Yet the great majority of
the region's cultural and educational institutions were not Jewish:
there was no sign of Jewish culture of any sort in most of the schools,
nor was Yiddish taught in them—facts that the Soviet media carefully
circumvented with intentionally ambivalent and misleading
statements —e.g., R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 31 March
1947/SWB I, 8 April 1947.
36. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 21-26 December 1948/
SWB I, 31 December 1948.
37. E.g., R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 17 June 1948/SWB Í,
25 June 1948; cf. also Ehrenburg's Pravda article, see pp. 191-92. The
change in emphasis was noted by the Jewish Chronicle, 5 November
1948.
38. E.g., R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 14 November 1948/
SWB I, 22 November 1948.
39. Namir, p. 116.
40. Ibid., pp. 308-10.
41. Ibid., pp. 260-61.
42. An end was even put to those broadcasts and articles that con-
trasted the favorable situation of Soviet Jewry with Western anti-
Semitism, inter alia, because by the early months of 1949 it was an
open secret that the facts were very different, even though the extent of
the repression of Soviet Jewry was not yet known. For the develop-
ments of the winter of 1948-49, see below.
43. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 6 July 1947/SWB Í, 11 July
1947. Some of the anticipated publications actually appeared, for
example the Kiev almanac Der Shtern, of which seven issues were
published; cf. p. 311.
44. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 4 October 1947/SWB Í, 10
October 1947. Kvitko took the opportunity to express his "great regret" at
finding "our brothers in the U.S.A. and Palestine in totally different
conditions."
45. For plans to put out three anthologies, on medieval Jewish
poetry, the Talmud and the Midrash (the homiletic interpretation of
the Bible), cf. The League for Friendly Relations with the USSR (Heb-
rew) 10 (November 1946). Yiddish-language media also reported inten-
tions to publish other works; e.g., the presidium of the Ukrainian Writ-
ers' Union announced early in 1947 its decision to publish an anthol-
ogy of Jewish literature in Ukrainian to contain works by Jewish writ-
ers with a bearing on the Ukraine—R. Moscow in Yiddish for N.
America, 25 March 1947/SWB Í, 31 March 1947. Cf. also above.
For a survey of Yiddish publications in this period and the problems
connected with their appearance, see Kh. Shmeruk (éd.), Pirsumim
Yehudiim Bivrit Ha-Moatzot 1917-1960 (English Title: Jewish Publica-
tions in the Soviet Union 1917-1960) (Jerusalem: the Historical Society
of Israel, 1961), pp. 97-102; for a survey and discussion of Russian-
language writings on Jewish subjects, see Mordechai Altshuler (éd.),
Pirsumim Rusiim Bivrit Ha-Moatzot al Yehudim Veyahadut (English
title: Russian Publications on Jews and Judaism in the Soviet Union)
(Jerusalem: the Historical Society of Israel, 1970), pp. 45, 62-66 and
75-76.
46. For Korneichuk's attack on Kipnis and the latter's "self-
criticism," see Literaturnaia gazeta, 25 September 1947. (Lazar'
Kaganovich was at this time First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party,
having been sent by Stalin to restore order in the Ukraine and replace
Khrushchev —temporarily demoted to the post of Chairman of the
Ukrainian Council of Ministers.)
There had been earlier attacks against Jewish writers and cultural
figures but without mention of their Jewishness, let alone of any spe-
cial interest in anything Jewish.
47. Der Shtern (Kiev) 2 (1948). As in the case of other national cul-
tures, criticism was not limited to Yiddish literature. An official of the
folklore section of the Jewish Department of the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences stated in September 1947 that in the course of the past year
the bureau had organized a number of meetings with Yiddish singers
T h e Offensive A g a i n s t Soviet Jewry 333
who had expressed their dissatisfaction that their basic repertoire con-
sisted almost solely of old folk songs. In order to change this, the
cooperation was needed of the composers as well as of the Moscow
Bureau of Yiddish Writers whose task it was to coordinate the creative
activity of the musicians and poets. In any case, it had become imposs-
ible to ignore the desire of the Jewish masses for new songs expressing
the sentiments and thoughts of the constructive Soviet patriot —
Aynikeit, 4 September 1947.
48. See ibid.
49. Kol Ha-Am, 30 January 1948.
50. Aynikeit, 26 August 1947.
51. Aynikeit, 13 September 1947. The "Ernes" publishing house was
affiliated to the RSFSR State Publishing House OGIZ.
52. For Mikhoels' death, see Pravda, 15 January 1948; Ilya Ehren-
burg, Post-War Years, 1945-1954 (vol. VI of Men, Years, Life) (London:
Macgibbon and Kee, 1966), p. 125; Khrushchev Remembers p. 261;
Svetlana Alliluyeva, OnJy One Year (London: Hutchinson, 1970), p.
149; and Joseph Schein, Arum Moskver Yiddishn Theater (About the
Moscow Yiddish Theater) (Paris: Les éditions polyglottes, 1964), pp.
191, 197, 200-5, 207-18, 219 and 223-34. For Markish's evaluation of
Mikhoels' murder, see his poem "Sh. Mikhoels —A Ner Tomid Beim
Oron," in Kh. Shmeruk (éd.), A Shpigl oyf a Shteyn (A Mirror on a
Stone) (Tel Aviv: I.L. Peretz, 1964), pp. 508-12.
53. E.g., R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 28 January 1948/SWB
Í, 6 February 1948.
54. Perhaps the earliest of these was an "open letter" signed by four
well-known Soviet Academicians —two of them Jewish —entitled "Dr.
Einstein's Mistaken Notions," New Times, 26 November 1947. For
Einstein's sympathies during the war and in the immediate post-war
period for the USSR and some of the causes it espoused, notably the
opposition to the use of atomic weapons, see Ehrenburg, Post-War
Years, pp. 72-78; cf. also n. 27 above.
55. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 17 June 1948/SWB Í, 23
June 1948.
July 1948. For the continued demand for Yiddish culture, cf. also
Aynikeit, M August 1948, and Altshuler, pp. 101-2.
57. R. Moscow in Yiddish for N. America, 16 October 1948/SWB Í,
25 October 1948.
58. For the rift with Tito which became public at the second Comin-
form conference, held in Bucharest in June 1948, see in particular the
Cominform organ For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, 1
and 15 July and 1 August 1948. For the intensification of the campaign
against nationalism, now shown to be inherently and unequivocally

opposed to Marxism, cf. the Soviet Party's Central Committee article
entitled "Where the Nationalism of the Tito Group Leads" in Pravda, 8
September 1948, and the address by Pravda's chief editor, Petr Pos-
pelov, on the anniversary of Lenin's death early in 1949—R. Moscow,
21 January 1949/SWB Í, 24 January 1949. For the application of this
new anti-nationalist momentum in Azerbaidzhán, Ukraine and
Belorussia, cf. R. Moscow, 10 September and 16 December 1948/SWB Í,
20 September and 20 December 1948, and Pravda, 5 February 1949.
59. For Zhdanov's supersession by Malenkov, cf. Robert Conquest,
Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1967),
pp. 88-93. For Stalin's anti-Semitism at this time, cf. Alliluyeva, Letters
to a Friend. As to his intimate circle, the only one who could perhaps
be suspected of any sympathy for the Jews was Lavrentii Beriia —cf. p.
375 and Harrison E. Salisbury, Moscow Journal (Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 372. Yet Beriia's influence was seem-
ingly being curtailed at this time, Abakumov, who had just succeeded
Beriia's associate Viktor Merkulov as minister of the interior, being
closely connected with Malenkov —cf. Wolfgang Leonhard, The Krem-
lin Since Stalin (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 91 and 176-77. Beriia
incidentally seems to have had connections with Mikhoels, whose
murder must almost certainly have been carried out by Beriia's oppo-
nents in the secret police apparatus. (Mikhoels' link with Beriia seems
to have been implied by the posthumous accusations made against the
former in connection with the Doctors' "Plot," which was aimed ulti-
mately against Beriia —see following chapter. Khrushchev disclosed
later that a plan to kill Litvinov in a similar way to Mikhoels was
found in the Interior Ministry archives after Stalin's death —
Khrushchev Remembers, p. 262.)
60. Pravda, 15 January 1948.
61. Ehrenburg, Post-War Years p. 125.
62. As late as 1955 Leonid Il'ichev, then collegium member of the
Soviet Foreign Ministry, maintained that Peretz Markish, who had
been arrested in January 1949 and executed in August 1952 was in
Moscow (Morgen Freiheit, 30 September 1955). The first reference in
any East European or Communist source to the fate of the Yiddish cul-
tural figures appeared in the Warsaw Folksstimme, 4 April 1956. For
the publicity given to attacks upon nationalist manifestations among
other national minorities, cf. n. 58 above.
63. For these, see Robert Conquest, The Soviet Deportation of
Nationalities (London: Macmillan, 1960).
64. The last issue that reached the West was dated 20 November
1948.
65. Shmeruk, Jewish Publications, pp. 102-3, 348, 399, etc.

66. Namir, pp. 250-51.
67. The arrests were spread over several months, some actually pre-
ceding the special session of the Writers' Union in November at which
one of the Yiddish writers publicly accused himself and his colleagues
collectively (cf. Leneman, pp. 68-72; this was "criticism and self-
criticism" in practice). Markish on the other hand was arrested only in
January 1948; on 1 January he was still broadcasting on Radio Mos-
cow's Yiddish program.
68. The B.B.C. monitoring services noted that on 18 January, the
Yiddish broadcast was not heard, although there had been no official
announcement concerning any change in the Yiddish program. Several
weeks later they noted that the Yiddish broadcasts had not been heard
"for some t i m e " - S W B Í, 11 February 1949.
69. Gilboa, pp. 190-91.
70. Altshuler, pp. 76-77, and Shmeruk, Jewish Publications, pp.
102-3; also private sources.
71. It is worth noting that in the last year or so of its existence audi-
ences in the Moscow Jewish theater were small (cf. Namir, p. 98). The
reason may have been that many of the regular audience, some of
whom actually had subscription tickets, had fallen victim to the perse-
cutions of the winter 1948-49; it may have been that the fate of the
theater was presumed to be sealed and people did not wish to con-
tinue being connected with it (cf. Gilboa, pp. 189-90). In the late
1950s, when the Soviet authorities sought to justify its closing, they
maintained that the reason had been that the Yiddish theater had
attracted only a small audience and was therefore unable to bear its
expenses. Until the summer of 1948 audiences had, however, been
large, cf. p. 314.
72. Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 259-61. Khrushchev linked the pro-
ject with Lozovskii, Mikhoels and Zhemchuzhina (Lozovskii was
indeed arrested in 1949 and executed in 1952; for Zhemchuzhina's exile
early in 1949, see p. 218 and n. 77 ibid.); at least one of the writ-
ers arrested late in 1948, Dobrushin, is also known to have been
accused of participating in the attempt to set up a Jewish republic in
the Crimea (Current Events in Jewish Life—an Institute of Jewish
Affairs publication —October-December 1955, quoting Wochenzeitung,
12 November 1955); other sources have implicated others of these
writers as well.
73. Perhaps the most famous example of the ideological offensive of
this period was the one conducted by Trofim Lysenko at the confer-
ence of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences early in
August 1948; cf. Zhores A. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T.D.
Lysenko (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969).

74. Literaturnaia gazeta, 5 June 1948.
75. Pravda, 12 July 1948; Literaturnaia gazeta, 21 July, 29 August
and 8 September 1948; also a programmatic editorial entitled "Against
the Bourgeois Ideology of Cosmopolitanism" in Voprosy filosofii 2
(1948); 14-29; and Novyi mir 6 (1948): 282-96.
76. Oktiabf 2 (1948): 138-42 and 146-48.
78. TASS, 3 February 1949/SWB I, 7 February 1949.
79. Pravda, 28 February 1949.
80. E.g., Pravda, 10 and 11 February and 3 and 5 March 1949: Vech-
erniaia Moskva, 11, 12, 16, 18 and 24 February 1949; Izvestiia, 12
13, 18 and 19 February 1949; and Kui'tura i zhizn', 20 February and 10
March 1949.
81. Literaturnaia gazeta, 26 February 1949. Attacks upon Jewish cri-
tics and men of letters, similar to those conducted in the Ukraine, took
place in other republics with considerable Jewish concentrations.
Among the central figures of the campaign were the Ukrainian Kom-
somol Central Committee Secretary, Vladimir Semichastnyi, and Lat-
vian Central Committee Secretary, Arvid Pelshe.
82. Literaturnaia gazeta, 9 March 1949.
83. Sometimes long lists would be published, each non-Jewish-
sounding name having such a clarification: thus, e.g.; "I. Rakhtanov, G.
lasnyi (Finkelstein), V. Viktorov (Zlochevskii), L. Shneider, A. Svetov
(Sheidlin), G. Gurevich"— Komsomol'skaia pravda, 6 March 1949.
84. Literaturnaia gazeta, 12 February 1949.
85. Pravda, 16 February 1949; cf. also above.
86. TASS, 17 February 1949/SWB Í, 21 February 1949.
87. Literaturnaia gazeta, 12 February 1949. Mikhail Shakhnovich,
the author of a book entitled "From Superstition to Science," was simi-
larly accused of unduly stressing Jews and Jewish topics (Kom-
somoVskaia pravda, 2 March 1949), while the composer Dmitrii
Klebanov was charged at a composers' meeting in Kiev of filling his
"Babii lar" symphony with biblical motives, as well as slandering in it
the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. He "forgets the friendship and
fraternity of the Soviet peoples and pursues the ideas of the solitari-
ness of the Soviet people tortured by the Germans in Babii lar" —
Pravda Ukrainy, 19 March 1949.
88. Vechemiaia Moskva, 14 March 1949.
89. Voprosy istorii 3 (1949): 158.
90. Pravda, 7 March 1949.
91. E.g., Pravda, 7 and 11 April, and 4, 5, 23 and 31 May 1949; New
Times, 7 April 1949; R. Moscow, 7 April, and R. Moscow in English for
the U.K., 3 May, and in Romanian, 16 May 1949/SWB Í, 11 April, 9

and 20 May 1949.
92. Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, pp. 132-33.
93. Salisbury, p. 29.
94. Pravda, îzvestiia, 13 March 1949. For the purge of Zhdanov's
supporters, see Conquest, Power and Policy, pp. 95-97.
8
Soviet Internal
Developments and the
Attitude to Israel
THE ROLE OF ISRAEL AND THE WORSENING POSITION

OF SOVIET JEWRY, 1949-52
The most blatantly anti-Jewish aspects of the anti-

cosmopolitan campaign had largely subsided by late March-
early April 1949, 1 yet cosmopolitanism continued to be a major
object of attack until Stalin's death. It remained an "instru-
ment" of Western imperialism and the antithesis of "Soviet pat-
riotism," against which it was necessary to conduct an unre-
lenting struggle. 2
Soviet officialdom and society, moreover, persisted in iden-
tifying cosmopolitans with Jews and although the authorities
relaxed the open anti-Jewish tension they had abetted in the
winter months of 1948-49, administrative measures affecting
Jews continued to be taken—dismissals from work, arrests,
deportations —throughout the country and in all walks of life.
The pretext was usually that these Jews were disloyal either in
ideology or in practice to the Soviet mother country, their sym-
pathies allegedly lying with foreign countries: the United States
and Israel; sometimes no reason was given at all for these
measures.
As early as 1948 attention had been drawn by Western com-
mentators to the fact that Jews were no longer being accepted to
diplomatic training institutions and a number of other represen-
tative careers and were even being dismissed from posts long
339
held in these fields (cf. chap. 5, n. 121). The party, too, seemed
to be retaining very few Jews, while academic and cultural
bodies had received instructions at the height of the anti-
cosmopolitan campaign not to take Jews as new employees and
even to try to get rid of Jews already in their employment. 3
In May 1949 the Ukrainian Party daily published an article
on the ideological training of students; the paper stressed that
academic institutions training cadres and experts had to teach
the science of "Soviet patriotism, politics, ideology, etc." and
noted that at the meeting of the party aktiv at the Gorky
Pedagogical Institute in Kiev the lecturers Shakhovskii and
Levin had been censured. 4 Another lecturer by the name of
Levin was attacked when the turn of the lawyers came in the
summer of 1949. 5 During the biological controversy in 1948,
too, a disproportionately large number of Jews had already been
dismissed from their posts and persecuted. Early in 1950 the
new head of the Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad, a
woman "Professor R.," openly accused her predecessor of hav-
ing a friend by the name of Aleksandrov who had connections
abroad: "his mother and brother live in Palestine (he is a Jew)
and his sister in America. Their past, as pupils of the Morgan
theory [which had been declared anti-Soviet in the biological
polemic] from which they did not retract, their foreign connec-
tions, their 'scientific' meetings in Murmansk and the vigorous
struggle of their friends against the changes introduced by the
Michurinist theory [that had become official doctrine], are all
undoubtedly links in a single chain of a single organization that
is conducting a struggle against Soviet science." Narrating the
story Zhores Medvedev notes: Aleksandrov's mother had never
been to Palestine but had perished of hunger in Leningrad; his
only brother, an old Bolshevik, had been killed by the White
Poles in 1919; and he had never had a sister. 6
The anti-cosmopolitan campaign thus went on felling Jewish
victims in all spheres of academic life, as well as in the fields
in which it had begun: the arts, criticism and the information
media (the editorial boards of a wide variety of newspapers and
journals underwent recurrent personnel changes). Early in 1951
the Soviet Writers' Union ordered the examination of books
written by Jews since 1948 in view of the revelation of their
"anti-Soviet tendencies"; an injunction that led, inter alia, to
protracted purges of Jewish writers and artists in the Ukraine. 7
In the big cities in which the Jewish population tended to
concentrate after the war—Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov
Soviet Internal Developments 341
and Odessa—the Jews' employment situation was particularly

difficult. By early 1951 the Jews seemed to be virtually
excluded from the labor market; it was said that young Jews
were making every effort to register as Russians in their pass-
ports so as to circumvent the obstacles that prevented Jews from
entering institutions of higher education and a growing number
of professions. The universities were operating a numerus
clausus against Jewish students, while certain faculties—for
example, journalism and the social sciences—were completely
closed to Jewish applicants. Soviet Jews said that they had
almost no chance of being employed even at a lower level than
befitted their training, especially if their names sounded Jewish.
As the cold war intensified, the occupations and fields of
activity that were classified as secret multiplied; so too did the
cases of Jews who were dismissed from senior positions,
including the management of industrial and other enterprises
and of a variety of institutions. If they were fortunate, Jews
would receive employment as assistant managers, a position
that was defined as professional rather than managerial. The
situation of Jewish engineers was especially difficult as many
plant managers were reluctant to accept Jews to responsible
posts befitting their training and professional attainment. The
situation in the medical profession was similar: young non-
Jewish doctors who had completed their studies after the war
were often given the jobs of older Jews whose retirement would
be brought forward by as many years as might be necessary. 8
These developments reached new heights in 1952. By the
summer of that year information was received in the West of
extensive administrative and discriminatory measures against
the Jews including dismissals from work on charges of "cos-
mopolitan tendencies" and indications of "bourgeois national-
ism." In this context Jewish doctors and scientists were accused
of subversion against Soviet science, as a result of which Jewish
members of the medical and other scientific professions were
investigated and charged with having "anti-Pavlovian and
anti-Soviet" theories in their work. The security organs claimed
that the Jewish scientific workers were preparing a "plot," of
which details were not given.
Likewise, the authorities issued oral instructions concerning
"administrative scandals," accusing Jewish officials of actively
assisting other Jews to obtain administrative posts. These
alleged scandals were given considerable publicity and once
more a "plot" was invoked as a pretext for a large-scale purge
of Jews in white-collar jobs.

Anti-Semitism was evident in the Komsomol, where Jews
held only minor posts—especially in local artels, as the various
regional and central institutions were "Judenrein." In DOSAAF
(the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force
and Navy—the paramilitary civil defense organization), no Jews
were employed in the sections considered in any way delicate,
such as those connected with the navy or air force and tele-
communications.
In 1951 there had been many cases of deportations of Jews to
labor camps particularly in Birobidzhan. These too multiplied
in early 1952, first and foremost—though by no means only—
in the federal republics with large Jewish populations. A
number of Jews, mostly party members, from the Ukrainian
cities of Kharkov, Poltava, Dneproderzhinsk and Lvov, for
example, were deported after being accused of belonging to a
large-scale black market "gang." The deportees were mostly
intellectuals or former local officials. (It has been suggested that
these measures served the dual purpose of thinning the Jewish
population in the European part of the USSR where it was con-
centrated and solving the problem of the lack of scientific per-
sonnel and other qualified cadres in the USSR's more remote
regions. 9 )
Just as attacks in the communications media on cosmopoli-
tanism served to incite to further anti-Semitism, so too did the
dismissal of Jews from places of work, the usurpation of their
posts by non-Jews, the arrests and deportations. True, it was not
only Jews who suffered in Stalin's last years, in which in addi-
tion to the general atmosphere of terror and suspicion there was
an ever-growing need to supply manpower to the outlying parts
of the country (cf. chapter 7, n. 1). Yet the proportion of Jews
among the regime's victims was certainly far larger than in the
population. These measures made Soviet citizens aware that the
anti-Jewish policy of the Soviet central authorities was being
applied by the local representatives of the party and
government—at all levels and in all localities. This realization
encouraged popular anti-Semitism which became increasingly
manifest and widespread in the four years under discussion,
March 1949-March 1953.
As a result Jews were subjected to social discrimination
throughout the USSR, not only in the traditionally anti-Semitic
Western areas. Its manifestations included all the well-worn,
coarse insults that had characterized pre-Soviet popular anti-
Semitism: children were called "Jew-boy" (zhid) and Black

Hundreds slogans appeared in synagogue courtyards ("Beat the
Jews and Save Russia"). Jews were popularly said to have run
away from the front during the war, leaving others to fight for
them, and to be currently living in luxury. 1 0
Official anti-Jewish policy had another significant feature in
the 1949-52 period: the almost total absence in the Soviet media
of any direct reference to Jews or anything openly connected
with Jews. In the wake of the total elimination of Jewish cul-
ture, which alone represented Jewish nationalism—given the
failure of the Birobidzhan scheme—the Jewish nationality dis-
appeared from print. It was only in April 1952 that the Jewish
religious communities were mentioned for the first time among
the religious sects in the USSR that were active on behalf of the
World Peace Movement. 1 1 The very rare references to anything
Jewish in the three preceding years included—apart from the
above-mentioned allusions to Talmudism and Talmudists—an
occasional reference to anti-Semitism in the West, 12 and just
one or two announcements of Yiddish concerts or other artistic
performances. 13
The item "Jews" in the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia
which appeared in a volume given to print in September 1952
and published in January 1953 was indeed careful not to define
the Jews as a people. It claimed that the Jews were rather "a
variety of nationalities" who were all descendants of the
ancient Hebrews —a people that had lived in Palestine from the
second millennium B.C. until the first or second century A.D.
"They do not comprise a single people since they do not re-
present a stable group of people that had been formed histori-
cally and grown on the basis of a common language, territory
and economic existence and a common culture. They share
their economic, political and cultural existence with the peo-
ples who surround them." The item went on: "As a result of
historic circumstances the Jews have not formed a homogene-
ous, ethnographic unit, but have dispersed over several conti-
nents and countries to form a variety of nationalities, with dif-
ferent languages, cultures and ways of life. Throughout history
the Jews have been assimilated by the peoples of the countries
they have inhabited."
The encyclopedia dealt, inter alia, with Soviet Jewry. After
the October Revolution, it wrote, the restrictions placed upon
Jews were removed as were those that affected other "suppress-
ed national minorities. In 1934 the Jewish Autonomous Region
was set up. Jewish workers have been given access to every
occupation and profession and have participated actively in the
building of Communism. In this way the Leninist-Stalinist
nationalities policy of the equality and friendship of peoples
has led to the disappearance of 'the Jewish question' in the
USSR." 14
The deterioration in the situation of Soviet Jewry was doubly
linked to the State of Israel. In the first place, the opinion was
held by many Soviet Jews that the worsening of their position
resulted from the supposed intervention of the Israeli
government—and specifically its first minister to Moscow —in
Soviet domestic affairs, i.e. the question of Soviet Jewish
immigration to Israel. Second, the anti-Jewish policy pursued
by the central authorities and the widespread official and popu-
lar anti-Semitism intensified the national consciousness of
Soviet Jewry.
The stories of Israeli attempts to raise the issue of Soviet Jew-
ish emigration to Israel had apparently emanated in late 1948
from official (Interior Ministry) sources (see p. 198). They were
presumably thought by the Soviet authorities to provide an
excellent pretext for the repressive measures taken against the
Jewish population, in addition to deterring Soviet Jews from
establishing contact with the Israeli Legation and otherwise
expressing their interest in Israel.
The stories were all the greater a mockery in view of Israel's
extreme precaution not to discuss Soviet Jewish emigration
with the Soviet government—apart from the cases of a very few
individuals—for carefully considered political reasons (see pp.
203-6). The Israeli government even refrained in the first two
years or so from making any public reference to Soviet Jewry
and the question of its immigration to Israel. The first public
mention of this issue by an Israeli statesman seems to have
been a call by Prime Minister Ben Gurion at Kibbutz Afikim on
21 May 1950 to the Soviet authorities to allow Soviet Jewish
emigration. 15 Apparently the first time an Israeli official dis-
cussed the matter with a Soviet representative was at a meeting
between Foreign Ministers Sharett and Vyshinskii during the
U.N. General Assembly in New York toward the end of the
same year. Vyshinskii rejected the appeal on the grounds that
permitting Jews to leave the USSR would contradict Soviet pol-
icy on the emigration of members of any national minority. 16
Israel, then, does not seem to have done anything to explain
the hardening of the Soviet Union's line toward its Jewish citi-
zens. On the other hand, the deterioration in the position of

Soviet Jews brought them—paradoxically and by a somewhat
circuitous route—closer to Israel.
The national consciousness that had been nurtured by the
Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel showed
signs of increasing precisely in the dark years of 1949-53, and
the official and broad application of the anti-Jewish line
brought this Jewish awareness to circles hitherto untouched by
it. Most of the national awakening of the previous years seems
to have been connected with people that either had previously
had interest in Judaism and Zionism —in pre-revolutionary Rus-
sia or in the areas annexed by the USSR during the war—or had
experienced some direct contact with Jewish or even Zionist
groupings in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe. Now questions
and doubts began to appear among the youth whose education
and experience were limited to what the Soviet regime had
given them, and whose sole link with anything Jewish was the
registration of their "nationality" in their passports. Young
Soviet Jews began to realize that their ethnic origin limited and
sometimes even totally obstructed their professional advance-
ment and to wonder what was the essence of that Jewishness
whose very existence was not even mentioned in the Soviet lit-
erature, publications and information media of the period.
The Jews had no way of publicly expressing their national
inclinations and dilemmas following the severe repression in
the winter of 1948-49 of those who had participated in the High
Holy Day demonstrations of October 1948 or otherwise
manifested —or appeared to manifest—any Jewish identification.
Yet, despite the inherent danger at a time when everyone was
suspected of working for the secret police—who had hundreds
of thousands, if not millions, of collaborators throughout the
country—small circles were formed in a number of places to
discuss Jewish topics and problems.
Given the total lack of interest in, let alone knowledge about,
religion after thirty years of Soviet education coupled with the
extensive rejection of Jewish tradition even before 1917, and the
absence of any Jewish cultural institutions or frameworks, the
national awakening of Soviet Jewish youth found expression in
identification with the State of Israel. While there had been
instances when even the young had appeared in the synagogues
in the post-war period, they had come to meet with their
fellow-Jews, not to pray, the very idea of which was alien to
them, especially in a language of which they did not even
know the alphabet. The establishment of a national state, on the

other hand, and its war of independence —which enjoyed the
open support of the Soviet State —were phenomena that Soviet
youth easily appreciated and sympathized with. Moreover, the
State of Israel provided the Jews with the very traits that Stalin-
ist theory defined as characterizing a nation and which were
lacking in the Diaspora. 17
The young Jew was thus in an obvious dilemma which bred
among a considerable section of Soviet Jewry an ever-growing
emotional link with the State of Israel (there seems to be no
way of estimating the number involved). In 1948 many young
Jews had felt considerable frustration at being prevented from
taking part in Israel's war of independence despite official
Soviet support. In the following period the anti-Israel line of
Soviet propaganda made the internal conflict of a growing
number of Soviet Jewish youth, in particular, yet more intense.
The more their government's policy brought home to them that
they had no real place in the Soviet polity, the more Soviet Jew-
ish students and intellectuals sought a solution to their sense of
alienation in their attachment to the new Jewish State.
The need for substantiating the link with Israel was catered
for in part by the very presence in Moscow of the Israeli Lega-
tion. All direct contact with Israeli diplomats had ceased fol-
lowing the developments surveyed in the last chapter, yet the
Jewish public continued to receive considerable moral encour-
agement from the attendance of Legation members in the
synagogues on Jewish holidays and occasionally also on the
Sabbath. Although strictly isolated and kept under open sur-
veillance, the Israeli diplomats were conscious that the eyes of
the entire congregation were turned upon them. (They were
able to break the cordons that separated them from the other
worshippers once a year only, on the Feast of the Law—Simhat
Torah—when they mingled among the congregation as they
made the rounds with the Scrolls of the Law; in the late 1950s
this holiday was to assume the features of a national holiday.)
However, a form of contact was found: small notes and letters
that were thrust into the hands or pockets of the Israelis either
in the synagogue or in encounters in public places (trains,
buses, streets and parks). This happened especially on the few
trips which members of the Israeli diplomatic staff were permit-
ted to make outside Moscow. In the towns they visited (Lenin-
grad, Tbilisi, Odessa) the Jews would stress their desire to know
what was being done abroad on behalf of Soviet Jewry, to
establish links with world Jewry and, above all, to emigrate to

Israel. In Moscow, a few Jews even took the risk of strolling in
front of the Legation offices on special occasions when, for
example, it might even be permitted to hang out a flag from the
Legation window, either to demonstrate identification or even
to draw one of the staff outside so as to create some sort of
clandestine contact. 18
The presence of the Israeli diplomats was even more
significant for Soviet Jews since hardly any Israelis visited the
Soviet Union and the Soviet media paid very slight attention to
the few who did. The small number of Israeli visitors did not
imply any special policy toward Israel (very few foreigners,
except for delegations from the People's Democracies, visited
the USSR in the period 1948-53); but the minimal publicity
given those Israelis who did visit was unusual.
The Israeli visitors to the USSR in this period were: Mapam
Knesset member Feiga Ilanit and Maki Central Committee
member Ruth Lubitz who attended the Moscow conference of
the I.D.F.W. in November 1949; a delegation consisting of two
Mapam members (Shlomo Rosen and Fej.bush_Bendori), two
Maki members (Shimon Cohen and Musa Jamil) and a non-
party importer (Shmuel Hasid), who participated in an interna-
tional economic conference held in Moscow in April 1952; and
a single sports team of volleyball players who took part in the
world championship, held in Moscow in August 1952. In the
first two instances the coverage was almost non-existent: the
press mentioned only the fact of the attendance of the Israeli
delegates to the Democratic Women's Conference, ignoring their
speeches altogether—in blatant contrast with its wont—while in
the case of the economic conference it made no mention of the
names of the Israeli participants, again an irregularity, although
it referred to the fact that Rosen spoke at the conference plenary
and Bendori in one of its committees. The volleyball team was
not, however, discriminated against: TASS reported —in
English—the appreciation of one of its members at how warmly
the team had been received in the USSR and the team's positive
impression of the Soviet people. The visit was indeed a major
event for Soviet Jews who could for the first time see the Israeli
flag and hear the Israeli anthem at the Moscow Dynamo
Stadium. Many of the thousands of Jews who attended the
Israeli team's games had come from outside Moscow. While
apprehensive of conversation with the Israeli sportsmen, many
asked for souvenirs. The Israeli players related on their return
home that the orchestra in the boat that had taken them for a
trip on the Moscow-Volga Canal had played Jewish melodies in
their honor. The arrival of Israeli cargo ships bringing fruit to
Odessa in the winters of 1951-52 and 1952-53 was likewise the
occasion for demonstrations of sympathy with Israel by a
number of Odessa Jews, some of them port employees. 1 9
In the 1949-53 period, as in the previous one, Jews who
showed a direct interest in Israel, especially those who actually
sought contact with the Israeli Legation or its staff, were sub-
jected to a variety of administrative measures. One source
reported that the M.V.D. had carried out investigations among
the Jewish employees of a complex of industrial plants in Khar-
kov in the months December 1951-February 1952; the plants'
'Tress and Propaganda Department" said they had maintained
contacts with the Israeli Legation. As a result twelve Jews were
dismissed from their jobs and deported to a labor camp in
Birobidzhan. 20 In another instance the military collegium of the
USSR Supreme Court passed a sentence of ten years in a labor
camp for moral improvement—following an appeal against a
twenty-five year sentence passed by a lower court—on a Jew
who had participated in one of the October 1948 demonstra-
tions in the Moscow synagogue and, in the fall of 1949, accord-
ing to the verdict, had "established criminal connections" with
an Israeli diplomat as a result of "anti-Soviet impulses, a
nationalist state of mind and an attitude of hostility to the
Soviet regime." The "connections" had taken the form of "an
oral agreement to gather information of an espionage nature"
on the situation of Soviet Jewry.
"In November 1949," the verdict went on, "the man met
clandestinely with a Legation official in Zubovaia Square . . .
and gave him libelous verbal information on the position of the
Jews in the USSR." In the spring of 1950 he prepared further
data, this time in writing, which, however, "he did not manage
to hand over." In August he "again established contact" and
gave the Israeli diplomat "two pieces of slanderous information
on the situation of the Jews in Moscow, the Ukraine and
Birobidzhan." In the fall of 1951 the accused gave "similar
calumnious information to a representative of the above-
mentioned Legation." Moreover, the court found him "guilty of
permitting himself nationalist utterances at a family party,
including expressions of dissatisfaction with the USSR's
nationalities policy." 2 1
The Israeli diplomats accredited to the Soviet capital were
informed of the link—in the eyes of the Soviet authorities —

between the situation of Soviet Jews and their real or imaginary
interest in the State of Israel. In October 1949, Namir cabled
Sharett: "In the provincial towns of the Ukraine large numbers
of Jews are being dismissed from their jobs in commercial and
industrial organizations as well as in small haberdashery and
shoemaking concerns. The deprivation of means of livelihood is
creating a critical situation." The Moscow Jew who provided
this information had also heard of deportations from Moldavia
on charges of belonging to " 'anti-social elements.' This year,"
Namir went on, "the animosity toward the Jews has grown.
Low-ranking officials crack down on them on the pretext that
the Jews are a disloyal element, suspected of espionage, while
at their places of work they are told 'Go to your State, to Israel.'
The courts pervert justice, passing deliberately severe punish-
ments on Jews. Many have been thrown this year into prisons
and sent to camps for pro-Israel sympathies or for manifesting a
desire to emigrate to Israel or taking part in the street demonst-
rations last year in honor of our Legation . . . . Were it not for
the extreme danger involved masses of Jews would be stream-
ing to the Legation offices, just as most of them are prepared to
leave for Israel without delay. Heavy depression and fear of the
future are weighing down on the Jews here."
In February 1950 the Israeli minister reported again in a simi-
lar vein: "There is total confirmation concerning numerous
individual deportations on charges of Zionism, sympathy for
Israel, requests to immigrate to Israel, connections with rela-
tives abroad, speculation and belonging to anti-social
elements —some of the crimes having been committed in the
distant past. It is impossible to estimate the numbers of those
affected. In some places many Jews, and Jews only, have been
declared criminals and deported. This is presumably the main
source of rumors concerning the deportation of entire Jewish
communities in different areas.
"The dismissal of Jews from places of employment is increas-
ing, without reason or on insignificant pretexts, especially from
managerial posts; the purge is continuing of cosmopolitans,
who are considered by the public as a whole to be all Jews.
Anti-Semitism from below is growing, the general atmosphere
is heavy. The central authorities do not apply any restraining
hand; the local authorities sometimes even lend a hand openly
or secretly, and they too determine who is a criminal and has to
be deported. The Jews have a very heavy feeling, fearing dis-
missals, deportation, confiscation of property. . . . It sometimes

appears that the authorities have an interest in making people
afraid . . . and the legend of Golda's transfer from her post
because of propaganda for immigration and Zionism which we
have heard from numerous sources also seems to serve the same
purpose as well as diminishing the Legation's prestige in the
eyes of the Jews." 2 2
In addition to the minimal contacts established with the Leg-
ation in these circumstances, Soviet Jewry had other means of
acquiring information about Israel and of satisfying the demand
for feeling a living link—even if only a passive one —with
Israel.
The most important of these links was listening to foreign
radio programs, a pastime that was also not without its risks.
The Soviet media had given certain information on the Palesti-
nian Jewish Yishuv and the State of Israel in 1947, 1948 and
early 1949, particularly its war of independence—sufficient
indeed to give a picture of that war and to explain Soviet sup-
port. But as early as the fall of 1948 the request of a Soviet Jew-
ish citizen to the Soviet radio to provide information on other
aspects of the State of Israel was not complied with. Once the
war was over the material provided was intended to depict
Israel's negative side only. The information published became
hostile, selective and unbalanced.
While the Soviet radio referred very rarely to Israel, except
for occasional derogatory descriptions, Western broadcasts to
Soviet audiences, especially those of the Voice of America and
the B.B.C., devoted considerable attention to Israel. Soviet Jews
listened to these programs regularly and they became a primary
source of information on developments in Israel.
From the end of 1948 the Israeli Voice of Zion to the Dias-
pora also reached the USSR and Jews began listening avidly to
its broadcasts throughout the USSR. Israeli broadcasts in the
period under discussion are thought to have had audiences of
tens, if not hundreds, of thousands. Sometimes individuals
would hear them and pass on their contents to their most
trusted friends and relatives; in other cases, families, or even
small circles who would meet regularly for the purpose, would
sit by the radio and listen. The information always spread
quickly among the Jewish population and gave a sense of a
direct tie with Israel. The broadcasts acquired further special
value for Soviet Jews as a consolidating factor (and eventually
also as a source for the revival of the Hebrew language).
Throughout most of the years under discussion all foreign

Russian-language programs were totally jammed, as were
English-language programs at certain periods. Israeli broadcast-
ing was not done in Russian at this time so as not to appear to
be interfering in Soviet domestic affairs. Yet by early 1953 there
was systematic jamming of Israeli broadcasts; by February of
that year they were completely unintelligible (this continued for
approximately two years). 23
Meanwhile, the Soviet media were intensifying their anti-
Israel propaganda, increasingly stressing precisely those sensi-
tive points which the Israeli programs to the USSR took pains
to avoid (cf. n. 23 above). The a priori Soviet position of deny-
ing any connection between Soviet Jewry and Israel seemed to
be contradicted in practice by Soviet propaganda in the years
1949-53 —although it continued to be official dogma. Such a
connection seems to have been implied by the Soviet media
immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel,
when the stand toward it was unequivocally favorable. Refer-
ences to "the Jewish State," "the Jewish army," "the Jews' war"
and so on, in which the Soviet press and radio abounded, must
surely have strengthened the image of the Soviet Jew as neces-
sarily connected with and involved in events in Palestine—in
the eyes of both Soviet Jews and the Soviet authorities and
non-Jewish public (cf. p. 280). The impact which Soviet support
for Israel in its war of independence had on the feeling of
identification with Israel of Soviet Jews has been dwelt upon. It
seems that having become aware of the strengthening Soviet
Jewish sympathies for and identification with Israel as a result
of the official position, the Soviet authorities resolved to
undermine these tendencies by adopting an opposite position.
To a certain extent they succeeded in this aim. Their prop-
aganda on Israel aroused Soviet Jewish criticism of and doubts
about Israeli domestic and especially foreign policy. In addition
to the feeling shared by many Soviet Jews that Israeli diplo-
macy had contributed to the deterioration in their own position,
they began to ask why Israel had adopted a pro-American orien-
tation, why it was hostile to the Soviet Union, and why it
opposed Soviet initiatives in the international arena.
The recurrent descriptions of Israel as linked with and con-
trolled by the United States may have been a logical result of
the Soviet authorities' view of their own Jews. If Soviet Jews as
such were disloyal to the Soviet motherland and attracted to
Israel, it was inevitable that Israel be shown as belonging to the
imperialist, warmongering camp, enslaving its economy to the

Marshall Plan, inviting the penetration of U.S. monopoly capi-
tal, bringing American generals to command its army, establish-
ing a reactionary regime, and so on.
It would seem, then, that the Jewish factor was a major con-
sideration in determining the Soviet propaganda line toward
Israel —on two different planes: on the one hand, the USSR's
sympathies for Israel had proved to have had unexpectedly
strong, negative concomitants and Israel had therefore to be
depicted as a state or society that must needs repel the products
of Soviet education; and, on the other, Soviet Jewry's own
alleged rootlessness in Soviet society and its links with the
capitalist camp, possibly but not necessarily connected with its
feelings for Israel, meant that Israel too had to appear as part of
a universal Jewish plot directed against the camp of progress
and democracy. The anti-Israel tone of Soviet writings on Israel
at a time when the Soviet government was officially supporting
that state (cf. pp. 211-17) can only be explained by this dual
Soviet-Jewish role. It seems too that in the following years,
when Soviet attention began to turn to the new array of anti-
imperialist forces in the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Iran) and the
USSR had no further positive role for Israel, Soviet propaganda
about Israel was directed above all at the Soviet Jewish popula-
tion.
During 1949 the Soviet media were not yet unequivocally
anti-Israel —presumably in view of the virtual lack of reaction in
the Arab world to Soviet overtures (see following chapter) —yet
their censure of Israel sharpened in the following years. That
this criticism was aimed at Soviet Jewry, at an audience that
felt a direct personal involvement in Israel's development and
well-being, was apparent from both its frequency and its con-
tent.
Thus, Soviet descriptions of Israel in this period stressed the
inadequacies of the Israeli economy and the deterioration in the
population's standard of living: the "cruel" rationing of clothes
and shoes (from June 1950), the poor health and consequent
underdevelopment of the children, 2 4 and similar details that
could hardly be of interest to an audience that felt detached
from Israeli everyday life. In a lengthy article in one of the
more important journals in the spring of 1951, the orientalist
Vatolina wrote of the high cost of living, the heavy burden of
taxation that fell upon "the broad masses," low wages and
increasing unemployment, especially in the larger towns. In
particular, she emphasized the hard lot of the new immigrants

who spent lengthy periods in transit camps under appalling
conditions without being able to find employment in either
industry or agriculture. Israel "is overflowing with immig-
rants," among whom those with "democratic leanings" have
"an especially difficult fate" for the authorities practice "a dis-
criminatory policy" against them. 2 5 Jewish youth, educated and
inevitably indoctrinated by the Soviet system and according to
the principles of the October Revolution, would clearly be
alienated by this oppression of its own views and way of think-
ing.
Other examples of interest in this context include an article
which opened by referring to Israel as "the Jewish State," pro-
ceeded to discuss its economic subjugation to the U.S.A., with
which it had enslaving agreements that were masked as friend-
ship treaties, and the allotting of most of the Israeli budget to
military needs, and concluded by quoting a slogan of Israel's
Soldiers' Conjimittee for Peace praising the USSR as the savior
of "the Jewish people." 2 6
Similarly calculated to turn Soviet Jewry against Israel and
perhaps also to show that the hardships it suffered in the USSR
were no greater than it could expect in Israel, was the frequent
mention of the use of violence by the Israeli authorities, for
example to suppress demonstrations of workers or "progress-
ive" groupings; the country's domination by religious circles;
and the militarism of Israeli life including its political and
social spheres—the Soviet media thus constantly stressed the
periodical lengthening and other hardships of Israeli military
service. 27
Most of these, and numerous other negative traits of Israeli
life, were described in a lengthy article in New Times in sum-
mer 1951. Its author, one P. Khazov, noted in the El Al plane in
which he traveled to Israel that the crew were American, the
Americans who dominated the airline having demanded the
dismissal of "many of the Jewish personnel." Israel's airfields
were likewise U.S. controlled; moreover although Israel was a
small country it had airfields at Lydda, in Haifa, Jerusalem, the
Galilee and the Negev to meet U.S. needs as these fields were a
link in the chain of U.S. military bases in the Mediterranean
region. The road system was also intended to satisfy strategic
considerations. Indeed, Khazov had read of U.S. intentions to
build a road from Cairo to Istanbul through Israel. In Haifa he
saw construction activity and recalled that "the Israeli democra-
tic press" had pointed out the British and U.S. interest in Haifa,
as one of the larger ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, in con-
nection with their "aggressive plans."
American firms, Khazov went on, received special conces-
sions and privileges in Israel and undermined local industry
which, "weak enough as it is," had been forced to close down
factories and dismiss workers for lack of raw materials. U.S.
"aid" which had turned Israel in the short period since its
establishment into an imperialist fiefdom in every sense of the
word had committed Israel to purchasing in the United States,
although European prices were much lower. The movie houses
showed American films which the public had no wish to see; a
"movie proprietor" told Khazov: "If we had Soviet films, it
would be a different matter; we should be showing to packed
houses."
The Soviet correspondent described the difficult socio-
economic conditions of Israeli life in great detail. On the one
hand, a flourishing black market and the comfortable villas of
the "Zionist leaders" built on plots purchased with public
moneys; on the other, a dearth of primary necessities, low
wages, poor housing, many of the poorer people living in
hovels or sheds, beggars, "many of them disabled war vete-
rans," and children "playing in the dust of the alleys."
There were also natural hardships. The climate was particu-
larly harsh: hot, dry and windless —"like a furnace" —in the
summer, and rain for "days on end" in the winter.
Khazov's visit to Jerusalem made him aware of the suffering
of Israel and its inhabitants because of the lack of any final sol-
ution to the Palestine question. The town to which, as if "to
stress their right to Jerusalem, the Tel Aviv authorities have
transferred some of their government institutions" was like a
"besieged fortress," its atmosphere tense and its very buildings
cut in two by the border between the Arab and Jewish parts.
Israel was in fact still in a state of war with its Arab neighbors,
the Western powers "doing their utmost to fan the protracted
conflict, from which they derive no little advantage." The
boundaries had been fixed to ensure constant incidents for
which the West insisted that the parties accept their 'media-
tion'." Although in the past Israel and the Arab part of Pales-
tine had "constituted a single economic unit," they had become
totally separated, and consequently Israel had to import from
afar agricultural produce "it might have obtained close at
hand."
The "chauvinistic policy" of the "Right-socialist ruling

party," Mapai, was especially evident in Nazareth. Although
situated "farther from the frontier than any other big city in
Israel," the town was "virtually under a military regime."
Altogether "every possible discrimination is shown against the
Arab population." A Jewish agricultural laborer told Khazov
that Arab and Jewish workers "were equally outraged at these
attempts to introduce American race practices into Israel." He
insisted that there could be no " 'cause of friction' " between
Arab and Jewish laborers in view of the hard lot of both.
"The immigration problem" was an "offshoot of the official
nationalist policy." Since the war "the Zionist leaders have
been doing their utmost to enlarge the Jewish population by
encouraging mass immigration. Large numbers of European and
Near Eastern Jews have been induced by Zionist propaganda to
abandon their homes and go to Israel. . . . The attempts to kin-
dle Jewish-Arab animosity are made with the obvious purpose
of diverting the attention of the tens of thousands of immigrants
who find themselves in the 'promised land' without homes,
work or livelihood, from the real source of their misfortunes."
The scores of immigrant camps were a "characteristic" fea-
ture of Israel. Their "dismal" condition was another subject
the Soviet journalist described in detail. "They are usually
pitched in bare sandy wastes, often far from any other inhabited
community. . . . Poverty, want, cold, squalor and disease reign
supreme. . . . Tents are frequently carried away by gusts of
wind, while the corrugated iron huts are intolerably hot in
summer and cold in winter.
"The material conditions of the immigrants are terrible,
because the scale of immigration is greater than Israel's
economic resources can cope with. . . . 'We have been fooled', I
was told in one of the camps. 'The Zionist agents who got us to
come to Israel told us that we were going to a land flowing
with milk and honey.' " Even those fortunate enough to find
work complained, for "an immigrant with college education is
considered lucky if he can find a job as a waiter or soda-water
clerk, and a qualified engineer as a builder's laborer."
An immigrants' demonstration, at which they demanded
"proper shelter in the coming winter" had turned into a
"bloody incident." Their "modest demand was considered pre-
sumptuous by the Israeli authorities. The demonstrators were
attacked by the police; thirty of them were injured and twelve
were arrested.
' T h i s is an illustration of the way Zionist propaganda makes

good its promises."
Back in the USSR, Khazov pondered "on the fate of this tiny
state created by the will of the United Nations. The three years
of Israel's existence cannot but disappoint those who expected
that the appearance of a new and independent state in the Mid-
dle East would help to strengthen the forces of peace and
democracy," even though "the people of Israel refuse to accept
the lot the imperialists are planning for them . . . to serve as
cannon fodder for aggressors" and the "many democratic organ-
izations in Israel" were fighting "actively . . . for peace, democ-
racy and social progress." 2 8
There can be little doubt that this lengthy article, the most
detailed of the plethora of material put out by the Soviet media
in the 1949-52 period, was intended for the Soviet-Jewish
public, highlighting as it did precisely what was most likely to
arouse the doubts, anxiety and reservations of Soviet Jewry:
unemployment, a very low standard of living, physical inse-
curity as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a harsh climate, a
police regime, national discrimination, and above all the hard-
ships and oppression of the immigrants, especially of those
with higher education, whom the State of Israel was totally
unequipped to absorb and help. Some of the hardships
described were similar to those suffered by Soviet Jewry in the
USSR, presumably to stress that immigration to Israel would
not improve their lot; others covered different aspects of life,
showing that they would actually make their position worse by
going to Israel.
THE SLÂNSKY TRIAL
The Soviet regime —monolithic, isolationist and discrim-

inatory—could not openly censure manifestations of the Soviet
Jewish national awakening since it denied the very existence of
a Jewish nationality in the USSR. Moreover, this national
awakening was primarily based on ties with a foreign state and
was part of a world-wide national movement that had ceased
officially to exist in the USSR with the elimination of the last
Zionist groupings in the 1920s. Any direct reference to this
phenomenon would be an admission that the assimilationist
policy that had led the Soviet leadership to insist that a Jewish
problem no longer existed in the USSR had failed. Perhaps it
would discredit also the entire Soviet way of life, insofar as a
significant number of citizens sought to exchange the socialist

paradise of the leading Communitst power for a capitalist soci-
ety in a minute, insecure and poverty-stricken Middle Eastern
state.
The People's Democracies of Eastern Europe were freer.
There, the campaign against bourgeois nationalism that fol-
lowed the rift with Tito was accompanied by an official anti-
Jewish, anti-Zionist and anti-Israel campaign which reached its
climax in a series of political show trials.
Although the relations of these states with Israel are not the
subject of this study, a survey of certain aspects of these trends
and particularly the trials is essential to clarify the Soviet
attitude toward Israel at the time. Just as the stand of the Peo-
ple's Democracies on immigration and political and military aid
played an important role in Soviet policy when the USSR was
calling for the establishment and strengthening of the Jewish
State in Palestine, so these same states played a central part in
carrying out the new Soviet policy toward Israel in the 1949-52
period. Furthermore, the active participation of the USSR in the
preparation and holding of these trials has been proven, the
evidence showing the direct intervention not only of the Soviet
embassies in the East European capitals and special Soviet
advisers sent there for the purpose, but also of Stalin himself.
The investigation conducted in 1968 by the Piller Commis-
sion in the archives of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
leaves no doubt that the role of the Soviet advisers who helped
the security organs of the People's Democracies in the prot-
racted and pedantic preparation of the trials was indeed deci-
sive. Karel Kaplan, one of the Piller Commission members, has
written of the "special position" of the Soviet advisers: their
arrival in Prague "enriched" interrogations with "new techni-
ques" and meant an increase in "psychological pressure," in
addition to "their influence . . . in the preparation of the trials,
in assembling the groups [of accused], in preparing the struc-
ture of conspiracy [as described in the trials], in preparing the
accused for appearance in court, etc." The advisers' "proposals
and opinions were accepted by the Minister [of National Sec-
urity] as well as by the other officials of the ministry and their
correctness was never questioned, while the leader of the advis-
ers took part in conferences with Gottwald when security ques-
tions were involved." 2 9 (Klement Gottwald was both president
of Czechoslovakia and chairman of the party.)
From mid-1948, the ideological tensions and trends, whose
development, influence and implications within the USSR have

been briefly discussed, began to appear in the People's Democ-
racies. The first two Cominform conferences laid down the total
severance of the socialist camp from its imperialist rival, stipu-
lated that Soviet socialism serve as the prototype for the entire
camp and called for the strengthening of the ties between the
People's Democracies and the Soviet Communist Party, the
attitude toward the USSR becoming the sole touchstone for loy-
alty to socialism. Finally, the idea of the separate road to
socialism—one of the central features of Tito's "bourgeois
nationalism"—was declared a major danger to the Communist
movement.
In 1948 a number of high-ranking officials had been dismiss-
ed in Romania, Poland, Hungary and Albania. The Cominform
organ said that national bourgeois deviationism still existed in
the People's Democracies, one of its expressions being reserva-
tions about the Soviet Union's international positions and a
search for "neutralism in foreign policy." 3 0 In 1949 extensive
show trials began; one of the main tenets of the accompanying
propaganda was that imperialism was attempting to recruit
traitors and spies from among the peoples infected with nation-
alism. For the purpose of this study it seems sufficient to dis-
cuss the trial in which the campaign against Israel was most
open and extreme, the conspiracy of the Anti-State Center
headed by Rudolf Slánsky, the Czechoslovak Party secretary-
general.
The campaign against bourgeois nationalism in Czecho-
slovakia mainly affected the Slovak Party, but it included an
unconcealed anti-Zionist offensive. 31 In the 1949 Hungarian
Rajk trial, which was shown to have direct connections with
Czechoslovakia, two of the accused were charged with Zionist
activities, one of them confessing that the Zionist movement
cooperated closely with American Intelligence. 32 In the summer
of 1949—after Soviet advisers had taken part in the interroga-
tion of two Czechoslovak citizens who had been handed over to
the Hungarian authorities in connection with the Rajk case—
Karel Sváb, head of the security department of the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party Secretariat, was informed by a senior
Hungarian security officer that the case "should be coordinated
under the direction of the Soviet authorities." 3 3 Early in Sep-
tember 1949 First Secretary of the Hungarian Party Mátyás
Rákosi wrote Gottwald that during the Rajk trial leading
Czechoslovak Party personalities would be appearing as sus-
pected of Titoism, including Interior Minister Vaclav Nosek;

Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis; Head of the Economic
Department of the President's Office Ludvik Frejka; Deputy
Director of the State Planning Commission Josef Goldmann;
Editor of the party organ, Rudé Pravo, Vilém Novy; Deputy
Foreign Minister Artur London; Deputy Minister of Foreign
Trade Evien Loebl; Chief Secretary of the Brno party regional
committee, Otto Sling; and Koloman MoSkoviC (or MoSko), one
of the four secretaries of the Slovak Party. Sváb was told by
Rákosi and Chief Soviet Adviser in Budapest General Belkin
that the investigations in Czechoslovakia should concentrate on
party members who had been in exile in Britain in World War
II or had fought in the International Brigade in Spain. He was
also told that it was better to err in the direction of punishing
the innocent than in letting off the guilty. Simultaneously the
Poles expressed the opinion that the activities of the foes of
socialism, in the form of an extensive international plot that
was spreading its tentacles throughout the People's Democ-
racies, focused on Czechoslovakia. 34 (The Cominform resolution
of November 1949, which called on the socialist states and par-
ties to strengthen their mutual ties and subordination to the
democratic camp, was especially relevant to Czechoslovakia as
the People's Democracy with the closest political, economic and
cultural ties with the Western camp.)
As a result of these pressures, the investigation of suspects
began in Czechoslovakia. On 16 September Gottwald and
Slánsky asked Malenkov to send people who were acquainted
with the Rajk case to act as advisers in Czechoslovakia. Within
a few days, on 23 September, two high-ranking Soviet security
officers, Makarov and Likhachev, arrived in Prague. Likhachev
was deputy head of the Soviet Ministry of State Security's
Department for Investigating Specially Important Cases and had
been closely connected with Minister Abakumov in investigat-
ing the "Leningrad Affair." The Soviet advisers quickly
acquired extraordinary powers; moreover, they were subjected
to no supervision by any Czechoslovak authority but only by
those in Moscow responsible for political security, to whom
they supplied current information on the progress of the inves-
tigations in Czechoslovakia. 35
At the same time, the preparations for political trials took on
enormous dimensions. The Piller Commission states that at this
stage the investigation of real misdeeds on the basis of
confirmed testimonies was replaced by a search for enemies
based on very doubtful evidence.36 Special attention was paid

to people suspected of Trotskyism or nationalism (the latter was
by very definition synonymous with anti-Sovietism), to those
who had lived or been active in a Western country and
bourgeois surroundings, and to people of Jewish origin, duly
stigmatized—as the Piller Commission has recorded—as Zion-
ists.37
In these same months (late 1949) party officials began to be
arrested, some of them from the list Rákosi had presented Gott-
wald. A significant percentage of them were Jews and from the
beginning the interrogations undertaken by the Soviet advisers
were accompanied by anti-Semitic mud-slinging.38 Yet the Jew-
ish factor was not brought out into the open at this juncture.
The actual accusations varied periodically—Titoism, bourgeois
nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and so forth—and when the sec-
urity organs and their Soviet advisers began their search in
1950 for "the Czechoslovak Rajk" they chose Clementis for the
role.39
The campaign against Slovak "bourgeois nationalism," how-
ever, ran into considerable difficulties and emphasis shifted to
the Brno case with Otto áling as the chief villain. Gottwald told
a party Central Committee plenum in February 1951 that "the
traitors and plotters Sling, Svermová, Clementis and company"
sought from inside the party "to dominate the party, to change
its policy, to seize state power . . . and turn back along the path
of capitalism, the path of uniting with the camp of imperial-
ism." They were said to have wanted to replace Slánsky and
Prime Minister Antonin Zápotocky and to kill Gottwald, in this
way severing Czechoslovakia from the USSR and socialism.40
Yet the security organs were still not satisfied, seeking an
even more important figure for the role of head of the
conspiracy. Kaplan has attributed this primarily to a change of
attitude of the socialist camp to international developments,
notably in the Middle East, as a result of which, in his opinion,
the slogan shifted from bourgeois nationalism to Zionism.
In the period when the socialist camp actively supported the
foundation and formation of Israel, the Czechoslovak Zionist
organization was legal and enjoyed officialdom's favor. In
Kaplan's view, the Zionist movement as such was seen as
consisting at the time of "a progressive current" that "tried to
bring about the cooperation of Israel with the socialist camp,
sympathizing with both the anti-imperialist foreign policy and
the democratic currents in its internal policy," and of a
reactionary element which desired to influence Israel's foreign

political orientation toward the United States and to "lean on
bourgeois power" in the domestic scene.The fight for Israel's
existence was simultaneously a fight for the character of the
state and "in its wider context, an important part of the fight
between two world camps for leading positions in the Middle
East. This conflict ended in a victory for the imperialist bloc
and its decisive economic and political influence in Israel. The
hopes engendered in the socialist camp that Israel would
become a progressive factor in the Middle East were not
realized. The attitude of the socialist states changed, therefore,
and with it also the position of the Zionist organizations [in
Eastern Europe]."
Concomitantly with the growth of U.S. influence in Israel
"some of the Arab States gradually shook off the English and
French subservience." There was thus a dual reason for "the
interest of the socialist countries" to shift to the Arab world.
This development in turn "projected itself into the internal
policy of the countries of the socialist camp, where anti-Jewish
feelings increased."
In 1951, Kaplan recorded, "anti-Semitic tendencies became
particularly ripe" in Czechoslovakia. A special department was
formed in the security organs to deal with Zionism.
Anti-Semitism combined with the struggle against Zionism
either because the latter culminated in anti-Semitism or because
it provided a reason for it. 41
Indeed, the developments that led to the Slánsky Trial were
characterized by an open anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish line in
the domestic arena and an anti-Israel stand in foreign policy
that formed a link between the so-called struggle against the
Anglo-U.S. conspiracy within the socialist camp and the
consolidation of an anti-imperialist front in the international
arena. Yet, Kaplan's version is contradicted by the actual
chronology of events. The open manifestation of anti-Je wish
sentiment preceded the developments in the international arena
to which he attributed it; a leading party figure, Prague
University Professor Arnost Kolman, had accused the party
leadership as early as September 1948 of allowing the class
enemy to disseminate anti-Semitic opinions in its ranks. 4 2 The
beginnings of the anti-Zionist campaign in Eastern Europe also
preceded the first indications of any change in the attitude to
the State of Israel, following immediately as they did the rift
with Yugoslavia and the Cominform decision on bourgeois
nationalism. The change in the East European attitude toward

Israel was rather the logical, perhaps even inevitable, outcome
of this anti-Zionist offensive than of any increased interest in
the Arab world of which the earliest signs appeared in the
summer of 1949 (see p. 384ff.).43
The attempt to attribute anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in
the People's Democracies in general and Czechoslovakia in
particular in the period under discussion to foreign policy
motives and to see in the change in attitude toward Israel a
decisive factor in the preparations for the Slánsky Trial, is no
less difficult logically than historically. In particular, it fails to
explain why Slánsky fitted the bill better than Sling as head of
the conspiracy. This becomes clear only in the light of the
Soviet directive that the Czechoslovak conspiracy was to be the
largest one, and of the subsequent rationale of assigning the
role of head conspirator to the most important Jew in the party,
especially given the mounting anti-Semitism and the fact that
so many of the prisoners were Jews: the Jewish origin of most
of the accused would provide the requisite common
denominator for including all the prisoners in a single plot.
Officially it was not possible to accuse the prisoners of
belonging to a single ethnic stock and to see this as the essence
of their activity against the party and the state. The formula was
therefore made up of the accepted synonyms: cosmopolitanism
and the relevant form of bourgeois nationalism, Zionism—the
latter despite the fact that virtually none of the prisoners had at
any stage been even slightly connected with the Zionist
movement or had any particular sympathy for the State of Israel
even when Czechoslovakia had supported it politically and
militarily. (Some of the Jewish prisoners, including Slánsky
himself, were known for having been far less sympathetic to
Israel than some of their non-Jewish colleagues, such as Prime
Minister Zápotocky.)
By early 1951 a systematic investigation was in progress to
implicate as many Jews as possible in the conspiracy. Artur
London who was arrested at this time thought at first that the
coarse, "Hitlerite" anti-Semitism of his interrogators
characterized just a few individuals. Later, he appreciated that
this was a witch-hunt intended to exacerbate discriminatory
measures against the Jews on the pretext of their being
foreigners, cosmopolitans and Zionists, and so inevitably
involved in espionage and illegally leaving the country. 44
The interrogations thus culminated in confessions to Jewish
nationalism and statements that Jewish nationalists had

deliberately been given party and governmental posts in a
number of fields, particularly in the economy. Slánsky's name
was brought up in this connection as a result of pressures from
the security organs which clearly intended to implicate him. It
was said that the secretary-general's attention had been drawn
to this trend, yet he had ignored it, Once prisoners began to
refer to him, some of the interrogators requested the Soviet
Embassy to be permitted to ask direct questions about him.
The danger of Jewish bourgeois nationalism and Zionism,
regarded at this time as a major weapon in the imperialist
conspiracy against the socialist camp, was underlined by the
Soviet advisers in mid-1951 at meetings with the head of
investigations sector of security, Lt.-Col. Bohumil Doubek, and
Deputy Minister of Interior Karel Kostál.
On 20 July 1951 Stalin himself wrote to Gottwald about
* 'incriminating material" received in Moscow on Slánsky and
Geminder which Moscow considered "insufficient" and
therefore decided to recall the leading Soviet adviser Vladimir
Bozharskii. Stalin invited Gottwald to come to the Soviet
capital to discuss the affair, but the Czechoslovak president sent
in his stead Deputy Prime Minister and Central Committee
Secretariat member Alexej Cepifika who reported on the
Czechoslovak investigations to the Soviet Politburo on 23 July.
During the discussion that followed Stalin said this could be an
attempt at provocation, and gave examples from the USSR
where honorable party members had been falsely accused by
people under arrest. The activities of the investigating organs
and the Soviet advisers, he insisted, must be subordinated to
"constant and rigid control" so as "not to allow general
mistrust to spread in the highest organs." Stalin wrote Gottwald
in a similar vein, warning against jumping to conclusions on
the basis of statements by convicted persons, yet nonetheless
recommending Slánsky's removal from his post of
secretary-general since he had appointed cadres which had
proved to be enemy elements.
Gottwald accepted Stalin's advice and some six weeks later
Slánsky was demoted to the post of deputy prime minister,
although he remained a member of the party's Political
Secretariat, the tasks and responsibilities of secretary-general
going to Gottwald. After another two months, apparently upon
further Soviet intervention, Slánsky was arrested.45
Slánsky's arrest shook the very fundaments of Czechoslovak
society and it was followed by an unprecedented chain of

arrests of leading personalities: regional party secretaries;
diplomats (such as Otto Fischl, ambassador to East Germany,
and Eduard Goldstuecker, envoy to Sweden and previously to
Israel); economists (Ludvik Frejka, Josef Goldmann and Deputy
Minister of Foreign Trade Rudolf Margolius); and later also
military figures. Others dismissed from their posts and arrested
included people directly connected with Slánsky through work,
notably his deputies Stefan Bastovansky, Josef Frank and
Gustav BareS; Koloman Moskovic; and Kopriva himself who,
according to Kaplan, was arrested on Stalin's own
recommendation.
In addition, the last Czechoslovak Zionist activists were
arrested as well as two Israeli citizens, Shimon Orenstein,
formerly an official of the Israeli Legation in Prague who was
visiting Czechoslovakia on a private business trip, and Knesset
member and Mapam Political Secretariat member Mordekhai
Oren, who went to Prague in December 1951 following a
W.F.T.U. conference in East Berlin which he had attended.
Simultaneously the Czechoslovak communications media
intensified their anti-Zionist, anti-cosmopolitan and anti-Israel
propaganda, 4 6 echoing all the themes used in similar campaigns
in the Soviet Union.
The final preparations for the trial, every detail of which was
painstakingly rehearsed, lasted an entire year. Three special
Soviet advisers were sent to reinforce the new chief Soviet
adviser, Aleksandr Beschasnov, and his assistants in
supervising investigations, proferring advice and helping to
plan the interrogation. 47
Eleven out of the fourteen selected to comprise the
"Anti-State Conspiratorial Center led by R. Slánsky" were Jews,
described in the charge sheet as being of "Czech nationality,
Jewish origin" (the Soviet advisers' proposal "Jewish
nationality," widely used in the USSR was^not accepted.). 48 The
fourteen were: Slánsky; Geminder; Karel Sváb, up to his arrest
head of Security and deputy minister of interior; Bedfich
Reicin, formerly deputy minister of national defense; Clementis;
Deputy Foreign Minister Vavro Hajdu; Sling; Frejka; Frank;
Margolius; London; Loebl; André Simone of the Rude
Pravo—the party daily —editorial staff; and Fischl. The wide
range of fields they represented demonstrated the extent and
danger of the plot.
On 20 November 1952 the trial began. The charge against the
accused was that "being Trotskyite-Titoite, Zionist, bourgeois-

nationalist traitors and enemies of the Czechoslovak people, of
the people's democratic system and of socialism, and being in
the service of the American imperialists, they, under the leader-
ship of hostile Western intelligence services, formed an anti-
State conspiratorial centre, undermined the people's democratic
system, disrupted the construction of socialism, damaged the
national economy, engaged in espionage, disrupted the unity of
the Czechoslovak people and the defense-efficiency of the
Republic, in order to tear it from the firm alliance and friend-
ship with the Soviet Union, in order to liquidate the people's
democratic system in Czechoslovakia, to restore capitalism, take
the Czechoslovak Republic again into the camp of imperialism
and deprive it of sovereignty and independence."
The indictment insisted that "there was nothing fortuitous in
the imperialists' selection of Slánsky. Coming from the family
of a big trader he infiltrated into the Communist Party and,
although outwardly acting like a Communist, he inwardly
remained all his life a faithful lackey of the bourgeoisie." In
1930 he "became an agent of the U.S. intelligence service"
working with a "notorious U.S. spy . . . who was also a rep-
resentative of international Zionism.
"With the crushing of the counter-revolutionary putsch in
Czechoslovakia in February 1948 . . . the American imperialists
placed before their Czechoslovak lieutenants headed by Slánsky
the task to strangle the People's Democratic Republic by means
of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy inside the Communist
Party and the physical removal of Klement Gottwald, leader of
the Czechoslovak people.
"Slánsky steadily planted in key positions in the Party and in
the state apparatus people devoted to him from among the
Western emigres, Zionists, Trotskyists, bourgeois-nationalists,
spies and other enemies of the Czechoslovak people." These
included people in all walks of public life, among them "the
Trots kyite B. Geminder, a Jewish bourgeois nationalist, one of
Slánsky's closest personal friends"; "André Simone alias Otto
Katz—international spy, Zionist and Trotskyite . . . and other
Zionist and adventurist elements"; Ludwig Frejka, "an old
cosmopolitan"; and "the adventurer Otto Fischl, one of the
organizers of Zionist subversive activity in the Czechoslovak
Republic, a high-ranking agent of the Israeli Intelligence Ser-
vice, who served the Gestapo during the occupation", d e m e n -
tis, "a veteran agent of the U.S., British and French Intelligence
Services, inveterate Slovak bourgeois nationalist, was appointed

Foreign Minister. For the purpose of helping Clementis and of
keeping an eye on him. Slánsky sent as Deputy Foreign Minis-
ters the Zionist V. Hajdu, son of a millionaire and an old agent
of the 'Intelligence Service' and the Trotskyite A. London,
inveterate U.S. intelligence agent."
These "betrayers of the Czechoslovak people, in their turn,
also recruited and planted in vital sectors of the Party and State
apparatus rabid enemies of People's Democratic Czechoslovakia:
Trotskyites, Zionists, collaborators, bourgeois nationalists,
capitalists and kulaks." So as to gather "espionage material,"
U.S. intelligence "also utilized its subsidiary Israeli and Yugos-
lav intelligence services and agents."
The indictment went on: "Slánsky, Geminder and other con-
spirators took particular care to support and encourage the sub-
versive activity of the Zionists—the reliable agency of U.S.
imperialism." Geminder had testified that " 'the U.S. imperial-
ists sought, by means of the Zionist agency in the Czechoslovak
Republic and its representatives, to destroy the political and
economic foundations of People's Democratic Czechoslovakia.'
"Testifying on the matter of the leading role played by the
U.S. monopolists in the subversive activity of the Zionist organ-
izations, Orenstein, a U.S. espionage agent, said that at a secret
meeting in Washington in 1947, Truman, Acheson, Ben-Gurion
. . ., Morgenthau, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and
Sharett . . . reached agreement on the so-called 'Morgenthau
Plan' which stipulated the conditions on which the U.S. would
support Israel. This plan contained in part a plan for large-scale
utilisation of Zionist organisations for espionage and other sub-
versive activity in the countries of people's democracy with a
view to supporting the aspirations of the U.S. imperialists for
world domination.
"Realisation of the criminal aims in Czechoslovakia was
entrusted to . . . a prominent agent of the U.S. intelligence ser-
vice," Israel's first Minister to Czechoslovakia, Ehud Avriel,
formerly Ueberall. "Upon his arrival in Czechoslovakia Ueberall
contacted Slánsky and Geminder and, together with them,
began actively to work on realisation of the crazy plan of Tru-
man and Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion, a lackey of U.S. imperialism,
responsible for the arduous material conditions in which the
working people of Israel find themselves, deprived the people
of their democratic rights and created unbearable conditions for
the Arab population, who suffer from brutal national discrimi-
nation. The Ben-Gurion Government converted Israel into a U.S.

possession, having created conditions for the predatory domina-
tion of the U.S. imperialists in the national economy and
unconditionally supporting the criminal plans of the imperialist
warmongers who have turned Israel into a bridge-head for war
against the USSR.
"Following the establishment of the State of Israel the Ameri-
cans used its diplomats as spies and through them and together
with the conspirators from the anti-state centre headed by
Slánsky, organized a number of acts of sabotage which caused
grievous harm to the Czechoslovak Republic."
In addition to Israel, "the American Jewish organization
'Joint,' which engaged in espionage, sabotage, blackmarket cur-
rency machinations, profiteering and smuggling, unfolded
large-scale subversive activity under the protection of the con-
spirators." Moreover, "all kinds of Zionist organisations . . .
engaged with impunity in varied subversive activity, issuing
anti-state leaflets, training terrorists, organising illegal flights
abroad of big capitalists and hostile elements."
Since "the conspirators and their masters" realized there was
no way of carrying out their "counter-revolutionary coup
d'état" as long as Gottwald led the Czechoslovak people,
Slánsky "undertook active measures to shorten [his] life . . . .
He selected physicians for [Gottwald] from among hostile ele-
ments with a black past [and] established close contact with
them." 4 9
Thus, it was evident that the "conspiracy" in its final form
was intended to strengthen the link with the USSR, to provide
an excuse for the country's difficult political and economic
situation, and to purge the party and state bureaucracy of Jews.
The trial lasted a week. The contacts the accused maintained
with the U.S., British, French, Yugoslav and Israeli Intelligence
were emphasized. Inter alia, Slánsky confessed to having been
linked with Zionist organizations, which had been "in contact
with similar organisations in capitalist countries." Czecho-
slovakia's trade with the capitalist world had, for example, been
"effected, to a considerable degree, through the medium of the
Zionists and their organisations, of course to the detriment of
the interests of Czechoslovakia." Geminder had pointed out that
not only had he, Slánsky and Clementis established a Trotskyite
group in the Czechoslovak foreign ministry; he had also main-
tained "espionage contact with agents functioning in the guise
of foreign journalists, diplomats and employees of the Yugoslav
and Israeli missions."

Chief Prosecutor Josef Urválek stated on 26 November that "a
feature" of the trial was that it pointed to the danger of Zionism
as an agent of U.S. imperialism. 5 0
On 27 November the court passed the death sentence on 11 of
the accused, the three remaining members of the Center receiv-
ing life imprisonment. The executions were carried out on 3
December. 51
On 2 December the Czechoslovak ambassador in the USSR,
Karel Kreibich, protested in a letter to the Party Secretariat at
the racialism and anti-Semitism of the indictment, 5 2 an accusa-
tion Gottwald took pains to refute in his report to the Czecho-
slovak Party Council two weeks later. "During the investigation
and in the course of the trial . . .," he explained, ''there was
discovered a new channel through which treason and espionage
penetrated to the Communist Party. This is Zionism. Why?
Because after the establishment of the State of Israel and its
subordination to America, the Zionist organizations of all
shades became branches of the U.S. intelligence service. The
Zionist organizations and their American masters foully abused
the sufferings brought upon the Jews by Hitler and other fas-
cists. It can be said directly that they want to make fortunes out
of the ashes of Oswiencim and Maidanek." This did not mean,
however, Gottwald insisted, that "a person of Jewish descent
and a Zionist are one and the same thing. . . . The deci-
sive factor is the class origin of the given person and his atti-
tude to the homeland, his loyalty, his work for the cause of
socialism. In exactly the same way the struggle against Zionism
has nothing whatever in common with anti-semitism. Anti-
semitism is a variety of barbarous racism . . . fostered, for
instance, by the American 'supermen' . . . in relation to Negroes
and colonial —and not only colonial —peoples. Anti-Zionism is
protection from American espionage, from subversive and
saboteur agents. Consequently, these are two different things, as
different from each other as heaven is from earth." 5 3
Gottwald's denials notwithstanding, any evaluation of the
Slánsky Trial must take into account the following facts:
1. The 11 Jewish members of the Center were specifically
designated as being of "Jewish origin."
2. Those of the Jewish accused, as well as other Jewish per-
sons mentioned in connection with the Center's activities,
who had changed their names always had their original
typically Jewish names given in parenthesis. They were,
moreover, constantly referred to as Zionists, cosmopoli-

tans, Jewish nationalists, and so on.
3. None of the accused were in fact Zionists although one or
two (for example Reicin) had been members of the Zionist
movement in their youth. On the contrary, most of them
were known for a hostility to Jewish nationalism and Zion-
ism, as well as to the Jewish religion, that distinguished
them from most of their non-Jewish colleagues.
4. Several of the Jews, both members of the Center and
others, whose names arose in the course of the trial, were
described as "corrupt," "imposters with Party cards" who
had swarmed into liberated Czechoslovakia like "locusts"
in order to serve the interests of the Western imperialists.
5. The injury the accused were said to have caused to the
Czechoslovak economy included attempts by Avriel to sell
Czechoslovak goods in the West through Jewish middle-
men who had become rich at Czechoslovakia's expense.
Otto Fischl had allegedly turned the Czechoslovak repara-
tions law into an instrument for cynical robbery from the
Czechoslovak State. 54
The impression of a conspiracy to effect a virtual Jewish
takeover was thus achieved. At the same time, the emphasis on
the plot's Jewish nature stressed the link between the Jews and
the United States. Slánsky, moreover, admitted that the inten-
sive campaign the regime had waged against anti-Semitism had
been exploited to cover up Zionist subversive activity. The
Czechoslovak press, he said, had made Israel popular without
mentioning that it was a bourgeois state and a U.S. base in the
Near East. He personally had defended Zionists by stigmatizing
those who had criticized their activities as anti-Semites, and
actually bringing them to court, persecuting them and expelling
them from the party. In this way he had created an atmosphere
in which people feared to oppose the Zionists and their organ-
izations and interfere with them.
The appearance of the two Israeli witnesses at the trial was
intended to strengthen the contention of a substantive and
inseparable link between world Jewry, Zionism and thé State of
Israel, all three serving Western, and particularly U.S., interests.
The Czechoslovak Party organ wrote of Mordekhai Oren: "This
active international Zionist leader, who is also a member of var-
ious Zionist organisations, was, as an important member of the
Zionist general staff, a professional spy. He was an agent of the
British espionage service and fulfilled its instructions in the
many countries he visited in the guise of a journalist. After

1945, when he set up headquarters in the People's Democracies,
he tried to seduce people holding senior positions in the gov-
ernment and the political parties to cooperate with the Zionists
and their imperialist paymasters."
The Morgenthau Plan, of which the indictment had given
only the barest outline, was Orenstein's contribution. The
U.S.A. and its satellites, Orenstein testified, had agreed to sup-
port the establishment of the State of Israel and grant it a $100
million loan in return for Israel's consent to hand over all its
military bases to the United States. Haifa was to be developed
as a naval base and in case of war between the United States
and the USSR transferred, together with other ports, to the
U.S.A. The Israeli General Staff was to be subordinated to the
U.S. Chief Command. Israel, moreover, was to become a
member of the Mediterranean bloc dominated by the United
States, although, until the outbreak of hostilities, it would
appear to be neutral so as to enable the Zionist leaders to con-
duct espionage and subversive activities in the Soviet Union
and the People's Democracies from their base in Israel. In
Czechoslovakia, Avriel had headed these activities, supported
by Slánsky with whom he had close ties.
Chief Prosecutor Urválek devoted a considerable portion of
his concluding speech to the Zionist issue. The reasons for this,
as he told the court, were twofold: in the first place, eleven of
the accused were products of the Zionist movement who had
offered their services to the U.S. imperialists; second, so that
the trial might unmask, for the benefit of all Communist and
workers' parties, the danger of Zionism. "Thousands of strings
of class interest had always linked the Zionist organisations
with world capitalism."
The danger of "international Zionism" had been aggravated
with the establishment of "the American pashalik, the so-called
State of Israel," although the center of Zionism had remained in
the United States, where the Zionists were among "the Ameri-
can monopolists who determine the U.S.A.'s aggressive policy.
. . . The cosmopolitanism and Jewish bourgeois nationalism" of
"the Zionist agents of Slánsky's conspiratorial Center" were
"two sides of a single coin minted in Wall Street.
"The building of socialism and the supplanting of the capital-
ist elements . . . stand in total contradiction to the egoistic class
interest of the Zionist. This trial has proven absolutely that the
Zionist movement is not merely a mistaken conceptual trend or
ideology. . . . The ruling clique in the State of Israel and the

Zionist capitalists the world over are all closely connected
through their factories, their companies, and their various murky
dealings (Geschaeften) with the American capitalists. . . . This
trial has demonstrated to us how Israel's official representatives,
the Zionist organisations and Slánsky, Geminder, Reicin and
Fischl collaborated, all being united in the filthy, shameless task
of plundering our country for the benefit of Israel, that is —in the
long run—for the benefit of the American imperialists. . . .
"The criminals sitting here in the dock," Urválek went on,
"shamefully abused the fact that the Czech and Slovak people
have always shrunk from anti-Semitism, especially after World
War II, when the Hitlerites, seized with racialist madness, mur-
dered masses of Jews in concentration camps and gas cham-
bers." This traditional Czechoslovak stand had been taken
advantage of by bourgeois elements "to infiltrate our Party."
They "hid their true face, that of a sworn class enemy, behind
the suffering of the Jews" at the hands of the Nazis. 55
The Soviet press and radio gave considerable publicity to the
Prague Trial. TASS stressed the common feature of the
Czechoslovak conspiratorial center and "hostile elements" in
the parties of the People's Democracies: Gomulka, Tito, Rajk
and Kostov. 56 An article by a New Times "special correspon-
dent" entitled "People, Be Vigilant!" described the Prague Trial
defendants as "Trotskyite-Titoite, Zionists, bourgeois-nationalist
traitors to and enemies of the Czechoslovak people, the people's
democratic system and socialism." It pointed out that they had
served no less than five intelligence services and that their
strength lay in the fact that they operated within the party and
state apparatus. The same article noted that Slánsky and Reicin
had not only tried to murder Gottwald; they were guilty of
actually causing the death during World War II of two of
Czechoslovakia's heroes (Jan Sverma and Julius Fuõik).
As for Israel, "it was irrefutably proved at the Prague Trial
that [it] had become an international espionage centre. . . . That
was why Slánsky appointed the Trotskyite nationalists and
Zionists," members of his center, "to leading positions in the
apparatus of the Central Committee of the Party, the ministries
of foreign affairs, foreign trade and finance, and other sectors."
Finally, the Soviet source noted the accused's economic crimes
which, it emphasized, were intended to increase Czechos-
lovakia's dependence on the West and thus sever the links
tying it with the socialist camp and the USSR. 57
THE DOCTORS' "PLOT"
The stand of the Soviet media on the Slánsky Trial indicated

that trends similar to those that we have surveyed in the Peo-
ple's Democracies existed within the USSR. Indeed, in
December 1952 the anti-Jewish campaign inside the Soviet
Union reached new heights. On the level of propaganda, its
main themes were the anti-Soviet activity and reactionary
nature of the Zionist movement and the State of Israel.
A guide for party propagandists defined Zionism early in
December as a "reactionary nationalist trend of the Jewish
bourgeoisie" which endeavored to "isolate the Jewish working
masses from the general struggle of the proletariat. Since the
establishment of the State of Israel the Zionists who seized
power there have been turning that country into an American
military base, into a stronghold of reaction in the Near East."
The Czechoslovak trial had shown that "the Zionist organiza-
tions are a true agent of American imperialism carrying out
espionage and subversive activities on behalf of the U.S.
imperialists." 5 8
Other media, meanwhile, were comparing Israeli policy—for
the first time—with the practice of Hitlerite Germany. One
Soviet paper said Israel was setting up ghettoes for its Arab
minority similar to those Hitler had set up for the Jews in
Poland. This was part of the "racist policy of the United
States," for "the bosses of the Jewish state sold their country for
dollars to the American imperialists." 5 9
The Soviet press made clear that Zionist activity had not
come to an end with the unmasking of the Slánsky group. On
the contrary, Pravda Ukrainy wrote in a New Year feuilleton,
this development had merely unsettled the Zionists. "In the
intervals between the sobbing and lamentation" at the fate of
Slánsky and his companions, "the Israeli retail tradesmen do
not forget (in conformity with their inborn disposition to com-
mercial machinations) to conclude a further deal for providing
spies to the Washington wholesale dealers." 6 0
The Soviet media linked this continued Zionist activity with
the rampant corruption in the Soviet economy which an
intensified "vigilance" campaign was seeking to "disclose"
accompanied by the customary purges. Thus, although the
purges were in fact intended to remove from office and posi-
tions of influence a wide range of economists, officials, and
even deputy ministers and ministers, 6 1 the Jews once more stole
the limelight. At the end of November a military tribunal in
Kiev passed a death sentence on three "enemies of the people"
with unmistakably Jewish names for "counter-revolutionary"
activity in commerce, said to have cost the Soviet State hun-
dreds of thousands of roubles. New York Times correspondent
Harrison Salisbury pointed out that since the 19th Party Con-
gress in October a vigorous campaign against economic crimes
had been underway, yet this was the first time that a military
court had dealt with such offenses and that a death sentence
had been imposed. Following this trial the Kiev Party organiza-
tion had stated that the situation in the city's commercial
institutions was "particularly bad." To prove this contention it
had indicated a number of economic misdemeanors on the part
of other Jews—thefts, embezzlement and the abuse of key posi-
tions to give jobs to fellow Jews. 62
The anti-Jewish campaign was not, however, restricted to the
economic field. On 13 January 1953, TASS announced that
"some time ago, a terrorist group of doctors was unmasked by
the organs of state security." The purpose of this group had
been "to put an end, by means of harmful medical treatment, to
the lives of active public figures of the Soviet Union." The doc-
tors had confessed to having murdered in this fashion both
Aleksandr Shcherbakov and Andrei Zhdanov. They had,
moreover, sought "to undermine the health of leading Soviet
military cadres so as to put them out of action and weaken the
country's defense . . . but their arrest disrupted their evil plans.
. . . All these doctor-killers, having become monsters of the
human race and having trampled the sacred banner of science
and profaned the honor of men of science, were mercenaries of
foreign intelligence services." Most of them "were connected
with the international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization
'Joint' set up by American intelligence supposedly in order to
give material aid to Jews in other countries. Yet, in fact, this
organization carried out under the direction of American Intel-
ligence extensive espionage, terrorist and other subversive
activity in a number of countries, including the Soviet Union.
The prisoner Vofsi stated during his investigation that he had
received injunctions to 'eliminate the leading cadres of the
USSR' from the U.S.A. through the 'Joint' and the Moscow doc-
tor Shimeliovich and the well-known Jewish bourgeois
nationalist Mikhoels." The other members of the group had
worked for British Intelligence. 63
This first announcement of the "plot" emphasized its

similarities to the Slánsky center: a. most of the accused, six out
of nine, were Jews; b. the doctors were charged with trying to
abuse their positions to shorten the lives of leading per-
sonalities, as well as with having actually killed two prominent
leaders; and c. the doctors were connected with U.S. and Brit-
ish Intelligence, the link with American Intelligence being the
Joint, which had also played a role in the Slánsky Trial.
There were, however, new components as well: a. the asser-
tion that the Joint had been set up by U.S. Intelligence to give
material aid to "Jews in other countries" made every Jew
everywhere suspect of ties with U.S. Intelligence; b. the refer-
ence to Shimeliovich and Mikhoels linked the new campaign
with the 1948 campaign against Jewish culture which had been
designed to eliminate the Jews as a separate national entity in
the USSR; 64 and c. the connection between the doctors and the
economic criminals was made obvious by the similar termin-
ology used in reference to both.
On 13 January too a leading article in Pravda attacked the
"opportunist theory" that the class struggle had been elimi-
nated with the success of the Soviet regime. The danger of this
theory was that it lulled "our people," led them into a trap and
enabled the enemy to unite to fight the regime. True, the
exploiting classes had long been eliminated in the USSR, yet
"the vestiges of bourgeois ideology remained, the vestiges of
the psychology and morality of private ownership." The bearers
of bourgeois ideas and morality also remained, "living people,
hidden enemies, supported by the imperialist world, who will
continue to do harm in the future." In conclusion, Pravda call-
ed for greater vigilance, as "sluggishness" was an enemy that
Soviet society had to overcome.
Izvestiia for its part compared the Doctors' "Plot" with that of
the doctors who had been accused in the 1930s of causing the
death of leading Soviet personalities (Maksim Gorkii, Valerian
Kuibyshev and Viacheslav Menshinskii). It accused the head
officials of the Ministry of Health of ignoring the activity of the
hirelings of foreign intelligence services, and went on to assert
that these agents were looking hard for "weak and soft spots
among certain unstable strata of our intelligentsia who are
affected by the plague of grovelling before everything foreign
and the plague of cosmopolitanism and bourgeois national-
ism." 6 5
To complete the picture the medical organ stressed the Zion-
ist nature of the Joint 66 —a point other sources returned to in the

following week.
In the days that followed Izvestiia contended that the bearers
of bourgeois ideology had pretended to be "Soviet people, so as
to penetrate our institutions and organizations, to ingratiate
themselves and to expand their own subversive activity." They
were able to do this since "some of our Soviet institutions and
their heads lost their vigilance and became contaminated with
gullibility." 6 7
The stress laid upon the failure of "our institutions" to
unmask the "plot" sufficiently early and the attribution of the
"terrorist doctors' " success to negligence had clear implica-
tions: this was an unmistakable indictment of the security ser-
vices and particularly of those who had stood at their head at
the time Shcherbakov and Zhdanov had died, above all Beriia
who had been Commissar for State Security until 1945 and
responsible apparently for internal security to the Politburo, of
which he had been a candidate member from 1939-46 and from
then on a full member. It also implicated Aleksei Kuznetsov
who had been entrusted with state security in the Central
Committee Secretariat, until executed in 1949; Vsevolod Mer-
kulov who had succeeded Beriia, with whom he was closely
associated personally as Commissar; and finally, Viktor
Abakumov, minister of State Security from 1946 until late 1951
when he was in turn succeeded by Sergei Ignat'ev who
occupied the post at the time the "plot" was finally
"revealed." 6 8
It was thus quickly apparent that the principal purposes of
the new vigilance campaign and the Doctors' "Plot" were: to
purge the security services of elements connected with Beriia
and Ignat'ev's other predecessors, as well as economic institu-
tions and certain circles of the intelligentsia and "men of sci-
ence;" to repress expressions of "bourgeois nationalism" among
the Soviet national minorities; and to unleash an intensive
anti-Jewish campaign, since the Jews were a convenient victim
as an unpopular grouping, long and systematically stigmatized
as foreign to Soviet society.
The anti-Jewish offensive served, inter alia, as an opportune
cover for achieving the two other aims, because Jews were
heavily represented in all the affected fields of life at all levels:
in the economy, in science and other intellectual spheres, and
in the security services —Beriia, as has been noted, was widely
considered to be pro-Jewish (cf. chap. 7, n. 59). Similarly the
publicity given to the penetration by members of Jewish-Zionist

organizations of the apparatus and institutions of the various
union republics was accompanied by parallel comment on a
similar penetration on the part of unspecified national
bourgeois elements, i.e. Lithuanians, Ukrainians, etc. The
large-scale repression of "nationalist" elements in the union
republics had begun with a major purge in Georgia, Beriia's
traditional stronghold, in late 1951, duly followed by purges
first in several other Transcaucasian and Central Asian repub-
lics and toward the end of 1952 in the Western republics. 6 9
Yet the Soviet information media toned down—almost
suppressed—the more general motifs of the purges and vigil-
ance campaign of Stalin's last months, mainly by highlighting
the Jewishness of the "offenders" with all the devices that had
characterized the 1949 campaign. 7 0 True, the Soviet leadership
made a superficial attempt to steer clear of charges of anti-
Semitism—mobilizing Jews to denounce the doctors, 71 recalling
the Soviet contribution to the survival of hundreds of thousands
of Jews during the war, and claiming to distinguish between
anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. 72 However, the main charac-
teristic of the new campaign was undoubtedly that of an all-out
anti-Jewish operation, directed against Jews both as individuals
and as a group. ' T h e majority of this loathsome gang," Pravda
wrote, referring to the "doctor-saboteurs," were "corrupt Jewish
bourgeois nationalists . . . hostile elements" who "neither have
nor can have any social support inside our country." 7 3
The communications media added attacks upon the State of
Israel to their general anti-Jewish offensive. New Times was the
first to point out the link between the Joint, Zionism and Israel.
"Philanthropy," the paper wrote in connection with the Joint,
"was, and is, only a camouflage for the espionage and sabotage
activities of this Zionist organisation created by the American
secret services. After the second world war 'Joint' developed
strenuous activities along these lines in the People's Democ-
racies. . . . In the Soviet Union, the activities of the 'Joint' were
proscribed. However, as is clear from the announcement of the
group of wreckers belonging to the medical profession, the
agents of this espionage and sabotage organisation continued to
carry out its activities in deep secrecy, and carefully masked."
The paper then gave a brief history of Zionism to explain the
role it was playing "in the plans of the warmongers." New
Times wrote: "the Zionist movement is a widely ramified
organisation extending to many countries. [It] embraces numer-
ous groups, religious and 'cultural' associations, and 'philan-

thropic' societies." At first, "the majority of the Zionist leaders
acted as agents of British imperialism. Many of them . . .
worked in the pay of the Intelligence Service. . . . But . . . the
American monopolies wanted to bring Zionism under their
political control and turn it into their own agency." After the
war "the key positions began to pass into the hands of the
Zionist hirelings of the dollar. . . . Present-day Zionism has
been placed in the service of American aggression and of
imperialist preparation for another world war. . . . The Zionist
organisations are breeding-grounds of corrupting cosmopolitan
ideas, which are easily reconciled and go hand in hand with
bourgeois nationalism. . . . This explains Zionism's anti-Soviet
orientations. The Zionist leaders are malignantly hostile to the
Soviet Union and the camp of peace and democracy generally.
Eban, the Israeli representative in the United Nations, helps the
Anglo-American bloc to defeat Soviet proposals aimed at prom-
oting international peace and security. The Zionist leaders who
govern the State of Israel conduct a campaign of slander against
the Soviet Union and its policy of promoting peace and friend-
ship among nations."
The Zionists supported U.S. policy and "everything that goes
with it, in particular, the revival of nazism and the implantation
of blood-thirsty fascist regimes imbued with the spirit of race
hatred, including anti-semitism." In this way, the Zionists
"expose themselves as enemies . . . of the labouring sections of
the Jewish people." As for their activity against the camp of
democracy, "it was revealed at the trial of the Slánsky gang"
that the Israeli ministers in Prague "worked in close contact
with the spies and saboteurs, gave them instructions, protected
them from discovery, etc. The sordid and nefarious activities of
the Zionist espionage and sabotage organisations have now
been brought into still greater prominence with the uncovering
by the Soviet security authorities of the terrorist group of
physicians." 74
THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
With the attack upon Israel during the "unmasking" of the

Doctors' "Plot," Soviet policy reached the opposite pole to its
1947 stand of support for the establishment of that state.
Indeed, both the basic assumptions and the goals which had
guided the earlier position were no longer valid; on the con-
trary, they had been virtually refuted by events. In the first

place, the official Soviet contention that Soviet Jewry was not
interested in developments in Palestine had not only been
proved wrong, but the encouragement Soviet Jews had derived
from their government's support for Israel to demonstrate their
own involvement had almost necessitated a volte-face. Second,
with the attainment of the strategic goal, the ousting of Britain
from Palestine, there was no reason on the regional plane to
support the Jewish State. As the focus of the anti-British strug-
gle in the Middle East transferred to Iran, Egypt and Iraq, Mos-
cow's interest centered on the countries which now seemed to
comprise the potential "revolutionary" situation that promised
fertile ground for Soviet activity. Third, on the international
level, the exacerbation of the cold war, with the concomitant
trends in both the USSR and the United States, precluded any
neutralizing influence on Washington by American Jewry such
as support for Israel and a solution of the D.P. problem had
been calculated to achieve, especially given Israel's own
increasingly pro-American orientation. Finally, Israel had
domestic dificulties, particularly in the economic field, from
which it appeared unlikely to extricate itself because of its
small size, lack of natural wealth and encirclement by hostile
neighbors. As Israel's political future was seemingly jeopar-
dized in any case, there was little risk in using it in order to
achieve far-reaching global gains.
In consequence, the USSR took advantage of an explosion in
the courtyard of its Tel Aviv Legation, in which three of its per-
sonnel were slightly wounded, to sever diplomatic relations
with Israel. 75 The note handed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry
to Israeli Minister Shmuel Eliashiv on 11 February 1953—two
days after the explosion—stated that the Israeli president and
foreign minister in letters they had addressed to the Soviet Leg-
ation the day previously had apologized and declared that the
Israeli government was to blame for "this felony" and was tak-
ing steps to find and punish its actual perpetrators. "However,
in view of the generally known and undisputable fact of the
participation by representatives of the government of Israel in
the systematic kindling of hatred and hostility toward the
Soviet Union and the instigation to hostile acts against the
Soviet Union, it is quite obvious that [these] statements and
apologies . . . are a spurious performance intended to cover up
the traces of the crime committed against the Soviet Union and
to evade responsibility for the offense. . . .
"The articles published in the press of Israel's ruling parties

are clearly provocative. So too are the speeches in Parliament of
representatives of these parties and of members of the Israeli
government, particularly the 19 January speech of Foreign
Minister Sharett who instigated openly to hostile action against
the government of the Soviet Union.
"The act of terrorism which took place on 9 February," the
Note concluded, "testifies to the absence in Israel of elementary
conditions for normal diplomatic activity on the part of the
government of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet gov-
ernment is recalling the Minister of the Soviet Union and the
personnel of the Soviet Legation in Israel and is severing rela-
tions with the government of Israel. Simultaneously, the Soviet
government declares that the further presence in Moscow of the
Israeli Mission is not possible and demands that the staff of the
Mission leave the confines of the Soviet Union at once." 7 6
Pravda commentator Iurii Zhukov returned to the theme that
the explosion was a mere continuation of previous Israeli sub-
versive activity against the USSR. "An unbridled slander cam-
paign against the USSR conducted in Israel with the active par-
ticipation of official persons preceded this vile deed." The
Israeli government had long been inspiring this campaign, but
it had become "especially violent" after the lopping off of the
Joint's "bloodstained tentacles." "The explosion of a bomb on
the territory of the Soviet Mission in Tel Aviv, carried out with
the direct connivance of the police, cannot fail to be linked
directly to all the subversive activity Israeli Intelligence is con-
ducting against the Soviet Union." Moreover, Zhukov went on,
"the base crime of the Zionist bandits . . . looks like an attempt
to demonstrate that, regardless of their numerous failures, the
Jewish bourgeois nationalist organizations intend to carry on
with their black deeds." The Soviet people, for its part, would
"draw the necessary conclusions: it will even heighten its vigil-
ance; it will follow with an even greater alertness all the
intrigues of the imperialist warmongers and their agents; it will
tirelessly strengthen the armed forces and intelligence organs of
our state; it will burn out with a hot iron the dangerous malady
of unconcern, eradicating sluggishness in its r a n k s / ' 7 7
The Soviet media continued to devote considerable attention
to the Zionist-Jewish-Israeli network. Trud showed how the
Joint had infiltrated into the USSR and it condemned the Zion-
ist intention of diverting "the Jewish proletarian masses" from
the class struggle. "Deceiving the workers of Jewish nationality,
the Zionists advocated the idea of immigration to Palestine—

that 'Promised Land'." Yet Lenin, in the process of "unmasking
the idea of a 'Jewish nation' " had already stressed the false and
reactionary character of this "Zionist idea." This paper also
surveyed the historical connection of Zionism with the various
imperialist powers and reiterated the charge that Israel had sold
itself to U.S. espionage activity in which its diplomatic service
played a significant role. Trud attacked the Histadrut for joining
the secessionist trade union federations which sought to split
the progressive trade union movement, in "just one manifesta-
tion of the campaign of war psychosis and anti-Soviet hysteria
fanned by Israel's rulers." The paper concluded: "The criminal
act of the Zionist gangs of a fascist trend against the Soviet
Legation and the unmasking of the terrorist-spy group of
doctor-killers confront Soviet people in all acuteness with the
task of doing everything to strengthen their vigilance in face of
the intrigues of the enemies of our socialist mother country." 78
Another article, in Literaturnaia gazeta, gave a long list of
Israel's anti-Soviet "provocations," beginning with a statement
by Ben Gurion in 1950 that "the keys to peace are in American
hands." Since then the Israeli prime minister had made other
similar anti-Soviet statements: he was said to have declared that
Israel's goal was to fight Communism, that Israel was prepared
to fight together with the United States in "a global conflict"
and that the American and Israeli flags would always fly side
by side. Finally, in October 1952, he had "pounced furiously on
the Soviet Union and the entire camp of peace and democracy."
Sharett did not "lag behind the prime minister." He had
promised "his American masters on more than one occasion
that Israel agreed 'to participate in the defense of the Near
East.' " As for his 19 January speech in the Knesset, the paper
described it as a "pogrom address."
It was stressed once more that while this had long been the
gist of statements by Israel's leaders, the anti-Soviet tendency
had become far more acute after the unmasking in the USSR
and People's Democracies of the "vile doings" of the Jewish
nationalist "spies and saboteurs." Thus, on 28 January "certain
'unknown malefactors' set fire to a Soviet bookshop in
Jerusalem. The Minister of the Interior put a ten-day ban on the
Communist paper Kol Ha-Am. The reason —the publication of a
Pravda article on the unmasking in the USSR of the group of
doctor-saboteurs and their connection with the Zionist organisa-
tion 'Joint'." On 8 February Israeli Communist Party representa-
tives were expelled from the Histadrut Executive. ''Finally, as

though to put the last touches to the sickening picture of terror
and repression inflicted by the Israeli authorities . . . parliament
member Sneh received a letter on 10 February threatening that
he would be killed unless he altered his stand. The reference
was to Sneh's objection to the anti-Soviet policy of the Israeli
rulers for which on 29 January he had been expelled from
Mapam.
''Is it not clear that the terrorist act in Tel Aviv is directly
connected with all the bloody provocations, with all the vile
speeches of the Zionist bandits against the Soviet Union?"
The Israeli rulers, Literaturnaia gazeta emphasized, were
U.S.-controlled. They supported the U.S. over Korea and did
service to the U.S. delegation at the U.N. They had even agreed
to the re-establishment of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht and to the
re-militarization of Western Germany, while Israel was a U.S.
base and bridgehead. As former U.S. Ambassador McDonald
had pointed out, "the Soviet oil industry can be bombed from
Lydda airfield."
At the same time, the Israeli leadership was directly tied with
"the international Zionist movement" and advocates
bourgeois-nationalist ideas, demagogically claiming leadership
of all the Jews regardless of their state affiliation." 79
On 18 February, the Soviet press reverted to the Soviet
domestic implications of these developments. In a further
appeal "to intensify political vigilance," Izvestiia drew the
attention of its readers to subversive imperialist activities
against the Soviet bloc (the "conspiracies" against the People's
Democracies of Rajk, Kostov, Slánsky, Gomulka and so on, and
against the USSR—the Doctors' "Plot" and the bomb explosion
in Tel Aviv). " The imperialists," Izvestiia maintained, "have
no social support within our country in their hostile subversive
activity against the USSR since the exploiter classes have been
wiped out and Soviet society represents the friendly coopera-
tion of workers, kolkhozniks and intelligentsia, all of whom are
united in the great goal of building Communism. Yet, here and
there fragments of the beaten capitalist classes still remain" and
on them "the imperialist intelligence services count in their
subversive activity against the USSR." As proof of the existence
of these enemies of the people who exploited the laxity and
apathy of the Soviet citizenry, Izvestiia listed a number of cases
of Soviet Jews who had despoiled the property of the socialist
commonwealth and society. The paper concluded with a call to
exercise greater care in appointing officials and to improve the

political and ideological training of the leading cadres with the
ultimate aim of ''ameliorating the work of the Soviet apparatus
and strengthening further the power of the Soviet socialist
state." 8 0
On the same day, another central paper, Trud, published an
article entitled "Cosmopolitanism in the Service of the War-
mongers." "It is not by chance," Trud wrote, "that it is pre-
cisely cosmopolitans and inveterate bourgeois-nationalists who
are entrusted with the warmongers' dirtiest and foullest tasks,
to the point of murder, espionage, subversion, sabotage, and the
elimination of the flower of the Russian nation." The latest evi-
dence of this was the case of the doctors, who were connected
with "the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization, 'Joint'."
The "Zionist agents of American imperialism" also exploded a
bomb on the premises of the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv. "We
have to wage a relentless struggle against cosmopolitans, a
struggle that is not only ideological, but also organizational and
practical, with the purpose of eradicating from Soviet reality
every manifestation of cosmopolitanism and bourgeois-
nationalism." 8 1
A long article in the Cominform organ by the Jewish
academician Mark Mitin summed up the themes voiced by the
Soviet media. The role of "the different Zionist organizations"
representing "an altogether widespread international espionage
network in the service of the U.S. imperialists carrying out their
criminal assignments," Mitin wrote, was not "fortuitous. . . . It
stems from the entire history and activity of the Zionist organ-
izations." One of the "central" goals of political Zionism "right
from its inception was to divert the Jewish working masses in
all countries from participating in the general revolutionary
struggle of the proletariat. In furtherance of this aim Zionism
advanced its ultra-reactionary idea of the so-called 'Jewish
community'. . . . It differed radically from the Marxist under-
standing of the nation."
These views had been "sharply criticised" by both Lenin and
Stalin, the "scientific theses" of the latter making "the
reactionary-nationalist essence of Zionism . . . particularly
clear." In addition, Zionism had never even "combated
anti-semitism and those who fomented it in the interests of
reaction." Mitin traced the connections of Zionist leaders with
rabid anti-Semites beginning with Herzl's ties with the Tsarist
Minister of the Interior, Viacheslav von Plehve, the initiator of
the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, and culminating in the services they

had rendered Hitler.
Mitin also reiterated the theme of Zionism's traditional
subservience to the interests of various imperialist powers and
Israel's passing "into the sphere of influence of the U.S. . . .
This, without doubt, accounts for the fact that such a small
country as Israel . . . already has five big inter-continental
airfields . . . useless from the point of view of normal air
communications but . . . very important strategically in the
aggressive designs of U.S.-British imperialism.
"Simultaneously, the Israel rulers are taking a most active
part in the 'cold war' which the U.S. imperialists are waging
against the countries of the socialist camp, and are doing all in
their power to aggravate international tension." After receiving
U.S. loans, the Israeli " 'leaders' began a frantic campaign of
lies and slander against the Soviet Union and the People's
Democracies, against the world peace movement, against the
national liberation movement in the Arab countries." They
motivated "the lowest chauvinistic instincts . . . to divert the
attention of the working people in the country from the catas-
trophic state of the economy. . . .
"The evil crimes of the group of doctor-killers, like the
activities of the Zionists—participants in the anti-state
conspiracy centre in Czechoslovakia and in the act of terror
against the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv—are all links in the
same chain. All are manifestations of the criminal activity of
the U.S.-British imperialists and their hangers-on aimed at
preparing a new world slaughter." 8 2
On 5 March Trud described in detail the formation of the
world-wide network of "religious, 'cultural-educational,'
'philanthropic' and other organizations" under whose auspices
Zionism sought to prepare its subversive and espionage
activities against the USSR and the People's Democracies.
Given the subordination of Zionism and Israel to imperialism as
a whole and the United States in particular, "the false game of
neutrality" played by Israel, which claimed at first to be neutral
in the inter-bloc conflict, "neither had nor could have any
success." Despite this and other mishaps, such as the
"unmasking" of Zionist "subversive activity," Zionism was still
"far from routed" and was continuing as before to prepare
"criminal actions" against the camp of peace. 8 3
On the day the above article appeared, however, Stalin died
and during the leadership changes which followed his death.
the anti-Jewish campaign and its accompanying developments

came to a halt. (These were reported to include a plan to exile
the Jewish population of Moscow and the other major cities to
Siberia or Birobidzhan 84 ). The last chapter of this study will
describe the repudiation of the Doctors' "Plot" and the renewal
of diplomatic relations with Israel.
• • •
The significance and implications of the events surveyed in

this chapter can perhaps best be highlighted by posing two
questions: 1. How far were the Slánsky Trial, the Doctors' Case
and the severance of diplomatic relations designed to serve as
gestures to the Arab world? 8 5 2. What was the contribution of
Israeli initiatives or activities to these developments? Was Israel
in any way able to prevent the total deterioration in relations
between the two states in the years 1949-53?
The answer to the first question would appear to be negative.
There is no evidence to suggest that in these initiatives the
Soviet leadership was motivated by the desire to win over the
Arabs. It is, of course, likely that the question was asked within
the Soviet leadership at some stage how the anti-Jewish,
anti-Zionist and anti-Israel campaign might affect the USSR's
Middle Eastern interests. Indeed, in the latter half of February
the Soviet press was clearly insinuating that Moscow was
expecting a certain political payoff on the regional level by
stressing the contradiction of interests between Israeli policy
and those of the Middle Eastern national liberation movements
which, like the Soviet Union, were also an object of Israeli
calumnies. 8 6 True, the USSR had begun to reassess its Arab
policy with the increased anti-imperialist activity in the Arab
world in 1949-50, the Arab opposition to Western-oriented
regional defense plans and the Arab states' stand on Korea. Yet
this reappraisal did not lead to any actual rapprochement; nor
were its conclusions sufficiently unequivocal to warrant policy
reversals regarding Israel to please the Arabs. In the months
January-March 1953 the B.B.C. recorded only two references to
the USSR's anti-Jewish and anti-Israel stand in Radio Moscow's
Arabic service. 87
The second issue, the role played by Israel, is more complex.
There can be no doubt that Israel's pro-American position on
Korea, Germany, and a number of other issues in the
international arena displeased the Kremlin. Yet, as has been
shown, the Soviet leadership had anticipated the Jewish State's

pro-American orientation even before deciding to support its
struggle for independence; Moscow nurtured no illusions on
this score, knowing the mutual ties between the Yishuv and
U.S. Jewry and the former's need for U.S. economic aid (to
which the USSR could offer no alternative). These
circumstances in the context of the increasing cold war made
Israel's attempts at non-alignment unrealistic. On the one hand,
the Soviet Union rejected the very possibility of neutrality in
the early 1950s; on the other, the United States was unwilling
to reconcile itself after the outbreak of the Korean War to a
stand of non-commitment on the part of other states.
Moreover, the anti-Israel position adopted by the USSR at this
period was a logical outcome, given the internal dynamism of
totalitarian politics as a whole and Soviet politics in particular,
of the motifs in Soviet domestic politics and developments
within the Communist bloc. In the first place, this position has
been shown to have been a direct consequence of the mutual
attachment between Soviet Jewry and the State of Israel. The
only possible step Israel could perhaps have taken to prevent
the deterioration in relations with the USSR in the years
1949-53 was to reject all links with Soviet Jewry. Yet even so
far-reaching a measure would probably have had no substantive
influence, since the initiative in demonstrating and establishing
this link was taken by Soviet Jews and not by the State of Israel.
In Stalin's last years the very manifestation of interest in Israel
by Soviet Jewish citizens was sufficient to induce an anti-Israel
campaign such as was conducted in late 1952-early 1953, even
without any reaction on the Israeli side.
Second, the USSR's anti-Israel position emanated from its
leadership's anti-Jewish policy which was in turn a function of
a complex interaction of domestic trends and factors which had
no substantive or a priori relevance to Jews —let alone Israel.
Since the anti-Jewish position was divorced even from Soviet
considerations regarding its Jewish minority—apart from the
anti-Semitism prevalent among the political elite and the public
alike—but was primarily intended to serve the broader goals of
the Soviet leadership at this time, Israel was clearly no more
than a passive actor in a rather dismal drama. These goals
included a major purge which was neither conceived nor
designed solely or even mainly to victimize Jews; its purpose
was rather to eliminate from the state apparatus, particularly
the economy and state security, members of elite groupings
currently out of favor, and to rid the intelligentsia of deviations

from the various theories that had been sanctioned by the
regime and which conformed with Stalin's position on
economics, the natural sciences, linguistics, literature, and so
on. 88 These were also the goals of the campaign against
"nationalism" especially that of the various national minorities
in both the USSR itself and the People's Democracies, a
campaign that had been conducted with vigor since the open
rift with Tito, throughout Eastern Europe and in the
non-Russian union republics of the USSR.
In order to demonstrate these contentions it is perhaps worth
recalling briefly some of the central themes of Soviet
propaganda at the very end of Stalin's life: Zionism and Israel
were being attacked for advocating immigration to Israel,
whereas Lenin and Stalin had shown that the Jews were not a
nation; for claiming to be responsible for, and even to control
the fate of, Jews the world over, irrespective of their state
affiliations; and for being ideologically oriented toward the
capitalist world. The short-term consequence of these
arguments was indeed the neutralization of all the
representatives of Zionism and perhaps even of the Jewish
nation as such in the Soviet and East European Establishment,
or at least in the higher echelons of officialdom and in senior
influential posts in the academic and intellectual world.
Nonetheless, the concluding paragraphs and sentences of the
many articles dedicated to the Jewish-Zionist-Israeli question
indicated their main intention. They called for increased
vigilance not against Jews and their activities but rather against
the bureaucratic failings that had enabled the Jews to infiltrate
every sphere of Soviet life and carry out their intrigues against
security and the economy in order to impede the building of
socialism.
Notes
1. One interesting exception was an occasional reference in Soviet

media to "Talmudism." The "hero" of the biological controversy of
1948, Trofim Lysenko, said for example in 1950 that Stalin taught
Soviet scientists to struggle against the Pharisees and Talmudists in
science-R. Moscow, 4 August 1950/SWB I, August 1950.
2. E.g., R. Moscow, 9 June, 2 October and 23 November 1949 and 14
June 1950, and R. Petropavlovsk, 10 August 1950/SWB I, 17 June, 7
October and 28 November 1949, 19 June and 18 August 1950.
3. Cf. e.g., Christian Science Monitor, 19 January 1950.

