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The Rohingya Refugee Social Change

1–15
Crisis: A Time Bomb © CSD 2020
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Waiting to Explode DOI: 10.1177/0049085719901038
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Shamsul Bari1

Nearly three years have passed since the influx of more than 700,000 Rohingya
refugees from Myanmar into Bangladesh began in August 2017, but there is still
no durable solution to their plight. Together with other Rohingya groups who
came to Bangladesh at different periods, these million plus refugees now con-
stitute world's largest single refugee population. The latest influx has comprised
victims of what the UN and other international observers have termed 'genocide'.
Bangladesh has so far managed to shelter the refugees with much difficulty and
great sacrifice. However, serious tensions have continued to mount in the over-
crowded camps, as have clashes with the local community. Unless Myanmar
facilitates voluntary repatriation of the refugees soon, the situation is likely to get
worse and engulf the whole region. Concerted international efforts are called for
to ensure voluntary repatriation of the refugees which is the only viable solution
for such large numbers.

Keywords
Refugees, genocide, voluntary repatriation, regional tension, international solidarity

Introduction

Beginning of the Influx

Nearly three passed since the largest influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar
into Bangladesh began in August 2017. Around three-quarter of a million
refugees poured into Bangladesh within a short span of time. Together with

1
Research Initiatives, Bangladesh (RIB), Dhaka, Bangladesh and Former Director, UNHCR, Geneva,
Switzerland.

Corresponding author
Shamsul Bari, Research Initiatives, Bangladesh (RIB), House 7, Road 17, Block C, Banani, Dhaka 3474,
Bangladesh.
Email baris@citech-bd.com
2 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

300,000–400,000 other Rohingyas who came to Bangladesh at different times

over the last three decades, they formed one of the largest refugee groups in the
world today.
The latest influx was a human avalanche, accompanied by heart-wrenching
scenes of pain, suffering and destitution. Refugee narratives about the horrific
circumstances which made them flee Myanmar reminded the world of these
human tragedies which have ‘shocked the conscience of mankind’ throughout
history. Human concern, sympathy and compassion for the Rohingyas poured
in from all corners of the world. Financial and material support flowed from
governments, international financial institutions, UN bodies, civil society and
individuals alike. Charges of genocide and crimes against humanity were raised
against the Myanmarese forces and calls for international accountability measures
against them were rife.
International support for refugees was more than matched by the generosity and
support of the government and people of Bangladesh. The spontaneous decision of
the government, with the whole-hearted support of the local population, to receive
such a huge refugee population is extremely rare in history. It has rightly earned
international accolades for the country and its prime minister. There is a general
recognition that the handling of such a large and shattered population by Bangladesh,
itself a densely populated developing country, was highly commendable.

Current Situation
Nearly three years on, however the plight of the refugees does not dominate
international headlines anymore. Like many other examples of human resilience
in coping with humanitarian calamities of such a huge magnitude, the refugees are
now ensconced in hundreds of densely populated refugee camps spread over a
large area bordering Myanmar. They continue to cope with the new realities of
their lives and mull over their uncertain future.
Despite admirable success in containing such a volatile situation, there is no
scope for complacency. Many signs of unrest have already manifested themselves
in the camps, foreboding more bad times to come. The atmosphere in the over-
crowded camps and the surrounding region is heating up for reasons not uncommon
to such situations. The hopelessness and frustrations of the refugees living under
such dire circumstances are the normal breeding grounds for tension and conflicts.
At the same time, the over-stretched hospitality of the local population has
begun to strain. Their complaints about refugee encroachments on their lives,
livelihoods and environment are getting louder and progressively more threatening.
As time passes, they will most certainly get worse. It is time, therefore, to look for
ways to resolve the underlying problems before they worsen further.
Clearly, the most urgent need is to inject some hope in the minds of the refugees
and the surrounding host population alike. Both must be assured that they are not
forgotten, and serious efforts are being made to resolve the crisis sooner than later.
Unless there is progress in that direction, darker and more ominous clouds will
continue to build up. In such an atmosphere, there will be no dearth of exploiters
to take advantage of the situation and make it worse. History is replete with
examples of such a nature.
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 3

There are also ominous signs of an onset of compassion fatigue among

international donors. By the end of July this year, only 35 per cent of the Joint
Response Plan of the UN for the care and maintenance of the Rohingya refugees
in Bangladesh for 2019, totalling USD 920.50 million, has been met. If the
contributions do not pick up soon, disastrous consequences are likely to follow in
the not too distant future.

Finding Solutions: What Are the Options?

