Resrep 27059

German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
After Humanitarianism: Bangladesh’s Evolving Rohingya Policy

Author(s): Ishrat Hossain
German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) (2020)
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Focus | ASIA
Ishrat Hossain
Ishrat Hossain Associate
ishrat.hossain@politics.ox.ac.uk
After Humanitarianism: German Institute for Global and
Bangladesh’s Evolving Rohingya Policy Area Studies (GIGA)

Leibniz-Institut für Globale
und Regionale Studien
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21
GIGA Focus | Asia | Number 6 | October 2020 | ISSN 1862-359X
20354 Hamburg
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus
Since August 2017 Bangladesh has hosted 1.1 million Rohingya refugees in
the world’s largest refugee camp, along its restive borderlands with Myan-
mar. Frustrated with a stalled repatriation process, Bangladesh is moving
forward with policies focused on refugee redistribution and stricter camp
surveillance. Though potentially effective in the short term, such policies
could complicate Bangladesh’s relations with donors and worsen human
rights abuses against the refugees.
• The Bangladeshi government wants to formally start refugee relocation to

Bhashan Char – a remote, flood-prone island in the Bay of Bengal – at the end of
the monsoon season (early November). The island will isolate the relocated refu-
gee population from their kin while complicating human security issues such as
aid delivery, emergency medical assistance, and support during natural disasters.
• The relocation could help decongest the overpopulated camps, which have seen a
rise in coronavirus cases since May 2020. However, the move risks making Bang-
ladesh unpopular with international development partners on human rights and
refugee protection grounds. A comparison with the recent fatal fire accident in
the Moria refugee camp on the isle of Lesbos, Greece, will be difficult to avoid.
• The government is further tightening surveillance in the camps after recent vio-
lent clashes between rival refugee gangs fighting for control over territory and
a burgeoning illegal drug trade.
• For decades, Bangladesh has served as a jumping-off point for Rohingya to il-
legally migrate to other Muslim countries in the region. The protracted refugee
situation and the COVID-19 lockdowns have compounded these clandestine ef-
forts in recent months. Thus, the Rohingya refugee crisis could potentially turn
into a regional “boat-people” crisis.
Policy Implications
In Myanmar’s current hyper-nationalist political climate, the resettlement of
Rohingya refugees remains highly contested, hence unlikely in the near term.
Therefore, European policymakers should continue to engage with Myanmar’s
political regime on finding sustainable solutions for the Rohingya crisis. The EU
should also conduct targeted lobbying aimed at dissuading Bangladesh from the
controversial refugee relocation plan, while maintaining its financial commit-
ments to improve security and living conditions for the refugees.
A Humanitarian Catastrophe
Since August 2017 Bangladesh has hosted more than 1.1 million Rohingya refu-
gees, members of a Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar who fled the north-
ern Rakhine State when the Burmese Army launched a security operation against
the Rohingya insurgent group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Fortify
Rights 2018).
The Rohingya have sought refuge in the coastal district of Cox’s Bazaar in
southeastern Bangladesh for decades, escaping brutal living conditions in Rakhine
State and periodic crackdowns by the Burmese military. Before the 2017 opera-
tion, there were at least three targeted military operations by the Burmese Army
against the Rohingya, carried out in 1978, 1992, and 2016, respectively. However,
the 2017 crackdown surpassed all previous military measures for its sheer scale of
attacks and the intensity of violence perpetrated against the entire community. The
disproportionate offensive against unarmed civilians has been labelled as “a text-
book example of ethnic cleansing” by the then UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein. The resulting mass exodus of nearly 710,000 people
constituted the largest refugee movement across an international border since the
Rwandan genocide in 1994. This latest influx of refugees joined the approximately
200,000 Rohingya already living in Bangladesh, including 35,000 registered refu-
gees from the 1992 exodus and another 74,000 who arrived after violence broke out
in Rakhine State in October 2016.
In Myanmar, the heavy-handed treatment of the Rohingya has widespread
popular support. The dominant vernacular narrative of Myanmar characterises the
Rohingya as illegal immigrants and Islamist terrorists. This issue is usually des
cribed in stark and uncompromising terms, with demonisation of the Rohingya one
of the most common outcomes. The Rohingya are not recognised by Myanmar’s
1982 Citizenship Law, which officially acknowledges 135 “national races” of Myan
mar (Cheesman 2017). The general population consider them as “Bengalis” – for-
eign interlopers from Bangladesh – who are on a mission to take over Rakhine
State. Adding to this fear is the threat narrative propagated by members of Bud-
dhist nationalist movements such as MaBaTha (the Organisation for the Protection
of Race and Religion) who staunchly advocate for an active fortification of Bud-
dhism against all foreign elements – Muslims in general and Rohingya in particular
(Walton and Hayward 2014). Due to these tense interactions, the root causes of the
Rohingya crisis – connected to citizenship and formal inclusion – are unlikely to
be resolved any time soon, forcing Bangladesh to come to grips with a protracted
refugee situation.
Against this backdrop, this article analyses the evolving policy responses of the
Bangladeshi government to the Rohingya refugee situation. It shows that as the dis-
placement enters its fourth year, the Bangladeshi government is facing pressure to
adjust its short-term humanitarian policies in order to address the protracted and
complex security, human rights and healthcare challenges emerging from hosting
this large population amidst a global pandemic. However, some of the proposed
solutions could further exacerbate existing vulnerabilities faced by the refugees and
have adverse implications for Bangladesh’s relations with international donors.
GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 6 | OCTOBER 2020 2

