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Theses, Dissertations & Honors Papers

2010

The Bush and the Obama Administrations and the Israeli-

Palestinian Conflict 2001-2009
Laura Simon Espinalt
Longwood University

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2001-2009" (2010). Theses, Dissertations & Honors Papers. 35.
https://digitalcommons.longwood.edu/etd/35

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The Bush and the Obama Administrations and the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2001-2009

Senior Honors Research, Political Science

Faculty Sponsor

Dr. William Harbour

Associate Professor of Political Science

Longwood University

201 High Street

Farmville, VA 23909

(434) 395-2219

harbourwr@longwood.edu
 CONTENTS

List of maps 3

1. Introduction 4

2. Origins of the Problem 6

2.1 The Zionist Movement 6

2.2 Formation of Israel 8

3. Israel's ongoing conflicts and key peace negotiations before the Bush II Administration 15

3.1 The Six-Day War & the Yorn Kippur War 16

3.2 1993 Oslo Peace Accord & Camp David 2000 Summit 20

4. The Bush II Administration vs. the Obama Administration 22

A. Literature Review 22

B. Bush's Foreign Policy 26

i. 9/11 29

4.3. Bush and Obama's Diplomacy toward the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict 30

4.3.1 Bush Policy 30

4.3.2 Obama Policy 31

4.4 Bush vs. Obama: Who is more likely to succeed? 34

4.4.1 Defining Successful Diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 35

4.4.2 Mediation and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 41

4.4.3 The Obama Administration Engagement in the Middle East 48

5. Annual Percentage of Trips made by a Secretary of State or Special Envoy from the Bush

Administration in 2001 to the Obama Administration in 2009 (Table 1) 54

6. Recent Developments (2010) 59

7. Conclusion 60

8. Endnotes 64

9. Bibliography 69

2
 LISTOF MAPS

I. U.N. Partition Plan 7

II. Palestinian Loss of Land 1946-2000 22
Ill. Palestinians Surrounded Settlements, 2006 47
IV. Israel's Wall & Settlements {Colonies), 2007 63

3
1. INTRODUCTION

For many centuries, Palestine was a peaceful land located at the eastern end of the

Mediterranean Sea. During its long history, this land has varied in its population and ownership. In

1840, the land of Palestine was inhabited by a multicultural population - approximately 86 percent

1
Muslim, 10 percent Christian, and 4 percent Jewish.

Over the centuries, the Jews of Europe have been persecuted and massacred on religious

grounds, for economic reasons, on social pretexts, and because of national and racial backgrounds. Jews

th h th
were slaughtered in the Crusades (ll -12' centuries), massacred during the Black Death (14 century),

th
burned at the stake in the Spanish Inquisition (15 century) and murdered by Chmelnicji's Cossacks in

century). At various times, they have been expelled from almost every European
th
the Ukraine {17

country - Germany and France, Portugal and Spain, England and Wales. The most profound event that

the Jews experienced was the Holocaust where about six million Jews were persecuted and killed by the

Nazis. This group had experienced many years of victimization, oppression, fear, insecurity, and

humiliation.

A long history of being persecuted led to the Zionist movement. In the late 1800s, a group called

the Zionists in Europe sought to create a Jewish homeland. At first, this immigration created no

problems. However, as more and more Zionists immigrated to Palestine, the indigenous population

became increasingly alarmed. In the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, many

purchases of Palestinian land were made. Eventually, fighting broke out, with escalating waves of

violence. Hitler's rise to power, combined with the Western countries' awareness of the Holocaust, and

the refusal to allow Jewish refugees to settle western countries in large numbers led to increased Jewish

immigration to Palestine. As a result of these factors, the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine

grew.

4
 As of 1947, before the Independence of the state of Israel, Jews in Palestine owned less than 7%

of the land, and after the 1948 war 80% of the Palestinian people were dispossessed of their homes,

farms, and businesses. The present state of Israel occupies all the land from the Jordan River to the

Mediterranean Sea, bounded by Egypt in the south, Lebanon to the north, and Jordan to the East. The

2
recognized borders of Israel constitute about 78% of the land. The remainder is divided between land

occupied by Israel since the war that took place in 1967, also known as the Six-Day War, and the

autonomous regions under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The Gaza Strip occupies an

additional 141 square miles south of Israel, and is under the control of Hamas. The Israeli-Palestinian

conflict has become one of the world's longest standing conflicts. Many attempts to resolve this conflict

have been made but all of them have failed. Resolving this conflict has been on the agenda of many

presidents of the United States, but none of them have successfully achieved a peace agreement

between these two groups. Some observers call this conflict the battle between the "West" and the

Islamic world. Its resolution would mean a new era in the field of international relations and a new start

based on understanding and respect between the western and Islamic worlds.

This project's aim is to determine whether or not the Obama administration has a chance to

produce a more effective foreign policy for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the approach used by the

Bush administration. Will Barack Obama produce a solution in the Middle East for the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict? We will analyze the two administrations' foreign policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

and compare the diplomacy used by Bush throughout his administration and the diplomacy used by

Obama during his first year in office. This study will encompass a time-period of eight years from 2001

to 2009. In order to determine whether foreign policy and diplomacy are successful or not, we will look

at the engagement and commitment during the Bush administration and compare it with that of the

Obama administration's first year. We will examine the requirements that embody good negotiations

5
from a problem-solving perspective, and will compare how the Bush and the Obama administrations

have approached the conflict.

This project is divided into seven main sections: a historical overview encompassing the Zionist

movement and the creation of Israel; Israel's ongoing conflict and key peace negotiations before the

George W. Bush administration; the Bush II Administration vs. the Obama Administration. This section

includes a literature review, Bush and Obama's foreign policy and diplomacy toward the conflict, and the

basis of a good mediator for this particular conflict. Next, we have the annual percentage of trips made

by a Secretary of State or Special Envoy to Israel or Palestine. Then, we have a section on recent

developments during Obama's first three months in his second year in office. Finally, we have the

conclusion. This conflict is one of the most important issues in the Middle East where political and

economic interests converge for the United States. How the Obama administration handles this conflict

will be important to his presidency.

2. ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM

2.1. The Zionist Movement

The Zionist movement plays a very important role when understanding the origins of the

problem and the formation of Israel. It was a national movement for the return of the Jewish people to

their homeland and the resumption of Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel. Over the centuries, Jews

were expelled from almost every European country - Germany and France, Portugal and Spain, England

and Wales. Yet, the most infamous atrocity of all was the Nazi Holocaust. During the Holocaust, Nazi

Germany carried out the genocide of six million European Jews during World War II. The Zionist

movement aimed to solve the "Jewish problem," the problem of a perennial minority, a people

subjected to repeated pogroms and persecution, a homeless community whose alienism was

6
underscored by discrimination wherever Jews settled. Zionism aspired to deal with this situation by

affecting a return to the historical homeland of the Jews, Israel. Nevertheless, this land had been

occupied by the Arabs for many centuries. It was during the Holocaust that a clash between the Jews

and the Arabs increased due to European Jewish immigration to Israel. Furthermore, the Zionist

movement was developing the country's infrastructure in order to save as many Jews as possible from

the Nazi massacre. Tension between the Jews and the Arabs increased during the years of 1936-47 until

the UN had to intervene by recommending the establishment of a Jewish and an Arab state. This

resolution was not accepted by the Arabs, but in 1948, in accordance with the UN resolution of

3
November 1947, the State of Israel was established.

h,_ ·-
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E-..l'l,T

General Assembly Plan or

Partition
With Economic Union, 1 94
□The lltOl!ottdJe,,,,tsh Salt
■The-p,opoudNabStllt

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beenritemabonllzone
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-=-=-=-a,

Map I: UN Partition Plan

7
2.3. Formation of Israel 1948

The Ottoman Empire had control of Palestine from 1841 to 1917. At the end of the World War I,

they were defeated and the British occupied the country. Britain ruled Palestine between 1920 and

1948, a period referred to as the "British Mandate." The British Mandate was not officially approved

4
until 1922 when the League of Nations issued the Mandate. The Mandate was in favor of the

establishment for the Jewish people of a homeland in Palestine. During World War I, British support for

a Jewish homeland was manifested through a letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour

to Lord Rothschild, president of the British Zionist Federation. This letter, also known as the Balfour

Declaration, was accepted by the League of Nations in 1922. However, this letter was in contradiction to

the plans of British imperialism, which was to maintain a balance between the Jews and the Arabs in

order to control the situation from above. In 1939, the British government published a new White Paper

restricting Jewish immigration and offering independence for Palestine within ten years. The 1939 White

Paper was rejected by the supervising body of the League of Nations, the Permanent Mandates

Commission as inconsistent with the Mandate. When the Second World War broke out, the British

government executed the White Paper policy as if Palestine had been a British possession. Britain

restricted the number of Jews entering Palestine, at times brutally. In spite of this attempt to stop the

flow of Jews into Palestine, the carefully prepared plans of British imperialism were rejected by the

Zionists, who organized groups and launched a bloody campaign against both the British and the

Palestinians. The aim was to drive them both out of Palestine and to pave the way for the establishment

of the Zionist state. It was the Holocaust under the Nazis in Europe that created a completely new

scenario and the Zionist idea of creating a homeland for the Jews in Palestine gained strength again.

More and more Jews started coming into Palestine, strengthening their position in the area while

refusing to submit themselves under the British rule. The British ended up losing control of the situation

and they referred the problem to the United Nations in early 1947.

8
 The creation of the State of Israel was a consequence of the United Nations partition plan. This

plan recommended the division of the Mandate of Palestine into two provisional states, one Jewish and

one Arab, and provided the framework for a regional economic union. One of the key players in that

decision was the United States where at that time Harry 5. Truman was the president and George

Marshall was the Secretary of State. Before Harry 5. Truman became president, President Roosevelt was

on good terms with Saudi Arabia, promising them that there would not be any policy decisions made

regarding Palestine without consulting the Arabs first. Roosevelt's sudden death a week later of making

a verbal promise to King Saud that he would consult the Arabs about any Palestine policy, created a

different political reality. The end of the war, the massive murder of Jews in the Holocaust, and Truman

becoming the new President changed Roosevelt's previous plans.

Within the Truman administration, there were big differences over the partition plan and within

public opinion. The main tensions were between President Truman being supportive of the partition

plan and the recognition of Israel, and George Marshall being firmly opposed to American recognition of

the new Jewish state. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that in the beginning of Truman's

presidency, he was opposed to the idea of a Jewish state despite his sympathy and support for Jewish

immigration. He had the economic concern that getting involved in the creation of a Jewish state would

be very costly and would require many US resources. However, he was supportive of Jewish immigration

into Palestine as Roosevelt tried to promote in his administration. Since the beginning of the process of

creating a Jewish state, the United States was mainly concerned with national interests and wanted to

stay away from involving the country into a costly conflict. The main argument for not involving the US

into the creation of the Jewish state came from the State Department. It advised the President that if

Palestine was given to the Jews, Saudi Arabia would go to war.

9
 Truman was very concerned about the 250,000 displaced Jewish people, refugees who had

survived Nazi concentration camps, who were now living in miserable camps in Europe and awaiting

clearance for immigration and final settlement. He was trying to make policies to let these refugees

enter the United States, but he was facing much of opposition. He also tried to make possible the

5
admission of some displaced Jews to Palestine, which at that time was under British control.

Nevertheless, the State Department was not very interested in Truman's idea. Truman kept trying to

facilitate Jewish immigration until he wrote a letter to the king of Saudi Arabia announcing his support

for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

At this point a _debate started between Truman's supporters for a Jewish state versus George

Marshall and State Department opposition to such a move. The State Department and Defense

Department were worried that Truman's idea of creating a Jewish state would hurt America's relations

with the Arabs since there were many interests involved such as petroleum. Another concern of the

State Department was that the possibility of Immigration of Jewish communists into Palestine would

also increase Soviet influence.

The UN met in special session in April 1947 to form a special United Nations Committee on

Palestine (UNNSCOP) that would come up with a solution for Palestine. Because the Soviet Union ended

up being supportive of the partition, the United Nations had little room for opposition. Moreover, a

public sentiment for partition and a Jewish state was growing. Jews in the United States and 65% of

6
American population supported partition, according to a poll taken in late 1947.

The partition resolution passed with two thirds majority. The State Department was composed

of a legendary group of presidential advisers also referred as the Wise Men. This group was formed by

the "Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, his predecessor, Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, the chief

of the Policy Planning Staff George Kennan, Dean Rusk, and of course George Marshall." These people
7

10
did everything possible to oppose the Palestine partition of 1947 and 1948. They thought the Palestine

problem was dwarfed by the problems arising in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, where country

after country was falling under Soviet influence. If the US was going to maintain a military position to

counter the USSR given the possibility of another war, US dependence on Arab oil would increase.

People like George Kennan were very concerned about the Soviet Union's expansion. In 1946 he sent a

telegram from the US embassy in Moscow mapping out a counterstrategy that would form the basis of

8
American foreign policy for nearly half a century. He proposed a policy of containment of USSR

expansion. This was to be a long-range foreign policy that would keep an eye on the Soviet Union

regarding their revolutionary expansionary goals. By adopting the containment policy in his

administration, Truman broke with the traditional pattern of American isolationism in foreign policy

avoidance of European power politics. Truman was convinced about the partition plan. On the other

hand, there was a lot of opposition from the State Department and they were calling for a meeting with

the UN General Assembly to work out a solution that would have support from the Jews and the Arabs.

The idea of a trusteeship plan was being discussed.