4. Pravda Ukrainy, 11 May 1949.
5. Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo 7 (1949): 6-12; and Vestnik
Akademii Nauk SSSR 8 (1949): 86.
6. Medvedev, pp. 124 and 129-31.
7. Late in 1949 new attacks were made on Pasternak and critics
Subotskii and Iuzovskii—Pravda, 19 September 1949; Zvezda 10
(1949); and private sources.
8. This survey of the Soviet Jewish employment situation at the

beginning of the 1950s has been based on a multiplicity of private
sources; for the situation in the universities, cf. also Alliluyeva, Only
One Year, p. 148.
9. This suggestion was put forward by Professor Mikhail Zand who

was himself at that time sent to Kazakhstan after graduating from the
Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow.
10. It is true that many Jews were employed in government
commercial organizations in some of which they probably comprised a
majority, only very few doing manual or artisan labor. Like most of
their fellow-workers in these organizations they took advantage of
opportunities provided by their employment to indulge in a certain
amount of small-scale speculation which had its financial reward and
duly aroused the jealousy of their neighbors. This section is based on
Foreign News Service, inc., No. 508, 16 September 1952, quoted in
Communist Anti-Semitism as "a document issued on October 17, 1952,
by the Voice of America and based on authentic information received
by the State Department."
11. The first mention listed the Jewish religious communities as

replying to the summons of Patriarch Aleksei to all churches and
religious organizations to discuss joint measures in the defense of
peace. It was followed by the participation of three rabbis at a
conference at Zagorsk in May 1952, the press reporting both the fact of
Rabbi Shleifer's address to the conference and the inclusion in the
conference's appeal to churches, religious functionaries and believers
the world over of a sentence addressed specifically to Jewish believers
everywhere urging them to participate actively in the struggle for
peace "since you need peace no less than all the other
peoples"— Izvestiia, 13 May 1952.
12. In December 1949 Ehrenburg specified the Jews among the
victims of American racial discrimination—R. Moscow in Italian, 8
December 1949/SWB Í, 12 December 1949. In the same month a British
fascist was quoted as saying that Hitler had shut down the gas
chambers too soon and that Britain should send all the Jews to
Palestine and then give the Arabs atom bombs—Novoe vremia, 16
December 1949.
Over a year later Ehrenburg referred at a Peace Council meeting in
Berlin to the extermination by the Nazis of millions of Jews — Ilya
Ehrenburg, Za mir (For Peace) (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel', 1952), pp.
339-40. For allusions to Talmudism see n. 1 above.
13. Thus in September 1950 the press announced the holding of
Yiddish performances in Tbilisi (Tiflis) and in January 1951 in
Tashkent—Zaria Vostoka, 24 September 1950; and Pravda Vostoka, 14,
16, 17, 18 and 25 January 1951.
14. Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2nd edition, vol. 15, pp.
377-79.
15. For Ben Gurion's speech, see Aryeh Ofír (éd.), Afikim (Kibbutz
Afikim, 1951), pp. 411-12.
16. Namir, p. 301.
17. One of the issues that attracted the attention of students and
Komsomol circles in this period, especially in localities with
considerable Jewish populations, was that of the psychic connection
among members of a given nation (a relationship Ehrenburg in his
September 1948 Pravda article had specifically denied Jews as having).
Discussions on this topic carefully steered clear of the question of the
national identity of Soviet Jews and the possibility of any psychic
connection among them, their main purport —from the point of view at
least of the Komsomol officiais —being to reject the very possibility of a
connection between Soviet Jews with their socialist culture and Jews
outside the USSR who were influenced by their bourgeois and
capitalist surroundings.
18. For this survey, see chiefly Namir, passim.
19. The attitude of the Soviet media to Ilanit and Lubitz was noted
by R. Israel, 13 November 1949/SWB IV, 22 November 1949; Ilanit's
speech appeared in Al Ha-Mishmar, 20 November 1949; and a single
sentence also in a special supplement to the English-language edition
of Sovetskaia zhenshchina 6 (1949). As for the economic conference,
Israel was listed among the 49 countries that sent delegates—Novoe
vremia 16 (1952). The volleyball team visit was covered in the Jewish
Chronicle, 8 August and 19 September 1952; TASS in English, 4
September 1952/SWB I, 8 September 1952; and Davar, 18 September
1952. For information on the visits of cargo ships see Ha-Aretz, 24
January and 5 March 1952.
20. Foreign News Service Inc., No. 508, 16 September 1952 (see n.
10).
21. Namir, pp. 331-32.
22. Ibid. pp. 307-10.

23. The Israeli broadcasting authority met all kinds of other
difficulties in its endeavor to make its broadcasts to the Soviet bloc
suit the needs of Jews there. Timing was problematic in itself: hours of
the day had to be chosen which were both convenient for the Jews and
free from obstruction. Constant attempts on the Israeli side to adjust
their hours to their audience led to frequent changes in schedule that
confused listeners —many of whom ordered their entire day to be free
at the correct time. Another difficulty was language: programs
broadcast in Hebrew had to be simplified as very few Jews in Eastern
Europe were able to keep u p with the constant innovations in the
language. Hebrew words had to be winnowed from the Yiddish
programs too, as did terminology peculiar to Israeli life. (Yiddish had,
on the whole, a much wider potential audience than did Hebrew, and
requests were received to increase the Yiddish broadcasts at the
expense of the Hebrew.) The most basic terminology of Israeli life had
to be explained at length as most Israeli programs presupposed far
more knowledge than Soviet Jewish audiences had. Information on the
structure of the Israeli state and developments within Israel also had to
be given, including statistical data to give an indication of the new
state's progress in a variety of fields (in the style of Soviet
propaganda). The Israelis had to take into account the specific position
of Soviet Jews, in particular their longing to break down the barriers
isolating them from the outside world, an issue that demanded great
care in view of the Soviet authorities' sensitivity to any allusion to
their Jewish minority. Soviet Jewish prejudices, as a result of their
education and indoctrination, also had to be considered (e.g., in
refraining from mentioning domestic controversies, which seemed to
those who had grown up in a one-party system to be a threat to Israel's
very existence). Finally, topics of inter-bloc confrontation and hostile
references to the USSR or even implications of anti-Soviet views and
positions were also carefully avoided —Namir, passim; Salisbury, pp.
16, 124, 153 and 272; and private sources.
24. E.g., Novoe vremia, 20 September 1950; and Pravda Vostoka, 1
and 4 October 1950.
25. L. Vatolina, "Israel —Base of American Imperialism in the
Middle East," Voprosy ekonomiki 4 (1951): 103. The rising cost of
living was emphasized particularly in early 1952 when the Soviet
Union announced its own price reductions. While it brought down
food prices by 10 to 30 percent, it pointed out the impoverishment of
the workers in the capitalist countries, including Israel. The Soviet
press even gave details: Trud, 20 March 1951, wrote of rises in Israeli
prices of: b r e a d - 2 0 % ; m i l k - 3 0 - 4 0 % ; m e a t - 4 6 % ; and shoes-40-50%.
Cf. also Vecherniaia Moskva, 4 November 1952; Trud, 5 November

1952; and izvestiia, 20 November 1952.
26. Moskovskaia pravda, 21 July 1951.
27. E.g., TASS, 18 April 1950, and TASS in Russian for abroad
(quoting Krasnyi flot), 28 December 1950/SWB Í, 25 April 1950 and 1
January 1951; Zaria Vostoka, 14 June 1952; and Bakinskii rahochii, 22
August 1952.
28. New Times, 21 August and 5 September 1951.
29. Karel Kaplan, "Thoughts about the Political Trials," Radio Free
Europe, Czechoslovak Press Survey 2149 (11 December 1968): 7-8.
Kaplan's discussion of the Commission's findings was published in the
Czechoslovak monthly journal, Novy Misl 6, 7 and 8 (1968) and
translated by RFE, Czechoslovak Press Survey 2147-49 (9-11 December
1968). Kaplan —a historian by profession —was later dismissed from the
party comptrol commission and expelled from the party for misuse of
its archives.
The full report of the commission, whose investigation was not
completed as a result of the Warsaw Bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia
on 21 August 1968, was published in 1970 outside Czechoslovakia and
appeared in English a year later: Jirí Pelikán (éd.), The Czechoslovak
Political Trials, 1950-1954. The Suppressed Beport of the Duhcek
Government's Commission of inquiry, 1968 (London: Macdonald,
1971).
For further material on the Slánsky Trial, its background and
implications, see: Eugene Loebl, Sentenced and Tried (London: Elek
Books, 1969); Artur London, U aveu (Paris: Gallimard, 1969); Josefa
Slánská, Beport on My Husband (London: Hutchinson, 1969); Maria
Slingová, Truth Will Prevail (London: Merlin Press, 1968); Meyer et
al., pp. 153-91.
30. "Struggle Against Bourgeois Nationalism Most important Task
of Communist and Workers' Parties", FALP, 1 December 1948.
31. Meyer et al., pp. 130-33.
32. Ibid., p. 458.
33. Pelikán, p. 75.
34. Kaplan, RFE 2147: 33-34.
35. Pelikán, pp. 80-85; for the special status of the Soviet advisers,
cf. also ibid., p. 136; for their active participation in the interrogations
and influence on the methods used in the interrogations, cf. ibid., p.
101 and see below.
36. Ibid., p. 80.
37. Kaplan, BFE 2148; passim. Some 600 people arrested in late
1949 were brought to trial in 1950 in two big, highly publicized politi-
cal trials. The accused were said to have participated in an interna-
tional conspiracy (one group comprised former—i.e. pre-1948—

activists in various political parties other than the Communist, and
was said to have had contacts with Yugoslav and West European dip-
lomats; the other group consisted above all of church dignitaries and
was charged with a Vatican-inspired plot). The accused were branded
as traitors before even appearing in court, which meant that the verdict
had been decided before the trial had begun. Finally, the stage was
pedantically set, every detail rehearsed beforehand, and the accused
simply recited by heart statements drilled into them in the preparatory
stages of the trial —ibid., pp. 11-12; and Pelikán, pp. 86-87.
38. Loebl, Sentenced and Tried, pp. 32-33; and Slingová, p. 60.
39. Pelikán, pp. 87-89.
40. FALP, 2 March 1951. Marie Svermová, head of the Party Sec-
retariat Organization Department and deputy secretary-general, was
said to be Sling's candidate for the post of secretary-general instead of
Slánsky.
41. Kaplan, RFE 2148; 29-30.
42. Ibid., RFE 2147: 17; for the Kolman case, see also Pelikán, pp.
64-66.
43. For mounting anti-Zionism in the People's Democracies and the
concomitant restriction or prohibition of Jewish emigration in late
1948-early 1949 and for Soviet-Israeli discussion of the subject, see
chap. 4, pp. 146-48 and n. 14.
44. London, pp. 217-18.
45. For Slánsky's arrest and its background, see Pelikán, pp. 102-8;
and Kaplan, RFE 2148: 30-37.
46. Cf. Meyer et al., pp. 160-64.
47. Pelikán, p. 108.
48. Ibid., p. 110.
49. FALP, 21 November 1952.
50. FALP, 28 November 1952.
51. Pravda, 4 December 1952.
52. Pelikán, pp. 118-19.
53. FALP, 19 December 1952.
54. Cf. Meyer et al., pp. 168-73. For the reparations law, see ibid.,
chap. 5.
55. Urválek's speech has been preserved in full in a Hebrew pro-
tocol of the trial, Mishpat Prag (The Prague Trial) (Mapai, 1953), part
3, pp. 340-42.
56. Pravda, 22 November 1952.
57. New Times, 3 December 1952.
58. Bloknot agitatora 35 (December 1952).
59. Salisbury, p. 310.
60. Pravda Ukrainy, 1 January 1953.
61. For the extensive purge being conducted at the time in the
economic ministries and other institutions, cf. Conquest, Power and
Policy, pp. 176-77. Economists and, together with them, philosophers
and historians were accused in particular of adhering to the views of
Nikolai Voznesenskii —for whose downfall in 1949 see ibid., pp. 98-
111—as against Stalin's last treatise "The Economic Problems of
Socialism in the USSR," in Bol'shevik 18 (1952): 1-50, which was the
latest criterion for economic theory—Salisbury, pp. 308-9, 315-16 and
320.
62. Ibid., pp. 305-6.
63. Pravda, 13 January 1953. It is worth noting a few facts in con-
nection with the "plot":
(i) the doctors were not all arrested at once but, as in the case of the
Slánsky Center, over a long period of time. Thus reports of the arrest of
one of them, Iakov Ettinger, reached the West in 1951—the dismissal
and early pensioning off of Jewish doctors in that year have already
been mentioned —while another member of the group, M. B. Kogan,
died in prison as early as November of the same year. Yet Meir Vofsi
and Stalin's own doctor V. Vinogradov appeared as late as 29 October
1952 at a medical congress in Moscow —Conquest, Power and Policy,
pp. 164-65;
(ii) the doctors concerned were the country's leading medical experts
and had indeed been treating the Soviet political elite for years. The
three non-Jewish members of the group, for example, were actually
among the signatories of Zhdanov's death certificate—R. Moscow, 1
September 1948/SWB Í, 3 September 1948. As late as October 1952,
Khrushchev, who had already seen the indictment against the doctors,
was treated in the Kremlin by Vinogradov—Khrushchev Remembers,
pp. 285-86.
64. Boris Shimeliovich, director of the Botkin Hospital in Moscow,
had been a member of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and was
arrested late in 1948 during the campaign against Jewish bourgeois
nationalists; for the assassination of Mikhoels, who was a cousin of
Meir Vofsi—his own real name having also been Vofsi —see pp. 312-
16.
66. Meditsinskii rabotnik, 13 January 1953.
68. For the control of the Soviet security services in the post-war
period, cf. Khrushchev's Secret Speech in L. Gruliow (éd.), Current
Soviet Policies II (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 182; also Conquest,
Power and Policy, pp. 163-91.
69. Cf. Salisbury, pp. 317 and 320; Conquest, Power and Policy,
chap. 7; and L. Gruliow (éd.), Current Soviet Policies [I] (New York:
Praeger, 1953), pp. 244-246.
One of the charges officially brought against Beriia after his downfall
in June 1953 was that he had sought "to arouse the vestiges of
national-bourgeois elements in the Union republics, to arouse hatred
and dissonance among the peoples of the USSR, and in particular to
undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR with the great
Russian people."—Pravda, 17 December 1953.
70. Cf. e.g., Pravda Ukrainy, 16 January 1953: "The kahns,
yarozhetskiis and grinsteins (perfume depots in Odessa) . . . the kap-
lans and poliakovs (Kharkov stores) arouse deep hatred among the
people."
71. Ehrenburg, who was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize late in
January 1953, was asked by the party propaganda institutions to refer
directly to the doctors' case in his speech at the ceremony. (The very
award was presumably intended to demonstrate that the regime was
not anti-Semitic; cf. also Ehrenburg's inclusion in the Soviet delegation
to the first Peace Congress at the height of the 1949 anti-cosmopolitan
campaign, see p. 323.) Ehrenburg, however, refused; all he was pre-
pared to say was that "No matter what his national origin, a Soviet
citizen is first and foremost a patriot of his country, and he is a true
internationalist, an opponent of racial and national discrimination" —
Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, p. 289. Another Jew, Mark Mitin, however,
wrote one of the most vehement articles against the Joint, "the Zionist
doctors" and the State of Israel; see below.
72. E.g., Pravda, 14 February 1953; Krasnaia zvezda, 20 February
1 9 5 3 - q u o t e d by Salisbury, p. 327; and FALP, 20 February 1953. Cf.
also Gottwald's apologia following the Slánsky Trial, p. 368 above.
73. Pravda, 6 February 1953. Jewish doctors were the worst suffer-
ers: patients caused uproars in their clinics, abused them and refused
to take the medicines they prescribed—Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, p.
298. Meditsinskii rabotnik published recurrent stories of scandals
involving Jewish doctors—Salisbury, pp. 319-20. But they were not
alone, as the press attacked Jewish intellectuals and scientists and re-
presentatives of a wide range of economic and commercial organiza-
tions accusing them of fraud, embezzlement, duplicity and a series of
security offenses as well—e.g., Pravda, 13 January 1953; Izvestiia, 23
January 1953; Kommunist 4 (1953); and Salisbury, pp. 319-21.
75. On 9 February an unaffiliated activist group, led chiefly by
former Lehi members, exploded a bomb in the precincts of the Soviet
Legation in Tel Aviv in protest against the Doctors' Case. Protest action
was also taken against the Czechoslovak Legation in the wake of the
Slánsky Trial. For the arrest and trial of several members of the group,
cf. chap. 11, n. 14.
76. Izvestiia, 12 February 1953. In the course of the 19 January
debate on "The Jews in the USSR," Sharett had said: "The State of
Israel cannot be silent when confronted with an attempt by any politi-
cal factor to abuse the Jewish people and with an imminent danger to
the Jewish masses anywhere.
"The government of Israel," the Israeli foreign minister maintained,
"has always seen in friendly relations with the USSR one of the main-
stays of its international status and a valuable asset to the entire Jewish
people. It views with profound sorrow and grave concern the malig-
nant policy of active hostility toward Jews officially adopted in the
USSR
"The Israeli government will denounce in the United Nations and
from every other platform the incitement against the Jewish people
which is being conducted in the countries with a Communist regime
and the slurs being cast on its competent organizations and will cau-
tion against the danger threatening the welfare of the millions of Jews
in these countries.
"The Israeli government will continue to assert, and with even great-
er vigor, the right of all Jews who yearn for Zion to emigrate and come
to the State of Israel"— Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 13, pp. 481-94.
The Mapai daily wrote in an editorial comment on this speech: "The
barriers separating us from Soviet Jewry will not prevent them from
knowing and recognizing that the State of Israel is truly concerned
about them, is waiting for them, wants them and demands their
emigration"— Davar, 20 January 1953.
77. Pravda, 14 February 1953.
78. Trud, 15 February 1953.
79. Literaturnaia gazeta, 17 February 1953. For Middle East defense
plans, see pp. 408-9; for Israel's position on the issue, see p. 419.
Several months before, Sneh had set up a left-wing grouping,
Hativat Ha-Smol, within the party. At the end of January 1953, in the
wake of the Doctors' "Plot," the entire grouping was expelled from the
party. In May its members founded a new party, the Socialist Left of
Israel, which in October 1954 decided to disband and join Maki on an
individual basis.
The importance attached by Moscow to Moshe Sneh, as evidenced
by the Literaturnaia gazeta reference, was presumably a function of the
positions he held while a member of Mapam, i.e. editor of the party
paper Al Ha-Mishmar and secretary of the Israeli-Soviet Friendship
Association, with the obvious implications of the latter post regarding
Sneh's views on Israeli-Soviet relations. Cf. p. 426 and chap. 10, n. 6.

Sneh's left-wing views and his pro-Soviet orientation very probably
dated back to his visits to Eastern Europe as a member of the Zionist
Executive in 1947, which included his efforts in connection with
Czechoslovak military aid to Israel (see p. 151).
80. Izvestiia, 18 February 1953.
81. Trud, 18 February 1953.
82. FALP, 20 February 1953 (Mitin's article was reprinted in full in
Komsomol'skaia pravda, 24 February 1953).
83. Trud, 5 March 1953.
84. Cf., e.g., Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago
(Collins/Harvill Press and Fontana, 1974), p. 92, n.
85. On 14 December 1953, Milovan Djilas wrote in Borba that the
Prague Trial seemed on the surface to be intended to curry favor with
the Arabs, yet was in fact motivated by anti-Semitism (from an English
translation at the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London.) By February
1953 Western newspapers were in fact suggesting the possibility that
the Soviet anti-Israel campaign had the Arabs in mind.
86. In addition to Mitin's article, Vatolina returned to this theme in
Izvestiia, 24 February 1953.
87. The one was a short résumé of the New Times article of 21 Janu-
ary, the other a translation of Zhukov's Pravda article of 14
February—B. Moscow in Arabic, 24 January and 14 February 1953/SWB
I, 30 January and 20 February 1953. The next chapter will discuss
Soviet-Arab policy in the 1949-1953 period and the following one
(chap. 10) the Soviet position vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict.
88. It has not yet been proved who exactly was responsible for the
Doctors' Case. Beriia, Molotov and Mikoian are clearly above suspi-
cion. Beriia, who was to have been the chief victim, was not accused
of any connection with the case even by Khrushchev, who held him
responsible for a great number of crimes, of some of which he was
known to have been innocent. Molotov and Mikoian had been attacked
by Stalin at the time of the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 and,
as Khrushchev said in his Secret Speech in February 1956, if Stalin
had not died in March 1953 there was room to believe that Molotov
and Mikoian would not have survived until the 20th Party Congress.
Khrushchev's own connections with the Doctors' "Plot" are not clear.
On the one hand, Khrushchev was personally responsible for later
reappointing Ignat'ev to a party post; he claimed that Ignat'ev had
been compelled by Stalin to take steps against the doctors. On the
other hand, the procedure adopted in the Doctors' Case d i d not corres-
pond to Khrushchev's methods of action. Khrushchev understood full
well that a large-scale purge of the type elaborated in Stalin's last
months was liable to hit at all and sundry including those not origi-
nally intended to be its victims. (In 1956, Khrushchev said that the
entire veteran leadership was in a state of fear at the end of Stalin's
life, since no one knew whom the purge might affect.)
Even Stalin's role in the Doctors' Case is uncertain. Alliluyeva has
cast doubts on the accusations leveled against her father in this con-
nection. She writes that Stalin wanted to resign after the 19th Con-
gress, and it seems that his personal control of events was uneven at
this time. The dismissal of Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, head of Stalin's
personal secretariat —the Special Section of the Central Committee —
just before Stalin's death, must surely be seen as proof of the weakness
of the dictator's hold and his general instability toward the end of his
life.
It is probable that the men behind the purge were at least some of
the officials Stalin had been raising to positions of eminence in his last
years: Mikhail Riumin, Head of the Section of Investigating Specially
Important Cases at the Ministry of State Security; Averkii Aristov,
member of both the Presidium and the Central Committee Secretariat
where he headed the Department of Party Organs; D. I. Chesnokov,
Presidium member and one of the two chief editors of Kommunist; and
Iurii Zhdanov, head of the Central Committee's Science and Culture
Department. All four—like Ignat'ev —were dismissed from their posts
in April-May 1953 when Beriia was at the height of his power. Finally,
it is reasonable to presume that certain members of the military leader-
ship (five of whom were mentioned by TASS on 13 January as poten-
tial victims of the doctors) were connected with the case, as well as
Mikhail Suslov, member of the Secretariat, and Frol Kozlov, second
secretary of the Leningrad Gorkom, who wrote a major programmatic
article in Kommunist 1 (January 1953).
PART FOUR:
THE METAMORPHOSIS IN
SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS
9
The Soviet Global and

Regional Perspective,
May 1949-March 1953
SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF THE 'COLONIAL WORLD"
The hypothesis that the developments surveyed in the last

chapter were intended to serve the interests of a Soviet-Arab
rapprochement has been rejected. The reasons for doing so were
that there are virtually no indications, let alone actual proof,
that the Slánsky Trial, the Doctors' "Plot" and the severance of
diplomatic relations were in any way related to Soviet Arab
policy; and that there is much convincing evidence of other,
domestic motives, more than sufficient to explain these
developments.
Nonetheless, neither the regional nor the global interests and
objectives of the USSR can be ignored in a study of Soviet-
Israeli relations. First, the implications for these relations of the
changes that occurred in the Soviet attitude toward the Arab
states in the period May 1949-March 1953 (alluded to at the
end of chapter 6) should not be evaded. Second, since Soviet-
Israeli relations were necessarily an integral part of the Soviet
Union's Middle Eastern policy, the latter must be seen in the
perspective of Moscow's global strategies and policies in this
period. The variety of factors in the international arena which
played a significant role in determining Soviet support of the
Jewish State in 1947-48 were also a major consideration in
shaping the relationship between the two countries in subse-
quent years. Soviet-Israeli relations continued in part at least to
399
be a function of inter-power relations, Moscow's aspirations to

enhance its position at the U.N., and its endeavors to circum-
vent the barriers that separated it from fringe groupings in the
capitalist camp and reach a working arrangement with them in
opposing the official policies of the Western powers.
In the earlier period, as we have seen, the Soviet Union had
favored the establishment of the Jewish State in order to eject
the British from Palestine. Once the preliminary goal had been
attained, Moscow continued to support Israel in order to help it
consolidate its independence and achieve viability, for the
Soviet leadership appreciated that only a strong Israel would be
able to preserve its sovereignty in a hostile environment. An
Israel that had come to stay would serve the further purpose of
fomenting unrest in the other countries of the Arab East, thus
promoting the ultimate goal of depriving the Western powers of
their influence there. In the years 1949-53 the USSR continued
to seek the expulsion of Britain in particular from its military
position in the Middle East and the weakening of its political
sway in the Arab states. In addition, two other aims—ancillary
in the previous period—now became major Soviet ambitions: to
restrict the U.S.A.'s efforts to strengthen its own military and
political status in the Arab world; and to neutralize the region
vis-à-vis Western military strategic planning.
The overall similarity of Soviet goals in the Arab East before
and after 1949 did not, however, preclude changes in the
methods used to achieve them. The Soviet decision to support
the Jewish State had been partly based on a negative evaluation
of the chances of an effective Arab struggle against Britain.
With the conclusion of the Palestine War early in 1949, the
Arabs became the USSR's obvious potential allies in the tussle
with the West. This réévaluation emanated from: a. the hope for
coordination in the international arena with "the colonial and
semi-colonial" world against the common imperialist enemy:
the USSR was encouraging national aspirations in Asia and
Africa (although repressing them at home and in Eastern
Europe); b. indications of a growing determination in the Arab
countries to shake off British sway; and c. the exhaustion of the
potential of the policy based on the Middle East's minorities
and the anti-imperialist struggle in Palestine.
True, in the early 1950s the USSR still doubted the Arab
states' ability to end their dependence on Britain. Its attitude to
them was nonetheless influenced by their increasing opposition
to the West: on the domestic level—the struggle to remove for-
Soviet Global and Regional Perspective 401
eign forces and bases; on the regional level—especially the

issue of setting up a Middle East defense organization; and in
the international arena—in the context of the Korean War.
The year 1949 saw the beginnings of a fundamental and far-
reaching change in Soviet foreign policy tactics. The militant
line of the previous period had proved an evident failure, hav-
ing simply strengthened the opposing camp and done nothing
to overcome the military inferiority, political isolation and
economic weakness of the Soviet bloc. 1
A major instrument of Soviet foreign policy's new offensive
was the World Peace Movement. On the operative plane the
movement was intended to lessen the danger of war in a period
of Soviet vulnerability; to neutralize Western nuclear supre-
macy by a mass mobilization of public opinion against the use
of the atomic bomb; to weaken Western, and particularly U.S.
air power by making overseas bases politically unstable; and to
break down the barrier isolating the Soviet bloc countries and
the international Communist movement. 2
In order to exploit this organization with maximum effective-
ness the Soviet leadership gave the USSR's principal foreign
goals a new formulation. In so doing, it hoped to extend their
appeal to public opinion the world over far beyond the Com-
munist parties and the already existing front organizations
(such as the W.F.T.U., the I.D.F.W. and the W.F.D.Y.) The peace
slogan was designed to enlist the support for Soviet policy
objectives of political and social groupings that Soviet foreign
policy had not yet brought into its orbit, primarily the middle
class and intellectuals in the Western world, and to an extent
also the national movements of the colonial world. 3
The entire constellation of international relations became
transformed with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950,
which, among others, significantly created a framework for a
rapprochement between the Soviet Union and "the colonial and
semi-colonial" countries. The Soviet Union's appreciation of
this new potential was reflected in the gradual transformation
of the Peace Movement in 1951 and 1952 into a natural link
between the Soviet Union and officially neutralist elements in
Europe and Asia. 4
The 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, convened
in October 1952, put an official stamp on the developments of
the previous few years. Stalin's treatise, "The Economic Prob-
lems of Socialism in the USSR," printed on the eve of the con-
gress, indicated that the "peace-loving, democratic camp"
headed by the Soviet Union had been strengthened not only by

the accession of the East European People's Democracies and
the People's Republic of China (October 1949), but also by the
"surge of the national liberation struggle" in colonial and
dependent territories. Malenkov, for his part, called in the Cen-
tral Committee Report to the Congress for a reduction of tension
by a temporary stabilization of the international situation on the
basis of "peaceful coexistence" and cooperation between capi-
talism and Communism. Both leaders stressed the role of the
Peace Movement not as an instrument of revolution but as "a
democratic movement of hundreds of millions of people . . .
advancing demands and proposals for the preservation of peace
and prevention of a new war." Finally, Malenkov promised
"complete understanding" on the part of the USSR for coun-
tries which pursued an independent peace policy and broke out
of the impasse they had been driven into by "the American dic-
tators." 5
These, then, were the general trends and goals of Soviet fore-
ign policy in the 1949-53 period and provided the background
to the USSR's Middle Eastern policy in general and its relation-
ships with the Arab states and Israel in particular.
THE ARAB EAST AND "REGIONAL DEFENSE"
The major cause of Soviet apprehension in the Middle East

was the question of that region's inclusion in the West's
strategic buildup. In the winter of 1945-46 the USSR had
already been worried by plans to unite the area in a Western-
oriented military framework (see p. 37). This concern grew as
the time approached for the signing of the NATO Pact in April
1949 and as the ties between Turkey and NATO tightened. In
early 1949 the Soviet media were devoting considerable atten-
tion to British troop maneuvers in the context of the concluding
stages of the Palestine War and the domestic crises that hit the
Arab countries, in part at least as a result of the Arab defeat in
that war. 6 They reverted recurrently to such themes as the con-
frontation between Arab reaction, linked politically and militar-
ily to Britain, and Arab forces of progress which were said to be
pinning their hopes on the Soviet Union, and between the
internal repression and terror that Western-oriented regimes
inflicted on the Arab populations and the allegedly growing
public opinion in those countries that favored ties with the
world of tomorrow. 7 The Arab governments and the Arab
League, it was explained, needed a Western military presence

to suppress popular or national movements in their countries
and were therefore prepared to negotiate a regional military
pact; the West, for its part, needed the Arab League to unite the
region against the USSR and to guard its oil.8 The Western
powers, Radio Moscow asserted, were attempting to form a
military bloc in the Middle East and were setting up new milit-
ary bases from which to attack the USSR and the People's
Democracies, although the region's peoples had no wish to be
cannon fodder or mercenaries in an imperialist war.9
Soviet commentary on plans for a regional military bloc
dwelt at length upon the animosities, conflicting interests,
mutual grievances and rivalries of its various prospective part-
ners. These included Anglo-American competition for domina-
tion of the Middle East10—the Soviet media demonstrated a
constant interest in the various manifestations of U.S. penetra-
tion of the Arab world11—traditional Turkish-Arab hostility,12
inter-Arab dissensions 13 and the Arab-Israeli dispute. 14
Arms supplies and military training were further instruments
of the Western powers for securing their military positions in
the Middle East. Well before the official annulment of the arms
embargo to the region in August 1949 (see following chapter)
TASS reported that the British government had instructed the
military to renew deliveries of military matériel to Egypt, Iraq
and Transjordan.15 Soviet sources also claimed that Britain was
training Arab pilots, while France, Belgium and Sweden were
said to have concluded agreements with Egypt for the training
of personnel in arms production and for supervising Egypt's
arms industry.16 The main military presence was, however,
achieved through the establishment, maintenance and extension
of military bases, strategic communications and naval power
which attracted considerable Soviet comment.17
The insistence on the Soviet-Arab identity of interests in the
struggle against the West and its local agents was a corollary of
the Soviet emphasis on the contradiction of interests between
the West and the Arabs concerning an anti-Soviet regional
alliance. In the latter half of 1949 this began to have operational
significance. By September the Soviet media were suggesting
Soviet aid, including arms supplies, to the Arab toiling masses
in their struggle against imperialism. The Arabs, they wrote,
must not delude themselves into thinking that Anglo-American
rivalries would lead the United States to aid the Arabs against
Britain; they must look to the Soviet Union.18
This suggestion that Soviet assistance was possible signified

an important step forward from Gromyko's expression of con-
viction in November 1947 that the Arabs would yet turn to
Moscow. It likewise went beyond the appeal of the early
months of 1949 that called upon the Arabs to beware of becom-
ing involved in the plans of the warmongers and to bear in
mind that the USSR was the friend of the small peoples. This
change presumably emanated from, on the one hand, Soviet
readiness to extend assistance—however limited—to the Arabs,
and on the other, some foreknowledge that certain groupings
among the Establishment in the Arab states were prepared to
receive such assistance although the general atmosphere was
one of total reservation regarding the Soviet Union and suspi-
cion of its motives.
Indeed, by early 1950 it became known that the Soviet Union
was tentatively exploring the possibility of a rapprochement
with Damascus and Cairo. 19 Arab statesmen and politicians
were beginning to demand the establishment of links with the
USSR^The leader of the Syrian Islamic Socialist Front, Mustafa
as-Siba'i, said in March 1950: "We are resolved to turn toward
the Eastern camp if the Democracies do not give us justice. . . .
To those who say that the Eastern camp is our enemy, we
would answer: when has the Western camp been our friend?. . .
We will bind ourselves to Russia were she the very devil." 2 0
Early in April the call was taken up _by a key minister in the
Syrian government, Ma'ruf ad-Dawalibi. As minister of national
economy, Dawalibi had negotiated with the Soviet minister to
his country, Daniil Solod, on Soviet suggestions for a trade
agreement and friendship pact and for supplying the Syrian
armed forces with all their requirements. Dawalibi called for a
non-aggression pact between "the Arab world" and the USSR
which would spare the Middle East in the event of a world war
and was preferable to being subjected to American pressures
that could "only lead to the judaization of what is left of the
Arab people. . . . The Arabs would prefer a thousand times over
to become a Soviet republic than a tidbit to be swallowed up by
the Jews." 21
Although Dawalibi's statement met with considerable reserva-
tion in the Arab world, given the traditional apprehensions
about links with the Communist camp, it nevertheless led to a
number of similar declarations. Egyptian Foreign Minister
Muhammad Salah ad-Din told the Egyptian Parliamentary
Committee for Foreign Affairs —during a discussion on "the
obstacles" the United States was putting "in the way of the
armament of the Egyptian army and Britain's lukewarm
attitude"—that he had "nearly decided" to m a k e a declaration
"that would be a modified version" of Dawalibi's. Since, he
noted, several commercial contracts had been concluded with
the Soviet Union, it was logical to deal with that country in the
purchase of arms. 2 2 Indeed, al-Ahram reported that the Egyp-
tian government was considering a Soviet suggestion to provide
arms in return for cotton. 23
Commenting on these developments, the Lebanese minister in
Washington and permanent delegate to the U.N., Charles Malik,
told members of the U.N. Correspondents' Association that he
anticipated a Soviet political offensive in the Middle East. The
USSR had much to gain in the area, in his opinion "far more
... than in, say, Indochina." This was a region that would not
tolerate a vacuum. Finally, "the increasing importance of ele-
ments who incline towards rapprochement with the USSR" was
not to be underestimated. 2 4
Soviet comment on Dawalibi's statement demonstrated the
far-reaching possibilities the USSR envisaged in Arab sugges-
tions for closer ties. Although his remarks reflected a very basic
and self-evident truth, one source said, they had had the effect
of a "bombshell." His statement had been supported by "the
overwhelming majority" of Syrian and Lebanese newspapers
and it was clear that Arab public opinion favored friendly rela-
tions and "cooperation with the Soviet Union." 2 5
This was the context of the Tripartite Declaration announced
by the U.S., British and French governments on 25 May 1950.
The three governments "recognize that the Arab states and
Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the
purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate
self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense
of the area as a whole." They therefore agreed —despite their
opposition to the development of an Arab-Israeli arms race—to
supply arms to the countries of the area on condition that they
received assurances "that the purchasing state does not intend
to undertake any act of aggression against any other state."
The Declaration was mainly designed to legitimize the Arab-
Israeli armistice lines and the annexation of the West Bank by
Transjordan (now Jordan). As Truman, however, made clear, it
was also intended to foil Soviet attempts to penetrate the area. 26
The USSR refrained from any official reaction to this attempt
by the Western powers to impose a Pax Occidentala on the
Middle East. The reason was presumably that the USSR was
unable to suggest, let alone enforce, any viable alternative
because it lacked any physical presence in the region. An offi-
cial protest about the USSR's exclusion from this Declaration
would merely have underlined Soviet weakness, thus probably
undermining the political advantage to be anticipated from
supporting the Middle Eastern states against Western domina-
tion.
The Soviet media nonetheless criticized the Declaration. They
asserted that its purpose was to subordinate the Middle East to
Western goals and turn it into an advance post in the projected
war against the USSR. 27 ' T h e peoples of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
Israel and other Middle Eastern states, to whom the imperialists
obligingly offer tanks, guns and planes," the paper of the Soviet
Ministry of Armed Forces wrote, were well aware that the
Western proposal meant "foreign supervision of the national
armed forces and an attempt to drag these countries into an
aggressive Mediterranean bloc. In proposing arms, the imperial-
ists intend to recruit for the Near East hundreds of thousands of
soldiers who would be ready to fight for the interests of the
Wall Street magnates." 2 8
Radio Moscow returned later in the year to the theme of the
Anglo-U.S. purpose of converting the Middle Eastern countries
into "bridgeheads for aggression against the Soviet Union and
attempting to conceal their anti-popular measures in these
countries behind the alleged menace of the USSR. But every-
body knows well that there are no Soviet troops in the Near
East, while British and American troops are stationed there; that
there are no Soviet bases there, but there are American and Brit-
ish bases; that there are no Soviet military and other advisers,
although British and American ones are. Soviet statesmen and
politicians call for true democracy, peaceful co-operation and
the freedom and independence of peoples throughout the world
and are fighting for the realisation of these ideas. At the same
time, American and British statesmen and politicians are
encouraging war psychosis, persecuting peace partisans, adver-
tising the atomic bomb as a means for the annihilation of peace-
ful populations and calling for another world war. Whence,
then, comes the menace to the security, freedom and indepen-
dence of the peoples of the Arab countries." 2 9
From May 1950 to October 1951 Soviet sources published
frequent reports on plans to create a Middle Eastern military
alliance on the NATO pattern and linked to NATO. 3 0 The main
themes were largely the same as in the previous period,

although the tenet of a Soviet-Arab coincidence of interests
seemed to be somewhat more convincing. This led to an
increasing emphasis on elements of conflict between the Arabs
and the other countries of the area—particularly Turkey. 3 1 The
Soviet media also made every effort to implicate the United
States in Britain's activities, as Arab xenophobia was largely
directed against Britain, 32 and to stress the dangers that
threatened the Middle Eastern countries from Anglo-American
regional strategies. 33
In mid-1951 the USSR welcomed Syria's rejection of U.S. aid
on the grounds that in accordance with Point Four (see note 1),
aid involved the acceptance by the recipient country of political
conditions. 3 4 The focus of the anti-imperialist struggle in the
Arab world was not, however, Syria but Egypt. (Not only were
the various military regimes which controlled the former coun-
try considered pro-Western, 35 but Syria no longer had foreign
troops on its territory.)
Egypt's chances for conducting an effective struggle to end
the British military presence appeared increasingly good. Since
the debate of 1947 (see pp. 78-79), the principal political forces
in the country had united to form a broad anti-British presence
which presented a real threat to the continued British presence
and coincided with the current Soviet dogma of broad fronts for
the conduct of national liberation struggles. A coincidence of
interests seemed to be in the offing that was not unlike the one
that had united the USSR with the Yishuv in 1947-48.
The Wafd's victory in the January 1950 elections on the basis
of a program that called for renewing the struggle against Bri-
tain was duly noted in the USSR. 36 So too was the appeal of the
president of the Egyptian National Assembly in June for the
urgent establishment of a national bloc to unite all parties
around the demand for the withdrawal of British troops from
the Canal Zone. 3 7 Soviet sources welcomed jis a new stage in
Egypt's national liberation struggle Mustafa Nahhas' speech
from the throne on the opening of the Egyptian Parliament in
November, in which the Egyptian prime minister threatened
Britain that if it did not withdraw its troops Egypt would abro-
gate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. 38 Radio Moscow drew
the attention of the Soviet public to an Egyptian newspaper
article which, commenting on the West's "war psychosis,"
insisted that the only war for which Egypt had to prepare itself
was the war against foreign occupation, against the Anglo-
American imperialists. 39
In December 1950 the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations were
renewed for the first time since the failure of the Bevin-Sidqi
talks in October 1946. _The conversations between Bevin and
Muhammad Salah ad-Din evoked considerable Soviet interest;
one commentator wrote that Britain was trying to bring Egypt
into NATO by substituting the Anglo-Egyptian treaty for a mul-
tilateral treaty that would encompass the entire Middle East. 40
On 11 April Britain handed Egypt its final proposals which
suggested a stage-by-stage withdrawal, to begin within a year
after the new agreement had been signed and to terminate in
1956 (the year the 1936 treaty was due to expire). The Egyptian
rejection of these proposals on 24 April was recorded by the
Soviet media. They pointed out, moreover, that one Egyptian
member of parliament had raised anew the suggestion for a
non-aggression pact with the USSR, while another had said that
the Soviet Union lacked ambitions in Egypt and that there was
no valid reason to think that it constituted a threat, as the Brit-
ish were insisting. 41
Egypt's struggle against the West entered a new phase in
October 1951. On 7 October the Egyptian government decided
upon a unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and
the unification of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. On
13 October, without any British government comment on this
step, the United States, Britain, France and Turkey suggested to
the Egyptian government that it join them in establishing a
Middle Eastern Command as a founding member and on an
equal status with the Western powers. Britain agreed to with-
draw from Egypt "such British forces as are not allocated" to
the Command, whose headquarters would be in Egypt. The
Egyptian government viewed the four-power project as a plan
to substitute other foreign troops for British ones and on 15
October rejected the invitation. On the same day the Egyptian
Parliament confirmed the abrogation of the 1936 treaty and
declared Faruq King of Egypt and Sudan.
Despite the Egyptian rejection, the four powers informed the
other Arab states and Israel of the Command project in the last
week of October, and on 10 November they laid down in a joint
statement that they were "proceeding with their announced
intention to establish the . . . Command." Each state joining it
would do so on a basis of complete equality with the proposing
powers and the preservation of its sovereignty. The four powers
noted that the defense of the Middle East was vital to the free
world and they promised arms and aid to states that responded
to their call. Finally, they declared that the Command would
not ''interfere in problems and disputes arising within the
area." 4 2 The other Arab states, however, were no more in-
terested in the Command than Egypt. The Syrian U.N. repre-
sentative told British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that for the
Syrian the source of aggression was not the USSR but Israel. 43
On 21 November, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko
handed Notes to the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,
Iraq and Israel, and on the following day also to the govern-
ments of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which had no diplomatic
representation in Moscow. The Soviet press published the text
of the Note to Egypt. The Note stressed that membership in the
Command involved putting troops, bases, ports and other
installations at its disposal and indicated the connection be-
tween the Command and NATO. The plan for setting up a Mid-
dle East Command had "nothing in common with the interests
of maintaining peace and security in the Near and Middle East,
nor with the genuine national interests of the states of this
area." On the contrary, its realization "would lead to the actual
military occupation of countries of the Near and Middle East"
and "the loss of the independence and sovereignty by these
countries and their subjugation to certain big Powers, which are
trying to use their territories [and] their material resources—oil,
cotton, etc.—for aggressive ends of theirs.
"All references to the interests of defence of countries of the
Near and Middle East," the Soviet Note insisted, were "merely
camouflage to disguise the drawing of Egypt" and the other
countries of the region "into military measures of the Atlantic
bloc directed against the Soviet Union and the people's democ-
racies." Yet the USSR presented no threat to the Middle Eastern
countries; rather it regarded "with sympathy and understand-
ing" the national ambitions and liberation struggles of the peo-
ples of the East.
The Soviet Note concluded by expressing appreciation for the
stand of the Egyptian government, while drawing its attention
"to the fact that the participation of countries of the Near and
Middle East in the so-called Middle Eastern Command would
cause serious damage to the relations existing between the
USSR and these countries, as well as to the cause of maintain-
ing peace and security in the area." 44
The last months of 1951 and the first months of 1952 witness-
ed intensified Egyptian terrorist activity against British troops
stationed in the country. Once more the Soviet press and radio
expressed their favorable view of developments in Egypt. A
broadcast on the eve of the new year dubbed 1951 "as a year of
brilliant successes for the camp of peace and democracy" in
which "a mighty anti-imperialist movement swept over the
countries of the Near and Middle East." As the Italian left-wing
socialist leader Pietro Nenni had told the third session of the
World Peace Council in November, "the Muslim world is astir
and the Arabs want to determine the destiny of their own coun-
tries themselves. In all the countries of the Near and Middle
East the vast masses are most ardently and enthusiastically
fighting against the beastly intrigues of the U.S. and British
imperialists." An Egyptian member of the World Peace Council,
Siza Nabrawi, was quoted as saying: "The measures of the Brit-
ish invaders . . . have provoked an ever-increasing resistance
movement of the Egyptian people." Egyptian workers had
refused to work for the British in the Canal Zone while
"'thousands of Egyptians have taken up arms and formed an
Army of Liberation!' . . . The Egyptian press carried such head-
lines as: 'Long live Russia, the Friend of all the Peoples of the
World.' " 4 5
TASS also recorded a statement by Nahhas that the British
presence in Egypt was an act of aggression against Egyptian
sovereignty and that Egypt as owner of the Suez Canal had the
right to act as its sole defender and would not surrender to vio-
lence and force. 46 A number of Soviet fishing vessels appeared
at Port Said to illustrate Soviet sympathy for the Egyptian
struggle against Britain, and were enthusiastically welcomed by
both the town's inhabitants and the Egyptian press. 4 7
The fall of the Wafd government at the end of January 1952
was described by Radio Moscow as a blow to the national inter-
ests of Egypt and the Arab countries. 4 8 It also evoked apprehen-
sions that Egypt and other Arab states after it might join a Mid-
dle Eastern military bloc. 49
Soviet concern at Egypt's intentions became even more
marked after the Free Officers' coup of 23 July 1952. The pro-
American leanings and the connections with the United States
of Egypt's new rulers were constantly noted in Soviet publica-
tions. In particular it was feared that Egypt would now join a
regional pact. 50 Note was also taken of the new regime's repres-
sive measures against the workers and Communist organiza-
tions. 5 1 As late as April 1953 the Soviet literary journal Novyi
mir published an article describing the Free Officers as adven-
turers with pro-American sympathies. The author maintained