Realities on the Ground
Since 2017 the Bangladeshi government under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has
been overseeing one of the largest refugee responses in the world. Bangladesh’s
initial strategy of dealing with the crisis was twofold: first, refugees were segregat-
ed into encamped settlements and, with the support of international aid, provided
short-term humanitarian assistance focusing on food, shelter and basic healthcare;
second, bilateral and international pressure was exercised on Myanmar that pro-
moted refugees’ safe and voluntary repatriation. Three years later, these strategies
have led to an overwhelmingly aid-dependent displaced population that has little
say in camp management or repatriation processes. So far, there have been two for-
mal efforts to start the repatriation process: in November 2018 and again in August
2019. On each occasion, the bilaterally agreed-upon official arrangements were put
on hold after thousands of refugees staged protests refusing to return to Myanmar
unless questions regarding their citizenship and other civic rights were resolved.
The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Myanmar declared that the conditions in northern
Rakhine State were unsuitable for safe return (Lederer 2019). Currently, there is no
timeline or plan for the repatriation to resume.
The sprawling Kutupalong–Balukhali mega-camp, located in the district of
Cox’s Bazaar, is the largest refugee settlement in the world. There are around 130
NGOs working in the camps alongside the Bangladeshi government, including 69
international NGOs and 12 UN agencies. More than 600,000 refugees live on a
13-square-kilometre landmass, making Kutupalong one of the most densely popu-
lated areas of Bangladesh. Most of these settlements were built upon cleared paddy
fields or levelled forested areas. The refugees live in substandard housing made
of bamboo and tarpaulin, following a Bangladeshi government ban on permanent
structures inside the camps. The houses often collapse during the monsoon months
(between June and October) when torrential rain and tropical storms hit the region.
Due to its long coastline along the Bay of Bengal, Cox’s Bazaar is also highly exposed
to natural hazards and extreme weather events, including seasonal landslides, mon-
soon flooding, and cyclones. There are no cyclone shelters inside the camps or a
written evacuation plan for refugees at risk. Hence, a medium-intensity cyclone, if
it directly crosses through the camp area, could cause serious harm.
Apart from natural disasters, there are growing concerns about worsening rela-
tions between the Rohingya and their host communities. In recent times, conflicts
have emerged over resource scarcity, increased prices of goods and accommoda-
tion, disruption of services (transportation and education), and labour displace-
ment. The camps are also becoming conflict grounds for rival refugee gangs fighting
over territorial control and a share of the burgeoning illegal drug trade, which has
raised security concerns within the government. So far, more than 200 Rohingya
have been shot and killed, either in confrontations with Bangladeshi law-enforce-
ment agencies or in internal gang wars. In October 2020 violent clashes broke out
between rival factions over the control of illegal drug business in the camp, leav-
ing seven people dead and another 2,000 displaced (Amnesty International 2020).
These incidents have exposed the vulnerability of the refugee population to the
whims of criminal gangs, especially at night, when government officials and aid
agencies withdraw from the camp sites.