Like any other large-scale refugee situation, the best solution for the Rohingya
refugees in Bangladesh is to go back home voluntarily, in safety and dignity, to
resume their normal lives once again. Voluntary repatriation is usually the only
viable solution for most refugee situations in the world where large numbers are
involved. Around 70 per cent of the world’s refugees since the Second World War
have found durable solutions by returning home.
The Rohingya refugees too would like to go back home if they can do so in
safety and dignity. They have said so, time and again. But they see no hope on the
horizon. Within a few months after their arrival in Bangladesh, they were told that
Myanmar had agreed to take back only those who wished to return voluntarily
under a bilateral agreement with the Bangladesh government. But when the
scheduled date for commencement of repatriation arrived on 15 November
2018, there were no volunteers. No one believed that the necessary conditions
for return were there. Since then, the two governments have set new dates at
regular intervals, with the same result. Most agree that safe return under existing
circumstances is inconceivable. Another date was fixed for 22 August 2019.
With the refugees saying that they will not go back unless fundamental
changes occur on the ground in Myanmar, particularly in relation to their basic
human rights, there is growing speculation, both inside and outside the camps,
on the other two possible solutions, namely a third country resettlement and
a local integration. It is essential to consider their viability under the existing
circumstances and dispel false expectations.
As for third country resettlement, it is clear that so many people will clearly
not be offered resettlement locations in third countries. Second, even if it were
possible, it would set a bad precedent for the international community. There are
many countries in the world where large groups of people like the Rohingyas
exist. Unwanted by the majority population they could be targetted for similar
expulsions, and expect that they too will be resettled elsewhere. This will
destroy the hallowed principles of asylum and refugee protection developed over
centuries.
Third, even a discussion about third country resettlement of the refugees
from Bangladesh might well unsettle the remaining half a million or so
Rohingya population still living in Myanmar and provoke them to join the
queue in Bangladesh. The combined pull and push factors will be too much
for the international community to handle. Instead of solving the problem, new
problems will arise. Of course, a few humanitarian cases, such as traumatised
4 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

victims of serious crimes, others in need of medical attention unavailable in the

camps and those who qualify for family reunification abroad, can be considered
for resettlement. This will not act as a pull factor, if done carefully, but show
important international solidarity on the issue.
That leaves us with local integration as a solution. This too is a non-starter for
the simple reason that it will be impossible for Bangladesh, itself an overpopulated
country, to absorb such a huge population without very serious social and political
consequences. No government will be able to deal with the situation without
peril to its own survival. Of course, a few refugees will always merge in the
local majority population, as has happened in the past. But it cannot be the main
solution for the majority.
That brings us back to voluntary repatriation as the only viable solution for
the vast majority of the Rohingyas in Bangladesh. It is important that all the
parties involved with the problem understand and accept the reality. That includes
Bangladesh and Myanmar, the other two immediate neighbours, India and China,
plus countries with interest in the region such as Japan and Russia, ASEAN
countries, the UN and the international community as a whole. All must realise
the dangers of letting such a large group of people simmer in hopelessness and
despair in the camps. They need to identify all possible ways and means to make
voluntary repatriation possible. And these will have to be implemented through
collective efforts and determination for as long as necessary. Failing to do so will
have grave consequences.

Need for a Comprehensive Strategy

There must be a clear recognition that for so many refugees with horrific memories
of the circumstances that made them flee Myanmar, it will not be possible to
accept an uncertain sedentary existence in the camps indefinitely. History tells us
that in most such situations, people are prone to nurture, most steadfastly, the
dream of reclaiming their lost land, stolen history, shattered memories and take
back control over their own lives. Such dreams die hard.
History also reveals that most protracted refugee situations attract exploiters. The
latter take advantage of the anger and frustrations of the refugees to advance their
own goals. Such possibilities have increased manifold in the fractured international
politics of our times. With their help, some refugees can be turned into terrorists,
or freedom fighters, depending upon the perception of the observer. But their
actions will inevitably involve violence, which will beget more violence and the
consequences therein. It is not in anyone’s interest to let such a situation develop
within the Rohingya refugee camps. It is neither good for the Rohingyas nor for
Myanmar, or for Bangladesh, the region or the international community as a whole.
In the context of present realities in Myanmar, and more particularly in the
Rakhine state where Rohingyas have traditionally lived, it may indeed be naive
even to talk about voluntary repatriation. Recent attacks by the Arakan Army
on the Myanmar military have heightened tensions. But this does not mean that
the Rohingya issue can be ignored and under present circumstances, no steps
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 5

can be taken to bring the goal of voluntary, dignified and sustainable return
closer. There has to be a recognition that the long-term repatriation is the only
practicable alternative to resolve the crisis at hand, and it must be pursued despite
all difficulties and for however long it may take to make it happen.