Another factor that was challenging Truman's position regarding the partition plan was the

hostility that the Arabs were showing. The Arab states made it clear that they would not cooperate with

the partition; instead, they would try to prevent the partition by the use of force. Another element

concerning President Truman's position was the fact that once the Jewish state was created, it could not

survive without help from outside; and if the US was going to intervene on behalf of the Jewish state,

they would be incurring Arab ire. Truman was being pressured by both sides. On one hand, the Zionists

were constantly asking for help for the thousands of homeless Holocaust victims seeking refuge in a

Jewish state. On the other hand, he had the pressure of the Arab states and the opposition of the

majority of seniors from the State Department. Truman expressed the situations as follows:

11
 The Jews are so emotional, and the Arabs are so difficult to talk with that it is almost impossible to get
anything done. The British have, of course, been exceedingly uncooperative... The Zionists, of course,
have expected a big stick approach on our part, and naturally have been disappointed when we can't do
9
that.

Despite pressure from both sides, Truman finally decided to announce the US support for a

Jewish state whether or not it was declared under UN auspices. At this time, the State Department

was still working on the creation of a trusteeship plan for Palestine. George Marshall thought that if a

United Nations special assembly on Palestine was created, the US would support a UN trusteeship

for Palestine. Nevertheless, this was contrary to Truman's decision. He saw the trusteeship plan to be

used only to establish a provisional order in Palestine after the termination of the British mandate on

May 15, but not as a substitution for the partition plan. This is why President Truman got furious on

March 10, 1948, when Warren Austin announced that the US government opposed the partition of

Palestine. On March 20 Secretary of State George Marshall made a similar announcement. Truman

wrote immediately to Chaim Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization that the US was

for partition and would stick to it. This partition plan was getting very delicate because there were

many different interests into play from different groups: the Zionist were seeking for a home after

the Holocaust, the US military was concerned about having to defend the new born country from the

attacks of the Arab states, and other people were looking more at national interests by promoting

domestic politics such as the flow of Arab oil to the U.S. oil. Because of this wide variety of demands,

Truman stated, "Since they all cannot have their way, it is a perfect example of why I had to

10
remember that 'The Buck Stops Here'"

After making clear Truman's support for the Jewish state, the Zionist General Council declared

on April 12 that on termination of the British mandate, it would establish a Jewish state in the

portion of Palestine allotted to the Jews. On May 4, Dr Jessup of the US delegation to the UN cabled

12
 Dean Rusk that the USSR would recognize the creation of such a state. Marshall's main concern was

international security. He was not convinced that the Israelis could defend themselves from an Arab

attack without the help of the United States or a third party long term. Marshall and Dean Rusk

made clear that the US would not use its own military power against the Arabs.

Two days before the termination of the British Mandate, discussions on determining the legal

frame for Israel were still on. Clark Clifford, Robert Lovett and George Marshall presented opposing

arguments in an Oval Office debate over whether the United States should recognize the Jewish state.

Clifford wanted an early recognition of the Jewish state and to support the partition. Lovett was

continuously bringing evidence of the infiltration of communists into the Zionist movement. Marshall

was worried about international security in case the Arabs were going to attack the new Jewish state

and the United States had no other option but intervene against the Arabs. President Truman was in the

middle of a very fragile situation. He was pressured by different groups in the government and at the

same time he was facing an election where his opponent, Dewey, was leading. Clark Clifford argued that

the United States had morally committed itself to the Jewish people since the time of Great Britain's

Balfour Declaration in 1917.

Even though Truman was an advocate for the creation of a Jewish state, he did not make an

explicit decision on recognizing it as quickly as Clifford was expecting. Because the UN General

Assembly was meeting at the US request to discuss the future government of Palestine, it would have

been inappropriate to have recognized the Jewish state before the meeting had ended. Clifford wanted

immediate recognition to help the president win a few votes. On May 14, Clark Clifford convinced

Eliahu Eilat, who was representing the Jewish state, to inform the president that the Jews had declared

the Israeli state and they wanted the United States to recognize it. This day the UN was still meeting in

special session arguing about the future of the Jews and Palestine. Truman did not hesitate on signing

13
the letter and recognized the state of Israel, crossing out "the Jewish state" from the prepared

statement. There was a lot of tension in the government when Rusk notified Warren Austen, who

headed the US delegation at the UN about the President's recognition of Israel. Warren never shared

this information with the US delegation and that brought a lot of controversy when the next day the US

delegation found out through the news. There was much anger in the UN and the US delegation

accusing the US government of being duplicitous. Warren Austin ended up resigning. Then in 1949, the

11
U.S. granted Israel de jure recognition on January 31.

During the next few years, Truman became more supportive of the Jewish state. The State

Department was still concerned for the US position in the Middle East if something was going to happen

in Israel. They were also worried about some Zionists being communists and siding with the USSR to

intervene in times of conflict. On the other hand, the Republican Party was fully supportive of the

Jewish State and they wanted more implication and commitment from the president's side. Many

arguments say that if Truman would have taken the position of not recognizing the State of Israel, he

12
would have lost the election of 1948. Another factor that supports this assumption is that public and

international polls expressed their agreement on the creation of a Jewish state as a compensation of the

Holocaust. However, the Arabs did not agree on being the ones who had to pay for the Holocaust. They

also were very disappointed on how the Jews took advantage of their superior military preparation and

organization by occupying most of the Arab cities in Palestine before May 15, 1948 when the British

mandate was still in effect in Palestine. "In contrast, the Palestine Arabs did not seize any of the

territories reserved for the Jewish state under the partition resolution. " 13 Israel progressed very fast,

moving towards an established state with its own government institutions, tax system, and economic

policies. They were becoming a very well organized national force and also managing most of the

country's economy even though they were the minority of the country.

14
 If we analyze the success of the Partition Plan today, we see that it was a failure in terms of

resolving the conflict. President Truman's rapid response on the recognition of Israel can be seen as a

precipitated thoughtless decision. His quick decision prevented the United Nations from finishing a

discussion regarding what mechanisms should be used to prevent more bloodshed and provide

protection to the large Palestinian population. By recognizing the Jewish state and giving land and a

home for all the Jewish that had suffered the Holocaust, the U.S. was also leaving 400,000 Palestinians

with no representation in the new-born state. This recognition meant the creation of a home for the

displaced Jews and a rising displaced population of Palestinians. The U.S. decision on recognizing Israel

provided a solution to the many Jewish refugees that became displaced after the Holocaust. On the

other hand, this decision also caused another problem to emerge between the Israelis and the

Palestinians. Marshall's vision regarding the consequences that would follow from the United States'

support of a Jewish state is very relevant today. One of the main struggles that the Obama

administration is facing is the inability to stop supporting Israel or to impose economic sanctions on the

Jewish state. As Marshall predicted during the UN partition in 1947, the formation of Israel would stir a

problem of international security in the world. Even though Israel has a very strong military structure,

the Israelis are not strong enough to defend themselves from an Arab attack if America decides to stop

supporting them and sending aid. As a result of Truman's support for the creation of a Jewish state back

in 1948, the United States has been dragged in as the main third party in the Jewish-Arab conflict. Sixty­

two years later one of the main focuses of America's foreign policy is still aiming at Middle East peace

with the Israeli-Palestine conflict high on the President's agenda.

3. ISRAEL'S ONGOING CONFLICTS AND KEY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE BUSH 11
ADMISTRATION

Since the formation of Israel, more than twenty conflicts have taken place between Israel and its

Arab neighbors. Israel's conflicted formation, and particularly its situation in the Middle East, makes this

15
country very vulnerable. Because of its size, slightly smaller than the size of New Jersey, the fact that it

is surrounded in all directions by potentially hostile countries and its unwillingness to withstand large

casualties and prolonged wars have emphasized Israel's need of security. Since the beginning of its

formation, Israel has been among the top countries that allocates the largest portion of GDP to military

expenditure. During 1950-66, Israel spent an average of 9% of GDP on defense. Real defense

expenditures increased dramatically after both the 1967 and 1973 wars. In 1996, the military budget

14
reached 10.6% of GDP and represented about 21.5% of the total 1996 budget. All these figures

express the importance to Israel of securing itself in order to overcome all the battles it has faced since

its formation.

3.1. The Six-Day War & the Yorn Kippur War

Two of the most important conflicts that worsened the situation of Israel in the Middle East

were the Six-Day War and the 1973 war, also known as the Yorn Kippur War, which brought major

challenges to the state of Israel. Israel had just come out of a successful victory in the Six-Day War of

1967 where they had defeated the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. At the end of the Six­

Day War, Israel had gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem,

15
and the Golan Heights. The consequences of this war are crucial for an understanding of the current

situation that President Obama faces today. This war made Israel's territory grow by a factor of three,

including about one million Arabs placed under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories.

Israel's strategic depth grew to at least 300 kilometers in the south, 60 kilometers in the east and 20

kilometers of extremely rugged terrain in the north, a security asset that would prove useful in the 1973

16
Arab-Israeli War six years later. Population of the captured territories was another factor of the war

that led to problems: of about one million Palestinians in the West Bank, 300,000 (according to the

United States Department of State fled to Jordan, where they contributed to growing unrest. The
17
)

16
other 600,000 remained. In the Golan Heights, an estimated 80,000 Syrians fled. Only the inhabitants of

East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights became entitled to receive full Israeli citizenship, as Israel applied

its law, administration and jurisdiction to these territories in 1967 and 1981 respectively, and the vast

majority in both territories declined to do so. The 1967 war also laid the foundation for future discord in

the region. On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, which demanded

that Israel withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied during the conflict. However, it was

unsuccessful. The formation of Israel along with the Six-Day War laid out the main salient issues that

have caused this conflict to be so intractable: the right of return of the 1948 refugees, Jewish

settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the status of the occupied territories. Many attempts to

resolve those issues have been made by the different U.S. administrations, and still today these four

salient issues remain unresolved. The most intractable issue that prevents the Obama administration to

facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace are the continuous Jewish settlement activity and the land seized in

the 1967 war, which includes East Jerusalem, the definition of borders of the Palestinian entity and

ending the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank by Israel. Moreover, the current Israeli Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu, shows little interest in negotiating statehood borders but instead he has a priority

for economic and security issues.

Another key conflict that had an impact on Jewish-Arab relations was the war in 1973.

According to a poll taken in 2006, Israelis ranked this war as the most important event in their history

since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, followed by the 1967 war, and Yitzhak Rabin's

18
assassination in 1995. This war represented in the Middle East a substantially important change in

character of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the relationship between the United States, Israel, and

the Soviet Union. During the three-week conflict, Israel and Egypt had fought the largest tank battles

since the end of World War II. Both sides faced significant losses, but the effects on Israel were the

most devastating. "More than 6,000 troops had been killed or wounded in eighteen days of fighting.

17
The loss of equipment and the decline of production and exports as a consequence of mobilization came

to nearly US$7 billion, the equivalent of Israel's gross national product for an entire year. Most

important, the image of an invincible Israel that had prevailed since the June 1967 war was destroyed

19
forever."

The name Yorn Kippur War derives from the name of the Jewish Day of Atonement, or Yorn

Kippur, the holiest day of the religious year in Israel. The Egyptian and Syrian military forces attacked

the Israeli forces on the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north. Following the

attack, many Arab states took part in the Egyptian-Syrian war by offering personnel, military equipment,

and/or financial support. Some of the aiding states were: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria,

Tunisia, Sudan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan. What dragged this war into a full-scale superpower

confrontation was the implication of the Soviet Union financing the Arab states and armies. The

president of the United States, Richard Nixon at the time, was very concerned about the Russian

position. He knew an Israeli defeat had to be avoided because such a result would strength Arab

relations with the Soviet. At the same time, he did not want to become the enemy of Egypt, Syria, and

other Arab countries because this could potentially lead to the start of a war in the Middle East like

Vietnam. However, four days of Israeli reverses convinced Nixon to send materials to Israel. He sent an

20
"extra ten Phantom jets and mounted an operation larger than the Berlin airlift of 1948-49." By the

th
18 of October, Israel forces successfully responded to the Arab armies' attacks. In the south, an

Egyptian offensive into Sinai was repelled, and Israeli forces led by General Ariel Sharon crossed the

21
canal to surround the Egyptian Third Army. The Soviets realized how strong the Israeli army was

becoming, so they requested to meet with the United States to negotiate a cease-fire. United States

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger went to Moscow to meet with Leonid Brezhnev. They both agreed on

the UN Security Council Resolution 338, which called for a cease-fire to take place within twelve hours,

for the implementation of Resolution 242, and for "negotiations between the parties concerned under

18
appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." The war
22

officially ended on October 22, 1973, but a sudden event represented a threat to all negotiations and

agreements achieved at the end of the war. The proclamation of the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with Vasser Arafat as its leader,

was hot well-received in the United States or lsrael. The PLO along with the Arab nations wanted the
23

elimination of Israel. Late in 1974, the majority of the PLO and some of the Arab nations including Egypt

were "willing to trade recognition of Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the territories it

had occupied during the Six Day War, including Arab Jerusalem, and the establishment of a Palestinian

state in the West Bank." Israel withdrew from all of the areas it had acquired from Syria during the
24

1973 war in addition to some areas gained in 1967. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement called for Israeli

withdrawal from parts of the Sinai. Prisoners of war were exchanged and the Arab world ended its oil

embargo. Nevertheless, hostility between Israel and Palestine was ongoing for subsequent years

because Israel did not want to ·recognize the PLO and the PLO attacks on Israel. Violence between the

two fronts escalated during the following years and reaching its peak in the Lebanese Civil War. In

March 1978, "the PLO launched an attack on Israel from a base in Southern Lebanon. Three days later

Israel invaded Lebanon using American-made weapons to bomb Beirut and kill hundreds of civilians."
25

A U.N. Security Council Resolution condemned the practices of Israel in southern Lebanon.