One of the long-standing solutions proposed by the Bangladeshi government to ad-
dress the changing security dynamics, the increased congestion, and the unforeseen
environmental challenges in the camps has been to relocate one-tenth of the camp
population to a new site. Bhashan Char, the envisaged destination, is a remote is-
land in the Bay of Bengal. The government argues that the newly built facilities
there will reduce pressure on resources, along with improving living conditions and
providing livelihood opportunities for the refugees.
The Island
As far back as 2015, the Bangladeshi government had already conceived of a plan to
relocate 32,000 registered Rohingya refugees – unrepatriated from the 1992 exo-
dus – from UNHCR-administered camps to a remote, uninhabited island in the Bay
of Bengal. It was subsequently named “Bhashan Char” – “Floating Island.”
The island is made up of sediment carried through the Meghna River estuary
and is located approximately 30 kilometres from the nearest inhabited island. Be-
fore the Rohingya relocation plans came about, Bhashan Char, which appeared on
the surface of the river only 11 years ago, was considered inaccessible, unstable, and
unliveable. According to geological experts, it takes at least 30 to 40 years for a silt
island to become stable enough for human habitation.
Facing strong international criticism, Bangladesh shelved the initial relocation
plan in 2016. However, in October of that year, Myanmar’s army launched security
operations against a newly emerged Rohingya insurgent group called Harakah al-
Yaqin – currently known as ARSA – after it attacked nine Border Guard outposts in
Rakhine State (International Crisis Group 2016). Similar to 2017, the 2016 crack-
down also systematically targeted civilian villages, causing approximately 74,000
Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Given these circumstances, the Bangladeshi gov-
ernment revived its 2016 Bhashan Char plan, aiming to “temporarily” relocate the
new arrivals to the island until they could be repatriated. This plan, however, was
upended when a much larger exodus took place less than a year later.
Nevertheless, the Bangladeshi Navy was tasked to complete a fast-tracked
USD 280 million building project implementing the government’s “Ashrayan-3”
scheme (Prime Minister’s Office 2019). As a result, the 13,000-acre Bhashan Char
underwent a rapid transformation. As of now, a 1,500-acre area of the island in-
sulated by a nine-foot-high flood embankment stands ready with 1,440 barracks-
style building blocks each capable of housing 16 families (four members apiece)
with shared kitchens and toilets. Other facilities include 120 cyclone shelters, a 40-
bed hospital, and livelihood opportunities including agricultural work; fish, poul-
try, and dairy farming; apiculture; and handicrafts. However, the government has
not yet clearly delineated plans for educational facilities, such as schools for the
Rohingya children.

Map
Figure 1
Map of Cox’s Bazar,
Bangladesh
Source: Human Rights
Watch 2018.
The Perils of Relocation
Despite the government’s insistence on the liveability of Bhashan Char, concerns

remain about the safety of the refugees on the island. Reports of inadequate num-
bers of cyclone shelters for 100,000 people as well as the flood-protection embank-
ment being 12 feet shorter than the recommended height have worried aid agencies.
Access to emergency medical services will also be severely compromised due to the
remoteness of the island: It takes more than three hours from Hatiya Island, the
nearest inhabited location, to reach Bhashan Char by boat. The island has no direct
road or water connection with any other territories of Bangladesh.
Furthermore, the relocation could also encourage the human-trafficking rackets
that operate along the coastline, whereby desperate Rohingya are frequently lured
into attempting to migrate illegally to Malaysia by boat. For decades, Bangladesh
has served as a jumping-off point for Rohingya to illegally migrate to other Muslim
countries in the region. According to UNHCR, over 100,000 Rohingya attempted to
migrate irregularly to a third country in the region (mainly Malaysia) between 2012
and 2016 (UNHCR 2016). The protracted refugee situation and the COVID-19 lock-