What Are the Choices Before Bangladesh?

Many in Bangladesh have questioned the wisdom of the government to have
entered into a bilateral repatriation agreement with Myanmar when there was no
indication that the flow of refugees had even stopped, let alone any indication of
Myanmar’s willingness to address the root causes. They argue that Myanmar had
a good reason to sign a repatriation agreement with Bangladesh—to stave off
international pressure and minimise universal condemnation of the horrific
atrocities that caused the refugee exodus. On the other hand, Bangladesh has
every reason to opt for the accountability path which will focus on the atrocities,
exert pressure on the ‘conscience of the mankind’ and seek the involvement of the
UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to bring the
perpetrators to justice. This might have forced Myanmar to reconsider its defiant
stance. Why did not Bangladesh do so?
The answer lies in the options Bangladesh had at the time. When a crisis of
such a large magnitude unfolds, the primary focus of all concerned is, of course,
attending to the immediate assistance needs of the refugees. This, as said before,
was met rather well. However, there was also an outcry for accountability of the
perpetrators of the terrible crimes which caused the refugee outflow. Charges of
genocide and crimes against humanity inevitably emerged from refugee narratives
and graphic images which filled the media.
In such a situation, the options before Bangladesh have included: (a) let the UN
take the leadership role, both for providing assistance and durable solutions for the
refugees, (b) to join others in denouncing Myanmar, and pursue the accountability
path, even if it leads to enmity and hostility and (c) to undertake a bilateral approach
of diplomacy, persuasion and cooperation with Myanmar to promote the quick
repatriation of the refugees. The government has to decide what path to follow.
The fact that the government chose to call the Rohingya refugees, ‘forcibly
displaced Myanmar nationals’ from the very beginning, was a clear indication that
it wished to avoid international demand to give the refugees a legal status with
well-defined rights under international law. It perhaps also felt that by not calling
them refugees, it will have the flexibility to seek solutions outside the international
regime. However, irrespective of the government’s wisdom to avoid using the
term ‘refugee’ for the concerned population, the international community rightly
chose to treat them as refugees since they fulfilled all the criteria for refugee status
and were in dire need of international assistance and protection. The UN and its
various bodies took the lead in this regard under the personal supervision of the
UN Secretary-General, Antonio Gueterres, who, not very long ago, was the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees. He was clearly the most experienced person
in the field.
6 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

However, as the emergency phase drew to a close and the enormity of the task
became clear to everybody, Bangladesh had to decide on how to go about dealing
with a problem of such a complex nature and large magnitude, so It chose to take
matters in its own hands.
Bangladesh’s decision can be viewed in the context of the international
politics of the time. It had to consider the role the UN could play under the given
circumstances. It was well known that on the accountability issue, China and
Russia, the two permanent members of the UN Security Council, with a close
interest in Myanmar, were unwilling to refer the matter to a special international
crime’s tribunal or to the ICC. On the other hand, securing India’s help to generate
international support was also a non-starter because it too did not wish to burn
its bridges with Myanmar, with whom it had significant bilateral interests, as
a rival to China. Moreover, Bangladesh itself was not sure about pursuing the
accountability path in deference to its wish not to harm Myanmar’s civilian leader
Aung San Suu Kyi’s position vis a vis the Myanmar army.
Given this situation, there was little chance for the UN to succeed in making
Myanmar accept its culpability and undertake remedial measures to help resolve
the refugee crisis. The UN could, however, play other roles that it normally plays
in such crises. It could be an intermediary bringing Myanmar and Bangladesh
together to discuss challenges and identify ways of dealing with them, including
its own role. It could also bring them together with regional countries and the
international community as a whole in a spirit of international solidarity to resolve
the crisis. But this was undercut by Bangladesh’s decision to take the bilateral
path and deal with Myanmar directly. In the face of Bangladesh’s own initiatives,
any UN initiative had to take a back seat.
Bangladesh’s decision to choose the bilateral approach was also affected by
the impending general elections in the country, scheduled for the end of 2018.
The government wished to project an image to the electorate that there was no
reason for alarm about the presence of such a large number of refugees in the
country as the problem was going to be resolved through bilateral negotiations
with Myanmar. Among other things, it meant that the accountability approach to
bring international pressure and opprobrium on Myanmar had to be put on the
back burner. Pursuing accountability while negotiating for voluntary repatriation
could be counterproductive.
There were, of course, other reasons for Bangladesh to take the bilateral
course. As two close neighbours, inseparably linked by geography and history,
a cooperative approach to resolve the refugee crisis was ideally the best option.
The accountability and acrimonious approach would have soured the relationship,
created hostility, contributed to violence and be detrimental to the development
process of both the countries.
The bilateral approach led to negotiations between Bangladesh and Myanmar
which resulted in the voluntary repatriation agreement between the two, first
reached in November 2017 and later revised in October 2018. It is not clear
whether both the parties seriously believed in a quick implementation of the
agreement or whether it was a strategy to start the process, hoping that it would
progressively gather momentum.
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 7