that Egypt's new rulers were ineffective and that their regime
could not be more than an intermediate stage in the Egyptian
people's struggle for their freedom. However, he also stressed
Egypt's economic and strategic importance. 5 2
Despite hesitancy caused by temporary setbacks on the local
scene, the Soviet leadership in the late Stalin period clearly set
their hopes regarding the Middle East on the Arab countries.
These were both the principal factor in the region and the main
anti-imperialist element. 5 3 Egypt was allotted a special role for
a number of reasons: its position in the Arab world as the
largest and most important Arab state; its strategic significance
in general and control of the Suez Canal in particular; and its
widespread and determined struggle against the British military
presence.
ARAB "NEUTRALISM" IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
The months April-May 1950 had witnessed a first turnabout

in Soviet-Arab relations against the background of the com-
mon opposition to the Western powers' regional policies: Arab
statesmen had made their first serious appeals for a rapproche-
ment with the USSR, only to be answered by the Tripartite
Declaration. In June the outbreak of the Korean War provided a
major international issue on which the USSR and the Arab
countries took a joint stand. In this way, the Korean War and
the developments that accompanied it converted the hostility to
the common imperialist enemy into a practical political factor
leading to coordination in the international arena between the
Soviet bloc and the "colonial and semi-colonial" world.
Arab "neutralism" had been born before the Korean_ War and
irrespective of it. In January 1950 Akram al-Hawrani's Syrian
Arab Socialist Party had called for a foreign policy free of for-
eign influences o¿ orientations. (It has been suggested that this
stand, like Dawalibi's, was caused by disappointment with the
West.) Yet, it was only in the winter of 1950-51, on the occa-
sion of the visits of leading Western military and political
figures mentioned above, that Arab neutralism began to make
itself felt. "The Arab nation fighting to free itself from Anglo-
French-American imperialism," a Syrian Ba'th manifesto said in
January 1951, "warns the Arab League against making any ges-
ture of adhesion to one or other of the two blocs; it holds to a
genuine neutralism which will prevent Western imperialism
making the Fatherland a strategic base and exploiting its oil

resources for military ends."
Early in February the Ba'th, the Arab Socialist Party and the
Islamic Socialist Front demanded "a policy of strict neutrality
toward the two world camps." The chairman of the Egyptian
Society of Muslim Youth asked the Arab League secretary-
general to "proclaim the most absolute neutrality. We wish," he
said, "neither to support Communism nor to defend imperialist
democracy."
But now the West rejected the very idea of neutralism just as
had the USSR a year or two before (see pp. 172-73). U.S. Assis-
tant Secretary of State George McGhee told his hosts in Cairo
and Damascus that neutralism operated solely in favor of the
enemy and that there could be no neutrality between aggressors
and defenders of freedom. 54
The Korean War thus led to a reversal of the stand of the two
great powers on the issue of neutralism. The new Western posi-
tion was a consequence of the hardening of U.S. policy in its
struggle to mobilize international support for the official U.N.
position in that war. 55 At the same time, the USSR became
aware of the expansion of neutralism and began to envisage its
inherent possibilities and, indeed, advantages. This new trend
in Soviet thinking was a further factor—together with the Arab
refusal to become linked with American aid programs and
Western military planning —in promoting a Soviet-Arab rap-
prochement.
The appearance of a major international issue on which the
two sides adopted a similar stand meant the removal of one
obstacle to the cementing of the Soviet-Arab friendship that the
USSR had preached in previous years. The other obstacle, the
Soviet Union's lack of either the conceptual or the practical
ability to grant economic or technical aid outside the bloc, was
also gradually being overcome. Soviet offers of aid within the
framework of barter trade agreements had been an important
factor in preparing the ground for Dawalibi's statement and that
of Egyptian Foreign Minister Salah ad-Din. The Soviet leader-
ship was clearly aware of its inefficacy on this score. Evidence
that it was beginning to consider extending aid to the Arabs in
the late Stalin period was provided by Soviet Arabic broadcasts
which lauded the benefits accruing to the People's Democracies
from Soviet technical aid. 56
Despite the apparent shift in the Soviet attitude, the decisive
factor in bringing about a Soviet-Arab alliance in the interna-
tional arena was not the USSR but the course of global
developments and the shaping of neutralism which, in the con-
text of the Korean War, took the form of a rejection of Western
methods and policies. The Arab-Asian bloc that crystallized in
the months after the outbreak of the Korean War adopted an
independent line that was not identical with the Soviet position
or even the result of Soviet influences and pressures; yet its dis-
tinctive feature was its opposition to Western policies and con-
duct.
True, first indications of a change in the Soviet attitude to the
Arab role in international politics had already appeared in late
1949. During the Fourth Regular Session of the U.N. General
Assembly Soviet comment had several times noted anti-Western
Arab stands, including even the Egyptian support of a Soviet
draft resolution in the Political Committee on international
supervision of nuclear arms. 5 7 These were, however, isolated
instances which, while demonstrating Soviet readiness to find a
common platform with the Arabs, did not imply the formation
of any actual ties or cooperation.
It was only the establishment late in 1950 of an Afro-Asian,
or Arab-Asian, bloc that brought the USSR and the Arab states
together over a central issue in the inter-bloc confrontation.
Although India was the backbone of the "neutralist" group, the
Arab states also played a central role. Egypt, which, like India,
was a member of the Security Council in 1950, had abstained in
the vote of 27 June that had authorized the U.N. to give military
assistance to South Korea, i.e. to intervene in the hostilities.
(Both, however, had supported the previous resolution of 25
June—which had laid down that North Korea had committed an
act of aggression and called upon it to cease fire and withdraw
to its own territory.) Egypt explained its vote of 27 June by say-
ing that the Korean conflict was a stage in the East-West con-
frontation which was of no interest to Egypt and that in previ-
ous instances of aggression against U.N. member states—i.e.
upon the establishment of Israel—the U.N. had taken no such
action. 58
The Soviet media paid much attention to the Egyptian absten-
tion and Cairo's refusal to support U.N. action in Korea. They
stressed that the Egyptian stand ignored U.S. and British press-
ures, which were also being applied—according to Soviet
sources—to the other Arab governments (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen) which had announced their solidarity
with the Egyptian position. 59
Yet, at the Fifth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assem-

bly the Arab states, including Egypt, voted for the resolution
that authorized the U.N. forces to cross the 38th Parallel into
North Korea; India and Indonesia were the only abstainers.
They also supported the decision (Unity for Peace) which
empowered the General Assembly to carry out military opera-
tions when needed in the future, thus circumventing the veto-
ridden Security Council. It was only in December that Indian
delegate Sir Benegal Rau initiated the coordinated activity of
the Asian and African delegations. Their first joint action was a
14-nation appeal to the Chinese People's Republic, whose forces
had entered Northern Korea in November, not to cross the bor-
der between the two Koreas; it was followed by other sugges-
tions designed to achieve a political settlement of the Korean
question.
The Soviet press and radio had ignored the positions adopted
by the Arab and other Asian states when these had opposed the
USSR. But when Arab-Asian cooperation led to actions that
displeased the West it was given due heed; the Arab-Asian
proposals, it was stressed, were supported by the Soviet delega-
tion, even though not entirely satisfactory to it. 60
The significance of this cooperation, from the Soviet point of
view, extended beyond the situation in the Far East (in itself a
major issue). The Arab-Asian activity of late 1950-early 1951
was the outcome of a new alignment of a number of states on a
central question that was preoccupying the U.N. and therefore
presaged a change in the voting disposition of that body.
As early as February 1951 Radio Moscow emphasized that
"an increasing number" of states were leaving the "voting
machine" dominated by the United States. 61 A year or so later,
Pravda reviewed U.N. votes on central international issues —
armament limitation, prohibition of atomic weaponry, and
arrangements for international supervision of both—and noted
that the West's voting system had failed since a considerable
number of delegations, "especially from the Middle East, had
either voted with the USSR or abstained." 6 2
On the whole, however, the Arab-Asian group's unity was
short-lived and its achievements at this stage were m i n i m a l -
even on questions concerning colonialism, on which its mem-
bers had a clear common interest. The hopes which the Soviet
leadership seems to have pinned on the "neutralism" of the
"colonial and semi-colonial" countries at this stage were pre-
mature. The Arab-Asian bloc did not become an effectively con-
solidated group and thus did not warrant the risk entailed in
wagering on it or allying with it. Although the USSR began to
assign a constructive role to the governments of former colonial
states, there was as yet no viable basis for a fundamental policy
change.
As a result, the Peace Movement remained, until Stalin's
death, the main instrument for furthering Soviet foreign-policy
objectives beyond the bloc. This movement which sought to
operate mainly through groupings in countries outside the bloc
that opposed their governments' anti-Soviet policies and
activities was based on the old tenet of the two camps. The con-
tinued reliance on the activities of pressure groups and front
organizations operating behind the lines of the opposing camp
contradicted cooperation with the governments of these states.
The poor performance of the ex-colonial governments, however,
encouraged the USSR to risk their estrangement by forming and
activating domestic opposition groupings. While the Peace
Movement and other front organizations were primarily focused
on Europe and intended to be Soviet levers in the developed
capitalist countries, Soviet propaganda also began to pay con-
siderable attention to their evolution in the underdeveloped
world. They were described as playing the main role in the
national liberation struggle of the countries concerned against
the remaining vestiges of the imperialist yoke.
At first this held for the Arab world as well. The interests of
the Arab peoples were still said to be opposed to the Arab
regimes which served foreign interests; the Arab front organiza-
tions comprised the framework in which the Arab peoples
operated and their goals were identified with those of the Arab
liberation struggle. 63 The workers, Radio Moscow said in 1949,
were rallying throughout the Middle East around the demand
for a British troop evacuation of Egypt and the other Arab coun-
tries. The Soviet media also reported that Arab representatives
participated actively in the various international forums and
organizations that played an important role in Soviet foreign
p o l i c y - t h e W.F.T.U., the I.D.F.W. and the Peace Movement -
and publicly praised the Soviet policy of peace. 64 In 1950 the
place occupied by the Arab Peace Movement in the Soviet
media grew markedly. The Arab masses were said to oppose the
Arab League which they considered a symbol of subservience
to, and an instrument of, Anglo-American imperialism. The
Peace Movement was stated to be providing the framework for
unity against foreign exploitation that the League had not sue-
ceeded in guaranteeing. Radio Moscow promised the Arab peo-

ple the support of millions of peace partisans everywhere and
expressed the conviction that the Arab proletariat realized that
Arab democratic rights and national independence could be
attained through "the common struggle against the warmon-
gers, the struggle of all nations for peace. 6 5 The Soviet press
and radio were constantly publishing figures to demonstrate the
success of the Stockholm Peace Appeal, said to have attained
72,000 signatures in Lebanon and 80,000 in Syria by mid-
August 1950, and over 100,000 in Lebanon and 150,000 in
Syria by the summer of 1951. By mid-1951 Soviet sources were
describing the victorious power of the movement in China,
India, North Africa, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iran. 66
Developments in the Middle Eastern and global arenas gave a
practical content as well as direction to this activity within the
framework created to implement Soviet foreign policy objec-
tives. The Tripartite Declaration, the Soviet central press main-
tained, had increased Arab enthusiasm for the Stockholm Peace
Appeal and for relations of friendship with the USSR. American
"intervention" in Korea provided a further stimulus for the
Peace Movement which was also "enthusiastically supported"
in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and Sudan and by the Arab
population of North Africa. 67
In fact, however, despite the relative success of the Peace
Movement in Syria and Lebanon, it was somewhat far-fetched
to identify the movement and its various campaigns and app-
eals with the struggle against Britain. The Egyptian populace did
not need slogans beyond its own immediate concern to be
enlisted in an anti-Western front. On the contrary, an atmos-
phere of intense and intemperate anti-imperialism prevailed in
the country as a result of its own demands vis-à-vis Britain.
Moreover, the methods of action suggested by the Peace Move-
ment were a great deal more moderate than the usual ones used
by most of Egypt's political groupings, including the Commun-
ists. It was neither easy nor rational to adapt the framework of
the various front organizations to the anti-British movement in
Egypt. It was clear that these were ancillary elements and not
the nexus of the Egyptian struggle against Britain, although
Soviet sources sought to attribute the growth of the Egyptian
national liberation movement to these groupings. 6 8 The more
the opposition and resistance to Britain grew, the greater did
the gap between the slogans of the Peace Movement and the
aims of the anti-British struggle become.
As a result, and in view of the relative solidarity of the Arab

states in both the regional and the international context, the
USSR resolved to try and associate with the Arab governments.
The break-up of the Arab-Asian group at the U.N. left the Arab
states as a significant factor in themselves. The Arab states,
Soviet sources pointed out, had not only refused to aid the U.N.
military effort in Korea; they were the scene of demonstrations
of sympathy for the Korean people. 6 9 Soviet comment on the
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Regular Sessions of the General As-
sembly highlighted the united stand adopted by the Arab states
on the Korean and other issues as well as its proximity to the
Soviet position. Soviet orientalist Vatolina wrote that the
Korean crisis had shown the West it could not rely on the Arab
states in the international arena and proved to the Arabs that
their struggle for independence necessitated a parallel struggle
for peace against the warmongers the world over. 70
It seems, then, that the USSR in the late Stalin period
decided to support the Egyptian struggle against Britain by
strengthening its ties with the official and recognized represent-
atives of that struggle. It preferred this to attempts to secure a
foothold in the country through a number of small, marginal
groupings that were in no way representative of the Egyptian
public. Moreover, tactical and strategic considerations led to a
Soviet preference for Egypt in the Arab world although the
USSR's organized sympathizers there were fewer and weaker
than in other Arab countries with a slighter anti-Western poten-
tial and where the front organizations had succeeded in demon-
strating that they comprised a factor of political consequence.
Finally, Moscow was already showing an interest in the pos-
sibilities of a viable alliance with the Arab states in the interna-
tional arena since they comprised a relatively consolidated
group and had obvious points of contact with Soviet attitudes
and policies.
ISRAEL'S ROLE IN SOVIET MIDDLE EASTERN

AND GLOBAL POLICIES
The basic developments that determined the Soviet attitude

to the Arab world in the 1949-53 period were clearly relevant to
the USSR's relationship with Israel. Although this relationship
was largely influenced by factors that had no connection with
the USSR's policies either in the international arena or on a reg-
ional level (see chapters 7 and 8), it was inevitably partly
determined by these considerations.

The termination of the Palestine War and the international
recognition of the armistice lines as Israel's de facto borders put
an end to the Soviet-Israeli coincidence of interests that had
been the principal feature of the relations between the two
countries in the early days of Israel's existence. The criterion
for attaining —or losing—Soviet friendship now became the
stand adopted by Israel (and the other Middle Eastern states) to
Western policies toward the region.
Most important of these were the various projects and prop-
osals for the formation of a Western-oriented regional bloc.
Although aware of the difficulties involved in establishing any
body or grouping that included both Israel and the Arab states
(cf. p. 405 and n. 31 above), the Soviet media tended for most
of the period to assign a weighty role to Israel in this context.
In the first months of 1949 there seems to have been only a
single reference to the possibility of Israel's inclusion in the
states whose participation in a Middle Eastern branch of the
North Atlantic alliance was to be anticipated. 7 1 While the ques-
tion of Israel's joining the Marshall Plan, putting bases at the
disposal of the West or otherwise deviating from its declared
policy of neutrality in the inter-bloc confrontation was an issue
of diplomatic contact, the USSR seems to have been convinced
at the time that Israel had no intention of wantonly alienating it
in this way. 72
In the ensuing year or so, until the spring of 1950, Soviet
sources made contradictory statements on this point. No less a
person than Foreign Minister Vyshinskii was reported as saying
late in October 1949 that Israel was the Middle East's only
democracy. 73 In April or perhaps even early May 1950 Politburo
member Kliment Voroshilov was said to have told the Comin-
form's military committee that Israel—which he described as
the main military factor in the Middle East —was trying to pre-
serve its neutrality. 74 Public statements, on the other hand,
seem to have taken their cue from Polish delegate Droho-
jowski's warning at the U.N. in May 1949 and Vladimir Luts-
kii's unqualified accusation of June 1949 that Israel had not
fulfilled its international commitments as laid down by the
November 1947 partition resolution. 75 They referred to U.S.-
Israeli negotiations on the establishment of Western bases on
Israeli territory, U.S. intentions to use and develop Israeli
highways, ports and airfields, and the penetration of American
officers, methods and influences into the Israel Defense
Forces. 76 It was, however, only in late 1950 that Israel appeared

as actually playing an active role in the implementation and
promotion of American military plans in the Middle East and
even as having U.S. military bases. 7 7
In this connection, the Soviet media followed closely such
developments as Israel's relations with Turkey, Israeli-U.S. rela-
tions and, in particular, the Israeli left's recurrent remonstr-
ances in the Knesset, its press and in public demonstrations
against the increasing rapprochement with the United States. 78
The proposal to set up a Middle Eastern Command was the
occasion for a renewed spate of articles on Israel's role in the
West's Middle Eastern strategic plans. In fact, Israel was not
invited to participate in the Command, although it was
informed of the approach to Egypt (as were the other states of
the region, see p. 408). Moreover, Israel opposed the entire pro-
ject, convinced that it could have no place in a military organ-
ization that included the Arab states and that arms supplies to
the Arabs within the Command threatened Israel's security. 79
The Soviet press and radio, however, maintained that in view
of Egypt's rejection of the proposal and the indifference to it of
the other Arab countries, the West was contemplating the for-
mation of a regional alliance without Arab participation. They
quoted Israeli Communist sources to prove in this context that
the United States was demanding that Israel internationalize
Eilat and permit the transit of American and British troops in
the Negev so as to set up a land corridor between Egypt and
Jordan. 80 Soviet sources made clear that the Note the USSR
addressed to Israel on 21 November in connection with the
Command proposal (see above) called for an unequivocal com-
mitment to remain aloof and warned of negative effects on the
relations between the two countries if Israel joined the Com-
mand. 8 1 In fact, the Israeli reply—of 8 December—contained a
statement that Israel had never agreed and would not agree in
the future to support the implementation or preparation of
aggressive actions against the Soviet Union or any other peace-
loving state. 82
More convincing, even if less critical, than the statements or
charges relating to Israel's role in this period in promoting
Western strategic plans in the area were those that reported its
economic subservience to the United States. The United States
was applying its "tried method of foisting Shylock loans on its
clients." Following the $100 million loan (see pp. 207-8), the
Soviet media asserted, the U.S.A. was conducting talks for
further credits, seeking to dominate the main sectors of the

country's economy. The growing American influence in the
economic field explained, according to these sources, the coun-
try's difficult economic position, of which it was a direct cause,
as well as Israel's agreement to integrate into Western strategic
arrangements which was an American condition for granting
economic aid. Economic agreements were said to specify the
dispatch of American experts to Israel who implemented U.S.
supervision over its agriculture, industry, commerce and
finance. Constant references were made to Israel concessions
in the sphere of oil exploration and production and to Ameri-
can investments in Israel and the establishment of economic
enterprises and companies that were either affiliated to Ameri-
can firms or otherwise directed by U.S. personnel. Israel's
economic planning and policies —inflation, devaluation, etc.—
were all in fact concessions to Washington intended to guaran-
tee the domination of U.S. capital and goods. 8 3
A further field in which Israel was said to be proving its role
as a U.S. colony was its cooperation with Western imperialism
in the international arena. Soviet charges on this score are
especially instructive for the student of Soviet policy shaping
since they include a number of internal contradictions. In the
latter part of 1949 the Soviet central press was publishing
simultaneously favorable and hostile comments on Israeli for-
eign policy attitudes. It noted approvingly Israeli reactions to the
report of the first Soviet atom bomb explosion: Ha-Aretz,
Pravda noted, reported the loss of the U.S. nuclear monopoly as
the most important development since World War II and called
on the West to support Vyshinskii's proposals to prohibit the
use of atomic weapons and create an international body for
supervision of atomic energy. Izvestiia referred to Davar's con-
viction that the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb must
lessen Western military adventurism and lead to compromise
formulae for the coexistence of states with different regimes. 84
At the same time, Literaturnaia gazeta —in an article directed
against the ties being formed between Franco's Spain on the
one hand, and Greece, Turkey and the Arab states on the
other—wrote that mutual recognition and the exchange of dip-
lomatic representatives between Spain and Israel were to be
expected in the near future. 85
This obviously far-fetched suggestion cannot but arouse sus-
picion that it was designed to meet an assignment imposed
upon the paper's editorial staff, to publish anti-israel material,
that bore no direct relevance to the issue under discussion (i.e.

Spain). This assumption is borne out by an article in Voprosy
ekonomiki in October 1949, which purported to be a résumé of
a lecture delivered in June by the orientalist Vladimir Lutskii,
publicizing the current official Soviet attitude toward Israel,
inter aJia, Lutskii charged that "the delegates of the State of
Israel fawn upon the Anglo-American imperialist bloc at the
U.N." 86 Yet, Israel had only been a U.N. member for a week
before the second part of the Third Regular Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly closed on 18 May, during which week the Israeli
delegation had either voted with the Soviet delegation or ab-
stained. Even if this sentence had been added in October— which is
presumably possible —Israel had not given any cause for it in the
early weeks of the Fourth Regular Session. On the contrary, Israel
was clearly making every effort to refrain from appearing as pro-
American on any cold war issue. 8 7
It was only on 1 December 1949 that Israel first adopted a
position that was opposed to the Soviet Union on a central
issue of international politics (the Soviet draft resolution enti-
tled "Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and con-
clusion of a five-power pact for the strengthening of peace").
The Israeli stand, the Soviet press maintained, demonstrated the
absurdity of the Israeli argument that it was independent of the
United States in the inter-bloc confrontation. 88
With the outbreak of the Korean War Soviet charges against
Israel's unequivocal pro-Western stand intensified. Although
the USSR had been reserved regarding Israeli pretensions at
non-alignment, Israel's rejection of neutralism led to vehement
attacks upon it.
On 3 July 1950, Foreign Minister Sharett informed U.N.
Secretary-General Lie that the Israeli government had decided
to express its opposition to all aggression wherever it occurred
and whatever its origins. It had resolved to fulfill its obligations
as laid down in the U.N. Charter and support the Security
Council's efforts to end the violation of the peace in Korea. On
the following day Sharett told the Knesset that the principle of
non-alignment with one bloc against the other which was a
fundamental of Israeli foreign policy could not be exploited to
renounce the cause of peace and evade responsibility toward
the U.N. As a small state, and particularly as a state that had
been the victim of aggression and was liable any day to be
attacked again, Israel could accept neither the paralysis of the
U.N. nor a U.N. renunciation of its right of intervention in order
to guarantee international security and defend the peace. 89

The USSR's information media reacted strongly. Israel's pol-
icy, they claimed, was now openly "identifying" with the
Western bloc. A statement by Sharett that Israel's position on
Korea did not signify alignment with the Western bloc on all
issues was not reprinted by Soviet sources. 90
A New Times article entitled ' T o a d y of the American
Aggressors" denounced Israel for its stand on Korea. Ben
Gurion, it was said, had repeated in the Knesset debate on
Korea statements of Acheson and Truman "whose prophet in
the Middle East" he was "more and more definitely becoming."
The paper went on to charge Ben Gurion with "trying to
ingratiate himself with Wall Street" by "abominable insinua-
tions and even slanders against the Soviet Union." Ben Gurion
had said "in an effort to reassure the public . . . that he did not
intend to send Israeli soldiers to Korea," yet this was "not
much of a concession" since the Americans were out to make
"a tally of their potential allies in their warlike ventures" and
did not need Israel's practical support. 9 1 (Interesting light on
Soviet practice is surely thrown by the fact that Ben Gurion
made no reference whatever to the USSR in his Knesset speech
on Korea. There can hardly be any doubt that the "insinua-
tions" and "slanders" were his criticisms of Soviet policy
toward its Jewish minority in his speech at Afikim six weeks
before, to which the USSR could hardly react directly, yet
which it could not be expected to let pass without some rejoin-
der. 92 )
Despite the first sharp reaction of the Soviet media to Israel's
stand on Korea, they were not unsympathetic to Israeli attitudes
to the Korean War during the following period. This applied
especially to Israeli attempts at the Fifth Regular Session of the
General Assembly to participate in the search for compromise
positions. 93 Hostility was apparent once more only with the
creation and activity of the Arab-Asian bloc; in January 1951,
for example, the Soviet central press commented positively on
Arab opposition to an Israeli proposal. 9 4 Even now, however,
the anti-Israel stance was not invariable (the variations could
apparently be traced to the fluctuations in Soviet hopes regard-
ing the Arab states on the same issue). 95
A central issue of international interest in general and of
Soviet foreign policy in particular, on which the USSR seemed
to be justified in thinking it could rely on Israeli support, was
Germany. Soviet sources noted Israeli protests against West
German inclinations to ignore the atrocities of the Hitler period

and to refrain from punishing its surviving activists. They also
cited Israeli leftist dissatisfaction with Western attempts to
integrate Germany into West European defense arrangements. 9 6
One aspect of the German question that was the occasion for
direct Soviet-Israeli contact was reparations. In January 1951
and again in March the Israeli government addressed Notes to
the four powers defining its demands, the two Notes to the
Soviet government concerning East Germany. Moscow, how-
ever, referred to these approaches for the first time only in
March 1952 when Semen Bazarov, head of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry Middle and Near East Department, told Israeli Minister
Shmuel Eliashiv that the handling of the reparations problem
must be postponed until the signature of a peace treaty with
Germany and that it would have to be solved by Germany itself
and not by the powers. A further Israeli Note, of September
1952, evoked a similar reaction: Deputy Foreign Minister Geor-
gii Pushkin told Eliashiv that East Germany was independent
and that he did not see how the USSR could influence it on this
score. Israel, he added, should support the unification of Ger-
many as this was a prerequisite for dealing with reparations. 9 7
By late 1952 Soviet sources were including Israel's attitude to
Germany on the list of its various crimes against "the camp of
peace and democracy." 9 8
There were a number of other international questions on
which the USSR and Israel adopted identical positions in this
period. Once more, throughout 1950 and 1951 and in early
1952, the Soviet media noted instances when Israel voted with
the USSR at the U.N., for example on Spain's acceptance to the
U.N. at the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly and
on Chinese representation at the Sixth Regular Session. 99 How-
ever, at the Seventh Regular Session which opened in the fall of
1952 they ignored a further Israeli vote against postponing the
discussion of the U.N. membership of the Chinese People's
Republic. 100
ISRAELI "PROGRESSIVE " GROUPINGS AND

FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
While contradictions between Israeli and Soviet foreign pol-

icy objectives were growing, the Israeli filial of the Peace
Movement, the instrument that had been set up upon Soviet
initiative to promote and serve the USSR's foreign policy in the
enemy camp, was growing rapidly. The Israeli Peace Movement

was the largest in the entire Middle East, standing in sharp con-
trast to its counterpart in Egypt—the state upon which the
USSR pinned its principal hopes regarding the anti-imperialist
struggle in the region—where the para-Communist front organ-
izations were small and insignificant.
The confrontation between the Israeli authorities and the
Peace Movement was the subject of one of the first Soviet
attacks upon the government of Israel. 101 Yet, as time went on,
the Soviet information media gave increasingly little publicity
to the activities and achievements of the Israeli movement,
much less than they afforded the far weaker Syrian and Leban-
ese movements. By the fall of 1949, coverage of the Israeli
movement was blatantly minimal. TASS reports of International
Peace Day celebrations in Israel included one single excerpt
from a speech at a Tel Aviv rally by Meir Yaari, member of the
permanent committee of the Congress of the Partisans of Peace,
and a bare mention of a unanimous resolution in favor of join-
ing the camp of the Partisans of Peace and of another mass
peace meeting in Haifa. 102 A TASS item that surveyed the
activities of peace partisans in different countries early in 1950
mentioned the Israeli partisans, 1 0 3 yet references to the first
Israeli peace conference were exceedingly concise. They
included one early mention that it was due, 1 0 4 and a Pravda
article on its concluding session which quoted Maki leader
Meir Wilner as saying that the camp of peace and socialism was
"stronger than the camp of reaction and ... able not to permit
the outbreak of a new war;" Wilner was likewise reported to
have called —on this same occasion —upon the Israeli public to
mobilize all its forces in the struggle against the warmongers.
Pravda also published an excerpt of a resolution calling upon
the Israeli government "to support Soviet proposals prohibiting
atomic weapons, restricting rearmament and concluding a pact
of the great powers. Our movement for defense of the peace,"
the Soviet party organ went on quoting, "will resist all attempts
to convert Israel into a base of aggression and will struggle
against the desire to include Israel in the aggressive Mediterra-
nean Pact that is in preparation." 1 0 5
On 10 June 1950 the Israeli Peace Movement Council
decided, in the wake of the World Peace Congress Permanent
Committee's Stockholm Appeal of three months before, to ask
everyone in Israel to sign a petition demanding a ban on the
use of atomic weapons in the event of war. 106 Although the
Soviet media were quick to stress the success of the campaign

in Israel, this information was supplied chiefly as part of the
general reports provided by the central institutions of the World
Peace Movement concerning its size, growth and achievements
throughout the world. The first report announced late in June
1950 that 111,547 signatures had already been collected
"despite" Mapai's counter-appeal. 1 0 7 Well before the end of
1950, 312,000 signatures were said to have been gathered, 108
while one Soviet paper pointed out that of the million or so
signatures collected throughout the Middle East, the largest
number had been secured in Israel where nearly 40% of the
adult population had signed the appeal. 1 0 9
In the following year the Israeli movement was even more
successful in its campaign for signatures to the appeal spon-
sored by the Berlin session of the World Peace Council in Feb-
ruary for a five-power peace pact (i.e. including the Chinese
People's Republic). 110 Once more, the wide response was duly
noted in the USSR; 111 one paper noted in particular the first 500
signatures of Israeli soldiers—proof, Kol Ha-Am was quoted as
saying, "that Israeli soldiers are disappointed with the Ameri-
can aggressors and their Israeli underlings who dream of using
our sons as cannon fodder." The secretariat of the World Peace
Committee announced early in 1952 that by the turn of the year
354,159 signatures had been gathered in Israel. 112
Nonetheless, Pravda ignored the_speeches of Israel's dele-
gates, Yaacov Maius and Tawfiq Tubi, at the second conference
of the World Peace Council held in Vienna in November 1951.
Izvestiia, which mentioned their appearance, did so only very
briefly. 113
From mid-1952 the tendency to emphasize the conflict be-
tween the Israeli Peace Movement and the authorities became
more pronounced. The Soviet press reported not only continued
measures to prevent the participation of Israeli delegates at the
movement's international function and conferences, but also
police interference to prevent u n d u e disturbances at peace par-
tisan demonstrations. 1 1 4
Other front organizations which played a major role in the
implementation of Soviet foreign policy objectives included the
W.F.T.U. In 1949 the Israeli Histadrut had taken part in the
W.F.T.U.'s activities, despite differences of opinion as to the
position it should adopt in the face of the growing tendency of
Western trade union movements to withdraw. 1 1 5 Beginning
early 1950 Soviet sources began to note the increasing ties be-
tween the Histadrut and the secessionist union movement. In

particular they criticised the visit to Israel in April of French
union leader Jules Moch said to be motivated by an attempt to
precipitate the Histadrut's withdrawal from the W.F.T.U. 116
On 11 May 1950 the Histadrut adopted a resolution to secede
from the W.F.T.U. The vigorous Soviet reaction stressed the
split in the Israeli labor movement, the large "progressive"
minority led by Mapam and Maki (the decision had been
adopted by 26:16), and the increasing subservience of Israel's
rulers to the United States of which this step was yet one more
indication. Pravda reported protest meetings and demonstra-
tions all over the country. 117
A further front organization that continued to attract Soviet
attention was the Israeli League for Friendly Relations with the
USSR. 118 The League's celebration of the 1949 October Revolu-
tion anniversary merited detailed comment, including the par-
ticipation in it of over 2,000 people, among them the staffs of
the Soviet and East European Legations. The Soviet media
noted the speeches of Mikunis, who stressed Soviet assistance
in achieving Israel's independence and insisted that the Israeli
masses would neither permit American imperialism to establish
bases on Israeli territory nor resort to force against Soviet
troops; of League Secretary Moshe Sneh who described the
achievements of the USSR; and of Minister Ershov who greeted
the audience. 1 1 9
In May 1951, TASS reported a mass meeting the League
organized on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet vic-
tory over Nazi Germany. One Soviet newspaper reported Sneh's
severe condemnation of the reactionary slander campaign being
conducted against the USSR and his appeal "to raise high the
banner of friendship with the great Soviet people." Sneh was
quoted as stating at this session that "the Soviet Union's peace
policy serves the interests of all the peace-loving peoples of the
world. The Soviet Union and the mighty peace camp at whose
head it stands are our only allies." Wilner who also participated
had reiterated that the Israeli people would not "let Israel be
dropped into an aggressive anti-Soviet bloc" and "will never
fight against the Soviet Union." 1 2 0
In addition to the front organizations, Israel's "progressive"
circles included two official political parties, Maki and Mapam.
The former's 11th convention in October 1949 attracted consid-
erable Soviet attention. The Soviet Party Central Committee sent
a telegram that wished Maki "success in the struggle for a
united socialist front and the cause of peace, and against the
inciters of a new war"; the telegram was read out in Russian,
Hebrew and Arabic and was received "with stormy
applause." 121 The Soviet central press also noted the increase in
party cells (or "primary organizations")122—presumably as a
result of the party's successes among Israel's Arab minority.
Indeed, the reports and speeches that Soviet sources com-
mented upon included one on the national question that stress-
ed the party's position of principle on the issue of "the dis-
crimination being conducted against the Arab minority";
another on the class struggle and the influence of American
capital on it and on the relation of forces in the country in
which the speaker stressed that economic independence was
the basis of political independence and demanded the national-
ization of foreign concessions. Finally, Radio Moscow drew its
audience's attention to the announcement of Central Committee
Secretary Wilner that if the Soviet army reached the Israeli fron-
tier in the course of its struggle against the aggressor it would
be received with enthusiasm and would be given all kinds of
assistance from the majority of Israel's population. 123
The themes the Soviet press and radio stressed in particular
were Maki's fealty to Soviet foreign policy objectives as express-
ed by its appeals for support of such general aims as the pro-
hibition of atomic weaponry and five-power cooperation; its
demands for consolidating Israel's relations with the Soviet
Union and the People's Democracies; and its attacks on those
elements of Israeli policy to which the USSR took exception, for
example, its economic policy and its ties with the United
States. Above all, however, the Soviet Union seems to have
expected Maki to initiate the consolidation of a "socialist" or
"progressive" front that would encompass and unite all the
country's radical groupings. The Central Committee of Maki,
Radio Moscow pointed out within days of the conclusion of the
11th party convention, was calling on the workers of Israel to
join a popular front to defend Israel's democratic rights, stan-
dard of living and independence and fight against the growth of
fascism in Israel.124 Maki's active role in demonstrating the sol-
idarity of Israel's "progressive" public was stressed by Soviet
sources, for example, when Henry Morganthau, former U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, visited Israel early in 1950. The pur-
pose of his visit was said to be to demand Israel's "Marshalliza-
tion" and participation in the projected Middle Eastern bloc, an
instance of the U.S. tendency to take advantage of Israel's
difficult economic position to serve the interests of U.S. expan-

sionism. The visit, according to the Soviet media, aroused the
"indignation" of the "progressive" public, which demonstrated
in Jerusalem demanding peace, jobs, bread and the conduct of a
struggle against the warmongers, and carrying such slogans as
"Israel will not become a springboard for war against the Soviet
Union" and "the Israeli people will not fight the Soviet
Union." 1 2 5
Maki was described by the Soviet media as playing a central
role in the protest activities against Israel's support of the
United States over Korea and against other indications of "sub-
servience" to the West. TASS published Maki's 1951 Indepen-
dence Day statement denouncing undue expenditure on milit-
ary bases, airfields and seaports undertaken "in accordance
with the aggressive American plans directed against the Soviet
Union." The statement noted that "half of the Cabinet Minis-
ters" were spending Israel's Independence Day in the U.S.A., a
fact that characterized the negotiations in progress for "linking
Israel with the aggressive Middle Eastern bloc." It also indi-
cated, as TASS stressed, the high cost of living and the viola-
tion of democratic rights. 1 2 6 Two Soviet newspapers which pub-
lished the statement added details concerning Israel's "subjuga-
tion" to the U.S.A. and the infringement of rights guaranteed in
Israel's Charter of Independence. 1 2 7
While the Soviet press and radio emphasized the central posi-
tion Maki occupied in the activities of the country's front
organizations as the focus and leader of Israel's "progressive"
public, Mapam too occupied a special place in Soviet-Israeli
relations. Although it did not engage in unqualified apologetics
for Soviet policies and attitudes as did Maki and although there
were ideological contradictions that neither side concealed,
Mapam supported the general foreign policy goals of the USSR,
called for a Soviet-oriented Israeli foreign policy and often
stood together with Maki against the government's domestic
policies. Moreover, Mapam (which was still united, i.e. includ-
ing Ahdut Ha-Avoda and Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair) represented —as
the Soviet side was well aware —a substantial percentage of the
population and comprised an integral part of the Yishuv and all
its institutions. 1 2 8
Indeed, all sectors of Mapam demanded that ties with the
West be reduced. At a mass demonstration sponsored by
Mapam in July 1950 in Jerusalem under the slogan "Hands off
Korea!," Yisrael Galili called on the government to adopt a pol-
icy of neutrality in the inter-bloc confrontation (on the same

lines as some of the Arab countries). At the same time Galili
went on to point out that his own party was not neutral, but
had definite ideological commitments to the world for which
the Soviet Union was struggling and which it was in fact attain-
ing. 1 2 9
It was therefore natural that Soviet sources should refer to
Mapam's opposition to the Histadrut's secession from the
W.F.T.U. and to its stand on Korea 130 and on Israeli positions at
the U.N. Pravda even reported the Israeli government's sugges-
tion to deprive Moshe Erem of his parliamentary immunity fol-
lowing his participation in demonstrations against the visit to
Israel of Commander of British Middle East Land Forces Gen-
eral Sir Brian Robertson. 131 In May 1951 Radio Moscow broad-
cast a statement by an anonymous Mapam Knesset member that
the Americans had first sought to obstruct the establishment of
the State of Israel and later tried to undermine its indepen-
dence. U.S. capital had strengthened its position in the country
while Israel's national economy was distorted by crippling
American loans. The Mapam Knesset member had gone on to
warn the Israeli public that national independence and univer-
sal peace were inseparable and that the conduct of "a stubborn
struggle against imperialism and war [and] for socialism and
peace" was of the utmost importance. 1 3 2
In summer 1952 New Times published excerpts from Meir
Yaari's speech at the special session of the World Peace Council
held in Berlin in July. Yaari had shown that the Middle East
Command had been intended to draw the region's countries
into an aggressive anti-Soviet pact under false pretences.
Instead it had evoked the opposition of the peoples and the lib-
eration movements had grown in strength and size throughout
the Middle East. The Israeli masses, Yaari had concluded,
would march together with the great family of nations that
numbered over half of mankind under the banner of peace. 133
Shortly afterwards a central Soviet paper reported a meeting
organized by the Israeli Peace Committee and "the united left-
wing workers' party, Mapam." 1 3 4
The entry "Israel" in the BoVshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia
(in a volume that went to print in October 1952) highlighted
the ambivalence of the Soviet attitude to Mapam as against the
unequivocal identification with Maki. The section on "political
parties" listed Mapam immediately after Maki. The latter was
said to be standing "at the head of the struggle of Israel's prog-
ressive forces on behalf of democratic reforms and political and

economic independence and is actively participating in the
struggle for peace. It favors the consolidation of Israel's rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies and
unmasks the treacherous policy of the government which is
causing Israel's economic and political subjugation to the
U.S.A." Mapam, however, was defined here as "a left-wing
Socialist Zionist party" comprising "part of the proletariat,
socialist workers, members of Zionist socialist settlements and
part of the intelligentsia. The Mapam party, which appears
together with the Communist party in opposing the Israeli gov-
ernment's foreign policy and favoring peace and friendship
with the countries of the democratic camp, adopts a national-
bourgeois position on the national question." 1 3 5
It is very difficult to estimate the role of Israel's left-wing par-
ties and groupings and front organizations in the relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and Israel at a time when these were
generally worsening. The existence of a strong Peace Movement
and other significant pro-Soviet bodies may even have helped
aggravate relations on the inter-state level. This contention is
based in part on the assumption that rather than being effective
in preventing Israel's affiliation to the opposite camp, the
activities of Israel's "progressive" circles exacerbated the gov-
ernment's reactions —chiefly for reasons of a domestic nature —
in a way that hindered it from taking measures that could
perhaps have brought the two governments closer.
• • •
In conclusion, it seems that although Israel took a number of

steps in the May 1949-March 1953 period that annoyed the
USSR, its actions did not determine the negative stance Mos-
cow adopted toward it. This judgment is based on two central
facts: on the one hand, the unqualified support of Israel in the
international arena continued for several months after the sign-
ing of the $100 million loan; on the other, the anti-Israel offen-
sive began quite some time before Israel shed its position of
non-alignment in the summer of 1950. "The leaders of the State
of Israel," Vladimir Lutskii had already said in June 1949,
"express their readiness to join the aggressive Mediterranean
bloc being knocked together by the Anglo-American imperial-
ists." In addition to Israel's sycophancy to the West at the U.N.
(see p. 421), "the leaders of the Mapai party have come out
openly against the World Congress of the Supporters of Peace

and are striving for the withdrawal of the Israeli trade unions
from the World Federation of Trade Unions. ... Thus," the
Soviet orientalist concluded, "the U.N. resolution concerning
the creation in Palestine of an independent, democratic Jewish
state has in essence not been realized." 1 3 6
There can be no doubt that Lutskii's views, presented at a
joint symposium of the Academy of Sciences' Economic and
Pacific Institutes, held at a time when the Establishment was
reassessing and reorienting its policies toward Asia and Africa,
were not only condoned a priori but actually expressed the
Soviet leadership's official position. This is also borne out by
the fact that any Jew must have been doubly cautious in express-
ing any opinion whatever before such a forum a mere two or
three months after the height of the anti-cosmopolitan cam-
paign, in which Lutskii had himself taken an active part (cf. p.
322). It is likely that the relevant authorities especially selected
a Jew to presage a turn for the worse in the official attitude to
Israel; indeed, as we saw, another Jew, Izrail' Genin, had given
intimations of the first volte-face half a year before (cf. p. 212;
Vatolina, the only other orientalist who referred to the Middle
East at the same symposium, significantly made no mention of
Israel). Finally, not only was the symposium part of the official
reappraisal: the journal which published the résumé of the pap-
ers on developments in "the colonial and semi-colonial coun-
tries" was put out by the Pravda publishing house; there was a
considerable lag between the holding of the symposium and the
appearance of the résumés, an indication of careful editing; and
the period—summer 1949—marked the zenith of coordination
between scientific institutions and the central authorities. If our
basic contention is correct, the contradictions between reality
and the phenomena portrayed as reality, such as the stories of
American bases in Israel or Israel's participation in a projected
Middle Eastern Command or bloc, become less difficult to com-
prehend.
This contention seems to confirm the assumption outlined in
the last chapter that much Soviet comment on Israel was aimed
at countering the encouragement Soviet Jews had received from
Moscow's support of the Yishuv's war of independence and the
growing Soviet Jewish identification with the State of Israel.
The Soviet volte-face was tantamount to an admission that the
attempt to draw a dividing line between Israel and Soviet Jewry
had failed. On the operative level it led to an anti-Israel offen-
sive as a corollary, or perhaps even an integral part of the anti-

Jewish campaign being conducted in the USSR and the People's
Democracies. The definition of Israel as early as 1949 as a focus
of U.S. activity in the Middle East is best explained by the
identification of Israel with Jews, identified in their turn in both
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with the United States
and the anti-socialist, imperialist camp.
In other words, after the armistice agreement and Israel's
acceptance to U.N. membership, which spelled the final ousting
of the British military presence from at least Jewish Palestine,
the Soviet leadership decided it had attained everything pos-
sible from its support of Israel. The actual decision was prob-
ably taken several months before the voJte-/ace was given its
official stamp or begun to be implemented in mid-1949; this
would explain the very few anti-Israel expressions of the winter
months, December 1948-February 1949. As in 1947, the policy
switch of 1949 received its most manifest expression once the
Soviet line on the various components of the USSR's relations
with Israel had become consistent.
The armistice agreements and Israel's U.N. membership thus
meant that the Soviet Union's principal strategic aims—the
ousting of British troops from Palestine and the creation of a
buffer between those parts of the Arab world that retained a
large British military presence had been achieved. On the polit-
ical level, an important goal was likewise attained, i.e. the set-
ting up in the midst of the Arab world of a state whose political
and social conceptions and foundations were intrinsically dif-
ferent from those of the Arab states and could be expected to
exercise a far-reaching influence on its neighbors. This
influence in turn would almost necessarily lead to a further
weakening, if not to a total collapse, of Britain's position in the
Middle East; in any case, the USSR had nothing to lose from
any change in the status quo of the Arab world or in the nature
of the Arab regimes, as it had no economic, political or military
hold on or investment in the Arab countries. Indeed, whether as
a direct or indirect result of Israel's formation, or even as a
development wholly independent of Israel's existence, there
were definite indications in 1949 of a growing anti-imperialist
movement in the Arab world in which the USSR was clearly
able to find a common understanding in the realm of bilateral
relations and in the international arena on the basis of a com-
mon purpose: an end to Britain's military hold on the Suez
Canal, Iraq and the remainder of the Arab world. An under-
standing between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries was
promoted as a result of the former's growing attention to the
problems of "the colonial and semi-colonial" world with the
specific purpose of creating a united front in the international
arena against the imperialist camp. However, despite the Soviet
decision to effect a rapprochement with the Arab world, the
lack of any significant response on the part of the Arabs pre-
vented Soviet relations with Israel from deteriorating on the
practical level to match the anti-Israel propaganda offensive
dictated by the Soviet leadership's Jewish policy. In the period
under discussion, i.e. in the four years immediately prior to Sta-
lin's death, the former remained relatively normal and tranquil;
it was in the latter alone that the motive, momentum and
perhaps even the need to bring about the drastic deterioration
of the winter of 1952-53 existed.
Notes
1. For a systematic and comprehensive account of Soviet foreign

policy deliberations and considerations at this time, see Shulman. The
Soviet leadership, Shulman argues, came to realize in 1949 that the
hardline policy had
a. exposed the Soviet Union to physical danger in view of its
military-strategic weakness and vulnerability in the face of the marked
progress made by U.S. technology and science;
b. closed the ranks of the Western countries, the Berlin blockade and
the Communist threat in France and Italy, for example, merely serving
as an incitement to the establishment of NATO and the decision to
create an independent West German State;
c. encouraged the United States to extend its economic aid prog-
rams, which meant also political and military influence in the various
parts of the world; in addition to the Truman Doctrine and Marshall
Plan (cf. pp. 48-49 and 73 respectively), the U.S. president had
announced a program for economic and technical aid to underde-
veloped countries and areas in Point Four of his January 1949 Inaugu-
ration Speech.
2. For the early stages of the Peace Movement, including its opening
congress (held in Paris in April 1949) and its integration in Soviet
foreign policy, see ibid., chapters 1 and 2; Ehrenburg, Post-War Years,
chap. 16; Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 97 and 117-20; also con-
temporary Soviet speeches, newspaper articles and broadcasts, e.g.,
Pravda, 11 March 1949; R. Moscow in French and in English for N.
America, 12 March 1949, and TASS in Russian for abroad, 11 April

1949/SWB Í, 18 March and 25 April 1949; FALP, 15 April 1949; and
Documents on International Affairs, 1949-50, pp. 129-39.
3. Shulman, chapters 4 and 5.
4. Pietro Nenni, the chairman of the second session of the World
Peace Council held in November 1951, stressed the extensive pos-
sibilities for cooperation between the movement and the neutralist
countries in South-East Asia and the Middle East, notably India —
Shulman, pp. 202-3. Soviet comment on the W.F.T.U. General Council
that met in the same month also stressed the speeches of Asian and
African delegates. See also pp. 410 and 415.
5. For the Congress, see Shulman, chap. 10; for Stalin's treatise, see
also above, chap. 8, n. 61.
6. Cf. pp. 272 ff.
7. E.g., R. Moscow in Arabic, 8 and 10 February 1949, and in Engl-
ish, 24 February 1949, and R. Moscow, 20 July 1949/SWB I, 14 and 28
February and 25 July 1949; also New Times, 23 February 1949. These
sources commented on developments in Iraq where the Communists
suffered severe repression in February 1949 —cf. Khadduri, pp. 362-63.
Arab worker opposition to the formation of a Western-oriented regional
pact was manifested —according to Radio Moscow in Arabic, 5 August
1949/SWB Í, 12 August 1 9 4 9 - b y strikes in Egypt and Lebanon,
demonstrations in Syria and the consolidation of the trade unions in
Iraq and Lebanon.
8. E.g., R. Moscow, 8 February 1949, and R. Moscow in English, 24
February and 16 March 1949/SWB Í, 14 and 28 February and 21 March
1949.
9. R. Moscow in Arabic, 9 April 1949, and TASS in Russian for
abroad, 28 April 1949/SWB Í, 15 April and 2 May 1949.
10. E.g., R. Moscow in Arabic, 13 and 21 May 1949, R. Moscow, 22
May 1949, and TASS for home consumption, 20 June 1949/SWB Í, 20
and 30 May and 27 June 1949.
11. R. Moscow in Arabic, 4 June and 14 September 1949 and 14 Feb-
ruary 1950/SWB Í, 10 June and 19 September 1949 and 20 February
1950.
12. R. Moscow in Arabic, 13 May and 25 June 1949/SWB Í, 20 May
and 1 July 1949. Soviet media stressed in particular Turkish-Syrian
discords over Alexandretta.
13. Krasnaia zvezda, 16 and 19 July 1949.
14. See p. 448.
15. TASS in Russian for abroad and R. Moscow in Arabic, 11 July
1949/SWB Í, 18 July 1949. For references and allusions to British viola-
tions of the embargo during the Palestine War, see p. 241.
16. R. Moscow, 13 December 1949/SWB I, 19 December 1949.

17. TASS in Russian for abroad, 17 February 1950, R. Tashkent in
English for the East and R. Baku in Turkish, 31 March 1950 and R.
Moscow, 12 April 1950/SWB Í, 3 March and 7 and 17 April 1950; also
Krasnaia zvezda, 1 March 1950.
18. R. Moscow in Arabic, 13 September 1949/SWB Í, 19 September
1949.
19. ANA, 5 May 1950/SWB IV, 9 May 1950.
20. Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965), p. 102.
21. AI-Misri, 9 April 1950. Dawalibi referred in particular to U.S.
demands that the Syrian government "sign a peace treaty with Israel in
order to safeguard international peace in the Middle East" and to U.S.
warnings against "our closing the border with Transjordan." Damas-
cus, the Minister told al-Misri, had replied "that we considered this an
interference in our affairs, and that such activity must lead us seriously
to consider that the aims of American policy are to judaize the Arabs
and establish a new bastion of military and economic imperialism in
the midst of the Arab countries."
At a press conference in May, Dawalibi said the main outlines of a
Syrian-Soviet economic agreement had been agreed, while talks had
also been conducted on the question of a friendship treaty. He reported
that the Syrian government welcomed the Soviet offer to furnish all
the Syrian armed forces' requirements from arms manufactured in the
USSR or Czechoslovakia, but had as yet made no decision on this
m a t t e r - R . Cairo, 13 May 1950/SWB IV, 16 May 1950.
22. R. Damascus in English, 26 April 1950/SWB IV, 2 May 1 9 5 0 -
quoting the Egyptian Ãkhir Sa'a.
23. Al-Ahram, 3 May 1950.
24. R. Sharq al-Adnã, 11 May 1950/SWB IV, 16 May 1950. In Febru-
ary Solod, who was minister to Damascus and Beirut simultaneously,
was said to have suggested a trade and friendship agreement with
Lebanon as well as Syria—R. Sharq al-Adna, 27 February 1950/SWB
IV, 7 March 1950.
25. New Times, 24 May 1950; also R. Baku in Turkish, 15 June
1950/SWB I, 19 June 1950.
26. For the text of the declaration, its background, significance, and
implications, see Benjamin Schwadran, "Arms for the Middle East,"
Middle Eastern Affairs 1, no. 6-7 (June-July 1950): 167-79.
27. TASS, 26 and 27 May 1950, R. Moscow in Arabic, 28 May and
10 June 1950, and TASS in Russian for abroad, 29 May and 16 August
1950/SWB I, 29 May, 2 and 16 June and 21 August 1950.
28. Krasnaia zvezda, 4 June 1950.
436 T H E U S S R A N D ISRAEL: 1947-1954
29. R. Moscow, 10 October 1950/SWB Í, 13 October 1950.