down have already begun to compound these clandestine efforts in recent months.
The proposed relocation could further exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities for the
Rohingya, forcing them to choose between taking a boat out of Bangladesh or being
shifted to the remote island.
The route from Bangladesh to Malaysia via Thailand is a popular one with Ro-
hingya willing to take the perilous trip in hopes of reuniting with family members
or finding a better future. However, it is also a risky route, as boats are frequently
intercepted by authorities or suffer capsizes, and migrants are treated inhumanely
by traffickers. The most recent humanitarian disaster unfolded in May 2020, when
several boats carrying more than 1,000 Rohingya and some Bangladeshi migrants
were abandoned in the open waters by human traffickers fearing arrest. Both Ma-
laysia and Indonesia refused to take in the floating refugees, citing possible coro-
navirus contagion as the reason. After days of diplomatic deliberation, Bangladesh
allowed the boats to land back on its shores. But before the boats could dock, hun-
dreds had already died of starvation, dehydration, and illnesses.
Sticking to its relocation policy, the Bangladeshi government moved to resettle
in Bhashan Char 300 Rohingya, including 33 children, who were rescued from the
traffickers instead of sending them back to the camps in Cox’s Bazaar. The presence
of a large number of Rohingya in this remote location could further encourage hu-
man trafficking along the coastline.
Cautious Stakeholders
In August 2020 Bangladesh’s foreign secretary, Masud Bin Momen, announced that
the government will begin transferring 100,000 Rohingya to Bhashan Char at the
end of the monsoon season in early November (UNB 2020). The government has
previously given similar deadlines for relocation and then backed down on the pro-
posed timelines. For example, in 2019 an initial plan to transfer 50 to 60 families
at a time via the Cox’s Bazaar–Chittagong–Noakhali route over several months was
agreed upon. The route offers a combination of land and water journeys, providing
more flexibility than a boat journey from Cox’s Bazaar to Noakhali. But the govern-
ment has remained vague about the modalities of the transfer process and offered
only broad-stroke information about the service delivery options that will be avail-
able once the relocation has taken place.
Initially resistant, some UN agencies now appear somewhat open to accom-
modating the relocation scheme in their aid delivery model. According to media
reports, last year the World Food Programme (WFP) supplied the government with
a tentative operation plan for food delivery to the island (McPherson 2019). Since
mid-2019 the UN agencies in Bangladesh, most prominently the WFP and UNHCR,
have been urging the government to share various modalities of relocation with
aid agencies such as sustainable living conditions and proposed service delivery
mechanisms (WFP 2020). Access to transportation and the high cost of transport-
ing humanitarian assistance to the island were flagged as potential challenges for
providing timely services. The UN has also reinforced the condition of voluntary
relocation as the key criterion for the resettlement of the refugees to Bhashan Char,
striking a considerable blow to the entire plan. A comprehensive UN technical as-

sessment regarding the habitability of the island and its disaster preparedness is
still pending.
Voluntary relocation to Bhashan Char will be tough to achieve any time soon, as
the idea of moving to this destination is extremely unpopular among the refugees.
Rohingya leaders have even compared the island to a prison and protested the lack
of consultation with refugees before the plan was advanced (Islam 2019). Some gov-
ernment officials in the camps have also echoed the Rohingya sentiments on lack of
proper prior consultation.
For the last several months, the Bangladeshi government has been lobbying in-
ternational development partners to support the relocation efforts. The outbreak of
COVID-19 in the refugee camp in May 2020 (Islam and Yunus 2020) has bolstered
the argument in favour of the Bhashan Char relocation, as it will reduce congestion
in the overpopulated camps. The semi-permanent buildings complete with bunk
bedding, access to fresh water and sanitation, and permanent cyclone shelters offer
a significant upgrade from the current congested housing conditions. In early Sep-
tember 2020, the government arranged a visit of 40 Rohingya leaders and families,
supervised by Bangladeshi Army and Navy officers, to Bhashan Char to persuade
the Rohingya to voluntarily relocate to the island. However, the attempts of Bang-
ladeshi officials to convince the Rohingya to move have recently been undermined
by reports of refugees already living in Bhashan Char having experienced physical
abuse and harassment by Bangladeshi Navy officers (Shukla 2020).
Sustaining Humanitarianism – The Role of EU Member States
Bangladesh’s policy shifts vis-à-vis the Rohingya refugee population may appear
familiar to observers of international refugee regimes, as they follow a similar tra-
jectory: initial outrage and condemnation, followed by humanitarian assistance,
followed by eventual donor fatigue as the refugees languish in makeshift living
arrangements. For the Rohingya in Bangladesh the situation is no different, as
near-term voluntary repatriation remains an elusive prospect. Under these circum
stances, sustained international assistance to Bangladesh designed to improve liv-
ing conditions for the refugees in the camps, including by enhancing security provi-
sions and creating more livelihood opportunities, is crucial.
Until October 2020, there was a 52 per cent gap in required funding to sustain the
humanitarian assistance for the refugees given that only 48 per cent (USD 510 mil-
lion) of the overall USD 1.06 billion requirement was committed (UNOCHA 2020).
However, a recent virtual international donor conference on the Rohingya crisis (held
on 22 October) was able to bridge this gap by pledging another USD 600 million in
humanitarian responses (UNHCR 2020). In future, the EU member states should
continue their fundraising efforts to ensure that the UN and the government of Bang-
ladesh are financially equipped to respond to the most critical humanitarian needs.
Additionally, EU members should use diplomatic channels to dissuade Bang-
ladesh from going forward with the controversial plan of Rohingya relocation to
Bhashan Char by drawing negative parallels with the recent fatal accident at the
Moria refugee camp on Lesbos. Relocating one-tenth of the population several
hundred kilometres away from Cox’s Bazaar will disrupt kin relations and family
networks for the Rohingya and increase the risk to human life in the event of emer-