It was clear that the hostilities between Israel and Arabs had to stop with some kind of peace

agreement. Someone had to come up with some kind of proposal that would make Menachem Begin,

Israel's Prime Minister and Anwar Sadat, Egypt's President content. American President Jimmy Carter

26
was the first who advocated a "'homeland' for the Palestinians. Carter started informal negotiations

with the two leaders, inviting them to Camp David to discuss a statement for a possible peace

agreement. Begin was very skeptical of the idea of recognizing a Palestinian homeland or having to talk

to the PLO. Both parties had very different interests when discussing a peace agreement. Sadat's main

19
requirements were a withdrawal of the Israelis from the Egyptian Sinai and Palestinian rights. In order

for the implementation of peace in the Middle East, Resolution 242 had to be the basis of agreement.

After many discussions between Carter, Sadat, and Begin they negotiated the Camp David Accords. This

accord was based on the fulfillment of Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Some of the main

points of the agreement were: full Egyptian recognition of Israel, abolishing economic boycotts, and

guaranteeing that citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
27

One question that was not clarified in the accords was Israel's settlement activity. Israel kept building

settlements in the West Bank, which caused great concern back in 1978 up to the present time. Conflict

kept ongoing for the next years, and the first Intifada took place in 1987 where an uprising by the

Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza against Israeli occupation took place, lasting until 1991.

As a result of this first intifada, a peace process through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians

took place at the Madrid Conference in 1991. This Conference was also the first time that the United

States became directly involved as a third party mediator of the negotiations.

3.2 1993 Oslo Peace Accord & Camp David 2000 Summit

Due to the fact that the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was unwilling to negotiate directly

with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), these bilateral talks were replaced by secret back­

channel negotiations between PLO and representatives of Israel, as a result of these talks in 1993 they

signed the "Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements" (DOP), also known as

the "Oslo Accord." The Oslo Accords are considered to be very important for the advancement of

reaching a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine for the series of principles that were agreed: Israel

would recognize the PLO and the PLO would stop violence against Israel; issues regarding Israeli

settlements, Palestinian statehood, refugees, and Jerusalem would be negotiated without

precondition. A series of interim agreements attempted to move the process forward and give the
28

20
Palestinians governing control over the areas in which the majority of their population lived. But again,

the two parties did not fulfill the terms of agreement and the peace process was derailed, leaving the

parties in the intractable conflict and perpetuating the cycle of violence. With the failure of the Oslo

peace process, which reached its final impasse with the unsuccessful Camp David Summit ·and the

subsequent eruption of the second intifada in 2000, the parties have met for several rnunds of talks

under the auspices of the United States. In 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush launched the unfruitful

"Roadmap for Peace" in partnership with the Quartet of Middle East Negotiators (US, UN, EU, and

Russia), which outlined a detailed plan for dealing with key issues and was intended to bring about

resolution by 2005. The Roadmap, however, made little progress and was once again derailed, this time

by the democratic election of the Islamic militant group Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary

elections in 2006. Most recently, the Annapolis Conference in 2007 was planned and hosted by the US

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The conference was considered significant at the time because it

was the first time that a two-state solution was articulated as the mutually agreed-upon outline for

addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, Annapolis was unsuccessful for the progress of a Middle

East peace.

21
 Palestinian loss of land 1946 to 2000
Palestinian and Jewish land 1946 UN Partition plan 1947 1949 -1967 2000

-
Je..1sll l_,d -I! l_,d braetiland
• Palesum., land • Pa1e911noan laoo

Map II: Palestinian loss of land 1946-2000

4. THE BUSH II ADMINISTRATION VS. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

4.1. Literature Review

Among the different specialists on the Middle East, there are a wide range of opinions and

positions when addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some scholars are more optimistic when

envisioning a possible peace between the Jews and the Arabs, while others have no hope of achieving a

final peace. The most pessimistic researchers on the topic see this conflict as an unresolved ongoing

struggle between the Jews and the Arabs that has lasted for over 60 years. Furthermore, every

American president has failed in reaching a peaceful solution between these two groups. Nathan J.

Brown, a professor of political science and International Affairs at George Washington University, argues

22
that the diplomatic process to achieve a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine has come to a

dead end. Despite all the efforts from past administrations and the Obama administration, Israel and

Hamas have refused to recognize each other's legitimacy. Brown proposes the establishment of a clear

and written cease-fire that builds on the common interests of both. He also believes that a short-term

cease-fire has to be accompanied by intensive efforts to turn this into a workable medium term

armistice. No long-term solution is possible without a viable Palestinian leadership able to make

authoritative decisions for all Palestinians. An armistice would provide an opportunity to rebuild the

29
Palestinian Authority. In conclusion, Brown does not believe that a two-state solution will be

reachable any time soon.

Other experts on the topic also share Nathan J. Brown's vision that at the present time there is

no such viable two-state solution. Aaron Miller, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in

Washington, argues that there is no conflict ending solution that addresses all four core issues of the

problem, which are: Jerusalem's status, Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war, Israeli settlements in the

30
West Bank, and the borders problem. It is difficult to tell even if a solution is possible in the future.

He sees as main constraints for a common resolution the problems regarding Jerusalem and the right to

return. He believes the present time is not right for a final solution. He supports the idea of having a

very active special envoy, such as George J. Mitchell in the Middle East, who takes the issue seriously but

he argues that America's engagement in the conflict cannot be episodic like in the past. America has to

engage in a more proactive and sustained course. The Arab-Israeli conflict must remain an important

priority, "America policy-makers must keep in mind a realistic sense and measure of time lest they try to

31
accomplish too much, on the one hand, or not attempt enough, on the other.

Ambassador Zalman Shoval, a current Israeli politician and diplomat who served as Israel's

ambassador to the United States from 1990 to 1993 and 1998 to 2000, also sees that a final agreement

will not be reached any time soon. He says that even if an agreement was going to be achieved in all

23
core issues. Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and settlements a real peace agreement would have to have

the support of a substantial majority on both sides. The resistance of so many Palestinians accepting

32
Israel's right to exist makes the idea of peace become an illusion.

On the other hand, there are other experts on the topic that have a more optimistic vision of

achieving a peace accord. Ambassador Martin lndyk, who directs the Saban Center for Middle East

Policy at the Brookings Institution, offers interesting ideas regarding the conflict. He believes third-party

intervention is necessary to establish a lasting peace. Some of the Arab neighbors such as Egypt and

Jordan are already contributing. Nevertheless, he expresses the importance of a bigger involvement

from many other Arab states in order to make viable a two-state solution. Unlike the other scholars,

Ambassador lndyk says that Israel enjoys peace with Egypt and Jordan, and that the idea of a two-state

solution is becoming more acceptable to both sides. He also argues that despite the position of Ha mas,

they are gradually coming to terms with Israel's reality, as demonstrated by the ceasefire- negotiations

with Israel and Gaza. lndyk believes that all the obstacles facing the Israel-Arab conflict such as the

refugee problem are not impossible to resolve. With spirited leadership and a willingness to commit

33
both sides with each other it is possible to achieve a lasting peace.

Another scholar supportive of a two state solution is Paul Scham, an adjunct scholar at the

Middle East Institute in Washington D. C. He believes that a two-state solution is the only door that will

open other options including the achievement of a lasting peace. It is necessary for the establishment of

a Palestinian state with national responsibility in order to move towards post-nationalism as Europe did.

At the present time these two societies need to' work more on building a mutual trust from the societal

level as well as the governmental level. If in the worst case a two-state solution was not viable, he

34
states: "I see no plausible scenarios for a consensual one-state solution. It is not a serious option."

David C. Unger, a member of The New York Times editorial board specializing in foreign policy,

24
also shows an interesting position on the two0state solution. His article "The Inevitable Two State

Solution" states that,

By 2033, two states, Israel and Palestine, will be living side-by-side in an uneasy peace, with the
risk of war between them and terrorism across their common border diminishing year by year.
This two-state solution will not be imposed by the United States or the Arab world. It will be
freely chosen by the Israelis and Palestinians themselves. The growing Palestinian majority living
between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River will continue to insist on nothing less. And a
solid majority of Israelis will by then have come to see a two-state partition of Palestine as
35
essential to Israel's survival as a tolerable place to live and raise their families.

David Unger believes that one of the essential steps by the Israeli government in order to

achieve a two-state solution is to freeze all the settlement expansion. However, the demographic

conditions under which these two societies are living will not make it easy to reach a trusting

relationship and agreeing on common points. The role of outsiders will be very important in

encouraging compromise between the two sides, but the ultimate actions and decisions regarding the

conflict will have to be made by the effected parties: Israel and the Palestinians.

Finally, Robert Axelrod, an American political science professor best known for his work on the

evolution of cooperation, uses the game theory to explain the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

and suggests an exit strategy called tit-for-tat for the Israelis to use in order to alleviate the conflict.

Axerold argues that the current strategy being used by Israel and Hamas during the confrontations leads

to waging a war of attrition. This creates a zero-sum game, in which each side keeps attacking until one

loses in the round of conflict. The problem is that Israel does not know when Hamas will run out of

ammunition and call for a halt in fighting, while simultaneously; Hamas does not know when Israel will

bow to political pressure and accept an inferior cease-fire, thus allowing the rocket threats to continue.

The tit-for-tat strategy proposes that Israel should declare an unlimited cease-fire, as well as an end to

its blockade of Gaza, contingent on subsequent cooperation by Hamas. Concurrently, Israel should

communicate to Hamas some of the consequences for continuing rocket fire. For instance, for each

rocket fired across the border, Israel would close the border crossings for a day, or destroy a certain

25
 number of targets. The advantage of this strategy is that it gives both sides the opportunity to de­

escalate the violence and to save face. If the rockets do stop, the Israeli government can tell its citizens

that it has secured their safety, while Hamas can tell Gazans the strategy forced Israel to back down and

36
achieved more freedom of movement.

This Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very critical issue ongoing for over sixty years. In order to

bring regional peace in the area, it is necessary to come up with a resolution that ends the tensions

between Israel and Palestine. Some of the experts are more optimistic when addressing the conflict

while others see a dead end to the problem. There are many constraints preventing peace between the

two groups, such as recognizing each other's legitimacy, Jerusalem, and the right of return of Palestinian

refugees. Despite expert opinions saying that the solution depends on the Israelis and Palestinians to

bring about peace, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a core issue and a main challenge for every

American administration. The question rests on whether the new American President, Obama will

succeed or if one more American administration will fail to reach such peace between the Jews and the

Palestinians.

4.2 Bush's Foreign Policy

Since the formation of Israel in 1948, every American president has maintained a special

relationship with the Jewish. state. Nonetheless, the creation of Israel started a major conflict between

the Jews and the Arabs, taking the form of an open war between the neighboring Arab states and Israel.

Many attempts by different American administrations have been made to bring a two-state solution

which would create an independent Palestinian state alongside with an independent Jewish state. Even

37
though there is substantial support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict there are

still significant areas of disagreement and low-levels of credibility to achieve any final commitment

. between the two societies. This ongoing dispute for over 60 years has involved high levels of violence

26
conducted by regular armies, paramilitary groups, terror cells and individuals causing the casualties of

many innocent civilians.

Republican George W. Bush was elected President in 2000. Shortly before his inauguration in

January 2001, a national election in Israel took place. Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister after

defeating Ehud Barak. All the previous efforts and negotiations made for peace with former President

Clinton, Prime Minister Barack and PLO leader Arafat were frozen. The Bush administration also

distanced itself from an agenda focused on global problems in other places in the Middle East and

elsewhere, and gave priority to relations with great powers, Americans' neighbors, and domestic

38
policy.

Bush's shift in ideology and foreign policy from the Clinton administration was evident when he

appointed his team. His team was made with people from strong conservative and neoconservative

backgrounds. The main figures of the Bush's team that would have a key role in the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict were Colin Powell, the secretary of state, Anthony Zinni, Bush's special envoy to the Middle East

who was like Powell, a retired four-star general with conservative attitudes, and Condoleezza Rice,

Bush's national security adviser. Rice was not known for taking strong positions on the issues on the

Middle East and third world affairs, but she was an expert on Russia and the great-power relations as

the administration that had taken office wanted to emphasize. She had a very ambitious role for the

United States and pursued a very determined agenda in shaping the world in the twenty-first century.

39
After Bush won the reelection in 2004, Condoleezza Rice was appointed secretary of state. On

November 28, 2007, General Jones was appointed as the State Department's Special Envoy for Middle

East Regional Security. In this capacity, he worked with Israeli and Palestinian officials in furthering the

40
Peace Process - focused on the full range of issues in order to strengthen security for both sides. All

these posts were characterized by very conservative advisors. The one exception was Colin Powell. He

27
was a pragmatic internationalist that understood the importance of American power, but also worried

about the costs of alienating other countries. He believed that the United States should only use force

41
as a last resort against clear threats, a view not shared by his colleagues .

The Bush team's world view before 9/11 was the promotion of a conservative agenda. Bush

also acknowledged that an arrogant and overbearing U.S. interventionism would generate resentment

and only complicate U.S. foreign relations; this was one of the reasons for his contention that less

emphasis should be put on nation-building in far-off places. American power should be only exercised in

terms of American interest. Unlike Clinton, Bush and most of his advisers accepted this "billiard-ball

view of the world, where the United States was the biggest ball in the table and could move every other

42
ball when and where it wanted." Bush wanted to avoid Clinton-style international activism in the

world including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the first month of his presidency, there were no real

prospects for resuming the talks started in the Clinton administration. He dismissed Clinton's proposals,

which would have returned around 94% of the occupied territories to the Palestinians. Arafat also

rejected Clinton's plan after Egypt and Saudi Arabia advised Arafat not to accept and many Palestinians

opposed making concessions to Israel. The Arabs viewed the plan as a way to legitimize Israel's

expansion and internationally illegal policies over the past 52 years regarding Jerusalem, resettlement of

refugees and Israeli Jewish settlement policy. The neoconservative administration was not looking to

get engaged as an active mediator between the two parties. They felt Israel and Palestine could work

out their land and security problems themselves. Bush took a passive role in the conflict letting the

Israelis, the strongest economic and military power in the region, -use force against the Palestinians and

escalate violence. The Bush administration was strongly opposed to the Palestinian Authority and their

support for terrorist attacks. His obvious affinity for Israel was not going to contribute to reaching a

peace agreement. He refused to meet with Arafat.