30. E.g., Pravda, 16 October 1950; and Izvestiia, 13 January 1951.
These reports became particularly frequent early in 1951, when a
number of British and U.S. senior officials and military leaders visited
the Middle East, for example, George McGhee, assistant secretary of
state for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, and Comman-
der of British Middle East Land Forces General Sir Brian Robertson.
31. E.g., Pravda, 21 March 1951; and R. Moscow in Arabic, 15 May
1951/SWB Í, 18 May 1951. These animosities continued to attract
Soviet attention in the ensuing period as well, e.g., R. Moscow in
Arabic, 13 July 1952, R. Moscow, 16 and 19 August 1952/SWB I, 18
July and 22 August 1951; and Pravda, 24 August 1952. For reference
to the Arab-Israeli conflict in this context, cf. TASS in Russian for
abroad, 12 March 1951, and R. Sovinform in English, 16 April 1951/
SWB I, 16 March and 20 April 1951.
32. Novoe vremia, 17 January 1951; R. Moscow in Turkish, 26 Janu-
ary 1951/SWB I, 2 February 1951; and Izvestiia, 14 April 1952.
33. TASS, 15 January 1951/SWB I, 19 January 1951; and Pravda, 3
April 1951.
34. Krasnaia zvezda, 9 June 1951; and Novoe vremia, 27 June 1951.
According to the latter, these conditions included: "an obligation to
wage an effective struggle against the people's liberation movement in
their own countries and against all 'elements' that favor cooperation
with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.
"Middle Eastern countries must promise to support every decision
passed by the U.S.-British majority in the United Nations on Korea and
the blockade of the Chinese People's Republic.
"Governments receiving 'aid' must consent to the maintenance on
their territories of American missions— missions to supervise allocation
of 'aid', and military missions which will handle the training of the
armies of these states.
"Arab countries must approve of all the military plans which the
United States, in conjuction with other Western powers, may elaborate
for the Mediterranean and Middle East area."
35. For the various coups which deposed and created governments
in Syria in the years 1949-51, see Seale, chapters 3-6.
36. R. Moscow in Arabic, 6 January 1950/SWB I, 13 lanuary 1950. At
first, however, Soviet commentators had their doubts as to the sincerity
of the Wafd's intentions and the likelihood of their relevance to practi-
cal politics. In May Vatolina suggested that the Wafd was only for-
mally demanding a British evacuation; in fact it was negotiating a new
treaty-izvestiia, 12 May 1950.
37. TASS, 8 June 1950/SWB I, 12 )une 1950.
38. Pravda, 23 November 1950; R. Moscow, 25 November 1950/SWB

I, 1 December 1950; also New Times, 29 November 1950.
39. R. Moscow, 22 December 1950/SWB Í, 28 December 1950.
40. R. Moscow, 5 February 1951/SWB Í, 9 February 1951.
41. R. Moscow in Arabic, 11 May 1951/SWB Í, 14 May 1951. For
details of the negotiations, see Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the
Defence of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan, December 1950-
November 1951, CMD. 8419 (London: HMSO, 1951).
42. American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Depart-
ment of State Publication 6646 (U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1957), pp. 2180-85.
43. Anthony Eden, FuJJ Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 227-28.
44. Soviet News, 27 November 1951, reprinted in Documents on
International Affairs, 1951, pp. 429-31.
45. R. Moscow in Persian, 29 December 1951/SWB Í, 4 January 1952.
46. TASS, 2 January 1952/SWB Í, 7 January 1952.
47. TASS, 8 and 9 January 1952, R. Moscow in Czech and Slovak, 13
and 14 January 1952/SWB Í, 14 and 18 January 1952; and Pravda, 25
January 1952.
48. R. Moscow in Arabic, 5 February 1952/SWB Í, 11 February 1952.
49. R. Moscow in Arabic, 3, 15 and 16 February and 12 July 1952,
and R. Moscow, 28 and 29 June and 12 and 13 July 1952/SWB Í, 8 and
21 February and 4 and 18 July 1952.
50. Zaria Vostoka, 26 July 1952; R. Moscow, 26 July 1952, TASS, 28
July 1952, and TASS in English, 29 July 1952/SWB Í, 15 August 1952.
51. R. Moscow, 18 August 1952, and TASS, 24 August 1952/SWB J,
22 and 29 August 1952. The entry on Egypt in BoVshaia sovetskaia
entsiklopediia which went to press in September 1952 concluded its
survey of Egypt's political history with a few remarks on the coup of
the "reactionary officers' group linked with the U.S.A.," that had
conducted "savage reprisals against the workers' movement." Yet—
the entry summed up optimistically —"no reaction can suppress the
struggle of the Egyptian people for its independence"—BoVshaia
sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2nd edition, vol. 15, p. 460.
52. Roger Vailland, "What I saw in Egypt," Novyi mir 4 (1953):
204-44. Vailland was a French Communist writer who had been sent to
Egypt by the organ of the French Peace Movement, Défense de la Paix,
to survey its political, economic and cultural problems. For his origi-
nal article, dated 1 October 1952, see Oeuvres Complètes de Roger Vai-
lland (Lausanne: Editions Rencontre, 1967), vol. 6, pp. 183-300.
53. A Soviet Arabic broadcast, quoting statements made by North
African and Middle Eastern delegates to the November 1952 Vienna
Peace Congress, noted the Arab peoples' determination to fight
"imperialist tyranny" and their desire to exploit alone their countries'

natural resources and live their own lives—R. Moscow in Arabic, 24
December 1952/SWR Í, 2 January 1953.
54. Seale, pp. 103-4.
55. This position had in turn been made possible by the absence of
any Soviet representative at the Security Council in the summer of
1950, following the Soviet walkout early in the year —in protest that
China continued to be represented in the U.N. by the Nationalist gov-
ernment.
56. E.g., R. Moscow in Arabic, 27 August 1952/SWB I, 1 September
1952.
57. R. Moscow, 22 and 23 September and 6 October 1949/SWB Í, 26
September and 10 October 1949; and Pravda Ukrainy, 26 November
1949.
58. G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and
Faber, 1966), p. 103.
59. R. Moscow, 3 and 15 July 1950/SWB I, 7 and 17 July 1950; see
also Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem (New York: Abelard-
Schuman, 1970) pp. 51-52. Lebanon in fact altered its position within a
few days.
60. E.g., R. Moscow in English, 24 January 1951, and R. Baku in
Turkish, 28 January 1951/SWB Í, 29 January and 2 February 1951.
61. R. Moscow in Persian, 2 February 1951/SWB Í, 9 February 1951.
63. E.g., R. Moscow in Arabic, 4 and 7 June and 26 July 1949, 19
January and 5 March 1950, and 30 June 1952, TASS in Russian for
abroad, 6 and 29 July 1949, R. Moscow in Turkish, 27 July 1949, and
TASS for home consumption, 7 and 13 January 1950/SWB Í, 10 and 13
June, 11 July and 5 August 1949, 13 January 1950 and 4 July 1952, and
SWB IV, 24 January and 14 March 1950.
64. R. Moscow in Arabic, 21 October 1949, and in English for S.E.
Asia, 10 November 1949/SWB I, 28 October 1949, and SWB IV, 15
November 1949.
65. TASS in Russian for abroad, 5 April 1950, and R. Moscow in
Arabic, 16 May 1950/SWB I, 14 April and 22 May 1950.
66. R. Moscow, 17 May 1950, and R. Moscow in Arabic, 9 June and
20 August 1950 and 21 and 25 July 1951, and TASS, 24 August 1950/
SWB I, 22 May, 15 June and 25 and 28 August 1950, and 27 and 30
July 1951; also Literaturnaia gazeta, 30 August 1951. These statistics
contained frequent contradictions and were, in any case, virtually
uncheckable.
67. Izvestiia, 17 August 1950 and 11 May 1951. For the Peace
Movement in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, see Walter Z. Laqueur, Com-
munism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Routledge and

Kegan Paul, 3rd edition, 1961), pp. 156-58, 164, 196 and 199-200.
68. In late 1949 Soviet media mentioned in this context the Work-
ers' National Liberation Committee, the National Committee of Workers
and Students, and the local trade unions—R. Moscow, 30 November
1949/SWB Í, 5 December 1949. By mid-1951, they were trying to por-
tray the Egyptian Peace Movement as the bearers of this role—R. Mos-
cow in Arabic, 20 and 23 July 1951/SWB Í, 27 July 1951.
69. Izvestiia, 6 May 1951; Pravda, 2 August 1951; and R. Moscow in
Arabic, 29 June 1952/SWB I, 4 July 1952.
71. izvestiia, 18 February 1949.
72. For these discussions, see pp. 171-73 and 218-19.
73. The statement was made in an unpublished interview with an
Egyptian journalist —Dagan, p. 42.
74. Ibid., p. 48.
75. For Drohojowski's and Lutskii's respective statements, see pp.
277-78 and 430-31.
76. Krasnaia zvezda, 14 August 1949; R. Moscow, 19 August 1949,
and TASS in Russian for abroad, 14 January 1950/SWB Í, 26 August
1949 and 20 January 1950.
77. E.g., Krasnyi flot, 18 October and 15 December 1950. For the
later development of these themes, see chap. 8, e.g., p. 353.
78. Vecherniaia Moskva, 11 December 1950; Novoe vremia, 27
December 1950; R. Moscow in Arabic and Greek and R.
Tashkent in English, 9 January 1951, TASS in Russian for abroad, 21
March 1951, R. Moscow, 29 March 1951, and TASS, 18 May 1951/SWB
Í, 15 and 19 January, 30 March, 2 April and 25 May 1951; Pravda, 18
January and 13 May 1951; izvestiia, 5 May 1951; and Krasnyi flot, 29
June 1951.
79. A. Ben-Asher [Katriel Katz], Yahasei Hutz 1948-1953 (English
title: Foreign Relations 1948-1953) (Tel Aviv: Ayanot, 1955), pp. 247-
53; also Sharett's speech in the Knesset, Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 10, pp.
277-81.
80. Vecherniaia Moskva, 25 October 1951; and Novoe vremia, 1
November 1951.
82. As quoted by Molotov in his letter to Sharett on the eve of the
renewal of diplomatic relations in July 1953— Izvestiia, 21 July 1953
(cf. p. 472).
83. R. Moscow in English for the U.K., 22 June 1949, and in Arabic
20 July 1949, TASS, 20 July and 1 August 1949, 28 November 1950
and 2 March 1951, R. Moscow, 20 August and 3 November 1949, and
440 THE U S S R A N D ISRAEL: 1947-1954
30 May 1951, and TASS in Russian for abroad, 11 and 12 November

1949, 2 January and 16 October 1950/SWB Í, 27 June, 25 July, 8 and 26
August, 7 and 21 November 1949, 6 January, 20 October and 4
December 1950, 9 March and 4 June 1951, and SWB IV, 22 November
1949; Pmvda, 21 July 1949 and 14 March 1951; Krasnaia zvezda, 30
July 1949; Vecherniaia Moskva, 2 August 1949; Literaturnaia gazeta,
25 March 1950; Krasnyi flot, 18 August and 15 December 1950;
Sovetskaia Litva, 5 December 1950; Novoe vremia, 27 February 1952;
and Vatolina, "Israel —Base of American Imperialism in the Near East,"
pp. 94-105. For a previous discussion of the Soviet media's image of
Israel in the context of the USSR's attempts to diminish its Jewish
population's interest in and identification with Israel, see above pp.
352-56.
84. Izvestiia, 24 September and 24 November 1949; Pravda, 29 and
30 September 1949; TASS, 22 October 1949/SWB Í, 29 October 1949;
and Dagan, pp. 46-47.
85. Literaturnaia gazeta, 10 September 1949.
86. "Reports and Discussions: the National Liberation Struggle in
the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries After World War II," Vop-
rosy ekonomiki 10 (1949): 84-87. For the circumstances and
significance of the Lutskii lecture, cf. also below.
87. Israel, for example, abstained on the 22 October vote on the pre-
servation of human rights and freedom in Hungary, Romania and Bul-
garia; it voted for the inclusion of Czechoslovakia rather than Yugos-
lavia in the Security Council; and it voted with the USSR on China
and Greece.
88. E.g., Literaturnaia gazeta, 25 March 1950.
89. Dagan, pp. 50-51; and Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 6, pp. 2057-58.
90. Cf. New Times, 26 July 1950, which referred to other statements
made by Sharett in the same speech.
92. The Jews in the Soviet Union, Ben Gurion had pointed out,
"have not a single school, not a single newspaper of [their] own. For
the USSR recognizes [only] the equality of nations that inhabit their
own country. It can be said about the USSR less than about any other
country that there is anti-Jewish discrimination there. Yet the same
Soviet Union that has so profoundly understood the national question
in general, has not been able to comprehend the special nature of the
Jewish problem, the special nature of the tragedy of a dispersed nation
that can live and be like other nations only in its own homeland." For
Ben Gurion's Afikim speech, where he had made the first public
appeal of any Israeli statesman for immigration from the USSR, see
p. 344.
93. ízvestiia, 28 September and 14 October 1950; Pravda Ukrainy,

29 September and 6 October 1950; and Pravda, 14 October 1950.
94. Pravda, 15 January 1951; and ízvestiia, 16 January 1951; cf. also
Pravda Ukrainy, 15 December 1950.
95. For a favorable comment on Israeli activity over Korea, cf., e.g.,
ízvestiia, 7 January 1952; at the end of 1952, on the other hand, Soviet
references to Israel's stand over Korea were once again negative; e.g.,
Pravda, 16 November 1952 (this may have been connected with the
general anti-Israel tone that permeated Soviet remarks on Israel in the
month of the Slánsky Trial).
96. R. Moscow in English for the U.K., 26 December 1950/SWB Í, 1
January 1951; and ízvestiia, 1 March 1951.
97. For the Soviet position on the relative aspects of the German
problem in a general foreign policy context, see Shulman, pp. 168-71
and 191-94; for a short account of the reparations issue in the context
of Israeli foreign policy, see Ben-Asher, pp. 237-48; for the content of
the January 1951 notes, see Ha-Aretz, 18 January 1951; also Dagan, p.
65; and Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 10, pp. 895-964.
99. Vecherniaia Moskva, 1 November 1950; and ízvestiia, 14
November 1951 and 31 January 1952.
100. For the Israeli vote, see GA OR, 7th Session, 389th Plenary
Meeting, 25 October 1952.
101. See p. 217.
102. TASS, 2 October 1949/SWB ÍV, 11 October 1949.
103. SWB I, 17 February 1950.
104. TASS for home consumption, 1 March 1950/SWB Í, 6 March
1950.
106. R. israeJ in Yiddish, 11 June 1950/SWB ÍV, 16 June 1950.
107. Literaturnaia gazeta, 28 June 1950. The Mapai leadership had
published a statement on 10 June saying that the Peace Movement
institutions were being patronized by one side in the cold war and that
as a result it did not consider the signing of the appeal appropriate to
Israel's non-alignment policy. Mapai did not, however, forbid its mem-
bers to sign—R. israel, 10 June 1950, and Voice of Zion in English, 11
June 1950/SWB ÍV, 16 June 1950.
The statistics provided by the Soviet media were not entirely consis-
tent (cf. n. 66): Vecherniaia Moskva, for example, had reported 140,000
signatures by 28 June; nevertheless, the picture portrayed here was
fairly representative of the general curve —cf. also Novoe vremia, 7 July
1950, and Pravda Vostoka, 11 August 1950.
108. ízvestiia, 25 November 1950.
109. Krasnyi flot, 28 December 1950.

110. izvestiia noted on 1 March 1951 the speech at Berlin of Maki
activist Ruth Lubitz.
111. Literaturnaia gazeta, 4 October 1951.
113. Izvestiia, 6 November 1951. Pravda's survey of the speeches of
the other delegates, including those from the Arab countries, gave the
main gist of their messages.
114. Zaria Vostoka, 1 July 1952; and Trud, 8 August 1952.
115. Certain trade union organizations, notably the A.F.L., had
remained aloof from the beginning. Yet in 1948-49 others had with-
drawn, including the second major American labor organization, the
C.I.O., the British T.U.C. and the French C.G.T. The Israeli differences
of opinion were expressed by the Histadrut's Mapai and Mapam dele-
gates, the former tending to favor secession—Voice of Israel, 28 and 30
May 1949/SWB ÍV, 7 June 1949; and an article by M. Oren in Miyoman
Ha-Mazkirut 10 (28 March 1949).
116. Trud, 14 April 1950; and R. Moscow, 17 April 1950/SWB IV, 25
April 1950.
117. Trud, 12 May 1950; TASS, 13 May, 5 June and 11 September
1950, and R. Moscow 16 May and 5 June 1950/SWB Í, 19 and 22 May
and 15 September 1950, and SWB IV, 9 June 1950; izvestiia, 14 May
1950; Pravda, 31 May 1950; and New Times, 20 September 1950.
118. For earlier interest in the League, cf. pp. 179-80.
119. Pravda and Izvestiia, 6 November 1949. The Soviet media
reported several times in this period Israeli declarations concerning
Soviet support of Israel in its war of independence and the related
refusal of the Israeli population to join the anti-Soviet camp. In 1950
Radio Moscow published a Maki Independence Day statement to the
effect that Israel's struggle for independence had once more shown
that the Anglo-American imperialists were its "sworn enemies" and
that the people would never forget "the decisive political and other
assistance" rendered by the USSR and the People's Democracies—R.
Moscow in English for the U.K., 24 April 1950/SWB I, 28 April 1950.
120. Vecherniaia Moskva, 7 May 1951.
121. Pravda, 23 October 1949.
122. Pravda, 25 October 1949.
123. For the 11th Maki convention, see also TASS in Russian for
abroad, 22 and 26 October 1949, and R. Moscow, 24 October 1949/SWB
Í, 26 and 31 October 1949, and SWB IV, 28 October 1949; and Izves-
tiia, 23, 25 and 27 October 1949. Wilner's statement was based on a
formula used by French Communist Party Secretary-General Maurice
Thorez in February 1949; see Shulman, p. 58. The charge of discrimi-
nation against Israel's Arab minority was frequently reiterated in this

period, whether in order to win over that minority, or to gain credit in
the Arab countries, or perhaps to blacken Israel's image in radical Jew-
ish circles in the West or even among Soviet Jewry, cf. pp. 354-55.
124. R. Moscow, 3 November 1949/SWB Í, 7 November 1949. For
earlier attempts to set up a popular front that would include Mapam
and Maki, see pp. 178 and 214-15.
125. R. Tashkent in English for the East, 25 January 1950, TASS in
Russian for abroad, 26 January 1950/SWB Í, 30 January 1950; Vecher-
niaia Moskva, 27 January 1950; and Izvestiia, 28 January 1950.
126. TASS in Russian for abroad, 11 May 1951/SWB I, 15 May 1951.
127. Trud and Krasnyi flot, 12 May 1951.
128. One Soviet paper describing "the growing determination" of
the opposition to government policy on the part of "the country's real
master, the people," referred to the Mapam paper Al Ha-Mishmar as
"reflecting the opinion of a decisive number of inhabitants" —Krasnyi
flot, 15 December 1950. Cf. pp. 176-79.
129. R. Israel, 15 July 1950/SWB W, 21 July 1950. Galili was a
member of Mapam's Ahdut Ha-Avoda faction.
130. TASS quoted AJ Ha-Mishmar as saying that the Israeli govern-
ment's decision to support the U.S.A. over Korea was a betrayal of the
Israeli p e o p l e - T A S S , 7 August 1950/SWB Í, 11 August 1950.
132. R. Moscow, 13 May 1951/SWB Í, 15 May 1951.
133. New Times, Supplement, 9 July 1952, pp. 13-14.
134. Trud, 8 August 1952.
135. Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2nd edition, vol. 15, p.
517. Soviet reservations about Mapam's attitude to "the national ques-
tion" reflected that party's consistent position on the question of the
right of Jews the world over, including Soviet Jews, to emigrate to
Israel —e.g., Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 1, pp. 860-61, 29 June 1949, and a
programmatic article by Yaacov Riftin, in Al Ha-Mishmar, 30 April
1950, in which he stressed that political rapprochement between Israel
and the USSR would inter alia create a link between Israel and Soviet
Jewry.
136. Voprosy ekonomiki 10 (1949): 84-87.
10
The Soviet Stand on the

Arab-Israeli Conflct,
May 1949-March 1953
THE CONFLICT IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET

MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY
The period that followed the 1949 General Armistice

Agreements saw relative quiet in the Arab-Israeli theater. Yet
the conflict was clearly not solved by these agreements and
remained a potential threat to international peace and a major
issue on the international agenda.
Soviet spokesmen and media had attributed the Palestine War
to Britain's, and to a lesser extent also the United States', efforts
to promote their strategic, political and economic goals in the
region, namely: a. control of key strategic areas and positions;
b. diversion of the Arabs' attention from their subservience to
foreign domination and their repression by Britain's local
lickspittles; and c. Western control of the Middle East's natural
resources, especially oil. As the war progressed Soviet sources
talked of the resentment of the Arab peoples at the adventure
into which the Arab armies had been dragged in Palestine
which they duly attributed to foreign interference in their
affairs. The Palestine War, it was alleged, enabled the Western
powers to exert new pressures on the Arab world and exploit
the political, social and military weakness the Arabs had
demonstrated and the economic difficulties the war had created,
so as to preserve unpopular regimes and increase dependence
on the West; the latter included participation in Western
445
military planning in the context of the East-West confrontation.

The termination of the Palestine War was no less an object of
Soviet censure than its conduct. Since 1947 (and even earlier),
the USSR had hoped the international handling of the Palestine
question would enable it to participate in resolving one of the
Middle East's most urgent and complex problems. The Soviet
Union had made various efforts to penetrate the organizations
set up to supervise developments concerning Palestine and to
ensure maximum handling by the Security Council of which it
was a permanent member. It had also advocated direct
negotiations between Arabs and Israelis so as to prevent or
diminish Western influence on the peace-making process. Yet
all these efforts had been systematically countered by the West
which sought to forestall any Soviet penetration of the region.
As a result, Western representatives and interests enjoyed full
hegemony over the mediation and truce supervision machinery
during the war and continued to monopolize the instruments
created to implement the armistice agreements.
The various U.N. bodies and committees delegated to handle
the different aspects of the Palestine problem, and their
domination, or alleged domination, by Western powers did not,
however, determine the Soviet attitude to the substance of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. With the signing of the armistice
agreements the Soviet Establishment undertook a review of the
conflict and its global and regional implications, and also of the
war that had so recently come to an end. In his lecture at the
June 1949 symposium on the national liberation struggle in the
"colonial, semi-colonial and dependent" countries that was part
of the réévaluation of these countries in the context of Soviet
foreign policy goals, Soviet orientalist Vladimir Lutskii said
that it was largely due to the Palestine War that "all the
objective conditions for the development of a national liberation
movement exist at the present time in the Arab countries. The
Palestine War has made acute the crisis of the colonial system
in the Near East, has shown to the Arab popular masses the
total rottenness and the reactionary nature of the ruling cliques
of the Arab countries and unmasked their intimate ties with
English and American imperialism. It has worsened the already
difficult economic situation of the Arab peoples, led them to
the verge of economic disaster and brought numerous
calamities upon the popular masses, upon whose shoulders the
entire burden of the war was laid." 1
The justification of Soviet policies and diplomacy during the
Soviet Stand on Arab-Israeli Conflict 447
Palestine War was thus no longer the establishment of the

Jewish State. While the Soviet Union still supported Israel's
continued existence, this was now presented as a mere means
toward another end, and not an end in itself. Since no further
achievement could be anticipated from continued support of
Israel, which was now described as an entity totally different
from the "democratic" state the USSR had envisaged in
November 1947, the emphasis reverted to the possibility of
assisting the Arabs —with the ultimate purpose of overthrowing
the pro-Western regimes that ruled the Arab countries and
ousting Britain from its remaining positions in the Middle East.
The Security Council renewed its discussion of the Palestine
question, for the first time since the end of the fighting, in
August 1949. The Council's agenda consisted this time of: a.
Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche's report on the negotiations that
had preceded the armistice agreements and the situation of the
truce as defined in these agreements; and b. his request to
terminate the role of Mediator since, he insisted, the armistice
agreements had made it superfluous, assigning to the
Conciliation Commission the task of bringing about a final
peace settlement. 2
On 8 and again on 11 August the Soviet and Ukrainian
delegates renewed their call of the previous year for direct
negotiations between Arabs and Israelis. They favored
abolishing the entire mediation machinery and leaving the
achievement of a final settlement to the sides themselves
without external interference and pressures. Yet the Soviet
proposal was defeated; the Council decided to retain the
observers, although reducing their number, as well as the
Conciliation Commission. It ordered General William E. Riley,
chief of staff of the now independent U.N. Truce Supervision
Organization, to report to it regularly on the observation of the
truce and the conditions of the armistice agreements, while the
Conciliation Commission was to handle the political aspects of
the Palestine question. 3
The Soviet attitude of principle that called for direct
Arab-Israeli negotiations was intended on the operative plane to
minimize Western influences in the Arab-Israeli arena. The
possibility must not be ruled out, however, that Soviet
advocacy of direct negotiations emanated in part at least from
the assumption that there was in fact no chance whatever of
implementing them and, hence, nothing to lose from
demanding them. Whichever consideration motivated Soviet
thinking, the only direct contacts that took place did not satisfy
it. The USSR viewed with open disfavor the talks that took
place between Israel and Transjordan in late 1949-early 1950
with the aim of achieving a non-aggression treaty between
them. The reason presumably was the derogatory Soviet
attitude toward 'Abdallah and his efforts to annex the greater
part of the area allotted by the partition resolution to the
independent Palestinian Arab State and eventually to establish
a Greater Syria. 4 Indeed, as late as the fall of 1949 the official
Soviet position was still the establishment of an independent
Arab state in Palestine. Semen Tsarapkin told the U.N. General
Assembly's Fourth Regular Session Ad Hoc Political Committee
that an ever-increasing public opinion among Palestine's Arab
population was demanding just this. 5 In addition to the direct
Soviet denunciation of Israeli contacts with 'Abdallah, the
Mapam daily, Al Ha-Mishmar, said the Soviet bloc would be
manifesting greater consideration of Israeli interests were it not
for Israel's suggestions to arrive at a peace settlement with
Jordan. 6
The chief Soviet objection to Israel's contacts with Amman
and the legitimization of 'Abdallah's annexation was that these
would strengthen Britain's position in the area. Moreover, in
1949 the Soviet side had already recognized the importance of
the Arab-Israeli conflict as an obstacle to Western strategic
planning, which —it contended—included attempts to reconcile
Arabs and Israelis with a view to enabling a regional military
bloc to be established. The Pax Occidentala imposed by the
Tripartite Declaration thus created a common interest between
the Soviet Union and the Arabs who were not ready to
reconcile themselves to the existence of the Israeli State. 7
Yet, although the general theme was that of Western attempts
to impose an Arab-Israeli settlement on the sides concerned, a
number of Soviet commentators continued to contend that the
Western powers were trying to exacerbate the Arab-Israeli
conflict. 8 One of these voices was the organ of the Armed
Forces Ministry. In an article that stressed Anglo-American
differences and rivalries in the area and attributed the
deterioration of relations among the Arabs to the opposing
orientations of the various Arab states —some being pro-British
and others pro-American —Krasnaia zvezda maintained that the
two imperialist powers were also making every effort to
aggravate "animosity between Arabs and Jews." Arab-Israeli
hostility was said to "enable the imperialists to interfere
permanently in the domestic affairs of both the Arab countries

and the State of Israel." 9 In times of active hostility,
moreover—for example, during the crisis on the Syrian border
in the spring of 1951 (see below) —all were agreed that the
Western powers had purposely aggravated the situation. "In
their rivalry," a Syrian Communist Party activist wrote in the
Cominform organ, "both American and British imperialists use
the Israel Government for the purpose of exercising pressure on
the Arab Governments and facilitating realisation of their
military plans." 1 0
As Moscow's prospects for improving relations with the Arab
states grew, Soviet officials and information media sought to
indicate Arab-Israeli differences to prove the USSR's
community of interests with the Arabs. The theme of the West's
use of the non-Arab states to promote its own interests in the
Middle East—which had earlier stressed in particular Turkey's
role as a Western factotum and indicated traditional
Turkish-Arab animosities —now came to include Israel. Turkey
and Israel together, Soviet sources stated, were seeking to
divide the region between them in return for the assistance they
rendered the West. 11
The USSR thus derived a double benefit from the existence of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the first place it profited directly
from Arab hopes that the Soviet Union would give the Arab
states the help they sought against Israel and which the
Western powers were unable to proffer (cf. p. 404). (A number
of pro-Western elements in the Arab world continued in the
early 1950s to insist that the USSR was actually aiding Israel;
they spread stories of large numbers of East European
immigrants to Israel, etc.) Second, Moscow gained indirectly as
a result of the explicit Western interest in minimizing the
issues at stake and even terminating the conflict if at all
possible. Even in these years of relative calm the conflict was
sufficiently alive for the Western desire to end it to be doomed.
Although aware that the Arab-Israeli conflict was one of the
central components of Middle Eastern politics 1 2 and cognizant
of the advantages likely to accrue from it for the USSR, the
Soviet leadership exercised the utmost caution in all that
related to the conflict in the May 1949-March 1953 period. Its
unequivocally pro-Arab stand in the international arena was not
matched on the level of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet
Union did not even take advantage of its growing anti-Israel
position in order to win sympathy or popularity in the Arab
45Ü THE USSR AND ISRAEL: 1947-1954
world, as evidenced by the scarcity of this theme in its Arabic

propaganda. The reason for this disinclination to intervene
directly in the conflict on the political level was probably the
consciousness of Soviet weakness in the region and a lack of
desire to put its somewhat nebulous achievements to too early a
test, especially in view of the pro-Western tendencies of the
Arab regimes.
The almost total omission in the Soviet media of any
reference to the conflict as such was a sure indication of this
caution. Even in late 1952, when Soviet anti-Israel propaganda
was reaching unprecedented intensity in a variety of other
contexts, the central press ignored totally both the debates on
the Palestine question at the Seventh Regular Session of the
General Assembly and the Soviet bloc vote together with the
Arab states on 18 December. A solitary reference to the debates
in the republican press restricted itself to their narrow, formal
framework—the work of the Conciliation Commission —evading
entirely their wider aspects and implications and ignoring the
Soviet vote. 13 At the U.N. itself, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Valerian Zorin explained his delegation's vote by reminding the
Assembly Plenary that the USSR had opposed the Conciliation
Commission from the moment of its creation and even before. 14
"My delegation," he said, "has frequently pointed out that this
Conciliation Commission, set up on the initiative of the United
States and directed by that country, does not and cannot serve
the cause of peace in the Near and Middle East and cannot
promote the settlement of disputes which have arisen between
States in that region. On the country . . . it . . . aggravates the
position and is contrary to the interests of the inhabitants of
that area." 15
On the whole, the December 1952 vote was an exception as
Soviet wariness of involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was
not restricted to the media; during the four years under
discussion the stand of the USSR's U.N. delegation was no less
ambivalent and evasive. It consistently abstained, especially on
the operative level, i.e. in the Security Council. The Soviet
Union's hesitancy, if not actual aloofness, is thus borne out by
an examination of its stand on the specific issues which
troubled the international arena in this period: Jerusalem, the
Arab refugees, the demilitarized zones on the Syrian-Israeli
border and passage through the Suez Canal.
JERUSALEM
The status of Jerusalem had been a particularly thorny issue

from the moment the Palestine question had been brought
before the U.N. 16 The USSR had supported the city's inter-
nationalization as stipulated in the November 1947 partition
resolution. Despite Soviet opposition to the activities of the
Trusteeship Council as an instrument of imperialism by
definition (cf. p. 118), the Soviet U.N. delegation had duly
taken its place in the Council—which had been empowered by
that resolution to supervise its implementation regarding
Jerusalem—when it began in April 1948 to prepare the requisite
statute for the city. 17
Meanwhile, the intense interest the USSR was manifesting in
the property of the Orthodox Church and the Russian Palestine
Society (cf. p. 182) may well have been intended inter alia to
strengthen the Soviet standing in Jerusalem so as to make its
influence more strongly felt on this issue.
Gromyko's opposition to Bernadotte's June 1948 demand to
demilitarize Jerusalem had likewise been based on the conten-
tion that the mediator's desire to effect this by means of a spe-
cial U.N. force contradicted the 1947 resolution. 18 At the Third
Regular Session of the General Assembly the Soviet delegation
had continued officially to insist on the fulfillment of the parti-
tion resolution in all that concerned Jerusalem. Israeli represen-
tatives, however, who met with their Soviet counterparts were
under the impression that they had left the door open for
changes in the direction called for by Israel on the grounds that
the U.N. had failed to impose the Jerusalem statute. 19
The proximity of the Soviet and Israeli stands on Jerusalem
was highlighted by the presence of Minister Ershov at the open-
ing of the first Knesset in Jerusalem on 14 February 1949. (Just
a few davs before, the Israeli government had decided to
implement regular Israeli administrative procedures in
Jerusalem, insisting that Jerusalem was an integral part of
Israel.) The Soviet participation in the ceremony was particu-
larly noticeable in view of the absence of the entire Western
diplomatic colony—except for the Dutch minister—and the fact
that Ershov was accompanied by Polish Consul-General Loc and
two other members of the Soviet Legation staff.20
Yet when the Fourth Regular Session of the Assembly con-
vened in the fall of 1949, the USSR was careful to refrain from
adopting any stand on Jerusalem. As late as 23 November, the

day prior to the opening of the discussion on Jerusalem in the
Ad Hoc Political Committee, Israeli sources believed the Soviet
position to be undecided. 2 1 Yet within a few days the Belorus-
sian, Ukrainian and Soviet delegates were once more support-
ing internationalization in accordance with the November 1947
formula. 22
Soviet media and officials insisted that their government had
reverted to its original position to prevent Jerusalem's domina-
tion by 'Abdallah, and not for any reasons of an anti-Israel
nature. This contention seems indeed to have been borne out by
events.
Soviet comment on the termination of the work of the
Assembly Political Committee's sub-committee, set up to
examine the various proposals regarding the status of
Jerusalem, noted that it had dealt with three draft resolutions:
a. that of the Conciliation Commission which suggested that
Jerusalem be divided between Israel and Britain's puppet state,
Transjordan. This suggestion, according to TASS, ignored the
1947 resolution that had insisted on the separation of Jerusalem
from the rest of Palestine as an independent entity controlled
by an international regime under U.N. supervision, with the
Trusteeship Council enjoying administrative authority;
b. an Australian proposal to authorize the Conciliation Com-
mission to alter its draft to bring it closer to the partition resol-
ution and set a plan for a solution of the problem before the
Fifth Regular Session of the Assembly in the fall of 1950;
c. Israel's proposal to empower the U.N. Secretary-General to
reach an agreement on behalf of the U.N. with the government
of Israel on the supervision and protection of the Holy Places.
The Soviet delegation, TASS noted, had suggested an
amendment to the Australian proposal, according to which the
Trusteeship Council would complete at the Fifth Regular Ses-
sion the proposed statute for Jerusalem by introducing changes
in favor of greater democratization of the city's regime. Indeed,
TASS reported, the sub-committee had adopted the Soviet
amendment as well as one proposed by El Salvador and the
Australian proposal on which these were based. 23
TASS reported the Plenary debate on the day the vote was
taken, 9 December, with a detailed list of those who voted for
and against internationalization. The Trusteeship Council, it
said, would now be compelled to complete the preparation of a
statute for the city that would promote democratization. The
Council, too, would have to ratify the statute and implement

it. 24
Indeed, a Soviet delegate once more participated in the dis-
cussions of the Trusteeship Council, in spite of the USSR's gen-
eral ban on that body, while Soviet media renewed their com-
ment on its proceedings and activities. 25
Explaining the Soviet stand to the Knesset—despite the
embarrassment it caused Maki which had hitherto supported
Israel's annexation of New Jerusalem—Meir Wilner emphasized
that during the U.N. debate of the Jerusalem question the Soviet
delegation had directed "all its criticism" at 'Abdallah, the
Conciliation Commission and British and U.S. policy. The
Soviet proposal was not leveled against Israel or "the Jews of
Jerusalem." 26
Sharett seemingly agreed. Pointing out in the same forum
that for the first time the USSR and its allies had voted against
Israel on an issue of vital importance and directly relevant to
the latter, he said: "It is, therefore, important to emphasize that
Soviet representatives have told us repeatedly that their stand
on the question of Jerusalem is on no account to be seen as an
expression of any change in the USSR's attitude to the State of
Israel. They have requested us to consider their position as a
separate and isolated matter. . . . They say that their com-
prehensive support of the 29 November resolution in all its
parts and their position regarding the Arab factor, that in fact
controls the Old City and its adjuncts at the present, left them
no alternative other than support on principle of the entire
internationalization plan. . . .
"We," Sharett went on, "much appreciated this explanation
in view of the goodwill it shows, yet we are not content. . . .
We shall continue in the near future—as we did before and
have done during the session of the Assembly—to make every
effort to prove to the USSR and its allies at the U.N. that the
path we have taken is the only way likely to sustain Jerusalem,
to meet the just demands of the State of Israel and the entire
Jewish people without harming any just cause of other group-
ings, and to promote peace, stability, security and progress." 2 7
Despite its unequivocal support of internationalization in
1949, the USSR changed its position early in 1950. On 17 April
Iakov Malik presented Trygve Lie with a Note informing him
that the Soviet government considered it impossible to continue
supporting the internationalization resolution since it realized
that this contradicted the wish of both the Arab and Jewish
inhabitants of Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine. 28 TASS noted

on the occasion that the special regime stipulated by the 29
November 1947 resolution had not yet been established and it
was clear that the resolution had become antiquated. The Soviet
government was nonetheless "convinced" that the U.N. would
be able to find a solution for the Jerusalem problem that both
the Arab and Jewish sections of the city would "accept." 2 9
The December 1949 stand taken by the USSR had been an
official continuation of declared Soviet policy on the 29
November 1947 resolution although countering a number of
indications in an opposite direction. Its apparent motive was
indeed to delay or prevent the legitimation of Transjordan's
annexation of the Arab part of Palestine as a whole and
Jerusalem in particular. It was thus logical that when such
hopes were proved futile the USSR saw no point in continuing
to push them. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Lavrent'ev's
description of the April 1950 volte-face as a gesture of friend-
ship toward Israel 30 seems no more convincing than the argu-
ment that the earlier position emanated from an anti-Israel posi-
tion. 31
Whatever the Soviet motives, the implications of the Note to
Trygve Lie were undoubted. Just as the Soviet bloc votes had
made possible the adoption of the December 1949 resolution, so
the reversal of the Soviet position meant that internationaliza-
tion no longer had majority support.
In the following years the USSR's attitude to Israel's various
practical measures to convert Jerusalem into its capital was
ambivalent. Although one commentator reported the transfer to
Jerusalem by "the Tel Aviv authorities" of some government
institutions "as though to stress their right to Jerusalem," 32 and
another source accused the United States of agreeing that
Israel's capital be transferred to Jerusalem, 33 the USSR let it be
understood that they too agreed to this step de facto.34
THE ARAB REFUGEES
The question of the Arab refugees was a further issue that

troubled the international arena. When it had first arisen in
summer 1948 the Soviet Union had immediately appreciated its
political nature and insisted that it had to be dealt with by
political rather than humanitarian means. The USSR had
accused Britain, and to a lesser extent also the United States, of
creating the entire issue, reiterating the Israeli contention that
large numbers of Arabs had fled from their homes before the
termination of the Mandate. 3 5
Returning to the subject in the spring of 1949, the Soviet
media repeated the above themes. In one broadcast Radio Mos-
cow said the British and Americans were taking advantage of
the plight of the Arab refugees to employ them in constructing
military bases and strategic highways; it noted too that Glubb
Pasha had called for help to be given the refugees so as to miti-
gate their hatred for the British and prevent their resentment
leading them to Communism. 3 6 The British, the same station
said later in the year, were exaggerating the dimensions of the
refugee problem as a pretext for giving economic and social aid
to the Arabs; it was noteworthy in this context that the refugees
who suffered most were those in the British puppet state of
Transjordan. 37 Krasnaia zvezda also reported the physical and
political privations of the refugees in Transjordan and reminded
its readers that while some Arabs had abandoned their homes
as a result of the fighting, entire villages—tens of thousands of
human beings— had been uprooted under the threat of the Arab
Legion's bayonets and 'Abdallah's false promises. The Middle
Eastern peoples protesting "the catastrophic situation" 01 ihe
Arab refugees, the paper was convinced, would not be led
astray by the lies of the West; they knew that only the USSR
protected small peoples. 3 8
In December 1949 the Soviet press reported the establishment
of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) which it
described as "first and foremost a means for the further penetra-
tion of Anglo-American imperialism into the countries of the
Near East and a means of strengthening its positions in these
countries." The Soviet bloc countries, it was noted, had
opposed this step. 3 9 Indeed, the Soviet media returned several
times in the following period to the political and military
advantages the West derived from its control of the various
organizations that gave what was supposed to be aid to the
Arab refugees. 40 UNRWA's annual report became the occasion
for regular debates on the refugee problem. Toward the end of
1950 Soviet sources for the first time quoted the demands con-
cerning the refugees voiced by the Arab delegations—the Fifth
Regular Session of the General Assembly saw the beginning of
Soviet-Arab cooperation (on Korea). Soviet attention was drawn
to the Egyptian representative's criticism of U.N. activity
regarding Palestine especially on the refugee issue, and the
debate on the question of relief, repatriation and financial com-
pensation for the property "taken" from them—noting the refer-

ences of the Lebanese, Egyptian and Transjordanian delegates
to the hardships the refugees were enduring. 4 1
In the following year Izvestiia covered Palestinian refugee
demonstrations in Lebanon on the occasion of a visit by
Secretary-General Lie. The refugees, the paper wrote, carried
slogans: "We want to return to Palestine; We reject all projects
for our settlement outside Palestine; We shall return to our
native land despite repression and terror." Lie's car had been
greeted with hisses. 4 2
Later in the year the Soviet press pointed out that Egypt was
persisting in its advocacy of the Arab states' demands for the
return of the Arab refugees to their homes and their compensa-
tion for the material damage done them. 4 3 The Western powers,
on the other hand, were said to be taking advantage of the
refugee problem to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Arab
countries. A draft resolution they had proposed to the General
Assembly Political Committee had been adorned with false
phrases about aid to ameliorate the position of the countries of
the region; in fact, refugee relief was a pretext for violating the
sovereignty of these states and subjugating them economically.
As a result the proposal had aroused the anger of the Arab rep-
resentatives as well as of other delegations. 44
Soviet comment on the last General Assembly Regular Ses-
sion of the period, the seventh, was on similar lines. It too was
relatively sparse. Most speakers at the Ad Hoc Political Com-
mittee, it was noted, had pointed out the failure of the U.N. to
render real assistance to the Arabs, doing nothing either to help
them return to their homes or "to rehabilitate them by perma-
nent settlement in other countries." Their number had reached
over a million and their situation was extremely difficult
despite the considerable U.N. expenditure on them. Yet while
the Soviet press recorded Arab criticisms of Israel for persecut-
ing the Arabs of Palestine and compelling them to leave their
homes, it also noted the Israeli delegate's remark that the Arab
governments were doing nothing to alleviate the situation of
the refugees in their respective countries. 4 5
As on other issues relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the
Soviet Union was aware of both the inherent political dynamite
and its own total inability to influence developments. As a
result the Soviet stand was carefully and consistently equivocal
and non-committal. 46
BORDER INCIDENTS
The international arena was similarly troubled, even if less

regularly, by problems arising from the frontier lines fixed by
the General Armistice Agreements. Particularly complicated
were the arrangements concerning the demilitarized zones
whose formation the USSR had opposed in 1948 on the
grounds that they would be a source of continued conflict and
necessitate the presence of a considerable observer force. 47 The
Mixed Armistice Commissions were duly preoccupied with
recurrent incidents that bred not only complaints by both sides
to the U.N. Secretariat but also Security Council debates.
The most serious of these incidents in the 1949-53 period
came to a peak in spring 1951. It was an outcome of Israel's
plans to drain the Huleh Lake, which necessitated the digging
of canals within one of the demilitarized zones stipulated by
the Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement. 4 8 The first Soviet reac-
tion attributed the trouble on the border to Anglo-U.S.
4
'intrigue." London and Washington were seeking to divert the
attention of the Arab and Israeli masses from the struggle for
peace, national independence, bread and employment and to
link the Arab and Israeli peoples to their aggressive war plans.
They hoped that in "dividing the Middle Eastern peoples by
encouraging hostility and ill-feeling among them," they would
compel the parties concerned to turn to them for help and
obtain military bases in the region. The U.N. officials were
likewise exacerbating Arab-Jewish differences instead of help-
ing establish peace. The sole solution had to be the expulsion
from all of Palestine and the Arab East of the imperialists and
their troops. 4 9
A further Soviet comment said that the U.S. ambassador in
Israel had been indulging in "suspicious activity" in connec-
tion with the Israeli-Syrian frontier incidents. The U.S. govern-
ment was said to be trying to avoid a U.N. discussion of the
situation in the hope that the sides concerned might achieve a
compromise solution and out of fear that such a discussion
would reveal "to whom the clues point." Indeed, it was noted,
American pressure on the Israeli and Syrian governments had
caused them to review their positions and consent to a discus-
sion at the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. 50 Both
governments were in their turn "insisting" on creating an acute
frontier situation to distract attention from the military obliga-
tions they had undertaken vis-à-vis the U.S.A. as well as from

"the anti-Soviet intrigues conducted in alliance with the Turk-
ish Government." 5 1
Pravda published a long article in mid-April describing the
incidents which noted that the Mixed Armistice Commission
was totally under U.S. influence and reiterated a call by Kol
Ha-Am for its abolition and for a struggle against the war fever
that had been kindled and for peace and friendship among all
nations. 5 2
The first Security Council debate on the Syrian-Israeli
conflict—on 17 April 1951—was reported by Pravda to be the
consequence of approaches by both sides, each of which had
accused the other of violating the armistice agreement and try-
ing to occupy the demilitarized zone. A laconic reference to the
Council's second meeting on this issue on 25 April merely
noted that UNTSO Chief of Staff General Riley had spoken in
terms similar to the Israeli representative, who had insisted that
Syria had provoked the conflict. 53
The further deterioration in the situation early in May, when
fighting was renewed following the penetration of Syrian forces
into the demilitarized zone, was followed closely by the Soviet
media. "It was officially announced in Tel Aviv," Pravda wrote,
that "Syrian troops penetrated Israeli territory" even beyond the
demilitarized zone. The same paper went on to record an Israeli
military spokesman's estimate that the Syrian force had been
larger than a company and had been supported by fire from the
Syrian side of the border, as well as his announcement that
Israeli forces had "hurled the opponent back" on to Syrian ter-
ritory. 54 Another source also noted the seriousness of the
clashes and commented on the demands of the Israeli "progres-
sive" press for the elimination of the U.N. " 'observer' "machin-
ery and armistice commissions as well as the abolition of the
demilitarized zones since these were being used by the Ameri-
cans to spread a war psychosis. 5 5
Renewed discussions in the Security Council were once more
reported in brief. The Armed Forces Ministry organ wrote that
the United States, Britain, France and Turkey had proposed a
cease-fire after stating that it was difficult to decide which side
was guilty of creating the crisis. The paper reported the main
arguments of the two sides. It cited both Israeli representative
Eban's demand that the Council decide not only on a cease-fire
but also on the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the demilitar-
ized zone, and the Syrian rejection of Israel's charges concern-
ing Syria's responsibility for the conflict and suggestion that the
Council order the withdrawal of all armed troops from the
demilitarized zone and the restoration to their homes of the
inhabitants driven away by the Israelis. Finally, Krasnaia
zvezda noted the rejection by the entire Council of the Syrian
and the Israeli proposed amendments, all its members —except
the USSR, whose delegation abstained—voting in favor of a
cease-fire on the basis of the 15 July 1948, 11 August 1949 and
17 November 1950 resolutions and the obligations of both sides
under the armistice agreement. 56
During the final Security Council resolution that terminated
the discussion of the crisis in that forum (S/2152/Rev.2), the
same scenario was repeated: the Soviet delegate took no part in
the debate and the USSR was again the only abstainer, while all
other members voted in favor. 57
Summing up the crisis, Pravda quoted a Maki statement to
show that the danger of incidents could be eliminated "if the
government of Israel relinquishes its subordination to the
imperialists and its participation in American preparations for
war." 5 8
The Soviet stand on this crisis highlights the Soviet determi-
nation to remain aloof from the issue of Arab-Israeli confronta-
tion. Soviet comment throughout refrained from referring to the
substance of the problem, the drainage of the Huleh area and
the use of water sources; even the key questions in the frontier
situation that could not be ignored completely (secure borders,
return of Arab inhabitants, etc.) received only the sparsest and
most non-committal mention. The close following of events,
however, testifies that standing aloof was not an indication of
apathy, but rather of political impotence. In consequence of this
weakness the USSR, although aware of the West's basic need
and desire for peace in the Middle East, was unable to take
advantage of crisis situations which —like the peace-keeping
procedure and machinery—could be controlled and influenced
only by the Western powers.
THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE ARAB EMBARGO

One more specific issue was of major import in the years
under discussion: the use of the Suez Canal and Egypt's
embargo on Israeli shipping and cargoes on their way to and
from Israeli ports.
These limitations imposed by Egypt within the framework of
its confrontation with Israel clearly contradicted current Soviet

theory on navigation in international waterways. Following the
failure of the USSR's attempt in 1945-46 to obtain preferential
status in the Turkish Straits similar to that enjoyed by the
United States in the Panama Canal and by Britain at Gibraltar
and in the Suez Canal, its publicists had consistently
expounded freedom of navigation. 59 Indeed, this contradiction
occasionally evoked adverse comment in the Soviet media 6 0 as
well as finding expression in Soviet-Egyptian bilateral relations.
In 1949 a minor diplomatic incident resulted from the refusal of
the Port Said authorities to provide food and medical supplies
to a Soviet ship which had visited Haifa. The Soviet Legation in
Cairo protested to the Egyptian government contending this
was a violation of international principles. 6 1 An obviously ne-
gative, although restrained, description of an Egyptian search of
a Soviet ship to ensure that it had not visited Israel appeared in
the same year in a central Soviet newspaper. 6 2
The issue was complicated by Soviet awareness of tne
strategic importance of the Suez Canal, especially for the British
Empire and in the context of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Despite
the obstacles and reservations, the Egyptian demand for com-
plete control of the Canal was therefore frequently approved by
Soviet sources especially in the 1950-51 period. 6 3 Thus, when
Egyptian limitations on use of the Canal became an issue of
international debate, the USSR sought to use the opportunity to
prove the significance and sincerity of its friendship for the
Egyptian people—especially since Egypt found itself confront-
ing the Western powers.
The Security Council first addressed itself to the question of
navigation in the Canal in October/November 1950. (It had been
on the agenda of the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commis-
sion since May 1949 when Israel lodged its first complaint that
the embargo comprised a violation of Article 2 of the armistice
agreement, which prohibited "hostile or warlike actions.")
Reporting the first meeting that debated the issue, Izvestiia
wrote that the Security Council had discussed the Egyptian and
Jordanian complaints against Israel and the Israeli complaint
against Egypt. Yet while the paper gave details of the former,
the Israeli complaint about the closing of the Canal to Israeli
ships and cargoes was depicted simply as unspecified charges
concerning violations of the armistice. When the Soviet media
finally referred to the substance of the Israeli charge against
Egypt, almost one month later, they stressed the Anglo-
Egyptian rather than the Israeli-Egyptian confrontation on this

score. Reporting the Security Council debate of 13 November,
TASS said that Israel had accused Egypt of illegally blockading
the Canal and that British representative Gladwyn Jebb had
censured Egypt sharply on the subject, mentioning in particular
the recent holding up of tankers destined for Haifa. No Soviet
representative spoke at any of the six meetings devoted to the
subject, the Soviet delegate abstaining, together with the Egyp-
tian one, on the vote that was held on 17 November, which
made no direct mention of navigation in the Canal. 64
The issue reappeared on the Council agenda in July 1951 fol-
lowing an Israeli Note of 11 July to the president of the Coun-
cil. Although again it arose within the general subject of "the
Palestine Question," it was now the sole item under debate. 6 5
Once more Soviet sources preserved an almost total silence.
The first reference in a central newspaper—almost a month
later—concerned only the Anglo-Egyptian confrontation, to
which it in fact attributed the U.N. debate on the Canal, once
again ignoring altogether the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. 66 At the
U.N. the Soviet delegate first broke his silence on 29 August, at
the seventh meeting which discussed the problem; even then it
was only to request a postponement of the vote, first for one
week and, when this was rejected, for two days. Tsarapkin told
the Council he had "some remarks" to make, but was not yet
"prepared to do so." The draft resolution submitted by Britain,
France and the United States was not "the only correct solution
of the problem" and the Council "should try to find some other
method of approach" and "show flexibility" rather than "dic-
tate conditions and impose a decision which, as the representa-
tive of Egypt remarked, is equivalent to an ultimatum." 6 7
On 31 August the Soviet central press published a first article
on Israel's complaint and the resultant discussion. A long TASS
item from U.N. headquarters in New York said that on 27 and
29 August the Security Council had debated Israel's complaint
concerning " 'restrictions' Egypt had placed on the passage of
ships in the Suez Canal." At_the first of these meetings, Egyp-
tian delegate Mahmud Fawzi had stated that all the states in
whose name Jebb had spoken —France, Holland, Turkey, Britain
and the United States —were interested parties and therefore,
according to Article 27 of the U.N. Charter, must abstain in the
vote on the draftresolution that called for the removal of the
restrictions. Fawzi had also pointed out that the British and
U.S. delegates had "shunned considering the question of
Egypt's legal rights and tried to present it as a question of tech-

nical procedure." The Egyptians for their part, Pravda wrote,
had also asked to submit a draft resolution calling on the Sec-
urity Council to approach the International High Court regard-
ing the right of the above-mentioned states to vote on "the
restrictions Egypt placed in relation to the passage through the
Canal of ships on their way to Israel, carrying war materials."
Since Egypt was not a member of the Council, Pravda
explained, it needed a member state to support this draft resolu-
tion and put it to a vote. The session, the Soviet Party organ
went on, was postponed for 48 hours so that the Egyptian sug-
gestion could be examined before one of the members sup-
ported it and put it officially before the Council.
Proceeding to describe the 29 August meeting of the Council,
Pravda made no further mention of Egypt's attempt to find a
sponsor for its proposal (presumably because the USSR had not
agreed to play the role). The paper merely noted that U.S. dele-
gate Warren Austin referred in his speech only to the British-
French-American draft without even mentioning the Egyptian
suggestion. It also reported Fawzi's expression of regret that the
five members who had no right to take part in the vote had "not
reconsidered their position and are trying to impose a resolu-
tion which cannot lead to an agreed solution." Finally, Pravda
mentioned Tsarapkin's request for a week-long delay and its
rejection by the Council, and his further suggestion to postpone
the vote for two days "so that he might be able to expound the
standpoint of the Soviet delegation before the vote." 6 8
The Egyptian media expected unequivocal Soviet support.
They welcomed Tsarapkin's request for a postponement, inter-
preting it as an indication that the USSR intended to veto the
Western draft. 69 It is likely that this anticipation had been
encouraged in diplomatic contacts with the Soviet side letting
it be understood that it wras considering this possibility. Yet
when the Council reconvened on 1 September, Tsarapkin did
not even ask to speak, despite the president of the Council's
express reminder that the debate had been postponed so as to
enable delegations that desired to do so to express their posi-
tion. Nor did the Soviet delegation veto the draft—which called
on Egypt to terminate restrictions on international commercial
shipping and the passage of merchandise in the C a n a l -
preferring rather to abstain (together with the Indian and Chin-
ese delegations). 70
Once more Soviet conduct was determined by a realistic
appraisal of the political situation. Theoretically the USSR was

prepared to support Egypt's position in every aspect of that
country's struggle with the West, in which the Suez Canal was
clearly a significant factor; the Kremlin was also ready—in
principle—to violate for this purpose the norms it had post-
ulated regarding navigation in international waterways, without
actually retracting its theoretical opposition to all blockades of
such waterways. However, when it came to the crunch, the
USSR refrained from taking the decisive step. Moscow's reason-
ing presumably was that it did not wish to prevent the adoption
of an anti-Egyptian resolution that might place it in the awk-
ward position of having to deliver the goods and render Egypt
practical support it was unable to provide.
• * *
In conclusion, then, the Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli

conflict in the last four years of Stalin's rule, i.e. following the
conclusion of the General Armistice Agreements, was character-
ized by ambivalence and reservations vis-à-vis both parties. The
general inclination toward the Arabs received no practical
expression. The USSR virtually abstained from discussing the
substance of any of the specific issues that arose in the interna-
tional arena, as a result of its inability to influence develop-
ments on the spot. When the Soviet leadership did adopt a
clear position on any particular issue, it reflected a negative
attitude to Western stands and an attempt to frustrate Western
plans and steps rather than any independent stand on the posi-
tions of the two sides directly involved in the conflict.
Notes
1. Voprosy ekonomiki 10 (1949): 87. Cf. pp. 537-38.