gency. It will also be a costly humanitarian assistance endeavour due to the remote
location, which may prove problematic for aid agencies, which are already running
critically low on necessary funding to sustain primary services.
Alternatively, EU policymakers should offer assistance to help Bangladesh tran-
sition from its present short-term approaches to a more sustainable, medium-term
refugee management policy. This assistance should encompass two broad-based
nodes: The first node should focus on bolstering Bangladesh’s efforts to improve
overall camp security, with the international community providing the necessary
technical support to improve refugee consultation and participation in the decision-
making process. The second node should focus on investing in policies and pro-
grammes to support livelihood opportunities and income generation for refugees
so that pathways to basic financial resilience can be created, thereby reducing aid
dependency.
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About the Author
Ishrat Hossain is a doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford and associated with
the GIGA Institute for Asian Studies. Before starting her PhD, she worked as a pol
itical analyst in Bangladesh, most recently for UNDP. She has researched and pub-
lished on the Rohingya crisis and communal conflict in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
ishrat.hossain@politics.ox.ac.uk, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/team/hossain
Related GIGA Research
The members of the GIGA’s Research Programme 2, “Peace and Security,” study
how social identities and ideology affect processes of mobilisation and contention
as well as how they either intensify or de-escalate insecurity and violent conflict.
In particular, the Identities, Ideology, and Conflict Research Team analyses how
religion and ethnicity combine with material factors, such as natural resources, to
shape the trajectories of conflict. Furthermore, members of the GIGA’s Research
Programme 4, “Power and Ideas,” seek to explain and understand processes and
links between power and ideas across the globe – at the local, national, regional,
and international levels. Various members of the research programme focus on

South Asian countries’ foreign and regional policies, as well as their roles in multi-
lateral organisations.
Related GIGA Publications
Bank, André, and Christiane Fröhlich (2018), Forced Migration in the Global South:
Reorienting the Debate, GIGA Focus Global, 3, June, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
publication/forced-migration-in-the-global-south-reorienting-the-debate.
Fröhlich, Christiane, and Lea Müller-Funk (2020), Perceiving Migration Crises: A
View from the European Neighbourhood, GIGA Focus Middle East, 5, Septem-
ber, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/perceiving-migration-crises-a-view-
from-the-european-neighbourhood.
Ghabash, Weam, Mustafa Hatip, Lea Müller-Funk, Rand Shamaa, and Mouran
Turkmani (2020), Refugee Perspectives on Migration Policy: Lessons from the
Middle East, GIGA Focus Middle East, 3, June, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publi
cation/refugee-perspectives-on-migration-policy-lessons-from-the-middle-east.
GIGA (various years), Forced Displacement and Migration, on this page, the GIGA
has compiled its expertise on the background to the crises in the regions of origin,
www.giga-hamburg.de/en/forced-displacement-and-migration.
Mijares, Victor M., and Nastassja Rojas Silva (2018), Venezuelan Migration Crisis
Puts the Region’s Democratic Governability at Risk, GIGA Focus Latin America,
6, October, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/venezuelan-migration-crisis-
puts-the-regions-democratic-governability-at-risk.
Pedroza, Luicy, and Pau Palop-Garcia (2020), How Latin American States Protect
Their Emigrants in Times of COVID-19, GIGA Focus Latin America, 6, October,
www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/how-latin-american-states-protect-their-
emigrants-in-times-of-covid-19.
Roewer, Richard (2017), Myanmar’s National League for Democracy at a Cross-
roads, GIGA Focus Asia, 1, April, www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/myan
mars-national-league-for-democracy-at-a-crossroads.

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German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)

After Humanitarianism: Bangladesh’s Evolving Rohingya Policy

Bangladesh’s Evolving Rohingya Policy Area Studies (GIGA)

• The Bangladeshi government wants to formally start refugee relocation to

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The Perils of Relocation

Despite the government’s insistence on the liveability of Bhashan Char, concerns

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Sustaining Humanitarianism – The Role of EU Member States

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Amnesty International (2020), Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugees’ Safety Must be

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About the Author

Related GIGA Research

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Related GIGA Publications

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General Editor GIGA Focus Series: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kurtenbach

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