It is now clear, however, that the strategy has not worked, and unless new life
is injected into the process, unrest in the camps will grow, with all its negative
consequences. To avert such a situation, there is, therefore, an urgent need for the
two neighbours to come together—this time with the help and support of the UN
and the international community—to develop a comprehensive long-term strategy.
The strategy should include clear-cut roles for all concerned, including Bangladesh,
Myanmar, the UN and the regional countries, including China and India.

Role of Bangladesh Under a Comprehensive Strategy

As the host country, saddled with such a large refugee population, Bangladesh
will have to take the lead in any comprehensive strategy. To begin with, it will
have to take the initiative to engage, with the help of the UN, in a renewed and
more focussed negotiations with Myanmar to resolve the crisis. The pros and cons
of the positive engagement between the two countries will have to be expounded
painstakingly. At the same time, the dangers of negative developments, including
the emergence of jihadist activities and external exploitation of the situation, must
be reiterated forcefully.
Positive engagements will have to begin at home. It should include a
commitment to the improved care and maintenance of the refugees and better
camp management, pending repatriation of the refugees in safety and dignity.
Part of it would involve the creation of conditions in the camps that would
allow refugees to rebuild their social lives which they lost upon expulsion from
Myanmar and to prepare themselves for return to Myanmar as valuable human
resources, with proper skills and abilities to rebuild their lives and society. A more
socially vibrant atmosphere in the camps would also minimise tension and the
influence of negative forces.
Bangladesh’s commitment to the refugees should also include closer attention
to education, health and safe housing for the refugees in camps. It may be recalled
that international concerns have been repeatedly expressed about the stringent
policies of the Bangladesh government on education and stable housing for
refugees in the camps. While this was perhaps understandable in the context of
expected early return of the refugees to Myanmar under the bilateral voluntary
repatriation agreement, there is a need to revise this given the changed realities.
A revised education policy could be justified on grounds that by keeping
refugee children and youths engaged in educational activities in the camps,
they would be shielded from harmful activities such as narcotics and human
trafficking, and contribute to minimise tensions in the camps and keep exploiters
at bay. Moreover, formal, informal, technical and vocational education, geared
to the needs in Myanmar, identified in consultation with Myanmar’s would help
them to be better equipped for a more productive life in Myanmar.
As for allowing the construction of more stable housing in the camps, it would
minimise likely casualties caused by frequent cyclones and landslides in the area
and avoid criticism about the lack of the government’s preparedness in this regard.
Moreover, in the interest of both the refugees and local inhabitants, Bangladesh
8 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

would need to further improve the law and order situation within the camps. This
would benefit the protection needs of the refugees, especially vulnerable groups
such as women and children, and at the same time, help in preventing criminal
activities and potential radicalisation that could have a negative spillover effects
on the host communities and Bangladesh society as a whole.
In short, ensuring better facilities to the refugees in the camps and preparing
them for return could be a win-win situation for all. International appreciation of
continued generosity by Bangladesh is likely to garner continued international
support for the refugees in the country. A potential also exists for garnering
additional funds from the World Bank and the ADB for Bangladesh in support of
such projects.
While undertaking this onerous responsibility, Bangladesh will have to make it
clear to all concerned that its position on the care and maintenance of the refugees
in Bangladesh is premised upon the commitment of the UN and the international
community for continued support towards assistance and durable solution of the
refugees. A commitment of this nature will make it easier for Bangladesh to justify
to its citizens the need to persevere in harbouring the refugees in Bangladesh for
a longer period than anticipated, and to respect the principles of international
protection in their treatment.
Equipped with renewed international commitment, Bangladesh will have to
initiate fresh negotiations with Myanmar for a more comprehensive and clear-
cut plan of action (PoA) to make voluntary repatriation a reality. Elements of
such a PoA are discussed in the paragraphs below. It must be undertaken with the
close cooperation of the UN and in tandem with other bilateral and multilateral
initiatives to keep the subject alive in the international fora. Appointing a special
representative of the prime minister for the Rohingya issue, who would promote
the message all over the world in a relentless manner, would help. It would be
immensely useful if the prime minister could herself undertake visits to important
capitals to share Bangladesh’s concern with world leaders and brief them about
the dangers of inaction in this regard, as it did recently in China.