28
4.2.1. 9/11

Eight months after Bush's first term as president began, the September 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks occurred. This event changed American foreign policy. For many years, America was

consolidating its role as the sole superpower with no treats to their national security. The United States

was a leader and a promoter of globalization, economic liberalization, and aiding the third world and

developing countries. After September 11, the United States shifted its foreign policy and focused on a

policy of fighting global terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. David Bernell argues

43
that the United States entered into a new era of foreign relations defined by "the war on terrorism."

President Bush felt the United States had a new mission of fighting terrorism during the next years of his

administration. He best represented this new direction in his speech in Congress nine days after the

attacks. Bush stated:

Now this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of
territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago,
where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response
involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one
battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic
strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of
funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge
or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation,
in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will
be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime (George W. Bush, Address to Congress,
September 20, 2001).

This speech represented the beginning of a new era and direction in American foreign policy.

America had been attacked and hurt in front of the entire world. This leading superpower known for

promoting and spreading the values of freedom and democracy for the past decade had been attacked.

Now, according to Bush, it was time for America to fight back for its principles.

After the terrorist attacks, Bush's foreign policy added a new strategy called preemption. After

the Cold War the United States did not face any major threat to their national security. Because of a

29
new era of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. could no longer rely on the

deterrence strategy. America could no longer wait to be attacked before making a preemptive strike.

4.3. BUSH AND OBAMA'S DIPLOMACY TOWARD THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

4.3.1. Bush Policy

President's Bush agenda in the Middle East was not easy after all the unpredictable events in

the months before he became president. Following the breakdown of the Camp David talks between

Palestinians and Israelis in July 2000, during the Clinton administration, and the subsequent outbreak of

violence on September 28, the sides nevertheless agreed to continue talks during December and

January 2001. From January 21 to 27, they met in Taba, on the Israeli Egyptian border. Both sides

hammered out proposals that came much closer to each other's positions than ever before. The four

central issues in dispute in the Israel-Palestine conflict were: the right of return for the 1948 refugees,

the Jewish settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the status of the Occupied Territories. The right to

return was one of the most delicate issues to address during the talks. About 500,000 to 780,000

Palestinians were displaced during the 1948 Israeli War of independence, either because they fled

Palestine or because they were forced out by the Israelis. UN General Assembly Resolution 194, issued

in December 1948, stated that refugees wishing to return to the territory of Israel and willing to live at

peace with their neighbors should have the right to do so. The resolution was never implemented. In

the next fifty years that followed, the refugee population has grown to about 4 million (estimates range

from 3.7 million to 4.6 million), many living in camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Gaza Strip and West

44
Bank, in the most primitive conditions.

Violence increased during the second intifada, which started in 2000, violence increased costing

45
the lives of thousands of Palestinians and nearly two hundred lsraelis. Pressure from the international

30
community urged the need of addressing a peace initiative between Israelis and Palestinians. In June

2002, President George W. Bush announced a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

being the first American president addressing the idea of creating a Palestinian state. On the other

hand, he stated that, "'Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian

46
state can be born."' This idea of giving sovereignty to the Palestinians was not well received among

the neoconservatives in Washington. They believed Israel should be allowed to defend itself and show

that through violence the Israelis would defeat a corrupted Palestinian authority. On the other hand,

the conservatives and most liberals in Congress were very supportive of this initiative looking for

compromise between the two sides and achievement of a lasting peace. In order to carry out this new

initiative, the Israelis had to stop the settlement activity, return territory occupied after Sharon's visit to

Temple Mount before September 2000, and fulfill the U.N. Resolution 242. The commitment failed to

be fulfilled.

Bush's early focus on domestic policy had changed to a dominating foreign policy focusing with

the Middle East. The Bush administration started a large mission in the Middle East to protect the U.S.

from the threat of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and had to address the ongoing violence

between the Israelis and Palestinians. Bush wanted to replace Arafat, the Palestinian leader connected

to terrorist groups with a new leader that could be trusted to democratize the Palestinian authority.

4.3.2. Obama Policy

When President Barack Obama took office in 2009, America entered a new course in foreign

policy. Unlike ex-President Bush, Obama took charge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict '"from day one'"

as he promised in his campaign. During his first day in office, he phoned four Middle Eastern leaders

including President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel, King Abdullah of

Jordan, and President Mahmud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority. By this action he was committing the

31
involvement of America in the pursuit of an Israeli-Arab peace. He also started to work on the

consolidation of a cease-fire by "establishing an effective anti-smuggling regime to prevent Hamas from

rearming, and facilitating, in partnership with the Palestinian Authority, a major reconstruction effort for

47
Palestinians in Gaza."

Another prominent action taken by the Obama administration was the appointment of a

Cabinet team. While the Bush team had a strong neoconservative ideology, reflecting the path American

foreign policy was going to undertake for the next four years, Obama's appointees a broader range of

ideologies including both conservative and liberal. Four of the key appointees important for America's

foreign policy in the Middle East were Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; General James L. Jones, a retired

Marine commandant and former North Atlantic Treaty Organization supreme commander, as his

national security adviser; former Senator George Mitchell as the special envoy for the Middle East

Peace; and he also retained a Bush appointee, Robert Gates, as his secretary of Defense.

George Mitchell's appointment was a key indicator of the new administration's commitment to

the Middle East peace process. He also had many experiences in international conflicts having served as

a special envoy to Northern Ireland in 1995 during Bill Clinton's presidency. After three years of

constant diplomacy across the Atlantic, "Mitchell's calm persistence and soft-spoken manner led to the

48
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998." Mitchell's experience in Northern Ireland to help

make a peace agreement could be applied in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Mitchell also

proved early signs of engagement prior to his post as special envoy in 2009 when in 2001, following the

outbreak of the second Intifada, he headed a commission that called on Israel to freeze construction of

new settlements and on the Palestinians to take strong action to stop terrorist attacks against Israel.

49
However, the Bush administration ignored this report and sidelined Mitchell's efforts.

32
 We can see Mitchell's early commitment to the Middle East through his immediate work on a

lasting cease-fire between Israel and Palestine along with several visits he made to the Middle East in

the first few months of his presidency. In contrast to the Bush administration, President Obama and

Secretary Clinton appointed a "Special Envoy for Middle East Peace" within their first week in office.

The Bush administration did not assign a "Special Envoy for Middle East Security" until November 28,

2007. In 2002, Bush designated Anthony Charles Zinni to fill the post of "special envoy in the Middle

East." He was a retired four-star general in the United States Marine Corps and a former commander in

chief of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).50 He did little work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Obama administration played a more active role for the United States, relying more on allies

and multilateral institutions. The United States engaged the international community after years of

American unilateralism. Obama also pledged that the U.S. would again adhere to the "constitutional"

world order to establish rules of behavior to be backed by international laws and institutions such as the

51
United Nations and the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration claimed that the UN and

52
the International Criminal Court restricted U.S. sovereignty.

Another change on the previous direction of America's foreign policy was reflected on Obama's

emphasis on the use of "soft power" and diplomacy rather than "hard power." Soft power is defined as

53
"the ability to get what you want by attraction rather than coercion or payments." This idea stresses

the notion that nations can attract and influence other nations by using its democratic values, political

institutions, economic partnership, and diplomacy. Furthermore, the use of soft power tends to abate

the anti-American sentiment oversees. The Obama administration is also predisposed to start an era

dominated by strong diplomacy engagement, which moves away from the idea of America's

unilateralism and exceptionalism while moving towards a more cooperative America while dealing with

foreign leaders.

33
 The new administration even went further than this notion of America's reliability on soft

power. In her statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hillary Rodham Clinton

introduced the idea of "smart power'' as the new tool of America's foreign policy. She defined it as:

The full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and
cultural -- picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power,
diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy. This is not a radical idea. The ancient Roman
poet Terence, who was born a slave and rose to become one of the great voices of his time,
declared that in every endeavor, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first." The
54
same truth binds wise women as well.

During Hillary Clinton's speech, she enforced the use of diplomacy as a leading tool on America's

foreign policy to lessen tensions and achieve results to promote stability and good values. She

acknowledged the support of the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on the use of diplomacy as a way to

pursuit national security and foreign policy objectives. Secretary Gates stated, "our civilian institutions

of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long,

both relative to military spending and to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the

55
world." Despite Hillary Clinton's confidence regarding America's foreign policy towards a world full of

conflicts, she quoted Senator Richard Lugar's that the United States cannot solve every person or

nation's problems. The United States does not have the power, the resources, or an unlimited time

56
frame to solve every problem in the world. This is the reason why the success of America's foreign

policy relies on "establishing priorities" and making "smart decisions" before getting engaged on global

issues. Weighing the probability of success and failure before getting involved in a conflict will also

influence the successes and failure of Obama's foreign policy.

4.4. BUSH VS. OBAMA: WHO IS MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED?

In order to determine if the Obama administration will have a more successful foreign policy in

developing a possible solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the approach used by the Bush

administration, we need to define the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and what the elements of a successful

34
diplomacy are in this particular type of conflict. Will Barack Obama produce a solution in the Middle

East for. the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In order to proceed with our research question, it is also

important to identify what we mean by success and how we are going to determine if Obama's foreign

policy moves toward in a more successful direction than the approach used by the Bush administration.

Therefore, we will explore the factors that lead to a successful mediation and determine whether or not

Obama is being successful in mediating this conflict.

4.4.1. Defining Successful Diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

According to Daniel Wehrenfennig, a successful approach can be defined as the establishment

of ongoing dialogue between different conflicted parties, leading to more cooperation and

understanding. Ultimately, increased cooperation, peace talks, agreements, the end of violence and

57
potentially the resolution of the conflict will act as indicators of success.

Diplomacy in the last decades has been very successful. Since the end of the Cold War, half of

all conflicts have been ended through communication and peace talks between the conflicted parties,

58
whereas 100 years ago roughly on·e in five was resolved through negotiation. Many of the successful

conflict resolutions from the last four decades can be attributed not only to what is called Track One

59
diplomacy (official diplomacy) but also to Track Two diplomacy (unofficial diplomacy). The most

common result of official intervention is an agreement, whether a cease-fire to end violence in active

intractable conflicts or to a more comprehensive settlement of the underlying conflict. In contrast,

unofficial third parties have no resources to bring to the table and therefore generally take on a more

60
facilitative or educational role. Success requires the use of both Track One and Track Two diplomacy,

especially since one single actor is not enough to achieve lasting peace and security. During the last few

decades, we have seen an evolution in Track Two diplomacy. Non-governmental actors not involved in

the conflict have been playing a more significant role when facilitating communication between the

35
disputants of the parties. Because official diplomacy has generally failed to consider social-psychological

and spiritual approaches in peace building, Track Two diplomacy has emerged to fill this void. Montville

describes track two diplomacy as an unofficial interaction between members of adversarial groups or

nations to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in

ways that might help resolve their conflict. He notes that Track Two diplomacy is in no way a substitute

for official, formal Track One government-to-government or leader-to-leader relationships. Rather, it is

designed to assist official leaders by compensating for the constraints imposed upon them by the

61
understandable need to appear to be strong in the face of the enemy. Due to the intractability of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a series of facilitated workshops aiming to bring together representatives of

the two groups in conflict and help ameliorate the integration of the Israeli and Palestinian society were

established by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These workshops were known as

"International Youth Camp for Israelis and Arabs" and were created to undermine negative stereotypes

62
and re-humanize relationships between the parties.

According to Peter Coleman, intractable conflicts are those that remain unresolved for long

periods of time and then become stuck at a high level of intensity and destructiveness. They typically

involve many parties and concern an intricate set of historical, religious, cultural, political, and economic

63
issues. Intractable conflicts are very complex and difficult to resolve due to a series of factors: the

protracted length of time that the conflict endures; the stubborn resistance to conflict resolution

despite repeated attempts made both by the parties themselves and by outside interveners; and the

tendency for frequent reciprocal acts of physical, sociological, and psychological violence resulting in

64
psychological wounds and a very deep sense of grievance and victimization. Finally, they continue

65
despite repeated attempts by third parties to resolve or transform the conflict. This model fits

perfectly with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These two groups have been in an ongoing dispute for

over sixty years with many attempts to resolve the problem but they always failed to reach any peace

36
agreement. This conflict is also characterized for its deep psychological wounds as a consequence of the

1947 UN partition plan outcomes that displaced many Palestinians from their land after the creation of

the Jewish state. From 1948 until 1993, Israel and Palestine lived under a period of continuous violence

and conflict. This period was dominated by the Six-Day War in 1967 and the first intifada in 1987 that

reflected Palestinians distress regarding Israeli rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip territories.

This was the first rebellion where a third party became involved in the negotiations between

Israelis and Palestinians. The Madrid Conference that George H. W. Bush organized in 1991 and co­

sponsored by the Soviet Union is an example of conference diplomacy because the international

community facilitated the dialogue between the two communities as well as Arab countries including

Syria, Lebanon, an_d Jordan. But the lack of progress in the Madrid talks let to the beginning of an

66
unofficial channel that began operating between Israelis and the PLO, under the auspices of Norway.

These unofficial talks culminated on September 1993 where PLO recognized the right to exist for Israel

in peace and security and acknowledged U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for

peace. On the other hand, Prime Minister Rabin gave official recognition to the PLO as a legitimate

67
entity. What could have been the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict failed due to unwillingness and

poor commitment to fulfill the previous agreements.