2. SC OR, 4th Year, Supplement for August 1949, Document S/1357,
21 July 1949. For the creation of the Conciliation Commission, see
pp. 262-63.
3. SC OR. 4th Year, Nos. 36-38, 4, 8 and 11 August 1949; New York
Times, 12 August 1949; and tevestiia, 13 August 1949.
4. For Soviet disapproval of the Greater Syria plan as early as 1946,
see p. 37; for consistent hostility toward 'Abdallah and his plans
regarding Palestine, see chap. 6 passim.
5. GA OR, 4th Regular Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 50th

Meeting, 29 November 1949.
6. Al Ha-Mishmar, 4 January 1950. The paper's editor, Moshe Sneh,
who, as secretary of the Israeli-Soviet Friendship Association, had
especially close contacts with Soviet representatives, was likewise
specifically critical of Israel's intentions to recognize 'Abdallah's
annexation activities—ibid., 6 January 1950.
7. New Times, 15 June 1949; Pravda, 9 July and 22 October 1949;
TASS, 3 August 1949, R. Moscow in Arabic, 9 August 1949, and R.
Moscow, 11 August 1949/SWB I, 8, 15 and 22 August 1949; for similar
statements in 1950, see New Times, 1 March and 5 July 1950; and
Izvestiia, 11 May 1950. For earlier references to Soviet awareness of
the nuisance value of the Arab-Israeli conflict vis-à-vis Western
strategic plans for the Middle East, see p. 403 and chap. 9, n. 31.
8. The deviation probably did not reflect any differences of opinion
within the Soviet Establishment on the conflict itself, but should rather
be compared with such apparent contradictions as the alternate
definition of the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East as
one of competition and cooperation. The information media presum-
ably received instructions to depict the conflict of interests between
the peoples of the Middle East and the West and to demonstrate the
interference of the latter in the affairs of the former. We have already
seen several instances of divergent approaches regarding issues on
which the Soviet Union had not yet made any operative commitment.
9. Krasnaia zvezda, 19 August 1950.
10. FALP, 13 April 1951.
11. E.g., TASS in Russian for abroad, 21 March 1951/SWB Í, 30
March 1951; and Izvestiia, 14 April 1951.
12. Soviet comment on international forums and events noted Arab-
Israeli clashes, for example at the Seventh Regular Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly—Pravda, 15 November 1952.
13. The provincial press had likewise been alone in noting the pre-
vious stage of the debate, i.e. at the Political Committee—Pravda
Ukrainy, 2 November 1952.
14. Cf. above. At the previous (the sixth) Regular Session Moscow
had actually sought the abolition of the Commission on the grounds
that it perpetuated Western influence in the affairs of the peoples of
Palestine-GA OR, 6th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 36th
Meeting, 10 January 1952, and A/207(A/AC.53/2.24); cf. also TASS in
Russian for abroad, 8 January 1952/SWB I, 14 January 1952. At the time
too the Soviet media had accused the Commission of overstepping its
powers and violating the sovereignty of the Arab states; they had also
noted similar complaints from delegates of "many" other states, "espe-
cially from Asia and Africa"-R. Moscow, 17 January 1952/SWB Í, 21

January 1952. It is surely relevant to note that many Western commen-
tators were no less insistent on the Conciliation Commission's ineffec-
tiveness, failures and inefficiency which they too attributed to its struc-
ture and composition and to the subordination of its members to their
various governments rather than to the U.N.; cf. Earl Berger, The
Covenant and the Sword, Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-1956 (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 41-59. Indeed, following the
Sixth Regular Session's discussion of its report, the Commission's
activities were restricted and became purely technical, with no—or vir-
tually no—political implications.
15. GA OR, 7th Session, 406th Meeting, 18 December 1952.
16. As early as mid-1947 UNSCOP had established a special sub-
committee to investigate questions connected with Jerusalem: the
interests of the various religions, the Holy Places and the city's future
status. See also pp. 79-80 and 85-86.
17. New York Times, 16 April 1948.
18. See pp. 244-45.
19. Cf. pp. 255-56.
20. Voice of Israel in Yiddish, 14 February 1949/SWB IV, 24 Febru-
ary 1949.
21. R. Israel, 23 November 1949/SWB IV, 29 November 1949.
22. GA OR, 4th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 47th and 50th
Meetings, 26 and 29 November 1949.
23. Izvestiia, 7 December 1949.
24. TASS in Russian for abroad, 12 December 1949/SWB I, 16
December 1949.
25. R. Moscow, 16 December 1949/SWB I, 19 December 1949; and
Izvestiia, 18 December 1949.
26. Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 3, pp. 224-25, 5 December 1949.
27. Ibid., p. 378, 2 January 1950.
28. GA OR, 5th Session, Suppl. No. 1 (Annual Report of the Secret-
ary General on the Work of the Organization), p. 6.
29. Izvestiia, 22 April 1950 (The wording of the TASS item that
mentioned that the 29 November 1947 resolution was antiquated was,
presumably significantly, ambiguous. While the context was Jerusalem,
a literal rendering would have it refer to the partition resolution as a
whole.)
30. R. Israel, 23 April 1950/SWB IV, 2 May 1950.
31. Nor does the contention that the April 1950 stand resulted from
an increasing hostility toward the Vatican seem valid, since there
appears to have been no development between late 1949 —when the
Soviet bloc voted together with the Catholic states —and spring 1950 to
explain such a change. The anti-Catholic trials, for example, in the

People's Democracies were already under way in the latter half of
1949.
33. Pravda, 21 August 1952.
34. Cf. Dagan, p. 48. For a continuation of this line, see below
p. 476.
35. See pp. 248-50.
36. R. Moscow in Arabic, 15 May 1949/SWB Í, 20 May 1949.
(Glubb's apprehension that Communism might spread in the refugee
camps was shared by numerous Arab sources and officials; cf. ANA, 1
and 3 May and 11 July 1949, and 9 July 1950. and R. Sharq al-Adna,
20 July and 7 September 1949/SWB IV. 10 May, 19 and 26 July and 13
September 1949, and 14 July 1950.)
37. B. Moscow in Arabic, 9 and 12 July 1949/SWB I, 18 July 1949.
38. Krasnaia zvezda, 17 July 1949.
39. izvestiia. 7 December 1949.
40. Krasnyi flot, 1 August 1950; Izvestiia, 3 November 1950 and 27
July 1951; Krasnaia zvezda. 28 November 1950; and Trud, 8 May
1 9 5 2 - t h e last said that Palestinian Arab refugees were being enlisted
into the U.S. force in Korea.
41. Pravda Ukrainy, 30 September 1950. and Komsomol'skaia
pravda, 3 November 1950. The Soviet Union continued to refer to
Transjordan although it had officially become Jordan in April 1950.
42. Izvestiia, 25 April 1951.
44. Trud, 18 January 1952.
45. Pravda Ukrainy, 2 November 1952.
46. The Soviet position on the Arab refugees may have been further
complicated by the refugee problem that troubled them a great deal
more, namely that of East Europeans who —according to the official
version— had been driven from their homes by the Hitlerites and were
to be found in West Germany and other Western countries. All-out
Arab support of Soviet demands on this question might have led to a
Soviet pro-Arab stand on the Arab refugees.
47. See p. 259.
48. For the negotiations that had preceded the Israeli-Syrian armis-
tice agreement, the establishment of three demilitarized zones and the
agreement itself, as well as Israeli plans for reclamation of the Huleh
area and the resultant incidents —of which the first, a Syrian attack on
a Palestine Land Development Company bulldozer, took place on 15
March—see Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Israeli-Syrian Armistice
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), pp. 37-79 and 339-50.
49. R. Moscow, 6 April 1951/SWB Í, 13 April 1951; and Krasnaia

zvezda, 7 April 1951.
50. TASS in Russian for abroad, 11 April 1951/SWB I, 16 April
1951.
51. TASS in Russian for abroad, 18 April 1951/SWB Í, 23 April
1951.
52. Regarding the actual incidents, Pravda wrote: "On 5 April
Syrian troops opening machine-gun fire killed seven and wounded
three Israeli policemen. On the same day the Israeli air force bombed
Syrian border posts. Shooting continued on 10 April. Finally, on 11
April a fight took place between Israeli and Syrian aircraft. One Israeli
plane was destroyed. The Syrian authorities announced that the Israeli
airforce tried, as it were, to attack the Syrian capital, Damascus" —
Pravda, 14 April 1951.
53. Pravda, 19 and 27 April 1951.
54. Pravda, 4 May 1951.
55. Izvestiia, 5 May 1951. Fighting was further reported and com-
mented on in Vecherniaia Moskva, 5 May 1951; Krasnaia zvezda, 6
May 1951; and Pravda, 7 May 1951.
56. Krasnaia zvezda, 10 May 1951; also TASS in Russian for abroad,
10 May 1951/SWB Í, 14 May 1951. For the Security Council resolution
(S/2130), see SC OR, 6th Year, 545th Meeting, 8 May 1951; for the 15
July 1948 and 11 August 1949 resolutions, see pp. 246-47 and 447
respectively; the November 1950 resolution (S/1907) had referred to the
activities of UNTSO and the Mixed Armistice Commissions.
57. SC OR, 6th Year, 547th Meeting, 18 May 1951.
58. Pravda, 23 May 1951.
59. E.g., Novoe vremici, 1 September 1946; and Pravda, 18
November 1946.
60. Cf. below.
61. R. Sharq aJ-Adna and R. Cairo in English, 8 October 1949/SWB
ÍV, 18 October 1949.
63. Cf. p. 410. For earlier declarations of support for Egyptian
demands regarding the Canal, see p. 78.
64. SC OR, 5th Year, Nos. 53, 56, 59, 60, 64 and 66, 16, 20 and 30
October and 6, 13 and 17 November 1950, and Resolution S/1907;
Izvestiia, 18 October 1950; Pravda. 15 November 1950; and TASS in
Russian for abroad, 15 November 1950/SWB Í, 20 November 1950.
65. SC OR, 6th Year, 549th Session, 26 July 1951, and Document
S/2241.
66. Literaturnaia gazeta. 21 August 1951.
67. SC OR, 6th Year, 556th Session, 29 August 1951.
68. Pravda, 31 August 1951.

69. Al-Ahram, 1 September 1951.
70. SC OR, 6th Year, 558th Meeting, 1 September 1951. The Egyp-
tian press noted the USSR's abandonment of the Egyptian cause—al-
Ahram, 8 September 1951.
11
Soviet Criteria and Tactics Revised,

1953-54
THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS
In the period between the termination of the Palestine War in

Israel's favor in late 1948-early 1949 and the severance of dip-
lomatic relations in February 1953, the USSR's attitude toward
Israel had been determined by considerations extraneous to
developments in Israel or even for the most part in the Middle
East. The principal factors had been trends in the domestic or
East European arena and in the East-West confrontation. After
Stalin's death the Soviet leadership tried to sever foreign policy
from internal problems and to conduct it with a new flexibility
on the basis of Soviet national interests, as understood in the
Kremlin, and in accordance with the specific circumstances of
each individual issue. Within the framework of this conception,
Moscow discovered a new field of maneuver in the Arab world
which became the decisive factor in Soviet-Israeli relations in
the immediate post-Stalin period.
Within weeks, if not days, of 5 March 1953 a substantial
transformation was apparent in the orientations of the new
leadership. A number of the indications of change at home and
abroad had a direct influence on Soviet-Israeli relations.
Exactly one month after Stalin's death Pravda announced that
the charges brought against the doctors had been annulled, that
the prisoners had been released and all those involved in the
case "fully exonerated of the charges brought against them"; as
469
for the people who had conducted the case, they had "been
arrested and made to answer for their crime." 1
Two days later a Pravda editorial accused former Minister of
State Semen Ignat'ev and his deputy Mikhail Riumin of con-
cocting a provocative case against "honest Soviet people, prom-
inent personalities of Soviet science." Ignat'ev was said to have
shown "political blindness and gullibility," while "despicable
adventurers of the Riumin type tried by means of their fabri-
cated investigation to kindle in the Soviet public, which is knit
together by moral-political solidarity and the idea of proletarian
internationalism, feelings of national hostility that are foreign to
socialist ideology. In these provocative aims they did not stop
short of shamefully slandering Soviet people. A careful inves-
tigation has established, for example, that the honest public
figure, People's Artist of the USSR Mikhoels, was slandered in
this way."
The article concluded by promising that the government
would henceforth operate within the framework of Soviet law
and guarantee the civil rights stipulated by the Constitution
without, however, impinging its vigilance regarding "real man-
ifest and hidden enemies." 2
As Ehrenburg has recorded, it soon became clear that a very
basic transformation had occurred with Stalin's death, although
the substance of the change was not immediately evident. 3
Indeed, the different members of the new leadership reacted
variously to the issues that were troubling the country, includ-
ing the Doctors' "Plot" to which Beriia, not surprisingly,
seemed to be the most—if not the sole —unequivocal opponent.
Pravda's report of Riumin's trial (held from 2 to 7 July 1954),
for example, made no mention whatever of the Doctors' Case. 4
Khrushchev's own ambivalent attitude to the affair became evi-
dent in the attempt made in his Secret Speech to lay the entire
blame directly on Stalin and to exonerate Ignat'ev of any
responsibility for the role he had played. What is more,
Khrushchev consistently avoided alluding to the Jewish aspect
of the "Plot." 5 Despite the leadership's equivocal stand, the
announcement of the doctors' release and the attack on the
entire affair as a provocative frame-up were sufficient to allevi-
ate the tensions it had created in Soviet society for both the
official and the man in the street, for Jew and non-Jew. Particu-
lar emphasis was laid on reducing hostility between the
nationalities, which was one of the foci of Beriia's dispute with
his colleagues. 6 As a result of these developments the planned
Soviet Criteria and Tactics Revised 471
attack of Israeli Labor Minister Golda Meyerson at the U.N. on

the USSR's anti-Jewish policy was canceled, as was a planned
conference of Jewish organizations the world over under the
slogan "Let My People Go." 7
Yet although Soviet Jewry felt in an easier position following
the rejection of the Doctors' "Plot" as compared with the fear
and despair that it had suffered in Stalin's last months, there
was no concrete improvement. While the doctors who had
actually been arrested in connection with the "Plot" were given
back their previous posts, the thousands who had been dismiss-
ed from their jobs during the late Stalin period were not rein-
stated. Nor were the institutes of higher learning and the facul-
ties that had been completely or virtually closed to Jews
reopened to Jewish students. The Jews had to content them-
selves with the elimination of the more extreme manifestations
of government-inspired anti-Semitism.
One significant demonstration of the general sense of relief
was the fact that a small number of Jews reestablished contact
with the Israeli Legation which reopened in the latter half of
1953 (see below). For the first time since 1948 a few letters,
chiefly concerned with a search for relatives, reached the Lega-
tion. The synagogue, especially the main Moscow synagogue,
again became the chief center for establishing and maintaining
contact, although synagogue officials continued to obstruct
conversations and the transmission of information. Even now,
however, when Israeli diplomats took advantage of the opening
of new districts to foreign travel to visit the Ukraine (Kiev,
Kharkov, Poltava, the Crimea), the Jews there were apprehen-
sive of having open contact with them, although they crowded
around the Legation car and attended the local synagogues in
somewhat larger numbers on the occasion. 8 Further evidence of
the changed times was the reappearance of a few Yiddish cul-
tural events, which attracted large crowds. 9
Normalization and the relaxation of tension were the new
Soviet leadership's slogans in foreign policy also. From its very
first statement it called for alleviating strains and stresses in
international affairs, particularly between the USSR and the
United States. From the time of Prime Minister Malenkov's
speech on 15 March 1953 at the Supreme Soviet in which he
stressed that all problems and disputes could be solved peace-
fully and by negotiations, the Soviet Union initiated a series of
declarations and diplomatic moves that were intended to
ameliorate international relations without, however, conceding
substantive Soviet interests. 10

Against this background, Moscow sought to normalize rela-
tions which had become strained with a number of capitals
(among them Belgrade, Athens, Ankara), and in July 1953 it
resumed diplomatic relations with Israel.
Already in April Western observers were connecting the
release of the doctors with the Soviet ''peace offensive" toward
the U.S.A. and the Kremlin's desire to demonstrate understand-
ing in its relations with the U.S.A. and the West as a whole. 1 1
On the day of their release the first diplomatic contact was held
between Soviet and Israeli representatives since the rupture in
February. The Soviet ambassador in Sofia, Mikhail Bodrov,
approached the Israeli chargé d'affaires in the Bulgarian capital,
Ben-Zion Rezin, at a Hungarian Embassy reception and alluded
at once to the event. 12 On the same day the Israeli government
announced that it hoped for a renewal of relations. An Israeli
Foreign Ministry communiqué of 4 April 1953 said that Israel
welcomed the announcement that "the libel against the Jewish
doctors had been proved false. . . . In connection with the doc-
tors false charges were leveled at the time against Jewish organ-
izations throughout the world, such as the Joint and the Zionist
Organization, and the accusations against the doctors provided
the basis for an anti-Jewish campaign, one of whose measures
was the severance of relations with the State of Israel.
"The government of Israel," the communiqué asserted,
"hopes that the making of amends will be supplemented by the
conclusion of the anti-Jewish campaign and will welcome the
restoration of normal relations between the USSR and the State
of Israel." 13
The Bulgarian capital had continued to be the scene of con-
tacts to explore renewing relations. Still in April the Polish
ambassador in Sofia told Rezin specifically that if the Israeli
government sought to renew relations it must approach the
Soviet government officially; he offered his own services to
transmit such a message. Other Soviet and East European offi-
cials were meanwhile suggesting that the resumption of rela-
tions was not far off. By mid-May the Israeli government had
retracted its insistence that the USSR take the initiative for the
resumption of relations as the initiator of their severance and
on 28 May, after the Polish Embassy had duly passed on the
change in the Israeli position, Ambassador Bodrov received
official intimation of it from Rezin and another Israeli diplomat,
Gershon Avner, the chargé d'affaires in Budapest who had been
sent to Sofia to take part in the negotiations with the Soviet

representatives there.
On 2 June the Israelis were once more invited to the Soviet
Embassy where Bodrov read out a statement to them that the
USSR government was "ready to consider the Israeli govern-
ment's request concerning the renewal of relations." The
Ambassador demanded at the same time that the Israeli gov-
ernment a. find and try the perpetrators of the 9 February bomb
outrage on the Soviet Legation premises, and b. declare that it
sought friendly relations with the USSR. The Soviet Union,
Bodrov concluded his statement, had "taken an active position
at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel and con-
veys its wish to maintain friendly relations with Israel."
On 8 June the Israeli diplomats handed the Soviet Embassy
their government's reply and on 15 June they were asked to
come again to meet with Bodrov. This time, the Soviet side
somewhat altered its demands, the most important change
being a request that Israel declare it would not participate in
alliances and agreements directed against the USSR. (Dulles
had just returned from his Middle East tour, see p. 479). A
week later the Israelis duly changed the text of their original
approach concerning the resumption of relations, yet when they
were called to the Soviet Embassy to be presented with "an
agreed formula for an announcement of the renewal of relations
to be published at a fixed day and hour in Moscow and
Jerusalem," they were again confronted with changes in the
Soviet position. This time the words "normal relations" had
been substituted for "friendly relations," while the reference to
the Soviet position at the time of the establishment of the Israeli
State had been left out. The Israelis decided to reject the new
version and on 8 July presented Bodrov with yet another prop-
osal, which, while omitting any allusion to the Soviet stand of
1948, included a statement of the USSR's desire for friendly
relations.
Two days previously Sharett had written Molotov, who had
been reinstated as foreign minister after Stalin's death: "Aware
of a noticeable improvement in the atmosphere surrounding
international affairs, and of the renewed widespread desire to
arrive at peaceful and constructive solutions of major interna-
tional issues still pending, the Israeli government wishes to
raise . . . the question of renewing diplomatic relations between
the USSR and Israel." The Israeli foreign minister referred to
the bomb incident, recalled his government's 10 February Note
expressing regret and apologies and readiness to pay compensa-

tion for the damage done, and went on: ' T h e Israeli police has
made every effort to discover the criminals and bring them to
justice. . . . Extensive searches have been carried out in the
offices of certain organizations and in private houses and tens
of suspects have been arrested for investigation. Unfortunately,"
these steps had "yielded no tangible results so far" yet it was
still hoped that they would arrive at a successful conclusion.
Finally, the Israeli foreign minister reminded his Soviet coun-
terpart of his government's 8 December 1951 Note and reiter-
ated its content (see p. 419). Sharett continued: "Having no hos-
tile feelings towards the Soviet Union but, on the contrary,
being anxious to establish and maintain relations of friendship
and amity with it, Israel will not be a party to any alliance or
pact aiming at aggression against the Soviet Union."
On 15 July Molotov replied. He began by noting the Israeli
request for renewing relations, Israel's regret at the "crime" car-
ried out against the Soviet Legation in February and its declara-
tion that efforts were continuing to find and punish its perpet-
rators. The Soviet government also took note of the statement
that Israel wrould not be party to any alliance that had "aggres-
sive aims against the USSR." The Soviet foreign minister went
on: "Taking into account these assurances of the government of
Israel, as well as the expression of its anxiety to reestablish rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, and following its own policy of
maintaining normal relations with other countries and of
strengthening collaboration between peoples, the Soviet gov-
ernment, for its own part, also declares its desire to have
friendly relations with Israel, and considers it possible to rees-
tablish diplomatic relations with the government of Israel."
The announcement of the resumption of relations was made
simultaneously in the two capitals on 21 July; Izvestiia — which
gave the event marked publicity—published in full the
exchange of Notes between the two foreign ministers. 14
The Soviet Union made considerable efforts to demonstrate
its desire for a speedy normalization of relations. Within 48
hours of Rezin's request that Moscow agree to the return of
Shmuel Eliashiv as minister, the Soviet Embassy in Sofia
informed the Israeli chargé d'affaires that the Soviet govern-
ment was prepared to give visas to an advance group of Lega-
tion employees to leave shortly to make the requisite arrange-
ments for its reopening. On 1 August Bodrov transmitted his
government's consent to Eliashiv's reappointment, emphasizing
that the minister could leave at once for the USSR. He also
asked Rezin to pass on the necessary information concerning
the USSR's suggested successor for Ershov, Aleksandr
Abramov; by 5 August the Soviet media announced Abramov's
appointment (after receiving Israel's agreement). 1 5 As an indica-
tion of the normalization of relations, Soviet and East European
diplomats attended, for the first time since the severance of
relations, a reception held by the Israeli U.N. delegation on 11
August. 1 6
In a long programmatic speech at the Supreme Soviet on 8
August, in which he listed the steps taken by the new Soviet
leaders toward the relaxation of international tension, Malenkov
said: "Desirous of lessening general tension, the Soviet Gov-
ernment consented to the re-establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with Israel. In doing so it was mindful of the fact that the
Israeli Government had given an undertaking that 'Israel would
not be a party to any alliance or pact aiming at aggression
against the Soviet Union.' We believe that resumption of dip-
lomatic relations will facilitate co-operation between the two
States."
However, Malenkov found it necessary to emphasize, "the
assertion made by certain foreign newspapers that resumption
of diplomatic relations with Israel will tend to weaken the
Soviet Union's relations with the Arab states is devoid of foun-
dation. The activities of the Soviet Government will be directed
in the future, too, to further friendly co-operation with the Arab
states." 1 7
At the end of August the first two diplomats of each state, a
secretary and an attaché, arrived at the other's capital to prepare
the reopening of their respective Legations 18 and late in
November the remaining staff arrived. Pravda reported
Eliashiv's return to Moscow, 19 and the Soviet media gave
unusual prominence to the Israeli minister's presentation of
credentials to Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet Kliment Voroshilov. Voroshilov, indeed, made certain
remarks on the occasion that gave the Israelis ground to think a
substantive change might have occurred in the Soviet attitude
to Israel. He greeted, for example, "the Jewish people of the
State of Israel and its Government," while no Soviet public
figure in the late Stalin period (i.e. since 1949) had mentioned
the Jewish people in connection with Israel except in a pejora-
tive connotation. He also expressed the hope that Soviet-Israeli
relations would be characterized by the "understanding" that
had typified them at the time of the initial establishment of

relations. 20
In Israel Abramov was likewise making friendly gestures.
Answering questions put to him on arrival by local
correspondents —in itself a most irregular procedure for a Soviet
diplomat—he noted that the Soviet Legation was situated "for
the time being" in Tel Aviv. 21 Moreover, he presented his cre-
dentials to President Yitzhak Ben-Zvi in Jerusalem, although
the representatives of the other powers all avoided the Israeli
capital, to which the Foreign Ministry had been transferred that
same year. At the credential presentation ceremony Abramov
reiterated Malenkov's conviction that the resumption of dip-
lomatic relations would "help the development of friendly rela-
tions between our countries as well as the strengthening of
peace and international cooperation—which is the sincere aspi-
ration of the USSR government." He also committed himself to
endeavoring "to promote the development of economic and cul-
tural relations between the USSR and Israel." 22
Commercial ties were indeed the main focus of Soviet-Israeli
contacts in the period that followed the resumption of relations,
and the only sphere in which contacts had any tangible out-
come.
By the late Stalin period economic ties were already being
given a central role in Soviet diplomacy (cf. pp. 405 and 412).
This had expressed itself, inter alia, in agreements under which
the USSR imported Israeli citrus fruits and bananas. 2 3 This
trend continued as an important feature of the mitigation of
tensions in the immediate post-Stalin era. Very shortly after the
resumption of relations the USSR proposed to sell Israel 75,000
tons of crude oil (some 6% of Israel's needs). In November
1953, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Pavel Kumikin
expressed a desire for bilateral commercial ties, suggesting a
trade agreement or treaty based on the principle of clearing. He
said that the goods suggested by Israel were mostly suitable for
import to the USSR. The technicalities were negotiated princi-
pally with representatives of Prodintorg and Nafta, which were
responsible respectively for the import of agricultural products
and the export of oil. On 3 December an agreement was signed
for the import to the USSR of citrus fruits and bananas in
exchange for oil, and on 4 January 1954 a further agreement
was signed by which Israel was to purchase 75,000 tons of oil
in 1954 and one-quarter million tons in 1955. (Although the
possibility of a comprehensive trade agreement was discussed,
it did not materialize at this, or any later, stage.) 24

Another sphere in which the USSR demonstrated its desire
for a normalization of relations was the ''unification of
families." Israeli hopes for a significant gesture regarding emig-
ration were not fulfilled. Nor did the anticipation expressed by
East European diplomats that the resumption of relations would
lead to a renewal of Jewish emigration from the People's Demo-
cracies 25 prove justified. Nevertheless, the Soviet authorities
permitted several scores of Jews to join their families in Israel.
On 21 December 1953, at a first conversation with Eliashiv after
the minister's return to Moscow, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Gromyko expounded the new leadership's unequivocally nega-
tive position on the principle of emigration. He stressed that
this was a matter that concerned Soviet citizens (in the months
following Stalin's death foreign citizens had been allowed to
leave the country) and expressed his surprise that Israel was
raising an issue that there was no realistic foundation for dis-
cussing. However, Gromyko went on, Moscow differentiated
between emigration which necessitated a political decision and
individual cases of family reunification which could be dealt
with on the consular level. 26
The considerable number of contacts Israeli diplomats held in
subsequent months with the relevant organizations and institu-
tions indeed entailed some encouragement for the former, at
least as regards the exceptional cases. This was a definite step
forward: from September 1948 to February 1953 exit permits
had been given to 18 Jews, 12 of them over 60, and six of
whom were still in the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Sharett,
commenting on Soviet-Israeli relations in the Knesset in
November 1954, noted "a considerable increase in our trade
with the USSR" and "the slight alleviation that has taken place
. . . in the emigration from the Soviet Union of elderly parents
of Israeli citizens." 2 7
A further Soviet gesture was the raising of the level of the
diplomatic mission of each country in the other's capital. Israel,
which had already suggested in August 1953 that the two lega-
tions become embassies, renewed the proposal in December
1953. Four months later the Soviet government agreed in prin-
ciple on condition that the Israeli side approach it officially. An
Israeli government Note was promptly forthcoming and the
announcement of an agreement to raise the status of the two
missions was issued on 16 June. On 10 August Abramov duly
presented his credentials to President Ben-Zvi as the USSR's
first ambassador in Israel and three days later Eliashiv pre-

sented his new credentials to Deputy Chairman of the Pres-
idium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Sharaf Rashidov. 28
Further indications of the relaxation of tensions in the Soviet
conduct of its international relations and of its ties with Israel
in particular included the form, size and substance of the
USSR's participation in Israeli diplomatic receptions, 2 9 Another
significant sign of goodwill was the publication by Izvestiia of
an Israeli Embassy denial of a report that had appeared in the
same paper a few days previously that Israel had approached
the U.S. government with a request for a bilateral defense tre-
aty. 30
Neither these various gestures nor the general tendency to
normalize relations, however, were sufficient to justify the
assumption that the USSR's attitude to Israel had substantially
improved. 31 The basic Soviet position continued to be negative,
any change being one of emphasis and context. As we have
seen, at the end of the Stalin period, Moscow had attacked
Israel for its ties with the forces of world reaction and its role
within an alleged world-wide conspiracy against the USSR and
the People's Democracies. The new leadership's anti-Israel pol-
icy, on the other hand, resulted directly from its rapprochement
with the Third World as a whole and the Arab countries in par-
ticular. The proclivity toward the Arabs that had existed since
1949 or 1950 had been seen especially in the creation of a basis
for cooperation in the international arena in order to achieve
common aims in the struggle against imperialism. In 1953-54
contacts were established with the intention of extending bilat-
eral ties in order to promote the Soviet penetration of the Arab
world (see below). In this way, Stalin's successors arrived at a
basic policy toward Israel that was not dissimilar in effect from
that of the Stalin regime. Despite the indications of goodwill
and the disappearance of extreme expressions of anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism, 32 the USSR thus continued to
pursue a fundamentally anti-Israel course of action. Previously,
this had had implications chiefly in the realms of propaganda
and domestic policy; but now, although its verbal expression
was relatively moderate, its practical significance for Israel was
far greater and more lasting.
THE SOVIET-ARAB RAPPROCHEMENT
There is little material available to document adequately the

intentions of the new Soviet leadership toward the Arab world
in the first months after Stalin. However, Malenkov's 8 August
statement does seem to indicate that the prospects for promot-
ing Soviet ends in the Arab countries as a whole and in Egypt
in particular in the context of the East-West confrontation were
being carefully scrutinized in this period when the official pol-
icy of mitigating international tensions demanded restraint in
the two principal areas of conflict, Europe and the Far East.
Two developments had special significance in stimulating
Soviet interest. The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had achieved a
settlement of the Sudanese question in February 1953, yet were
proving fruitless on the major issue of the British evacuation of
the Suez Canal Zone and were consequently being recurrently
interrupted. 3 3 At the same time the West, specifically the new
Eisenhower Administration in Washington, was renewing its
endeavors to interest the Arab states in a Western-oriented col-
lective alliance. This, too, seemed to be a failure. On the con-
clusion of his Middle East tour of May 1953 John Foster Dulles
reported the general Arab disinterestedness in any such
arrangement and announced his government's resultant deci-
sion to approach the states of "the northern tier" which, in
view of recent experience and their proximity to the Soviet
frontier, were conscious of a constant Soviet threat to their
sovereignty and territorial integrity. 34
Soviet sources, while closely following both these develop-
ments, did not yet indicate any consolidation of ties with the
Arab world; they merely continued, as in the previous period,
to emphasize conflicts of interest between the Arabs and the
West, the desire of the peoples and countries of the region to
attain full sovereignty and independence, and the Arab disin-
clination to participate in Western military plans and pacts. 35
References to Soviet-Arab friendship and "consistent" Soviet
support for the Arabs as late as the winter of 1953-54 referred
specifically to these general, regional frameworks of dispute
with the West. 36
The importance of Egypt as a focus, on the one hand, of
Western attempts to establish a regional military command and,
on the other, of the Arab-Western conflict was being stressed in
the Soviet media as early as January 1953. Despite apprehen-
sions regarding the new Free Officers' regime and its potential
role as an obstacle to the successful conclusion of Egypt's anti-
imperialist struggle, the USSR was thus seemingly anxious to
return to the period of rapprochement and sympathy of late
1951-early 1952.
By the summer of 1953 economic relations were being culti-
vated; in August the Egyptian Cabinet approved a trade agree-
ment with the USSR and called for the exchange of Egyptian
cotton for Soviet war matériel and oil. By the end of the year an
Egyptian "economic delegation," headed by Deputy War Minis-
ter Hasan Rajab, had left for a three-month tour of Eastern
Europe, including nearly two months in the Soviet Union.
Simultaneously, early in January 1954, the Soviet media were
reporting U.S. intentions to terminate economic and military
aid to Egypt; Washington's intention, according to Izvestiia,
was to pressure Egypt into settling its differences with Britain. 37
In February, the Soviet media reprinted an appeal by al-Misri to
recognize the Chinese People's Republic and establish trade
relations with it as China would be able to purchase Egyptian
cotton and lessen Egyptian dependence on Britain and the
U.S.A.^8 I n j h e same month Egyptian National Guidance Minis-
ter Salah Salim was announcing Soviet proposals to aid Egypt
in implementing development projects. 39
The Soviet central press did not give much coverage to the
Egyptian "economic delegation." It noted, however, that the
guests at a reception held in its honor included Deputy Prime
Minister Anastas Mikoian, Foreign Trade Minister Ivan
Kabanov, and the director of TASS, Nikolai Pulganov (although
the head of the delegation was only a deputy minister). It also
wrote that the delegation had held talks with the various organ-
izations that dealt with foreign trade, as a result of which "the
mutual desire of the [two] parties to develop and consolidate
the economic and commercial ties between the two countries
was revealed." The aid proposals Salah Salim referred to may
well have been made to Rajab's delegation which, Izvestiia
reported, had visited industrial plants in various parts of the
country including one that manufactured power plant equip-
ment (generators and turbines). 40
At the end of March 1954, three weeks after the delegation's
departure from the USSR, Soviet sources announced that fol-
lowing the successful conclusion of negotiations between the
two countries a trade agreement had been signed in Cairo. At a
reception given on the occasion the Soviet trade attaché in
Cairo said that the USSR was prepared to give Egypt technical
aid of all sorts. As for trade, arrangements would be made "by
which the USSR will be able to supply Egypt with the goods it
needs and to purchase from Egypt the goods it itself requires.
Egypt will be able to obtain from the USSR machinery, oil pro-
ducts, wood . . . as well as different industrial products and
even the complete equipment for various industrial plants."
Rajab, for his part, said the USSR was prepared and wished to
grant technical aid either through the U.N. (the Soviet Union
had recently declared its participation in U.N. technical aid pro-
jects) or by bilateral agreements similar to U.S. Point Four aid
to developing countries. His delegation's tour of the USSR,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had
shown that the possibilities for economic cooperation between
Egypt and Eastern Europe were unlimited. 4 1
Izvestiia noted that the agreement demonstrated the consoli-
dation of commercial links between the two countries on a
basis of equal rights and mutual benefit, each state enjoying
preferred nation status in the realms of commerce and naviga-
tion. The Soviet government organ went on to quote an Egyp-
tian paper as having described the agreement as one of Egypt's
"most important" trade agreements, since it opened "tremend-
ous possibilities . . . for importing machinery and industrial
equipment," freed Egypt from dependence on "the mercies of
the few countries it depended on before for the import of
machinery," and "put an end to the monopoly of Lancashire
(the center of the British cotton industry—ed.) in the purchase
of Egyptian cotton." 42
In March, too, Pravda announced that the Soviet and Egyp-
tian governments had decided "to raise reciprocally" their
respective legations, each in the capital of the other, to embassy
level. 43 This announcement, like the terms of the trade agree-
ment, was manifestly different from the version employed in
the case of Israel. The importance the USSR clearly attributed to
the trade agreement, the emphasis on the supply of "machinery
and industrial equipment," the fact that the Egyptian economic
delegation had been headed by the deputy minister of war, and
the subsequent Soviet portrayal of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian
arms deal as a purely commercial transaction that in no way
exceeded the limits of economic relations —all point to the
probability that at least the first preparations for the arms deal
had been made at the beginning of 1954.
This assumption is buttressed by the frequent references in
the Soviet media at this time to U.S. arms supplies to the Mid-
dle East within the framework of measures to create a pro-
Western military pact, which constituted the main Soviet con-
cern in the region. 44 Links between the West and countries of
the Middle East and particularly the growing U.S. commitment
to the area were an obvious source of worry and had to be effec-
tively countered. In view especially of Arab opposition, Izves-
tiia wrote early in 1954, the Eisenhower Administration had
concluded that the idea of a Middle Eastern alliance was dead.
It now sought to achieve separate alliances with those govern-
ments that were interested—the paper specified Iraq, Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia —in the course of which Washington would
also supply arms. 4 5
Although the Soviet press did not tire of showing the harm
done to the interests of the Arab peoples as a whole by U.S.
plans and policies, Egypt remained the focus of the opposition
to the West. In January 1954 Pravda published two TASS cables
from Cairo, one of which referred to the apprehensions preval-
ent in Egypt about the planned U.S. military-strategic plans in
the Middle East, and the other to a statement by 'Aziz al-Misri
to an Egyptian journalist stressing Soviet support for peoples
struggling for their independence. 4 6 Early in February Izvestiia
printed a statement by Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd
an-Nasir that the Arab countries would not participate in
Anglo-American military proposals for defense of the Near East.
The Arabs, Nasir was quoted as saying, had first of all to free
themselves from imperialist, especially British, oppression;
moreover, having reached adulthood, they would not allow
themselves to be taken in again by threats and empty prom-
ises. 47 Muhammad Najib was also cited as saying that his ear-
lier assumption that the United States was the friend of the
Arabs had been proved false, and that Egyptian public opinion
had been disappointed by the United States. 48 In mid-April
Nasir's reaction to the Turkish-Pakistani Treaty (signed on 2
April) was reported: "The^ participation of any Arab country
whatever in the Treaty—Nasir said—would lead to a rift in the
unity of the Arab peoples."^ 9 Several days later the Soviet press
informed its readers that Nasir had been appointed to take over
supreme power in the country as prime minister and governor-
general. At a press conference on 19 April Nasir had once again
insisted that Egypt refused to cooperate with the occupying
power and with the violation of Egyptian sovereignty and that
the Arab governments declined to join any alliance outside the
Arab League until the Arab problems, and first and foremost the
Egyptian question, had been solved. 50
Egypt's central role not only in the struggle to be rid of the
British but also in highlighting Arab opposition to Western reg-
ional defense projects made it an obvious object of Soviet dip-
lomatic efforts. Nonetheless, the USSR's intentions of penetrat-
ing the Arab East and thus outflanking the "northern tier" drew
Moscow's attention_to other Arab countries as well. In February
1954 the fall of Adib ash-Shishakli opened u p new possibilities
for relations with Syria. 51 In April, too, within days of reporting
Lebanon's refusal to accept American aid, the Soviet press
announced the conclusion of a Soviet-Lebanese trade agree-
ment. This was significantly accompanied by news of a Leban-
ese government decision to consider the first of May an official
holiday. 5 2
The marked progress of Soviet-Arab and particularly Soviet-
Egyptian relations, with the creation of a close and intense rela-
tionship deriving from common strategic and international
interests, had a direct bearing on Soviet-Israeli relations. This
was most obviously demonstrated in the Soviet stand on the
Arab-Israeli conflict in 1953-54. As distinct from the previous
period in which the USSR had consistently refrained from sup-
porting either side, the Soviet Union now adopted an un-
equivocally pro-Arab position. This transition, which seems all
the more contradictory in view of the Soviet tendency to nor-
malize its bilateral relations with Israel, can be explained only
in the context of Moscow's regional policies, and particularly
the change in its relations with the Arab world.
The Soviet media were already manifesting interest in the
Arab-Israeli conflict in the spring of 1953. One source presented
its readers with a distinctly pro-Arab rendering of an incident
near Rafah on 30 April. 5 3 This bias did not include the central
daily press at this stage. Yet the literary journal that printed in
April 1953 the article of the French Communist publicist, Roger
Vailland, on the new Egyptian regime stressed significantly
both the strategic and economic inferiority of Israel vis-à-vis
Egypt, noting Egypt's much larger population and territory and
the fact that it had ports on two seas and was not surrounded
by hostile states, and the political value of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in winning the hearts of Egypt's rulers. "Only receipt of
arms from the Americans for the struggle against Israel and the
renewal of the Palestinian War," wrote Vailland, "could
encourage the [Egyptian] army to try to link up the Muslim
masses of Egypt in a military pact with the U.S.A.; yet the

U.S.A. is the ally of the State of Israel." The obvious alternative
to the United States, Britain, could grant Egypt the necessary
aid but was hated by the Egyptians for its Suez Canal bases and
its violation of the sovereignty of the Egyptian armed forces. 54
Having learned the dual lesson—the importance of the Arab-
Israeli conflict for winning Arab friendship and the Western
inability to take advantage of this because of commitments to
Israel—and having decided in principle to extend military and
economic aid to a few carefully chosen ''developing" countries,
the USSR awaited its opportunity. It did not have to wait long.
Toward late summer 1953 Arab-Israeli relations deteriorated. 55
In September a series of developments took place that brought
''the Palestine question" yet again to the Security Council.
On 2 September 1953 Israel commenced work on what was
known as the Benot Yaacov Project. This was a project to con-
struct a power station at the southern end of a new canal to
which some of the Jordan waters (south of the Benot Yaacov
bridge) would be diverted and the excavation of which entailed
digging in one of the Syrian-Israeli demilitarized zones.
Although the Israeli government explained that the plan did
not involve the use of Arab-owned land, UNTSO Chief of Staff
General Vagn Bennike laid down that it contradicted the relevant
articles of the Syrian-Israeli armistice agreement. He ordered
the interruption of work until an arrangement was reached with
Damascus. After barren discussions between the Israeli govern-
ment and Bennike, they decided on 15 October to bring the
matter before the Security Council.
Meanwhile, Washington was threatening to interrupt its
economic aid to Israel if it continued diverting the Jordan wat-
ers, and on 17 October the three Western powers requested the
Security Council President to convene the Council urgently to
discuss the tension between Israel and its neighbors. The final
incentive for this request was apparently the Israeli action of 14
October against three Jordanian villages, the Qibya i n c i d e n t -
undertaken in retaliation for the murder of civilians in the vil-
lage of Yahud —in which 42 people were killed and 16
wounded (including women and children).
The Security Council met on 19 October and on 27 October
ordered Israel to interrupt its work in the demilitarized zone for
the duration of the debate. This was done on the following day
and the United States, which had been holding up aid since 20
October, renewed deliveries. On 16 December, i.e. after nearly
two months of discussion, the three Western powers submitted

a draft resolution that criticized Syria for interfering with reg-
ional development projects and censured Israel for ignoring
instructions issued by General Bennike. 56
The Soviet media had been reporting the Security Council
debates fairly extensively. 57 Apart, however, from persistent
reservations regarding Western initiatives —notably the mission
of U.S. special envoy Eric Johnston who had arrived in the area
in October to negotiate with the governments of Israel, Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt the possibility of an agreed plan for
using the Jordan and Yarmuk waters—they, like the Soviet U.N.
delegation, gave no indication of the position the Soviet gov-
ernment intended adopting. The submission of the Western
draft somewhat altered the situation. On 17 December Andrei
Vyshinskii, who headed the Soviet delegation, said the draft
required "additional study" and reiterated the request of Leban-
ese delegate Charles Malik that the Council refrain from taking
any precipitous decision. 58 On the same day a Soviet source
published a Lebanese paper's remarks that "the American sug-
gestions for preserving peace and security along the Israeli bor-
der" would transform the demilitarized zone under cover of the
U.N. into "an American military camp. . . . The opinion is rife"
among "Arab circles," the Soviet paper went on quoting, "that
if the plan is carried out it will lead to the reverse results —the
increase of tension currently prevalent in Palestine and on its
frontiers and will comprise a manifest threat to the indepen-
dence of the Arab countries, both those that border on Israel
and those that do not. 59
On 21 December 1953 Vyshinskii emphasized that his gov-
ernment's opposition to the Western draft derived above all
from its attempt to achieve the settlement of problems con-
nected with the demilitarized zone without the consent of the
two parties directly concerned. The text of the draft implied,
Vyshinskii went on, that it was intended to cater for the inter-
ests not of Syria and Israel but of states "thousands of miles
away." The absence of any provision for an agreement between
the parties meant that the acceptance of the draft would lead to
"a further deterioration in the relations" between them. Vysh-
inskii called on the Council to postpone sine die a decision on
the Western draft so as to enable the parties concerned to reach
the agreement essential for the settlement of the specific prob-
lem which had caused the current dispute. If Syria and Israel
"do not wish to come to an agreement, I do not think that any
course of action can be imposed upon them." 6 0

On 29 December Vyshinskii suggested that the Western draft
be replaced by one "which would answer the questions with
which we are concerned, that is the building of a hydro-electric
station, the benefit or harm that project might bring to either
party or to both of them, and a way out of a situation causing
tension between two states which we want to achieve peace,
tranquillity and constructive cooperation as neighbouring coun-
tries." One party, the Arab states, had already said it could not
accept the draft, which proved that it retarded "our progress." 6 1
The Soviet position on the Western draft and the Johnston
mission was an integral part of the USSR's Arab policy at this
period, one of the main facets of which was the consolidation
of economic ties and proposals for economic aid. This was the
significance of Pravda's insistence that Johnston's proposals for
using the Jordan waters were being exploited by the United
States to increase its own influence in the area and to apply
pressures on the countries of the region; indeed, the C.P.S.U.
organ said, Washington threatened Syria and Jordan with with-
holding credits for hydrotechnical work on the Yarmuk unless
they agreed to Johnston's £ecommendations. (Another Soviet
source referred to an al-Ahram article on further U.S. pressures
in the form of a Note to the Lebanese government protesting
against the "unjustified" banning of U.S. companies operating
in Israel, and threatening the adoption of economic sanctions
unless the Arab countries reneged on their embargo. None of
the Soviet media, however, mentioned U.S. pressures on Israel
to stop working in October.) The C.P.S.U. organ also reported
the holding of a conference in Beirut for the protection of the
rights of the peoples of the Near and Middle East that had call-
ed on the Arab governments and peoples not to cooperate with
the imperialists in finding a solution to the Palestine question
and the problems connected with it. The participants of the
conference were said by TASS to have issued a communiqué
expressing their conviction that the Palestine problem was the
result of "imperialist rule" and that its solution was closely
linked with the ending of that rule. 62 Commenting on Vyshin-
skii's 29 December appearance at the Security Council, Izvestiia
censured the West for trying to replace the issue being debated
by the Council with the question "how will the American
monopolies dominate the economies of the Near and Middle
East by exploiting the opportunity provided by the dispute
between Syria and Israel." 63
Meanwhile, Pravda was noting the opinion of a Syrian paper

[al-Liwa') that the Palestinian tragedy was an irreparable dis-
grace to the so-called free world. The paper had also demanded
an end to U.S. propaganda in the Arab countries which was
damaging to ties with ''friendly countries that support our just
demands in international organizations, fight together with us
against imperialism, and support our brothers in Tunisia and
Morocco as well as the withdrawal of foreign troops from
Egypt, Libya, and other Arab countries suffering from imperial-
ist occupation." 6 4 New Times, too, contrasted the U.S. tendency
to subjugate the Arab countries with Soviet support of their
national demands. With reference to the Jordan waters dispute,
the paper said Vyshinskii had revealed the imperialist intent of
the Western draft which sought U.S. economic penetration of
the Arab world; it stressed, too, that the Arab media had wel-
comed the Soviet delegation's position. 65
The Western draft underwent certain alterations, 66 but was
nonetheless attacked again —in its amended form—by Vyshin-
skii on 21 January 1954. While acknowledging that the amended
proposal included certain improvements, he argued that most of
it still ignored the particular problem which concerned the
Council directly as well as the issue of obtaining the consent of
the two sides to the action it suggested. Moreover, it left an
opening for exploitation of the existing situation by "joint-stock
companies, trusts and monopolies." 6 7
On the following day Vyshinskii enlarged on these themes,
insisting that the USSR sought "a realistic and, as far as poss-
ible, a complete settlement of this dispute." A "paper settle-
ment," he said, "could not eliminate the friction and subse-
quent difficulties which will inevitably arise in the demilitar-
ized zone." It was inconceivable to achieve a settlement by
bypassing the parties and giving "a free hand" to Bennike,
empowering him with the ultimate authority that should be the
Security Council's. Should the Syrian and Israeli governments
prove unable to agree on joint measures even with the help of
the Mixed Armistice Commission, the Security Council would
have to try to find a solution acceptable to both parties and cor-
responding to the U.N. Charter. Vyshinskii agreed with Charles
Malik's contention that while the armistice agreement had been
designed to preserve "existing rights," once Israel had dug the
canal in question it would acquire new rights and the balance
between the sides would be upset.
When the Soviet delegation, together with that of Lebanon,
finally voted against the Western draft, thus defeating it, Sir
Gladwyn Jebb of Britain remarked that this was the first time
the veto had been resorted to "in connexion with the affairs of
the Middle East." He described the event as "melancholy
because it can hardly be a good augury for the future of interna-
tional co-operation [and] sinister perhaps because of its implica-
tions in connexion with the cause of peace in the Arab world."
Vyshinskii, for his part, failed to understand why "if anyone
votes against Sir Gladwyn Jebb, that may result in a breach of
the peace . . . the guardian angel of which today is, to the com-
plete surprise of all, Sir Gladwyn Jebb." To charge the USSR of
a "terrible crime because for the first time [it] is voting with the
Arab states on a question which concerns their interests" did
not indicate a "serious" attitude. "Today's vote," Vyshinskii
went on, "has shown that the time is past when the representa-
tives of a few powers had no need to be anxious about the fate
. . . even of such of their draft resolutions and proposals as
were contrary to the interests of the people they were allegedly
intended to benefit." 68 Izvestiia summed up the debate by quot-
ing Charles Malik to the effect that the Pax Occidentala had
indeed appeared in "the most disagreeable form." 6 9
Just a few days after the conclusion of the discussion of the
Syrian-Israeli dispute the Security Council was faced with yet
another aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely the question
of the passage through the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba of
Israeli ships and cargoes, and ships and cargoes traveling to
and from Israeli ports. Since the 1 September 1951 resolution
some merchant shipping had passed through the canal on its
way to and from Israel. Yet in November 1953 the Egyptian
government announced that, in addition to previous restric-
tions, it had decided to include foodstuffs in the list of goods
whose passage was prohibited as liable to strengthen Israel's
military potential. In December two cargoes were in fact
requisitioned by the Egyptian authorities and in January the
Egyptians opened fire on a merchant ship going to Eilat by way
of the Tiran Straits, compelling it to turn back. On 28 January
Israel complained to the Security Council. 70
Vyshinskii took no part whatever in the eight meetings that
preceded the voting. 71 Yet when the draft resolution, submitted
by New Zealand, was put to the vote on 29 March, he once
again exercised his right of veto, although the draft was based
on the 1 September 1951 resolution on which the USSR had at
the time abstained. 72 Vyshinskii attributed his vote to the in-
effectiveness of the earlier resolution, insisting that there could

be no advantage in adopting again a resolution that had proved
unsatisfactory. The very adoption of such a resolution, he
noted, impaired the Council's "prestige and its international
authority"; all the more so when this was an old one (an
"ancient, two-year old, moth-eaten resolution, dragged out of
the archives"). The only way of solving the problem was by
"direct negotiations between the interested parties." The rep-
resentatives of Israel and Egypt should "sit down together at
one table and try to settle the question which the Security
Council cannot settle now."
As early as 1951, Vyshinskii went on, the USSR had realized
that the resolution was unsatisfactory and unable to provide a
solution to the problems it was designed to settle. Meanwhile,
two years had passed without any positive results and "there
can be no hope now for any positive results, since the represen-
tatives of Egypt and Lebanon—the representatives of the Arab
states here present—have categorically stated that they do not
consider this resolution to be appropriate, and have proposed
that other measures be taken." As a result the Soviet veto had
been inevitable.
"The Soviet Union," Vyshinskii pointed out, "is not less but
more concerned than many others with peace in the Near and
Middle East and throughout the whole world. . . . Our task is to
achieve positive results in relations between Israel and the Arab
states and really to help the parties to the dispute to settle their
problems in their common interest, in the interests of maintain-
ing peace and international security."
The French representative, Charles Lucet, commented that
apart from the obstructive nature of the veto as such, it was par-
ticularly frustrating in the instance under discussion. "We all
know," Lucet told the Council, "how far in the present case it
has been possible to attempt direct negotiations, . . . particu-
larly since the USSR representative now tells us that it was the
Palestine case as a whole which should have been settled. . . .
By his vote today Mr. Vyshinskii is imperilling the entire opera-
tion of the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Council's
whole part in the settlement of disputes. . . . If Mr. Vyshinskii
wished to prevent the Council from taking any action at all in
the future, he would hardly set about it otherwise." 7 3
Reporting the debate and the vote, Pravda dwelt on Vyshin-
skii's call not only for direct negotiations but also for concrete
aid to the parties concerned in settling their problems, so as to
promote peace and international security. The paper also

reported Charles Malik's speech and the gratitude to the USSR
expressed by Egyptian delegate Mahmud 'Azmi. It also wrote
that, according to the latter, the Egyptian government would
begin of its own volition to rescind the restriction on the pas-
sage _of commercial shipping on its way to Israel. 74 (In fact,
'Azmi had merely said that Egypt "of its own free will will
move towards tolerance.")
The Soviet support of the Arab party to the conflict in these
two instances was based on several fundamental assumptions
and directed toward certain well-defined objects. In the first
place, the USSR sought to demonstrate to the Arabs not only
the value and significance of its support but also that Soviet
support—unlike that of the West—was not necessarily restricted
to the bilateral level. Simultaneously, Moscow sought to prove
to the West that the time was past when the Western powers
could settle Middle Eastern issues as they wished. Henceforth,
Moscow was saying, the West must take the USSR into consid-
eration as an influential and dynamic factor in the Middle East
that was no less ready than the West to grant aid to the region
and make investments in it. The USSR's role was all the more
important in the light of its common interests with the Arab
states, especially Egypt and Syria which were fighting a deter-
mined struggle against the West (reminiscent of the struggle
Israel had waged in 1948). This struggle took the dual form of
opposition to the pro-Western military alliance in preparation,
of which the Arabs —except for Iraq—were as apprehensive as
the USSR, and the well-advanced fight, that was no less
strategic an interest for Moscow, to eject Britain from Egypt.
It is likely that the Kremlin was also suggesting in early 1954
that in addition to the need to consult it in any effort to reach a
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it might well serve as
arbitrator between the sides. Indeed, following Vyshinskii's
reference to a peaceful settlement, the Soviet media alluded to
this possibility. 75 The existence of such a trend would explain
the Soviet Union's insistence on maintaining semblances of
equilibrium in its relations with Egypt and Israel. This line
received its most manifest expression two years later in the
Soviet Foreign Ministry statement of 17 May 1956. 76
• * •
The following tendencies can thus be discerned in the Soviet

attitude to Israel in the first year or so after Stalin's death: a.
Moscow renewed its diplomatic relations with Israel—within
the framework of a general trend toward normalizing its foreign
relations and by the easing of domestic tensions that had previ-
ously strained relations between the two states; b. the Soviet
Union chose to establish and preserve a normal and positive
relationship with Israel; and c. as a result of the desire for rap-
prochement with the Arab states, which in turn emanated from
the new leadership's policy toward the Third World, 77 the
USSR resolved to support them both on the bilateral level and
in the international arena, 78 the latter including specifically and
necessarily the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet reasoning appears to
have been based on the following considerations: the USSR did
not wish to lose the option of applying pressures on its new
Arab allies as long as the position it sought in the area was not
an established fact; it desired the role of a leading power in the
region by virtue of its status with both parties; it saw in the
Arab-Israeli conflict a principal and unchanging means of
acquiring influence in the Arab East.
Notes
1. The Ministry of the Interior in whose name the announcement

appeared had "undertaken a thorough examination of all the materials
of the preliminary investigation and of the other data concerning the
group of doctors." It had been duly "established" that the doctors had
been arrested "irregularly, without any legal foundation. The examina-
tion has shown that the charges are unfounded and that the documen-
tary data on which the investigators relied is untenable. It has been
established that the confessions of the prisoners, which were alleged to
confirm the charges, were obtained by the officials of the Investigation
Section of the former Ministry of State Security by using impermissible
methods that are severely prohibited by Soviet law"—Pravda, 4 April
1953. Government changes announced already on 7 March had
included the merging of the former Ministries of the Interior and State
Security into a new Ministry of the Interior under Lavrentii Beriia.
3. Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, pp. 320-28. The writer gave expres-
sion to these changes in his novel The Thaw written at this time in
which he referred directly to the Doctors' "Plot".
4. Pravda, 23 July 1954. The "Plot" was nevertheless mentioned in

the trial —Conquest, Power and Policy, pp. 117, 118 and 190.
5. For Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the Twentieth C.P.S.U. Con-
gress in February 1956, see Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 559-618; for
further discussion of the Soviet leadership's attitude to the "Plot", see
also Conquest, Power and Policy, pp. 186-91 and chap. 9. It is interest-
ing too in this connection to note the careers during Khrushchev's
domination of the party of Ignat'ev and two of Stalin's other close
associates of the winter of 1952-53, Frol Kozlov and Averkii Aristov:
Kozlov had written a major article that appeared in the first 1953
number of the C.P.S.U. theoretical journal Kommunist, under the title
"Political Vigilance —the Duty of the Party Member," and was an obvi-
ous contribution to the purge campaign of which the Doctors' "Plot"
was a part.
6. New York Times Moscow correspondent Salisbury noted on 9
April 1953: "A series of mass meetings is being held to discuss friend-
ship of nationalities within the Soviet Union and equal rights among
all peoples. . . . There is a big drive on to liquidate race antagonisms
and anti-semitism" —Salisbury, p. 375. For Beriia's stand on the
national question, cf. above p. 375 and chap. 8, n. 69.
7. For the Israeli government's decision to denounce Soviet anti-
Jewish policies, see chap. 8, n. 76. For the decision to cancel this pro-
test, see JTA, 8 April 1953. For the conference and its indefinite post-
ponement, see Davar, 2 and 22 March 1953.
8. For a description of the experience of an Israeli diplomat in the
USSR including contacts with Soviet Jews in the 1950s, see Ben Ami
[Arie L. Eliav], Between Hammer and Sickle (Philadelphia: Jewish Pub-
lication Society, 1967).
9. In March 1954 posters appeared in the streets announcing per-
formances that included Yiddish songs although sung by non-Jewish
artists; by April the well-known Yiddish singer Anna Guzik was
appearing in three concerts.
10. The most important single event within the framework of the
"normalization" process was the ending in June 1953 of the Korean
War. For the trends and developments of Soviet foreign policy in the
immediate post-Stalin, period, see, Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and
Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 539-71; David J. Dallin,
Soviet Policy After Stalin (London: Methuen, 1960), pp. 115-217; and
J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 1963), pp. 72-149.
Malenkov had already called in the late Stalin period for peaceful
coexistence, cf. p. 402 above, but his appeal had not at the time been
matched by Soviet practice.
11. New York Times, 5 April 1953.