Role of Myanmar Under a Comprehensive Strategy

Compared to Bangladesh, Myanmar’s tasks in a comprehensive strategy will, of
course, be more difficult. Those knowledgeable about the country know that
creating conditions conducive to the return of the refugees from Bangladesh to
Myanmar will require a sea change in the mindset of the key actors who contributed
to the outflux in the first place. They include the local Buddhist population and
their leaders, officials of the state and the union government, members of the
armed forces and perhaps the entire population of Myanmar. There is hardly any
group which has harboured a positive attitude towards the Rohingyas. It seems to
have evolved primarily during the period of military rule in Myanmar since
historically the Rohingyas and the local Rakhine Buddhist population have lived
together for centuries. They even participated in general elections. However, the
level of hatred and hostility towards each other, revealed through refugee
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 9

narratives and statements of Rakhine Buddhist leaders following the exodus,

underlines the enormity of the task.
To change such deeply-entrenched negative mindsets will certainly be an uphill
task. The belief of the Rakhine Buddhists that Muslim Rohingyas are outsiders,
‘illegal Bengali immigrants’ as they are called, do not belong to the territory and
must not live there, can only be changed through a long and objective process of
recounting true history and undertaking specific corrective measures. Apart from
positive engagements of both state and union governments, civil society efforts
will also have to be generated with all sincerity. These should complement other
confidence-building measures mentioned below. It will not be achieved without
a firm determination on the part of all concerned, but it should not be impossible.
Rohingyas have lived side by side with their Buddhist neighbours in Myanmar
for centuries, there is no reason why they should not be able to do so in the future.
Fortunately, good guidance is available in this regard from the final report of
the Rakhine Advisory Commission (RAC), led by former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, released in August 2017. It provided an overarching framework for
addressing the fundamental challenges that underpin the development, security
and human rights crises of the Rakhine state. They are critical of both for the
development of the region and for creating conditions conducive to the return of
the refugees.
The RAC report also contains a set of concrete recommendations for the
Myanmar authorities to implement. Myanmar has formally accepted to do just that.
In an ideal strategy, Bangladesh and Myanmar should work together, in a spirit of
friendship, cooperation and, wherever necessary, compromise, to implement the
recommendations. There must be a relationship of trust between the two countries
on monitoring progress. They must get together from time to time to do so.
There are 88 recommendations under 16 broad categories in the RAC report.
Among these, the more important ones, crucial to the creation of conditions
conducive to the return of the refugees, include economic and social development
of Rakhine state, citizenship, freedom of movement, situation of internally displaced
persons (IDPs), intercommunal cohesion, strengthening trust in the security
sector, relationship with Bangladesh, regional relations and implementation of the
recommendations.
Among these, the two key areas of immediate concern are the cross-cutting
subjects of citizenship and freedom of movement. They would need priority
attention as they are of fundamental concern for prospective returnees. If a good
beginning is made these points, others are likely to fall in place.
From what we know, some efforts have been made by individual line ministries
to implement recommendations relating to their respective works. What is
unclear, however, is whether the government, in its overall approach to translate
the recommendations into actions, is taking them as a transformative framework
for addressing the root causes of Rakhine’s crises. Without such an approach,
small gains, here and there, will not be able to generate the necessary confidence
in the minds of those concerned.
Unfortunately, so far there is no clear message emanating from the government
or actions on the ground that indicate that the recommendations are being taken
10 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