This lack of commitment led to the failure of the Camp David Summit, the emergency of the

second intifada in 2000, and the escalation of the conflict. According to Daniel Wehrenfennig's

definition of success, all the efforts made by the Clinton administration to promote ongoing dialogue

and peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians to ultimately achieve a peace agreement failed.

Ronald Fisher states that the main elements that reversed the efforts for a successful diplomacy after

the Oslo peace failure and the second intifada were the abandoning of most dialogue initiatives

between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead, further separation and segregation created a very hostile

political and physical environment to engage in dialogue, which brought most initiatives to halt. Fisher

37
argues that keeping dialogue alive between the conflict parties in times of tension can abate the

violence of the conflict and can re-stabilize the relations. He uses as examples the dialogue between the

East and West in the Cold War, namely in the form of the so called Darth mouth Conferences, the Cuban

missile crisis and the Afghanistan war. These three cases are examples of positive contribution of

keeping dialogue going even in times of great strains.68 This ongoing communication contributed

immensely to the relaxation of tensions between the parties and later to the end of the Cold War

69
itself. The breakdown of peace talks and dialogue after the Oslo Accord and the second intifada

involved a big step back on the efforts made to the road to a peace agreement between Israel and

Palestine.

70 71
In 2001, we have the Taba Talks , followed by the Roadmap and Geneva Accords in 2003. In

2004, Israel made a move by withdrawing from Gaza, and in 2005 the official intifada ended with the

Shark el-Sheikh summit. However, that same year, violence within Gaza started again, and tensions

escalated when in 2006 Hamas won the parliamentary election, putting a challenge to Bush's mission in

the Middle East which had been based on the implementation of democratic governments. Later on in

this year, starting on July 12, a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel took place which

resulted in the involvement of the international community to put end to the conflict.

In 2007, after a year of high tensions, the United States organized and hosted the Annapolis

Conference with a clear attempt to restart the '"Performance-Based Road Map to Peace"' to address the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 72 Nevertheless, there was little hope that the Bush administration was going

to be successful at moving towards a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians for various

reasons. Bush's strong support for the Jewish state excluded representatives from Hamas and Syria

from participating in the conference, as both refuse to recognize the State of Israel. The exclusion of key

players in the summit led to question the validity of President Bush's motives and to suggest that the US

was "pushing for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in order to secure Arab backing for a

38
 73
possible US-led war against lran." Another reason that prevented a successful outcome was the dual

role the United States played as the mediator and chief supporter of the more powerful party, lsrael.7 4

International observers, such as Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, have stressed that it was

"absolutely necessary to establish an international follow-up mechanism that monitors progress in the

75
negotiations among the parties, as well as the implementation of commitments made." It took almost

five years after launching the Roadmap for Bush to appoint General William Fraser to monitor and

76
oversee implementation of Roadmap commitments. Lack of commitment from both parties led to

conflict again. In 2008 and 2009, there was a major conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip,

which caused another breakdown in the talks between the two parties.

During the Bush administration, we see little effort at involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict. Even when efforts were made to engage the two parties to work for peace talks, Bush did not

use successful diplomacy. We could argue that during the Bush administration, there was a regression

of dialogue that brought Israelis and Palestinians back to the years before Oslo. Some efforts for a

peace process regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict took place in June 2002 when Bush became the

first U.S leader to embrace the idea of a Palestinian statehood; and during the following year, in the

Geneva Accords in 2003, another attempt was made to reach a peace agreement between the two

communities by non-official peace talks. Those talks aimed to resolve the key issues of the problem: the

expansion of settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the right of return of the refugees. Yet, this

agreement gave many accommodations to Israel while requiring greater commitments from

Palestinians, as opposed to Israel. These disproportionate conditions led to the failure of the

agreement.

Furthermore, the combination of America's pro-Israel stance and George W. Bush's invasion of

Iraq were interpreted by many Muslims as a war on Islam rather than a war on "terrorism."77 During the

following years, ongoing violence predominated in the region with the hostilities of the second intifada.

39
The continuous fighting in the region, the increasing separation of the parties accentuated with the rise

of the Hamas, failure from both parties to commit on previous resolutions and agreements, and failure

by foreign actors to approach the conflict with successful diplomacy and understanding the concerns of

the two sides increased suspicion between Israelis and Palestinians. Since the beginning of peace talks

between Israelis and Palestinians back in the Oslo years, dialogue had been interrupted every time an

agreement had been unsuccessful. We see that talks had some success at various points in time and

they were even an accelerating force for the peace process. Contrary, in the case of the Israeli­

Palestinian conflict dialogue has been discontinued in times of crisis and hostilities. The discontinuation

of dialogue during tough times could be part of the reason for the intractability of the Jewish-Arab

conflict. Another example is the Northern Ireland conflict in which ongoing dialogue ultimately helped

78
to build and sustain Lederach's identity peace constituency while pushing for conflict resolution.

The way dialogue has been handled in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has led to the current

situation where neither party trusts the other, they refuse to meet at the table without preconditions,

and a third party attempts to bring these two groups closer together, which causes Israel and Palestine

to remain stagnant. Successful diplomacy involves promoting the establishment of ongoing dialogue

between different conflict parties, leading to more cooperation and understanding the two parties'

concerns and fears. President Obama faces quite a challenge. He must reverse the sporadic American

diplomacy of the past eight years by promoting peace talks between these two communities without

letting the channel of communication die. Obama needs to approach the conflict with the "long-term,

79
patient, but firm and vigilant containment" mentality that was used during the U.S.-Soviet struggle. It

is going to be a very long process where everyone must be patient and not tempted to give up even

when things seem to not going anywhere.

40
4.4.2. Mediation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Another important factor to consider when analyzing the success or failure of Obama's and

Bush's foreign policy and diplomacy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be the use of mediation in

the region. Mediation can be best defined as a tool for conflict management or resolution that involves

an outsider, or a third party, in our case the United States, who is not directly a disputant. Furthermore,

mediation is not thought to be either forceful or binding unless negotiating parties choose to make it

so.so

In our present time, mediation plays a very important role when playing international politics.

We live in a period of time where great technological advancement has led to the creation of weapons

of mass destruction making conflicts very costly. We also do not have any set of rules nor is central

authority that can regulate patterns of international behavior, and power diffused among many units

that guard their sovereignty. This is why mediation can offer an effective way of dealing with

differences between antagonistic states at a lower cost.

Jacob Bercovitch has been one of the leading figures in the quantitative analysis of mediation.

He has examined 295 conflicts occurring from 1945 to 1995, using statistical data to test different

81
hypothesis about mediation. He found a series of factors which correlated strongly with successful

mediation. Some of the most relevant conclusions he found were that mediation was most likely to

succeed when the adversaries both had well defined and legitimate identities. Mediation was most

successful (64%) where one or both of adversaries had no significant cultural minority. Mediation was

least successful (38%) where one or both of adversaries had a significant cultural minority. Power

disparities between adversaries were also a significant factor. Mediation was most successful (51%)

where there was little difference in power. Mediation was least successful (33%) where the power

difference was great. The mediation environment is also a factor influencing mediation success.

41
Mediation was most successful when it occurred on the mediators' territory (54%) or on neutral

territory (50%). Mediation was less successful when held in the parties' territory (45%) and least

successful when it moved between a number of sites (36%).

82

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not in a favorable position for the American leaders to succeed

when mediating the conflict. Israel is divided by two different cultures: Jews and Arabs. There is also a

great power disparity between these two groups which makes mediation more difficult to succeed. We

have a dominant actor, Israel, and an oppressed group, the Palestinians. There is also unequal resource

distribution and different access to goods such as social services, jobs, and basic amenities. While Israel

83
per capita average income in 2006 was$ 20,000, it was$1,170 in the occupied territories. Israel is also

being supported by the United States and since 1976 has been the largest annual recipient of direct U.S.

economic and military assistance. Israel receives about$3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year.

These disproportionate figures making Israel the party that holds the big share of the pie and the

continuous support of the United States to Israel creates challenges for negotiations to be successful.

Analysts argue that marked power disparity strengthens the strongest party's view of the mediator as a

stumbling block toward the achievement of total victory, and reinforces the stronger party's

unwillingness to accept mediation in the first place, or enhances its reluctance to make any concessions

84
or compromises during mediation essential for attaining successful results as seen in the case of lsrael.

According to a study by Marieke Kleiboer, there are three characteristics that affect mediation

outcomes: conflict ripeness, the level of conflict intensity, and the nature of the issue in

conflict. Conflict ripeness addresses the importance of proper timing of mediation initiatives for
85

achieving successful outcomes. A conflict passes life, cycles which encompasses different phases, and

86
there are certain stages more suitable to intervene than others. However, there are different

arguments when addressing the proper timing for mediation. Some of them support an early entry

42
where it is still possible to consider possibilities for settlement before the conflict has become too

entrenched and the parties too inflexible in their attitudes. Nevertheless, since it is too late for an early

entry in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since it started back in 1948 when Israel was formed, we are

going to use the "classical position" which supports late entry, and it is based on the thesis that

mediation is most fruitful when failure to reach an agreement is precipitating an emergency. Feelings of

emergency will strongly increase the disputants' motivation to moderate their intransigency and revise

87
their expectations. An example is the 1993 Oslo Accord where Israel and the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO) agreed to recognize each other, and signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP)

providing for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for five years. Such

reconciliation from the PLO was in part a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union which left the PLO

without superpower support. Another factor was that Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf

War left the organization broke during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91. This reflects a case that when one of

the parties gets exhausted and in a jeopardized situation, the party becomes more approachable and

mitigates its intransigent position in the conflict. When such situation takes place, we could identify it as

the "proper timing" for mediators to take action and step into the conflict. Obama's skills to identify

such moments could determine the advancement of the peace process,

The second factor affecting mediation outcome is the level of intensity in the conflict. There is

some disagreement among the analysts about the impact that intensity can have in the mediation

outcomes. In our study, we will use the Bercovitch evaluation of intensity in terms of number of

fatalities experienced in each side. In his evaluation, he found empirical support for the hypothesis that

as the number of fatalities in a dispute increase, the likelihood of mediation to be successful declines.

Therefore, he argues that protracted and intense conflicts should be managed in a different way.88 In

the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, during the AI-Aqsa or second intifada, a total of 603 Israelis

43
 89
were killed, compared to 1,596 Palestinians, between 2000 and 2002. These numbers reflect the

disproportionality of power between the two sides.

The final characteristic of a dispute that Kleiboer suggests to have an impact on the mediation

outcomes is the nature of the issue. There are many distinctions between issues that can take place

within a conflict. For example, sovereignty issues, security issues, etc. However, experts define the

90
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a dispute that arises from deep-rooted values and with a zero-sum

91
outcome, with no room for assisted negotiations. Moreover, Fisher and Rubin argue that even when a

conflict seems to have a zero-sum gain; it is possible to fractionate the issue into negotiable subunits

92
and to try to trade those off against one another. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, another element

that past American leaders have failed to take into account is the importance for mediation to take

place not only among the adversary parties, but also among factions within the parties themselves. If

the Obama administration wants to win only over Natanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas's side, he will not

succeed as a mediator. He does not only need to convince the Prime Minister of Israel and the

President of the Palestinian National Authority, but the cabinet, the political opposition, the local people

of the region, and the press. The situation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is based on the presence of

different constituencies that makes it harder for the representatives in the region to engage in any

meaningful form of conflict settlement, because it is difficult to make concessions without losing vis-a­

93
vis any of their constituencies.

Our final and most relevant characteristic to explain mediation success and therefore analyze

Bush's and Obama's approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the characteristics of the

mediator. It has been usually identified three attributes that a mediator has to have in order to become

94
accepted by the disputant parties: impartiality, leverage, and status.

44
 Impartiality has become one of the most controversial issues when referring to the Israeli­

Palestinian conflict. In our study, we are going to combine two of the theories debated about the

impartiality of the mediator to find the most suited attribute for a mediator to succeed in the Israeli­

Palestinian conflict. According to the traditional thesis, impartiality is a critical quality for successful

mediation. It helps gain the disputants' confidence, which leads to the acceptability of the mediator and

ultimately mediation success takes place. However, we are also going to argue that impartiality is not

the only element to rely on when addressing the conflict. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it

is hard for the United States to position itself in an impartial position. The United States has established

strong ties with the state of Israel since its formation, yet one of the ways American leaders can make a

difference when addressing the conflict is by reducing the mediator's bias toward one of the parties.

Some efforts by President Obama are apparent through some of the remarks in his Cairo speech where

he put the United States in a neutral position instead of a pro-Israel position as seen in past

administrations. Another component that can be important when addressing the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict is that the mediator becomes an "insider-partial" instead of an "outsider neutral." In other

words, the mediator success in the conflict depends not only upon his objectivity regarding the issue but

his connectedness and trusted relationship with the conflict parties.

The Obama's administration approach to the conflict should be based on a direct and face-to­

face relationship with the leaders of the parties to promote engagement and allow political, economic,

and social exchange. In the Bush administration, on the other hand, there were a low percentage of

meetings with Israeli and Palestinian leaders during his first term (refer to Table 1). Bush took a distant,

pro-Israeli position since the beginning of his administration. He also used the opportunity of Arafat's

decision to walk away from the negotiation table to consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not ripe

enough for resolution. After Vasser Arafat death in November 10, 2004, when an opportunity emerged

not only to stop violence in the region but also to bring the two sides back to the negotiation table, the

45
Bush administration remained on the sidelines, supportive of Israel's disengagement policy, with little

effort to resolve the on-the-ground problems, and disinclined to talk about the core issues associated in

95
reaching a final status.