12. Ben-Zion Rezin, "I Conducted Negotiations for the Renewal of
Diplomatic Relations with the Soviet Union," Maariv, 10 March 1972.
13. Ha-Aretz, 5 April 1953.
14. For the account of the developments that led to the resumption
of relations, see Dagan, pp. 72-73; Rezin; JTA, 6 April 1953; and Izves-
tiia, 21 July 1953. In connection with the Israeli government's actions
against those responsible for the bomb incident and their role in
Soviet-Israeli relations, it is worth noting that at least one Soviet
paper—Leningradskaia pravda, 27 August 1953 —reported the conclu-
sion of the trial conducted by a military tribunal in Tel Aviv against a
terrorist group, two of whom had confessed to organizing the outrage
as well as terrorist actions against the Czechoslovak Mission in Tel
Aviv. The paper noted, moreover, that although one of the group's
leaders had evaded arrest and one of the accused had been acquitted,
the other twelve members of the group were sentenced to varying
periods of imprisonment, from 1 to 12 years.
15. Jzvestiia, 5 August 1953; and Rezin. Abramov had been minister
to Finland from 1946 to 1948 and had since then filled senior posts at
the Soviet Foreign Ministry Third (Central) European Department.
16. JTA, 13 August 1953.
17. Documents on international Affairs, 1953, p. 26.
18. Al Ha-Mishmar, 20 September 1953.
20. Pravda, 15 December 1953; the event also featured in the news-
reels shown in Soviet movie-houses.
21. Davar, 1 and 2 December 1953.
22. Davar, 6 December 1953.
23. Ha-Aretz, 10 December 1951 and 2 March, 19 May and 7, 12 and
14 September 1952. Cf. p. 348.
24. New York Times, 14 September 1953; Davar, 24 and 30
November and 4 and 6 December 1953; and )TA, 17 December 1953.
25. )TA, 4 August 1953.
26. Dagan, pp. 75-76.
27. Divrei Ha-Knesset, vol. 17, p. 67, 15 November 1954.
28. The latter ceremony was attended by Deputy Foreign Minister
Zorin; head of the Foreign Ministry's Middle and Near East Depart-
ment, Grigorii Zaitsev, and of its Department of Protocol, Evgenii
Kiselev; and Secretary of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Pegov. Soviet
media gave considerable publicity to the event but restricted their
reports to quoting mutual routine expressions of goodwill. F'or these
events, see Dagan, pp. 84-85; New York Times, 17 )une 1954; Pravda,
15 August 1954; and Soviet News, 18 August 1954.
29. For example, at the first Israeli Independence Day party after the
resumption of relations.
30. Izvestiia, 10 August 1954. (The original report was published on
3 August.) An earlier and interesting, if less significant, display of
Soviet goodwill to Israel was the visit of an Israeli team to take part in
the European basketball championship in May 1953 in Moscow. The
Soviet media went out of their way to praise the "high level" of Israeli
sport shown in the team's victory over the Czechoslovak team, men-
tioning in particular the sympathy shown the Israelis by the Moscow
public—Davar 19, 27 and 31 May 1953, quoting Radio Moscow. See
also an account of the visit by a member of the Israeli team, Moshe
Daniel, in Mibifnim (November 1953): 187-95.
31. Such conclusions had been drawn by non-Israeli observers as
well, cf. Observer, 1 August 1954; and Jewish Chronicle, 27 August
and 3 and 10 September 1954.
32. While direct denunciations of anti-Semitism ceased with Beriia's
fall in late June 1953 (although at a March 1954 election speech
Molotov enumerated anti-Semitism among the failings of the Tsarist
regime—Pravda, 12 March 1954), the anti-Semitism of the early
Khrushchev period —which cannot be surveyed here —was generally
more sophisticated than that of the late Stalin years.
33. Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 176; and Eden, pp. 247-61.
34. Dulles' report was published in the New York Times, 1 June
1953.
35. E.g., Pravda, 12 May 1953; and Izvestiia, 8 September 1953.
36. E.g., New Times, 9 January 1954; also an article by Khalid Bak-
dash, Syrian Communist Party Secretary-General, FALP, 20 November
1953.
37. Izvestiia, 3 January 1954. The Soviet press was insistent that all
the Arab League states stood by Egypt in its struggle against the West
(e.g., Izvestiia, 13 January 1954); it also stressed that despite the inter-
nal differences within the Egyptian Revolutionary Council, especially
between Najib and Nasir, there was agreement that Egypt should not
join any Western military pact —e.g., Izvestiia, 28 February and 2, 4, 7,
9, 10, 20, 24, 27, 28 and 30 March 1954.
38. Pravda and Izvestiia, 20 February 1954. Egypt's stand on other
international issues, such as the prohibition of atomic weaponry was
likewise praised— Izvestiia, 10 April 1954.
39. Al-Ahram, 10 February 1954.
40. Izvestiia, 17 January, 5 and 13 February and 6 March 1954.
41. Al-Ahram, 28 March 1954.
42. Izvestiia, 30 March 1954.
43. Pravda, 22 March 1954. Just over a month later the two minis-
ters, 'Aziz al-Misri in Moscow and Daniil Solod in Cairo, presented

their credentials as ambassadors—Pmvda and Izvestiia; 30 April 1954.
44. In particular, Soviet attention was directed at this period to
Turkish-Pakistani plans "for achieving closer friendly collaboration,"
among other things "for strengthening peace and security" —
announced by the two governments on 19 February 1954, Documents
on international Affairs, 1954, pp. 177-78; Soviet Notes to Ankara and
Karachi stressed the threat involved to the USSR's own national
security—Soviet News, 24 March 1954, reprinted in ibid., pp. 179-80.
49. Izvestiia, 15 April 1954.
50. izvestiia, 20 and 21 April 1954.
51. Indeed, the Soviet media followed intently Syrian domestic
developments following Shishakli's ouster—e.g., Izvestiia, 27 and 28
February and 2, 3, 4 and 17 March 1954.
52. Izvestiia, 20 and 25 April 1954. Pravda itself reported on 3 May
Lebanese May Day celebrations. The Soviet-Lebanese rapprochement
also involved a series of cultural and similar events—izvestiia, 3
March and 18 and 24 April 1954.
53. Pravda Vostoka, 4 May 1953. The source of the report was Reut-
ers quoting ai-Ahram.
54. Novyi mir 4 (1953): 204-44. Although Vailland wrote his article
in October 1952 (see chap. 9, n. 52) and although it was apparently
translated and prepared for publication in the Soviet Union before Sta-
lin's death, its implications at a time when the USSR was able and
ready to give military aid to other countries were manifest.
55. In the spring and early summer feelers had been put out for an
Israeli-Egyptian rapprochement —Berger, pp. 170-72.
56. Bar-Yaacov, pp. 114 and 117-37; Berger, pp. 105-24; E. L. M.
Burns, Between Arab and Israel: (London: Harrap, 1962), p. I l l ; and
SC OR, 8th Year, 626th, 627th, 630th, 633rd, 635th, 640th, 642nd,
643rd, 645th, 646th and 648th Meetings, 19 October to 16 December
1953. (On 24 November the Security Council passed a resolution cen-
suring Israel for the Qibya action and requesting Jordan "to continue
and strengthen the measures which they are already taking" to prevent
"unauthorized persons" from crossing the demarcation line, which
often resulted in "acts of violence"-Resolution S/3139/Rev.2).
57. E.g., Pravda, 20-22 October and 11 November 1953; Pravda Vos-
toka, 27 October and 3 November 1953; and Izvestiia, 12 November
1953.
58. SC OR, 8th Year, 649th Meeting, 17 December 1953. In the ele-
ven meetings devoted to the Palestine question between 19 October
and 16 December, Vyshinskii had restricted his contributions to tech-
nical and procedural remarks. (With Molotov's reinstatement as foreign
minister Vyshinskii had once again become deputy foreign minister
and head of the Soviet U.N. delegation.)
59. Pravda Vostoka, 17 December 1953.
60. SC OR, 8th Year, 651st Meeting, 21 December 1953.
61. SC OR, 8th Year, 654th Meeting, 29 December 1953.
62. Pravda, 23 December 1953 and 7 February 1954; and Vecher-
niaia Moskva, 30 December 1953.
66. The revised draft was submitted on 20 January 1954, S/3151/
Rev.2.
67. SC OR, 9th Year, 655th Meeting, 21 January 1954.
68. SC OR, 9th Year, 656th Meeting, 22 January 1954.
70. During 1953 other ships had been stopped on their way to Eilat.
For the blocking of the Straits and the closing of the Canal in the
1951-54 period, see Berger, pp. 158-62; and SC OR, 9th Year, Suppl.
Document S/3168 and S/3168/Add.l, 28 and 29 January 1954.
71. SC OR, 9th Year, 657th-664th Meetings, 4 February to 29 March
1954.
72. The draft recalled the earlier resolution, expressed regret that
Egypt had not acted upon it, called upon the Egyptian government to
fulfill its obligations in accordance with the 1951 resolution and sug-
gested referring the Israeli complaint to the Mixed Armistice
C o m m i s s i o n - S C OR, 9th Year, Suppl. S/3168/Corr.l, 19 March 1954.
73. SC OR, 9th Year, 664th Meeting, 29 March 1954.
75. Vecherniaia Moskva, for example, wrote on 14 May 1954 that
the Jordanian Communist Party had called on the peoples of Israel and
the Arab countries to intensify the struggle for peace and the fraternity
of peoples and to endeavor to avert war between the Arab countries
and Israel. This was clearly a formula for struggle that would place the
USSR in a leading role.
76. For this document, which it is beyond the scope of this study to
analyze, see Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, pp. 163-65.
77. Egyptian sources very interestingly reported in March 1954,
prior to the signature of the Soviet Egyptian trade agreement, that the
USSR was undertaking a campaign to extend its commercial ties with
Asian and Middle Eastern states—Egyptian Gazette, 7 March 1954.

78. The connection between the two was highlighted by the fact that
the vote on the Suez Canal dispute took place just two days after the
signature of the trade agreement.
Afterword
The examination of Soviet-Israeli relations in the period we

have covered provides a vivid demonstration of the workings of
Soviet foreign policy. In the body of the study we have discuss-
ed Soviet motivation and practice with regard to one small
state in an area of interpower rivalry. The purpose of this final
section is not so much to sum up the intricacies of the USSR's
attitude toward and ties with the State of Israel, which has been
done in the concluding pages of each chapter. It is rather to
sum up the general implications of those central aspects and
factors of the Soviet Union's thinking and conduct in the inter-
national arena as a whole that are highlighted by its relation-
ship with Israel.
The 1947-54 period, from the point of view of Soviet foreign
policy, was characterized by the following trends: a. the con-
solidation of the People's Democracies and the establishment of
the Soviet bloc; b. the polarization of East-West relations on the
inter-government, inter-state level accompanied, on the one
hand, by the closing of the Iron Curtain and, on the other, by
attempts to circumvent this self-imposed seclusion by penetrat-
ing the Western camp through institutional contacts with a
wide range of its public organizations and social and political
groupings; c. an effort to stress the point that the USSR was a
major world power with consequent legitimate interests in
every corner of the globe even where it had not established a
physical presence (this, for example, provided the context of
both the tactics and content of Soviet U.N. positions); d. the
need to minimize the practical significance of both its position
of strategic inferiority in the period of a Western nuclear mono-
poly and also of the other aspects of its technological tardiness
and economic difficulties at a time when the United States was
giving mass economic and technical aid; and e. the consequent
hard-line policy that culminated in Europe with the first Berlin
blockade, and in the Far East with the Korean War; this policy
499
began to show signs of mitigation as early as 1949, especially

regarding what was to become the Third World, a mitigation
which was finally legitimized by Stalin's successors in 1953 as
a result of not only the evident failure of the more obdurate line
but also the USSR's successes in overcoming some of its more
blatant disadvantages in the immediate post-war period.
These are the trends and developments which our story helps
bring into focus. Although it covers only the USSR's relations
with one small state, it provides ample evidence that that
power's policy toward any single state cannot be detached from
the context of its general foreign, and to an extent sometimes
also its domestic, policy objectives. Thus the story of Soviet-
Israeli relations in the period under discussion illuminates the
varying significance at different times and in different constella-
tions of at least some of the major factors that comprise the
essence of present-day power politics: the balance of forces
among the great powers and the nature of their relationship; the
interests of a particular power in a given region and its ability
to preserve and promote these interests; the interplay of global,
regional and bilateral considerations; the interaction among
military, political and economic calculations and motivations;
and finally, the complexities of the relationship between a
major world power and a small state, both in conditions of con-
verging interests and objectives and when the circumstances
that created this identity of purpose—which must inevitably be
temporary given the disproportion between the two sides —no
longer exist.
At the same time, our study shows the Kremlin operating as a
dictatorship whose official raison d'être has been carefully
shaped within an elaborate ideological framework. It illustrates
some interesting features of the international relations of such a
regime as well as highlighting the elements influencing its for-
eign policy. It demonstrates, too, aspects of Soviet decision-
making processes and the impact of domestic trends and
developments on foreign policy orientations. The evolution of
Soviet-Israeli relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s also
provides an insight into two other problems: how far Moscow is
committed to its own doctrines on the one hand, and to its
ideological partners —avowed and fully-fledged or potential and
partial —on the other; and what was the role played by prop-
aganda and dogma, comrades and fellow-travelers in shaping
the course of Soviet foreign policy and promoting its goals.
Surely, too, the advantage the USSR was able to take of a bit-
Afterword 501
ter, seemingly insoluble regional conflict to consolidate its

political leverage in the Middle East was the consequence of its
specific system of government. This becomes especially obvious
when Soviet flexibility is compared with the limitations
imposed on the United States by recurrent public declarations
of commitment to one or the other side in the conflict, usually
made within the framework of the democratic electoral process.
Finally, the Soviet attempts to reach out toward U.S. Jewry as a
basically nonconformist element vis-à-vis its own surroundings
and government, with inclinations to the "world of tomorrow"
or the camp of "progresss" headed by the USSR, and the simul-
taneous Soviet policy of isolating its own Jews from their breth-
ren in other countries and the radical methods employed by
Moscow to ensure this demonstrate with particular clarity the
USSR's enormous maneuverability as compared with the West-
ern democracies.
Our story also shows how the USSR, in addition to being a
great power and an ideologically conceived totalitarian state,
has another significant feature that distinguishes it from other
powers and dictatorships. As a multinational state preaching
national autonomy for its ethnic minorities, it has a special
problem in maintaining relations with states or nations that
have a direct interest in the USSR in the form of a significant
representation in one of its national or other minorities. This is
seen in a particularly striking way in the case of its Jewish
minority. The Soviet Union, having been unable to sever itself
completely from pre-revolutionary Russia, has, for example, a
long heritage of anti-Semitism dating far back into the Tsarist
past. Not satisfied with imposing on its Jewish minority the
already stringent normative restrictions applied to its multifari-
ous national minorities, the USSR deprived its Jews of any out-
let for national expression within the Soviet polity. The result
was not, however, wholesale assimilation. Already reawakened
to a sense of Jewishness by the Holocaust, large numbers of
Soviet Jews reacted to official and popular anti-Semitism and
anti-Jewish discrimination by identifying with Israel as the only
viable solution to their quest for a group identity. Thus, despite
its insistence on the Soviet Jews' successful incorporation in
their homeland, the Kremlin was unable to ignore them in its
official relations with Israel.
In this way the study of Soviet-Israeli relations gives an
instructive insight into the dynamics, mechanisms and consid-
erations of Soviet foreign policy. In turn, only a comprehension
of these motifs can explain the trends and objectives that

determined the relationship between the two states. On the sur-
face the topic is full of striking contradictions: the support of
the Arabs on the level of polemics along with the encourage-
ment of Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to the camps of
Germany and Austria in the period from mid-1945 to early
1947; the apparently sudden declaration of support for the
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine; the dichotomy of
the mid-1948 to mid-1949 period, with the USSR continuing to
back Israel in the international arena, yet turning against it on
the domestic level; the conduct of normal bilateral relations
side by side with an insidious, indeed often violent, prop-
aganda campaign in the Soviet communications media in the
May 1949-March 1953 period; and finally, the resumption of
relations accompanied simultaneously by gestures of friendship
and an anti-Israel stand on the Arab-Israeli conflict in late
1953-early 1954. Above all is the outstanding contrast between
the all-out support in the crucial period of the establishment of
the Israeli state and the hostility to it in the subsequent years.
This too can be explained by a careful examination of Soviet
policy in its wider framework as two expressions of one and the
same objective: to prepare the ground for the acquisition of
Soviet political, military and economic leverage in the Middle
East by widening the major breach in the disposition of forces
of the chief foreign power in the region and creating a power
vacuum.
The detailed survey and analysis of Soviet-Israeli relations in
the 1947-54 period has, moreover, relevance and value for the
student of Soviet foreign policy and Soviet attitudes and ambi-
tions regarding the Middle East and Israel in later periods. On
the one hand, the ingredients of the later relationship were pre-
sent in the earlier period; on the other, the USSR has remained
a major world power, a Marxist-Leninist "dictatorship of the
proletariat" and a multinational polity, motivated by similar
considerations, thinking in similar terminology and operating
with similar methods. We have seen in this study that the
twists and turns in Soviet policy in this area already in this
early period served a deep, underlying consistency of purpose.
This pattern, given the almost unchanging nature of Soviet
conceptual and institutional frameworks, seems of equal valid-
ity today and essential to an understanding of current Soviet
diplomatic exercises and reactions.
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Subject Index
A.F.L. 81, 442 n. 115 American Jewry. See United

Agitprop. See Soviet Union, States, Jewish population of
propaganda and agitation American Zionist Emergency
Ahdut Ha-Avoda 136 n. 34, Council 51
221 n. 23, 428, 443 n. 129. Anglo-American Committee of
See also Mapam Inquiry 22-25, 26, 32, 39,
Al-Hamishmar. See Mapam 70,81
Allied control commissions. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936
See World War Two, Allied 35, 74, 82, 102 nn. 49 and
control commissions 52, 269-70, 407-8
Allied powers. See World War Anti-cosmopolitan campaign
Two, Allied powers 200, 219, 272, 280, 298,
"All-Palestine Government" 313, 317-324, 326, 339-41,
256, 289-90 n. 115 349, 431
Ail-Union Academy of Anti-Fascist Youth Committee.
Agricultural Sciences 335 See World Federation of
n. 73 Democratic Youth
Ail-Union Society for the Dis- Anti-imperialism 172, 188,
semination of Political and 224-5 n. 51, 230 n. 124,
Scientific Knowledge 212 266, 275, 352, 360-1, 384,
Ambijan (American Commit- 400, 407, 416. See also
tee for the Settlement of national liberation move-
Jews in Birobidzhan) 306 ments and wars
American Committee of Jew- Anti-semitism 27, 31, 74, 88,
ish Writers, Artists and Sci- 100 n. 30, 101 n. 31, 172,
entists 113 191-2, 230 n. 121, 300-2,
American Council of Jewish 304, 313, 314, 315, 317,
Workers 76 322-3, 327, 331 n. 42,
American Jewish Committee 341-3, 344, 349, 360-2,
81 368-9, 371, 376-7, 382, 385,
American Jewish Conference 471, 478, 492 n. 6, 494 n.
64 n. 135 32. See also Black Hun-
511
512 Subject Index
dreds, Poland: anti- 250, 281, 4 0 2 , 415, 417,

semitism in 432, 434 n. 7, 445-7. See
Anti-Soviet propaganda and also Free Officers
trends 212, 215-6, 311, 340, Arab Supreme Committee. See
348, 360, 372, 379-80, 389 Arab Higher Committee
n. 2 3 , 4 5 8 Arab unity 233, 289-90 n. 15,
Anti-Zionism. See Zionism 417, 482-3, 4 9 4 n. 37
and Zionist M o v e m e n t Armenians. See Middle East,
Aqaba 173, 269, 271-2. See minority groupings
also Gulf of Aqaba and Armistice and armistice
Straits of Tiran agreements 252, 258, 263,
Arab-Asian bloc 413-4, 417, 270, 279, 280, 405, 4 1 8 , ch.
422 10 passim, 484. See also
Arab East. See Middle East m i x e d armistice c o m m i s -
Arab Higher Committee 40, sions
117, 118, 235, 260, 285 n. Arms supplies 80, 87, 111,
59 113-4, 122, 133 n. 6, 139,
Arab-Israeli conflict 354, 4 0 3 , 144, 149-168, 211-2, 216,
ch. 10 passim, 483-91. See 237, 260-1, 267, 271, 292 n.
also Israel, war of indepen- 133, 4 0 3 , 405-6, 435 n. 21,
dence; Je wish-Arab rela- 480, 481-3; U.S. protest at
tions Soviet bloc military aid to
Arab-Israeli conflict, settle- Israel 158-9, 166-7, n. 55,
ment of 258. See also armis- 212
tice and armistice agree- Arrests and deportations 327,
ments, demilitarized zones, 330 n. 19, 335 n. 67, 339,
direct negotiations 342, 345, 348-9, 384
Arab League 19, 21, 4 1 , 4 3 , Atlantic pact. See N A T O
49, 55 nn. 14 and 16, 83, A t o m i c bomb and nuclear
110, 114, 115, 234, 254, weaponry 37, 273, 333 n.
267, 289 n. 115, 402-3, 54, 387-8 n. 12, 4 0 1 , 406,
411-2, 415, 4 8 3 , 4 9 4 n. 37. 414,420,424,427
See also Arab unity A u s c h w i t z 140, 329 n. 9, 368
Arab Legion. See Transjordan Austria 93; Soviet occupation
Arab refugees 178, 248-50, z o n e in 24; Western occu-
252, 255, 264, 276-8, 285 pation zones in 22, 26, 28,
nn. 57, 58 and 59, 289 n. 4 7 , 8 8 , 170
108, 454-6, 466 nn. 36, 40 Aynikeit 187, 192, 201, 303,
and 46. See also population 307, 309, 311, 316, 334 n.
transfers 64. See also Jewish Anti-
Arab Socialist Party (Syria) Fascist Committee
411
Arab states and regimes 115,
Subject Index 513
Balkan countries. See people's 319, 320-2, 333-4 n. 58,

democracies 341, 348, 358, 360, 361-3,
Ba'th411 365, 370-1, 373-7, 381-3,
BBC (British Broadcasting 393 n. 69, 430
Corporation) 350 Brichah 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 57
Beersheba. See Negev n. 41
Belorussia 31, 58 n. 53; Yidd- Britain. See Great Britain
ish theater in Minsk 316 British Zionist Federation 148
Belorussian mission at U.N. Bulgaria 24; Jewish emigration
See United Nations, Soviet from 148. See also people's
delegations at democracies: Jewish emig-
Benot Yaacov project. See Jor- ration from
dan river and waters
Berlin blockade and crisis Carpatho-Russia 32
(1948-9) 272, 286-7 n. 79, Central Committee of Polish
433 n. 1 Jews 27, 172
Bernadotte plan 169, 251, Central Europe, Jews of 77
255-264, 273, 286-7 n. 79, C.G.T. 442 n. 115
287 n. 90. See also United China (CPR) 292 n. 146, 402,
Nations, mediator and 414, 423, 425, 436 n. 34,
mediation 438 n. 55, 440 n. 87,480
Beterem 215-6, 229-30 n. 121. C.I.A (Central Intelligence
See also Mapai Agency) 166-7 n. 55
Bevin-Sidqï negotiations. See C.I.O. 81, 442 n. 115
Egypt: relations with Great Cold war 23, 36, 48-49, 51, 60
Britain, Great Britain: with- nn. 75 and 76, 74, 88, 114,
drawal from Egypt 170, 172-3, 206-7, 218, 259,
Bible 311, 332 n. 45 266, 274, 279, 304, 309,
Biltmore program. See Pales- 314, 323, 324, 341, 378,
tine question, Biltmore 385, 421, 441 n. 107, 471-2,
program 479. See also Berlin block-
Biological controversy 385 n. ade and crisis, non-
73, 386. See also Soviet alignment, regional blocs
Union, arts and sciences and pacts
Birobidzhan 200, 305-9, 311, Collectivism. See Israel, col-
313, 315, 330-1 nn. 27-35, lective settlements and
342, 343-4, 348, 384 cooperatives
"Black Book" 303 "Colonial and semi-colonial
Black Hundreds 343 countries" 171, 273, 274,
Blocs and pacts. See regional 281, 400-1, 411, 414, 431,
blocs and pacts 433,446
"Bourgeois Nationalism" 216, Colonialism 36, 187, 414
218, 299, 310-1, 314, 316, Cominform 73, 136 nn. 33 and
514 Subject Index
34, 221 n. 23, 324, 333 n. Crimea, proposal for Jewish

58, 358, 359, 361. See also settlement in 316, 328 n. 4,
For a Lasting Peace, For a 335 n. 72
People's Democracy Cyprus 114; "illegal" immig-
Committee of Polish Jews in rants deported to 99 n. 13,
the USSR 58 nn. 50 and 52, 170,248
301 Czechoslovakia 29, 30, 67, 70,
Communist League of Pales- 80-1, 84, 98 nn. 8 and 11,
tine 222 n. 25 144-5, 149-168 p a s s i m , 260,
Communist parties, non-ruling 357-71 passim, 481; Zionist
18; Arab 267; Middle East- organization 360. See also
ern 167 n. 61 Arms supplies. Piller Com-
Communist party of Egypt m i s s i o n , Slánsky Trial
410, 416; France 63 n. 114,
176, 433 n. 1, 437 n. 52,
442 n. 123; Great Britain 37, Davar. See Mapai
Jewish section 24, 328 n. 2; Demilitarized zones 252,
Iraq 434 n. 7; Israel, see 457-9, 484-5
Maki; Italy 433 n. 1; Jordan "Democratic" forces and
496 n. 75; Palestine 24, 56 organizations. See "prog-
n. 35, 61 n. 9 1 , 103 n. 60, ressive" forces and o p i n i o n
121, 136 nn. 33 and 34, 166 Denazification 24
n. 46. See also Communist Developing countries 4 8 1 , 484
League of Palestine, Pales- Diaspora and dispersion 143,
tinian Arab Communists; 173, 178-9, 346
Syria and Lebanon 134 n. Direct negotiations 245, 250,
18 258, 267-8, 270-1, 285 n.
Conciliation C o m m i s s i o n 253, 60,446,447-8,485,489
262, 263-4, 268, 277, 447, Disarmament 176, 414
450, 452-3, 464-5 n. 14 Doctors' "Plot" 334 n. 59,
Conferences, three-power for- 373-84 passim,392-3, 394 n.
eign ministers' conferences 79, 395-6 n. 88, 469-71, 491
20; three-power summit nn. 1 and 3 , 4 9 2 n. 5
conferences. See Potsdam DOSAAF 342
Conference, Yalta Confer- D.P.s (Displaced Persons) 22,
ence 24, 28, 29, 33, 47, 55 n. 22,
Cosmopolitanism 317, 360, 57 n. 4 1 , 75, 77, 88, 89, 102
370, 374, 377, 383. See also n. 45, 112, 118, 142, 170,
Anti-cosmopolitan campaign 248-9, 378. See also
Cotton 405, 480-1 Austria: Western occupa-
Council for the Affairs of tion zones in, Cyprus, Ger-
Religious Cults 190, 329 n. many: Western occupation
17 zones in
Subject Index 515
Dumbarton Oaks Conference Espionage 348-9, 362, 365-6,

16, 55 n. 14 367-8, 370, 373, 376-7, 381
Ethioipia 165 n. 37
Eastern bloc. See Soviet bloc Etzel. See Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi
Eastern Europe. See people's European Jewry 26, 89, 186,
democracies 386. See also West Euro-
Eastern Mediterranean 114, pean Jewry
354 European Recovery Program
East Germany 423 284 n. 38
East-West confrontation. See Export-Import Bank 207
cold war
Economic and technical aid. FaJastin, al- 40
See European Recovery Fascism 24, 26, 74, 100 n. 30,
Program, Marshall Plan, 101 n. 31, 114-5, 140, 151,
Point Four, Trade, Truman 213, 233, 265, 300 302, 303,
doctrine 304, 427. See also Nazi
Egypt 78-9, 352, 378, 407-11, Germany, Nazis and Nazism
413, 416-7, 479; Anglo- Federation of Arab Workers'
Egyptian negotiations 408, Sections 103 n. 60
479. See also Bevin-SidqT For a Lasting Peace, For a
negotiations, Great Britain: People's Democracy 120-1,
withdrawal from Egypt, 382-3
Sudan; anti-British and Foreign broadcasts 350-1
anti-Western trends and Free Officers 410-11, 437 n.
forces 35, 79, 102 n. 49, 79, 51,480, 482-3, 494 n. 37
408-10, 416, 490, 494 n. 37; Friendship associations. See
peace movement 439 n. 68; societies for friendship with
relations with Great Britain the USSR
460-1, 484; relations with Friendship pact 404, 435 nn.
USSR 404-5, 410, 460, 21 and 24
462-3, 479-83, 488-90, 494 Front organizations 166 n. 46,
n. 38, 496-7 n. 77. See also 170, 180, 209, 229 n. 112,
Soviet Union, diplomatic 279, 401, 415-7, 424-30, 439
mission in Egypt; social n. 68. See also American
discontent 60 n. 71. See Committee of Jewish Writ-
also Anglo-Egyptian Treaty ers, Artists and Scientists,
of 1936, Free Officers, Great League for Friendly Rela-
Britain: withdrawal from tions with the USSR, World
Egypt, Hizb al-Watan, Mus- Federation of Trade Unions
lim Brothers, Misr al-Fatãt, World Peace Movement
Suez Canal, Suez Canal
zone, Wafd
Emes, Der 312, 316, 333 n. 51
516 Subject Index
Galilee 86, 156, 234, 242, 253, permanent members of

255, 256-7, 353 Greater Syria 37, 233, 448
Germany 93, 149, 384, 422-3; Greece 48-49, 83, 85, 135 n.
Soviet occupation zone in 28, 187, 234, 440 n. 87,472
24; Western occupation Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of
zones in 22, 24, 26, 28, 47, Tiran 488, 496 n. 70
57 n. 41, 88, 170. See also
East Germany, Nazi Ger- Ha-dor217
many, West Germany Hagana 26, 121. See also
Great Britain, arms supplied to Brichah
Arabs 236. See also arms Haifa 40, 86, 103 n. 60, 240,
supplies; military forces 242, 247, 253, 264, 284 n.
and bases 40-1, 113-4, 220 38, 353-4, 370
n. 19, 236, 268-71, 274, 280, Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair 32-3, 99
432; Palestine Mandate 16, n. 19, 103 n. 60, 136 n. 34,
17, 19, 20, 21, 41, 43, 46, 221 n. 23, 428. See also
47, 48, 52, 53, 65, 70-1, 73, Mapam
75, 79, 82, 91, 96, 111, 113, Hativat Ha-Smol 394 n. 79
117, 125, 126, 127, 130-1, Hebrew 189, 311, 345, 350,
208-9, 249-50, 285 n. 58, 389 n. 23
455; position in Middle Hebrew Communists 178, 222
East 25, 132, 236, 238, 254, n. 25, 229 n. 119
400, 432, 445, 448; relations Histadrut 103 n. 60, 152, 214,
with Arabs 241, 271. See 380, 381, 425-6, 429, 442 n.
also Portsmouth Treaty; 115
relations with USA. See Hitlerism. See fascism, Nazi
United States: relations Germany, Nazis and Nazism
with Great Britain; with- Hizb al-Watan 60 n. 73
drawal from Egypt 20, 47-8, Holocaust 25, 47, 68-9, 70, 75,
78-9, 82, 85, 102 n. 49, 95, 100 n. 30, 191, 298, 299,
407-10, 415, 417, 479, from 300, 303, 325, 345. See also
Levant 85, from Palestine Auschwitz, "Black Book",
20, 50, 51, 52, 85, 97, 113, Majdanek
140, 218-9, 234, 282 n. 4 Holy places 35, 60 n. 69, 131,
Great power Conferences. See 237, 239, 242, 277, 452, 465
conferences: three-power n. 16. See also Jerusalem
foreign ministers' confer- Huleh Lake. See demilitarized
ence, Potsdam Conference, zones
Yalta Conference Hungary 24, 150, 152; Jewish
Great power cooperation emigration from 147. See
72-73,425,427 also people's democracies,
Great powers. See United emigration from
Nations: Security Council,
Subject Index 517
Ideology 160, 206-7, 298-9, International Democratic Fed-

301-2, 317, 335 n. 73, 374. eration of Women (I.D.F.W.)
See also anti-cosmopolitan 347,401,415
campaign, "Bourgeois na- International economic con-
tionalism", Marxist-Leninist ference (Moscow 1952) 347
theory, "Zhdanovshchina" International events and
Ihud 103 n. 60 forums, sporting events
Immigration (to Palestine) 16, 347-8, 494 n. 30
21, 24, 25-33, 43, 47, 53, 57 International issues 83, 176,
n. 41, 76-7, 79, 86, 88, 105 381, 384, 414, 420-1, 424,
n. 78, 113, 117-8, 122-3, 436 n. 34, 440 n. 87. See
140, 141-149, 160, 170, 178, also atomic bomb and nu-
186, 192, 238, 240, 243, clear weaponry, colonia-
244, 248, 255, 283 n. 34, lism, disarmament, Germa-
285 n. 57, 308, 355, 386, ny, Greece, Indochina, In-
443 n. 135. See also donesia, Korea and Korean
Brichah, Bulgaria: Jewish war, Yugoslavia, Soviet rift
emigration from, Cyprus, with
D.P.s, Hungary: Jewish International peace and se-
emigration from, people's curity 276, 424-5, 445
democracies: Jewish emig- International Refugee Organ-
ration from, Poland: Jewish ization (IRO) 249
emigration from, Soviet International trusteeship 16,
Union: emigration from, 80, 118, 132. See also
Romania: Jewish emigration United Nations, General
from Assembly: 2nd Special Ses-
India 413-4 sion
Indian Ocean 37 International waterways 460,
Indochina 405 462-3, 488. See also Gulf of
Indonesia 85, 187, 414 Aqaba and Straits of Tiran,
Institute of International Suez Canal, Turkish Straits
Affairs. See Soviet Union, International wheat conference
foreign ministry, Institute of 208
International Affairs Iran 49, 135 n. 28, 196, 234,
Institute of Oriental Studies 352, 378. Soviet withdrawal
322 from 20
Institute of Pacific Studies Iraq 135 n. 28, 352, 378, 434
322, 431 n. 7, 482, 490. See also
Inter-Arab relations 403. See Portsmouth Treaty
also Arab League Irgun Tzva'i Le'umi 45, 63 n.
International Brigade. See 119, 121, 249, 251
Spanish civil war "Iron Curtain" and isolation-
518 Subject Index
ism 198, 206, 209, 218, 280, 418-23, 426-30, 440 n. 87.
298-9, 314, 317, 323, 327 See also non-alignment,
Islam 34; Muslim activity, 37, United States: relations
139; Muslim world 410. See with Israel; membership in
also Lebanon: Muslim U.N. 170, 205, 264-6, 271,
population of, Muslim 276-8, 280, 289 n. 110; par-
Brothers, Soviet Union: liamentary elections 207,
Muslim population of, 211-2, 229 n. 119, 266, 276,
Yugoslavia: Muslim popula- 279; regime 192, 212, 281,
tion of 418, 423-30 passim; War of
Islamic Socialist Front (Syria) Independence 110, 113,
404 139, ch. 4 passim, 175, 179,
Isolationism. See "Iron Cur- ch. 6 passim, 305, 346, 442
tain" and isolationism n. 119, Soviet Jewish inter-
Israel, Arab minority in 182, est in 186-90, 224-5 n. 51,
222 n. 32, 355, 366, 372, 305. See also League for
427, 442-3 n. 123, 456. See Friendly Relations with the
also Nazareth; collective USSR, World peace move-
settlements and coopera- ment
tives 44, 62 n. 107, 78, 176, Israel Philharmonic Orchestra
178, 197, 213; Communist 210
Youth League 228 n. I l l ; Israeli "left" 181, 183, 211,
diplomatic mission in 222 n. 30, 394 n. 79, 419.
Soviet Union 180, 183-206 See also League for
passim, 216, 217, 223-7, Friendly Relations with the
309, 344, 346-8, 349, 471, USSR, Maki, Mapam,
493 n. 28; domestic politics "Progressive forces", World
175-183, 212, 214-5, 217, peace movement
221 n. 23, 222 n. 30, 251, Israeli Medical Association
279, 352-3, 354-6, 366, 378, 210
443 n. 128. See also Israel: Israeli peace movement. See
parliamentary elections, world peace movement
Israeli "left", Maki, Mapai, Israeli-Soviet Friendship Asso-
Mapam, economy 353-6, ciation. See League for
389-90 n. 25, 420, 427-8. Friendly Relations with the
See also United States, rela- USSR
tions with Israel: economic Italian Socialist Party (P.S.I.)
aid; frontiers. See Jewish 179. See also Nenni, Pietro
state, frontiers of; interna-
tional orientation of 192, Jaffa 86, 113, 240, 242
206-7, 211, 219, 230 n. 124, Jerusalem 47, 60 n. 69, 80, 85,
251, 279, 351, 360-1, 366-7, 87, 88, 93, 129, 130, 155,
368, 377, 380-1, 384-5, 178, 234, 239, 242, 244-6,
Subject Index 519
253, 255, 256, 276-7, 353, zhan

354, 451-4, 465 n. 1 6 , 4 7 6 Jewish State Theater 315, 335
Jewish A g e n c y for Palestine n. 71
19, 44, 47, 54 n. 10, 66, 77, Jewish unity 309, 314, 320-2,
84, 87, 88-9, 118, 121, 124, 325. See also world Jewry
128, 148, 150, 151, 160, 228 Jewish Women's Congress 57
n. 110, 244 n. 41
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee Jews. S e e Diaspora and dis-
74, 100 n. 29, 187, 198, 200, persion, European Jewry,
201, 224 n. 4 3 , 226 n. 73, Poland: Jewish population
229 n. 115, 298, 300, 301, of, Romania: Jewish popula-
302-5, 309, 310, 312, 315, tion of, Soviet Jewry,
3 1 6 , 3 2 5 , 392 n. 64 United States: Jewish p o p u -
Je wish-Arab relations 4 1 , 4 2 , lation of, Western Jewry,
52, 71-2, 75, 80, 84, 101 n. world Jewry
36, 103 n. 60, 110, 115, ''Joint" — Joint Distribution
118-9, 213, 244, 275, 277, Committee (J.D.C) 367,
302. See also Arab-Israeli 373-6,379, 382,472
conflict, Israel: War of Jordan. See Transjordan
Independence Jordan, river and waters 47,
Jewish Foundation Fund 197, 484-5, 487
213 Judaism 321
Jewish national h o m e 16, 18,
19, 49, 72, 76, 8 1 , 306-7, Kenya, transfer of British
309. See also Birobidzhan bases to 48
Jewish question 24, 26, 30, 32, Keren Hayesod. See Jewish
100 n. 30, 142, «171, 179, Foundation Fund
191-2, 299-300; in Central Kharbin 203
and Eastern Europe 25. See Kibbutzim. See Israel: collec-
also Soviet Union: Jewish tive settlements and
question in cooperatives
Jewish state, establishment of Kielce, pogrom at 28, 29, 329
49-50, 79, 129, 130-1, 132, n. 13
138 n. 50, 186-7, 188, 244, Kol Ha-Am. See Maki
275, 277, 305, 325, 447, K o m s o m o l 342, 388
473. See also Jewish Korea and Korean war 83, 85,
national h o m e , partition; 93, 187, 3 8 1 , 384-5, 4 0 1 ,
frontiers 85, 86, 88, 169-70, 411-4, 417, 421-2, 428, 429,
234, 242-5, 250, 252-3, 436 n. 34, 441 n. 95, 4 4 3 n.
254-6, 264, 265, 354. See 130, 4 5 5 , 4 6 6 n. 40, 492 n.
also Aqaba, demilitarized 10
zones, Galilee, Jerusalem,
Negev. See also Birobid-
520 Subject Index
Latin American countries 90, nn. 128 and 135, 448

452 Marshall Plan 73, 89, 120,
League for Friendly Relations 173, 352, 418
with the USSR18,39,45,59n. Marxism. See Marxist-Leninist
62, 82, 179-80, 181, 209-10, theory
219,229n.ll2,304,394n.79, Marxist-Leninist theory 49, 56
426, 464 n. 6 n. 30, 78, 319, 382. See also
League for Struggle Against ideology
Anti-Semitism 115 Mediterranean 40, 353. See
League of Nations 235 also Eastern Mediterranean,
Lebanon 256, 438 n. 59, 487-8; regional blocs and pacts
Muslim population of 256; Middle East 322, 360-1; Com-
relations with USSR 435 n. munist infiltration of. See
24, 483, 495 n. 52 Soviet Union: penetration
"Lehi" (Lohamei Herut Yis- into Middle East; minority
rael). See Stern group groupings 34, 59 n. 66, 182,
"Leningrad affair" 323, 359 223 n. 35. See also Israel:
Leninism. See Marxist- Arab minority in. For Mid-
Leninist theory dle East see also regional
Libya 487 blocs and pacts, Soviet
Lithuania 58 n. 53 Union penetration into
Lydda 242, 253, 353, 381 Middle East
Middle East command. See
regional blocs and pacts
Majdanek 300, 368 Military aid. See arms sup-
Maki 160-1, 175-6, 178, 181, plies,military training
182, 214-5, 221 n. 23, 222 Military training 145, 155,
n. 25, 229 n. 119, 275-6, 157, 159, 167 n. 57, 403.
380-1, 394 n. 79, 424, 426- See also people's democ-
30, 442 n. 110, 453, 459 racies: military training of
Mandate. See Great Britain, Jewish emigrants
Palestine Mandate Misr al-Fatãt 60 n. 73
Mandatory system 17, 20, 46 Mixed armistice commissions
Mapai 121, 157, 176, 179, 457, 489; Israeli-Egyptian
214-5, 355, 425, 430-1, 441 mixed armistice commis-
n. 107, 442 n. 115. See also sion 460, 496 n. 72;
Beterem Israeli-Syrian mixed armis-
Mapam 121, 136 n. 34, 143, tice commision 457-8, 484,
148, 157, 171, 172, 176-9, 487
212, 214-5, 221 nn. 23 and Morgenthau plan 366, 370
24, 222 n. 26, 228 n. 119, Morocco 487
279, 364, 381, 394 n. 79, Moscow Jewish Community
426, 428-30, 442 n. 115, 443 and synagogue 187, 190-1,
Subject Index 521
193-5, 197, 198-9, 200, 224 Neutrality. See non-alignment

n. 4 3 , 226 n. 75, 227 n. 98, N e w Zionist Organization. See
300-1, 346, 471 Revisionist party
Mossoviet theater 210 Non-aggression pact 4 0 4 , 408
M u s l i m Brothers 60 n. 73 Non-alignment 170, 171-3,
206-7, 219, 358, 370, 383,
Naje Lebn, Dos 311. See also 385, 4 0 1 , 411-7, 418, 4 2 1 ,
Central Committee of Polish 429, 4 3 4 n. 4, 441 n. 107.
Jews See also Arab-Asian bloc,
"National bourgeoisie" 214 Israel: international orienta-
National democratic front 121, tion of
214-5 North Africa 487
National Liberation League Northern Tier 479, 483
103 n. 60, 121, 136 n. 33, Nuclear weaponry and war-
400-1 fare. See atomic bomb and
National liberation m o v e m e n t s nuclear weaponry
and wars 36, 37-38, 39, 45, Nuremberg trials 329 n. 11
95, 139, 187, 236, 254, 273,
275, 400-2, 407, 409, 415-6; OGIZ 333 n. 51
Arab national liberation Oil 36, 40, 49, 50, 61 n. 93,
m o v e m e n t 2 5 1 , 383-4, 400, 137 n. 42, 145, 209, 241,
446 247, 254-6, 287 n. 79, 4 0 3 ,
Nationalism. See "bourgeois 4 1 2 , 4 2 0 , 4 4 5 , 4 7 6 , 480. See
nationalism" also Haifa
NATO 2 7 1 , 276, 292 n. 135, O s w i e c i m . See A u s c h w i t z
4 0 2 , 406, 408-9, 418, 4 3 3 n. Orthodox church. See Russian
1 Orthodox Church
Nazareth 103 n. 60, 182, 355 OVIR 201-2
Nazi Germany, Nazis and Naz-
i s m 3 1 , 69, 84-5, 114-5, 148, Pakistan 4 8 2 , 4 9 5 n. 44
232-3, 265-6, 3 0 1 , 324, 3 7 1 , Palestine. Arab invasion of
372, 377, 383, 387-8 n. 12, 117-8, 120, 122-3, 124, 127,
4 2 3 , 466 n. 46; collabora- 140, 232, 237, 261-2, 275,
tion w i t h by Soviet popula- 285 n. 58; military situation
tion 298. See also in 56 n. 38, 63 n. 119, 110,
denazification, World War 111. See also Israel: war of
Two i n d e p e n d e n c e ; political stat-
Near East. See Middle East us of. See Great Britain:
N e g e v 47, 86, 146, 155, 156, Palestine mandate, with-
173, 243, 253, 254-5, 256, drawal from Palestine; par-
261, 264, 267, 268, 270-2, tition, United Nations: par-
283 n. 31, 287 n. 87, 353, tition resolution. See also
419 Israel, Yishuv
522 Subject Index
Palestine Arab Congress 267 Partition 47, 71-2, 75, 79,