very seriously. On the contrary, one hears that they are treated primarily as an
exercise to stave off pressure from the international community. There appears to
be little inclination to address the structural challenges underpinning Rakhine’s
human rights crisis. This should be a matter of serious concern for all. Unless
genuine efforts are made towards transformative changes foreseen in the RAC
recommendations, refugees are unlikely to go back home and the attendant
problems will fester or even rise.
On freedom of movement, it is well known that the Rohingya population has
had to deal with a spectrum of barriers including formal, informal and social
restrictions. They include, local orders restricting movements, requirement of
travel authorisation, departure cards, registration for an overnight stay in another
township, passing through security checkpoints and so on. While formal barriers
may be resolved through policy changes and clear instructions to local-level
officials, removing informal and social barriers is far more difficult. It would be
important to give particular attention to this issue. Progress in this area will have
to be monitored on a regular basis by the two governments, with the participation
of the UN. The government is clearly reluctant to involve others in the matter, but
it must be made a sine qua non.
The recommendations include a mapping exercise to identify all existing
restrictions and actions to remove them. Clearly, a basic requirement of the returning
refugees would be the ability to move around freely in their areas of residence with
security protection, whenever and wherever needed. It will facilitate, among other
things, their access to healthcare, education and livelihoods. As such, freedom of
movement and access to services must, therefore, be addressed in tandem.
The recommendations also sought to delink freedom of movement from the
possession of National Verification Cards (NVCs) or citizenship documentation.
This is because it would otherwise restrict the movement of a much larger
population of Rohingyas who do not hold them. Any progress in this area will
have to be widely publicised.
The Commission also recommended that the lifting of restrictions of movement
must be accompanied by a clear communications strategy aimed at members of all
communities in Rakhine. An objective of this strategy is an increased interaction
between the two communities. There are other recommendations related to the rule
of law and the role of the police and the need for specialised police units for the
Rohingya population. They too are extremely important for confidence building.
On the citizenship issue, the RAC report underlined that the acceptance of the
NVC by the Rohingyas would largely depend on the government showing that it
is a clear path to citizenship. This will be facilitated if the verification process of
6,000 existing Rohingya NVC holders are completed as soon as possible. Progress
on this too should be widely publicised.
The more difficult issue relates to the situation of those who do not qualify for
citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law. The Commission recommended the
adoption of a policy consistent with international standards for citizenship and
permanent residency. This is clearly the key to the success of the exercise. It is
equally important to ensure that the process is voluntary and should not involve
any coercion. This will encourage greater willingness of the Rohingyas to agree
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 11

to verification. And, of course, it will be essential to ensure that the process takes
place in tandem with the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the returnees and
assurances of their security.
The implementation of RAC recommendations in other key areas will also
have an important bearing on the success of government’s efforts to create
conditions for the return of the refugees. They include a proper relocation of IDPs,
promotion of intercommunal dialogues, strengthening trust in the security sector,
closer relationship and interaction with Bangladesh. Some of these are reportedly
being implemented in some ways. Implementing the most critical ones will,
however, take a much longer time. An important indicator of the government’s
sincerity in this regard would be to watch the progress being made in resolving the
IDP situation.
As refugees in Bangladesh remain in close contact with the remaining
Rohingyas in Rakhine state, including in the IDP camps, improving the situation
particularly of this group, would be important to enhance the confidence of the
refugees to return. International involvement, through the UN and its affiliated
bodies, would be a good indication of the government’s intent. Moreover, as many
of the perpetrators of violence against the Rohingyas included local security forces,
reform of the security sector, for example by replacing local police and border-
guard forces by forces from other ethnic minorities in Myanmar, like Karen or
Shan, would also be important in infusing confidence among the refugees about
improvement of the security situation in Rakhine state.
Clearly, the tasks of the Myanmar government to implement the RAC
recommendations are daunting, given the long history of ethnic conflicts, political
upheavals and the difficult transition from half-a-century-long military rule to a
civilian government. While the international community should be understanding
of the enormous difficulties Myanmar has to face in implementing the RAC
recommendations, the government too must demonstrate its equal commitment to
both the development-based recommendations and the rights-based ones. Greater
emphasis on development at the cost of human rights will mean a continuation or
even an increase in social inequality and segregation in Rakhine state, negating
the objectives of the recommendations.
It will be easier for the international community to have faith in Myanmar’s
commitment to implement the RAC recommendations in all sincerity, more
concrete actions will be needed than mere pronouncements of the government.
An essential step would be to give the UN full access to areas of return of the
refugees. There is little meaningful progress in this regard. Even the adoption of
the tripartite MoU among the government, UNHCR and UNDP, and the formation
of Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICE) by the government appear to be
primarily aimed at relieving international pressure.
It is obvious that the restlessness among the refugees in Bangladesh camps,
which are on the rise, will continue to grow unless prospects for return increase.
Otherwise, more ominous developments will most certainly follow. The dangers
of radicalisation and its likely consequences for the entire region, which have
been alluded to earlier, require no further elucidation.
There are also other scenarios which are no less ominous. Frustrated, angry and
despondent refugees may begin to escape from the camps and move illegally to
12 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