The last two factors that some analysts refer to when determining mediator success are

leverage and status. Leverage has been difficult to define, but as an overall idea is the mediator ability

to put pressure on one or both of the conflicting parties to accept a proposed settlement. 96 In order to

apply pressure the mediator needs to have power and influence resources. These resources can come

in many forms. We can distinguish between negative sanctions (sticks) or positive sanctions (carrots).

We have recently seen some efforts from the Obama administration to put pressure, on the Israeli side

to stop settlement activity, being one of the main issues preventing the Palestinians to sit down in the

negotiation table to resume talks. Obama has been characterized since the beginning of his

administration to be a leader of dialogue, integrity, and respect when addressing to the international

community. However, his "good manners" seem not to work when addressing the prime minister of

Israel, Netanyahu.

Throughout this year, Obama has been trying to convince Israel to stop settlement activity in

order to re-launch Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Nevertheless, the Israeli Prime Minister has ignored

Obama's demands by continuing the construction activity. According to the article "Israel Brushes off

Obama Criticism over Jerusalem," Israel broke ground on a new housing complex for Jews in east

Jerusalem just a day after Israel defied American, European and Palestinian demands to stop settlement

activity by announcing it will press forward with construction of 900 apartments in another Jewish area

97
in east Jerusalem. Obama has criticized the plan for putting peace negotiations between Israelis and

Palestinians in jeopardy. Obama's leverage towards this situation during the next months is going to be

critical for America's foreign policy in the region. In a speech by Tony Blair, official envoy of the Quartet

on the Middle East, said that Obama's commitment in this conflict since the first day of his

46
administration will lead to find a way to re-launch talks between these two communities. He also

remarked that the main issues that have to be addressed in order for the Jews and the Arabs to move

forward with the negotiations are: Israel's security and protection, and on the other hand, to

demonstrate to the Palestinians that if they sat down at the table it would lead genuinely to a two-state

solution. Obama has a high status, being one of the most powerful world leaders today. He also has a

good reputation in the international community and he has got in his team George Mitchell, who is a

greatly respected expert on the Middle East. The question is whether or not Obama will have to take his

power as the American leader one step further in order to persuade the Israelis and Palestinians to

make concessions and lead the two disputant parties to make agreements.

Palestinians
Surrounded
2006

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Map Ill: Palestinians Surrounded (settlements), 2006

47
4.4.3. The Obama Administration Engagement in the Middle East

President's Obama election victory has brought hopes to bring about progress in the Israeli­

Palestinian conflict and, ultimately, a two state solution. Unlike other past presidents, Obama has

acknowledged the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict early in his administration, instead of

waiting until his last years of office. Success in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict area is heavily linked to

the president's engagement in the area and the capability of keeping dialogue and commitment going

without discontinuity. When comparing the Bush administration's special envoys, the secretaries of

state, and the president himself, we see a significant difference in comparison to the numbers of

meetings of the Obama administration's appointees in the Middle East, George Mitchell, and President

Obama we can see a significant difference in the numbers.98 On Obama's first day in office, January 21,

one of his first actions on foreign policy was to call Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, former Israeli

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Jordanian King Abdullah II and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud

Abbas in order to initiate talks and engagement towards Arab-Israeli peace from the beginning of his

presidency. He also pledged to help consolidate the lsrael-Hamas ceasefire following the fighting in

Gaza. The next day the Obama administration appointed former U.S. Senator George Mitchell as special

envoy for Middle East peace, with the task of reviving efforts towards a two-state solution, a broader

Arab-Israeli peace and developing a program to address the situation in Gaza. On January 26, in his first

televised interview since taking office, Obama spoke to the Muslim world on the Arab satellite television

network, Al Arabiya. 99 Other elements that support the idea of successful diplomacy in the Israeli­

Palestinian conflict can be illustrated by the engagement and commitment that the Obama

administration has had in speeches with the leaders on this region and the Arab world, White House

meetings, and the trips made by the president, the Secretary of State, and the Special Envoy to the

region.

48
 Obama has been making key speeches to reach the Arab world and at the same time

concentrate on fundamental elements for Middle East peace and stability. In April, he spoke before the

Turkish Parliament in Ankara, addressing a majority Muslim country for the first time. In June, he gave a

speech in Cairo, in which he identified steps that Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab world must take to

0
achieve peace. 10 One essential difference between the approaches used by the Obama administration

versus the Bush administration is Obama's call for involvement of more nations in resolving the Israeli­

Palestinian conflict.

The White House meetings hosted by President Obama have been also very significant as an act

of commitment to progress in this conflict. A remarkable occasion took place on April 21, when King

Abdullah of Jordan became the first Arab leader to visit Obama at the White House. The result of the

meeting didn't carry any concrete outcomes, but overall both leaders acknowledged the importance of

American and the Arab nation cooperation for the peace process. Obama also held his first White

House meeting with Netanyahu on May 18, following a meeting with Israeli President Shimon Peres

earlier in the month. During that same month, Obama also had a meeting with President Abbas.

Another significant incident was President Hosni Mubarak meeting with Obama in the White House on

August 18, being his first trip to Washington D.C. after more than five years. One of the points of the

meeting was a discussion on Egypt's role as a partner in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Other meetings

reflecting Obama's active engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace have been Obama's encounter with the

Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. Although talks had no positive outcome, they

provided a discussion of the countries' political, economic and security relationship, as well as Arab­

Israeli peace and nuclear cooperation. In this conflict, even when meetings produce no positive

outcome, it reminds the Arab leaders that America is engaged in the Middle East problems with a

foreign policy agenda to work on. In September 22, Obama also held a trilateral joint meeting in New

49
York with Abbas and Netanyahu in order to relaunch new negotiations between the two leaders

101
regarding the current situation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Other positive signs of commitment in this conflict have been Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

and Special Envoy George Mitchell multiple trips to the region. Clinton's first appearance to the Middle

East as secretary of state was in early March. She announced a U.S. pledge of more than $900 million to

the Palestinians at the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Economy for the

Reconstruction of Gaza in Egypt. She also traveled to Israel, Turkey and the Palestinian territories during

her trip. Furthermore, Clinton accompanied President Obama on his trip to Egypt in June 4. Hillary

Clinton has also visited Israel on November 2, although this raised many criticisms among the

Palestinians for her suggestion that full freeze of Israeli settlements should not be a pre-condition for

the negotiations of peace talks between the two communities. Clinton's engagement in the Middle East

as a Secretary of State during these first months has been very dynamic. In such a short period of time

she has met with foreign ministers, leaders and other senior officials from Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

102
Emirates. Mitchell has also been engaged in multiple trips to the Jewish-Arab region. His first trip to

Israel was in January 27 with the main purpose of exploring the complexities of the situation between

Israelis and Palestinians. Mitchell made a second appearance to the area in late February, where,

among other stops, he joined Clinton at the Gaza reconstruction conference in Egypt. Mitchell began a

new round of diplomacy in the Middle East on April 15, 2009. One of the main objectives of the tour

was to bridge the growing division between the right-wing Israeli government and the Palestinian

authority. In July, he met with Barak in London, following their June meeting in New York. He also held a

meeting in London with Netanyahu in August. Mitchell's main efforts during all these trips to the region

have been the dispute over the West Bank settlements, a crucial issue to advance Israeli-Palestinian

negotiations for peace. Finally, Netanyahu agreed on a halt of settlements for ten months.

50
 In contrast to the steps made by the Obama administration, Bush's first visit as a president to

Israel and Palestine took place in January 9, 2008 seven years after being in office. Even though the two

secretaries of state during the Bush administration made more than one trip to the region, the

frequency of their trips was relatively low compared to the times Hillary Clinton and George Mitchell

have engaged in talks with an Israeli or Palestinian leader in the first ten months of Obama's

administration.

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell made two trips to the region during the first year of the

Bush II administration in 2001. In 2002, he met Israeli and Palestinian leaders, officials, and

representatives only one time during the month of April. In the following year, Powell made two more

trips in the area during the months of June and May to meet again with their leaders. In his last year as

secretary of state, 2004, Powell traveled one more time to Jerusalem and Jericho in November to attend

the APEC Summit meeting, meet with Prime Minister Sharon and foreign Minister Shalom. He also met

with Prime Minister Qureia, acting President Fattough, and former Prime Minister Abbas. We can see a

clear low frequency of trips made to the Israel or Palestine during the first term of the Bush

administration.

Considering that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the top conflicts in every

American foreign policy agenda, the first four years of the Bush administration saw little engagement

and commitment for Arab Israeli peace. Things took a slightly different direction during Bush's second

term in office. As we can see in Table 1, the frequency with which the new assigned secretary of state,

Condoleezza Rice, traveled to the region increased from the previous administration. Rice met with

Israeli and Palestinian leaders an average of four times per year from 2005 to 2008. During 2005, Rice

met two times with Minister Sharon, three times with Prime Minister Abbas, and attended the Saban

Forum meeting and memorial service for the late Prime Minister Rabin. In 2006, she visited the region

three times where she met with the newly elected Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livini,

51
and Prime Minister Abbas. It was during 2007 that Condoleezza Rice's trips in the regions were

intensified. She traveled multiple times to Jerusalem and Ramallah mainly to discuss the proposed

Middle East peace conference with Prime Minister Olmert, Foreign Minister Livni, and President Abbas.

During the last year of the Bush administration, Rice accompanied President Bush to Ramallah to meet

with President Abbas and visited the Church of the Nativity. We have to remark that this was

President's Bush first trip to Jerusalem and Ramallah since being elected President in 2001. Condoleezza

Rice also met with Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni to discuss the Gaza crisis.

Despite the intensification of trips during the second term of the Bush administration, and Bush's nine-

day tour to the Middle East, critics argue that Bush's renewed interest and diplomacy in the Middle East

and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was based on empty words and with no specific political initiatives or

to address a new vision to overreach a solution. After Bush's Middle East tour in 2008 journalists

writing in Gulf News expressed the Arab sentiment of Bush's visit and Bush's foreign policy towards the

conflict during those eight years. Francis Matthew, the United Arab Emirates-based daily wrote:

"despite his renewed interest in the Middle East, Bush failed to introduce any new vision or overarching

mission, and he spoke in generalities which ignored the Middle East's need for specific solutions."

Osama al-Sharif, a Jordanian-based journalist also writing in Gulf News, commented:

"If anything the presidential visit to the beleaguered Holy Land underlined the
feebleness of US influence on the outcome of the negotiations. The so-called honest
broker looked bemused, sometimes indifferent to the realities that millions of people on both
side of the divide now face as a result of an entangled conflict. The American president,
making his first - and most likely his last - visit to the Palestinian territories failed to deliver
one thing that the people of this region need most: hope."
103

In other words, despite a call for justice, freedom, and the importance of introducing democratic

reforms across the regions, there was no specific direction to start working on a plan that would address

the problems of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and initiate a process for a peace solution.

This overview of the American engagement in dialogue with the Israeli-Palestinian leaders

during the Bush administration shows that efforts for an Arab-Jewish peace were limited considering the

52
magnitude of the conflict and considering previous American efforts towards a final status solution. On

the other hand, we are in a very delicate position to make quick assumptions of the shape that Oba ma's

foreign policy and diplomacy will undertake during the Obama's years. Because Obama and his team

have been in office for slightly more than one year, it is very hard to compare eight years of Bush's

presidency with one year of Obama's presidency.

The following table provides the statistics of the Bush and Obama administration's engagement

in Israel and Palestine from 2001 to 2009. This table attempts to reflect the annual percentage of trips

that secretaries of state or special envoys have made to Israel and to Palestine in order to meet with one

of the leaders and discuss issues that relate to the peace process of these two communities.

53
5. Table 1: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE OF TRIPS MADE BY A SECRETARY OF STATE OR SPECIAL ENVOY
FROM THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION IN 2001 TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION IN 2009
Bush Administration, 2001-2005
Former Secretary of State, Powel I

Tel Aviv and Met with Prime Minister-elect

February 24-25, 2001 Israel
Jerusalem Sharon and senior Israeli officials

February 25, 2001 Palestinian Authority Ramallah Met with Chairman Arafat.

Met with Prime Minister Sharon

June 27-28, 2001 Israel Jerusalem
and Foreign Minister Peres.

June 28, 2001 Palestinian Authority Ramallah Met with Chairman Arafat

Percentage of Trips 7.14%

Percentage of Meetings with an

6.45%
Israeli Leader
Percentage of Meetings with a
8.70%
Palestinian Authority
Met with Prime Minister Sharon,
Tel Aviv, Jerusalem,
April 12-15, 2002 Israel Foreign Minister Peres, and senior
Safed
Israeli officiaIs.
Apri I 14, 2002 Palestinian Authority Ramallah

Continued meetings with Israeli

16-17-Apr-02 Israel Jerusalem officia Is and Palestinian
representatives.

April 17, 2002 Palestinian Authority Ramallah Met with Chairman Arafat

Percentage of Trips 3.57%

Percentage of Meetings with an
6.45%
Israeli Leader
Percentage of Meetings with a
8.70%
Palestinian Authority

54
 Met with Prime Minister Sharon
and senior Israeli officials;
May 10-12, 2003 Israel Jerusalem
attended a Quartet working group
meeting

May 11, 2003 Palestinian Authority Jericho Met with Prime Minister Abbas

Met with Prime Minister Sharon

June 20, 2003 Israel Jerus a Iem
and senior Israeli officials.

Met with Prime Minister Abbas

June 20, 2003 Pa I estin i an Authority Jericho
and senior Pa Ies tin ian offic ia Is.

Percentage of Trips 7.14%

Percentage of Meetings with an

6.45%
Israeli Leader

Percentage of Meetings with a

8.70%
Palestinian Authority

Attended APEC Summit meeting.