Palestine Commission 109-10, 84-97 passim, 101 n. 41,
111, 112, 116-7, 121-2, 135 n. 28, 243. See also
126-7 United Nations: partition
Palestine Communist Party. resolution
See Communist party of "Peaceful coexistence" 402,
Palestine 420, 492 n. 10
Palestine Liberation Army 233 People's democracies 27,
Palestine question ch. 1-3 and 141-168 passim, 176, 242,
6 passim, 305, 446, 484, 328 n. 1, 357, 366, 481;
486; Biltmore Program, 47, Jewish Communist organ-
81; federation, binational ization in 27. See also Cen-
solution 32-3, 41, 71, 75, tral committee of Polish
76, 79, 80, 99 n. 19, 243; Jews; Jewish emigration
Morrison-Grady plan 46-7, from 27, 28, 30, 33, 52, 53,
51. See also partition 57 n. 47, 68, 88-90, 140,
Palestine war. See Israel: war 141-9, 205, 216, 248-9, 447;
of independence Arab protest at 261-2, 449,
Palestinian Arab state 236, Western protest at 29, 68,
244, 253, 254, 255, 262. See 149; Jewish population of
United Nations: partition 192; Jewish spokesmen of
resolution 172; Jews' support of Israel
Palestinian Arabs 44, 114, 127, 166 n. 46, 172; military
182, 240, 248. See also "All training of Jewish emigrants
Palestine government", 90, 144, 162 n. 7; Zionism
Haifa, Israel: Arab minority and Zionist Organizations
in, Nazareth, Palestine Arab in 162 n. 14, 216, 360, 366,
Congress, Palestine Libera- 367. See also Bulgaria,
tion Army; Palestinian Arab Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Communists 101 n. 36, 103 Poland, Romania, Soviet-
n. 60, 182, 222 n. 25. See Union: relations with peo-
also Federation of Arab ple's democracies, repatria-
Workers' Sections, National tion from
Liberation League, Union of Pilgrimages. See holy places
Arab Intellectuals Piller Commission 357, 359-
Palmah 157 60, 390 n. 29
Pan Crescent and Pan York. Pogroms 114, 162 n. 7, 302,
See people's democracies: 304-5, 383 (Kishinev, 1903).
Jewish emigration from See also Kielce: pogrom at
Pan-Slavism. See "Slavic Point Four 407, 433 n. 1, 436
brotherhood" n. 34,481
Partisans of peace. See World Poland 24, 28, 42, 67-9, 84, 98
peace movement nn. 8, 11 and 12, 103 n. 57
Subject Index 523
134 n. 21, 186, 277-8; anti- 75, 306, 401. See also
semitism in 28, 31, 68, 302. "progressive" forces and
See also Kielce: pogrom at; opinion
consular representation in
Palestine. See Loc, Raphael; Qibya incident 484, 495 n. 56
Israel's proposed arms deal
with 153, 165 n. 44, 166 n. Racialism 24, 26, 74, 101 n.
51; Jewish emigration from 31, 300, 330 n. 24, 368, 377
28, 29, 47, 58 n. 56, 153, Radio Moscow 232; Radio
162 n. 7; Jewish population Moscow in Arabic 51, 78,
of 28, 29, 30, 31, 68. See 85, 292 n. 147, 384, 412; in
also Central committee of Yiddish 51, 74, 100 nn. 28
Polish Jews, Committee of and 29, 192-3, 259-60, 267,
Polish Jews in the USSR; 298, 304, 306-8, 309, 316,
U.B. 29. See also people's 332 n. 45, 335 nn. 67 and
democracies, Polish Com- 68, 437-8 n. 53
mittee of National Libera- "Red Army" 100 n. 30, 167 n.
tion, Soviet Union : repatri- 57,427
ation from Refugee problem, 466 n. 48.
Polish Commitee of National See also Arab refugees,
Liberation 28 D.P.s, repatriation
Politburo. See Soviet Union: Regional blocs and pacts 37,
leadership 60-61 n. 78, 81, 120, 133 n.
"Popular front" 178 11, 271-2, 370, 402-3, 406,
Population transfers 255. See 418, 424, 427-9, 430-1, 434
also repatriation n. 7, 448, 473-4, 479, 483-4,
Portsmouth Treaty 133 n. 11 490; Middle East Command
Potsdam Conference 21 408-10, 419. See also
Pravda 191-2 Northern Tier
Professional and educational Religion 311, 345; in service
discrimination and purges of world peace movement
339-42, 345, 349, 471 343, 387 n. 11; Jewish relig-
"Progressive" forces and opinion 321, 329 n. 17, 345. See
ion 24, 39, 41, 43, 44, 62 n. also Moscow Jewish com-
107, 74, 75, 77, 114, 115, munity and synagogue. See
121, 142, 160, 170, 171, also Bible, Council for the
172, 192, 212, 214, 217, Affairs of Religious Cults,
267, 278, 299, 300, 302, holy places, Islam, Roman
304, 305, 310, 313-4, 323, Catholic Church, Russian
324, 330 n. 24, 356, 360-1, Orthodox Church
402, 426, 428-30
Progressive front 427 Reparations. See Germany
Public opinion (Western) 74, Repatriation 57 n. 4 1 , 146. See
524 Subjet Index
also Soviet Union: repatria- Israeli "left"

tion from, to Socialist Zionism 179. See
"Reunification of families" also Mapai, Mapam
477 Societies for friendship with
Revisionist party 151, 213 the USSR 134 n. 19. See
Roman Catholic Church 391 n. also League for Friendly
37. See also Vatican Relations with the USSR,
Romania 24, 29, 145, 163 n. Syria: Society for Cultural
20, 164 n. 34; emigration Relations with the USSR
from 88-90, 144, 145-7, 148, Soiuzpechat' 312
177, 227 n. 94; Jewish Soldiers' Committee for peace.
population of 177. See also See world peace movement
people's democracies Soviet-American confronta-
RSFSR 58 n. 53; State Publish- tion. See cold war
ing House. See OGIZ Soviet-American cooperation
Rumors 206, 227-8 n. 98, 344, 51, 87, 90-4, 109, 172, 272.
350 See also "peaceful coexis-
Russian Orthodox Church 35, tence"
60 n. 69, 451. See also holy Soviet bloc 48, 67-9, 77, 80,
places, Russian Palestine 84, 141-9, 151-2, 218, 253,
Society 263, 277, 278, 317, 324,
Russian Palestine Society 451 359, 385, 448, 454. See also
Cominform, people's demo-
San Francisco Conference. See cracies, Soviet Union: rela-
United Nations: founding tions with people's democ-
conference racies, Yugoslavia: Soviet
Saudi Arabia 161, 482 rift with
Secret Speech. See Soviet Soviet Jewish culture 198,
Union: Communist party of, 302, 308, 309-12, 313,
20th Party Congress 316-7, 325; Soviet Jewish
Shtern, Der 311, 332 n. 43 Writers' Bureau 310, 333 n.
Siberia. See Arrests and 47; Ukrainian Academy of
deportations Sciences, Department for
Sinai peninsula 268-70 Soviet Jewish Literature,
Slánsky trial 357-371 passim, Linguistics and Folklore
372,374,377 311, 316, 332-3 n. 47. See
Slav bloc. See Soviet bloc also Yiddish
"Slavic brotherhood" 32 Soviet Jewry 70, 99 n. 15, 175,
Social problems and order 177, 183, 185-206 passim,
192, 250. See also Arab 219, 224 n. 43, 279-80, ch.
states and regimes, Egypt: 7 and 8 passim, 422, 431;
social discontent contact with and interest in
Socialist left of Israel. See Jews abroad 186, 189, 219,
Subject Index 525
221 n. 24, 225 n. 62, 228 57, Great Britain 18, Iraq
nn. 110 and 111, 280, 281, 21, 33, Israel 174-83, 209,
297-8, 300, 312, 314, 315, 220-3, 378-83, 393 n. 75,
317. See also Birobidzhan, 426, 451, 473-4, 475-6, 492
Jewish Anti-Fascist Com- n. 14, Lebanon and Syria
mittee, Jewish State Thea- 18, 26, 33, 39, 60 n. 69,
ter, Moscow Jewish com- 304, United States 76, 77 \
munity and synagogue, diplomatic relations with
Soviet Jewish culture, Israel: establishment of 169,
Soviet Union: emigration 173-4, severance of 378-83,
from, Jewish question in, renewal of 472-8, to
World War Two: Jews' role embassy level 477-8. See
in also Israel: diplomatic mis-
"Soviet man" 318 sion in Soviet Union, Soviet
Soviet Union, Academy of sci- Union: diplomatic mission
ences 18, 332, 431. See also in Israel; domestic policy
All-Union Academy of and scene 205, 280-1,
Agricultural Sciences, Insti- 312-3, 324, 372-3, 385, 470,
tute of Oriental Studies, 491, 500. See also anti-
Institute of Pacific Studies; cosmopolitan campaign,
Armed forces 396 n. 88. See Doctors' "Plot", Soviet
also "Red Army"; arts and Jewry, Soviet Union: emig-
sciences 299, 335 n. 73, ration from, leadership,
340-1. See also anti- Muslim population of,
cosmopolitan campaign, national minorities and
biological controversy; Doc- nationalities policy, State
tors' "Plot", "Zhdanov- Secrets Act, Union of Writ-
shchina"; Communist party ers, Western republics,
of 136 n. 33, 176, 301, 319, "Western" territories";
323, 426; Central Commit- economic and trade rela-
tee 299, 309, 317; depart- tions with Israel 170, 207-9,
ment of agitprop 316; spe- 348, 476; economic crimes.
cial Section 396-88; 19th See Soviet Union: domestic
Party Congress 395 n. 88, policy and scene; emigra-
401-2; 20th Party Congress tion from 26, 344, 477; Jew-
395 n. 88, 471. See also ish emigration from 26, 27,
Komsomol, cultural rela- 70, 166 n. 49, 188, 189-90,
tions with Israel 209-10; 196, 198, 200-5, 227 nn. 96
diplomatic missions abroad and 98, 307, 308, 344, 349,
174, 181, 182, 222-3 n. 32; 394 n. 76, 440 n. 92, 443 n.
diplomatic missions in 135, 477; "Let my people
Egypt 18, 33, 34, 35-6, 38, go" 471. See also
59 n. 66, 60 n. 71, 225 n. "reunification of families",
526 Subject Index
Soviet Union: repatriation lim population of 265;

from; forces and bases in M.V.D. (Ministry of Internal
Eastern Europe 57 n. 41; Affairs) 197-8, 204, 225 n.
Foreign Ministry 142, 182, 51, 225-6 n. 68, 327, 328 n.
183, 184, 185, 198, 203, 1, 334 n. 59, 344, 348, 359,
210, departments: Consular 373, 375, 491 n. 1; Depart-
203-4, Near and Middle ment for Investigating Spe-
East 142, 155-7, 183, 184, cially Important Cases 359,
203, 210, Protocol 183, 184, 396 n. 88, 491 n. 1. See also
209, Sovinformburo 298, Abakumov, Viktor, OVIR;
Institute of International national minorities and
Affairs 322; Foreign policy nationalities policy 71, 75,
217, 218, 236, 272, 279, 95, 298, 301-2, 305, 306-7,
298, 299-300, 302, 306, 309, 309, 312, 313, 316, 326,
312, 314, 324, 4 0 1 , 415, 4 3 3 343-4, 346, 348, 375-6, 386,
n. 1, 469, 471-2, 500-2. See 393 n. 69, 440 n. 92, 443 n.
also "colonial and semi- 135, 470, 492 n. 6, 501. See
colonial countries", Com- also "bourgeois national-
munist parties, front organ- ism", Soviet Jewry; national
izations; Foreign Trade security 36-7, 316, 373, 381,
Ministry 208-9, Nafta 476, 495 n. 44; penetration into
Nefteksport 209, Prodintorg Middle East 33-8, 78, 105-6
476, Sovfrakht 209, Vnesh- n. 8 1 , 111, 133 n. 5, 135 n.
torg 208; Government Print- 28, 148-9, 163 n. 23, 243,
ing Office. See Soiuz- 260, 399, 405, 4 4 6 , 478;
pechat'; internal security. propaganda and agitation
See Soviet Union: M.V.D.; 56 n. 32, 74, 75, 100 n. 30,
Jewish population of. See 139, 181-2, 212, 217, 222-3
Soviet Jewry; Jewish ques- n. 32, 272, 301, 305, 313-4,
tion in 179, 198, 205-6, 316, 323, 325, 331 n. 42,
229-30 n. 120, 308, 344, 440 350-2, 393 n. 7, 420-1, 441
n. 92; leadership 196, n. 95, 442 n. 119, 449-50.
315-6, 323-4, 363, 375, See also A l l - U n i o n Society
383-4, 395-6 n. 88, 469-71, for the Dissemination of
492 n. 5. See also "Lenin- Political and Scientific
grad Affair", Soviet Union: K n o w l e d g e , Ainikeit, Corn-
domestic policy and scene; inform, public opinion,
military observers 240-1, Radio Moscow, TASS; Red
282 n. 28; Ministry of State Cross and Red Crescent
Security (M.G.B). See Soviet Societies 303; relations w i t h
Union: M.V.D.; m i s s i o n at Arabs 83, 85, 95, 98 n. 11,
U.N. See United Nations: 149, 154, 239, 260-2, 265,
Soviet delegations at; Mus- 274, 281, 352, 361-2, 384,
Subject Index 527
399-417 passim, 432-3, 435 Sudan 79, 408, 479

nn. 21 and 24, 447-50, 455, Suez Canal 41, 78, 410-1, 432,
475, 478, 479-91 passim; 459-63, 488-90, 496 nn. 70
relations with people's and 72, 497 n. 78
democracies 27, 29, 30-33, Suez Canal zone 268, 270,
67, 80-1, 98 n. 8, 143-161, 407, 479, 484. See also
227 n. 94, 278, 357, 363; Great Britain: withdrawal
Soviet "advisers" in peo- from Egypt
ple's democracies 357, Syria 407, 489, 495 n. 51;
358-60, 363-4. See also arms deal with Czechos-
Soviet bloc; relations with lovakia 164 nn. 28 and 34,
United States 23. See also 435 n. 21; relations with
cold war, "peaceful coexis- USSR 404, 435 n. 21, 483,
tence", World War Two, 490; Society for Cultural
Allied powers; repatriation Relations with the USSR
from 28, 29, 31, 58 n. 53; 134 n. 19, 457-9, 483. See
repatriation to 26, 34, 59 n. also Arab Socialist Party,
66, 223 n. 35; security Ba'th, Islamic Socialist
organs. See Soviet Union: Front
M.V.D.; State Commission
Investigating Germanan Talmud 332 n. 45
Atrocities 301; State Secrets "Talmudism" 343, 386 n. 1
Act 200, 299; trade and aid TASS 38, 39, 60 n. 71, 168 n.
agreements. See trade; 62, 174, 181, 222 n. 32, 232,
Union of Writers 309, 316, 282 n. 1
317, 335 n. 67, 340. See Terror 251
also Soviet Jewish culture: Third World 478, 491. See
Soviet Jewish Writers' also "colonial and semi-
Bureau, Ukraine: Ukrainian colonial countries ' ',
Writers' Union; Western developing countries, non-
republics 301. See also alignment, underdeveloped
Belorussia, Lithuania, countries
Ukraine; "Western ter- Tiran straits. See Gulf of
ritories" (areas annexed in Aqaba and Straits of Tiran
and after World War Two) Titoism 358-60, 365, 371
345 Tnuva 213
Spain. See International issues Trade 404, 412, 435 n. 24,
Spanish civil war 140, 145, 480-1, 484, 486, 496-7 n.
359 77. See also Soviet Union:
Stockholm peace appeal. See economic and trade rela-
world peace movement tions with Israel
Stern group 45, 63 n. 114, 90, Trade unions 121, 180, 267,
121, 251, 393 n. 75 330 n. 24, 380, 434 n. 7,
528 Subject Index
439 n. 68, 442 n. 115. See Sciences, Department for

also A.F.L., C.G.T., C.I.O., Soviet Jewish Literature,
Histadrut, "progressive" Linguistics and Folklore
forces and opinion, T.U.C., Ukrainian mission at U.N. See
World Federation of Trade United Nations: Soviet
Unions delegations at
Transjordan 37, 113, 242-4, Underdeveloped countries 433
448, 452, 455, 466 n. 41; n. 1
plans to annex Arab Pales- Union of Arab Intellectuals
tine 113, 120, 264, 267, 290 103 n. 60
n. 115, 448, 454. See also United Nations 16, 18, 24, 42,
Bernadotte plan; annexation 46, 48, 50, 53, 86-7, 377,
of West Bank 405 394 n. 76, 412-3; Economic
Tripartite Declaration 405-6, and Social Council 249;
411, 416, 448 Founding Conference (San
Trotskyism 360, 365, 371 Francisco) 17, 18-20; Gen-
Truce Commission 123, 124, eral Assembly: 1st Special
125, 235-6, 237, 240, 256, Session 65-73, 307; 2nd
282 n. 12 Regular Session 82, 84-97
Truman Doctrine 48-9, 73, 120 passim, 307. See also
Trusteeship. See international United Nations: partition
trusteeship, United Nations: resolution; 2nd Special Ses-
Trusteeship Council sion 118, 119, 120, 123,
T.U.C. (Trades Union Con- 125-131; 3rd Regular Ses-
gress) 304 sion 252, 254-63, 276-8,
Tunisia 487 451; 4th Regular Session
Turkey 37, 48-9, 135 n. 28, 448, 451; 5th Regular Ses-
196, 402, 408, 449, 472, 495 sion 414, 422, 452, 455; 6th
n. 44 Regular Session 464 n. 14;
Turkish-Arab relations 37, 7th Regular Session 450,
403, 407, 434 n. 12,449 456, 464 n. 12; mediator
Turkish straits 460 and mediation 130-1, 237-8,
240-1, 242-3, 259, 263, 268,
U.B. (Urzad bezpieczeñstwa). 283 nn. 29 and 30, 447. See
See Poland: U.B. also Bernadotte, Folke, Ber-
Ukraine 31, 32, 58 n. 53, 319- nadotte plan, Bunche,
20, 332 n. 46; Jewish popu- Ralph; military and
lation of 306-7; Ukrainian observer force 91, 111, 116,
Writers' Union 310, 311, 136 n. 28, 247, 451, 457;
319, 332 n. 45. See also partition resolution 90, 96,
Shtern, Der. See also 117-32, 231, 234, 236, 238,
Crimea, Soviet Jewish cul- 242-5, 252-4, 260-1, 263-4,
ture: Ukrainian Academy of 266, 273, 275, 280, 286 nn.
Subject Index 529
71 and 77, 290 n. 115, Supervision Organization)

451-4, 465 n. 25. See also 447, 458, 484
Jewish state: frontiers, parti- United States, domestic poli-
tion, United Nations: Gen- tics 132, 239, 258, 287 n.
eral A s s e m b l y , 2nd Regular 90. See also United States:
Session; Secretary-General Jewish population of;
4 5 2 . See also Lie, Trygve; e c o n o m i c and technical aid
Security Council 78-9, 87, 4 3 3 n. 1, 487. See also
91-4, 96, 103 n. 58, 105 n. d e v e l o p i n g countries, Euro-
81, 109, 110, 111, 112, pean Recovery Program,
116-9, 121-5, 235, 237-8, Export-Import Bank, Mar-
246-7, 255, 256, 257, 258, shall Plan, Point Four,
268, 289 n. 110, 4 1 3 , 4 3 8 n. Truman Doctrine, United
55, 4 4 6 , 4 4 7 , 450, 458-9, States: relations w i t h Israel;
460-2, 481-90; Committee of Jewish population of 51, 74,
S e v e n 268, 270, 291 n. 119; 76, 8 1 , 1(51, 170, 171, 198,
permanent members of 69, 259-60, 279, 302, 306, 309,
70, 116, 119; use of veto 378. See also American
266, 289 n. 112, 4 1 4 , 488- Council of Jewish workers,
90; Social, Humanitarian American Jewish Confer-
and Cultural Committee 285 ence, American Zionist
n. 59; Soviet delegations at Emergency Council; military
19, 65-6, 69-72, 8 3 , 84-5, forces and bases 37, 114,
86-8, 90-1, 117-9, 122-31, 353, 370, 436 n. 34; military
150, ch. 6 passim, 450, 4 5 1 , intervention in Palestine 2 1 ,
459, 461; Trusteeship 105 n. 51, 136 n. 28, 137
Council 19, 46, 87, 118, nn. 42 and 4 3 , 241, 282 n.
120, 451-3. See also interna- 12, 283 n. 13; occupation
tional trusteeship. For zones in Austria and Ger-
United Nations see also many. See Austria: Western
Dumbarton Oaks Confer- occupation z o n e s in, Ger-
ence, Israel: membership i n many: Western occupation
U.N., Korean War, Palestine zones in; penetration into
Commission M i d d l e East 49, 73, 281,
UNRWA (United Nations 352, 4 0 3 , 436 n. 30, 487;
Relief and Works Agency) position on Palestine 17,
455 2 1 , 22, 55 n. 22, 88, 135 n.
United Nations Special Com- 28, 259-60. See also United
mittee on Palestine Nations, General Assembly:
(UNSCOP) 70, 78, 79, 82, 2 n d Special Session, and
84, 86, 90, 94, 231, 465 n. Security Council, United
16 States: relations w i t h Israel;
U N T S O (United Nations Truce relations w i t h Arabs 137 n.
530 Subject Index
42, 407, 412, 435 n. 21, Wafd 60 n. 73, 407, 410, 436
479-80, 486-7. See also reg- n. 36
ional blocs and pacts; rela- War of independence. See
tions with Great Britain Israel: war of independence,
20-2, 24, 47, 50-1, 52, 89, national liberation move-
90-1, 132, 269, 270, 271, ments and wars
272-3, 275, 284 n. 38, 286 Western Europe 84, 287 n. 79,
n. 79, Soviet comment on 423; Third Force 211
49-51, 64 n. 133, 266-7, Western Jewry 74, 89, 100 n.
272, 407, 448, 464 n. 8. See 29, 161, 170, 171, 304, 309,
also Anglo-American Com- 310, 314. See also West
mittee of Inquiry, Palestine European Jewry, United
question, Morrison-Grady States: Jewish population of
plan; relations with Israel Western occupation zones. See
138 n. 56, 267, 274-5, 281, Austria: Western occupa-
351-2, 353-4, 361, 370, tion zones in, Germany:
418-9, 427, economic aid Western occupation zones
161, 167 n. 58, 207, 219, in
370, 419-20, military assis- West European Jewry 23, 70,
tance 133 n. 6, political 313
pressures 207, 250, 267-9, West Germany 381, 422-3, 433
291 n. 123, 484, 486; State n. 1, 466 n. 46
Department 17, 20, 22, 72, Workers' Bank (Bank Hapoa-
83, 89, 91-3, 118, 135 n. 28, lim) 214
207, 260, 287 n. 79. See Workers' Federation. See His-
also Marshall Plan, Truman tadrut
Doctrine World Communist movement
Uruguay. See Latin American 401
countries World Federation of Democra-
tic Youth 228 n. 111,401
Va'ad Le'umi 119
World Federation of Trade
Vatican 391 n. 37, 465 n. 31
Unions (W.F.T.U.) 76, 364,
Vilnius. See Lithuania
401, 415, 425-6, 429, 431,
V League. See League for
434 n. 4; founding confer-
Friendly Relations with the
ence 18, 76
USSR World Jewish Congress 17, 28,
Voice of America 350 172, 330 n. 24
Voice of Zion to the Diaspora.
World Jewry 172, 225 n. 57,
See Voice of Israel
324,326,369
Voice of Israel 189, 350, 389
World peace movement 281,
n. 23
323-4, 343, 383, 388 n. 12,
VOKS 180, 209-10, 229 n. 112
401-2, 410, 415-6, 431, 434
n. 4, 441 n. 107; Israeli
Subject Index 531
peace movement 179, 217, Yiddish writers 335 n. 67. See

343, 423-5, 429-30, 441 n. also Soviet Jewish culture
107. See also religion in Yishuv 16, 19, 42-5, 50, 56 n.
service of world peace 38, 63 nn. 114, 119 and
movement 122, 73, 77-8, 82, 89, 165 n.
World war three 273 37, 186, 211, 224 n. 43;
World War Two 148, 187, 275, contacts with people's
297-8, 371, 376; Allied con- democracies 30, 68, 76;
trol commissions 57 n. 47; contacts with Soviets 16,
Allied powers 15, 52, 132, 18, 19, 25, 30-3, 39, 45, 11,
198. See also Potsdam Con- 81-2, 86-8
ference, Yalta Conference; Yugoslavia 65, 66, 67, 70, 11,
post-war settlement 15-20, 80, 98 nn. 7 and 8, 152-3,
300; relaxation of domestic 159, 187, 263, 366-7, 391 n.
constraints 298-9; role of 37, 440 n. 87, 472; Muslim
Soviet and East European population of 98 n. 7, 134
Jewry in 192, 300-1. See n. 21; Soviet rift with 80,
also "Black Book", 164 n. 35, 216, 218, 314,
Holocaust, Nuremberg trials 325, 333 n. 57, 357, 361,
World Zionist Organization 386
16, 28, 63 n. 123, 165 n. 37,
213, 304, 366, 370, 472. See Zagorsk. See religion in ser-
also American Zionist vice of world peace move-
Emergency Council, British ment
Zionist Federation, Jewish Zátec 158-9
Agency for Palestine, peo- Zhdanovism ("Zhdanovshchi-
ple's democracies: Zionist na") 299, 309-11, 317, 325
organizations Zionism and Zionist move-
ment 44, 76, 159, 163 n. 14,
Yalta Conference 15, 16, 17, 178, 186, 188, 189, 192,
306 213-5, 216, 250-1, 286 n.
Yiddish 196-7, 199, 311, 331 61, 292 n. 147, 311, 316,
n. 35, 389 n. 23. See also 321-2, 327-8, 345, 349, 356,
Radio Moscow in Yiddish 358, 360-3, 364, 365-6,
Yiddish concerts 343, 388 n. 368-71, 372, 376-7, 377-83,
13, 471, 492 n. 9 386. See also "bourgeois
Yiddish literature 309-12, nationalism", Socialist Zion-
313-4 ism
Yiddish theater 197, 313, 314, Zionist organization, world.
316, 331 n. 35. See also See World Zionist Organ-
Belorussia: Yiddish theater ization
in Minsk, Jewish State The-
ater
Name Index
Abakumov, Viktor 315, 334 n. Azzam, 'Abd ar-Rahman 21,

59, 359, 375 114
'Abd al-Hâdï, 'AwnT 40
'Abd al-Ilah 10 n. 78 Bakdãsh, okhãlid 494 n. 36
'Abdallah 37, 113, 128, 233, Bakhrakh, Isaak. See Isbakh,
256, 265, 267, 284 n. 41, Aleksandr
290 n. 115, 448, 452-3, 455, Bakulin, Ivan 142, 155-7, 183,
464 n. 6 203, 210, 227 n. 90, 308
Abramov, Aleksandr 475-6, Balti, Bed 223 n. 33
477, 493 n. 15 Bares, Gustav 364
Acheson, Dean 48, 72, 366, Bar Yehuda, Yisrael 40
422 Barzilai, Israel 32, 166 n. 51
Agronov, M. N. 18, 26, 39, 40, Bastovansky, Stefan 364
44, 45 Bazarov, Semen 423
Agronsky, Gershon 227 n. 96 Beeley, Harold 23, 48
Aleksei, Patriarch 35, 387 n. Bejerano, Moshe 183, 208-9
11 Belinkov, Semen 115-6
Alliluyeva, Svetlana 396 n. 88 Belkin, General 359
Ailing, Paul 83 Bendori, Feibush 347
Al'tman, Iogann 317 Benes, Eduard 150
Anders, Wladyslaw 115, 134 Ben Gurion, David 17, 44, 138
n. 21 n. 56, 145, 146, 149, 152,
Antonov, Aleksei 155-6, 301 155, 157, 167 n. 58, 172,
Aristov, Averkii 396 n. 88, 492 174, 175, 243, 269, 344,
n. 5 366-7, 380, 422, 440 n. 92
Attlee, Clement 21, 22, 47 Bennike, Vagn 484-5, 487
Austin, Warren 116-8, 123, Bentov, Mordekhai 174
125,138 n. 56 Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak 476-7
Avigur, Shaul 151, 152 Berdichevskii. See I.
Avner, Gershon 472 Buliarenko
Avriel, Ehud 151-3, 165 n. 37, Bergelson, David 187, 312
366, 370 Beriia, Lavrentii 328 n. 1, 334
'Azmi, Mahmud 490 n. 59, 375, 393 n. 69, 395-6
532
Name Index 533
n. 88, 470, 491 n. 1, 4 9 4 n. Cohen, S h i m o n 347

32 Creech-Jones, Arthur 111,
Berman, Adolf 29 128-9
Berman, Janob 31, 145 Crum, Bartley 23
Bernadotte, Folke 142, 160,
237, 240, 242-7, 251-3, 283 Dalton, Hugh 48
n. 31, 284 n. 38, 4 5 1 . See Danin, Daniil 321
also Bernadotte plan Davidov, Issachar 191
Bernstein, Peretz 209 Dawãllbl, Ma'nïf ad- 4 0 4 - 5 ,
Beschasnov, Aleksandr 364 4 1 1 , 4 1 2 , 435 n. 21
Bevin, Ernest 20, 22, 47, 51, Djilas, Milovan 395 n. 85
67, 78, 105 n. 78, 163 n. 23, Dmiterko, Liubomir 320
243, 286 n. 79, 408. See Dmitroff, George 63, n. 114,
also B e v i n - S i d q l n e g o t i a - 145
tions Dobrushin, Yekhezkel 314,
Bodrov, Mikhail 472-3 335 n. 72
Bogomolov, Aleksandr 290 n. Donskoi, Mark 199-200
115 Doron, Uriel 151
Boiadzhiev, Grigorii 318 Doubek, Bohumil 363
Bol'shakov, Ivan 199 Douglas, Lewis 141
Borshchagovskii, Aleksandr Dragunskii, David 199, 301
317 Drohojowski, Jan 277-8, 4 1 8
Bozharskii, Vladimir 363 Dulles, John Foster 146, 4 7 3 ,
Buliarenko, I. 320 479
Bunche, Ralph 255, 256, 257, Durbrow, Elbridge 99 n. 22
2 5 8 , 2 7 0 , 447
Burgess, Guy 181 Eban, Abba 243, 249-50, 277,
Byrnes, James 21 377, 458
Edelberg, Misha 180
Cadogan, Alexander 113, 249, Eden, A n t h o n y 409
265, 285 n. 58 Egorov 181
Cepicka, Alexej 363 Ehrenburg, Ilya 64 n. 135, 186,
Chekin, Vasilii 174 191-3, 194, 198, 199, 301,
Chesnokov, D. I. 396 n. 88 303, 313, 323, 327, 387-8 n.
Chobrutskii, Samuil' 200, 301 12, 388 n. 17, 393 n. 71,
Churchill, Winston S. 16, 18, 4 7 0 , 491 n. 3
21 Einstein, Albert 330 n. 27, 333
Clarman, Joseph 62 n. 112 n. 54
Clementis, Vladimir 145, Eisenhower, Dwight 4 7 9
150-1, 165 n. 37, 359, 360, Elath, Eliahu 19, 77, 8 1 , 82,
365-7 86, 98 n. 8, 104 n. 76, 148,
Clifford, Clark 135 n. 28, 138 173
n. 56 Eliashiv, S h m u e l 378, 4 2 3 ,
534 Name Index
474-5, 477, 478 Glubb, John ("Glubb Pasha")

Epstein, Eliahu. See Elath, 455, 466 n. 36
Eliahu Goldberg, Ben-Zion 224 n. 43,
Epstein, Leonid 267 230 n. 121, 303-4, 329 n. 17
Epstein, Shakhno 229 n. 115 Goldberg, L. 187
Erem, Moshe 30, 429 Goldmann, Josef 359, 364
Ershov, Pavel 146, 174-5, Goldmann, Nahum 17, 57 n.
177-8, 180, 181, 215, 220 n. 47, 160
13, 230 n. 121, 426, 451, Goldstuecker, Eduard 364
475 Gomulka, Wladislaw 145, 371,
Ettinger, Iakov 392 n. 63 381
Eytan, Walter 174 Gorkii, Maksim 374
Gorkin, Aleksandr 183
Fabregat, Rodriguez 90 Gottwald, Klement 357, 358,
Fadeev, Aleksandr 316 359, 360, 363, 365, 367, 368
Fãruq, King 408 Gravitsky, Josef 172
Fawzl, Mahmud 261-2, 285 n. Grinbaum, Yitzhak 179
58, 461 Gromyko, Andrei 65, 66,
Faysal, Amir 83, 104 n. 68 69-72, 74-7, 79, 81, 82, 84,
Fedorin, Metrofan 174, 180, 94-6, 98 n. 3, 103 n. 58,
181 110, 113, 116-9, 122-5, 127,
Fefer, Itzik 74-5, 101 nn. 36 129, 130, 143, 186, 197,
and 41, 187, 192, 220 n. 7, 217, 235-9, 241, 244-7, 250,
312, 330 n. 30 283 nn. 28, 29 and 30, 307,
Felix, Otto. See Doron, Uriel 404, 409, 451, 477
Finkel'shtein. See Martich, E. Grossman, Meir 188-9, 216,
Fischl, Otto 364-5, 369, 371 230 n. 121
Forrestal, James 137 n. 42 Gurevich, G. 336 n. 83
Frank, Josef 364 Gurvich, A. 318
Franks, Oliver 268 Guseev, Fedor 184
Frantsev, Georgii 322 Guzik, Anna 492 n. 9
Frejka, Ludvik 359, 364-5
Fucik, Julius 371 Hajdu, Vavro 364, 366
Hasan, Mahmud 79
Galili, Yisrael 153, 176, 177, Hasid, Shmuel 347
428-9, 443 n. 129 Hawrãnl, Akram al- 411
Gan, I. 320 Heifetz, Grigorii 201, 211, 229
Gelber, Lionel 88-9 n. 115
Geminder, Bedrich 363, 364-5, Heifetz, Pinhas 202
366-7, 371 Henderson, Loy 18, 22, 54 n.
Genin, Izrail' 178, 212-5, 217, 6, 104 n. 76, 105 n. 81, 133
273, 275, 431 n. 6
Ginzburg, Grigorii 210 Herzl, Theodore 382
Name Index 535
Hilldring, John 92, 93 Kaplansky, Shlomo 180

Hinin, Sasha 228 n. I l l Katz, Aharon 303
Hitler. See Nazism, Nazi Ger- Katz-Suchy, Juliusz 129, 130
many and Nazis Kaukjï, FawzT al- 257-8
Horowitz, David 48, 84, 86 Kaznacheev, Aleksandr 222-3
Hoskins, Lt. Col. Harold 54 n. n. 32
4 Kennedy, John F. 287 n. 91
Houdek, Vladimir 129 Khazov, P. 353-6
Husayni, Amin M u h a m m a d Kholodov, Meerovich 317
al- 40, 61 n. 91, 233, 255, Khrushchev, Nikita 287 n. 91,
256, 290 n. 115 310, 319, 334 n. 59, 335 n.
72, 392 n. 63, 395-6 n. 88,
Iakovlev, Vladimir 30-33 470, 492 n. 5, 494 n. 32
Ianchenko 43 Khûrï, Fãris al- 239, 240,
Iasnyi, G. 336 n. 83 248-9, 260, 265, 274, 288 n.
Idelson, Yisrael. See Bar 97
Yehuda, Yisrael Kipnis, Itzik 310-1
Ignat'ev, Sergei 375, 395-6 n. Kiselev, Evgenii 493 n. 28
88, 470, 492 n. 5 Kisilev, Kuzma 329 n. 11
Ilanit, Feiga 347 Kiseleva 184, 209-10
Il'ichev, Leonid 334 n. 62 Klinger, Stephen 151
Isbakh, Aleksandr 321-2 Knox, Gordon 92, 93
Iudin, Pavel 136 nn. 33 and 34 Kogan, M. B. 392 n. 63
luzovskii, losif 317, 318, 387 Kokin, Viktor 18, 39, 61 n. 87
n. 7 Kolmán, Arnost 361
Komarov, Vladimir 300
Ja'ban, Muhammad 'All 290 n. Konev, Ivan 57 n. 41
115 Konzhukhov, Ismail 203
Jamãlí, Fãdil 21, 83, 104 n. 68 Kopper, Samuel 88, 89, 104 n.
Jamil, Miísã 347 68, 138 n. 59
Jebb, Gladwyn 461, 488 Kopriva, Ladislav 364
Jessup, Philip 127, 128, 245, Korneichuk, Aleksandr 310-1,
246, 282 n. 28 319
Johnson, Herschel 84, 92, 93, Korvin, Evgenii 18, 55 n. 13
105 n. 81, 110 Kostál, Karel 363
Johnson, Eric 485-6 Kostov, Traicho 371, 381
Kozlov, Frol 396 n. 88, 492 n.
Kabanov, Ivan 480 5
Kaftanov, Sergei 328 n. 2 Kreibich, Karel 368
Kaganovich, Lazar 310 Krichevskii, Abram 199
Kaplan, Eliezer 207 Krupitskii, Eliahu 191
Kaplan, Karel 357, 361-1, 364, Kuibyshev, Valerian 374
390 n. 29 Kumikin, Pavel 476
536 Name Index
Kushnirov, Aharon 312 Magnes, Dr. Judah L. 41

Kuznetsov, Aleksei 375 Maiskii, Ivan 54 n. 10
Kvitko, Leib 310, 312, 332 n. Maius, Yaacov 425
44 Makarov 359
Malenkov, Georgii 145, 315,
Lange, Oskar 98 n. 12 323, 334 n. 59, 359, 395 n.
Lapid, Aryeh 183, 228 n. 110 88, 402, 471, 476, 479, 492
Lavrent'ev, Anatolii 454 n. 10
Lenin, Vladimir 380, 382 Malik, Chades 83, 239, 257,
Levavi, Aryeh 183, 185, 189- 405, 485, 487, 489
90, 203, 223 n. 35, 226 n. Malik, Iakov 249, 255, 258,
75 264-6, 268, 271, 272, 276-7,
Levin, Fedor 321 453
Levite, Lev 30-32, 42, 176-9, Maliugin, Leonid 317
181, 221 nn. 23 and 24 Manuil'skii, Dmitrii 23, 243,
Lie, Trygve 65, 76, 109, 110, 245, 246-7, 248, 290 n. 115,
245, 264, 270, 421, 453-4 329 n. 11
Lifshitz. See Zhadanov, L. Mar dam, Jamil 250
Likhachev 359 Mardor, Mordekhai (Munya)
Lisicky, Karel 80 151
Litvinov, Maksim 54 n. 10, Margulius, Rudolf 364
201, 334 n. 59 Markish, Peretz 313, 334 n.
Loc, Raphael 67, 174, 177, 451 62, 335 n. 67
Locker, Bed 148, 160, 163 n. Marshall, George 48, 105 n.
20 78, 138 n. 56, 166 n. 49,
Loebl, Evzen 359, 364 167 n. 55, 284 n. 38, 286 n.
London, Artur 359, 362, 364, 79
366 Martich, E. 320
Lopez, Alfonso 122 Marx, Kad 157
Lovett, Robert 105 nn. 78 and Masaryk, Jan 17, 81, 150, 165
81, 128, 138 n. 56, 148, 159 n. 37
Loytsker, Chaim 311 McClintock 105 n. 78, 167 n.
Lozovskii, Solomon 54 n. 10, 55, 282 n. 28
335 n. 72 McDonald, James 220 n. 13,
Lubitz, Ruth 347, 442 n. 110 268-9, 291 n. 123
Luca, Vasile 145 McGhee, George 412, 436 n.
Lucet, Chades 489 30
Lutskii, Vladimir 322, 418, Medvedev, Zhores 340
421, 430-1 Meir, Golda 142, 147, 155,
Lysenko, Trofim 335 n. 73, 157, 173, 183, 184, 185,
386 n. 1 191, 193-5, 196-7, 198, 199,
200, 203-4, 208, 210, 216,
MacDonald, John 256 218, 223 n. 36, 224 n. 40,
Name Index 537
227 n. 90, 254-6, 350, 471 180, 220 n. 19

Meirov, Shaul see Avigur, Mussolini 114
Shaul
Mendele Moikher Seforim Nabrawï, Siza 410
311-2 Nahhãs, Mustafa 407, 410
Menshikov, Mikhail 208 Najib Muhammad 482, 494 n.
Menshinskii, Viacheslav 374 37
Merkulov, Viktor 334 n. 59, Namir, Mordecai 145, 183,
375 190-1, 193-5, 196, 199,
Merriam, Gordon 54 n. 6 203-4, 205, 209-10, 218, 226
Meyerson, Golda. See Meir, nn. 73 and 75, 229 n. 112,
Golda 278,349
Mikhoels, Solomon 201, 308, Nãsir, Jamãl 'Abd an- 482, 494
312, 313, 315, 316, 327, 334 n. 37
n. 59, 335 n. 72, 373, 392 n. Nenni, Pietro 179, 410, 434 n.
63, 470 4
Mikoian, Anastas 395 n. 88, Nikolov, Naugen 184
480 Nixon, Richard 288 n. 91
Mikunis, Shmuel 120-1, 136 n. Nosek, Václav 359
33, 145, 160-1, 162 n. 9, Novikov, Kiril 19, 20
167 n. 58, 167-8 n. 61, 168 Novikov, Nikolai 46, 59 n. 66
n. 62, 207, 209, 211-2, Novy, Vilém 359
214-5, 338 n. 117, 426 Nuqrâshï, Mahmûd Fahml 102
Mine, Hilary 31 n. 49
Mirski, Mi chai 172 Nûn as-Sa'Id 104 n. 68
Misrï, Aziz al- 482, 494-5 n. 43
Mitin, Mark 382-3, 393 n. 71 Oistrakh, David 210
Moch, Jules 426 Olszewski, Josef 98 n. 12
Modzilewski, Zygmund 145 Oren, Mordekhai 61 n. 87, 292
Molochkov, Fedor 183, 184, n. 136, 364, 369
209 Orenstein, Mordekhai. See
Molotov, Polina. See Zhem- Oren, Mordekhai
chuzhina, Polina Orenstein, Shimon 162 n. 8,
Molotov, Viacheslav 20, 46, 58 364, 366, 370
n. 47, 169, 173, 183, 196, Osobka-Morawski, Eduard 28
219, 225 n. 57, 226 n. 77,
254, 395 n. 88, 439 n. 82, Paniushkin, Aleksandr 126-7,
473-4, 494 n. 32 173, 228 n. 105
Morgenthau, Henry 366, 427 Parker, Ralph 199
Moskovic, Koloman 359, 364 Parodi, Armand 263
Mosley, Oswald 101 n. 31 Pasternak, Boris 387 n. 7
Moyne, Lord 62, 112 Pauker, Anna 144, 145-6, 163
Mukhin, Mikhail 174-5, 176-7, n. 13
538 Name Index
Pegov, Nikolai 473 n. 28 225 n. 57

Pelshe, Arvid 336 n. 81 Ross, John 128, 282 n. 28
Penfield, James 159 Rothstein, Lunia 225 n. 51
Plehve, Viacheslav von 382 Rusk, Dean 89, 105 n. 78, 128,
Popkov, Georgii 323 135 n. 28, 167 n. 55, 282 n.
Popov, Mikhail 174 28
Poskrebyshev, Aleksandr 396
n. 88 Sadeh, Yitzhak 153, 177
Pospelov, Petr 323 Salãh ad-Dïn, Muhammad 404,
Pruszynski, Ksawery 90 408,412
Pulganov, Nikolai 480 Sãlim, Sãlah 480
Pushkin, Georgii 423 Salisbury, Harrison 323
Schwartz, Harry 229 n. 121
Rajab, Hasan 480-1 Semeshkin, Aleksandr 174,
Rajk, Laszlo 358-60, 371, 381 177
Rakhtanov, I. 336 n. 83 Semichastnyi, Vladimir 336 n.
Rákosi, Matyas 358-60 81
Rankovic, Aleksander 145 Seraev, Ilya 184
Rashidov, Sharaf 478 Sergeev, Mikhail 78
Ratner, Yohanan 155-7, 183, Sergeev, Nikolai 174
184, 199 Sergei, Patriarch 35
Rau, Benegal 414 Shapiro, Henry 184
Reading, Eva Violet, Marchio- Shapiro, Moshe 223 n. 35
ness of 57 n. 41 Sharett, Moshe 44, 57 n. 47,
Reicin, Bedrich 364, 369, 371 72, 86-7, 99 n. 20, 122-3,
Remez, David 174 133 n. 6, 146-7, 148, 166 n.
Rezin, Ben-Zion 472, 474-5 49, 169, 173, 174, 205, 216,
Riftin, Yaacov 176, 443 n. 135 219 n. 1, 227 n. 94, 240,
Riley, William 447, 458 243, 253, 260, 264, 285 n.
Riumin, Mikhail 396 n. 88, 59, 292 n. 136, 344, 349,
470 366, 379, 380, 394 n. 76,
Robertson, Brian 429, 436 n. 421, 439 n. 82, 453, 473-4,
30 477
Rodionov, Mikhail 323 Shcherbakov, Aleksandr 373,
Rogol'skaia, N. 228 n. I l l 375
Rokah, Yisrael 174 Shchiborin, Aleksei 38, 40,
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 16, 17, 184, 203, 210, 256
21, 53 n. 2, 54 n. 4, 306 Shertok, Moshe. See Sharett,
Rosen, Pinhas 174 Moshe
Rosen, Shlomo 347 Shimeliovich, Boris 373, 392
Rosenblueth, Pinhas. See n. 63
Rosen, Pinhas Shishakll, AdTb ash- 483
Roshkov, Vladimir 174-5, 180, Shleifer, Shlomo 190-1, 195,
Name Index 539
226 n. 75, 228 n. 110, 387 Stanley, Oliver 17

n. 11 Stassen, Harold 60 n. 75
Shneider, L. 336 n. 83 Steinhardt, Laurence 1 5 8 - 9 ,
Shtemenko, Sergei 184 167 n. 55
Shtein, Boris 86-8, 150 Stratton, William Grant 102 n.
Shvedov, Aleksei 18, 44, 60 n. 45
75 Subotskii, Lev 387 n. 7
Shvernik, Nikolai 223 n. 38 Suchor, Antonin 144
Siba'T, Mustafa as- 4 0 4 Sultanov, Abdurrahman 34
Sidqï, I s m a i l 102 n. 49. See Suslov, Mikhail 316, 396 n. 88
also Bevin-Sidqï negotia- váb, Karel 358, 364
tions and agreement Sverma, Jan 371
Silver, Abba Hillel 51, 64 n. Svermová, Marie 360, 391 n.
135, 118-9 40
Simic, Vladimir 84 Svetov, A. 336 n. 83
Simone, Andf 364 Svoboda, Ludvik 150, 164 n.
Simonov, Konstantin 319 27
Slánsky, Rudolf 63 n. 114, 162
n. 8, 358-371 passim, 372, Tarasenko, Vasilii 122, 123,
381. See also Slánsky trial 126, 129-30, 235, 237
Sling, Otto 359-60, 362, 364 Tarnopoler, Lev 39, 304
Smith, Walter Bedell 36, 184 Teichholz, Bronislaw 57 n. 41
Sneh, M o s h e 151, 3 8 1 , 394-5 Thorez, Maurice 442 n. 123
n. 79, 4 2 6 , 4 6 4 n. 6 Tito 218, 314, 317, 3 7 1 , 386.
Sofronov, Anatolii 317 See also Titoism, Yugos-
Soldatov, Aleksandr 277 lavia
Solod, Daniil 34, 4 0 4 , 435 n. Truman, Harry S. 21, 22, 47,
24 49, 50, 8 1 , 88, 118, 130, 135
Sommerstein, Emile 28, 58 n. n. 28, 137 n. 42, 138 n. 56,
56 207, 269, 287 n. 90, 366,
Spychalski, Marian 29 405
Stalin, Iosif 16, 17, 21, 36, 37, Tsarapkin, S e m e n 84-5, 86-8,
54 n. 4, 60 n. 75, 8 1 , 184, 9 1 , 9 4 , 127-8, 150, 186,
197, 201, 224-5 n. 51, 226 260-2, 271, 292 n. 136, 307,
n. 77, 259, 280, 300, 3 0 1 , 448,461
305^306, 315, 316, 323, 334 Tiîbï, Tawfiq 425
n. 59, 342, 357, 363, 376,
382, 383, 385, 386 n. 1, 392 Urválek, Josef 368, 370
nn. 61 and 6 3 , 395-6 n. 88,
4 0 2 , 411-2, 415, 417, 4 3 3 , Vailland, Roger 437 n. 52,
4 6 3 , 469, 4 7 0 - 1 , 4 7 3 , 475, 4 8 3 , 495 n. 54
476-8, 479, 4 9 1 , 492 n. 5, Varshavskiy I. 318
494 n. 32, 495 n. 54 Vatolina, Lidiia 4 1 , 49-50, 395
540 Name Index
n. 86, 417, 431, 436 n. 36 n. 4, 64 n. 135

Vavilov, Mikhail 76, 77, 81
Velebit, Vladimir 77, 80, 98 n. Yaari, Meir 424
8 Yitzhaki, Yitzhak 180
Viktorov, V. 336 n. 83
Vinogradov, V. 382 n. 63 Zaitsev, Grigorii 21, 493 n. 28
Vishnevskii, Vsevolod 312 Zand, Mikhail 224 n. 51, 387
Vlasov I. A. 183, 208, 223 n. n. 9
38 Zapotocky, Antonin 152, 360,
Vofsi, Meir 373, 392 n. 63 362
Voroshilov, Kliment 201, 418, Zaslavskii, David 100 n. 30,
475 140, 302
Voznesenskii, Nikolai 323, 392 Zavodskii, lurii 210
n. 61 Zhadanov, L. 320
Vyshinskii, Andrei 62 n. 112, Zhdanov, Andrei 73, 223 n.
84, 146-7, 151, 157, 173, 36, 299, 315, 316, 323, 373,
204, 208, 218, 227 n. 94, 375, 392 n. 63
263, 274, 281, 344, 418, Zhdanov, lurii 396 n. 88
420, 485-9 Zhemchuzhina, Polina 196-7,
199-200, 226 n. 78, 300, 335
Wadsworth, George 104 n. 68, n. 72
135 n. 28 Zhits, Grigorii 192, 314
Wahbã, Hãfiz 104 n. 68 Zhukov, lurii 379
Wallace, Henry 120, 259-60 Zilliacus, Konni 50
Weizmann, Chaim 160, 174-5, Zirulnikov, Shlomo 180-1, 225
179, 207, 269, 305 n. 57
Werth, Alexander 188 Zonov, Vasilii 185
Wilner, Meir 207, 424, 426, Zorin, Valerian 142, 183, 184,
442 n. 123, 453 185, 198, 203, 208, 254-5,
Wilson, Evan 23, 54 n. 6 280, 286 n. 71, 450, 493 n.
Wilson, Woodrow 81 28
Winiewicz, Josef 68 Zuckerman, Yitzhak (Antek)
Wise, Stephen 51, 53 n. 2, 54 29, 153, 165 n. 44

(Transaction_Society Book Series, Ta_S-10) Yaacov Ro'i - Soviet Decision-Making in Practice_ the USSR and Israel, 1947-1954 (Transaction_Society Book Series, Ta_S-10)-Transaction Publishers (1980)

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The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

The Monograph Series

SOVIET DECISION MAKING IN PRACTICE

The Monograph Series

* Titles distributed by Transaction Books

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright ° 1980 by Taylor & Francis.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 79-64857

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

(The monograph series - Shiloah Center for Middle

ISBN 13: 978-0-87855-267-2 (hbk)

PART II: THE COINCIDENCE OF INTERESTS 107

PARTIU: SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND SOVIET

AFL — American Federation of Labor

* Published by the BBC Monitoring Service

Finally, I want to express the hope that my wife, without

THE CONTEXT OF THE SOVIET

The Period of Non-Commitment

The early months of 1945 saw the legitimization of the Soviet

from the mandatory system, due to be abolished, to the new

weeks of 1945, it is certain that a substantial change occurred in

ing to evoke discussion on Britain's Palestine Mandate. It even

While Novikov refused to commit himself on this issue, Soviet

The British government, meanwhile, continued to evade any

extreme nationalists is to look to Soviet Union for help against

declared purpose of the Committee than to the fact that it

lecturer went on, "has become an international issue, in which

direct consequence of the report and its handling by London and

THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE

With its hands tied on the level of inter-power diplomacy, the

Soviet-dominated Eastern and Central Europe, the Soviet

powers — to indicate that the USSR was not opposed to Brichah

Morawski had written him: ' T h e Government will facilitate the

frontier points to be used were also determined, the main

In long and comprehensive talks that covered the Jews in

political circumstances Soviet policy makers would be likely to

approve the binational state Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair was

THE MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE

Soviet Activity in the Arab East

Support for Jewish emigration from the People's Democracies

widespread disappointment with and hostility to Britain.

complete dissociation — of the ties that had traditionally linked

purpose. For example, at a meeting which took place on Soviet

The Palestine Question

The USSR's growing interest and activity in the Middle East as

problem was currently being discussed in Moscow. The day

Command that led the United Resistance Movement, Yisrael

Saudi Arabia, and ensure the maintenance of complete British

Most other examples of Soviet allusions to Jewish-Arab

Attitude to the Yishuv

The Arab-Jewish conflict, however, was not the main reason

settlement of Jews in Palestine through the Zionist movement had

cultural relations were organized both on a commercial basis and

PROSPECTS AND PRESSURES FOR

Having established a wide network of contacts, with the dual

was to be limited to matters of virtually no political importance,

U.N. the question of the implementation of its Palestine Mandate.

question of Palestine became evident. The Soviet media were

The period February 1945-February 1947 thus ended the way it