neighbouring countries such as India, Nepal and others in the region and beyond.
The more desperate ones may take to rickety boats to undertake the perilous
journey across the sea to Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and farther on, as many
of their compatriots did not very long ago. Recurrence of scenes of shipwrecked
Rohingya women, men and children trying to stay afloat in the deep sea, seeking
to be rescued by passing ships, will once again raise international concern for the
plight of the refugees and shock the conscience of mankind.
Side by side, calls for accountability for the perpetrators of the atrocities, which
caused the refugee outflow, are likely to re-emerge. While Bangladesh has so far
been lukewarm to the idea, it will not be able to do so much longer.
The best alternative, therefore, for Myanmar, will be to work together with
Bangladesh for the return of the refugees and reduce tensions. A collaborative
effort might ease Myanmar’s tasks to implement the RAC recommendations
and show progress, however slow in the beginning. The two countries could set
a schedule to meet regularly to assess challenges and progress and undertake
corrective measures, as necessary. A closer relationship between the two countries
will be useful not only to pave the way to resolve the humanitarian crisis but
also to foster the closer economic relationship between them. The phenomenal
growth in the economy of Bangladesh in recent years could provide a spur to
complementary economic growth in Myanmar. A safer, more prosperous life for
people on both sides of the border is the best way to ensure that people can remain
peacefully in their homes and help their countries to develop. For this to happen,
the help of the two immediate neighbours in the region, India and China, would
be essential.

Role of the UN Under a Comprehensive Strategy

The lack of progress in voluntary repatriation under the bilateral agreement
between Bangladesh and Myanmar has highlighted the need for multilateral efforts.
Developments in the last two years have shown that there can be no repatriation
unless progress is made on ground realities in Myanmar. While the latter is formally
committed to implementing the recommendations of the Kofi Anan Commission,
it is faced with serious problems both in terms of government policy and popular
resistance to their implementation. As a result, there has been no progress in
Myanmar which can ignite any hope for the international community.
Because there has been no progress in voluntary repatriation so far, questions
have been raised about its feasibility in the foreseeable future. This has led many,
including the UN and the international community at large, to conclude that their
main role, for the time being, can only be concerted efforts to ease the burden on
Bangladesh and help it to manage the refugee population in the country. While
this may indeed be the logical conclusion for the time being, it will be a mistake
to take it as a firm conclusion. For reasons discussed above, it is imperative for
the UN to redouble its efforts to make voluntary repatriation feasible, by whatever
strategy necessary and for however long it may take.
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 13

It is true that international pressure thus far has not altered Myanmar’s political
stance on the issue and there is no reason to believe that increased efforts will yield
better results given the fact that China and Russia are likely to remain opposed to
any punitive measures against Myanmar approved by the Security Council. But
the risks for failing to develop long-term strategies are formidable and they may
be disregarded only at the peril of the international community as a whole and the
region (especially India and China) in particular.
It has been rightly concluded by the ICG report on Myanmar of October 2018:
‘The status quo could morph in dangerous ways. If host communities or national
political sentiment in Bangladesh turns against the refugees, the government may
pressure them to return against their will’. The consequences of forced return need
no elaboration. Efforts towards voluntary repatriation must, therefore, continue.
To keep the rising tensions in the camps to manageable levels, it is also vital that
international donors are prepared to support the humanitarian operations for the
long haul and consider development support for the affected part of Bangladesh
to reduce the burden on local communities and the government.
UN’s efforts in Bangladesh must also be matched by determined efforts to
assist Myanmar to stabilise the situation in Rakhine state. It is important that the
lives and livelihoods of the Rohingyas and other Muslim communities who are
still there are made secure and no more exoduses take place. The foremost task
for the UN in this regard should be to assist Myanmar in implementing the RAC
recommendations. The UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Myanmar,
Swiss Diplomat Christine Schraner Burgener, could play a critical role in political
engagement with the Myanmar government. She has, reportedly, not been able to
make much headway in this regard so far but, in the present context of Myanmar, it
is not surprising. But her role remains vital. Her engagements with other relevant
players and regular reporting to the UN Security Council is equally important.
A strategic combination of continued Security Council scrutiny with sustained
diplomatic engagement on her part is likely to yield results in the long run.