November 21-22, 2004 Israel Jerusalem Met with Prime Minister Sharon
and Foreign Minister Shalom

Met with Prime Minister Qureia,

November 22, 2004 Palestinian Authority Jericho acting President Fattouh, and
former Prime Minister Abbas.

Percentage of Trips 3.57%

Percentage of Meetings with an

3.23%
Israeli Leader

Percentage of Meetings with a

4.35%
Palestinian Authority
Average of Trips during Bush's First
1.5
term
Average of Meetings with an Israeli
1.75
Leader (2001-2004)
Average of Meetings with a
1.75
Palestinian Authority (2001-2004)

55
 Bush Administration, 2005-2008
Former Secretarv of State, Conndolezza Rice

Met with Prime Minister Sharon and

February 6-7, 2005 lsrael Jerusalem
Foreign Minister Shalom.
Pa I estini an
February 7, 2005 Ramallah Met withPrime Minister Abbas.
Authority
Palestinian
June 18, 2005 Ramallah Met withPrime Minister Abbas.
Authoritv
Met withPrime Minister Sharon and
July 21-23, 2005 Israel Jerusalem
senior Israeli officials.

Palestinian Met withPrime Minister Abbas and

July 23, 2005 Ramallah
Authority Palestinian officials.

Attended the Saban Forum meeting and

a memorial service for the latePrime
November 13-15, 2005 Israel Jerusalem Minister Rabin; took part in negotiating
a border crossing agreement with the
Palestinian Authority

An nu al percentage of Trips 14.29%

Annual percentage meetings with

9.68%
an Israeli leader

Annual percentage of meetings

13.04%
with a Palestinian authority
Met withPrime Minister Olmert and
July 24-25, 22006 Israel Jerusalem
Foreign Minister Livni.
Palestinian
July 25, 2006 Ramallah Met with President Abbas.
Authority

July 29-31, 2006 Israel Jerusalem Met with senior Israeli officials.

Met withPrime Minister Olmert and

October 4-5, 2006 lsrael Jerusalem
Foreign Minister Livni.
Palestinian
October 4, 2006 Ramal I ah Met withPresident Abbas.
Authoritv
Met with Prime Minister 01 mert and
November 30, 2006 Israel Jerusalem
Foreign Minister Livni.
Annual Percentage of Trips 10.71%

Annual Percentage of Meetings

12.90%
with an Israeli Leader

56
 Met with Foreign Minister Livni and
January 13-14, 2007 Israel Jerusalem
Defense Minister Peretz.
Palestinian
January 14, 2007 Ramallah Met with President Abbas.
Authority
January 14-15, 2007 Israel Jerusalem Met with Prime Minister Olmert

Met with Prime Minister Olmert and

Foreign Minister Livni. Met with Prime
February 17-20, 2007 Israel Jerusalem
Minister Olmert and Palestinian
President Abbas on February 19.

Pa I esti nia n
February 18, 2007 Ramallah Met with President Abbas.
Authoritv
Met with Prime Minister Olmert and
March 25-2 7, 2007 Israel Jerusalem
Foreign Minister Livni.
Palestinian
March 25, 2007 Ramallah Met with President Abbas.
Authoritv
August 1-2, 2007 Met with President Peres and Foreign
Israel Jerusalem
Minister Livni.
Palestinian
August 2, 2007 Ramallah Met with President Abbas.
Authoritv
Met with President Peres, Prime
September 19-20, 2007 lsrael Jerusalem Minister Olmert, and Foreign Minister
Livni.
Discussed prospects for an Israel-
Palestinian
September 20, 2007 Ramallah Palestinian peace conference with
Authority
President Abbas.
October 17-18, 2007 Israel Jerusalem Met with Foreign Minister Livni.

Discussed proposed Middle East peace

Tel Aviv, conference with Prime Minister Olmert
November 3-5, 2007 lsrael
Jerusalem and Foreign Minister Livni. Addressed
the Saban Forum.

Palestinian Discussed proposed Middle East peace

November 5, 2007 Ramallah
Authority conference with President Abbas

Annual percentage of Trips 25%

Annual Percentage of Meetings
25.81 %
with an Israeli Leader
Annual Percentage of Meetings
26.09%
with a Palestinian authoritv
Tel Aviv,
January 9-11, 2008 lsrael Accompanied President Bush.
Jerusalem
Palestinian
January 10, 2008 Ramallah Accompanied President Bush.
Authority

Annual Percentage of Trips 7.14%

Annual Percenatge of Meetings

6.45%
with an Israeli Leader

Annua I Percentage of Meetings

8.70%
with a Palestinian Authority

Average of Trips during Bush's

4
Second term
Average of Meetings with an Israeli
4.25
Leader (2005-20081
Average of Meetings with a
3.25
Pa I esti nia n Authoritv (2005-2008 l

57
 Obama Administration durin11: his First Year
Secretarv of State, Hillaiv Clinton Soecial Envov. Georne Mitchell

Jerusalem 3/2-
Israel January 28, 2009 Israel Jersusalem Met with Israeli Prime Minister
4/09
Palestinian Met with Palestinian President
Israel and Palestine October 28, 2009 January 29, 2009 Ramallah
Authority Mahmoud Abbas

Israel November 2, 2009 July 28, 2009 Israel Jerusalem Prime Minister Natanyahu

September 14, 2009 Israel Jerusalem President Peres

September 15, 2009 Israel Jerusalem Prime Minister Natanyahu

Meet Palestinian Negotiator Saeb
September 16, 2009 Palestine Rama II ah
Erekat

Percentage of Trips 21.43%

Percentage of Meetings with an Israeli

22.58%
Leader

Percentage of Meetings with a

13.04%
Palestinian Authority

Percentage of Trips to Israel and Palestine (2001-2009)

25%

21.43%

14.29%
.., ,.. .... "'

,. n
7.L4%
3.57%

2001
0 J.i
2002 2003 2004 .......... 2006
2007
2008
2009
6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2010)

Interesting events have been taking place during Obama's second year. Early in the year, some

steps have been taken by the Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad to address in a constructive

manner the end of Israel's occupation and settlements of the West Bank and the creation of a

Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. We can see reflected Fayyad's desire to resume peace talks as well

as to create a Palestinian state in the following statement: "Israelis have a long history. Pain. Ambitions.

Like you, we have our own history of pain and suffering, and we have our own ambition -- to live

104
alongside you in peace and security" Palestinians are reluctant to accept Israelis pre-conditions and

resume talks in the negotiation table considering Israel's intransigent position on the settlements issue

in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The U.S. has been trying to engage in diplomatic relations with

Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu about re-starting peace negotiations with the Palestinians,

but Netanyahu has been showing no desire for stopping settlements in East Jerusalem. Tensions

reached its peak during Vice President Joseph R. Biden visit to Israel, when an Israeli government

ministry announced the construction of 1,600 housing units in the ultra-orthodox neighborhood of

5
Ramat Shlomo. 10 Netanyahu met with Obama in Washington March 24, 2010 to improve U.S. -Israel

relations after months of tension and disagreement in the issue of settlements. Nevertheless, the result

of the meeting seemed to remark Netanyahu's unwillingness to make any step for the halt of

settlements. Moments before Obama and Israeli Prime Minister met, word leaked out in Jerusalem that

106
another 20 new apartments had been approved for Jews in an Arab neighborhood of East Jerusalem.

Prime Minister Netanyahu also put an exclamation mark on his settlement views during his visit in

Washington, telling the pro-Israel American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC} that "Jerusalem is

107
not a settlement. It's our capital."

59
 After following the events that have been taking place during the first months of Obama's

second year it seems that Netanyahu is choosing the building of settlements over the peace process.

State Department spokesman Philip Crowley defined the steps that the United States will have to

undertake next as a "series of pass-fail tests that will determine if the effort succeeds." Crowley

followed as: Our immediate pass-fail test is whether or not we can get the parties into direct

negotiations. Then, pass-fail test No. 2 is whether or not we get to an agreement that is in the Israeli

interest and the Palestinian interest and the interest of the rest of the region and clearly in the interest

108
of the United States. As Mr. Crowley argued, the U.S. can keep playing the role of third party in the

negotiations, yet, the problem remains that the U.S. cannot determine the outcomes of these "series of

pass-fail tests." This is ultimately about what the parties themselves are willing to do.

7. CONCLUSION

After reviewing Obama's first year in the presidency, we realize that his efforts for promoting an

Israeli-Palestinian peace have been obstructed by the intransigency of the leaders of the two disputing

parties. President Obama said in The Guardian "I think the Israelis and Palestinians have found that the

political environment, the nature of their coalitions, or the divisions within their societies were such that

109
it was very hard for them to start engaging in a meaningful conversation." The outcomes of Obama's

first year have raised some questions whether or not Obama should continue his engagement to resume

negotiations between these two societies. As we have been demonstrating throughout the paper, one

of the key ways to ensure a future peace resolution between Israel and Palestine is America's active role

and engagement in the area. Nevertheless, after ending an unsuccessful first year in his Middle East

diplomacy, it is time for President Obama and his administration to take a tougher tone with Israel.

Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu keeps reaffirming his unwillingness to freeze settlements,

which makes it very difficult to restart negotiations with Mahmoud Abbas. Early in this year, Special

60
Envoy George Mitchell and Vice President Joseph R. Biden have visited Israel to meet Prime Minister

Netanyahu to discuss ways to move forward a peace process. But again, the outcomes of those visits

have been unsuccessful due to Netanyahu's indisposition to stop settlement construction. Netanyahu

keeps building in East Jerusalem, which leads to Palestinian officials not wanting to meet at the

0
negotiations table. They continue to insist on a total freeze before resuming talks. 11

Obama also mentioned in an interview with the Washington Times that internal conflicts have

made it hard for the Israelis and Palestinians to restart talks, and that we overestimated America's

ability to persuade them to do so when their politics ran contrary to that. 111 The leaders from the two

parties have been very intractable when it has come in terms of finding a common ground to put end to

the conflict. Neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel nor the Palestinian president,

Mahmoud Abbas, seems to be engaged on a peace process right now.

The Obama administration needs to re-address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a new

strategy that can produce a better outcome for the end of the 2010 year. Some of the potential issues

to reconsider are: applying some more pressure to the side of Israel even if that implies some risk of

failure; revise the strategies that have been employed to address the Hamas since the economic warfare

policy invoked by Israel, the Quartet powers (the European Union, the United States, Russia and the

United Nations ), and Egypt. This policy failed to remove the Hamas regime while punishing 1.4 million

Gazans, impoverishing the moderate middle class, and empowering and enriching lslamist smugglers. 112

In order for the Obama administration to succeed, Obama has to position the United States as a

strong nation committed to the principles of his leadership and to engage with the international

community. The Obama administration has to maintain the principles of America's foreign policy based

on a new era of commitment, engagement, mutual interests, and mutual respect.

61
 Despite all the mediation efforts made by America, the European Union or the Arab nations, it is

up to the leaders of Israel and Palestine to stop positioning themselves with fixed requirements to move

on in the talks, and realize that they need to find some kind of common ground or interest between

them so peace talks and negotiations can be re-launched between the two communities. It is too early

to talk about the Obama's administration success or failure in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ideally, this

paper will have a second volume at the end of Obama's first term where it will be able to fully analyze

the outcomes of Obama's foreign policy in the Middle East. By having looked at Obama's first 12

months in the administration, we can conclude that despite his inability to improve the situation

between the Jews and the Arabs he has set a new tone and a new style in America's foreign policy.

Obama has tried to address the conflict using smart power based on many diplomatic encounters during

his first year, however, Obama's diplomatic efforts have not been successful enough. Now, Obama is

switching to a tougher policy toward Israel because he sees the issues relating Jewish housing in East

Bank and east Jerusalem linked to the security of American soldiers who are fighting against lslamists

insurgencies. 113 Hopefully, one day, those talks will be translated to a final resolution that will allow

Jews and Arabs to live in peace in the same land.

A final peace agreement can only be made by the parties of the conflict. In order for diplomacy

to succeed in this conflict, the parties need to start looking at their interests instead of articulating their

respective positions. American diplomatic efforts to facilitate a peace agreement must involve deep and

consistent engagement.

62
 1
ISRAEL S WALL AND SETTLEMENTS (COLONIES)
FEBRUARY 2007
•·• _.... e , -) 2'0C1

__
h.J. �...
i,... --- �� ISRAEL
: eh<u,,,, 101(
\\6. b�!:!,y
,,,
rt'"'\:fi�.
, .... �Q;Qr.,;::l'ffll('.t'l!r;t
ISRAEU-OCCUPIED _.
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□....,,.
St::�t<I!'! "b�lt��--.-• {,1 .:-•,. WEST3ANK ... ·,...,
-ut-3"
•
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Palestinian Land Restricted

...
bylsraeH Sett! mmts and the Wall

�t·
\'\�st Be� arN1
� ,..,� ot -,. .,__ ..
..... ....
-<>1...--,.,,
.,.-:..-- Va,..-,

Ara.a• tr.rna.1:ninf
for f'al0$1in1Ml

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Directly Affec1$d by tt\e Wal!

c>.,i,.c n a<>< "?<!' •�

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•'-0'...,ft\&IN •> -..� ... d.....,,.,,.,..,_,.,,,

Map IV

63
8. ENDNOTES

1
Humayun Ansari and David Cesarani, "Muslim-Jewish Dialogue in a 21st Cebtury World." Humanities Research
Council. Paper held at Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, 22-23 Apr. 2006.
2
Humayun Ansari and David Cesarani, "Muslim-Jewish Dialogue in a 21st Cebtury World."
3
Benyamin Neuberger, Zionism, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999).
4
"The British Mandate Period 1920-1948." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
<http://www.wrmea.com/jews_forjustice/mandate.html>.
5
"Truman and U.S. Support for Israel," Middle East: MidEastWeb, 27 Aug. 2009, 15 Dec.
6
Ibid.
7
Richard Holbrooke, President Truman's Decision to Recognize Israel, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. 1 May
2008, 13 Dec. 2009.
( http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp ?DBI D=l&LNGID=l&TMI D=lll&FID=376&PI 0=1851&110=22
03)
8
Steven W. Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II ( Washington, D.C.: CO, Print,
2010), 35.
9
"Truman and U.S. Support for Israel," Middle East: MidEast, 27 Aug. 2009, 15 Dec. 2009.
10
Robert J. Donovan, "Conflict and Crisis, The Presidency of Harry S Truman 1945-1948," Truman Library.
11"The 1948 Recognition of Israel," Alternative Insight-Foreign Policy and Politics, 3 Sept. 2009, 15 Dec. 2009.
12
Ibid.
13 Henry Cattan, The Palestine question. Routledge, 1988. 25 Aug. 2009.
14
"Israel: The Economics of Peace," Thomas White Global Investing (http://www.thomaswhite.com/explore-the­
world/israel.aspx).

16
Steven J. Bra ms and Jeffrey M. Togman, Camp David: Was the agreement fair? In Paul F. Diehl (Ed.), A Road Map
to War. Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict. (p. 243) Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press
Young, Tim. Developments in the Middle East Peace Process 1991-2000 London: International Affairs and Defense
Section, (House of Commons Library) 12.
17
"U.S. Department of State," Background Note: Jordan, (Washington, D.C)
18
Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land. (New York: Bantam Books, 2008), 134.
19
Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Israel: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988.
20
Ritchie Ovendale, Origins of the Arab-Israeli wars. (London: Longman, 1992), 220.
21
Metz, Israel: A Country Study.
Ovendale, Origins of the Arab-Israeli wars, 226.
22
23
Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid. (New York: Simon & Achuster, 2006), 37.
24
Ovendale, Origins of the Arab-Israeli wars, 225.
25
Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, 44.
26
Oven dale, Origins of the Arab-Israeli wars, 229.
27
Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, 229.
28
"The Oslo Declaration of Principles," Middle East: Mid East. 11 Sep. 1993, 15 Dec. 2009
(http://www. mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm).
29
Nathan J. Brown, "Palestine and Israel: Time for Plan B." POLICY BRIEF 78 (2009).
Http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/palestine_israeJ_planB.pdf. Carnegie: Endowment for International
Peace, Feb. 2009. Web. 27 Sept. 2009.
30
Zalman Shoval and Aaron David Miller, "Assesing the Annapolis Process" The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy," 7 May 2008, 12 Aug. 2009. < http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/000207S/f_0002075_1117.pdf>.
31
Aaron D. Miller, The Much Too Promised Land (New York: Bantam Books, 2009), 372.
32
Shoval and Miller, "Assesing the Annapolis Process" The Washington Institute for Near East Policy," 7 May 2008.
33
Jim Zanotti, "Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution," Congressional Research Service, 8
Jan. 2010. 25 Jan. 2010. < http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/137186.pdf>.

64
34
Paul Scham, "The Two-State Solution: Old Standby, Perhaps, but Imperative." The Palestine-Israel Journal,"2
Nov. 2008, 5 Aug. 2009.
(http://dev.pij. org/jcms/in dex.php?option=com_authors&task=author&content_type=ath&id=73 &Itemid=64).
35
David C. Unger, "The Inevitable Two-State Solution,"World Policy Institute, Summer 2002, 4 Aug. 2009
{http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/wopj.2008.25.3.59).
36
Steven Klein, "When and how will Israel end Gaza operation?" Haaretz, 1 Feb. 2009, 5 May 2010
(http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1052060.htm I).
37
Ahmed Mohamed, "Polls Show Vast Support for Two-State Mideast Peace Solution," America.gov,
(http://www.america. gov/st/mena-english/2009/July/200907021105032SAdema hoMO.6612164. htmI).
38
Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman, The George W. Bush Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects {Washington,
D.C: CQ Press), 191.
39
P. Edward Haley, Strategies of Dominance {Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2006), 135.
40
"The White House," The National Security Council available from
http://www. whitehouse.gov/ administration/eop/ nsc/nsa/
41
P. Edward Haley, Strategies of Dominance, 46.
42
lvo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound {Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 45.
43
David Bernell , Readings in American Foreign Policy, New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 389.
44
"The Taba Proposals and the Refugee Problem," Middle East: MidEastWeb
< http://www.mideastweb.org/taba.htm>.
45
Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace not Apartheid {New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 155
46
Ibid., 155
47
Rabbani, Mou in, and Chris Toensing. "The Continuity of Obama's Change." Middle East Report {2009). 27 Jan.
2009.
48
Ed Moloney, "His wasn't the Central Role in the Northern Ireland peace deal," The Jerusalem Post, Apr. 2009, 15
Dec. 2009. {http://www.jpost.com/Home/Article.aspx?id=131748).
49
Ibid.
5
° Carol Migdalovitz, United States. The Middle East Peace Talks. Cong. Doc. 1891137. Library of Congress.
51
Stewart Patrick, Global Governance Reform: An American View of US Leadership. The Stanley Foundation,
Feb.2010. ( http://www.sta nleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/PatrickPAB210.pdf).
52
Steven W Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War JI {Washington: CQ Press, 2009), 361.
53
Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power {New York: Oxford, 2002), 9.
54
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Nomination Hearing To Be Se_cretary of State, U.S. Department of State, 13 Jan. 2009, 15
Oct. 2009.

55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Daniel Wehrenfennig, "Beyond Diplomacy: Conflict Management in the Network Society" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania
Convention Center (Philadelphia, 31 Aug. 2006), 2.
58
Timothy D. Sisk, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities, Kroc Institute . 2 Mar. 2002,
13 Jan. 2010.
59
Track I diplomacy is a term that refers to official governmental diplomacy,which is essentially a process whereby
communications from one government go directly to the decision-making apparatus of another. On the other
hand, Track II diplomacy refers to people who become involved "in the middle" of a conflict. They are not
disputants, but rather people who try to work with the disputants to resolve the conflict or transform it to make it
less destructive. Sometimes these intermediaries are official or "formal" intermediaries: professional mediators,
arbitrators, judges, or other official actors. But often they are informal, or unofficial people who work outside
official negotiation or mediation. Diana Chigas, "Track II {Citizen) Diplomacy." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy

65
Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, Aug. 2003.
(http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2 diplomacy/).
60
Diana Chigas, "Negotiating Intractable Conflicts," in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable
Conflict, 123-158 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005): 128
61
Olga Botcharova, Implementation of Track Two Diplomacy. Forgivness and Reconciliation. Templeton Foundation
(Philadelphia & London, 2002), 279-303.
62
Ibid., 286
63
Peter Coleman, "Intractable Conflict," in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, eds. Morton
Deutsch and Peter Coleman, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 2000), 428.
64 Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. & Aall, P. Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 7.
65
Kreisberg, L. Nature, dynamics, and phases of intractability. In Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. 0. & Aall, P. (Eds.),
Grasping the nettle: Analyzing cases of intractable conflict, United States Institute of Peace Press ( Washington,
D.C., 2005).
66
A secret unofficial channel began operating between Israelis and the PLO, under the auspices of Norway.The
unofficial talks continued throughout early 1993 and culminated in the initialling of a joint Declaration of Principles:
(DOP) on August 19, 1993. Then, after having formally recognized each other in mutual letters, Israel, represented
by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO, represented by Yassir Arafat, signed an agreement in Washington on
September 13, 1993.
67
Jimmy Carter, We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land, 49.
68 Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution (New York: Syracus University Press, 1997), 112-117, 194-208.
69
James Voorhees, Dialogue Sustained: The multilevel peace process and the Dartmouth conference (Washington:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002).

70
In December 2000, talks were held with Israeli and Palestinian teams in Washington hosted by President Clinton
who presented a bridging proposal to the parties aimed at ending the al Aqsa intifada. That proposal was taken up
at marathon talks between Israeli and Palestinian delegations at the Egyptian resort ofTaba between January 22
and January 28, 2001.The Clinton administration had already left office and the Bush team was not yet engaged.
This was also the end of the peace process during the Barak government, and effectively the end of the entire Oslo
peace process that started in Madrid in 1991.The Barak government continued to offer concessions to the
Palestinians, but neither the Israeli public nor the Knesset supported these positions. Ariel Sharon's landslide
victory was only days away on February 6, 2001 ("Israel 1991 to Present Taba Conference," Palestine Facts,
(http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_alaqsa_taba.php)).

71 Representatives from the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia formed a group known as the "The
Quartet," which began to shape international policy toward resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
Quartet issued the statement below regarding a road map for peace on September 17, 2002. The program is an
outline that is evolving over time. Palestinians and Israelis have greeted each version with various reservations.
At present writing (November) fighting continues, and there is no real evidence of implementation of any part of
the plan. In October, President Bush issued his version of a more detailed roadmap, based on Israeli and
Palestinian input. Another version was issued in December, 2002 and a third one was leaked unofficially in April,
2003. ("Quartet Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian Peace," Middle East: MidEastWeb, 17 Sep. 2002
(http://www.mideastweb.org/quartetrml.htm)).

72 Stephen Zunes, The Failure of Annapolis. (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, 3 Dec. 2007).
73
"Bush Peace Plan Met with Scepticism." Global Policy Forum. 2 Nov. 2009, 18 Jan. 2010,
(http://www.globaIpo Iicy. org/component/content/article/ 189/38242.htm I).
74
Stephen Zunes, "The Failure of Annapolis."

66
75
Ibid,
76
Daniel Levy, "Four Comment on Bush's Visit to Israel" Prospects for Peace
(http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/2008/01/four_comments_on_bushs_visit_t.html).
77 Irwin Arieff, "Middle East Peace Prospects." CQ Researcher Online. 1 May 2009

(http ://1 ibrary.cqpress.co m/ cqresearcher/cqrglobal).

78
Ronald J. Fisher, "Interactive Conflict Resolution" Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and
Techniques, eds. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1997) 239-272.
79
Kennan, American Diplomacy, 111-112
80
Philip A. Schrodt and Deborah J. Gerner , "An Event Data Analysis of Third-Party Mediation in the Middle East
and Balkans," Journal of Conflict resolution, Jun. 2004; 48: 310- 330.
81
Ibid.
82
Bercovitch, J. (ed.) (2002). Studies in International Mediation: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin.
New York: Palgrave.

83
"Central Intelligence Agency." (2008). The World Factbook
8
George Modelski, "International settlements of internal wars. In International apects of civil strife, edited by J.
4

Roseneau (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

85
Marieke Kleiboer. Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation, (The Journal of Conflict
Resolution © 1996)
86
O.R. Young, "Intermediaries: Third parties in International Crisis," (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1967), 19-20.
87
Northedge and Doneland 1971; Frei 1976; Rubin 1981b; Moore 1987; Koh 1990)
88
(Becrovith 1991:13)
89
Don Radlauer, "En Engineered Tragedy Statistical Analysis of Causalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict,"
EretzYsroel.org, Sep. 2000 (http://www.eretzyisroel.org/~jkatz/mostly .html).
90
(Burton 1972a; Azar 1986)
91
(Fisher 1978; Druckamn 1993, 26-9)
92
(Fisher 1971, 142-2; Rubin 1981b, 30)

93
Kleiboer, Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation.
94
(Susskind and Babbitt, 1992)

96
Merieke Kleiboer , "Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation."
97
"Israel Brushes Off Obama Criticism Over Jerusalem." Associated Press, (The New York Times, 18 Nov. 2009)
98
See Table 1
99
"Obama Administration Efforts Towards Arab-Israeli Peace," Middle East Progress
http://middleeastprogress.org/2009/09/obama-administration-efforts-towards-arab-israeli-peace/
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
103
Francis Matthew, "Empty words, yet again." Gulfnews. 14 Jan. 2008. Web. 21 Nov. 2009
<http://guIfnews.com/opinions/columnists/empty-words-yet-again-1.77743>.
1
04 Howard Schneider, "Palestinian premier speaks at Israeli conference," The Washington Post, Feb. 3, 2010 <
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/02/AR2010020202854.html>.
105
Mark Landler, "Israeli Suggests Steps to Aid Peace Talks," The N ew York Times, March 18, 2010
<http://www.nytimes. com/2010/03/19/world/mi ddIeeast/19israel. htmI? scp= 1&sq =Is ra el%20peace&st
106
Kirit Radia, Ann Compton, and Karen Travers. "Netanyahu Extends Washington Visit as U.S., Israel Disagreements Persist,"
abc News. March 24, 2010 < http://abcnews.go.com/Po1itics/benjamin-netanyahu-extends-washington-visit-us-israel­
disagreements/story?id=l019l933>.

67
107
Howard La Franchi, "Obama's strategy in Israeli-Palestinian conflict at crossroads," The Christian Science
Monitor, March 24, 2010 < http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0324/0bama-s-strategy-in­
l sraeli-Palestin ian-conflict-at-crossroads>.
108
Howard LaFranchi, "Obama's strategy in Israeli-Palestinian conflict at crossroads."
109
Chris McGreal, "Obama Admits US Underestimated Israeli-Palestinian deadlock," The Guardian, Jan. 22, 2010
<http://www.gua rdian.co. uk/world/2010/jan/22/obama-m iddle-east-israel-palestinians-settlem ents sec. E.
110
Ibid.
111
Ami Teibel, "Mideast envoy seeks to restart talks," The Washington Times, January 22, 2010.
112
Yossi Alpher, "On Israel-Palestine, No More of the Same," The New York Times, February 2, 2010
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/opinion/03 iht-eda lpher. htm I>.
113
Mark Landler and Helene Cooper, "Obama Speech Signals a U.S. Shift on Middle East," The New York Times, Apr.
14, 2010 ( http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/lS/world/middleeast/lSm ideast.html).

68
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