Role of China and India

Regional dynamics are equally important for a proper response to the crisis. China
is currently a major development partner for many countries, including in South
Asia. It is a foremost investor in Myanmar and, to an increasing degree, in
Bangladesh and has a significant influence on both. Its Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) include both countries. It has a significant infrastructure vision for the
whole region. Its bilateral relationship with Myanmar, both military and civil, has
been deepening progressively. China supplies 70 per cent of Myanmar’s military
equipment, and its presence is visible everywhere in the country.
With so much economic, political and military clout in the country, China
could play a key role to make Myanmar recognise the importance of its close
cooperation with Bangladesh to resolve the Rohingya crisis. For surely, lack of
progress in returning the Rakhine state to normalcy and ensuring stability in the
region can be enormously detrimental to development aspirations of the region.
14 / Shamsul Bari Social Change

Without a resolution of the underlying crisis, and the danger of conflagration

looming large in the horizon, there can be no steady progress. Frequent disruption
of ongoing activities will also remain under constant threat.
India is another close neighbour with investment and influence in Myanmar. It
is also a key ally of Bangladesh. Yet India failed to condemn Myanmar’s expulsion
of the Rohingyas and the atrocities which accompanied them. Two factors
appear to have influenced India’s position. One, India’s growing economic and
commercial interest in Myanmar and second, its geopolitical vision for the region,
where it is a rival to China’s growing clout in the region. India is thus wary about
taking any position which might affect its growing foothold in Myanmar. The
other factor appears to be India’s fear of becoming a sanctuary for the Rohingya
refugees. It perhaps felt that any soft position towards the Rohingyas might attract
them to seek refuge in India. It remained noncommittal during the cataclysmic
influx of the Rohingya into Bangladesh, except for offering material support. It
refrained carefully from condemning Myanmar for the ghastly atrocities which
caused the refugee flow. Whether coincidently or not, it also initiated deportation
of approximately 40,000 Rohingya refugees who had earlier taken shelter in India.
Whatever is India’s justification for its position on the matter, there can be little
doubt that should the situation of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh take a bad
turn, India will not escape the consequences. It may have to pay a much higher
price in the future for the short-term gains it may have made by avoiding deeper
engagement so far. If unrest among the refugees spreads and violence erupts in the
camps, any attempt of the refugees to flee the camps will inevitably affect India
with its proximity to and long porous boundary with Bangladesh. The dangers of
radicalisation of the refugees are likely to harm India very significantly.
The communal tensions which were whipped up in the context of the recent
general elections in India and the unprecedented political tensions created by
India’s scrapping of the constitutional provisions for Kashmir more recently have
put a serious strain on the social fabric of India. Efforts by those who may wish
to exploit such a volatile situation by resorting to use the Rohingyas to stoke the
fire in India cannot be ruled out. The time is right, therefore, for India to play a
more positive role to resolve the Rohingya crisis. Such a role will also strengthen
its expanding relationship with Bangladesh.

Concluding Remarks
The Rohingya refugee crisis is a time bomb that must be defused swiftly. Any
future flare-up will have disastrous consequences for peace and security, not only
for Bangladesh and Myanmar but also for the region and the international
community as a whole. As voluntary repatriation is clearly the only solution for
such a large group of refugees, Bangladesh and Myanmar should work together,
with full support and cooperation of the international community, to implement a
plan of action based on the recommendations of the Kofi Anan Commission. This
must be undertaken with unwavering sincerity and determination. Despite the
seeming impossibility of the task and enormous hurdles to be crossed, there is
 The Rohingya Refugee Crisis / 15

simply no other alternative. It is time for a specific action. No amount of moral

support or offer of mediation by the international community, without focussing on
a specific plan of action to change the ground realities, can be meaningful. Only
determined efforts to change the ground realities in Myanmar can resolve the crisis.
Myanmar must undertake the most critical task of removing the long-
held prejudices and misunderstandings between the Rohingyas and the local
population. Changing peoples’ mindset is obviously a very difficult task which
will take a long time to yield the desired results. Any short cut approach may work
in the short term but will certainly not work in the long run. It may be possible
to mislead world public opinion, by repatriating a few hundred refugees here and
there, from time to time, but for the bulk of the refugees, no approach which falls
short of creating the necessary conditions for return will work. The sooner this is
realised the better.
As a next-door neighbour of Myanmar, eternally linked by geography and
history, Bangladesh should be able to show patience and understanding to allow
the transformative efforts in Myanmar to take shape and pave the way for the
refugees to return. It must, however, constantly make sure that the planned course
of action, including taking good care of the refugees and preparing the refugees
to return home as productive citizens of Myanmar, is being followed up most
sincerely. Together, the two countries must keep the international community
fully informed about the progress made and challenges faced. The UN should be
able to play a critical role in helping Myanmar to overcome the challenges.
Once the Rohingya crisis is resolved, the two neighbours, Myanmar and
Bangladesh, should be able to forge a new partnership to take their people and
the region forward.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication
of this article.